**Burden text – The aff burden is to coherently justify the prohibitive action of the resolution. Prefer: a) Predictability – The resolution is the stasis point of pre-round prep b) Text – ought is defined as expressing obligation[[1]](#footnote-1) which means ought not necessitates prohibition c) Neg burden choice – The aff should have clarified one in the 1ac, by not doing so they have forfeited their right to read one. This would be like reading a new util framework in the 1ar, which kills 1NC strategy since I premised it on your lack of one.**

**Non-cognitivism is true –**

**[1] Motivation –** Since every individual strives towards the good, the inability for every individual to align their interests proves no factual account of the good. Wittgenstien**[[2]](#footnote-2)**, I said that so far as facts and propositions are concerned there is only relative value and relative good, right, etc. And let me, before I go on, illustrate this by a rather obvious example. The right road is the road which leads to an arbitrarily predetermined end and it is quite clear to us all that there is no sense in talking about the right road apart from such a predetermined goal. Now let us see what we could possibly mean by the expression, 'the absolutely right road.' I think it would be the road which everybody on seeing it would, with logical necessity, have to go, or be ashamed for not going. And similarly the absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about. And I want to say that such a state of affairs is a chimera. No state of affairs has, in itself, what I would like to call the coercive power of an absolute judge.

**[2] Open question – Every ought statement is subject to a verification by the listener, since no moral judgement can ever be externally verified as truth apt, there can be no factual claim. When I say ‘you ought not murder’ my claim is subject to disagreement, while ‘2+2=4’ is not. This means moral claims are not truth-apt since otherwise we would never be able to make moral claims at all.**

**This justifies emotivism. Miller,** Miller, Alexander. “Rejection of Non-Naturalism.” *Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics.* Oxford: Polity, 2003.explains: Ayer denies that moral judgments express beliefs: rather, **moral judgments express emotions**, or sentiments, **of approval and disapproval. Since these emotions** and sentiments are unlike beliefs in that they **do not** even purport to **represent how the world is, the judgments which express them are not truth-apt.** Compare your belief that there are children in the street, which purports to represent how the world is, with your horror at the fact that the children are torturing a cat. The belief has a representative function: it purports to represent how the world is, and it is true if and only if the world actually is as it represents it. The emotion of horror, on the other hand, has no such representative function: it is not the sort of thing that can even be assessed for truth or falsity. In short, moral judgments are neither true nor false: they do not state anything, but rather express our emotions and feelings. As Ayer puts it in a famous passage: “**If I say to someone, ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money’,** I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, ‘You stole that money’. In adding that this action is wrong, I am not making any further statement about it. **I am simply evincing my moral disapproval about [stealing]** it. **It is as if I had said, ‘You stole that money’, in a** peculiar **tone of horror, or** written **with** the addition of some special **exclamation marks. The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker*.***”(Ayer [1936] 1946: 107; emphases added) It follows that: “**If I now** generalize my previous statement and **say, ‘Stealing money is wrong,’ I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning** – that is, expresses no proposition that can be either true or false.” ([1936] 1946: 107)

**Thus, the standard is consistency with positive emotive responses.**

**Prefer –**

**[1] Text – Ought incurs emotivism. Cappelle**[[3]](#footnote-3)**,** Our corpus contained few instances in which the speaker expresses an ‘objective’ opinion (as in (1a) above)—and besides, whether an opinion counts as truly objective is always hard to verify—or in which the speaker just plainly states which requirements ‘objectively’ have to be fulfilled for some other situation (as in (1b) above). At any rate, we did not find corroboration that ought to occurs more frequently than should in such cases. However, **if ought to were really** more **objective** than should**, then it should be avoided in contexts containing hedges like I think or If you ask me, but sentences like th[is]** following do occur, **seem[s] perfectly natural** and have been shown in this study to be indeed more frequent than similar sentences with should (cf. the seventh result stated in section 4)**.** (20) a. **If you ask me, though, it ought to be twice that size.** (www.deadline.com/hollywood/mr-rogers-gone-but-notforgotten/) b. “I think this woman ought to be replaced immediately by myself,” he said. (Cobuild corpus, The Times newspaper) c. …what’s been er been going through my head recently is, is er the, looking at the pattern of the meetings and the way the meetings are arranged and, and how, erm, at the last meeting we had a speaker er and that I think, we all found that quite interesting and the one, one from Central America that things and I feel we ought to have that much more frequently than we do have er, a, either a speaker or a focus of some sort of meetings erm, so I think that’s something I’d like to raise and get the A G M at the next meeting I think [a] similar thing we ought to consider there… (BNC, spoken discourse) Moreover, our study also reveals that **ought to** (vs. should) **is chosen twice as likely with first and second person subjects**, which refer to the author and his addressee, as with third person subjects (cf. our eighth result)**. This suggests that ought to is more (inter)subjective than should.**

**[2] A priori knowledge is merely an acceptance of an individual’s conception of rationality based on emotive conference of value. Macintyre 81,** Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue, 1981 The most influential account of moral reasoning that emerged in response to this critique of emotivism was one according to which an agent can only justify a particular judgment by referring to some universal rule from which it may be logically derived, and can only justify that rule in turn by deriving it from some more general rule or principle; but on this view [S]ince every chain of reasoning must be finite, such a process of justificatory reasoning must always terminate with the assertion of some rule or principle for which no further reason can be given. ‘Thus a complete justification of a decision would consist of a complete account of its effects together with a complete account of the principles which it observed, and the effect of observing those principles. **If [I]** the enquirer still goes on **ask** ing **‘But why should I live like that?’** then there is no further answer to give him, because we have already, ex hypothesi, [we have already] said everything that could be included in the further answer.’ (Hare 1952, p. 69). **The terminus of justification is** thus **always**, on this view, **a not further to be justified choice**, a choice unguided by criteria. **Each** individual implicitly or explicitly **has to adopt his or her own first principles on the basis of such a choice. The utterance of any universal principle is in the end an expression of the preferences of an individual will and** for that will **its principles** have and **can have only such authority as it chooses to confer upon them by adopting them**.

#### [3] Appeals to emotivism are best for motivating real world solutions to oppression. Yaouzis, Nicolas Olsson MORALITY AND OPPRESSION, published in The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously, December 18, 2018, ///AHS PB First, note that although moral error theory entails that there are no moral reasons, it does not entail that there are no other kinds of reasons. For example, Olson (2014) points out that there is a reductive meaning of “reason” that does not entail irreducible normativity. I have a prudential reason for attending the department’s political philosophy seminar rather than go out for ice cream because I’m interested in learning more about political philosophy, and the best way to accomplish this is to attend the seminar. Similarly, someone can have a prudential reason to support a policy to pay reparations to the descendants of victims of the transatlantic slave trade if they think that this will further their interests. This will not alleviate Mills’s worry. Even if the descendants of the transatlantic slave trade have prudential reasons to support such a policy, it seems (at first glance) unlikely that most members of other groups have prudential reasons to support it. However, I think that there is cause for optimism. After all, humans feel sympathy for each other. We grieve at others’ sorrow and rejoice at their pleasure. We also tend to become upset at people who cause suffering and applaud people who make others happy. To use David Hume’s words ([1740] 1985: 436): “When we observe a person in misfortunes, we are affected with pity and love; but the author of their misfortunes becomes the object of our strongest hatred, and is the more detested in proportion to the degree of our compassion.” So, when a person hears about, say, the plight of an Afghan refugee soon to be deported, it is natural for the observer to feel affection and pity for the refugee, while at the same time hatred and antipathy toward the persons responsible for the decision to deport the refugee. Affection for the refugee and antipathy for the persons responsible for the decision often tend to give rise to a desire for change. Therefore, an activist can appeal to these desires, rather than to non-existing moral facts, to convince politicians and fellow citizens to not deport Afghan refugees.

### Offense:

**1. Every emotive judgement is indexed to a particular individual, no emotive sentiments can ever be fully universal. This means that the resolution negates since there is no emotion that can be applied to a universal claim that x is y.**

**2. Even if not,** **desires are predicated on pursuing an individual course of action. Ought not statements do not make sense and are counter-intuitive because individuals have an overwhelming emotion against decisions out of their control. Cain,**Cain, George. "Needs, Desires, Fears, and Freedom." The Downtown Review. Vol. 1. Iss. 1 (2015). Available at: http://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/tdr/vol1/iss1/7  Now, thus far we have discussed how **humans are connected by common** needs, **desires**, and fears. **What people want most of all is the ability to have control of their persons**, their lives, and their circumstances **in order to** satisfy their needs, **fulfill their desires**, and eliminate their fears if possible. **In order to have such control, people need the freedom to do so. This freedom is** commonly known as**autonomy**. Although what constitutes true autonomy is entirely subjective and varies from person to person, the most general definition of the term is the freedom of the individual to do whatever he wants to do without any hindrances.

**3. Expressions of desires empirically negate. Page and Berry 19, \*Poll from the Suffolk Political Research Center of 1,000 registered voters, taken March 13-17 by landline and cell phone, has a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points.\***Susan Page and Deborah Barfield Berry, Poll from the Suffolk Political Research Center of 1,000 registered voters, taken March 13-17 by landline and cell phone, has a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points., Poll: Americans say even the legal breaks for college admission are rigging the system, 3/20/2019, <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/poll-americans-say-even-the-legal-breaks-for-college-admission-are-rigging-the-system/ar-BBUZXN4> ///AHS PB Meanwhile, those surveyed overwhelmingly support colleges' use of standardized tests like the SAT and the ACT to screen applicants. By 65-27 percent, they say the tests should continue to be used. Some critics have argued the tests can be a disadvantage for minority students, and some colleges no longer require applicants to take them. In the admissions scandal, some parents are accused of intervening to raise their children's test scores. In the poll, younger respondents were more likely than older ones to say the tests shouldn't be used, though a solid majority of all age groups endorsed them. Just one-fifth of those 65 and older oppose the use of the tests, while one-third of those 18 to 34 years old oppose them – that is, the age group most likely to have recently had to take them.

1. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. "A Lecture on Ethics." Heretics Society. Cambridge University. Cambridge University, Cambridge, England. 1 Nov. 1929. Address [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Bert Capelle and Gert De Sutter [Professors at Ghent University]. “Should vs. Ought To.” [↑](#footnote-ref-3)