# JF Rawls Harvard NC

## Longer

### Framework

#### Ethical Pluralism is true: There is not one universal moral truth, and instead each agent acts on their own conception of the good.

J.L Mackie, Australian Philosopher, The subjectivity of values, 1977, ///AHS PB

[First] The Argument from Relativity The argument from relativity has as its premiss the wellknown variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community. Such variation is in itself merely a truth of descriptive morality, a fact of anthropology which entails neither first order nor second order ethical views. Yet it may indirectly support second order subjectivism: radical differences between first order moral judgements make it difficult to treat those judgements as apprehensions of objective truths. But it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tells against the objectivity of values. Disagreement on questions in history or biology or cosmology does not show that there are no objective issues in these fields for investigators to disagree about. But such scientific disagreement results from speculative inferences or explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evidence, and it is hardly plausible to interpret moral disagreement in the same way. Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people ’ s adherence to and participation in different ways of life. The causal connection seems to be mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy. Of course, the standards may be an idealization of the way of life from which they arise: the monogamy in which people participate may be less complete, less rigid, than that of which it leads them to approve. This is not to say that moral judgements are purely conventional. Of course there have been and are moral heretics and moral reformers, people who have turned against the established rules and practices of their own communities for moral reasons, and often for moral reasons that we would endorse. But this can usually be understood as the extension, in ways which, though new and unconventional, seemed to them to be required for consistency, of rules to which they already adhered as arising out of an existing way of life. In short, the argument from relativity has some force simply because the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values. But there is a well-known counter to this argument from relativity, namely to say that the items for which objective validity is in the first place to be claimed are not specific moral rules or codes but very general basic principles which are recognized at least implicitly to some extent in all society – such principles as provide the foundations of what Sidgwick has called different methods of ethics: the principle of universalizability, perhaps, or the rule that one ought to conform to the specific rules of any way of life in which one takes part, from which one profits, and on which one relies, or some utilitarian principle of doing what tends, or seems likely, to promote the general happiness. It is easy to show that such general principles, married with differing concrete circumstances, different existing social patterns or different preferences, will beget different specific moral rules; and there is some plausibility in the claim that the specific rules thus generated will vary from community to community or from group to group in close agreement with the actual variations in accepted codes. The argument from relativity can be only partly countered in this way. To take this line the moral objectivist has to stay that it is only in these principles that the objective moral character attaches immediately to its descriptively specified ground or subject: other moral judgements are objectively valid or true, but only derivatively and contingently – if things had been otherwise, quite different sorts of actions would have been right. And despite the prominence in recent philosophical ethics of universalization, utilitarian principles, and the like, these are very far from constituting the whole of what is actually affirmed as basic in ordinary moral thought. Much of this is concerned rather with what Hare calls “ideals” or, less kindly, ‘fanaticism’. That is, people judge that some things are good or right, and others are bad or wrong, not because – or at any rate not only because – they exemplify some general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be claimed, but because something about those things arouses certain responses immediately in them, though they would arouse radically and irresolvably different responses in others. ‘Moral sense’ or ‘intuition’ is an initially more plausible description of what supplies many of our basic moral judgements than ‘reason’. With regard to all these starting points of moral thinking the argument from relativity remains in full force. [Second] The Argument from Queerness Even more important, however, and certainly more generally applicable, is the argument from queerness. This has two parts, one metaphysical, the other epistemological. If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else. These points were recognized by Moore when he spoke of nonnatural qualities, and by the intuitionists in their talk about a ‘faculty of moral intuition’. Intuitionism has long been out of favour, and it is indeed easy to point out its implausibilities. What is not so often stressed, but is more important, is that the central thesis of intuitionism is one to which any objectivist view of values is in the end committed: intuitionism merely makes unpalatably plain what other forms of objectivism wrap up. Of course the suggestion that moral judgements are made or moral problems solved by just sitting down and having an ethical intuition is a travesty of actual moral thinking. But, however complex the real process, it will require (if it is to yield authoritatively prescriptive conclusions) some input of this distinctive sort, either premisses or forms of argument or both. When we ask the awkward question, how we can be aware of this authoritative prescriptivity, of the truth of these distinctively ethical premisses or of the cogency of this distinctively ethical pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception or introspection or the framing and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination of these, will provide a satisfactory answer; ‘a special sort of intuition’ is a lame answer, but it is the one to which the clearheaded objectivist is compelled to resort. Indeed, the best move for the moral objectivist is not to evade this issue, but to look for companions in guilt. For example, Richard Price argues that it is not moral knowledge alone that such an empiricism as those of Locke and Hume is unable to account for, but also our knowledge and even our ideas of essence, number, identity, diversity, solidity, inertia, substance, the necessary existence and infinite extension of time and space, necessity and possibility in general, power, and causation. If the understanding, which Price defines as the faculty within us that discerns truth, is also a source of new simple ideas of so many other sorts, may it not also be a power of immediately perceiving right and wrong, which yet are real characters of actions? This is an important counter to the argument from queerness. The only adequate reply to it would be to show how, on empiricist foundations, we can construct an account of the ideas and beliefs and knowledge that we have of all these matters. I cannot even begin to do that here, though I have undertaken some parts of the task elsewhere. I can only state my belief that satisfactory accounts of most of these can be given in empirical terms. If some supposed metaphysical necessities or essences resist such treatment, then they too should be included, along with objective values, among the targets of the argument from queerness. This queerness does not consist simply in the fact that ethical statements are ‘unverifiable’. Although logical positivism with its verifiability theory of descriptive meaning gave an impetus to non-cognitive accounts of ethics, it is not only logical positivists but also empiricists of a much more liberal sort who should find objective values hard to accommodate. Indeed, I would not only reject the verifiability principle but also deny the conclusion commonly drawn from it, that moral judgements lack descriptive meaning. The assertion that there are objective values or intrinsically prescriptive entities or features of some kind, which ordinary moral judgements presuppose, is, I hold, not meaningless but false. Plato ’ s Forms give a dramatic picture of what objective values would have to be. The Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both a direction and an overriding motive; something ’ s being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it. Similarly, if there were objective principles of right and wrong, any wrong (possible) course of action would have not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it. Or we should have something like Clarke ’ s necessary relations of fitness between situations and actions, so that a situation would have a demand for such- andsuch an action somehow built into it. The need for an argument of this sort can be brought out by reflection on Hume ’ s argument that ‘reason’ – in which at this stage he includes all sorts of knowing as well as reasoning – can never be an ‘influencing motive of the will’. Someone might object that Hume has argued unfairly from the lack of influencing power (not contingent upon desires) in ordinary objects of knowledge and ordinary reasoning, and might maintain that values differ from natural objects precisely in their power, when known, automatically to influence the will. To this Hume could, and would need to, reply that this objection involves the postulating of value-entities or value-features of quite a different order from anything else with which we are acquainted, and of a corresponding faculty with which to detect them. That is, he would have to supplement his explicit argument with what I have called the argument from queerness. Another way of bringing out this queerness is to ask, about anything that is supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is linked with its natural features. What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty – say, causing pain just for fun – and the moral fact that it is wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely that the two features occur together. The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’? And how do we know the relation that it signifies, if this is something more than such actions being socially condemned, and condemned by us too, perhaps through our having absorbed attitudes from our social environment? It is not even sufficient to postulate a faculty which ‘sees’ the wrongness: something must be postulated which can see at once the natural features that constitute the cruelty, and the wrongness, and the mysterious consequential link between the two. Alternatively, the intuition required might be the perception that wrongness is a higher order property belonging to certain natural properties; but what is this belonging of properties to other properties, and how can we discern it? How much simpler and more comprehensible the situation would be if we could replace the moral quality with some sort of subjective response which could be causally related to the detection of the natural features on which the supposed quality is said to be consequential.

#### However, the resolution is a question of government action. Since moral principles cannot form the basis for political justice, justification must proceed from mutual agreement on what social structures ought to look like in a pluralistic society. Thus, the problems to political solutions must be resolved politically, not through appeals to ethics.

Zhuoyao Li, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Saint Johns College who specializes in social and political philosophy, ethics, and comparative political theory, The public conception of morality in John Rawls' political liberalism, published 2016, <http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/egp.v9.28679> ///AHS PB

According to Rainer Forst, justification is behind everything.43 A variety of definitions of human beings, such as animal rationale and animal sociale, essentially characterize humans as justifying and reason-giving beings.44 Thomas Scanlon shares a similar view. The essence of Scanlon’s contractualist moral theory is famously summarized in his principle: ‘An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement’.45 This principle neither makes reference to the ontological and epistemological aspect of moral reality, nor does it appeal to any metaphysical truth. Instead, ‘the contractualist ideal of acting in accord with principles that others (similarly motivated) could not reasonably reject is meant to characterize the relation with others the value and appeal of which underlies our reasons to do what morality requires’.46 In other words, the objective basis of morality need not rest on naturalistic or metaphysical entities. Instead, it can be normatively constructed through mutually justificatory relations. It will be remembered that the source of the queerness of morality is its objective prescriptivity. Once we adopt justificatory objectivity, this sense of queerness disappears. On the one hand, morality is objective. As for the epistemological part of the argument, one might respond that moral objectivity need not lie in its ‘external’ reality as ontological objectivity suggests; instead, morality is objective because moral demands can be reasonably, that is, reciprocally and generally justified to all. As for the metaphysical part of the argument, one might similarly respond that moral reasons are ‘independently’ valid regardless of the agent’s subjective motives, and they are reasons for all without their corresponding to a transcendent reality that must be ‘discovered’ with special faculties.47 On the other hand, morality is prescriptive in virtue of its justificatory objectivity. Moral demands are ‘subjective’ only insofar as that it is ‘I’ who demands it. Moral demands are equally ‘objective’, because these demands must first pass the test of reasonable justification in order to be ‘moral’. To ask for an answer to the question of ‘what ought I to do’ is also to demand a justification for the answer, and moral questions are ‘answered only with strictly shared reasons; they are ‘‘objective’’ insofar as they cannot be reasonably (reciprocally or generally) rejected’.48 Therefore, even though it is ‘I’ who utters the moral demand, it is really the justifying and hence the objective ‘we’ that give this demand its prescriptive power. Being reasonably justified excludes any moral reasons for an agent not to follow the demand, because so doing will be against her justifying and reason-demanding human nature (according to Forst) and will exclude herself from the cooperative relation (according to Scanlon).49 A justificatory view thus maintains the objective prescriptivity of morality. Once we adopt justificatory objectivity, the sense of queerness disappears and one does not have to accept Mackie’s overall conclusion that there are no objective values.

#### Thus, only the original position combats arbitrary self-interest and bias, since individuals cannot know where they are in society from behind the veil. Actors must imagine themselves in the original position, a place where they conceive of themselves as purposeful agents with particular desires, but do not know their specific conception of the good or their social location, and have the power to determine principles that govern society.

John Rawls, Dead Philosopher who taught at Harvard for a bit, A theory of justice, 1999 edition, ///AHS PB

One should not be misled, then, by the somewhat unusual conditions which characterize the original position. The idea here is simply to make vivid to ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for principles of justice, and therefore on these principles themselves. Thus it seems reasonable and generally acceptable that no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice of principles. It also seems widely agreed that it should be impossible to tailor principles to the circumstances of one’s own case. We should insure further that particular inclinations and aspirations, and persons’ conceptions of their good do not affect the principles adopted. The aim is to rule out those principles that it would be rational to propose for acceptance, however little the chance of success, only if one knew certain things that are irrelevant from the standpoint of justice. For example, if a man knew that he was wealthy, he might ﬁnd it rational to advance the principle that various taxes for welfare measures be counted unjust; if he knew that he was poor, he would most likely propose the contrary principle. To represent the desired restrictions one imagines a situation in which everyone is deprived of this sort of information. One excludes the knowledge of those contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided by their prejudices. In this manner the veil of ignorance is arrived at in a natural way. This concept should cause no difﬁculty if we keep in mind the constraints on arguments that it is meant to express. At any time we can enter the original position, so to speak, simply by following a certain procedure, namely, by arguing for principles of justice in accordance with these restrictions. It seems reasonable to suppose that the parties in the original position are equal. That is, all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles; each can make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on. Obviously the purpose of these conditions is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of justice. The basis of equality is taken to be similarity in these two respects. Systems of ends are not ranked in value; and each man is presumed to have the requisite ability to understand and to act upon whatever principles are adopted. Together with the veil of ignorance, these conditions deﬁne the principles of justice as those which rational persons concerned to advance their interests would consent to as equals when none are known to be advantaged or disadvantaged by social and natural contingencies.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with principles chosen behind the veil of ignorance. Prefer it:

#### [1] Normativity: Even if objective morality exists, agents can just ask why should I be moral and decide to be bad. The original position solves for this because individuals don’t know how ethical norms will affect them, they are incentivized to consent. IE: A rich person has a self-interested reason to support welfare, because they don’t know their position.

#### [2] My framework solves moral disagreement because by focusing on political justification, it avoids metaethical debates to create solutions that anyone can agree too. Thus your framework is nonunique because we have already taken it into consideration. Also means the NC comes first on probability, since there is a higher chance that multiple groups have valid perspectives as opposed to the aff being the one true theory.

#### [3] Epistemology: Any agreement formed by individuals aware of their social locations will be corrupted by unequal power relations

David Gauthier summarizes Rawls, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, Why Contractarianism?, 1998, ///AHS PB

What a rational person would agree to in existing circumstances depends in large part on her negotiating position vis-à-vis her fellows. But her negotiating position is significantly affected by the existing social institutions, and so by the currently accepted moral practices embodied in those institutions. Thus, although agreement may well yield practices differing from those embodied in existing social institutions, yet it will be influenced by those practices, which are not themselves the product of rational agreement. And this must call the rationality of the agreed practices into question. The arbitrariness of existing practices must infect any agreement whose terms are significantly affected by them. Although rational agreement is in itself a source of stability, yet this stability is undermined by the arbitrariness of the circumstances in which it takes place. To escape this arbitrariness, rational persons will revert from actual to hypothetical agreement, considering what practices they would have agreed to from an initial position not structured by existing institutions and the practices they embody. The content of a hypothetical agreement is determined by an appeal to the equal rationality of persons. Rational persons will voluntarily accept an agreement only insofar as they perceive it to be equally advantageous to each. To be sure, each would be happy to accept an agreement more advantageous to herself than to her fellows, but since no one will accept an agreement perceived to be less advantageous, agents whose rationality is a matter of common knowledge will recognize the futility of aiming at or holding out for more, and minimize their bargaining costs by coordinating at the point of equal advantage. Now the extent of advantage is determined in a twofold way. First, there is advantage internal to an agreement. In this respect, the expectation of equal advantage is assured by procedural fairness. The step from existing moral practices to those resulting from actual agreement takes rational persons to a procedurally fair situation, in which each perceives the agreed practices to be ones that it is equally rational for all to accept, given the circumstances in which agreement is reached. But those circumstances themselves may be called into question insofar as they are perceived to be arbitrary – the result, in part, of compliance with constraining practices that do not themselves ensure the expectation of equal advantage, and so do not reflect the equal rationality of the complying parties. To neutralize this arbitrary element, moral practices to be fully acceptable must be conceived as constituting a possible outcome of a hypothetical agreement under circumstances that are unaffected by social institutions that themselves lack full acceptability. Equal rationality demands consideration of external circumstances as well as internal procedures.

#### [4] Prefer procedural consistency to the original position over consequences: [1] Knowledge of how things will empirically fare is precluded from actors behind the veil so our only knowledge of the action comes from the original position [2]

### Offense

#### I defend that states ought to possess nuclear weapons. Now negate:

#### [1] Under the veil states cannot verify how other states will act, which justifies possessing nuclear weapons to ensure security.

John Rawls, Dead Philosopher who taught at Harvard for a bit, The Law of Peoples: with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 2001, ///AHS PB

I shall only briefly mention the question of controlling nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Among reasonably just liberal and decent peoples the control of such weapons would be relatively easy, since they could be effectively banned. These peoples have no reason for going to war with one another. Yet so long as there are outlaw states—as we suppose—some nuclear weapons need to be retained to keep those states at bay and to make sure they do not obtain and use those weapons against liberal or decent peoples. How best to do this belongs to expert knowledge, which philosophy doesn't possess. There remains, of course, the great moral question of whether, and in what circumstances, nuclear weapons can be used at all (see the discussion in §14).

#### [2] Nuclear weapons give weaker states recourse against greater powers and deter coercive bargaining practices. This is consistent with the original positions, since states don’t know what amount of power they will have from behind the veil.

Michael Shellenberger, I write about energy and the environment, Who Are We To Deny Weak Nations The Nuclear Weapons They Need For Self-Defense? Aug 6, 2018, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2018/08/06/who-are-we-to-deny-weak-nations-the-nuclear-weapons-they-need-for-self-defense/#306db94c522f> ///AHS PB

How does a weak nation-state like France level the playing field with a more powerful adversary like Germany? By obtaining a weapon capable of wiping out its major cities. Twice victimized and humiliated by its neighbor, France after World War II set off to build a nuclear bomb that, had it been available before 1940, would have deterred the German invasion. Can anyone blame France for getting the bomb? Of course not. After all, Germany’s war upon its neighbors resulted in the deaths of 50 million people. But that didn’t stop the U.S. government from trying to prevent France from building a nuclear weapon. Senior Kennedy administration officials in 1962 [described](https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/europe-de-gaulle-the-deterrent/) France’s nuclear program as “foolish, or diabolical — or both.” How could the U.S. deny France the means with which to defend herself? By promising to protect France with its own nuclear weapons through what is called “extended deterrence.” French President Charles de Gaulle didn’t buy it. He felt that “the United States would not risk New York or Detroit to save Hamburg or Lyons,” [noted](https://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/06/world/the-de-gaulle-nuclear-doctrine-is-alive-in-paris-military-analysis.html) the New York Times, “if faced with a choice between the destruction of Western Europe and a Soviet-American missile exchange.” A nuclear-armed France, U.S. officials warned, “could lead to a proliferation of nuclear powers,” [reported](https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/europe-de-gaulle-the-deterrent/) Ronald Steel in Commentary, “that is, to demands by other allies, especially Germany, for nuclear status.” The identical argument was later made against China, India and Pakistan, and is now being made against allowing North Korea and Iran to possess nuclear weapons. The widespread assumption is that the more nations have nuclear weapons, the more dangerous the world will be. But is that really the case? I don’t ask this question lightly. I come from a long line of Christian pacifists and conscientious objectors and earned a degree in peace studies from a Quaker college. I have had nightmares about nuclear war since I was a boy and today live in California, which is more vulnerable to a North Korean missile than Washington, D.C. — at least for now. But it is impossible not to be struck by these facts: No nation with a nuclear weapon has ever been invaded by another nation. The number of [deaths in battle worldwide has declined 95 percent](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace#the-share-of-battle-deaths-is-declining-even-faster) in the 70 years since the invention and spread of nuclear weapons; The number of Indian and Pakistani civilian and security forces’ deaths in two disputed territories [declined 90 percent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir#cite_note-43) after Pakistan’s first nuclear weapons test in 1998. In 1981, the late political scientist Kenneth Waltz published an [essay](https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm) titled, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better.” In it he argued that nuclear weapons are revolutionary in allowing weaker nations to protect themselves from more powerful ones. International relations is “a realm of anarchy as opposed to hierarchy… of self-help… you’re on your own,” Waltz [explained](https://youtu.be/F9eV5gPlPZg). How do nuclear weapons work? Not “through the ability to defend but through the ability to punish...The message of a deterrent strategy is this,” explained Waltz. “‘Although we are defenceless, if you attack we will punish you to an extent that more than cancels your gains.’” Does anybody believe France should give up its nuclear weapons? Certainly not the French. After President Barack Obama in 2009 called for eliminating nuclear weapons, not a single other nuclear nation endorsed the idea. All of this raises the question: if nuclear weapons protect weak nations from foreign invasion, why shouldn’t North Korea and Iran get them? Why Nuclear Weapons Make Us Peaceful On January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush denounced Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an “axis of evil.” North Korea was “arming with missiles,” he said. Iran “aggressively pursues these weapons” and the “Iraqi regime has plotted to develop...nuclear weapons for over a decade.” One year later, the U.S. invaded and occupied Iraq. The ensuing conflict resulted in the [deaths of over 450,000 people](http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001533) — about four times as many as were killed at Hiroshima — and a [five-fold increase in terrorist killings](https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2015/11/18/the-plague-of-global-terrorism) in the Middle East and Africa. It all came [at a cost of $2.4 trillion dollars](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-usa-funding/u-s-cbo-estimates-2-4-trillion-long-term-war-costs-idUSN2450753720071024). Now, 16 years later, U.S. officials insist that North Korea and Iran need not fear a U.S. invasion. But why would any nation — particularly North Korea and Iran — believe them? Not only did the U.S. overthrow Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein after he gave up his nuclear weapons program, it also helped overthrow Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 after he too had given up the pursuit of a nuclear weapon. North Korean President Kim Jong-un may, quite understandably, see his own life at stake: Hussein was hanged and Gaddafi was tortured and killed. Both hawks and doves say North Korea and Iran must not be allowed to have a weapon because both regimes are brutal, but nuclear weapons make nations more peaceful over time. There were three full-scale wars before India and Pakistan acquired the bomb and only far more limited conflicts since. And China became dramatically less bellicose after acquiring the bomb. Why? “History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable,” notes Waltz, “and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action.” Is it really so difficult to imagine that a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran might follow the same path toward moderation as China, India, and Pakistan? Nuclear weapons are revolutionary in that they require the ruling class to have skin in the game. When facing off against nuclear-armed nations, elites can no longer sacrifice the poor and weak in their own country without risking their lives.

#### [3] Under the veil, the ideal conception of nuclear weapons is as a mastery of the form of war. Thus, absent material circumstances nukes are a weapon, merely by its conception, that defuses the conditions for the actual fighting of war while guaranteeing success even if war were to be executed.

#### [4] Nothing is intrinsically bad because we do not know how the object will be used from the original position, just what the object is in and of itself. For example, guns only become bad when people use them a certain way outside of ideal circumstances, but are just a neutral object prior to application.

## Stuff

#### New indeixcals card

[https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/egp.v9.28679](https://sci-hub.tw/https:/www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/egp.v9.28679)

One of the best places to find the answer to the first question is Søren Kierkegaard’s Either/Or, because it casts doubt upon traditional foundationalist views of morality. In Either/Or, we are presented with a duality between the young man ‘A’ who advocates the aesthetic way of life with essays addressed to an unspecified audience, and the Judge that advocates the ethical way of life with letters addressed to ‘A’ so as to convince the latter to abandon aesthetic melancholy and commit to the ethical way of life.21 Between these two ways of life, how ought one to choose? What grounds our choice to be moral? According to Alastair MacIntyre, for a person confronting this choice, there is really no reason for her to adopt one rather than the other: Suppose that someone confronts the choice between them having as yet embraced neither. He can be offered no reason for preferring one to the other. For if a given reason offers support for the ethical way of life ... the person who has not yet embraced either the ethical or the aesthetic still has to choose whether or not to treat this reason as having any force ... He still has to choose his first principles, and just because they are first principles, prior to any others in the chain of reasoning, no more ultimate reason can be adduced to support them.22 For an individual choosing whether her life shall be guided by the aesthetic or the ethical, the choice cannot be a rational one in either case, since it is itself the choice of what will count for the agent as a reason. Let’s call this argument from rational choice. MacIntyre also puts the problem in terms of authority. The ethical, according to MacIntyre, ‘is presented as that realm in which principles have authority over us independently of our attributes, preferences and feelings’.23 But the question is: ‘whence does the ethical derive this kind of authority?’24 Since ‘A’ does not have any reason to prefer the ethical over the aesthetic, it is difficult to imagine how the ethical is to have any authority on ‘A’, which means that he is free to abandon the ethical view anytime he wishes. Let’s call this argument from authority. Thus, MacIntyre reaches the controversial conclusion that the choice to be ethical must be an arbitrary one.

# TOC NC

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[First] The Argument from Relativity The argument from relativity has as its premiss the wellknown variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community. Such variation is in itself merely a truth of descriptive morality, a fact of anthropology which entails neither first order nor second order ethical views. Yet it may indirectly support second order subjectivism: radical differences between first order moral judgements make it difficult to treat those judgements as apprehensions of objective truths. But it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tells against the objectivity of values. Disagreement on questions in history or biology or cosmology does not show that there are no objective issues in these fields for investigators to disagree about. 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Of course there have been and are moral heretics and moral reformers, people who have turned against the established rules and practices of their own communities for moral reasons, and often for moral reasons that we would endorse. But this can usually be understood as the extension, in ways which, though new and unconventional, seemed to them to be required for consistency, of rules to which they already adhered as arising out of an existing way of life. In short, the argument from relativity has some force simply because the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values. But there is a well-known counter to this argument from relativity, namely to say that the items for which objective validity is in the first place to be claimed are not specific moral rules or codes but very general basic principles which are recognized at least implicitly to some extent in all society – such principles as provide the foundations of what Sidgwick has called different methods of ethics: the principle of universalizability, perhaps, or the rule that one ought to conform to the specific rules of any way of life in which one takes part, from which one profits, and on which one relies, or some utilitarian principle of doing what tends, or seems likely, to promote the general happiness. It is easy to show that such general principles, married with differing concrete circumstances, different existing social patterns or different preferences, will beget different specific moral rules; and there is some plausibility in the claim that the specific rules thus generated will vary from community to community or from group to group in close agreement with the actual variations in accepted codes. The argument from relativity can be only partly countered in this way. To take this line the moral objectivist has to stay that it is only in these principles that the objective moral character attaches immediately to its descriptively specified ground or subject: other moral judgements are objectively valid or true, but only derivatively and contingently – if things had been otherwise, quite different sorts of actions would have been right. And despite the prominence in recent philosophical ethics of universalization, utilitarian principles, and the like, these are very far from constituting the whole of what is actually affirmed as basic in ordinary moral thought. Much of this is concerned rather with what Hare calls “ideals” or, less kindly, ‘fanaticism’. That is, people judge that some things are good or right, and others are bad or wrong, not because – or at any rate not only because – they exemplify some general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be claimed, but because something about those things arouses certain responses immediately in them, though they would arouse radically and irresolvably different responses in others. ‘Moral sense’ or ‘intuition’ is an initially more plausible description of what supplies many of our basic moral judgements than ‘reason’. With regard to all these starting points of moral thinking the argument from relativity remains in full force. [Second] The Argument from Queerness Even more important, however, and certainly more generally applicable, is the argument from queerness. This has two parts, one metaphysical, the other epistemological. If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else. These points were recognized by Moore when he spoke of nonnatural qualities, and by the intuitionists in their talk about a ‘faculty of moral intuition’. Intuitionism has long been out of favour, and it is indeed easy to point out its implausibilities. What is not so often stressed, but is more important, is that the central thesis of intuitionism is one to which any objectivist view of values is in the end committed: intuitionism merely makes unpalatably plain what other forms of objectivism wrap up. Of course the suggestion that moral judgements are made or moral problems solved by just sitting down and having an ethical intuition is a travesty of actual moral thinking. But, however complex the real process, it will require (if it is to yield authoritatively prescriptive conclusions) some input of this distinctive sort, either premisses or forms of argument or both. When we ask the awkward question, how we can be aware of this authoritative prescriptivity, of the truth of these distinctively ethical premisses or of the cogency of this distinctively ethical pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception or introspection or the framing and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination of these, will provide a satisfactory answer; ‘a special sort of intuition’ is a lame answer, but it is the one to which the clearheaded objectivist is compelled to resort. Indeed, the best move for the moral objectivist is not to evade this issue, but to look for companions in guilt. For example, Richard Price argues that it is not moral knowledge alone that such an empiricism as those of Locke and Hume is unable to account for, but also our knowledge and even our ideas of essence, number, identity, diversity, solidity, inertia, substance, the necessary existence and infinite extension of time and space, necessity and possibility in general, power, and causation. If the understanding, which Price defines as the faculty within us that discerns truth, is also a source of new simple ideas of so many other sorts, may it not also be a power of immediately perceiving right and wrong, which yet are real characters of actions? This is an important counter to the argument from queerness. The only adequate reply to it would be to show how, on empiricist foundations, we can construct an account of the ideas and beliefs and knowledge that we have of all these matters. I cannot even begin to do that here, though I have undertaken some parts of the task elsewhere. I can only state my belief that satisfactory accounts of most of these can be given in empirical terms. If some supposed metaphysical necessities or essences resist such treatment, then they too should be included, along with objective values, among the targets of the argument from queerness. This queerness does not consist simply in the fact that ethical statements are ‘unverifiable’. Although logical positivism with its verifiability theory of descriptive meaning gave an impetus to non-cognitive accounts of ethics, it is not only logical positivists but also empiricists of a much more liberal sort who should find objective values hard to accommodate. Indeed, I would not only reject the verifiability principle but also deny the conclusion commonly drawn from it, that moral judgements lack descriptive meaning. The assertion that there are objective values or intrinsically prescriptive entities or features of some kind, which ordinary moral judgements presuppose, is, I hold, not meaningless but false. Plato ’ s Forms give a dramatic picture of what objective values would have to be. The Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both a direction and an overriding motive; something ’ s being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it. Similarly, if there were objective principles of right and wrong, any wrong (possible) course of action would have not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it. Or we should have something like Clarke ’ s necessary relations of fitness between situations and actions, so that a situation would have a demand for such- andsuch an action somehow built into it. The need for an argument of this sort can be brought out by reflection on Hume ’ s argument that ‘reason’ – in which at this stage he includes all sorts of knowing as well as reasoning – can never be an ‘influencing motive of the will’. Someone might object that Hume has argued unfairly from the lack of influencing power (not contingent upon desires) in ordinary objects of knowledge and ordinary reasoning, and might maintain that values differ from natural objects precisely in their power, when known, automatically to influence the will. To this Hume could, and would need to, reply that this objection involves the postulating of value-entities or value-features of quite a different order from anything else with which we are acquainted, and of a corresponding faculty with which to detect them. That is, he would have to supplement his explicit argument with what I have called the argument from queerness. Another way of bringing out this queerness is to ask, about anything that is supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is linked with its natural features. What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty – say, causing pain just for fun – and the moral fact that it is wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely that the two features occur together. The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’? And how do we know the relation that it signifies, if this is something more than such actions being socially condemned, and condemned by us too, perhaps through our having absorbed attitudes from our social environment? It is not even sufficient to postulate a faculty which ‘sees’ the wrongness: something must be postulated which can see at once the natural features that constitute the cruelty, and the wrongness, and the mysterious consequential link between the two. Alternatively, the intuition required might be the perception that wrongness is a higher order property belonging to certain natural properties; but what is this belonging of properties to other properties, and how can we discern it? How much simpler and more comprehensible the situation would be if we could replace the moral quality with some sort of subjective response which could be causally related to the detection of the natural features on which the supposed quality is said to be consequential.

#### Thus, morality cannot be the basis for states ought to do. Instead, good and bad are established through mutual agreement between rational people. This agreement must take place from behind the veil of ignorance, a hypothetical bargaining position where individuals create a society without knowing their position in it.

John Rawls, Dead Philosopher who taught at Harvard for a bit, A theory of justice, 1999 edition, ///AHS PB

One should not be misled, then, by the somewhat unusual conditions which characterize the original position. The idea here is simply to make vivid to ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for principles of justice, and therefore on these principles themselves. Thus it seems reasonable and generally acceptable that no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice of principles. It also seems widely agreed that it should be impossible to tailor principles to the circumstances of one’s own case. We should insure further that particular inclinations and aspirations, and persons’ conceptions of their good do not affect the principles adopted. The aim is to rule out those principles that it would be rational to propose for acceptance, however little the chance of success, only if one knew certain things that are irrelevant from the standpoint of justice. For example, if a man knew that he was wealthy, he might ﬁnd it rational to advance the principle that various taxes for welfare measures be counted unjust; if he knew that he was poor, he would most likely propose the contrary principle. To represent the desired restrictions one imagines a situation in which everyone is deprived of this sort of information. One excludes the knowledge of those contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided by their prejudices. In this manner the veil of ignorance is arrived at in a natural way. This concept should cause no difﬁculty if we keep in mind the constraints on arguments that it is meant to express. At any time we can enter the original position, so to speak, simply by following a certain procedure, namely, by arguing for principles of justice in accordance with these restrictions. It seems reasonable to suppose that the parties in the original position are equal. That is, all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles; each can make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on. Obviously the purpose of these conditions is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of justice. The basis of equality is taken to be similarity in these two respects. Systems of ends are not ranked in value; and each man is presumed to have the requisite ability to understand and to act upon whatever principles are adopted. Together with the veil of ignorance, these conditions deﬁne the principles of justice as those which rational persons concerned to advance their interests would consent to as equals when none are known to be advantaged or disadvantaged by social and natural contingencies.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with principles chosen behind the veil of ignorance. Prefer it:

#### [1] Individuals can always ask can always ask “why be moral” so they MUST have a reason to act that isn’t just “be moral” since we can ask why do that. Only my framework solves this since by being unaware of their social location, rational agents have a selfish reason to help others.

#### [2] Disagreement: no person can independently prove their view of the good, and if there are many goods, they can come into conflict and we don’t know how to rank them; thus actions must be justified by reference to all people’s theories of the good—only the veil of ignorance puts the agent in the position of all those potentially affected.

#### [3] People are biased in favor of their conception of the morality but since pluralism is true their conception is necessarily wrong. This means the veil of ignorance is key to avoiding epistemic bias by abstracting away from existing philosophical beliefs.

#### [4] Any agreement formed outside the veil will be corrupted by unequal power relations

David Gauthier summarizes Rawls, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, Why Contractarianism?, 1998, ///AHS PB

What a rational person would agree to in existing circumstances depends in large part on her negotiating position vis-à-vis her fellows. But her negotiating position is significantly affected by the existing social institutions, and so by the currently accepted moral practices embodied in those institutions. Thus, although agreement may well yield practices differing from those embodied in existing social institutions, yet it will be influenced by those practices, which are not themselves the product of rational agreement. And this must call the rationality of the agreed practices into question. The arbitrariness of existing practices must infect any agreement whose terms are significantly affected by them. Although rational agreement is in itself a source of stability, yet this stability is undermined by the arbitrariness of the circumstances in which it takes place. To escape this arbitrariness, rational persons will revert from actual to hypothetical agreement, considering what practices they would have agreed to from an initial position not structured by existing institutions and the practices they embody. The content of a hypothetical agreement is determined by an appeal to the equal rationality of persons. Rational persons will voluntarily accept an agreement only insofar as they perceive it to be equally advantageous to each. To be sure, each would be happy to accept an agreement more advantageous to herself than to her fellows, but since no one will accept an agreement perceived to be less advantageous, agents whose rationality is a matter of common knowledge will recognize the futility of aiming at or holding out for more, and minimize their bargaining costs by coordinating at the point of equal advantage. Now the extent of advantage is determined in a twofold way. First, there is advantage internal to an agreement. In this respect, the expectation of equal advantage is assured by procedural fairness. The step from existing moral practices to those resulting from actual agreement takes rational persons to a procedurally fair situation, in which each perceives the agreed practices to be ones that it is equally rational for all to accept, given the circumstances in which agreement is reached. But those circumstances themselves may be called into question insofar as they are perceived to be arbitrary – the result, in part, of compliance with constraining practices that do not themselves ensure the expectation of equal advantage, and so do not reflect the equal rationality of the complying parties. To neutralize this arbitrary element, moral practices to be fully acceptable must be conceived as constituting a possible outcome of a hypothetical agreement under circumstances that are unaffected by social institutions that themselves lack full acceptability. Equal rationality demands consideration of external circumstances as well as internal procedures.

#### [5] Impact calc: The veil of ignorance resolves actions between states by taking decisions an agent would agree too if they didn’t know which country they were a citizen of. This theory of IR is key to combating cultural bias and the lack of external sovereign in motivation.

### Offense

#### I defend that states ought to possess nuclear weapons. Now negate:

#### [1] States don’t know how other states will act from under the veil. This justifies ppossessing nukes Under the veil states cannot verify how other states will act, which justifies possessing nuclear weapons to ensure security.

John Rawls, Dead Philosopher who taught at Harvard for a bit, The Law of Peoples: with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 2001, ///AHS PB

I shall only briefly mention the question of controlling nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Among reasonably just liberal and decent peoples the control of such weapons would be relatively easy, since they could be effectively banned. These peoples have no reason for going to war with one another. Yet so long as there are outlaw states—as we suppose—some nuclear weapons need to be retained to keep those states at bay and to make sure they do not obtain and use those weapons against liberal or decent peoples. How best to do this belongs to expert knowledge, which philosophy doesn't possess. There remains, of course, the great moral question of whether, and in what circumstances, nuclear weapons can be used at all (see the discussion in §14).

#### [2] Nuclear weapons give weaker states an fighting chance against powerful adversaries and deter coercive bargaining practices. This negates since states don’t know their geopolitical power from behind the veil. Independently turns case.

Michael Shellenberger, I write about energy and the environment, Who Are We To Deny Weak Nations The Nuclear Weapons They Need For Self-Defense? Aug 6, 2018, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2018/08/06/who-are-we-to-deny-weak-nations-the-nuclear-weapons-they-need-for-self-defense/#306db94c522f> ///AHS PB

How does a weak nation-state like France level the playing field with a more powerful adversary like Germany? By obtaining a weapon capable of wiping out its major cities. Twice victimized and humiliated by its neighbor, France after World War II set off to build a nuclear bomb that, had it been available before 1940, would have deterred the German invasion. Can anyone blame France for getting the bomb? Of course not. After all, Germany’s war upon its neighbors resulted in the deaths of 50 million people. But that didn’t stop the U.S. government from trying to prevent France from building a nuclear weapon. Senior Kennedy administration officials in 1962 [described](https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/europe-de-gaulle-the-deterrent/) France’s nuclear program as “foolish, or diabolical — or both.” How could the U.S. deny France the means with which to defend herself? By promising to protect France with its own nuclear weapons through what is called “extended deterrence.” French President Charles de Gaulle didn’t buy it. He felt that “the United States would not risk New York or Detroit to save Hamburg or Lyons,” [noted](https://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/06/world/the-de-gaulle-nuclear-doctrine-is-alive-in-paris-military-analysis.html) the New York Times, “if faced with a choice between the destruction of Western Europe and a Soviet-American missile exchange.” A nuclear-armed France, U.S. officials warned, “could lead to a proliferation of nuclear powers,” [reported](https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/europe-de-gaulle-the-deterrent/) Ronald Steel in Commentary, “that is, to demands by other allies, especially Germany, for nuclear status.” The identical argument was later made against China, India and Pakistan, and is now being made against allowing North Korea and Iran to possess nuclear weapons. The widespread assumption is that the more nations have nuclear weapons, the more dangerous the world will be. But is that really the case? I don’t ask this question lightly. I come from a long line of Christian pacifists and conscientious objectors and earned a degree in peace studies from a Quaker college. I have had nightmares about nuclear war since I was a boy and today live in California, which is more vulnerable to a North Korean missile than Washington, D.C. — at least for now. But it is impossible not to be struck by these facts: No nation with a nuclear weapon has ever been invaded by another nation. The number of [deaths in battle worldwide has declined 95 percent](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace#the-share-of-battle-deaths-is-declining-even-faster) in the 70 years since the invention and spread of nuclear weapons; The number of Indian and Pakistani civilian and security forces’ deaths in two disputed territories [declined 90 percent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir#cite_note-43) after Pakistan’s first nuclear weapons test in 1998. In 1981, the late political scientist Kenneth Waltz published an [essay](https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm) titled, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better.” In it he argued that nuclear weapons are revolutionary in allowing weaker nations to protect themselves from more powerful ones. International relations is “a realm of anarchy as opposed to hierarchy… of self-help… you’re on your own,” Waltz [explained](https://youtu.be/F9eV5gPlPZg). How do nuclear weapons work? Not “through the ability to defend but through the ability to punish...The message of a deterrent strategy is this,” explained Waltz. “‘Although we are defenceless, if you attack we will punish you to an extent that more than cancels your gains.’” Does anybody believe France should give up its nuclear weapons? Certainly not the French. After President Barack Obama in 2009 called for eliminating nuclear weapons, not a single other nuclear nation endorsed the idea. All of this raises the question: if nuclear weapons protect weak nations from foreign invasion, why shouldn’t North Korea and Iran get them? Why Nuclear Weapons Make Us Peaceful On January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush denounced Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an “axis of evil.” North Korea was “arming with missiles,” he said. Iran “aggressively pursues these weapons” and the “Iraqi regime has plotted to develop...nuclear weapons for over a decade.” One year later, the U.S. invaded and occupied Iraq. The ensuing conflict resulted in the [deaths of over 450,000 people](http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001533) — about four times as many as were killed at Hiroshima — and a [five-fold increase in terrorist killings](https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2015/11/18/the-plague-of-global-terrorism) in the Middle East and Africa. It all came [at a cost of $2.4 trillion dollars](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-usa-funding/u-s-cbo-estimates-2-4-trillion-long-term-war-costs-idUSN2450753720071024). Now, 16 years later, U.S. officials insist that North Korea and Iran need not fear a U.S. invasion. But why would any nation — particularly North Korea and Iran — believe them? Not only did the U.S. overthrow Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein after he gave up his nuclear weapons program, it also helped overthrow Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 after he too had given up the pursuit of a nuclear weapon. North Korean President Kim Jong-un may, quite understandably, see his own life at stake: Hussein was hanged and Gaddafi was tortured and killed. Both hawks and doves say North Korea and Iran must not be allowed to have a weapon because both regimes are brutal, but nuclear weapons make nations more peaceful over time. There were three full-scale wars before India and Pakistan acquired the bomb and only far more limited conflicts since. And China became dramatically less bellicose after acquiring the bomb. Why? “History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable,” notes Waltz, “and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action.” Is it really so difficult to imagine that a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran might follow the same path toward moderation as China, India, and Pakistan? Nuclear weapons are revolutionary in that they require the ruling class to have skin in the game. When facing off against nuclear-armed nations, elites can no longer sacrifice the poor and weak in their own country without risking their lives.

#### [3] Turns are incoherent: A] Aff rely on nukes being used badly. ssume Nukes are used badly, which isn’t intrinsic just a consequence. calculus is impossible behind the veil since individuals don’t know how to measure happiness of different people in order to arbitrate if an action’s correct B] Rely on nukes being used for warfare under other frameworks