# JANFEB19 CP’s

# Counterplans

## Conditions CP

### 1NC - Democracy

#### Counterplan: The United States federal government should provide military aid to <regime> if and only if <regime> adopts periodic national elections and abides by the outcomes of those elections.

#### Elections solve regime chance and democratization – we don’t need to win 100% solvency

Morgenbesser and Pepinsky 18 [Lee, Griffith University, Thomas B., Cornell University, “Elections as Causes of Democratization: Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective”, published 2018, accessible online at <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Lee_Morgenbesser/publication/323451946_Elections_as_Causes_of_Democratization_Southeast_Asia_in_Comparative_Perspective/links/5baccc3a92851ca9ed29929e/Elections-as-Causes-of-Democratization-Southeast-Asia-in-Comparative-Perspective.pdf>] / MM

The central claim of democratization by elections is that elections have causal effects on regime change. In the simplest terms, elections structure political interaction and, in turn, influence political outcomes (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Snyder & Mahoney, 1999). The most explicit expression of the idea that even flawed elections in authoritarian regimes can eventually bring about democratization is offered by the contributors to Lindberg (2009a). Despite some reservations, the authors provide partial support for this theory in Latin America and the Middle East/North Africa, but especially in Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. The underlying premise is that de jure competitive elections are a venue for political competition involving not only a competition for votes but also broader competition over the rules of the political system that unfolds simultaneously and interactively (Schedler, 2002; Tsebelis, 1990). In light of the different demands held by dictators, ruling parties, and opposition groups, flawed elections become imbued with uncertainty over their outcomes. The former must make a trade-off between electoral control and electoral credibility, whereas the latter seek tangible political gains without conferring any benefits. Because neither actor is capable of reconciling these goals, they face a strategic dilemma. The critical point here is that, regardless of the choices made, elections have the intrinsic capacity to undermine authoritarian rule. This is based on a simple formula with roots in the classic work by Dahl (1971): The lower the costs of toleration, the greater the security of the incumbent regime; the higher the costs of repression, the greater the security of its opponents. Over time, the repetition of flawed elections increases the costs of authoritarian rule in ways conducive to democratization. The aura of inevitability attached to authoritarian elections has made it an alluring field of enquiry. A prominent focus has been on what type of regime is sufficient for electoral democratization to take hold. Under competitive authoritarianism, dictators and ruling parties dilute the capacity of opposition parties to win office, intentionally infringe upon civil liberties, and regularly abuse state resources to create an uneven playing field. Under hegemonic authoritarianism, those same actors legally bar opposition parties from existing, violate basic civil liberties through the use of overt repression, and monopolize access to resources, media, and the law (on both subtypes, see Levitsky & Way, 2010). Using this distinction, Howard and Roessler (2006), Brownlee (2009), and Donno (2013b) have demonstrated that electoral democratization is more likely to occur in competitive authoritarian regimes. This outcome is itself dependent upon the relative weakness of the ruling party when faced with opposition coordination (van de Walle, 2006; Wahman, 2013) and international conditionality (Donno, 2013a; Hyde, 2011; Kelley, 2012). Such conditions contribute to an environment that favors cleaner elections by raising the costs of manipulation and misconduct for dictators and ruling parties. Another notable cost of flawed elections is the possibility of mass protests, which have been highlighted for their capacity to oust these incumbent actors and trigger democratization (Beaulieu, 2014; Brancati, 2016; Bunce & Wolchik, 2010, 2011). This is symptomatic of the risks confronting authoritarian regimes attempting the difficult task of maintaining both electoral control and electoral credibility. A theoretically rigorous and empirically expansive body of literature finds that even flawed elections under authoritarianism “matter” for democratization. An opposing view nevertheless contends that the very same elections can aid the longevity of authoritarian regimes, especially over the long term (see Gandhi, 2015; Knutsen, Nygård, & Wig, 2017; Miller, 2015b). In a balanced analysis of this debate, Schedler (2013) concludes that the conceptual differentiation between competitive and hegemonic authoritarianism dissolves any empirical contradiction observed in terms of regime trajectories. In his view, democratization hinges on the fact that multiparty elections make dictators and ruling parties **dependent on** other actors, thereby rendering them vulnerable to them. This is because the existence of electoral competition creates **structural vulnerabilities** in the form of individual and collective challengers, whereby opposition parties, regime allies, state agents, and citizens desert the dictator and ruling party (Schedler, 2013, pp. 146-149). In a similar way, Miller (2015a) argues that a track record of contestation under authoritarianism has a positive effect on democratization. Drawing on an expansive dataset covering the years 1815 to 2004, he finds that competitive oligarchies and electoral authoritarian regimes have the **highest relative risk factors** for democratic transitions, especially compared with plebiscitary authoritarian regimes. Notwithstanding how central the proposition of democratization by elections has become within the broader contemporary research on democratization, which is conveyed by the aforementioned scholarship, our contribution is motivated by two important weaknesses.

#### Aid uniquely provides an incentive to democratize – empirics go neg

Schenoni and Mainwaring 18 [Luis, University of Notre Dame, Scott, Harvard University, “US Hegemony and regime change in Latin America, published 2018, accessible online at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2018.1516754>] // BBM

This section aims to show that US foreign policy on the ground as proxied by foreign aid had a significant impact in the probability of a democratic transition, controlling for other relevant variables. We use survival analysis to test for the impact of US foreign aid policy in the average Latin American country. We replicate the main models in Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán,57 replacing their measure of US support for democracy (Figure 1) with a country specific measure of US foreign economic and military aid. Two observations are pertinent regarding the way in which Mainwaring and PérezLiñán coded US support for democracy in Latin America. First, their variable provides one value per year for the whole region. It therefore fails to reflect the US stance vis-à-vis specific Latin American countries, which probably biases the regression results in a conservative way by overlooking country-to-country variation. Second, measuring public statements may raise validity issues because actual policies, which are the result of complex political and bureaucratic processes, can be at odds with the statements of individual officials. Country-specific statements could be used to proxy signals, but not agency on the ground.58 We look at foreign aid instead. Almost all cases of effective US pressure on behalf of democracy involved the use of foreign aid, so it should provide a good proxy for US support for regime change. We look at both economic and military aid channelled by any US government agency, department, and office (US Overseas Loans and Grants Greenbook) as a per capita measure. We consider broader trends in aid to capture a larger set of uses. For instance, US support for authoritarian coups was often channelled through military assistance, and USAID was only one among many agencies and organizations through which pro-democratic funding was channelled.59 This variable ranges from zero to 210 US dollars per capita, with over 95% of the observations concentrating below the 100 US dollars per capita threshold. In Tables 1 and 2, we analyse the correlation of US foreign assistance with the probability of a democratic transition among authoritarian regimes (Table 1) and of a democratic breakdown among democracies (Table 2) for the 1945–2005 period. We replicate the main survival models in Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, using their models 4.4.5 and 4.2.5 as a baseline (first column) that we then modify by introducing the variable for US aid.60 The **positive coefficients** for US foreign assistance are consistent with the case studies. The US offered aid to authoritarian governments on the condition that they were making progress toward democratization. The US cut aid to authoritarian regimes that were not moving toward democracy. Thus, greater US aid is associated with a **greater probability of a transition** to democracy. The second column in Table 1 shows that when US foreign assistance proxies for US pro-democracy policies, the association between regional diffusion and US policy preferences, on the one hand, and democratic transitions, on the other, disappears. As measured by the p-value, US policy as proxied by foreign aid has a stronger association with democratic transitions than the regional diffusion variable. In column 3, we take out the variables for regional diffusion and US policy preferences and retain US foreign assistance. Compared to the original model (column 1), the model in column 3 slightly increases explanatory power despite being a bit more parsimonious. Finally, column 4 shows that, as measured by the p-value, the US aid variable was statistically more significant than domestic actors’ preferences in the 1977–2005 period. Table 2 applies the same procedure to the survival of democracy. In line with the qualitative findings in the last section, the association of US policy with democratic breakdowns is less impressive. The second column shows that the predictive power of regional diffusion per se is not overcome by adding the variable for US aid. Column 3 shows that overall (1945–2005) greater US foreign assistance is associated with a **reduced probability** of a democratic breakdown. The US did not consistently support democracy in the 1948–76 period, so in Column 4 there is more variance in the association of foreign aid with democratic breakdown, resulting in much larger standard errors. The conclusion from these tables is that US foreign assistance is strongly associated with the third wave of **democratization** in Latin America. US aid or its lack thereof did not cause regime change by itself, but it served as a proxy for US support for democracy and opposition to authoritarianism. Using this proxy, from 1977 to 2005 hegemonic effects were significantly associated with authoritarian breakdown and democratic stability in Latin America. Conversely, results for 1948–1976 do not support the idea that the US systematically bolstered authoritarian regimes. Although it goes beyond the goals of this article to explain the waves of authoritarianism from 1948 to 1954 and 1964 to 1977, the polarizing effects of the Cold War, especially after the Cuban revolution, loom large in any understanding of these regional trends. The US was the main actor in the Guatemalan coup of 1954 and it strongly influenced other outcomes, but the evidence suggests that it did not unleash the waves of authoritarianism that began in 1948 and 1964.

#### Democracy solves a laundry list of impacts – independently an alt cause to the aff.

**Kasparov 17** [Garry Kasparov, Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation, former World Chess Champion, “Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership,” Testimony Before The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 16th, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/021617\_Kasparov\_%20Testimony.pdf]

As one of the countless millions of people who were freed or protected from totalitarianism by the United States of America, it is easy for me to talk about the past. To talk about the belief of the American people and their leaders that this country was exceptional, and had special responsibilities to match its tremendous power. That a nation founded on freedom was bound to defend freedom everywhere. I could talk about the bipartisan legacy of this most American principle, from the Founding Fathers, to Democrats like Harry Truman, to Republicans like Ronald Reagan. I could talk about how the American people used to care deeply about human rights and dissidents in far-off places, and how this is what made America a beacon of hope, a shining city on a hill. America led by example and set a high standard, a standard that exposed the hypocrisy and cruelty of dictatorships around the world. But there is no time for nostalgia. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, Americans, and America, have retreated from those principles, and the world has become much worse off as a result. American skepticism about America’s role in the world deepened in the long, painful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their aftermaths. Instead of applying the lessons learned about how to do better, lessons about faulty intelligence and working with native populations, the main outcome was to stop trying. This result has been a tragedy for the billions of people still living under authoritarian regimes around the world, and it is based on faulty analysis. You can never guarantee a positive outcome— not in chess, not in war, and certainly not in politics. The best you can do is to do what you know is right and to try your best. I speak from experience when I say that the citizens of unfree states do not expect guarantees. They want a reason to hope and a fighting chance. People living under dictatorships want the opportunity for freedom, the opportunity to live in peace and to follow their dreams. From the Iraq War to the Arab Spring to the current battles for liberty from Venezuela to Eastern Ukraine, people are fighting for that opportunity, giving up their lives for freedom. The United States must not abandon them. The United States and the rest of the free world has an unprecedented advantage in economic and military strength today. What is lacking is the will. The will to make the case to the American people, the will to take risks and invest in the long-term security of the country, and the world. This will require investments in aid, in education, in security that allow countries to attain the stability their people so badly need. Such investment is far more moral and far cheaper than the cycle of terror, war, refugees, and military intervention that results when America leaves a vacuum of power. The best way to help refugees is to prevent them from becoming refugees in the first place. The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There existential threat today is not found on a map, but it is very real. The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. Terrorist movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in North Korea threatening nuclear blackmail, and, at the center of the web, an aggressive KGB dictator in Russia. They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by the values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And they are thriving as the U.S. has retreated. The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. American leadership begins at home, right here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the meaning and importance of these things. Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully. Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making America great begins with believing America can be great. The Cold War was won on American values that were shared by both parties and nearly every American. Institutions that were created by a Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years later thanks to the courage of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency created the decades of strategic stability that is the great strength of democracies. Strong institutions that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning. In contrast, dictators can operate only tactically, not strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers, but cannot afford to think beyond their own survival. This is why a dictator like Putin has an advantage in chaos, the ability to move quickly. This can only be met by strategy, by long-term goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news. The fear of making things worse has paralyzed the United States from trying to make things better. There will always be setbacks, but the United States cannot quit. The spread of democracy is the only proven remedy for nearly every crisis that plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty, terrorism–all are generated and exacerbated by authoritarian regimes. A policy of America First inevitably puts American security last. American leadership is required because there is no one else, and because it is good for America. There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America being envied, imitated, and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect, but for having the exceptional courage to always try to be better. Thank you.

### 1NC – Chad/Dougherty

#### The United States should provide military aid to the Republic of Chad on the conditions that:

#### Aid is only directed to counter-terror missions to fight Boko Haram

#### Aid is distributed following the Millennium Challenge Corporation model

#### All other military aid is immediately ended

#### Solves case

Adams and Sokolsky 15 Gordon Adams [Fellow at the Stimson Center and Professor Emeritus at American University’s School of International Service.] Richard Sokolsky [Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former director of the Department of State’s Office of Defense Relations and Security Assistance.], 7-27-2015, "Governance and Security Sector Assistance: The Missing Link," No Publication, <http://www.securityassistance.org/blog/governance-and-security-sector-assistance-missing-link> RE recut

U.S. security assistance and cooperation programs have been less successful than administrations have hoped and may have actually worsened the security of many recipient countries. In our view, such programs are likely to be more effective if they are more selective, better monitored, and linked, with real consequences, to recipient country performance with respect to both the internal operations of the security sector and the broader objective of effective, efficient, accountable, and uncorrupt governance. How might this outcome be advanced? The foreign economic assistance program of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) offers a model for revamping U.S. security sector assistance to lash it up more effectively with efforts to improve governance. The MCC decision-making process is much more selective and conditional than traditional development assistance. It requires potential assistance recipients to measure up to 16 broadly accepted indicators of good governance before they are eligible for MCC funding. Countries that meet these standards are treated more like partners than aid recipients. They develop and take ownership of their own plans for how MCC funds will be used to advance economic growth and human security. Countries are selected for participation based on their performance, and the amount of funding they receive is determined by the quality of their plans, formalized in “compacts” with the MCC. Because MCC funds are limited and the program is highly selective, prospective MCC partners are, in effect, challenged to compete for funding with other countries. Once countries sign a compact, the MCC applies stringent performance and evaluation controls to monitor and hold MCC partners accountable for results. Poor country performance in meeting its commitments under their compacts can and has been penalized by the termination of the compact (e.g., Nicaragua, Mali). MCC countries are incentivized to improve their policy performance to meet standards that both improve governance and advance U.S. national objectives. The MCC format and experience to date might be a useful approach to U.S. security assistance programs. The small SGI program suggests there is interest in linking broader governance performance to funding. This approach would establish a set of broader governance criteria, as well as criteria specifically related to security sector behavior, that would determine the initial eligibility of countries for assistance. The U.S. would establish a “challenge fund” consisting of the bulk of U.S. security assistance funds, for which potential recipient countries could compete. To be successful, the stewards of this fund would need to establish stringent performance standards both for overall governance and for security sector governance that competing countries would have to meet before they are declared eligible and selected for participation in the fund. For example (the list below is illustrative and not exhaustive), governments should: Be committed to civilian-led accountable institutions and have a military that only acts under civilian command and with clear and transparent rules of engagement. Make military/security capabilities, budget data, and weapons procurement transparent to civilian authorities and not allow the military to own productive resources in the civilian economy. Require military/security training to include human rights, accountability to civilians and civilian institutions, and adherence to rule of law and prohibit military/security forces from detaining individuals indefinitely or without trial. Have defense and interior ministries headed by civilians appointed through an accountable process, with low measures of corruption, as MCC uses. Have legislatures with capacity for effective oversight of military/security ministries and with budget/appropriations role for these budgets. Have a free press allowed to scrutinize and report on military and security force budgets and activities without repression. Have clear rules of engagement for dealing with internal unrest that meet international standards and do not use military/security forces for internal political repression. Make an adequate investment of resources for training in the areas of democratic and community-oriented policing and have an investigatory framework that does not rely on torture and forced confession.

### 1NC – Counternarcotics

#### CP text: The United States federal government should

#### End all airstrikes on Poppy and Opium production facilities in Afghanistan

#### Condition aid to Afghanistan on adoption of periodic national elections and abiding by the outcomes of those elections.

#### Increase US boots-on-ground counternarcotics counterterror operations if Afghanistan abides by said conditions

#### Solves opium reliance – their ev

Suroush 17 (Qayoom Suroush, researcher with the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). He earlier served as a Senior Advisor for Afghanistan’s National Security Council, “U.S. Bombing of Drug Labs in Afghanistan Is Counterproductive to Fighting the Taliban”, Just Security, 12-6-17, Available Online at https://www.justsecurity.org/60598/u-s-bombing-drug-labs-afghanistan-counterproductive-fighting-taliban/, accessed 1-17-19, HKR-AM) / MM

The rise and continued dependency on poppy cultivation is rooted in persistent challenges in Afghanistan – namely a lack of security, counter-productive government control, and a poor economy. UNODC’s 2017 village surveys showed that “opium poppy cultivation is closely related to poor governance, lack of security, and lack of basic infrastructure and services that are essential for the well-functioning of a society. Moreover, socio-economic factors, for example scarce employment opportunities, lack of quality education and limited access to markets and financial services contribute as well … The ongoing instability has made sustaining livelihoods by licit means more difficult and has amplified the vulnerability of the population to economic and environmental shocks.” Without addressing these challenges, any counter-narcotics campaign, be it through raids or air strikes, will be ineffective.

#### Elections solve the alt causes

Morgenbesser and Pepinsky 18 [Lee, Griffith University, Thomas B., Cornell University, “Elections as Causes of Democratization: Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective”, published 2018, accessible online at <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Lee_Morgenbesser/publication/323451946_Elections_as_Causes_of_Democratization_Southeast_Asia_in_Comparative_Perspective/links/5baccc3a92851ca9ed29929e/Elections-as-Causes-of-Democratization-Southeast-Asia-in-Comparative-Perspective.pdf>] / MM

The central claim of democratization by elections is that elections have causal effects on regime change. In the simplest terms, elections structure political interaction and, in turn, influence political outcomes (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Snyder & Mahoney, 1999). The most explicit expression of the idea that even flawed elections in authoritarian regimes can eventually bring about democratization is offered by the contributors to Lindberg (2009a). Despite some reservations, the authors provide partial support for this theory in Latin America and the Middle East/North Africa, but especially in Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. The underlying premise is that de jure competitive elections are a venue for political competition involving not only a competition for votes but also broader competition over the rules of the political system that unfolds simultaneously and interactively (Schedler, 2002; Tsebelis, 1990). In light of the different demands held by dictators, ruling parties, and opposition groups, flawed elections become imbued with uncertainty over their outcomes. The former must make a trade-off between electoral control and electoral credibility, whereas the latter seek tangible political gains without conferring any benefits. Because neither actor is capable of reconciling these goals, they face a strategic dilemma. The critical point here is that, regardless of the choices made, elections have the intrinsic capacity to undermine authoritarian rule. This is based on a simple formula with roots in the classic work by Dahl (1971): The lower the costs of toleration, the greater the security of the incumbent regime; the higher the costs of repression, the greater the security of its opponents. Over time, the repetition of flawed elections increases the costs of authoritarian rule in ways conducive to democratization. The aura of inevitability attached to authoritarian elections has made it an alluring field of enquiry. A prominent focus has been on what type of regime is sufficient for electoral democratization to take hold. Under competitive authoritarianism, dictators and ruling parties dilute the capacity of opposition parties to win office, intentionally infringe upon civil liberties, and regularly abuse state resources to create an uneven playing field. Under hegemonic authoritarianism, those same actors legally bar opposition parties from existing, violate basic civil liberties through the use of overt repression, and monopolize access to resources, media, and the law (on both subtypes, see Levitsky & Way, 2010). Using this distinction, Howard and Roessler (2006), Brownlee (2009), and Donno (2013b) have demonstrated that electoral democratization is more likely to occur in competitive authoritarian regimes. This outcome is itself dependent upon the relative weakness of the ruling party when faced with opposition coordination (van de Walle, 2006; Wahman, 2013) and international conditionality (Donno, 2013a; Hyde, 2011; Kelley, 2012). Such conditions contribute to an environment that favors cleaner elections by raising the costs of manipulation and misconduct for dictators and ruling parties. Another notable cost of flawed elections is the possibility of mass protests, which have been highlighted for their capacity to oust these incumbent actors and trigger democratization (Beaulieu, 2014; Brancati, 2016; Bunce & Wolchik, 2010, 2011). This is symptomatic of the risks confronting authoritarian regimes attempting the difficult task of maintaining both electoral control and electoral credibility. A theoretically rigorous and empirically expansive body of literature finds that even flawed elections under authoritarianism “matter” for democratization. An opposing view nevertheless contends that the very same elections can aid the longevity of authoritarian regimes, especially over the long term (see Gandhi, 2015; Knutsen, Nygård, & Wig, 2017; Miller, 2015b). In a balanced analysis of this debate, Schedler (2013) concludes that the conceptual differentiation between competitive and hegemonic authoritarianism dissolves any empirical contradiction observed in terms of regime trajectories. In his view, democratization hinges on the fact that multiparty elections make dictators and ruling parties **dependent on** other actors, thereby rendering them vulnerable to them. This is because the existence of electoral competition creates **structural vulnerabilities** in the form of individual and collective challengers, whereby opposition parties, regime allies, state agents, and citizens desert the dictator and ruling party (Schedler, 2013, pp. 146-149). 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#### Independently, democracy solves the case

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As one of the countless millions of people who were freed or protected from totalitarianism by the United States of America, it is easy for me to talk about the past. To talk about the belief of the American people and their leaders that this country was exceptional, and had special responsibilities to match its tremendous power. That a nation founded on freedom was bound to defend freedom everywhere. I could talk about the bipartisan legacy of this most American principle, from the Founding Fathers, to Democrats like Harry Truman, to Republicans like Ronald Reagan. I could talk about how the American people used to care deeply about human rights and dissidents in far-off places, and how this is what made America a beacon of hope, a shining city on a hill. America led by example and set a high standard, a standard that exposed the hypocrisy and cruelty of dictatorships around the world. But there is no time for nostalgia. 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The best way to help refugees is to prevent them from becoming refugees in the first place. The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There existential threat today is not found on a map, but it is very real. The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. Terrorist movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in North Korea threatening nuclear blackmail, and, at the center of the web, an aggressive KGB dictator in Russia. They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by the values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And they are thriving as the U.S. has retreated. The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. 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There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America being envied, imitated, and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect, but for having the exceptional courage to always try to be better. Thank you.

### 1NC – Uganda/Immaculate Heart

#### CP Text: The United States federal government should condition aid to Uganda on

#### US weapons not being used by police officers

#### US oversight on Ugandan counterterror missions

#### Reforms outlined in the Human Rights Watch’s list of concrete governmental reforms

Burnett 18 Maria Burnett, an Associate Director at Human Rights Watch and in charge of the organization’s work on East Africa, with expertise in Uganda, emerging human rights issues in Central Africa, and Somalia, 6-26-2018, "Addressing Torture in Uganda," Human Rights Watch, [https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/26/addressing-torture-uganda /](https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/26/addressing-torture-uganda%20/) MM

On June 26, the UN International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, we offer these five concrete actions senior police leadership should take to work to end police torture: 1. Publicly declare a zero-tolerance policy for torture and mistreatment of anyone in police custody. Send a circular to all police posts making clear that any officer responsible for torture or mistreatment will face both administrative and criminal sanctions, as appropriate to their personal liability. This could include a prison sentence and job loss. The circular should also be available to the general public. 2. Mandate senior police officials to encourage people to report allegations of torture or mistreatment by police. They should also proactively question those detained or imprisoned to ascertain if they faced mistreatment or torture during police custody and then document those allegations of abuse. Officers should investigate all allegations in collaboration with the directorate of public prosecution, ensuring charges are brought under the Torture Prohibition and Prevention Act, where appropriate. 3. Publicly and unequivocally disband all of Uganda’s unregulated paramilitaries, including Kiboko Squad, the Boda Boda 2010, Crime Preventers, Kifeesi, and other such units created by the past administration. 4. Ensure police training makes clear the distinction between the role and function of police and of the military in enforcing law and order. Trainings should emphasize non-partisan policing and teach skills of crowd control and policing based on international standards on use of force and firearms. This means learning to use restraint in protests, how to de-escalate situations to protect the rights of protesters, how to apply nonviolent means before resorting to force, and to use lethal force only when strictly unavoidable to protect life. 5. Work with parliament to establish a new, genuinely independent police oversight body with the legal powers to initiate prosecutions in cases of police misconduct. The promises of Uganda’s police leadership to take on torture are good news. But without learning from the past and taking robust action to address abuses, police torture will continue unchecked.

#### Our oversight plank improves counterterror effectiveness

Adams and Sokolsky 15 Gordon Adams [Fellow at the Stimson Center and Professor Emeritus at American University’s School of International Service.] Richard Sokolsky [Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former director of the Department of State’s Office of Defense Relations and Security Assistance.], 7-27-2015, "Governance and Security Sector Assistance: The Missing Link," No Publication, [http://www.securityassistance.org/blog/governance-and-security-sector-assistance-missing-link /](http://www.securityassistance.org/blog/governance-and-security-sector-assistance-missing-link%20/) MM

U.S. security assistance and cooperation programs have been less successful than administrations have hoped and may have actually worsened the security of many recipient countries. In our view, such programs are likely to be more effective if they are more selective, better monitored, and linked, with real consequences, to recipient country performance with respect to both the internal operations of the security sector and the broader objective of effective, efficient, accountable, and uncorrupt governance. How might this outcome be advanced? The foreign economic assistance program of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) offers a model for revamping U.S. security sector assistance to lash it up more effectively with efforts to improve governance. The MCC decision-making process is much more selective and conditional than traditional development assistance. It requires potential assistance recipients to measure up to 16 broadly accepted indicators of good governance before they are eligible for MCC funding. Countries that meet these standards are treated more like partners than aid recipients. They develop and take ownership of their own plans for how MCC funds will be used to advance economic growth and human security. Countries are selected for participation based on their performance, and the amount of funding they receive is determined by the quality of their plans, formalized in “compacts” with the MCC. Because MCC funds are limited and the program is highly selective, prospective MCC partners are, in effect, challenged to compete for funding with other countries. Once countries sign a compact, the MCC applies stringent performance and evaluation controls to monitor and hold MCC partners accountable for results. Poor country performance in meeting its commitments under their compacts can and has been penalized by the termination of the compact (e.g., Nicaragua, Mali). MCC countries are incentivized to improve their policy performance to meet standards that both improve governance and advance U.S. national objectives. The MCC format and experience to date might be a useful approach to U.S. security assistance programs. The small SGI program suggests there is interest in linking broader governance performance to funding. This approach would establish a set of broader governance criteria, as well as criteria specifically related to security sector behavior, that would determine the initial eligibility of countries for assistance. The U.S. would establish a “challenge fund” consisting of the bulk of U.S. security assistance funds, for which potential recipient countries could compete. To be successful, the stewards of this fund would need to establish stringent performance standards both for overall governance and for security sector governance that competing countries would have to meet before they are declared eligible and selected for participation in the fund. For example (the list below is illustrative and not exhaustive), governments should: Be committed to civilian-led accountable institutions and have a military that only acts under civilian command and with clear and transparent rules of engagement. Make military/security capabilities, budget data, and weapons procurement transparent to civilian authorities and not allow the military to own productive resources in the civilian economy. Require military/security training to include human rights, accountability to civilians and civilian institutions, and adherence to rule of law and prohibit military/security forces from detaining individuals indefinitely or without trial. Have defense and interior ministries headed by civilians appointed through an accountable process, with low measures of corruption, as MCC uses. Have legislatures with capacity for effective oversight of military/security ministries and with budget/appropriations role for these budgets. Have a free press allowed to scrutinize and report on military and security force budgets and activities without repression. Have clear rules of engagement for dealing with internal unrest that meet international standards and do not use military/security forces for internal political repression. Make an adequate investment of resources for training in the areas of democratic and community-oriented policing and have an investigatory framework that does not rely on torture and forced confession.

### 1NC – Cameroon

#### The United States should provide military aid to the Republic of Cameroon on the condition that:

#### Aid is distributed following the Millennium Challenge Corporation model

#### The Leahy Law isn’t violated

#### Solves case – their evidence

Freymeyer 18 Christian Freymeyer, 9-20-2018, [studies international development and economics at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He served with the Peace Corps in Cameroon from 2011 to 2013. His previous writing has appeared in the Africa Report, Thompson Reuters Foundation, and EURACTIV.] "The United States Can Stop Cameroon’s Brutal Crackdown," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/20/the-united-states-can-stop-cameroons-bloody-crackdown-biya-anglophone-africa/ RE

The conflict in Cameroon’s English-speaking regions is rooted in the country’s colonial past and path to independence, and it cannot necessarily be resolved by outside powers. But the U.S. government could put a unique type of pressure on Cameroon’s leaders simply by enforcing U.S. laws already on the books. The so-called Leahy Law, passed in 1997 and named for its chief advocate, Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy, essentially bars the Departments of State and Defense from providing military assistance to foreign security forces that have credible accusations of human rights violations made against them. From a growing number of press reports, firsthand accounts, and on-the-ground videos, it’s clear that the BIR and the military more broadly are violating Cameroonians’ human rightsFrom a growing number of press reports, firsthand accounts, and on-the-ground videos, it’s clear that the BIR and the military more broadly are violating Cameroonians’ human rights. These are exactly the types of forces the Leahy Law was designed to target. The BIR has always been a bit of an outlier when compared with its counterparts from other branches of the armed forces: It’s well funded, receives training from the United States, and is led by a retired Israeli military officer. The BIR doesn’t even report to the country’s defense minister, taking orders instead directly from Biya. My first encounter with them was on the day of the last presidential election, in 2011, when I lived in the country’s Northwest Region. While the casting of ballots was a mere formality—apart from in 1992, the first multiparty election, Biya has won every time by massive margins—the day still had an eerie feel to it. Every shop was closed, and only a handful of bars dared open their back doors to allow regulars an opportunity to pass the time with a drink. Meanwhile, dozens of BIR soldiers paraded through the streets in full riot gear, carrying sophisticated weapons. This isn’t the first time Cameroon’s military has been in the spotlight for unsavory reasons. In 2016, before the current conflict erupted, Amnesty International accused the BIR of vast human rights violations. The investigation alleged that more than 1,000 people, many of whom were arrested arbitrarily, were held in horrific conditions in Maroua Prison, located in the north of the country. The report alleged that eight people were dying per month due to malnutrition, disease, and torture. Further investigations based on the Amnesty report alleged that torture, illegal imprisonment, and extrajudicial killings were happening at a base used by the U.S. military in its joint operations against the extremist group Boko Haram, which has a foothold in the far north of Cameroon. In the wake of the exposé, the U.S. government launched its own investigation to determine if U.S. personnel on the ground were aware of the allegations. (The results have not yet been made public.) This is precisely why it’s time to invoke Leahy’s law. For years, the U.S. government has been giving several forms of security assistance to Cameroon. According to the Security Assistance Monitor, the United States has dished out more than $220 million in military and security funding to Cameroon since 2012, via the State Department and the Pentagon. But rather than use this funding as leverage to force Biya to de-escalate the conflict in Anglophone regions and put an end to rampant human rights abuses, the Trump administration is remaining depressingly mum. In May, a Pentagon spokesman evaded questions about the checkered reputation of forces being trained and equipped by the U.S. government, despite his comments coming just days after the U.S. ambassador to Cameroon stated that he believed military personnel were carrying out targeted killings in the country’s English-speaking regions. New reports show that more and more BIR forces, most often associated with the fight against Boko Haram in the north of the country, are being redirected to Anglophone regions, leaving open the possibility that forces directly trained by U.S. officials for an important counterterrorism operation are now being diverted to a domestic campaign of repression that has left hundreds of civilians dead and tens of thousands displaced. The same Pentagon spokesman even conceded this possibility by saying that the Cameroonian government is free to move its assets as it likes, setting up a situation where an elite force trained by the United States in order to pursue U.S. security interests can be moved on a whim to put down domestic unrest in a manner that harms, rather than helps, U.S. interests in the region. This wouldn’t be the first time Washington has enforced the Leahy Law. Just a couple of years ago, Congress agreed to review Nigeria’s exclusion from U.S. military aid. Countries from Pakistan to Indonesia have been subject to review under its terms in the past. There’s no reason why Cameroon shouldn’t be held to the same standard. Critics of U.S. foreign policy are quick to count every penny going to humanitarian aid or development projects, but the billions of dollars that support questionable leaders and armies around the globe, sometimes directly enabling human rights violations, are far too often overlooked. U.S. policymakers are in a unique position to demand changes to the conduct of Cameroon’s military, and all they need to do is follow rules that are already in place.

#### The MCC plank stops HR violations and boosts democracy

Adams and Sokolsky 15 Gordon Adams [Fellow at the Stimson Center and Professor Emeritus at American University’s School of International Service.] Richard Sokolsky [Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former director of the Department of State’s Office of Defense Relations and Security Assistance.], 7-27-2015, "Governance and Security Sector Assistance: The Missing Link," No Publication, <http://www.securityassistance.org/blog/governance-and-security-sector-assistance-missing-link> RE recut

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### 1NC – Honduras

#### CP text: idk

#### Solves case – their solvency advocate

**Johnson 16** [Johnson, Hank. Now serving his seventh term in the U.S. House of Representatives from Georgia’s Fourth Congressional District – which encompasses parts of DeKalb, Gwinnett and Newton counties and all of Rockdale County – Congressman Hank Johnson has distinguished himself as a substantive, effective lawmaker and a leading national progressive voice. Johnson was named one of the most effective Democrats in Congress by a University of Virginia and University of Vanderbilt study. Prior to taking his seat in Congress in 2006, Rep. Johnson practiced criminal defense law in Georgia for twenty-seven (27) years. He served twelve (12) years as a magistrate judge, and five (5) years as a county commissioner. *Rep. Johnson introduces “The Berta Cáceres Human Rights in Honduras Act”*. June 15, 2016. Press Release. <https://hankjohnson.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rep-johnson-introduces-berta-c-ceres-human-rights-honduras-act?fbclid=IwAR3D_1LaS0xvWOn9s0ElnwhjWOYMK3UnbiW9aBo2LgPghLoB3sOMEfV46s4>] MT

The “Berta Cáceres Human Rights in Honduras Act” (H.R. 5474) would suspend those funds – and prohibit international loans providing for security assistance – from being dispersed unless Honduras makes serious inroads to addressing blatant human rights violations by police and military forces. “We provide millions of dollars in security assistance to Honduras every year but these same forces have been found to attack and kill environmental, labor and human rights activists like Cáceres without any effective response from the Honduran authorities,” said Rep. Johnson. “It’s time for our government to send a stronger message by leveraging security assistance and multilateral loans in order to put real and lasting pressure on the Honduran government to protect its activists and pursue those responsible for these outrageous crimes.” In March, Rep. Johnson and Rep. Keith Ellison (MN-05) penned a letter signed by more than 60 Congressional colleagues calling for an independent, international investigation into the murder of Cáceres with backing from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). The State Department, The New York Times, the Associated Press and numerous human rights groups have documented that the Honduran police and military are widely believed to be deeply corrupt and commit gross human rights abuses – including torture, rape, illegal detention, and murder – with impunity. The bill – cosponsored by Judiciary Committee Ranking Member John Conyers (MI-13), Rep. Keith Ellison (MN-05), Rep. Marcy Kaptur (OH-09), Rep. Jan Schakowsky (IL-09) and Rep. José E. Serrano (NY-15) – requires investigations into a series of suspicious killings of human rights activists and demands the Honduran government protect the rights of trade unionists; journalists; human rights; defenders; Indigenous, Afro-Indigenous, small farmers and LGBTI activists; critics of the government and other civil society activists so they may operate without interference from the police or military. “Like so many across the globe, I was deeply saddened to hear that beloved human rights activist Berta Cáceres became the latest victim of violence and impunity in Honduras earlier this year,” said Rep. Conyers. “I am proud to support this bill that will ensure that U.S. military and police aid is dispensed only when Honduran institutions have demonstrated a firm commitment to bring perpetrators of violence to justice.” “Berta Cáceres willingly risked her life to fight for equality and justice in Honduras,” said Rep. Ellison. “In the wake of her death, and the continued violence against organizers, activists, and civilians, it is time to finally address human rights in Honduras. Members of Congress have written letters on this for years, but the situation continues to deteriorate. It’s time to take stronger action. This bill would suspend security aid to Honduras until human rights are protected, members of the Honduran security forces are held accountable, and justice is achieved for the victims.” “There are rampant abuses of human rights in Honduras by security forces, and unanswered, enduring questions about the murder of Berta Cáceres and other activists,” said Rep. Kaptur. “As President Truman remarked, ‘Once a government is committed to the principal of silencing the voice of opposition, it has only one way to go.’ These abuses have led to a climate of fear and intimidation, and until law and order are restored, we have a moral obligation to suspend all police and military aid to Honduras.” “I am proud to stand with Representative Hank Johnson in calling for a suspension of U.S. aid to Honduran military and police forces,” said Rep. Schakowsky. “The Honduran government has stood by while environmental activists like Berta Cáceres and trade unionists have been murdered for speaking up to protect workers, the environment and their country. It has allowed its law enforcement officials to violate the legal rights of its people and use violence in an attempt to intimidate activists into silence. U.S. taxpayers should not be asked to fund those anti-democratic actions. Until and unless the Honduran government puts an end to those practices and works with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to conduct an impartial and thorough investigation of past abuses, it does not deserve U.S. support.” “A number of reports from credible human rights organizations establish the extent to which the Honduran police and military are engaging in corrupt practices and gross human rights abuses in Honduras,” said Rep. Serrano. “When these abuses occur, Hondurans often do not have access to a strong and fair judicial system. Impunity cannot and will not be tolerated. Cutting U.S. security assistance to Honduras will send a strong message, limit funding for institutions that are broken, and serve as leverage to force the Honduran government to investigate these crimes, tackle corruption, and restore law and order.”

#### The MCC plank stops HR violations and boosts democracy

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
## Executive CP

#### Counterplan text: The executive branch of the United States federal government should <copy paste plan text>

#### The executive branch is faster and control most aid

Ryan 16 Missy Ryan, Reporter covering the Pentagon, military issues and national security, for the Washington Post, “State Department and Pentagon tussle over control of foreign military aid,” The Washington Post. July 10, 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/state-department-and-pentagon-tussle-over-control-of-foreign-military-aid/2016/07/10/ddc98f3e-42b0-11e6-88d0-6adee48be8bc_story.html?utm_term=.9a5f308162e0>/

President Obama’s most senior advisers convened last month to consider changes to the way the United States provides security aid to foreign nations, as a long-running struggle for control between the State and Defense departments intensifies. At the heart of the controversy is whether the State Department will retain its historic jurisdiction over security aid, or whether the Pentagon, which Congress has bestowed with increasing autonomy and resources over the past decade, will eclipse Foggy Bottom in taking greater responsibility for engagement with allied nations overseas. The June 30 meeting of Cabinet officials centered on execution of [Obama’s 2013 directive](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-policy) on security assistance, which sought to ensure that the billions of aid dollars the United States provides to allied nations each year are used more effectively. Adding to concerns at the State Department is a series of proposals in this year’s defense authorization bill, which would give the Pentagon permanent control over certain aid programs and greater flexibility in supporting counterterrorism activities overseas. [[U.S. will seek billions more to support Afghan military efforts](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-us-will-be-seeking-billions-more-from-other-countries-to-help-support-afghanistan-efforts/2016/06/17/3b6bb0b8-2f3d-11e6-b9d5-3c3063f8332c_story.html)]



#### Congress is normal means

BBC 18BBC, Reality Check: How can a US president cut off foreign aid?” BBC. January 5, 2018. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42557818>

**So what are the ways in which a US administration can cut off foreign aid? The answer is complicated**, and depends on the type of aid, as well as the specific country or group receiving it. So it would be almost impossible for the president to cut off aid from all 128 countries that voted for the UN resolution in one fell swoop. **Holding the purse strings It is** the US **Congress, not the president, that has the final say** **on the foreign aid budget. Because all spending has to be signed off by Congress, it "holds the power of the purse strings**", says Erin Collinson from the Center for Global Development, a non-partisan think tank based in Washington and London. **Congress can approve or alter the administration's budgetary proposals and can also specify in substantial detail where it wants the aid to go - even if that's in opposition to what the president wants.** However, in situations where Congress has not gone into specifics, an administration has a considerable amount of flexibility about how exactly it spends the allocated budget - although it has to notify Congress of its intentions. In the case of cutting aid to the Palestinians, [US officials told the Associated Press](https://apnews.com/014efbb86511429d9c09c818a76f58e0/Trump-threatens-to-cut-off-US-aid-to-Palestinian-Authority) that one option for Mr Trump would be to reroute aid which would normally go directly to the Palestinian Authorities to other NGOs working directly with the US Agency for International Development. In some cases, Congress will attach conditions to foreign aid, which could allow the president to stop it without having to run it by Congress. For example, in the case of Pakistan, most aid is conditional on the US secretary of state certifying that certain conditions - mostly related to counter-terrorism cooperation - are being met. This gives the administration the power to hold back the aid, by refusing to do that. In fact, the Trump administration has already held back foreign aid to Pakistan under these conditions. In September it [withheld $255m (£188m) in military aid](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-42536209)to the country, precisely by claiming it was not meeting its counter-terrorism obligations. What aid to Pakistan is being suspended? The $255m [is approximately a third of total US aid to Pakistan](https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/PAK) - other aid covers funds for education, energy, food and health. Although the US ambassador to the UN said recently that President Trump was willing to stop all funding, the State Department said that civilian assistance programmes were not included in the suspension. The US also sends millions of dollars through the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) - this is military assistance that reimburses Pakistan for counter-terrorism operations, and is not counted as US foreign aid. [Reuters quoted the Pentagon as saying up to $900m in CSF had been authorised for the 2017 fiscal year](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pakistan-aid/u-s-suspends-at-least-900-million-in-security-aid-to-pakistan-idUSKBN1ET2DX), and that this was being frozen. State Department officials said they could not yet put a dollar value on how much aid was being cut in total, and told reporters that "the suspension is not a permanent cut-off at this time". **What if there's a stalemate? Often any disagreements between the administration and Congress are worked out informally**, says Curt Tarnoff of the US Congressional Research Service. **If they aren't** - for example, **if the president refuses to spend the money specifically requested by Congress** - a process called **impoundment could be triggered.** **The matter could end up being decided in the Supreme Court.**

## NMS CP

### 1NC – Ptx

#### CP Text: The Joint Chiefs of Staff should update the National Military Strategy to include [eliminating military aid to authoritarian regimes]

#### It’s shielded from politics – NMS is classified and implemented by the Joint Chiefs

-NMS outlines how Combat Commands will execute broad goals from the NDS, which is guided by the NSS

MEHTA 18 Aaron Mehta, is Deputy Editor and Senior Pentagon Correspondent for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and acquisition at the highest levels of the Department of Defense and its international partners.Defense News, 1-17-2018, ["National Military Strategy update in the works — most of which will again be classified", https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/01/16/national-military-strategy-update-in-the-works-most-of-which-will-again-be-classified/] bcr 9-21-2018

BRUSSELS – Gen. Joe **Dunford,** the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, **is prepping his team to update the N**ational **M**ilitary Strategy – a classified document that will provide the framework for how the Pentagon can execute the goals of Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis. Speaking to reporters Jan. 15, Dunford said the document will not require “a complete rewrite,” but that updates will be needed to reflect what has changed since the last National Military Strategy was released in 2016. “In the National Military Strategy that we wrote [in 2016], we wrote it during a time of political transition. So what we tried to do was make it policy agnostic, knowing that when a National Defense Strategy came out we’d have to kind of go back and provide a policy framework within which the strategy would be implemented,” Dunford explained. The Trump administration is in the midst of releasing a series of interconnected strategy documents. **First came the N**ational Security **S**trategy in December, a broad overview of the administration’s priorities. Then comes the National Defense Strategy, which outlines how the NSS will apply to the Pentagon, on Jan. 19. That will be followed by the Nuclear Posture Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review, both expected in February. The National Military Strategy is best thought of as the operational version of the National Defense Strategy, outlining how the military will execute the goals laid out in the NDS. Hence, with a new National Defense Strategy must come changes to the National Military Strategy. So what might change under Dunford’s second crack at the NMS? The chairman made it sound like it will largely involve coloring in details that were already laid out in the previous document, particularly around the analysis of the “4+1” challenges to America – China, Russia, North Korea, Iran and violent extremism. There is good reason to keep big-picture strategy documents, where broad contexts and big ideas are presented – however lofty and inconsequential they may seem to the initiated – accessible for everyone. But those details may not make it to the public. As with the 2016 document, Dunford will be keeping the military strategy classified, with only a partial version released to the public. That was the first time in two decades the NMS had been classified, but the chairman intends to follow that path again. “It’s about plans. And so you want to classify those,” Dunford said. “We’ll come out certainly with an unclassified description of it, so that we’re transparent – as we were last time… The ‘how-to-deal-with-that’ in our campaign plans and operations plans is the part that needs to be classified.” As to timing, Dunford joked he would love to have the document done next week, but acknowledged it would likely take months before the document is finalized. “We’re going to work on that really hard. We’re going to work on that really hard. That is a main focus for 2018, is to get that thing done,” he said. “Look, I don’t want to put a date on the calendar, but it’s not February or March. “This will be a deliberative process, but we got a jumpstart on it. But it’s certainly months away from publishing.”

#### It solves - NMS is binding and prescribes specific objectives as well means and resources

Army War College 15 SSI – Army War College, June 2015, [https://ssl.armywarcollege.edu/dde/documents/jsps/terms/nms.cfm] bcr 9-21-2018

The NMS, signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the National Defense Strategy (NDS). It is a biennial report that describes the Armed Forces' plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides the vision for ensuring they remain decisive in the future. It also provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts from which the Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs identify desired capabilities and against which the Chairman assesses risk. Title 10 U.S. Code prescribes specific contents for the National Military Strategy report, including the strategy itself, the strategic environment, threats, military objectives, means for meeting those objectives, and required resources.

#### The NMS executes provision and withdrawal of military aid - DoD controls resources and personnel – it NEVER touches Congress

BINETTI 8 A Monograph by MAJ Michael R. Binetti United States Army, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas AY 2008 ["Institutionalizing Security Force Assistance ", https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a484764.pdf] bcr 12-4-2018

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE GUIDANCE Security assistance is very complex, derived from many different inputs and executed through many different outputs. The President of the United States, through the National Security Council (NSC), produce the National Security Strategy (NSS) outlining the major areas of concern and very broad ideas to address the issues and convey additional national level guidance through such documents as the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The resources used to execute these goals are predicated on the amount of funding expected from the Congress. These documents are used in the development of other policy guidance such as the National Defense Strategy which in turn provides guidance for the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism and the National Military Strategy. Even though the Department of States is responsible for direct foreign military aid, the Department of Defense is essentially subcontracted to provide security assistance. For example, in FY 2005, the DoD managed approximately $4.7 billion of total foreign aid spending.84 This necessitates the Secretary of Defense also publish Security Cooperation Guidance to provide guidance to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and combatant commanders, while the Department of State is responsible for publishing its Strategic Plan. While not directly stated in the DoS Strategic Plan, they allude to the large role the DoD plays in the execution of SA, stating, *Defense coordinates closely on counterterrorism and counter-narcotics programs, and provides the military-to-military contacts, assistance, and training that strengthen military and alliance relationships, play an important role in the management of arms transfers and the Excess Defense Articles program, and support the evacuation of non-combatants from crisis or disaster sites….85* Each Combatant Commander (CC) is responsible for developing their individual Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) as part of their larger theater strategy. It incorporates the national, defense and military strategies customized for the specific geographic combatant commanders’ area and is therefore ideally nested with higher guidance and regionally focused.86 The combatant commander’s theater strategy should be developed in conjunction with the Department of State (DoS) country team but because of different geographical boundaries, the DoS country teams representatives being military members and the combatant commander having great authority, the strategy is not always properly nested.87 Each US Embassy, under the Security Assistance Officer (SAO) soon to be Security Cooperation Officer (SCO), is supposed to develop a two year training plan for the country that is also nested with the CC. While it is the DoS that possess the authority for international engagement, it is the DoD that has the resources and as a result the DoD tends to have a larger voice than the DoS in execution.88 Each CC must submit their TSCP to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for annual review, but there is no national level process that ensures all the CCs TSCPs are nested or unified across the JIIM. riorities.”90 89 A recent report to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations noted that aid programs run by both the DoS and DoD, “..are in need of strong guidance from the embassies if they are to be coordinated with other programs the U.S. Government is supporting and are to be consistent with U.S. foreign policy priorities.”90

### Congress Normal Means

#### Congress is normal means

BBC 18BBC, Reality Check: How can a US president cut off foreign aid?” BBC. January 5, 2018. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42557818>

**So what are the ways in which a US administration can cut off foreign aid? The answer is complicated**, and depends on the type of aid, as well as the specific country or group receiving it. So it would be almost impossible for the president to cut off aid from all 128 countries that voted for the UN resolution in one fell swoop. **Holding the purse strings It is** the US **Congress, not the president, that has the final say** **on the foreign aid budget. Because all spending has to be signed off by Congress, it "holds the power of the purse strings**", says Erin Collinson from the Center for Global Development, a non-partisan think tank based in Washington and London. **Congress can approve or alter the administration's budgetary proposals and can also specify in substantial detail where it wants the aid to go - even if that's in opposition to what the president wants.** However, in situations where Congress has not gone into specifics, an administration has a considerable amount of flexibility about how exactly it spends the allocated budget - although it has to notify Congress of its intentions. In the case of cutting aid to the Palestinians, [US officials told the Associated Press](https://apnews.com/014efbb86511429d9c09c818a76f58e0/Trump-threatens-to-cut-off-US-aid-to-Palestinian-Authority) that one option for Mr Trump would be to reroute aid which would normally go directly to the Palestinian Authorities to other NGOs working directly with the US Agency for International Development. In some cases, Congress will attach conditions to foreign aid, which could allow the president to stop it without having to run it by Congress. For example, in the case of Pakistan, most aid is conditional on the US secretary of state certifying that certain conditions - mostly related to counter-terrorism cooperation - are being met. This gives the administration the power to hold back the aid, by refusing to do that. In fact, the Trump administration has already held back foreign aid to Pakistan under these conditions. In September it [withheld $255m (£188m) in military aid](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-42536209)to the country, precisely by claiming it was not meeting its counter-terrorism obligations. What aid to Pakistan is being suspended? The $255m [is approximately a third of total US aid to Pakistan](https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/PAK) - other aid covers funds for education, energy, food and health. Although the US ambassador to the UN said recently that President Trump was willing to stop all funding, the State Department said that civilian assistance programmes were not included in the suspension. The US also sends millions of dollars through the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) - this is military assistance that reimburses Pakistan for counter-terrorism operations, and is not counted as US foreign aid. [Reuters quoted the Pentagon as saying up to $900m in CSF had been authorised for the 2017 fiscal year](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pakistan-aid/u-s-suspends-at-least-900-million-in-security-aid-to-pakistan-idUSKBN1ET2DX), and that this was being frozen. State Department officials said they could not yet put a dollar value on how much aid was being cut in total, and told reporters that "the suspension is not a permanent cut-off at this time". **What if there's a stalemate? Often any disagreements between the administration and Congress are worked out informally**, says Curt Tarnoff of the US Congressional Research Service. **If they aren't** - for example, **if the president refuses to spend the money specifically requested by Congress** - a process called **impoundment could be triggered.** **The matter could end up being decided in the Supreme Court.**

### NB – Faster

#### Internal Solvency Net-benefit – JCS will drag their feet on legislative mandate, using existing documents is key to effective implementation

DONNITHORNE 13 Jeffrey Donnithorne, Dissertation – Philosophy PhD @ Georgetown U, 2013 [“PRINCIPLED AGENTS: SERVICE CULTURE, BARGAINING, AND AGENCY IN AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS,” <https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/559479/Donnithorne_georgetown_0076D_12323.pdf?sequence=1>] bcr 11-25-2016

Lastly, the aspect of my theory dealing with the anticipated agency environment finds some support during this time period as well. The JCS and the military services made a concerted effort to enact meaningful reforms within the existing legislative environment, eager to avoid widespread legislative changes. These efforts were motivated in part by a desire to be left alone by Congress and to make sure that any changes to the military institution came from the inside, not the outside. Viewed through the lens of anticipated agency, however, a complementary perspective can be seen as well. By enacting meaningful and seemingly goodfaith reform efforts internally, the JCS did not object to the substance of certain reforms; instead, the chiefs objected to the prospect of specific and durable legislation that would create a new agency contract. Consequently, the unified opposition from the JCS focused less on substance and more on form. The principal objections centered on the durable and binding nature of the contract—new legislation—rather than the policy changes that could be accommodated within the existing agency contract. Civil-military policymaking, as an instance of principal-agent contract negotiation, appears to involve the form of that contract as much as its substance.

### NMS=Works+Classified

#### NMS is classified and it works – it outline specific means to achieving blueprint of the NDS

KELLEY 18 Patrick Kelley, Defense Reporter at CQ Roll Call – Education: The Johns Hopkins University - Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Master’s Degree Field Of Study American Foreign Policy and International Economics, Roll Call, 2-5-2018, ["Top Pentagon Brass to Brief Lawmakers on New Strategies", https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/top-pentagon-brass-brief-lawmakers-new-strategies] bcr 9-21-2018

The National Defense Strategy and the Nuclear Posture Review are the latest in a series of four documents intended to act as a blueprint for national security policy during the Trump administration. The two documents follow the December release of the National Security Strategy, a wide-ranging strategic framework crafted by the National Security Council. The final document in the strategic quartet will be the National Military Strategy, a classified report conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that provides guidance for how the military should carry out its strategy.

### NMS Governs Aid/A2 DoS

#### Military aid is provided by the DoD which makes the NMS CP appropriate – don’t buy state department arguments, they’re responsible for other assistance like economics and development

BEARAK & GAMIO 16 MAX BEARAK Africa bureau chief based in Nairobi Education: Carleton College, BA in international relationsAND LAZARO GAMIO made interactive graphics for The Washington Post | Published in The Washington Post | Published: October 22, 2016 ["What you should know about US foreign assistance", https://www.stripes.com/news/us/what-you-should-know-about-us-foreign-assistance-1.435436] bcr 12-4-2018

We have laid out where the $42.4 billion will go in 2017. The money comes from the State and Defense departments and a slew of other agencies. But it would be wrong to think that "security assistance" comes entirely from the DoD. Security assistance is a broader term than so-called military aid because this financial support is often extended to other types of security forces such as anti-narcotic or trafficking units. Actually, only about half the security assistance budget is provided by the DoD. That mostly derives from programs directly tied to military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, such as the Afghan Security Forces Fund and the Iraq Train and Equip Fund. Deals like last month's with Israel, on the other hand, come from the State Department. In that case, the U.S. government is essentially financing Israel's military purchases. Under the current agreement, Israel can spend 26 percent of that money on military equipment produced in Israel, but the new deal, which starts in 2019, gradually phases out that stipulation. Then, like every other country, Israel will have to spend all the assistance money on American defense contractors. In other words, U.S. foreign military financing is essentially a way of subsidizing its domestic defense industry while strengthening the military capabilities of its strategic allies. Economic and development assistance is almost entirely provided through the State Department's budget. This includes the budgets for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Peace Corps, reserve funds for disaster relief, funds geared toward specific objectives, such as preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS, and bilateral economic assistance packages. This economic and development assistance cartogram, which is a fancy word for a map specifically geared toward a comparative display of statistics, shows American aid spread out among more than 100 countries and therefore vaguely resembles a normal map. Seven African countries feature among the top-10 recipients of economic assistance. Most of the money given to those countries is funneled toward health initiatives, particularly HIV/AIDS treatment and research. The biggest recipient, however, is Afghanistan, where the United States is hoping to win over hearts and minds with all kinds of development assistance after 15 years of military quagmire there. As opposed to the broad dispersal of economic development funds, the security assistance cartogram demonstrates the targeted nature of the American national military strategy. A swath of countries from Egypt to Pakistan - excluding Iran, of course - receive the vast majority of U.S. security assistance.

### Classification=Shield

#### Classification shields the link – it’s politically discreet, prevents snooping adversaries and provides more effective execution

CLARK 16 Colin Clark, the only person to create two successful all-online defense news websites, Breaking Defense and DoDBuzz. Breaking Defense has become the go-to place for senior defense officials like Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work, ATL Undersecretary Frank Kendall and others to talk with us so we can tell Congress, the rest of the Pentagon and the American taxpayer what the US military is doing and why. Breaking Defense, 9-21-2016, ["CJCS Dunford Calls For Strategic Shifts; ‘At Peace Or At War Is Insufficient’", https://breakingdefense.com/2016/09/cjcs-dunford-calls-for-strategic-shifts-at-peace-or-at-war-is-insufficient/] bcr 9-21-2018

NATIONAL HARBOR: The increasingly “adversarial” relationships with Russia and China are forcing the Pentagon to classify its previously public National Military Strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says. Classification will allow bolder and more specific discussions of how to manage those relationships and our responses to them, Gen. Joe Dunford told the annual Air Force Association conference here. “This year’s National Military Strategy will be classified so we can focus on these four-plus-one challenges and the five domains we are dealing with,” Dunford told the audience at the annual Air Force Association conference. (“Four plus one” refers to four nation-states — Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea — plus the enduring but ever-mutating problem of Islamic extremism, once exemplified by al-Qaeda but now embodied by the so-called Islamic State, aka Daesh. The five domains are the land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace). Russia (our top threat), China, and Iran use “economic coercion, political influence, unconventional warfare information ops, cyber ops to advance their interests and they do it in a way that they know we don’t have an effective response,” Dunford said. “They, unlike us, are able to integrate the full range of capabilities their states possess to advance their interests.” “Our traditional approach where we are either at peace or at war is insufficient to deal with that dynamic,” Dunford said. The current reality is more “an adversarial competition with a military dimension short of armed conflict.” These threats increasingly cut across the regional commands that dominate US military warfighting plans and resourcing. Key to better managing such cross-cutting threats is improving the ability of the Defense Secretary to work with the wide swath of functional and regional commanders, from Strategic and Cyber Commands to Central and Northern and Pacific Commands. Dunford has advocated for a stronger Joint Staff to handle “transnational” threats. To illustrate the need for change, Dunford pointed to North Korea. In the past, war plans assumed the fight was limited to the Korean peninsula. Now North Korea boasts ballistic missiles, cyber capabilities and submarines that are likely to very quickly drive the fight far beyond the peninsula. “I personally don’t believe the current planning and organizational construct or command and control are optimized for the current fight,” Dunford thinks. “What really is required is global integration.” That doesn’t mean the Defense Secretary will be watching a screen showing all US and allied forces and telling them what to do, Dunford assured the audience at AFA. Today, the chairman says, Defense Secretary Ash Carter is faced with a “cacophony of voices” from combatant and functional commanders, Dunford offered no details as to how this might change. Future wars will require decision superiority in a time of fast-paced conflicts across multiple domains. Raytheon exec Rick Yuse outlines 5 advanced technology enablers to gain critical advantage. What is clear is that this chairman is pushing hard and discreetly for major changes to how the US military is organized, how it is commanded and how America’s military will be used as an instrument

## Demining PIC

### 1NC – General

#### CP Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase funding for demining programs.

#### The United States should end all other military aid.

#### It’s competitive

ICIJ 7 The Int'l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, “A citizen’s guide to understanding U.S. foreign military aid,” [http://www.publicintegrity.org/2007/05/22/5772/citizen-s-guide-understanding-us-foreign-military-aid /](http://www.publicintegrity.org/2007/05/22/5772/citizen-s-guide-understanding-us-foreign-military-aid%20/) MM

For the “Collateral Damage” investigative study, the Center for Public Integrity created a database that tracks a subset of those financial flows: taxpayer-funded programs or assistance that contribute to a nation’s offensive military capabilities. The database does not include certain large nuclear non-proliferation programs or expenditures such as Foreign Military Sales or Direct Commercial Sales, which are not supported directly with taxpayer dollars. The database is also limited to tracking funds appropriated to either the Defense Department or the State Department. For this report, these are the criteria for “foreign military assistance” or “foreign military aid.” Funds appropriated to the State Department and Defense Department represent the vast majority of unclassified military aid and assistance. This report does not attempt to track smaller overseas programs where funding is appropriated to the Justice Department, Drug Enforcement Agency, or Department of Homeland Security. The public does not have any way of tracking classified programs administered by the U.S. intelligence community. These classified programs likely command large amounts of funding, especially after the 9/11 attacks, and oversight is limited to members of congressional intelligence committees. Programs included in the Center’s database: Coalition Support Funds (CSF): created after 9/11 to reimburse key allied countries for providing assistance to the U.S. in the global war on terror. Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP): created after 9/11 to give the Defense Department its own funding to train and educate foreign military officers in counterterrorism techniques. In practice, CTFP has evolved into a program very similar to IMET (see definition below). Department of Defense Counterdrug Funding: assists foreign militaries and security forces to combat drug trafficking around the world; also known as Section 1004 appropriations. Economic Support Fund (ESF): provides grants to foreign governments to support economic stability. ESF is often used for non-military purposes, but the grants are commonly viewed as a way to help offset military expenditures. They have historically been earmarked for key security allies of the United States. Israel and Egypt are the two largest recipients of ESF. Foreign Military Financing (FMF): finances foreign governments’ acquisition of U.S. military articles, services and training. International Military Education and Training (IMET): educates foreign military personnel on issues ranging from democracy and human rights to technical military techniques and training on U.S. weapons systems. International Narcotics and Law Enforcement/Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI): the primary State Department funding effort for countering drugs, including the large Colombian initiatives. Military Assistance Program (MAP): provides military material and services to foreign countries; the U.S. government is not reimbursed. MAP includes “emergency drawdowns,” which are emergency transfers authorized by the president for weapons, ammunition, parts and military equipment to foreign governments. Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related Activities (NADR): supports de-mining, anti-terrorism, and nonproliferation training and assistance. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO): supports programs that improve foreign militaries’ peacekeeping capabilities.

#### US efforts are key

Dugan 12 Emily Dugan, Chief Reporter of The Independent. With a reputation for exclusives and powerful reportage, News Reporter of the Year at the 2015 British Press Award, reported from across the world, including Afghanistan, the Central African Republic and Libya. Her investigations into the Criminal Courts Charge - and successful campaign to overthrow it, Her investigations into human trafficking have twice been awarded Best Investigative Article at the Anti-Slavery Day Media Awards and her human rights journalism was shortlisted for the Gaby Rado Memorial prize at the 2012 Amnesty Media Awards 10-14-2012, "IoS Investigation: The shocking truth about landmines," Independent, [https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/ios-investigation-the-shocking-truth-about-landmines-8210468.html /](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/ios-investigation-the-shocking-truth-about-landmines-8210468.html%20/) MM

The landmine belongs to another era – or so many of us like to believe. We think of it as an evil all but consigned to history by the entreaties of Diana, Princess of Wales, and a Nobel prize-winning campaign for a ban. But after years of steady decline in the number of casualties, the numbers harmed by landmines is on the rise again. In 2010-11 at least 4,191 people were maimed or killed by landmines, the first increase in the annual toll for seven years. Of these, at least 1,155 died of their injuries. This year is expected to be even worse. The events of **the Arab Spring** have **contributed** to this, **with Syria, Libya and Yemen** all **laying new mines**. Last year the confirmed use of mines by state forces reached its highest level since 2004. In Libya alone, there were 184 casualties from mines or explosive remnants of war (ERW), up from just one in 2010. This year Syrian forces have been placing landmines near the borders with Lebanon and Turkey, and civilian casualties have already been reported to Human Rights Watch. There is evidence that fresh mines have also been laid in Yemen. Even in places such as Angola, where landmines have been in the ground for decades – and whose minefields looked destined to be cleared after Diana visited in 1997 – casualties has risen, with 89 people harmed or killed by mines last year, double the number in 2010. Two years ago the British government abandoned the funding of de-mining projects in Angola, Colombia and Somalia. Guy Willoughby, the chief executive of Halo, the charity supported by Princess Diana, said: "There is donor fatigue. Princess Diana would be dismayed to think that almost 16 years after her visit I would be standing up and saying Angola needs another 10 to 15 years' clearance, and possibly longer if there's any further donor fatigue. The clearance time is dependent on the number of de-miners you can hire." Dignitaries from around the world will gather in New York on Friday to celebrate 20 years since campaigners formed the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). Eighty per cent of the world – 160 countries – has now joined the Mine Ban Treaty, which won the ICBL the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. When the group first met in 1992, 20,000 people were being hurt or killed by landmines every year. Now the number is less than a quarter of that, but experts are concerned that **governments have got complacent**. Nick Roseveare, the chief executive of the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), said: "Sadly, **last year** was the first year where **more landmines were being laid on a dramatic scale**. In the Syria conflict there's more evidence of landmines used, and in Gaddafi's Libya. More countries have been putting landmines into the ground, and that is inevitably going to lead to more casualties." Despite the stigma created by a worldwide treaty, landmines are still mass-produced – primarily in Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran. There are still about 110 million landmines in the ground today, according to estimates – hidden killers that would cost some £18bn to remove.Mr Roseeare fears that political support to tackle the problem may be waning. "There has to be a continued, dramatic increase in support by rich countries to solve this problem and fulfil the commitments of the treaty," he said. "But we're seeing donors disengaging from places like Angola. We regret that enormously. It's 15 years since Princess Diana walked in the minefields of Angola and there's still a huge problem."

#### The impact is massive

Tepe 11 Lecturer in European Studies and German at King's College London [Daniela Tepe, December 2011, The Myth about Global Civil Society: Domestic Politics to Ban Landmines] page 77-79

**Landmines** are among the most deadly weapons in the contemporary world. These weapons have **killed** more people than nuclear, chemical and biological weapons combined and their development and produc- tion is significantly cheaper. The price to produce a mine generally ranges from US $3 to US $30 per mine (Beier and Crosby 1998: 280). Although it is difficult to assess the precise figures of casualties from landmines (Maslen 2004: 27), the ICRC has estimated that every year 26,000 people are wounded or killed by landmines, including many civilians (ICRC 1996). **Many victims are not included in any data**, as the recording of victims relies on them being able to access medical care, which for many is out of reach. Shocking data exists from the most heavily mined countries. Cambodia, for example, recorded more than 54,000 people maimed or killed by mines or unexploded ordnances (UXOs) between 1979 and 2002. Or, as recorded by the Vietnamese Minister of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs in September 1999 ’at least 38,248 people had been killed and 64,064 people injured in landmine/UXO accidents since the end of the Vietnam War in April 1975 - indicting an average of 4448 deaths of injuries a year’ (Maslen 2004: 28). While the majority of victims of anti-personnel mines during actual conflict are men; children and women are disproportionately affected by mines and UXOs follow- ing the cessation of conflict. Among the countries most affected by mines are some of the World’s poorest with exact estimates difficult to make. The landmines campaign decided at a meeting in Montreux, Switzerland, in 1993 that the figure they would deal with would be 100 million mines. In the same year, the US Department of State published a report Called Hidden Killers that supported the campaign’s claim by estimating that between 65 and 110 million mines were hidden in more that 65 countries. The Department of State Report and the UN Secretariat to the General Assembly took on this figure as a reference point. The figure ’has been widely used and reused, a mantra that for several years became an uncontested reality, a compel- ling call to action’ (Maslen 2004: 24). In 1998, the US State Department stated that ’between 85 million and 90 million landmines are currently implanted in the soil of at least 62 nations’ (US State Department 1998, in Vines 1998: 121). It became obvious that the figures Were highly inaccurate, relying mainly on data and estimations provided by affected countries interested in inflating the numbers to claim higher funding for mine clearance. 'As time Went on, even some of those heading the cam- paigns against anti-personnel mines began to realise that the figure of 100 million was inflated, and probably grossly inflated. Yet the decision was taken, rather disingenuously, to remain silent’ (Maslen 2004: 25). No accurate data exists even today. Where several governments, NGOs as well as the UN General Assembly acknowledge that the figure of 100 million is wrong, there remains no indication from reliable sources as to the extent of this inaccuracy. This, nevertheless, does not downsize the problem that **explosive devices cause when lying forgotten in the soil**. As Maslen (2004: 25) puts it: Yet - and here is the grain of truth that remained obscured - although the 100 million figure for mines appears to have been widely inaccurate, the overall global problem of explosive remnants of wars surely surpasses it. No one knows how many abandoned or unexploded bombs, grenades, shells and rockets pollute the earth’s surface, but the figure is certainly gigantic. The variety of mines ranges from small blast mines that explode by foot Contact to so-called butterfly mines that look like toys. In order to explode they must be bent or twisted. The injuries caused also differ between types of mines: While some are designed to affect the lower part of body such as legs and genitals, others are designed to kill everything radius (see Cameron et al. 1998: Zi). The construction of anti-personnel (AP) mines is intended with the aim of maiming rather than killing their victims. ’The reason behind this lies in the macabre logics of the battlefield; it requires more effort to care for an injured soldier than for an already dead one’ (2007: 60) In addition to causing physical harm, **mines cause emotional harm** to their victims. Examples are the so-Called lifelong phantom pain for the victims or amputations resulting in low self-esteem and/or depression. in addition to the personal costs to the victims and their families and friends, landmines cause socio-economic costs that are just as severe. Landmines destroy life and habitat. Years after a crisis or War, Crucial **agricultural and living spaces remain mined and therefore leave civilians unable to return to their routines** (Wisotzki and Müller 1997). Furthermore, because of the proliferation of low-intensity warfare since the 1975 the usage of AP mines has increased. Being cheap and easily available to governments as well as guerrilla troops alike, mines, next to automatic rifles, became 'the Weapon of choice’ for both (Vines 1998: 120). Demining is difficult, time consuming, dangerous and costly. According to Wisotzki and Müller, one can buy a cheap plastic mine for no more than US $3 While the removal of one costs between US $300 and US $1000. While demining technology exists, humanitar- ian demining remains the only sufficient method for declaring areas safe. Companies that use or produce landmines are among those who produce the technology for demining. Partly they even receive govern- mental funding for the development of demining techniques. ’In 1996, for example, Westinghouse and Raytheon, the latter being a major producer of AP mines, competed for US Department of Defence con- tracts worth between US $40 million and US $50 million for research and development in the area of airborne detection systems’ (Beier and Crosby 1998: 282). UN standards ask for a clearance rate of 99.6 per cent While mine technology is not able to consistently destroy more than eight mines out of ten (Hubert 1998: 314).

#### There’s precedent and solvency

King 12 (First female Commandant of the US Army, Sergeant Major in the US Army, “USARAF participates in humanitarian mining program,” US Army Africa, 11/30, http://www.usaraf.army.mil/NEWS/NEWS\_121130\_dmn.html)

VICENZA, Italy – What started as a tasking from Africa Command eventually lead to a tremendous opportunity for U.S. Army Africa to help detect landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Africa in an effort to reduce loss of innocent lives and increase economic development. Humanitarian Mine Action program helps foreign nations train their local demining cadre to help clear areas littered with landmines and ERW from the aftermath of several decades of civil war. Partner nations with landmine problems request the program through the Department of State. Maj. Jennifer Smith, a plans officer in USARAF Plans, Operations and Training, is also the command’s HMA coordinator. To date, USARAF has completed eight HMA missions in Chad, the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Smith said USARAF’s role in the HMA program is to ensure their African counterparts are able to take training received from U.S. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Soldiers and train their own local EOD technicians to international standards. “[The HMA program] is a train-the-trainer program to [help] build the capacity of our partner nation so they can take care of their own landmine and explosive remnants of war problems,” Smith, a Greensburg, Pa. native said. Classes in the HMA program include demining, ordnance identification, explosives safety and theory, metal detector operations, demolitions, physical security, stockpile classes, medical training and one-~~man~~ person drills in a 21-day program of instruction. On average, each class has 20 students. Smith said training not only highlights relationships between the United States and Africa, it also allows her to develop a mutual respect and understand of African soldiers. “[This training] shows there’s a partnership between the U.S. and partner nations and it’s a way to show by example what a professional military looks like. They [African soldiers] have a lot of challenges in their countries, not only landmines but in the structure of the military, things we take for granted. I think it takes a lot of courage to show up every day and be interested in a subject even though you’re not sure you’re going to get paid for it. They keep a really positive mindset in spite of their uncertain careers,” Smith said. Smith said she enjoys returning to the continent to see students continually and routinely engaged in the program. In Chad, Smith said students have been going out on their own to conduct operations and eliminate landmines and unexploded ordnance to improve the quality of life for their citizens, which Smith feels is great progress. “I like this program because it’s not very expensive for the Department of Defense to run, yet out of all their reconstruction efforts I’ve been a part of, I feel like [the HMA program] is the most effective and has the greatest chance to build actual capacity in the country. It’s slow progress, but it’s better than building a million dollar school we don’t have books or teachers for. Training-the-trainer is always a good approach,” Smith said. In the future, Smith said she hopes the program will start to teach preventive instruction within the local communities, in addition to the technical training. “We’re hoping to expand into victim’s assistance and mine risk education. If that happens, our numbers will probably increase because we will have concurrent training squads,” Smith said.

### 1NC – Regime Competition

#### X regime is competitive

EIU 18 “Democracy Index.” 2018. <https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/>

\*\*Evaluated on electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture

167=Most Authoritarian, 116=Least Authoritarian

167 North Korea 166 Syria 165 Chad 164 Central African Republic 163 Democratic Republic of Congo 162 Turkmenistan 161 Equatorial Guinea 159 Saudi Arabia 159 Tajikistan 158 Uzbekistan 157 Guinea-Bissau 156 Yemen 155 Sudan 154 Libya 153 Burundi 151 Eritrea 151 Laos 150 Iran 149 Afghanistan 148 Azerbaijan 147 United Arab Emirates 146 Bahrain 145 Djibouti 144 Swaziland 143 Oman 142 Togo 141 Kazakhstan 140 Vietnam 139 China 138 Belarus 137 Guinea 136 Zimbabwe 135 Russia 133 Rwanda 133 Qatar 132 Republic of the Congo 131 Cuba 130 Egypt 129 Ethiopia 128 Algeria 126 Cameroon 126 Gabon 125 Angola 124 Cambodia 123 Comoros 122 Niger 121 Mauritania 120 Myanmar 119 Kuwait 117 Venezuela 117 Jordan 116 Ivory Coast

### 1NC – Aid Competition

#### Demining is a part of military assistance

Blanchard, 8 (Analyst in Africa Affairs, MA in Security Studies from Georgetown, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” *CRS Report for Congress*, CRS-17, 4-10-2008, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/104287.pdf)

U.S. Military Assistance and Security Cooperation in Africa: An Expanding Role

The Department of Defense conducts a wide variety of activities in Africa in support of U.S. national interests. Operational activities may include, but are not limited to, humanitarian relief,61 peacekeeping, counter-narcotics, sanctions enforcement, demining, non-combatant evacuations (NEOs), and maritime interdiction operations (MIOs).

### 1NC – Inherency-esque Competition

#### It competes - “Ought not” in the resolution means prohibition

Scheffler 92, Samuel, Human Morality, [https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2940972 /](https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2940972%20/) MM

First some terminological matters. I will call the judgment that a particular act is morally required, permissible, or prohibited an overall moral verdict about that act. I will treat judgments about what agents ought to do, or about what it would be right for them to do, as equivalent to judgments about what they are morally required to do. And I will treat judgments about what agents ought not to do, or about what it would be wrong for them to do, as equivalent to judgments about what they are morally prohibited from doing. Finally, it will be helpful to distinguish between a narrow use and a broad use of the term ‘moral consideration’. Used narrowly, it may refer to any consideration that is cast in what would ordinarily be regarded as explicitly or overtly moral terms. In this usage, moral considerations include verdictive considerations about what one ought or ought not to do, about what is morally required or forbidden, and so on, as well as more specific evidential considerations, such as considerations of rights, fairness, equality, and the like, which support but do not constitute overall moral verdicts.1 Used broadly, the term ‘moral consideration’ may refer either to a verdictive consideration or to any consideration that supports an overall moral verdict, whether or not the supporting consideration is formulated in explicitly moral terms. Consider, for example, the rescue case discussed in the previous chapter. If we suppose that it is permissible for the man to save his wife precisely because she is his wife, then the consideration that she is his wife counts as a moral consideration in the broad but not in the narrow usage. For our present purposes, the important thing to note is that, in raising the question of how moral considerations arc to be conceived of as impinging on agents’ deliberations, it is the role of overtly moral considerations—moral considerations narrowly understood—that we are inquiring about. For it is primarily the possibility of assigning too large a role to those considerations that generates the threat of an overly moralized conception of deliberation. With these remarks as background, let me now distinguish among five different ways in which overtly moral considerations may impinge on an agent’s deliberations about what to do.2 (30)

### 1NC – Saudi Arabia

#### Houthi landmines cause inhumane civilian casualties

**Kirkpatrick 19** David D Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, 2-18-2019, "Land mines block Saudi-led assault in Yemen, killing civilians," No Publication, [https://bdnews24.com/world/middle-east/2019/02/18/land-mines-block-saudi-led-assault-in-yemen-killing-civilians](https://bdnews24.com/world/middle-east/2019/02/18/land-mines-block-saudi-led-assault-in-yemen-killing-civilians%20/)

Nearly four years after Saudi Arabia plunged into Yemen’s civil war, Saudi and Yemeni commanders say hundreds of thousands of unmarked land mines planted by their opponents, the Houthis, have emerged as perhaps their most formidable defence. The hidden explosives, the commanders say, have helped keep the conflict close to a standstill despite the superior air power and other resources of the Saudi-led coalition. The mines have also killed as many as 920 civilians and wounded thousands, according to mine removal experts. Rights groups and other monitors say the minefields will leave Yemen riddled with buried explosives that could kill or maim unsuspecting civilians for decades before the devices can all be removed, as they have in Afghanistan, Colombia and Cambodia. “The scale of the problem is exceptionally large, and the impact is horrendous,” said Loren Persi Vicentic of Landmine Monitor, an independent nonprofit group. “Most of the casualties we see reported are civilians.” A Western mine-removal company hired by the Saudis estimates that the Houthis have laid more than 1 million mines, more than one for every 30 Yemenis and a concentration as high as that in any other country since World War II.

### 1NC – Myanmar

#### Myanmar is cluttered with mines

Smith 19 (Andy Smith. Mine action specialist Specialist in Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) covering:ERW hazards in HMA, including IEDs, project design and management, manual and mechanical demining procedures, detection technologies, tools and procedures, accidents and injury avoidance (risk management), training in HMA activities,International Mine Action Standards (IMAS),the integration of HMA activities with post-conflict peace-building efforts;, protective equipment for HMA, survey and Land Release. International, xx-xx-xxxx, "Why is there no demining in Mynamar," No Publication, <https://www.nolandmines.com/No%20demining%20in%20Myanmar.html>) AB

In 2019 Myanmar/ Burma still had lots of mines, many well recorded civilian casualties and intense outside scrutiny, yet there is no Humanitarian Demining happening? Why is that? Burma/Myanmar has endured the longest civil war of the last century, with many of its provinces (States) in more or less constant conflict with the central government in Rangoon for 60+ years. Enter the diplomats (especially the USA) and, encouraged by the international community, the Generals in government took off their uniforms and formally began a new era of democracy and peace in 2011. It is seven years since a ceasefire was agreed with most rebel groups and the main Humanitarian Mine Action agencies moved into the capital city to get Mine Action going. A National Mine Action Centre was established in Rangoon – but then they discovered that the agreements they had signed with the government meant that they could not actually demine anywhere until the Peace Accord had been ratified. I am told that the Rangoon office still stands empty. After considerable negotiation, they were permitted to organize some Mine Risk Education but the army is still in control and routinely turns away MRE workers when they try to cross into the affected areas, so not much MRE is actually happening. One may ask whether MRE delivered by people who do not know the devices (many improvised locally) or understand the conflict is really only a face saving exercise? The people know the threats which they and their livestock live with – and they simply want them removed. In areas without a power supply or shops, it is not an option for them to avoid gathering cooking wood, or avoid digging the land to grow their own food. Experience has shown that MRE and survey combined could have a place... but not without the means to follow up with actions to remove/destroy devices that none of those in the area want left in place.

### 1NC – Egypt

#### Egypt is cluttered with mines – that causes innocent deaths

Ahmed 19 Amira Sayed Ahmed, Amira Sayed Ahmed is a Cairo-based freelance journalist and full-time editor of local news at The Egyptian Gazette2-11-2019, "Cairo seeks international help to clear millions of land mines," Al-Monitor, [https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/02/egypt-alamein-landmines-clear-international-support.html /](https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/02/egypt-alamein-landmines-clear-international-support.html%20/) MM

Though World War II ended almost 75 years ago, residents of Egypt's coastal city of Alamein still live with the danger of land mines left behind, a matter that prompted parliament to rekindle the call for more international cooperation. On Jan. 29, the parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee met with Ahmad al-Fadhli, director of disarmament affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They plan to review Egyptian diplomatic efforts to deal with the land mine issue in Alamein region, and interact with the relevant countries. During the meeting, they also discussed the importance of enhancing international cooperation to provide Egypt with the modern techniques needed to fully clear the region. Committee secretary Tarek el-Khouli said in a press statement that Egypt isn't using all its tools to deal with this vital issue, given its broad international relations. Khouli urged Foreign Ministry representatives to develop a new approach to the land mines issue and submit a comprehensive report. The Second Battle of Alamein began in October 1942 between the Allied forces, led by British Marshal Bernard Montgomery, and the Axis forces, led by German Gen. Erwin Rommel. The defeat of the latter was a turning point in World War II and prevented Adolf Hitler and his Italian ally Benito Mussolini from conquering Alexandria and the Suez Canal. Alamein, in northwestern Egypt, lies about 60 miles west of the port of Alexandria. Currently, a specialized unit of the Egyptian army based near Alamein conducts daily mine-clearance operations. According to the State Information Service, some 17.5 million land mines from World War II were left behind, covering more than 250,000 acres of arable land along Egypt's north coast and Sinai. The Egyptian-Israeli wars also left nearly 5.5 million mines in Sinai and the eastern desert. Of that total of 23 million, Egypt's armed forces' have removed about 1.3 million mines since 1995. Egypt is calling for international support for demining, especially around Alamein. The mines are hampering development of the area, in particular New Alamein city, one of the megaprojects being implemented under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Parliament member Mohamed el-Ghoul recently resubmitted a 2017 motion demanding financial compensation from the countries that participated in World War II, mainly Germany and Britain, for the massive effort necessary to remove the millions of mines planted in the western desert. “Years have passed since the second world war, and despite the silence of the guns and the reconciliation among the enemies of yesterday, Egypt and its people are still paying the price of a crime they did not commit," said Ghoul, who is a member of parliament’s Human Rights Committee. "Many people lost their lives or [were seriously wounded] because of a curse hidden in the sand: land mines."

### 1NC – Honduras

#### **Honduras has tens of thousands of mines that put civilians at risk – US aid works**

US State Dept. 04 (They do state diplomacy stuff. “U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Programs: Latin America:LATIN AMERICA-HONDURAS” August 2004. https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/2004/37231.htm)

The Landmine Problem As a result of conflict with neighboring countries, Honduras is infested with an estimated 15,000-35,000 landmines implanted along its borders with Nicaragua and El Salvador. Although the mined areas are not densely populated, civilian injuries are periodically reported. In 1998, Hurricane Mitch's high winds and heavy rains shifted previously marked minefields, making them even more difficult to locate and subsequently clear.

### 1NC – Ukraine

#### Ukraine is filled with landmines

**Unicef ’17** (United Nations Children’s Fund, “Press release 220,000 children threatened by mines and other explosive weapons in eastern Ukraine – UNICEF,” 12/21/2017, UNICEF, <https://www.unicef.org/media/media_102350.html>, accessed 4/26/19) KED

GENEVA/KYIV, 21 December 2017 – Eastern Ukraine is now one of the most mine-contaminated places on earth, endangering 220,000 children who live, play and go to and from school in areas littered with landmines, unexploded ordnance and other deadly explosive remnants of war, UNICEF warned today. “It is unacceptable that places where children could safely play less than four years ago are now riddled with deadly explosives,” said UNICEF Ukraine Representative Giovanna Barberis. “All parties to the conflict must immediately end the use of these gruesome weapons that have contaminated communities and put children in constant danger of injury and death.” Available data from January to November this year show on average one conflict-related child casualty a week along eastern Ukraine’s contact line – a 500 kilometre strip of land that divides government and non-government controlled areas and where fighting is most severe. Landmines, explosive remnants of war (ERW) and unexploded ordnance (UXO) were the leading cause of these child casualties, accounting for approximately two-thirds of all recorded injuries and deaths during the period. Leaving many children with lifelong disabilities.

#### Mil aid is key to demining in the most concentrated areas

**Liubchenkova 3/13** (Natalia, “There’s only one way to tackle Ukraine’s infestation of mines ... slowly,” 3/13/19, euronews, <https://www.euronews.com/2019/01/28/mine-ridden-areas-in-eastern-ukraine-face-deadly-threat>, accessed 4/26/19) KED

Experts say it costs around €2.5 to lay a mine but around €900 to clear it. After the end of the conflict, Ukraine will need at least 15 years to clear anti-personnel, anti-tank mines, unexploded missiles and other explosive remnants of war. This is only a prediction: the security situation does not allow any of the three NGOs to operate either directly on the line of contact, nor in territories occupied by the separatists. And that’s where the situation might be worst. “We have now established that there are 200 minefields across the Luhansk and Donetsk region, and there are obviously much more than that. The security situation prevents us from accessing the densest contaminated areas along the line of contact,” says HALO Trust regional director for Europe Nick Smart in an interview. Nevertheless, he continues, “We have been successful recently in accessing the 15 kilometre buffer zone from the line of contact. We are getting into highest impacted communities along those areas.”

### 2NR – A2 Not Military Aid

#### Err neg – our ev is a database of “U.S. taxpayer funded programs or assistance that contributes to a nation’s offensive military capabilities”—the offensive and military planks of our definition should bolster its weight.

### 2NR – A2 Humanitarian Aid

#### Err neg on inclusion over exclusion – there’s no universal consensus on military aid

Kanaan and Ghazzal 18 (Salah Ziyad Ghazzal- DISEC Chair, Fadi Kanaan- Secretary General, DISEC BACKGROUND GUIDE, 2018, BEYMUN, JKS)

Definition of Foreign Military Aid The definition of the term ‘military’ is significant to understanding the concept of FMA as it signifies acts executed by an armed force i.e. with weaponry, on behalf of the government—or a rebel force in cases of unregulated or faulty military aid—to fight an opposition. While there is no universal definition for the term FMA, it is acknowledged as any transfer aiming to strengthen the military capability of a nation and contribute in maintaining national security. Military aid is, therefore, a type of foreign aid but in the military context. In fact, foreign military aid is often documented as a percentage of a country’s foreign aid budget. Usually, the country providing the aid is referred to as a ‘donor country’ and the one receiving the aid is referred to as a ‘recipient country’. Accordingly, military aid can be monetary (i.e. in the form of transferring money to a recipient country so it can purchase weapons or other military equipment) or materialistic, such as through the temporary transfer of army to logistically assist the recipient country.

#### There’s *no distinction* between humanitarian and military aid

Stelzer 15 MAJ Paul, The United States Humanitarian Demining Program: Civilmilitary Relations in Humanitarian Demining, 2015, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1001874.pdf

The conditions in Afghanistan illustrate the difficulties in civil-military relations with respect to the HDP. Actions during the civil war period were unsynchronized because the United Nations acted independently of the government and military, which resembles the problems described in the separatist theory. During the post 9/11 period, the aligned interests of the United Nations and the US military blurred the distinction between humanitarian and military aid which resembles the convergence theory. The result was the rejection of military aid in the form of attacks on deminers. The flood of international actors also pushed aside Afghan leadership which prevented the development of Afghan managerial capacity. The nationalization period marked a return to the separatist theory where the United Nations, the US government, and the military recognized the weakness of Afghan managerial capacity and all focused on independent exit strategies outside the scope of the Afghan government. The result of the HDP in Afghanistan was the successful development of local demining capacity, predominantly through the efforts of NGOs, with the absence of a governmental organization to coordinate their efforts. In many respects, the conditions in Afghanistan mirror conditions in other post conflict scenarios. The case of the HDP in Kosovo faced many of the same challenges as Afghanistan; however, the DOD succeeded in contributing to humanitarian demining in Kosovo where it failed in Afghanistan.

#### Here’s another definition

Overton 17

Iain Overton-editor, Jennifer Dathan-researcher, ADDRESSING THE THREAT POSED BY IEDS: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL INITIATIVES, https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Addressing-the-threat-posed-by-IEDs.pdf

However, the NAF itself has not received enormous amounts of foreign training or assistance, perhaps because the NAF have been accused of various human rights abuses during the conflict, deterring those who might otherwise provide military aid. In 2014, however, a Congressional Research Service Report asserted that $5 million in aid was being directed by the US to the NAF in the form of military-civilian relations and C-IED training, an increase from the previous year. In one publicised incident, a US bomb squad supervisor volunteered to provide C-IED training to Nigerian police during a visit on an unrelated mission. Other countries, including the UK, are also providing C-IED training to the NAF.

## HA/DR PIC

### 1NC – HA/DR PIC

#### CP Text: The United States should increase HA/DR aid to authoritarian regimes

#### The United States should end all other military aid to authoritarian regimes

#### HA/DR is building in tempo – fragile states can’t cope with disasters alone

BALDWIN ET AL. 18 Gretchen Baldwin, Elise Guarna, David Kaye, Shohei Kubo, Zaib Rasool, Samuel Ratner, Siddhey Shinde, Robert Ward Report for the Army Future Studies Group Completed in fulfillment of the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs Capstone Workshop Requirement Advisor: Daniel F. Madden May 11, 2018

[[“Urban Futures, Technology, and Military Operations “, https://sipa.columbia.edu/file/7120/download?token=BMS\_mSpc] bcr 12/5/18]([\“Urban Futures, Technology, and Military Operations \“, https://sipa.columbia.edu/file/7120/download?token=BMS_mSpc] bcr 12/5/18)

The recent history of US military HA/DR response is indicative of the Army’s likely operational tempo for the near future. From the disaster response for Haiti in 2010, to Fukushima in 2011, to Hurricane Sandy in 2012, to West Africa during the Ebola outbreak of 2014, and more recently in Puerto Rico, there has been no shortage of catastrophes requiring military assistance domestically and abroad. Going forward, the pace and scale of urban HA/DR operations may even increase. The combination of climate change and coastal population growth place large swaths of the world’s poorest people in a precariously vulnerable position. Nations in the global south will lack the capacity to effectively react to and contain the first order effects (and the follow-on effects) of a major emergency in one of its megacities. It will often fall to the US Army (or a sister service) possessing the global reach to prevent an unchecked catastrophe from upending stability.8 Information requirements during HA/DR operations include: • Is there effective governance? What capacities does the host nation have? What don’t they have? Is there an organized system in place for providing basic services to the populace? If not, does the capacity exist? Can services be provided in a consistent, reliable manner? • What are the critical institutions and what are the essential services people require to feel safe and secure? How can commanders assess what’s working and what isn’t? Where is the best application of the US Army’s resources? What are the essential services people deem critical for their everyday lives? • What constitutes “normalcy”? What did it look like before? What does it look like now? What metrics can the Army offer policymakers to show that their “normalcy” objectives have been achieved? Can this be an opportunity to use a whole-of-government approach to help build a new normalcy? Is that something the people want or would accept?

#### Cutting HA/DR would crush US broader response capacity - specifically to fragile, poorly governed states

STEWART 13 Colonel Michelle Stewart is currently assigned to PKSOI as the Chief, Infrastructure and Essential Services Branch, Security, Reconstruction, and Transition Division., PKSOI, Peace & Stability Operations Journal Online, 3(2) January 2013, ["Why Should the U.S. Military Continue to Support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Efforts Abroad", http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/Vol3\_Issue2\_web\_reduced.pdf] bcr 12-5-2018

The United States has been the world’s largest humanitarian aid donor every year to date since 1990. In 2010, U.S. expenditures for humanitarian aid peaked at $4.9 billion, though this federal account is targeted for significant cuts in 2013 and beyond, in part due to the American public’s perception that we spend too much on foreign aid in general. Former USAID Administrator, Andrew Natsios, commented on this perception and the impact of the proposed cuts. “While no federal account should be protected from cuts given the magnitude and severity of the budget and debt crisis, singling out foreign aid for disproportionate cuts – which is exactly what has happened – is a serious mistake the United States as a world leader will pay for in the future. While polls show a majority of Americans believe foreign aid makes up 25 percent of the federal budget, in reality it is less than one percent: cutting foreign aid will not make a dent in the federal budget deficit, but it will leave a gaping hole in our foreign policy and diminish our position in the world as a great power.”2 In fact, Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA), an independent consortium that provides impartial information on development and humanitarian aid to the press, governments, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), reports the United States is not the most generous donor as a proportion of gross national income (GNI). In fact, the United States spends only 0.2 percent of its GNI on foreign aid with only 0.03 percent of its GNI expended on humanitarian aid. In terms of humanitarian aid as a factor of GNI, the United States ranks only 13th in the world.3 Perhaps the most telling statistic of all, GHA also reports that 91.5 percent of America’s humanitarian aid was spent in states GHA deem “fragile.”4 Fragile states are those states facing particularly severe development challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability. U.S. diplomats, like those of many other donor nations, recognize the destabilizing impact of a natural or manmade disaster or humanitarian emergency to an already-fragile state. Donors seek to target aid resources to these locations as an attempt to circumvent devolution into armed conflict. In the wake of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. national strategy evolved in response to the realization that the greatest threat facing America was not a conventional military bent on conquering territory, but more shadowy threats originating from elusive, non-state actors hiding among the people, often in failed or failing states, who threaten regional and global stability for their own agendas. In particular, President Obama’s strategy calls for the use of three instruments of national power to address the problems of fragile and failed states – defense, diplomacy, and development, the “3D”s – with the greatest emphasis on development. “These strategies have elevated development programs – which are funded using foreign aid dollars – to a central place in America’s global strategy because they are often the most effective of the three D’s in addressing state failure and fragility.”5 To avoid the relatively high cost of a military response to a failed or failing state, and to promote greater global stability and security, President Obama advocates effective, well-placed use of foreign aid. HA/DR resources, notably targeted on fragile states, are critical components of this national security strategy The new strategy of achieving U.S. security objectives through diplomatic and developmental ways and means links DoD, DoS, and USAID more closely than ever. In 2010, under the leadership of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, DoS published the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). Secretary Clinton modeled this new strategy document aptly subtitled “Leading Through Civilian Power” on DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), recognizing Defense’s QDR process “provided a strategic plan for the department” while “forcing hard decisions about priorities.”6 Promulgation of the QDDR was just a start. Further efforts are underway to support collaborative planning among DoD, DoS, and USAID. Together, these entities seek to design a new framework for advancing U.S. interests abroad, “one focused less on repelling traditional cross-border invasions effecting regime change, and conducting large-scale stability operations and more on preserving access to key regions and the global commons, which are essential to U.S. security and prosperity.”7 Assuring American security in today’s global environment requires unprecedented “3D” collaboration and strategic application of US resources to missions like HA/DR that work toward maintenance of global stability.

#### Unchecked disasters without effective response guarantee disease outbreaks

MARTINEZ 17 Josh Martinez, Writer & Communications Assistant – ASU Graduate, Passport Health, 11-14-2017, ["How Do Natural Disasters Cause Epidemics?", https://www.passporthealthusa.com/2017/11/how-do-natural-disasters-cause-disease-outbreaks/] bcr 12-5-2018

From hurricanes to earthquakes and floods, no country is invincible against Mother Nature. Recent natural disasters show that even developed regions can struggle with the long-term effects. Events like Hurricane Katrina in the United States and more recently, the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and tsunami created a myriad of problems for the public. A lasting image for these storms will often be floods or decaying buildings. Many people will miss another dangerous problem: disease. With these natural disasters come the spread of diseases, and depending on the factors, an outbreak may follow. With poverty and population growth in developing regions, more people live in areas susceptible to these events. It isn’t just any one disaster that can cause one of these epidemics. Hurricanes, cyclones, tsunamis and earthquakes can all create widespread diseases. According to CBC News, while developed countries are at risk, it’s the poorer areas that are more likely to struggle with these epidemics. One of the main disasters that seem to feed into widespread diseases is mudslides. Mudslides and mass flooding hit the city of Freetown, Sierra Leone in 2017. The World Health Organization (WHO) is working closely with the government to prevent the spread of diseases. Many of the local citizens are displaced. Their homes are beyond repair, the forced to live in cramped quarters with many people. These circumstances are perfect for the spread of airborne diseases. The situation becomes more dire with pre-existing diseases in the area. Cholera and typhoid spread via tainted water, a common result of these events. Locals have no way to escape the pools of water and risk of infection. Alexander Chimbaru, Officer in charge of WHO Sierra Leone, acknowledges these challenges. “The mudslides have caused extreme suffering and loss of life, and we must do all we can to protect the population from additional health risks,” said Dr. Chimbaru. Whether a result of some disaster or its own event, floods are one of the most common natural disasters around the world. Many of the most common epidemics come in the form of water-borne diseases. According to the CDC, these floods make a perfect blend of water that’s infected with fecal matter and toxic chemicals. The water tends to attract insects, creating a much greater risk of mosquito-borne diseases. Overcrowding and cross-contamination could lead to cholera or typhoid cases. Meanwhile, the rise in mosquitoes may cause outbreaks of malaria, dengue or yellow fever. Long after the immediate threat passes, a natural disaster can continue to harm to the area. Many disaster relief plans focus on the trauma and mass casualty management. This often doesn’t include a strategy for treating diseases that could lead to an epidemic. What can be done to plan for these epidemics? It may require a mix of quick decisions and planning that takes place before the disaster. Relief areas would need access to safe water soon after the event begins. These areas would also need room to handle the large amounts of displaced locals. With less overcrowded regions, there’s less time for airborne diseases to fester and spread. Most viral diseases are common with displaced populations. The risk for epidemics can lower when the disasters don’t result in severe population displacement. According to the CDC, these are the areas that struggle to get basic needs. Safe water, sanitation, reliable shelter and healthcare services are scarce. With a plan for this kind of emergency relief, it’s possible to reduce epidemics after natural disasters.

#### Runaway pandemics mean societal collapse and extinction – mass death, warming, and nuclear war

Morris 13 Dr. Ian Morris, B.A., Birmingham University, 1981, Ph.D., Cambridge University, 1985-historian and archaeologist. He has published fourteen books. In addition he has been a visiting professor in the University of Zurich's executive MBA program. At Stanford he has served as chair of the Classics department, director of the Archaeology Center, and Senior Associate Dean of Humanities and Sciences. He has held several research awards, including Guggenheim and Andrew Carnegie fellowships, and has won a Dean's Award for excellence in teaching and several literary prizes. He is also a fellow of the British Academy, the Society of Antiquaries, and the Secular Policy Institute, and is a contributing editor at Stratfor, a stratgic forecasting company. Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, 03/15/13 ["The Measure of Civilization: How Social Development Decides the Fate of Nations", https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20130315/index.html/:pf\_printable] bcr 8-22-2016

However—there's always a "but" in these things—when we look back across the last 15,000 years of history, like I mentioned, we don't see just a constant upward trend in these scores. There are several periods when we get discontinuities, when we get collapses in social development scores. You can see several very clear examples on this graph. When we look back at the history of what happens when we get these great collapses in social development, **every time we see** the same five forces involved: Mass migrations that the societies of the day cannot cope with. This is always in the mix. The mass migrations often lead to **huge epidemic diseases**, as previously separate disease pools get merged. Epidemic diseases regularly killing half the population, it would seem, tend to lead to state failure. **Governments cannot cope** with catastrophe on this scale. The collapse of the governments tends to lead to breakdown in long-distance trade. Famines ensue, many, many more people die. And then, always there in the mix in some way, although it varies in every case, is climate change. It always plays into this. Now, I'm sure you don't need me to tell you these are forces that plenty of people are talking about as threats we are facing in the early 21st century. It seems to me perfectly possible that the 21st century is going to see another collapse of the kind we have seen so many times in the past. So in some ways it's possible the 21st century might be a rerun of what has happened many times before—but with one big difference: **We now have nuclear weapons**, which ancient people didn't have. The Romans would have loved nuclear weapons. Luckily, they didn't have them. I think if we do stumble into a collapse on the scale that I'm talking about here, **we should seriously expect** there is a possibility of **these being used**. It's quite possible that the 21st century will see a disaster that dwarfs anything we have seen earlier.

### U/L - Mil Aid/Mil Aid Key

#### HA/DR has become essential military aid during disasters since 91’ – solves distribution & communications programs, are super experienced, and has relationships with NGOs & civil governments

ANDERSON 15 Col. Gary Anderson, USMC (Ret.) was the director of operations (J-3) during Operation Sea Angel, and has been involved in relief operations in Somalia and the Philippines., New York Post, 5-5-2015, ["Nepal’s real need for help starts now", https://nypost.com/2015/05/05/nepals-real-need-for-help-starts-now/] bcr 12-5-2018

When disasters strike, the first impulse is to do good. The problem with that is in determining what “good” is. The current disaster in Nepal is no exception. Following the great cyclone-induced tidal surge that struck Bangladesh in 1991, a well-meaning group of Americans chartered an airplane and sent tons of donated clothing to that impoverished country. These donations included winter clothing for children. No one in Bangladesh has ever needed a snowsuit. The tragedy is that the airplane’s useless cargo took up valuable ramp space in the country’s only working international airport, blocking the delivery of desperately needed relief supplies. Disasters, whether natural or man-made, have a certain rhythm. There is the initial impact where treating trauma-related injuries and search-and-rescue operations take precedence. Most of the worst-hit victims either die or survive with whatever local aid is available. Search-and-rescue teams from overseas, such as the superb Fairfax County (Va.) team, flow in quickly to try to find victims in the rubble. After about 10 days, the immediate crisis abates; those who can survive have been treated or have been rescued, and the dead are buried or cremated. That’s when the real trouble starts. Food runs short, and disrupted water supplies cause waterborne diseases such as typhoid to run rampant. By that time, the CNN cameras have moved on. Humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations are a science. Nepal is fortunate to be in the operational area of the United States Pacific Command, which probably has the most expertise in disasters of any American military organization. Again, Nepal is lucky in that an American Special Forces team is in the country on a training mission. That team can work with relief organizations to determine what, if any, US military assistance is needed. Contrary to popular opinion, air drops of military rations and high-tech military hospitals are usually counterproductive. Emergency food acceptable to the impacted population, shelter material and medical supplies are usually available in the region. The challenge is in getting them to where they are needed. The helicopters and large transport aircraft of the American armed forces can be indispensable in solving the problem of the distribution of aid. Engineering support to help restore clean drinking water is also a US specialty. When we reacted to the 1991 disaster in Bangladesh that eventually became known as Operation Sea Angel, the Marines and Navy personnel sent to assess the disaster had no conception of HA/DR operations. Fortunately, the USAID representatives at the American embassy were wise enough to put us in touch with the resident non-governmental organizations, which knew the people and had representatives on the ground in remote areas; unfortunately, they couldn’t communicate with them due to damaged infrastructure. Our communications could fix that. With roads out, only helicopters could get to some areas with supplies; we could help there, too. The population did not need our rations or high-tech hospitals. They needed locally acceptable food, clean water and shelter kits; all that was available. It just needed to get to the right place. The NGOs had the keys to the solution, and we had the communications and transportation to get the right stuff to where it was needed. NGOs generally know the culture and the needs of the population, and they have established relationships with the governments of the countries that they work in. Since 1991, the American military and other government agencies have made great strides in forging relationships with these organizations. It is not a natural partnership; most NGO workers are more likely to associate with the Peace Corps than the Marine Corps; however, the relationship can work when it is most needed, and we will likely see that in Nepal. The point here is simple. Those who want to help need not collect cans of food or bundles of clothing. They should donate to the organizations that are working in Nepal. CARE, OXFAM, Save the Children and a host of others are doing good work; help them help the Nepalese.

### U/L - HA/DR Solves/Dictatorships

#### HA/DR is military assistance, spans the globe, and the best examples are responses to authoritarian states – it’s key to quick and sustained response

URES 11 Lt. Cmmdr. Stephen A. Ures, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, June 2011, ["FINANCING NAVAL SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RESPONSE: AN ANALYSIS OF COST DRIVERS AND CASH FLOWS", https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a547798.pdf] bcr 12-5-2018

The responsibility for the whole of U.S. military operations within a particular region of the globe lies with the COCOM. The COCOM’s authority may be accorded geographically by area of responsibility (AOR) or may transcend geographic boundaries into operational functions. When the DoD responds to a disaster, the COCOM with cognizant authority for that area will oversee the military response (Halvorsen, Caldwell, & Gurwith, 2011). Each of the three selected disaster cases addressed in this study occurred in a different COCOM AOR. The Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, although widely dispersed over thousands of miles, created the need for U.S. military assistance in the Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR. Additionally, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti was confined to the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) AOR, and the 2010 dispersed, slow onset flooding in Pakistan occurred in the Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR. The rapidity of military response is occasionally driven by the personal relationship between the ambassador to the stricken country and the COCOM himself but is more generally a function of the assertiveness known colloquially as “leaning forward” (Rogers, 2011). Once a disaster event occurs, and appears to meet the criteria for military assistance, the COCOM begins pushing assets (ships, aircraft, personnel, and supplies) toward the affected region. In extreme cases, when the enormity of the disaster is obvious, the COCOM can authorize military forces to conduct HA/DR in the host nation’s territory to preserve life and prevent suffering for no more than 72 hours (Halvorsen et al., 2011). Back in Washington DC, planning for a more sustained response begins as the Joint Staff makes an initial estimate of the incremental cost of the military response. Concurrently, the DoS, USAID, DoD, DSCA, Joint Staff, and COCOM collaborate as to the type, scale, and potential duration of the DoD response. This phase of the rapid planning process determines the cost drivers of the operation. Next, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller; OUSD[C]), the Financial Management & Comptroller organizations of the individual Services that will participate in the response, and the DSCA collaborate to provide a more detailed cost estimate. Their primary tool for this purpose is the Contingency Operations Support Tool (COST), which was created and is maintained by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). Once the Secretary of State formally transmits to the Secretary of Defense the request for military assistance and the Secretary of Defense agrees that DoD support is necessary, appropriate, and feasible, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) crafts a letter that authorizes the sustained response. The Secretary of Defense may deploy additional assets (e.g., ships, units, aircraft, personnel, equipment), and supporting commanders who control those additional assets can now change their operational control to the COCOM, who becomes the supported commander. More importantly, the authorization letter provides a top-line dollar value that bounds the upper limit of incremental spending and determines the scope of military support. This number is critical because it relates directly to the appropriation of OHDACA, which provides the legal framework under which the military response is both financed and authorized.

### L – Presence Key

#### Military presence is key to effective HA/DR – timeframe and capacity make the difference

John Gresham, Defense Media Network, 6-13-2013, He is an author, researcher, game designer, photographer, and military commentator with numerous publishing, design, speaking, and television appearance credits in his portfolio. He was the primary researcher and partner to Tom Clancy on his best-selling series of non-fiction “guided tour” books about military units. He has provided interviews, commentary, research, screenwriting, and production assistance for various documentary series produced for TLC and the History, Military, New York Times, Discovery, and National Geographic channels. His most recent book, Uncommon Valor, covering six Medal of Honor recipients and their deeds in Iraq and Afghanistan, is co-authored with Dwight Jon Zimmerman. ["SOUTHCOM: A Half Century of Service", https://static.dvidshub.net/media/pubs/pdf\_12110.pdf] bcr 8-15-2016

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) – Natural disasters can easily overwhelm the resources of an affected area, nation, or region. To save lives, there is often a narrow window of time; assistance that takes more than 48 hours to arrive may be too late to help. In responding to natural disasters, military forces have unique capabilities: prepackaged field hospitals, helicopters that can deliver people and supplies when airfields and ports are destroyed, and heavy engineering equipment that can clear rubble to rescue survivors. Above all, military forces bring trained and disciplined people who are ready to deploy on short notice.

### IL – HA/DR Works

#### HA/DR capabilities are key to disaster response and restabalization – partner capacity is built through presence, cross-training, and institutional relationships

Gary Roughead Et al., Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2013, USN (Ret.), an Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution, (2011–13) graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1973. In September 2007, Admiral Roughead became the twenty-ninth chief of naval operations after holding six operational commands and is one of only two officers in the navy’s history to have commanded both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. Ashore he served as the commandant at the US Naval Academy, during which time he led the strategic planning effort that underpinned that institution’s first capital campaign. He was also the navy’s chief of legislative affairs, responsible for the Department of the Navy’s interaction with Congress, and the deputy commander of the US Pacific Command during the massive relief effort following the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. [“”, <https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130226_Roughead_NavyHumanitarianAssist_Web.pdf>] bcr 8-8-2016

First, planned humanitarian engagement enhances the skills of military personnel. These op- erations place Navy medical staff, engineers, and others in austere environments where they apply their expertise efficiently and effectively, receiving on-the-ground training and experience that will endure throughout their military careers. These skills are particularly well suited to the missions of today's military. Second, the opportunity to practice medicine and engineering in distant locales can be a boon to morale. Global humanitarian operations help fulfill the "see the world" and "Global Force for Good" aspirations that often motivate Navy careers. Third, the Navy's investments in proactive humanitarian operations have improved its disas- ter response capabilities, most notably by establishing working relationships in countries prone to natural disasters, and by building stronger partnerships with humanitarian NGOs. The U.S. military's responses to humanitarian crises, while impressive in scale, are characterized by their ad hoc nature and hurried planning. Ilthough disaster response will always occur on short notice and in disrupted communities, a strong foundation in skills, professional contacts, and shared best practices enhances effectiveness and outcomes.

### IL – Disasters Crush Living

#### Unchecked disasters devastate middle-income countries – shatters fragile economies and living standards

Dr Tom Mitchell et al. Overseas Development Institute and Climate and Development Knowledge Network Dr Reinhard Mechler International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis Katie Harris Overseas Development Institute, Climate Development & Knowledge Network, May 2012, ["Tackling exposure: Placing disaster risk management at the heart of national economic and fiscal policy", http://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CDKN\_Tackling-Exposure\_Final-WEB4.pdf] bcr 11-9-2016

However, economic exposure to disasters is not evenly distributed. The risk of economic losses, as a proportion of annual GDP, is concentrated in middle-income countries with rapidly developing economies, and particularly exposed low income countries such as Small Island Developing States.xi Figure 3 shows countries with the largest monetary disaster losses as a percentage of gross national income since 1960.The burden of losses in middle-income countries has been increasing, with average losses of 1% of GDP from 2001–2006 (compared to 0.1% for high-income countries).xii However, economic loss of GDP is even more concentrated, with China and countries in South Asia accounting for more than 49% of global annual losses since the 1970s.xiii Given the influence of the economies of China, India and other Asian countries on global growth, future trends in disaster losses in such countries are of particular concern, for the region and globally. In 2008, regarded as one of the worst years for natural and man-made disasters, Asia lost a total of $269 bn due to disasters. Emerging economies were particularly exposed due to high urban migration, intensification of natural resource use without adequate management, and population growth.xiv

### IL – Poor Living = Disease

#### Poor living conditions magnify disease risk in Latin America – worldwide death and recession

(1) K. Bradley Penuel & (2) Matt Statler, Encyclopedia of Disaster Relief pp. 457, 2010, (1) Chief of Staff, Associate Dean for Special Projects at NYU School of Engineering Greater New York City AreaHigher Education Current NYU School of Engineering, New York University Previous New York University, Chemonics International, Gresham, Smith and Partners Education New York University (2) Matt Statler joined New York University Stern School of Business as a Clinical Assistant Professor of Management and Organizations in July 2009. He serves as the Richman Family Director of Business Ethics and Social Impact Programming for Stern's Undergraduate College, leading and coordinating the four-course Social Impact Core Curriculum as well as a range of co-curricular and extra-curricular activities. Prior to joining NYU Stern, Professor Statler served as the director of research for NYU's Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response, where he coordinated the research activities of the Center's multiple projects, while conducting original research focused on ethics of crisis management. [Google Books] bcr 8-9-2016

The unseasonal strains of influenza reach pandemic proportions on average once every three to four decades, such as in 2009 with the strain HINI. The lethality of these outbreaks is variable, but has the potential to be extremely high, as it was in 1918. Influenza pandemics begin with the development of new strains of influenza in poultry, pigs, and wild birds, and subsequent trans- mission of the virus to humans in the most populous countries of Asia and Latin America. The main danger lies in the novelty of the virus to the human immune system, and the first wave of infections-and perhaps deaths-would be expected to pass before a credible vaccine could be mass-produced for public distribution, which would take place six to eight months after the start of the pandemic. It is estimated that 25-30 percent of the world's popu- lation caught the Spanish influenza of 1918. Eleven per- cent of infected people died. In the United States, the out- break caused a 5 percent drop in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is estimated that a lethal outbreak of unsea- sonal influenza could infect up to 135 million people, 7.5 million of whom might die, while world GDP would fall by 2 percent ($800 billion). Advances in medical science and preparedness would be counteracted by the speed and breadth of transmission of the disease resulting from the efficiency of modern forms of transport. Pandemic planning is not merely a problem of medi- cine, public health, and hygiene. Vital though these issues are, there are also many social and economic ques- tions to be tackled. Hence, planning is a complex issue that requires drastic and expensive measures. Whether there is the political will to introduce them is another matter. The 2009 HIN 1 pandemic killed 14,286 people worldwide; as the average annual death toll from influ- enza of all kinds in the United States is about 36,000. critics argued that the threat was exaggerated. Others debated this challenge, citing the deaths of up to 50 mil- lion people (one tenth of those infected) in the 1918-20 influenza pandemic.

### ! – Global Collapse/High Prob.

#### Risk of global collapse from pandemics is high

Joshua Keating, Foreign Policy, 11-13-2009, Associate Editor @ FP ["The End of the World", http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/13/the-end-of-the-world/] bcr 8-22-2016

How it could happen: Throughout history, plagues have brought civilizations to their knees. The Black Death killed more off more than half of Europe’s population in the Middle Ages. In 1918, a flu pandemic killed an estimated 50 million people, nearly 3 percent of the world’s population, a far greater impact than the just-concluded World War I. Because of globalization, diseases today spread even faster – witness the rapid worldwide spread of H1N1 currently unfolding. A global outbreak of a disease such as ebola virus — which has had a 90 percent fatality rate during its flare-ups in rural Africa — or a mutated drug-resistant form of the flu virus on a global scale could have a devastating, even civilization-ending impact. How likely is it? Treatment of deadly diseases has improved since 1918, but so have the diseases. Modern industrial farming techniques have been blamed for the outbreak of diseases, such as swine flu, and as the world’s population grows and humans move into previously unoccupied areas, the risk of exposure to previously unknown pathogens increases. More than 40 new viruses have emerged since the 1970s, including ebola and HIV. Biological weapons experimentation has added a new and just as troubling complication.

### ! – Yes Extinction/A2 Burnout

#### Infectious disease oubtreaks possiblize extinction – new microbial diseases eschew burnout and resistance checks

Arturo Casadevall; M.D., Ph.D., Professor of Microbiology, Immunology and Infectious Diseases – Albert Einstein College of Medicine – Yeshiva University, Microbial Biotechnology, 5(5) 584-587, 2012 [“The Future of Biological Warfare,” <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3815869/>] bcr 11-23-2016

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.

### ! – Pandemics Risk Framing

**Recognition of pandemics means you prefer neg on risk calc - managing outbreaks is cost-effective and nuke war is an existential risk**

Dr. Nick Bostrom, Transhumanist, 2002 Phil Prof @ Yale ["Existential Risks", http://www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html] bcr 8-22-2016

Some of the lesser existential risks can be countered fairly cheaply. For example, there are organizations devoted to mapping potentially threatening near-Earth objects (e.g. NASA’s Near Earth Asteroid Tracking Program, and the Space Guard Foundation). These could be given additional funding. To reduce the probability of a “physics disaster”, a public watchdog could be appointed with authority to commission advance peer-review of potentially hazardous experiments. This is currently done on an ad hoc basis and often in a way that relies on the integrity of researchers who have a personal stake in the experiments going forth. The existential risks of naturally occurring or genetically engineered pandemics would be reduced by the same measures that would help prevent and contain more limited epidemics. Thus, efforts in counter-terrorism, civil defense, epidemiological monitoring and reporting, developing and stockpiling antidotes, rehearsing emergency quarantine procedures, etc. could be intensified. Even abstracting from existential risks, it would probably be cost-effective to increase the fraction of defense budgets devoted to such programs.[[23]](" \l "_ftn23) Reducing the risk of a nuclear Armageddon, whether accidental or intentional, is a well-recognized priority. There is a vast literature on the related strategic and political issues to which I have nothing to add here. The longer-term dangers of nanotech proliferation or arms race between nanotechnic powers, as well as the whimper risk of “evolution into oblivion”, may necessitate, even more than nuclear weapons, the creation and implementation of a coordinated global strategy. Recognizing these existential risks suggests that it is advisable to gradually shift the focus of security policy from seeking national security through unilateral strength to creating an integrated international security system that can prevent arms races and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Which particular policies have the best chance of attaining this long-term goal is a question beyond the scope of this paper.

### A2 HA/DR Bad - Impacts

#### Military HA/DR impacts outweigh the risks – disasters are inevitable and norm setting prevents abuse

David Pion-Berlin, Military Missions in Democratic Latin America pp. 136, 2016, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Riverside. He is a Latin Americanist widely known for his research and writings on civil-military relations, defense, security, and human rights. [Google Books - https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=uY1PDAAAQBAJ&source=ge-web-app] bcr 11/9/2016

While there are some risks to making military disaster response more permanent, it would seem as if the benefits outweigh the risks. Countries simply cannot do without a robust military response, when Mother Nature inflicts severe punishment on a nation or region. Besides, normalization invites the creation of norms, which can hopefully keep military disaster response within reasonable bounds. Norms insure there are clear guide- lines of behavior for civilians and soldiers alike, as follows. There must be laws or decrees that govern the emergency response; a clear chain ofcom- mand that establishes who has ultimate authority, and how those situated at lower rungs of the ladder are to respond; and a division of labor, that sets out tasks suitable for soldiers and those suitable for civilians. Whether written or informal, there must also be norms of interaction, forged from a basic mutual understanding and respect between political leaders, civilian contributors, and military commanders and subordinates.

### A2 HA/DR Bad - Intents

#### Don’t buy their alternate motives arguments – self-interest is inevitable HA/DR is a win-win in Latin-America that develops both party’s interests

James Stavridis, Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere strategy and U.S. Southern Command, 2015, retired four-star U.S. Navy admiral and NATO supreme allied commander who serves today as the dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Education PhD, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University MALD, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University BS, U.S. Naval Academy [Google Books] bcr 8-6-2016

Often, opponents of the military's involvement in development operations will argue that aid should only be administered by neutral groups because the military has some Machiavellian intent in conducting any such operation. They claim the military will always be seeking access to a region for its assets or basing rights or "hearts and minds," rather than for purely humanitarian reasons. This is an undeniable secondary benefit of conducting HA/DR and similarly focused missions, but this should not be the primary focus. The intent of providing training, education, and services to populations is not to precipitate a. quid pro quo situation, but rather to increase health care quality, access, and capacity to facilitate security and stability within our shared home.

## Saudi Non-Lethal PIC

#### CP Text: The United States federal government ought not provide military aid to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates except for non-lethal military aid.

Keating 12 (Joshua E. Keating. Joshua E. Keating was an associate editor at Foreign Policy. “What Exactly Is ‘Non-Lethal’ Aid?”. 8-2-2012. Foreign Policy. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/02/what-exactly-is-non-lethal-aid/>)

Barack Obama’s administration [announced](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/01/us-syria-crisis-usa-idUSBRE8701DU20120801) on Aug. 1 that it is setting aside an additional $10 million in "non-lethal" military aid to the anti-Assad rebels in Syria on top of $15 million already committed. U.S. officials suggest that most of the aid will take the form of communications equipment such as encrypted radios. But just what exactly counts as "non-lethal" aid? Anything that’s not specifically designed to kill someone. [Title 10 of the U.S. Code](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/8-42/8-42-appl.pdf), which defines the role of the armed forces, describes "nonlethal supplies" as anything that "is not a weapon, ammunition, or other equipment or material that is designed to inflict serious bodily injury or death." In other words, communications equipment, medical supplies, intelligence assistance, body armor, and infrastructure are fine. Guns, ammunition, mines, and missiles are not. It’s a vague definition but a legally significant one. With some restrictions — such as on countries that use child soldiers, though [that’s not always a hard-and-fast rule](http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/04/obama_waives_penalties_on_countries_that_employ_child_soldiers_again) — non-lethal aid can be given to foreign military or [law enforcement and drug interdiction agencies](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode22/usc_sec_22_00002291----005-.html) under Title 10 or Title 22, which pertains to State Department programs. Lethal aid falls under [Title 50](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50), which pertains to war and national defense and requires a full presidential finding and a briefing to congressional leaders.

#### Communication and medical facilities are key to preventing disease outbreaks.

AUSA 14 (The Association of the United States Army. The Association of the United States Army is a private, non-profit organization that acts primarily as an advocacy group for the United States Army. “ARMY BUILDS COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK TO AID OPERATION UNITED ASSISTANCE”. 10-29-2014. <https://www.ausa.org/news/army-builds-communications-network-aid-operation-united-assistance>)

Deploying to West Africa in the fight to stop the spread of Ebola is a U.S. Army team who are building a vital communications network, one of the many overlooked capabilities that could be at risk from budget cuts. A report provided by the Army says this is a key mission to provide command and control information to U.S. troops and to aid organizations. Retired Army Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, president and CEO of the Association of the U.S. Army, said the capability to set up a communications network in a remote area is an example of the sometimes-overlooked core strategic functions of the Army. “We are very concerned in the drawdown and budget reductions facing the Army that we could lose this capability, or save it at the risk of reducing some other equally important capability,” Sullivan said. The Army report says building the communications network is something the Army is doing along with constructing medical facilities and funneling supplies throughout the affected region. Here is the rest of her report: “The U.S. government understands the unique capability that the Army can bring to a situation like this,” said Col. Patrick C. Dedham, J6 director for the U.S. Africa Command, known as AFRICOM. “Where the network really comes in is to help provide command and control and situational awareness, not only to U.S. forces that are there, but also to enable them to share that information with non-governmental organizations, with USAID [the U.S. Agency for International Development] and other interagency partners. We’re helping them with information so we can all work better as a big team.” By sharing critical information such as the locations and status of Ebola treatment units, training updates for health workers, progress that’s been made to contain the disease, and the roles, responsibilities and contact information of various responders, the Army network will support improved coordination across the coalition of different organizations responding to the outbreak. “The closer you can get to everyone understanding what’s going on, the better off you will be,” said Maj. Jason A. Foreman, network operations director in charge of the team of 175 Soldiers with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 35th Signal Brigade (Theater Tactical), and 50th Signal Battalion (Expeditionary), part of the 35th TTSB, who are preparing to deploy to West Africa. “Just like medical people have specific skill sets, these are communicators. They’re extremely trained, they’re coming from the Cyber Center of Excellence, so you have some of the best expertise.” The Army’s effort to stand up the network is unfolding in phases as Soldiers and equipment flow into the region. First, AFRICOM sent its joint communications support element with contingency communications equipment to provide initial connectivity. As the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) recently assumed its role as the headquarters unit for the military mission, the Army set up communications for its joint headquarters to connect to the AFRICOM network. Now, as more 101st Airborne and 35th TTSB Soldiers deploy, they are bringing their Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) systems that form the backbone of the Army’s tactical communications network. Additionally, the Army and the Defense Information Systems Agency activated the Blue Force Tracking satellite network over the region in mid-October, which will enhance situational awareness for Army ground and aviation forces. Each step makes the network more robust, by extending services and building stronger satellite and line-of sight communications links, Dedham said. “The Army equipment is critical because it’s going to provide us the capacity that we need for the long term – whether that’s nine months or 12 months or longer,” he said, adding that the initial solution brought by AFRICOM needs to be returned to standby mode for new contingencies. “That’s why the Army signal support equipment and Soldiers are critical, so we can get the contingency capability out and use it for the next mission.” The Signal soldiers will also be ready for any contingencies that develop during their time in West Africa, bringing a flexible “tool kit” of equipment that includes lightweight SIPR/NIPR Access Point (SNAP) satellite terminals as well as WIN-T equipment mounted on vehicle platforms. “Each team that I have will have a SNAP terminal assigned to it, which allows us to be more rapidly deployable,” Foreman said. “Entering into a new theater of operations, you don’t know what you don’t know.” One unique element of the network being built for Operation United Assistance is the delivery of commercial internet enclaves that will allow Army units to make connections available for Doctors Without Borders, the Red Cross and other non-governmental organization (NGO) partners. The Army is activating commercial services at its Regional Hub Node in Landstuhl, Germany, which will provide the units and responders with reach-back access to the Army’s global information network to transmit voice and data, rather than relying on local 3G coverage. The package will enable unfettered internet access for Department of Defense and interagency partners to better collaborate with NGOs and the Liberian government, Dedham said. “The Army is providing the communications backbone for what is inherently a civil response,” said Lt. Col. Joel Babbitt, product manager for WIN-T Increment 1. “As engineers flow in to build treatment facilities, they will be operating directly with these NGOs, so the ability to provide a common backbone is critical to an assistance response task force.” The Army has delivered network connectivity for diverse humanitarian coalitions before, including during relief efforts after a devastating earthquake struck Haiti in 2010. What’s unique about the Ebola response mission, Dedham said, is the universal use of AFRICOM’s network to provide consistency and reach back to Army enterprise services like email and Defense Connect Online. Soldiers headed to Africa said they are eager to establish the robust communications that will support a sustained and effective response to the Ebola crisis. “We’re here to support the humanitarian assistance mission, and reliable communications are valuable to that,” Foreman said. “We’re looking forward to going out and helping people.”

## First Strike CP

### 1NC – Algeria

#### CP Text: The United States federal government should first strike Russia’s nuclear weapon facilities

#### That initial strike will completely destroy their nuclear arsenal – solves the impact.

Hans Kristensen et al 17, Associate Senior Fellow with the SIPRI Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, co-author to the world nuclear forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press) and a frequent adviser to the news media on nuclear weapons policy and operations, "How US nuclear force modernization is undermining strategic stability: The burst-height compensating super-fuze", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2017/03/how-us-nuclear-force-modernization-is-undermining-strategic-stability-the-burst-height-compensating-super-fuze/

The US nuclear forces modernization program has been portrayed to the public as an effort to ensure the reliability and safety of warheads in the US nuclear arsenal, rather than to enhance their military capabilities. In reality, however, that program has implemented revolutionary new technologies that will vastly increase the targeting capability of the US ballistic missile arsenal. This increase in capability is astonishing—boosting the overall killing power of existing US ballistic missile forces by a factor of roughly three—and it creates exactly what one would expect to see, if a nuclear-armed state were planning to have the capacity to fight and win a nuclear war by disarming enemies with a surprise first strike. Because of improvements in the killing power of US submarine-launched ballistic missiles, those submarines now patrol with more than three times the number of warheads needed to destroy the entire fleet of Russian land-based missiles in their silos. US submarine-based missiles can carry multiple warheads, so hundreds of others, now in storage, could be added to the submarine-based missile force, making it all the more lethal. The revolutionary increase in the lethality of submarine-borne US nuclear forces comes from a “super-fuze” device that since 2009 has been incorporated into the Navy’s W76-1/Mk4A warhead as part of a decade-long life-extension program. We estimate that all warheads deployed on US ballistic missile submarines now have this fuzing capability. Because the innovations in the super-fuze appear, to the non-technical eye, to be minor, policymakers outside of the US government (and probably inside the government as well) have completely missed its revolutionary impact on military capabilities and its important implications for global security. Before the invention of this new fuzing mechanism, even the most accurate ballistic missile warheads might not detonate close enough to targets hardened against nuclear attack to destroy them. But the new super-fuze is designed to destroy fixed targets by detonating above and around a target in a much more effective way. Warheads that would otherwise overfly a target and land too far away will now, because of the new fuzing system, detonate above the target. FIGURE 1. The deployment of the new MC4700 arming, fuzing, and firing system on the W76-1/Mk4A significantly increases the number of hard target kill-capable warheads on US ballistic missile submarines. The result of this fuzing scheme is a significant increase in the probability that a warhead will explode close enough to destroy the target even though the accuracy of the missile-warhead system has itself not improved. As a consequence, the US submarine force today is much more capable than it was previously against hardened targets such as Russian ICBM silos. A decade ago, only about 20 percent of US submarine warheads had hard-target kill capability; today they all do. (See Figure 1.) This vast increase in US nuclear targeting capability, which has largely been concealed from the general public, has serious implications for strategic stability and perceptions of US nuclear strategy and intentions. Russian planners will almost surely see the advance in fuzing capability as empowering an increasingly feasible US preemptive nuclear strike capability—a capability that would require Russia to undertake countermeasures that would further increase the already dangerously high readiness of Russian nuclear forces. Tense nuclear postures based on worst-case planning assumptions already pose the possibility of a nuclear response to false warning of attack. The new kill capability created by super-fuzing increases the tension and the risk that US or Russian nuclear forces will be used in response to early warning of an attack—even when an attack has not occurred. The increased capability of the US submarine force will likely be seen as even more threatening because Russia does not have a functioning space-based infrared early warning system but relies primarily on ground-based early warning radars to detect a US missile attack. Since these radars cannot see over the horizon, Russia has less than half as much early-warning time as the United States. (The United States has about 30 minutes, Russia 15 minutes or less.) The inability of Russia to globally monitor missile launches from space means that Russian military and political leaders would have no “situational awareness” to help them assess whether an early-warning radar indication of a surprise attack is real or the result of a technical error. The combination of this lack of Russian situational awareness, dangerously short warning times, high-readiness alert postures, and the increasing US strike capacity has created a deeply destabilizing and dangerous strategic nuclear situation. When viewed in the alarming context of deteriorating political relations between Russia and the West, and the threats and counter-threats that are now becoming the norm for both sides in this evolving standoff, it may well be that the danger of an accident leading to nuclear war is as high now as it was in periods of peak crisis during the Cold War. How the new accuracy-enhancing fuze works. The significant increase in the ability of the W76-1/Mk4A warhead to destroy hardened targets—including Russian silo-based ICBMs—derives from a simple physical fact: Explosions that occur near and above the ground over a target can be lethal to it. This above-target area is known as a “lethal volume”; the detonation of a warhead of appropriate yield in this volume will result in the destruction of the target. The recognition that the killing power of the W76 warhead could be vastly increased by equipping it with a new fuze was discussed in a 1994 alternate warhead study conducted by the Defense and Energy departments. The study calculated the number of warheads that would be needed for the W76 to attack the Russian target base, if START II were implemented. At the time, W76/Mk4 warheads had a fixed height-of-burst fuze (meaning the fuze could not adjust its detonation at an optimal location if it were falling short or long of a target). With those fixed-height fuzes, submarine-launched nuclear missiles were mainly aimed at softer targets such as military bases. But the study found that an enhanced Mk4A reentry-body with a new fuze that provided for an adjustable height-of-burst as it arrives would have significant capabilities against harder targets, compared to warheads with the earlier fuzes. The study assumed that a smaller number of Mk4 nuclear warheads with higher killing power per warhead could cover the Russian target base and be more effective than multiple attacks on targets with less destructive warheads. In other words, an enhanced fuze would allow the United States to reduce the number of warheads on its ballistic missile submarines, but increase the targeting effectiveness of the fleet. Figure 2 illustrates the kill distribution of US submarine-launched nuclear missiles equipped with the earlier, fixed height-of-burst fuzes. The dome-shaped volume outlined in gray shows the lethal volume within which a 100-kiloton nuclear explosion will generate 10,000 pounds per square inch or more of blast pressure on the ground. In other words, if a target on the ground cannot survive a blast of 10,000 pounds per square inch or more, it will be destroyed if a 100-kt nuclear weapon detonates anywhere within that dome-shaped volume. To show the physical relationship of the lethal volume for a particular ground target of interest—in this case a Russian SS-18 ICBM silo—Figure 2 was drawn to scale. Also shown to scale is the approximate spread of warhead trajectories that correspond to a missile that is accurate to 100 meters, a miss distance roughly the same as what is achieved by the Trident II sea-launched ballistic missile. Miss distances are typically characterized in terms of a quantity called the “circular error probable,” or CEP, which is defined as the radius of a circle around the aim point within which half of the warheads aimed at a target are expected to impact. In the case of a Trident II 100-kt W76-1 ballistic missile warhead, the lethal distance on the ground and the CEP are roughly equal. As a result, roughly half of the warheads equipped with the old, fixed-height fuze system could be expected to fall close enough to detonate on the ground within the lethal range. The new super-fuze for W76-1/Mk4A has a flexible height-of-burst capability that enables it to detonate at any height within the lethal volume over a target. Figure 3 shows how the new fuze vastly increases the chances that the target will be destroyed, even though the arriving warheads have essentially the same ballistic accuracy. The super-fuze is designed to measure its altitude well before it arrives near the target and while it is still outside the atmosphere. This measurement would typically be taken at an altitude of 60 to 80 kilometers, where the effects of atmospheric drag are very small. At this point, the intended trajectory is known to very high precision before the warhead begins to substantially slow from atmospheric drag. If the warhead altitude measured by the super-fuze at that time were exactly equal to the altitude expected for the intended trajectory, the warhead would be exactly on target. But if the altitude were higher than expected, the warhead could be expected to hit beyond the intended aim point. Likewise, if the altitude is lower than that expected, the warhead would likely hit short of the intended aim point. Testing has established the statistical shape and orientation of the expected spread of warhead locations as they fly towards the target. In the case of Trident II, the spread of trajectories around the intended trajectory is so small that the best way to increase the chances of detonating inside the lethal volume is to intentionally shift the aim point slightly beyond the location of the target. (Note that the intended trajectory in Figure 3 is shifted slightly down range.) By shifting the aim point down range by a distance roughly equal to a CEP, warheads that would otherwise fall short or long of the target using the conventional Mk4 fuze instead will detonate—at different heights dictated by the super fuze—within the lethal volume above a target. This shift in the down-range aim point will result in a very high percentage of warheads that overfly the target detonating in the lethal volume. The end result is that with the new Mk4A super-fuze, a substantially higher percentage of launched warheads detonate inside the lethal volume, resulting in a considerable increase in the likelihood that the target is destroyed. The ultimate effect of the super fuze’s flexible burst-height capability is a significantly increased target kill probability of the new W76-1/Mk4A warhead compared with the conventional warhead of the same type. Figure 4 shows the probability that warheads will detonate close enough to destroy the ground-target for both the conventional fuze and the super-fuze. As can be seen from figure 4, the probability of kill using a submarine-launched warhead with the new super-fuze (W76-1/Mk4A) is about 0.86. This 86 percent probability is very close to what could be achieved using three warheads with conventional fuzes to attack the same target. To put it differently: In the case of the 100-kt Trident II warhead, the super fuze triples the killing power of the nuclear force it has been applied to. Many Russian targets are not hardened to 10,000 pounds per square inch blast overpressure. Figure 5 shows the same probability of kill curves for the case of a target that is only hard to 2,000 pounds per square inch or more of blast overpressure, which is the actual case for almost all targets hardened to nuclear attack—ICBMs and supporting command posts, hardened structures at strategic airbases, submarines at pierside or in protected tunnels, hardened command posts at road mobile missile bases and elsewhere, etc. In this case, the super-fuze achieves a probability of kill of about 0.99—or very near certainty. This case also is equivalent to achieving a probability of kill associated with using three warheads with a 0.83 probability to achieve a 0.99 probability of kill. The probability of kills revealed by figures 4 and 5 have enormous security ramifications. The US military assumes that Russian SS-18 and TOPOL missile silos are hardened to withstand a pressure of 10,000 pounds per square inch or more. Since with the new super-fuze, the probability of kill against these silos is near 0.9, the entire force of 100-kt W76-1/Mk4A Trident II warheads now “qualifies” for use against the hardest of Russian silos. This, in turn, means that essentially all of the higher-yield nuclear weapons (such as the W88/Mk5) that were formerly assigned to these Russian hard targets can now be focused on other, more demanding missions, including attacks against deeply-buried underground command facilities. In effect, the significant increase in the killing power of the W76 warhead allows the United States to use its submarine-based weapons more decisively in a wider range of missions than was the case before the introduction of this fuze. The history of the US super-fuze program. The super-fuze is officially known as the arming, fuzing and firing (AF&F) system. It consists of a fuze, an arming subsystem (which includes the radar), a firing subsystem, and a thermal battery that powers the system. The AF&F is located in the tip of the cone-shaped reentry body above the nuclear explosive package itself. The AF&F developed for the new W76-1/Mk4A is known as MC4700 and forms part of the W76 life-extension program intended to extend the service life of the W76—the most numerous warhead in the US stockpile—out to the time period 2040-2050. The new super-fuze uses a technology first deployed on the high-yield W88/Mk5 Trident II warhead. The Navy’s Strategic Systems Program contracted with the Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation in the early 1980s to develop a new fuze that included “a radar-updated, path-length compensating fuze … that could adjust for trajectory errors and significantly improve the ability to destroy a target. This was an early and sophisticated use of artificial intelligence in a weapon.” It was the radar-updated, path-length compensating fuze—combined with the increased accuracy of the Trident II missile—that gave an SLBM the ability to hold a hardened target at risk. Efforts to incorporate the W88/Mk5 fuze capability into the W76/Mk4 was part of the Energy Department’s Warhead Protection Program in the mid-1990s to permit “Mk5 fuzing functionality (including radar-updated path length fuzing, and radar proximity fuzing) as an option to replacement of the much smaller Mk4 AF&F,” according to the partially declassified 1996 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (emphasis added). Apart from the inherent drive to improve military capabilities whenever possible, the motivation for increasing the target kill capability of the submarine-borne W76 was that the Air Force’s hard-target killer, the MX Peacekeeper ICBM, was scheduled to be retired under the START II treaty. The Navy only had 400 W88 hard-target kill warheads, so a decision was made to add the capability to the W76. In an article in April 1997, Strategic Systems Program director Rear Adm. George P. Nanos publicly explained that “just by changing the fuze in the Mk4 reentry body, you get a significant improvement. The Mk4, with a modified fuze and Trident II accuracy, can meet the original D5 [submarine-borne missile] hard target requirement,” [Nanos stated](https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/W76nanos.pdf). Later that same year, the Energy Department’s Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan formally described the objective of the fuze modernization program “to enable W76 to take advantage of [the] higher accuracy of [the] D5 missile.” By 1998, the fuze modernization effort became a formal project, with five SLBM flight tests planned for 2001-2008. Full-scale production of the super-fuze equipped W76-1/Mk4A began in September 2008, with the first warhead delivered to the Navy in February 2009. By the end of 2016, roughly 1,200 of an estimated 1,600 planned W76-1/Mk4As had been produced, of which about 506 are currently deployed on ballistic missile submarines. The implications. The newly created capability to destroy Russian silo-based nuclear forces with 100-kt W76-1/Mk4A warheads—the most numerous in the US stockpile—vastly expands the nuclear warfighting capabilities of US nuclear forces. Since only part of the W76 force would be needed to eliminate Russia’s silo-based ICBMs, the United States will be left with an enormous number of higher-yield warheads that would then be available to be reprogrammed for other missions. Approximately 890 warheads are deployed on US ballistic missile submarines (506 W76-1/Mk4A and 384 W88/Mk5). Assuming that the 506 deployed W76-1s equipped with the super-fuze were used against Russian silo-based ICBMs, essentially all 136 Russian silo-based ICBMs could be potentially eliminated by attacking each silo with two W76-1 warheads—a total of 272 warheads. This would consume only 54 percent of the deployed W76-1 warheads, leaving roughly 234 of the 500 warheads free to be targeted on yet other installations. And hundreds of additional submarine warheads are in storage for increasing the missile warhead loading if so ordered. The Trident II missiles that are deployed today carry an average of four to five W76-1 warheads each. However, each missile could carry eight such warheads if the US were to suddenly decide to carry a maximum load of W76 warheads on its deployed Trident II ballistic missiles. And the missile was tested with up to 12 warheads. Essentially all the 384 W88 “heavy” Trident II warheads, with yields of 455 kt, would also be available for use against deeply-buried targets. In addition, about 400 Minuteman III warheads, with yields of about 300 kt, could be used to target hardened Russian targets. In all, the entire Russian silo-based forces could potentially be destroyed while leaving the US with 79 percent of its ballistic missile warheads unused. Even after Russia’s silo-based missiles were attacked, the US nuclear firepower remaining would be staggering—and certainly of concern to Russia or any other country worried about a US first strike. Because of the new kill capabilities of US submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the United States would be able to target huge portions of its nuclear force against non-hardened targets, the destruction of which would be crucial to a “successful” first strike. One such mission would likely involve the destruction of road-mobile ICBMs that had left their garrisons to hide in Russia’s vast forests in anticipation of attack. The garrisons and their support facilities would probably be destroyed quickly, and some of the dispersed road-mobile launchers would also be quickly destroyed as they were in the process of dispersing. To destroy or expose the remaining launchers, United States planners would have the nuclear forces needed to undertake truly scorched-earth tactics: Just 125 US Minuteman III warheads could set fire to some 8,000 square miles of forest area where the road-mobile missiles are most likely to be deployed. This would be the equivalent of a circular area with a diameter of 100 miles. Such an attack would be potentially aimed at destroying all road-mobile launchers either as they disperse or after they have taken up position some short distance from roads that give them access to forested areas. Many of the nearly 300 remaining deployed W76 warheads could be used to attack all command posts associated with Russian ICBMs. A very small number of Russia’s major leadership command posts are deeply buried, to protect them from direct destruction by nuclear attack. The US military would likely reserve the highest-yield warheads for those targets. Figure 7 below shows an example of a structure that is roughly the size of the US Capitol building that is postulated to have rooms and tunnels as deep as 800 feet or more. Shelters that have rooms and tunnels at even greater depths could be sealed by using multiple nuclear warheads to crater every location where an entrance or exit might conceivably have been built.

#### Successful preemptive strike forces a surrender – solves further escalation.

Sarah Johnson 17, "U.S. Nuclear First Strike Policy; Be Afraid", Bill Track 50, https://www.billtrack50.com/blog/in-the-news/u-s-nuclear-first-strike-policy-be-afraid/

The second situation is a [preemptive strike](http://www.dictionary.com/browse/preemptive-strike) — a first-strike attack with nuclear weapons carried out to destroy an enemy’s capacity to respond. Preemptive strikes can be based on the assumption that the enemy is planning an imminent attack, but don’t have to be. The methodology behind a preemptive nuclear strike is to attack the enemy’s strategic nuclear weapon facilities (missile silos, submarine bases, bomber airfields), command and control sites and storage depots first. By hitting these targets first the enemy will be so wounded with so little of their resources left that they will be forced to surrender with minimal damage to the attacking party.

#### Otherwise, Russia will broadly scale up military AI – extinction.

Mike Rogers 17, former US Representative from Michigan, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Artificial intelligence — the arms race we may not be able to control", TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/351725-artificial-intelligence-is-the-new-arms-race-we-may-not-be-able-to-control

“Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become ruler of the world,” [said](https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/4/16251226/russia-ai-putin-rule-the-world) Vladimir Putin. The sphere the President of Russia is referring to is artificial intelligence (AI) and his comments should give you a moment of pause. Addressing students at the beginning of our Labor Day weekend, Putin remarked “Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind,” adding, “It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict.” For once, I find myself in agreement with the President of Russia, but just this once. Artificial Intelligence offers incredible promise and peril. Nowhere is this clearer than in the realm of national security. Today un-crewed systems are a fact of modern warfare. Nearly every country is adopting systems where personnel are far removed from the conflict and wage war by remote control. AI [stands](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/us/pentagon-artificial-intelligence-terminator.html) to sever that ground connection. Imagine a fully autonomous Predator or Reaper drone. Managed by an AI system, the drone could identify targets, determine their legitimacy, and conduct a strike all without human intervention. Indeed, the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom issued a press [statement](https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/12/16286580/uk-government-killer-robots-drones-weapons) in September that the country “does not possess fully autonomous weapon systems and has no intention of developing them,” and that its weapons systems “will always be under control as an absolute guarantee of human oversight and authority and accountability.” Let’s think smaller. Imagine a tiny insect-sized drone loaded with explosive. Guided by a [pre-programmed AI](https://www.amazon.com/Life-3-0-Being-Artificial-Intelligence/dp/1101946598), it could hunt down a specific target — a politician, a general, or an opposition figure — determine when to strike, how to strike, and if to strike based on its own learning. Howard Hughes Medical Center [recently](https://qz.com/1000011/scientists-attached-an-electronic-backpack-to-a-genetically-modified-dragonfly-and-turned-it-into-a-drone/) attached a backpack to a genetically modified dragonfly and flew it remotely. These examples are, however, where humans are involved and largely control the left and right limits of AI. Yet, there are examples of AI purposely and independently going beyond programed parameters. Rogue algorithms led to a [flash crash](http://gizmodo.com/rogue-algorithm-blamed-for-historic-crash-of-the-britis-1787523587) of the British Pound. In 2016, in-game AIs created super AIs weapons and [hunted down](http://www.kotaku.co.uk/2016/06/03/elites-ai-created-super-weapons-and-started-hunting-players-skynet-is-here) human players, and AIs have [created](https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonybradley/2017/07/31/facebook-ai-creates-its-own-language-in-creepy-preview-of-our-potential-future/#1cf69787292c) their own languages that were indecipherable to humans. AIs proved more effective than their human counterparts in producing and catching users in spear phishing programs. Not only did the AIs create more content, they successfully [captured](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Seymour-Tully-Weaponizing-Data-Science-For-Social-Engineering-Automated-E2E-Spear-Phishing-On-Twitter.pdf) more users with their deception. While seemingly simple and low stakes in nature, extrapolate these scenarios into more significant and risky areas and the consequences become much greater. Cybersecurity is no different. Today we are focused on the hackers, trolls, and cyber criminals (officially sanctioned and otherwise) who seek to penetrate our networks, steal our intellectual property, and leave behind malicious code for activation in the event of a conflict. Replace the individual with an AI and imagine how fast hacking takes place; networks against networks, at machine speed all without a human in the loop. Sound far-fetched? It’s not. In 2016, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency held an AI on AI capture the flag contest called the [Cyber Grand Challenge](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qSgYu3w3DMM) at the DEF CON event. AI networks against AI networks. In August of this year the founders of 116 AI and robotics companies signed a letter petitioning the United Nations [to ban](https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/21/16177828/killer-robots-ban-elon-musk-un-petition) lethal autonomous systems. Signatories to this letter included Google DeepMind’s co-founder Mustafa Suleyman and Elon Musk who, in response to Putin’s quote [tweeted](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/904638455761612800), “Competition for AI superiority at national level most likely cause of WW3 imo (sic)”. AI is not some far off future challenge. It is a challenge today and one with which we must grapple. I am in favor of fielding any system that enhances our national security, but we must have an open and honest conversation about the implications of AI, the consequences of which we do not, and may not, fully understand. This is not a new type of bullet or missile. This is a potentially fully autonomous system that even with human oversight and guidance will make its own decisions on the battlefield and in cyberspace. How can we ensure that the system does not escape our control? How can we prevent such systems from falling into the hands of terrorists or insurgents? Who controls the source code? How and can we build in so-called impenetrable kill switches? AI and AI-like systems are slowly being introduced into our arsenal. Our adversaries, China, Russia, and others are also introducing AI systems into their arsenals as well. Implementation is happening faster than our ability to fully comprehend the consequences. Putin’s new call spells out a new arms race. Rushing to AI weapon systems without guiding principles is a dangerous. It risks an escalation that we do not fully understand and may not be able to control. The cost of limiting AI intelligence being weaponized [could vastly exceed](https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf) all of our nuclear proliferation efforts to date. More troubling, the consequences of failure are equally existential.

#### Absent fiat, if conventional war with Russia started or was imminent, the US would use nukes first – small attacks go nuclear FAST and the US isn’t afriad

Tong Zhao et al 18, fellow @ Carnegie, PhD in Science, Technology, and International Affairs @ Georgia Institute of Technology, MA in International Relations @ Tsinghua University, “Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Entanglement”, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/09/12/reducing-risks-of-nuclear-entanglement-pub-77236

Chinese or Russian non-nuclear strikes against the United States could also spark escalation—a risk that has been overlooked since the Cold War—for reasons other than crisis instability. The risk would be most acute if China or Russia launched non-nuclear attacks against dual-use U.S. C3I assets (including early-warning and communication satellites, as well as ground-based radars and transmitters). Even if conducted exclusively for the purpose of winning (or at least not losing) a conventional war, such non-nuclear attacks could be misinterpreted by Washington as preparations for nuclear use. As a result, Washington might come to believe (wrongly) that it was about to become the victim of a nuclear attack—an effect termed misinterpreted warning. For example, China or Russia might attack U.S. early-warning satellites to enable their regional non-nuclear ballistic missiles (or, perhaps, non-nuclear ICBMs or boost-glide weapons in the future) to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. However, such an attack might be misinterpreted by the United States as an attempt to disable missile defenses designed to protect the homeland against limited nuclear strikes. Even if the United States did not believe that nuclear use by an adversary was imminent, it might still worry that non-nuclear strikes against its dual-use C3I assets could compromise its ability to limit the damage it would suffer if the war turned nuclear at some later point. Such damage-limitation operations, which are an acknowledged part of U.S. nuclear strategy, would probably involve nuclear or non-nuclear attacks on the adversary’s nuclear forces backed up by missile defenses. To have any chance of success, these operations would require very sophisticated C3I capabilities (to target mobile missiles, for example). Attacks on—or even perceived threats to—these C3I assets (many of which are dual use) could lead to concerns in Washington that, unless it took action now, effective damage limitation might be impossible—that is, the damage-limitation window might already have closed—if the war turned nuclear. The United States might respond to either of these concerns in ways that could further escalate the crisis. Washington would probably take steps to protect surviving C3I capabilities. It might, for example, attack anti-satellite weapons that were seen as particularly threatening. Such strikes could prove especially escalatory if they were conducted deeper inside the adversary’s borders than the United States had previously struck. Alternatively, or additionally, Washington might issue explicit or implicit nuclear threats against nuclear use or further attacks on C3I assets. In fact, the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review even goes so far as to threaten to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks on C3I assets. Risk mitigation will likely prove challenging. China may not want to disentangle its nuclear and non-nuclear forces because doing so might weaken its ability to deter U.S. attacks against the latter and because such disentanglement might prove challenging organizationally for the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (which operates China’s land-based nuclear forces). For Russia, the financial costs associated with disentanglement are likely to be a significant barrier. Moreover, inadvertent escalation is not generally regarded as a serious risk in China or Russia. Unfortunately, the belief that inadvertent escalation is unlikely actually makes it more probable because it leaves political and military leaders less inclined, in peacetime, to take steps that could mitigate the risks and more inclined, in wartime, to interpret ambiguous events in the worst possible light. Although there is more acceptance of the possibility of inadvertent escalation in the United States, there is little evidence that the U.S. government and military have fully factored the risks of entanglement into procurement policies and war planning. There is also little evidence that the administration of President Donald Trump is willing to invest significant political capital in reducing the risk of inadvertent escalation.

## Iran Nuclear Deal CP

### 1NC – MBS

#### CP Text: The United States federal government should

#### Rejoin the Iran Nuclear Deal

#### Stop nuclear energy and information sales to Saudi Arabia

#### Solves case – your only internal link says that prolif is only inevitable if we stay withdrawn from the Iran Nuclear Deal – YOUR EVIDENCE

Riedel 18, MA Harvard/PHD Royal Defense College, (Bruce, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/09/saudi-arabia-stability-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman.html#ixzz5d6Eyh8hP, 4-24) / MM

King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud and his son are pursuing the most virulent anti-Iran and anti-Shiite policy in modern Saudi history. This approach has deep roots in Wahhabi history. Mixed with Iran’s expansive regional meddling, the combination is dangerous and explosive. Washington needs to exercise great care and not inflame the situation. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the kingdom’s unique form of Islam, spent time in Basra in the middle of the 18th century. His exposure to Iraq’s most Shiite city was formative to his ideas, according to Michael Crawford, the premier Western biographer of Wahhab. He became an extreme critic of Shiism, branding them polytheists and infidels. Saudi armies sacked Shiite cities in Iraq, destroyed Shiite shrines in Mecca and invaded Yemen to try to defeat its Zaydi Shiite tribes. Modern Saudi monarchs have had antagonistic relationships with Iran, both with the shah and the ayatollahs, but they have avoided direct confrontation and always kept communication channels open. King Faysal (who ruled from 1964-1975) detested the shah as an egomaniac, but worked with him to create the Organization of the Islamic Conference (now known as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation). King Fahd (who ruled from 1982-2005) backed Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War, but he used the Saudi power of the purse to force Saddam to accept a cease-fire to end the war. King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud (who ruled from 2005-2015) appointed a Saudi Shiite as ambassador to Tehran and kept open dialogue even as he sent troops across the King Fahd causeway to smash Shiite majority dissent in Bahrain seven years ago. The troops are still there. King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have followed a much more confrontational approach. Their signature foreign policy initiative is the 3-year-old war in Yemen, which they portray as a necessary war to prevent the Iranians from taking over Yemen with the Zaydi Houthi rebels. The war has been marked by humanitarian disasters, like the bombing of a wedding party by the Saudi coalition April 22 and the mass starvation of the Yemeni people by the Saudi blockade. It is a sectarian conflict overplayed by a regional struggle for power by the Saudis and Iranians. The war costs the kingdom a fortune and the ayatollahs a pittance, but it’s very popular with the Wahhabi establishment. At home, King Salman and Prince Mohammed have led a ruthless crackdown on Saudi Shiite dissidents in the Eastern Province of the kingdom. The city of Awamiyah has been pounded into rubble by the Saudi authorities. Satellite imagery shows whole neighborhoods destroyed. The execution of prominent Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr led to the Saudis breaking of diplomatic relations with Iran. This, too, is popular with the Wahhabi clerical establishment. In Syria and Lebanon, the Saudis have sought to weaken the Bashar al-Assad regime and Hezbollah, but neither effort has worked. Iran is more firmly embedded in both states than ever before. The determination of the Donald Trump administration to pull America out of Syria has alarmed Riyadh. Its offer to send Saudi and other Arab troops, an old proposal repackaged, is hollow given the performance of Saudi ground forces in Yemen. Iraq is the exception that proves the rule. For a decade after the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saudi Arabia backed Sunni Arab resistance to the elected Shiite majority governments. The Wahhabi clerical establishment enthusiastically backed this approach, even as it benefited al-Qaeda in Iraq and ultimately the Islamic State. It was a bankrupt and counterproductive policy. It also became increasingly irrelevant, as the Sunni Arab community in Iraq lost its power and influence. So now the Saudis are trying to develop a positive relationship with Iraq’s Shiites. The Saudis have belatedly opened an embassy in Baghdad, and they seek to open consulates in Basra and Najaf to add to one in Erbil. There is talk of the crown prince visiting Iraq. The border is opening up for trade; sporting events are underway. The Saudi policy initiative is a bright spot for Iraq and the kingdom. But there are still limits. Iraq is not a member of the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance, which is intended to confront Iran by the Saudis. The Iranians have many more assets in Iraq than the Saudis, and they are determined to maintain their hegemony. The Saudis have no counter to the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The optimal solution to de-escalate the sectarian conflict in the region is to start in Yemen. The existing United Nations process is a nonstarter because it is based on a UN Security Council resolution that is tilted deliberately toward Riyadh. Washington, London and Paris have tremendous influence as the suppliers of arms to Saudi Arabia. They should work together to help find a face-saving way for the king and crown prince to end the war. It will take tough love. Iran is unlikely to help. The war in Yemen is a major strategic advantage for Tehran. It bogs the Saudis down at little cost to Iran. But it is also dangerous, especially now that the Iranians have helped the Houthis’ missile capabilities. Riyadh is literally under fire. This is playing arsonist during a wildfire. The Iranians are particularly eager to humiliate Prince Mohammed, who has called Ayatollah Ali Khamenei a 21st-century Hitler. Iran calls the crown prince infantile. In this toxic environment, it makes no sense for the Trump administration to jettison the multinational nuclear agreement with Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action can be criticized for its shortcomings, but it is keeping Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state. Prince Mohammed has made it publicly clear that if Iran returns to active development of a nuclear arsenal, Saudi Arabia will do the same. The United States should not add gasoline to the fire in Saudi Arabia.

## Counterterror PIC

### 1NC – Saudi

#### Counterplan text: The executive branch of the United States federal government should provide the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with counter-terrorism intelligence and advisory services.

#### The executive branch of the United States federal government should immediately end all other military aid provided to the authoritarian regimes of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

#### It’s competitive

ICIJ 7 The Int'l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, “A citizen’s guide to understanding U.S. foreign military aid,” [http://www.publicintegrity.org/2007/05/22/5772/citizen-s-guide-understanding-us-foreign-military-aid /](http://www.publicintegrity.org/2007/05/22/5772/citizen-s-guide-understanding-us-foreign-military-aid%20/) MM

For the “Collateral Damage” investigative study, the Center for Public Integrity created a database that tracks a subset of those financial flows: taxpayer-funded programs or assistance that contribute to a nation’s offensive military capabilities. The database does not include certain large nuclear non-proliferation programs or expenditures such as Foreign Military Sales or Direct Commercial Sales, which are not supported directly with taxpayer dollars. The database is also limited to tracking funds appropriated to either the Defense Department or the State Department. For this report, these are the criteria for “foreign military assistance” or “foreign military aid.” Funds appropriated to the State Department and Defense Department represent the vast majority of unclassified military aid and assistance. This report does not attempt to track smaller overseas programs where funding is appropriated to the Justice Department, Drug Enforcement Agency, or Department of Homeland Security. The public does not have any way of tracking classified programs administered by the U.S. intelligence community. These classified programs likely command large amounts of funding, especially after the 9/11 attacks, and oversight is limited to members of congressional intelligence committees. Programs included in the Center’s database: Coalition Support Funds (CSF): created after 9/11 to reimburse key allied countries for providing assistance to the U.S. in the global war on terror. Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP): created after 9/11 to give the Defense Department its own funding to train and educate foreign military officers in counterterrorism techniques. In practice, CTFP has evolved into a program very similar to IMET (see definition below). Department of Defense Counterdrug Funding: assists foreign militaries and security forces to combat drug trafficking around the world; also known as Section 1004 appropriations. Economic Support Fund (ESF): provides grants to foreign governments to support economic stability. ESF is often used for non-military purposes, but the grants are commonly viewed as a way to help offset military expenditures. They have historically been earmarked for key security allies of the United States. Israel and Egypt are the two largest recipients of ESF. Foreign Military Financing (FMF): finances foreign governments’ acquisition of U.S. military articles, services and training. International Military Education and Training (IMET): educates foreign military personnel on issues ranging from democracy and human rights to technical military techniques and training on U.S. weapons systems. International Narcotics and Law Enforcement/Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI): the primary State Department funding effort for countering drugs, including the large Colombian initiatives. Military Assistance Program (MAP): provides military material and services to foreign countries; the U.S. government is not reimbursed. MAP includes “emergency drawdowns,” which are emergency transfers authorized by the president for weapons, ammunition, parts and military equipment to foreign governments. Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related Activities (NADR): supports de-mining, anti-terrorism, and nonproliferation training and assistance. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO): supports programs that improve foreign militaries’ peacekeeping capabilities.

#### It’s military aid and there’s precedent

Blanchard 16 Christopher M., Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations”, September 20, 2016, [https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1017814.pdf /](https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1017814.pdf%20/) MM

Successive U.S. Administrations have referred to the Saudi government as an important partner, and U.S. arms sales and related security cooperation have continued with congressional oversight and amid some congressional opposition. The Trump Administration, like its recent predecessors, praises Saudi government counterterrorism efforts. Since 2009, the executive branch has notified Congress of proposed foreign military sales to Saudi Arabia of major defense articles and services with a potential aggregate value of nearly $139 billion. The United States and Saudi Arabia concluded arms sale agreements worth more than $65 billion, from FY2009 through FY2016. Since March 2015, the U.S.-trained Saudi military has used U.S.-origin weaponry, U.S. logistical assistance, and shared intelligence in support of military operations in Yemen. Legislation has been proposed in the 115th Congress to condition or disapprove of some U.S. weapons sales and condition or direct the President to end U.S. support to Saudi operations without specific authorization

### 1NC – Egypt – New Trier

#### Counterplan text: The United States federal government should provide military aid to the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Libya on the condition that

#### Aid is distributed following the Millennium Challenge Corporation model and significant human rights reform

#### Counterterrorism military aid is increased

#### All other military aid is immediately ended

#### Solves case

Adams and Sokolsky 15 Gordon Adams [Fellow at the Stimson Center and Professor Emeritus at American University’s School of International Service.] Richard Sokolsky [Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former director of the Department of State’s Office of Defense Relations and Security Assistance.], 7-27-2015, "Governance and Security Sector Assistance: The Missing Link," No Publication, <http://www.securityassistance.org/blog/governance-and-security-sector-assistance-missing-link>

U.S. security assistance and cooperation programs have been less successful than administrations have hoped and may have actually worsened the security of many recipient countries. In our view, such programs are likely to be more effective if they are more selective, better monitored, and linked, with real consequences, to recipient country performance with respect to both the internal operations of the security sector and the broader objective of effective, efficient, accountable, and uncorrupt governance. How might this outcome be advanced? The foreign economic assistance program of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) offers a model for revamping U.S. security sector assistance to lash it up more effectively with efforts to improve governance. The MCC decision-making process is much more selective and conditional than traditional development assistance. It requires potential assistance recipients to measure up to 16 broadly accepted indicators of good governance before they are eligible for MCC funding. Countries that meet these standards are treated more like partners than aid recipients. They develop and take ownership of their own plans for how MCC funds will be used to advance economic growth and human security. Countries are selected for participation based on their performance, and the amount of funding they receive is determined by the quality of their plans, formalized in “compacts” with the MCC. Because MCC funds are limited and the program is highly selective, prospective MCC partners are, in effect, challenged to compete for funding with other countries. Once countries sign a compact, the MCC applies stringent performance and evaluation controls to monitor and hold MCC partners accountable for results. Poor country performance in meeting its commitments under their compacts can and has been penalized by the termination of the compact (e.g., Nicaragua, Mali). MCC countries are incentivized to improve their policy performance to meet standards that both improve governance and advance U.S. national objectives. The MCC format and experience to date might be a useful approach to U.S. security assistance programs. The small SGI program suggests there is interest in linking broader governance performance to funding. This approach would establish a set of broader governance criteria, as well as criteria specifically related to security sector behavior, that would determine the initial eligibility of countries for assistance. The U.S. would establish a “challenge fund” consisting of the bulk of U.S. security assistance funds, for which potential recipient countries could compete. To be successful, the stewards of this fund would need to establish stringent performance standards both for overall governance and for security sector governance that competing countries would have to meet before they are declared eligible and selected for participation in the fund. For example (the list below is illustrative and not exhaustive), governments should: Be committed to civilian-led accountable institutions and have a military that only acts under civilian command and with clear and transparent rules of engagement. Make military/security capabilities, budget data, and weapons procurement transparent to civilian authorities and not allow the military to own productive resources in the civilian economy. Require military/security training to include human rights, accountability to civilians and civilian institutions, and adherence to rule of law and prohibit military/security forces from detaining individuals indefinitely or without trial. Have defense and interior ministries headed by civilians appointed through an accountable process, with low measures of corruption, as MCC uses. Have legislatures with capacity for effective oversight of military/security ministries and with budget/appropriations role for these budgets. Have a free press allowed to scrutinize and report on military and security force budgets and activities without repression. Have clear rules of engagement for dealing with internal unrest that meet international standards and do not use military/security forces for internal political repression. Make an adequate investment of resources for training in the areas of democratic and community-oriented policing and have an investigatory framework that does not rely on torture and forced confession.

#### They say yes

Dooley 18 Brian Dooley (Senior Advisor at Human Rights First where he works to contain and counteract a U.S. retreat from global leadership on human rights), 7-28-2018, "Administration should use its leverage to get Egypt to improve its human rights record," [https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/399341-administration-should-use-its-leverage-to-get-egypt-to /](https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/399341-administration-should-use-its-leverage-to-get-egypt-to%20/) MM

Last August, the State Department withheld $195 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) from Egypt. Rex Tillerson, then Secretary of State, said he couldn’t certify that Egypt had met the human rights conditions set by Congress. The Egyptian government’s human rights record is now even worse, yet the State Department, under Secretary Mike Pompeo, this announced that it would lift the hold on the funding. The move squanders Washington's leverage on President Sisi’s regime and undermines those fighting for freedom in Egypt. Last week I traveled to Egypt and spoke with activists targeted for peaceful dissent. Some face many years in jail if the regime follows through on charges. The police and security service routinely torture detainees with techniques such electric shocks, beatings and rape. “To me, an Egyptian living in Egypt, I see no improvement in the human rights situation,” said Mohamed Zaree of the Cairo Institute of Human Rights Studies, winner of the 2017 Martin Ennals Award for Human Rights Defenders. President Sisi recently ratified a draconian law restricting the work of NGOs, essentially making it a crime to advocate for human rights and development. And just this week, the government announced further restrictions on the use of social media, and parliament passed a law giving senior military commanders immunity from prosecution for the killing of protestors in 2013. It’s widely assumed that Sisi will soon change the constitution to abolish term limits for the presidency. Civil society leaders told me they want the United States to keep the holds on the aid and to expand human rights conditions. “The military aid is the only thing the authorities here care about,” said one. “It’s the best card for the Americans to play.” Withholding the aid was beginning to have an effect. The authorities had agreed to order a retrial in the notorious 173 Foreign Funding Case, in which a criminal court sentenced 43 employees of foreign NGOs to up to five years in jail and ordered the closure of the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, Freedom House, the International Center for Journalists and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. When the Court of Cassation announced a retrial in April this year, civil society leaders hailed this as a welcome first step. The hearing, however, has been postponed until Nov. 11. At the very least, the State Department should have waited to see progress on this case before lifting the holds. Secretary Pompeo now has to decide by Sept. 30 whether to release a further $195 million in FMF. It’s hard to see how he can certify progress on human rights. He should recognize that the repression is not only inflicting suffering on Egyptians but also weakening U.S. nation security. Ascendant in Egypt, ISIS is recruiting in the prisons and otherwise feeding off resentment caused by government abuses. The United States can’t afford to allow Egypt to slide further into a dictatorship. Secretary Pompeo should make clear that further FMF won’t be released until there is real movement on Case 173 and other human rights violations. If he doesn’t, Congress should deny funding until Egypt satisfies specific conditions. Sens. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), among others, have spoken out against the crackdown on civil society, and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) is blocking $300 million in FMF unless Egypt meets human rights requirements, including a proper inquiry into the 2016 torture and murder of Italian student Giulio Regeni. Washington needs to rethink its relationship with Cairo. Appointing an ambassador to Egypt would be a start, but real progress will happen only if the United States demands it. The Trump administration has leverage in the form of military aid. It should use it.

### 1NC – Azerbaijan

#### Text: The United States federal government should

#### Withhold all military aid to Azerbaijan, except aid that is designated for counterterrorism operations and advisory services

#### Increase military institution building, basic soldier life support, military education and training programs that bolster human rights, and US customs and border training

#### Solves case

CRS 10 Congressional Research Service, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests) <https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20100311_RL30679_2d2c894ca1f8d5101446117bc1a5ae9758b6b7d8.pdf> MP recut MM

Observers who urge greater emphasis on U.S. security assistance to the South Caucasus states argue that such aid serves crucial U.S. interests. Without greater assistance, these states may not consolidate their independence. The states remain vulnerable to international terrorist groups and to coercion from neighboring countries.159 These observers emphasize that U.S. customs and border training and equipment and other nonproliferation aid prevent WMD technologies, materials, and personnel from falling prey to terrorist states or groups and from being smuggled through the region. They also argue that the states may not be able to adequately safeguard their energy pipelines from terrorists or criminals. They urge greater U.S. military-to-military assistance, including for military institution-building, basic soldier life support, and military education and training programs that bolster human rights. Such aid, in this view, will foster the creation of a professional, Western-style military that is better able to resist external security threats, and will foster democratic civil-military relations that reduces the chance of military coups. Greater U.S. support for PFP training—involving cooperation among regional militaries—could spur these states to work together. These observers also argue that as Iran increases its military capabilities, including missiles and possibly nuclear weapons, the South Caucasus states may necessarily seek closer countervailing ties with the United States. Alternatively, the region might feel pressured to seek greater accommodation with Iran, including by distancing itself from the United States. Georgia’s integration into Western institutions, including NATO, bolsters security in the Black Sea-Caspian Sea regions.

#### There’s precedent for only counterterror support

Mohammed 13 (Arshad– Reuters reporter. “U.S. leans toward withholding most military aid from Egypt – source.” 10/9/13. Reuters. <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-egypt-aid/u-s-leans-toward-withholding-most-military-aid-from-egypt-source-idUKBRE99800R20131009?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FUKWorldNews+%28News+%2F+UK+%2F+World+News%29)-JJN> recut MM

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States is leaning toward withholding most military aid to Egypt except to promote counterterrorism, security in the Sinai Peninsula that borders Israel, and other such priorities, a U.S. official said on Tuesday. The official said U.S. President Barack Obama had not made a final decision on the issue, which has vexed U.S. officials as they balance a desire to be seen promoting democracy and rights with a desire to keep up some cooperation with Egypt’s military. The military on July 3 overthrew President Mohamed Mursi, who emerged from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood movement to become the country’s first freely elected president last year after the February 2011 fall of longtime authoritarian ruler Hosni Mubarak. Mursi supporters and security forces have repeatedly clashed since, including on Sunday, one of the bloodiest days since the military took power, with state media reporting 57 people dead. After Mursi’s ouster, the Obama administration said it would suspend about $585 million (364 million pounds) in military assistance to Egypt pending a wider policy review. The U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the Obama administration was now leaning toward continuing to withhold most of that, with the exceptions described above. The official said the United States was also leaning toward continuing some economic aid to Egypt, but chiefly funds that go to nongovernmental groups rather than to the government itself. A second U.S. official, also speaking on condition of anonymity, said a decision on the aid was likely to be made public by the end of the week, although he noted that an announcement has been repeatedly postponed. Egypt for decades has been among the largest recipients of U.S. military and economic aid because of its 1979 peace treaty with U.S. ally Israel, which agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula it seized from Egypt in 1967 as a result of the pact. The United States has long provided Egypt with about $1.55 billion in annual aid, including $1.3 billion in military assistance. OBAMA’S DILEMMA The removal of Mursi has left Obama with an acute dilemma: whether to get tough with the army for toppling a democratically elected president, albeit an Islamist who had few friends in Washington, or whether to acquiesce in his overthrow. U.S. officials have said there has been a sharp debate within the administration for months over the issue, with one saying that the Pentagon had argued for continuing military aid, while others urged a significant reduction. At the U.N. General Assembly on September 24, Obama appeared to split the difference, saying the United States would maintain constructive ties with Egypt’s interim government despite its anti-democratic moves - including an emergency law and restrictions on opposition parties, the media and civil society. He also suggested that some military aid would depend on the interim government embracing a more inclusive democracy. “Going forward, the United States will maintain a constructive relationship with the interim government that promotes core interests like the Camp David Accords and counterterrorism,” he said, referring to the U.S.-brokered agreements that led to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. “We’ll continue support in areas like education that directly benefit the Egyptian people,” he added. “But we have not proceeded with the delivery of certain military systems, and our support will depend upon Egypt’s progress in pursuing a more democratic path.” Earlier on Tuesday, CNN quoted a U.S. official as saying that an “accumulation of events,” including the recent violence, had led to the decision on a “full suspension” of aid, a report the White House denied. “The reports that we are halting all military assistance to Egypt are false,” Caitlin Hayden, a spokeswoman for the White House National Security Council, said in a statement. “We will announce the future of our assistance relationship with Egypt in the coming days, but as the president made clear at (the U.N. General Assembly), that assistance relationship will continue.” The Pentagon declined all comment. Vanessa Murray, a spokeswoman for the U.S. Defence Security Cooperation Agency, which oversees foreign military aid and sales, earlier told Reuters there had been no change in policy or status regarding Egypt. Officials at General Dynamics Corp, which makes M1A1 tank kits for Egypt, and Boeing Co, which is building Apache helicopters for the Arab country, said late on Tuesday they had not been notified of any decision to halt military aid. There was no immediate comment from Lockheed Martin Corp, which is building F-16 fighter jets for Egypt. Shipments of four F-16s have already been halted temporarily, and eight more jets were due to be delivered in December. Two former government officials familiar with foreign military sales have said the Obama administration is likely to curtail certain high-visibility weapons sales such as the 12 Lockheed Martin Corp F-16s due to be delivered to Egypt this year to send a message to the military. The planes could be fairly easily adapted for sale to other countries, they said.

### 1NC – Tajikistan

#### CP Text: The United States federal government should

#### Only provide counterterror oriented counternarcotics military aid

#### Distribute military aid based on the Millennium Change Corporation model

#### Increase drug treatment and prevention programs

#### Increase wages for state officials engaged in counternarcotics efforts

#### Solves case – the other solvency advocate will be read on case

Adams and Sokolsky 15 Gordon Adams [Fellow at the Stimson Center and Professor Emeritus at American University’s School of International Service.] Richard Sokolsky [Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former director of the Department of State’s Office of Defense Relations and Security Assistance.], 7-27-2015, "Governance and Security Sector Assistance: The Missing Link," No Publication, <http://www.securityassistance.org/blog/governance-and-security-sector-assistance-missing-link> RE recut

U.S. security assistance and cooperation programs have been less successful than administrations have hoped and may have actually worsened the security of many recipient countries. In our view, such programs are likely to be more effective if they are more selective, better monitored, and linked, with real consequences, to recipient country performance with respect to both the internal operations of the security sector and the broader objective of effective, efficient, accountable, and uncorrupt governance. How might this outcome be advanced? The foreign economic assistance program of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) offers a model for revamping U.S. security sector assistance to lash it up more effectively with efforts to improve governance. The MCC decision-making process is much more selective and conditional than traditional development assistance. It requires potential assistance recipients to measure up to 16 broadly accepted indicators of good governance before they are eligible for MCC funding. Countries that meet these standards are treated more like partners than aid recipients. They develop and take ownership of their own plans for how MCC funds will be used to advance economic growth and human security. Countries are selected for participation based on their performance, and the amount of funding they receive is determined by the quality of their plans, formalized in “compacts” with the MCC. Because MCC funds are limited and the program is highly selective, prospective MCC partners are, in effect, challenged to compete for funding with other countries. Once countries sign a compact, the MCC applies stringent performance and evaluation controls to monitor and hold MCC partners accountable for results. Poor country performance in meeting its commitments under their compacts can and has been penalized by the termination of the compact (e.g., Nicaragua, Mali). MCC countries are incentivized to improve their policy performance to meet standards that both improve governance and advance U.S. national objectives. The MCC format and experience to date might be a useful approach to U.S. security assistance programs. The small SGI program suggests there is interest in linking broader governance performance to funding. This approach would establish a set of broader governance criteria, as well as criteria specifically related to security sector behavior, that would determine the initial eligibility of countries for assistance. The U.S. would establish a “challenge fund” consisting of the bulk of U.S. security assistance funds, for which potential recipient countries could compete. To be successful, the stewards of this fund would need to establish stringent performance standards both for overall governance and for security sector governance that competing countries would have to meet before they are declared eligible and selected for participation in the fund. For example (the list below is illustrative and not exhaustive), governments should: Be committed to civilian-led accountable institutions and have a military that only acts under civilian command and with clear and transparent rules of engagement. Make military/security capabilities, budget data, and weapons procurement transparent to civilian authorities and not allow the military to own productive resources in the civilian economy. Require military/security training to include human rights, accountability to civilians and civilian institutions, and adherence to rule of law and prohibit military/security forces from detaining individuals indefinitely or without trial. Have defense and interior ministries headed by civilians appointed through an accountable process, with low measures of corruption, as MCC uses. Have legislatures with capacity for effective oversight of military/security ministries and with budget/appropriations role for these budgets. Have a free press allowed to scrutinize and report on military and security force budgets and activities without repression. Have clear rules of engagement for dealing with internal unrest that meet international standards and do not use military/security forces for internal political repression. Make an adequate investment of resources for training in the areas of democratic and community-oriented policing and have an investigatory framework that does not rely on torture and forced confession.

## Uganda Ebola PIC

### 1NC - General

#### CP Text: The United States federal government should to increase military aid to Uganda that builds local health capacity and prevents the spread of disease.

#### The United States should end all other military aid to Uganda.

Bachmann 17 [Jan Bachmann, (School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden) "Militarization going places?" Critical Military Studies Volume 4, 2018 - Issue 2: Spaces At The Intersections Of Militarism And Humanitarianism, 5-26-2017, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23337486.2017.1328809, DOA:3-12-2019 // WWBW]

While initially established after 9/11 to address terrorist activities in Eastern Africa, CJTF-HoA has since extended its civil affairs activities significantly across the region, from the Comoros to Djibouti. **CJTF-HoA is today part of the US military’s latest regional combatant command, US Africa Command (US AFRICOM).** In Eastern Africa, CJTF-HoA’s civil affairs teams pursue an ‘indirect approach’ to terrorism via an attempt to win the trust of local populations through the delivery of humanitarian and development projects (Bradbury and Kleinman 2010, 15–6).5 **Activities by civil affairs teams in Eastern Africa are not restricted to immediate humanitarian disaster response but span a wide range of peacetime activities, including building health capacity, improving water provision, or extending schools for recipients who are assumed to otherwise be on the brink of radicalization or spreading instability. Through the provision of aid to strategically situated communities over the last decade, the** 106 J. BACHMANN **US military has consolidated its preventative engagement with civilian populations.** Through extended engagement in small infrastructure projects, civil affairs activities may contribute to the normalization of military presence and activity in peacetime. Nonetheless, this assertion calls for empirical investigation. Both regions visited for this article – Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader districts in northern Uganda and Lamu County in northern coastal Kenya – are politically as well as economically marginalized areas in their respective countries. Nevertheless, the context in which the US military’s aid practices have been carried out differs between the two countries. **The projects visited for this study in northern Uganda were part of joint civil–military post-conflict reconstruction operations. Activities included veterinary projects, medical clinics for local communities, and school as well as hospital rehabilitations.** Subsequently, US civil affairs teams have begun engaging in small humanitarian projects in the country’s most marginalized region, Karamoja, on the one hand and on the other in larger interagency initiatives targeting human/animal health issues across the country (US Embassy 2013, US Africa Command 2013). The civil affairs team I happened to meet for this study worked in the Karamoja region. In contrast, in Kenya the civil affairs teams have been engaging in repair and construction activities since 2003 in the northern areas bordering Somalia, and have since carried out more than 200 projects.6 In other words, in areas such as Lamu County, civil affairs activities have become permanent and the US military has become one of the most visible foreign ‘development actors’ (for some of the projects' momentariness see figure 1).

#### **Response to the Ebola outbreak in Congo requires Ugandan deployment**

Basu 18 [Tanya Basu, () "U.S. Not Deploying Experts to Ebola Outbreak in Congo" Daily Beast, 11-14-2018, https://www.thedailybeast.com/us-not-deploying-experts-to-ebola-outbreak-in-congo, DOA:3-12-2019 // WWBW]

**The U.S. said it has not sent health workers or troops to the epicenter of the Ebola outbreak** because of the security situation. **It** has a disaster response team in Kinshasa, the capital city, and **is working with** Rwanda, **Uganda**, and Burundi **to keep the outbreak from crossing borders.** The U.K. has sent a senior epidemiologist to the outbreak site twice and [announced this week](https://news.sky.com/story/uk-experts-to-fly-to-ebola-affected-areas-of-democratic-republic-of-congo-11552602) that it will deploy two more teams—one to operate a lab and another to work on drug trials. **The larger the outbreak gets the greater the possibility that someone from one of the affected areas who is unknowingly infected could travel outside of Congo and spread the disease to another country.** Because of Ebola’s incubation period, it can be days or weeks before someone shows symptoms. In 2014, a Liberian man visiting family in Dallas died of Ebola, and two health care workers who treated him contracted the disease but survived. A doctor who returned to the U.S. from working in Guinea also fell ill but survived. **U.S. officials said that the administration has been undertaking an** [**“aggressive response”**](https://www.thedailybeast.com/obamas-ebola-czar-ron-klain-asks-will-donald-trump-step-up-now) **to the outbreak and have not ruled out the possibility of a military deployment.** They said a variety of experimental therapies and vaccines have been deployed on a “compassionate” basis.

#### Ebola will cross over into Uganda—massive death tolls without vaccination

Grady 19 [Denise Grady, () "The Battle Against One of the Worst Ebola Epidemics Ever Is in Trouble" No Publication, 3-7-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/07/health/ebola-epidemic-congo.html, DOA:3-12-2019 // WWBW]

**Last August, an** unrelated **outbreak began in the** war-torn northeastern part of the Democratic Republic of **Congo. So far**, 907 cases and **569 deaths have been attributed to the disease, near the country’s borders with** Rwanda, South Sudan and **Uganda. The region has decent roads and a highly mobile population, experts said, so there is constant concern that the disease will spread to those countries.** More than 80,000 people have been vaccinated, and although hard data is lacking, **experts suspect that without the vaccine, the epidemic would have grown much larger.** But efforts to stamp out the disease are failing in some areas because many people still don’t understand Ebola, and also because heavy-handed measures by outside organizations, local police and the military have alienated the communities, officials from aid groups and doctors who have worked in the region said. Fearful of being confined in isolation units, people have avoided testing and treatment. They do not want outside interference in rituals around death and burial.

### 1NC – BioD Impact

#### Causes BioD loss and extinction

Coyne 07 Jerry Coyne, Professor of Ecology at University of Chicago and Hopi Hoekstra, Professor of Biology at Harvard, 9/24/07 ([http://www.truthout.org/article/jerry-coyne-and-hopi-e-hoekstra-the-greatest-dying\_ /](http://www.truthout.org/article/jerry-coyne-and-hopi-e-hoekstra-the-greatest-dying_%20/) MM

Aside from the Great Dying, there have been four other mass extinctions, all of which severely pruned life's diversity. Scientists agree that we're now in the midst of a sixth such episode. This new one, however, is different - and, in many ways, much worse. For, unlike earlier extinctions, this one results from the work of a single species, Homo sapiens. We are relentlessly taking over the planet, laying it to waste and eliminating most of our fellow species. Moreover, we're doing it much faster than the mass extinctions that came before. Every year, up to 30,000 species disappear due to human activity alone. At this rate, we could lose half of Earth's species in this century. And, unlike with previous extinctions, there's no hope that biodiversity will ever recover, since the cause of the decimation - us - is here to stay.     To scientists, this is an unparalleled calamity, far more severe than global warming, which is, after all, only one of many threats to biodiversity. Yet global warming gets far more press. Why? One reason is that, while the increase in temperature is easy to document, the decrease of species is not. Biologists don't know, for example, exactly how many species exist on Earth. Estimates range widely, from three million to more than 50 million, and that doesn't count microbes, critical (albeit invisible) components of ecosystems. We're not certain about the rate of extinction, either; how could we be, since the vast majority of species have yet to be described? We're even less sure how the loss of some species will affect the ecosystems in which they're embedded, since the intricate connection between organisms means that the loss of a single species can ramify unpredictably.     But we do know some things. Tropical rainforests are disappearing at a rate of 2 percent per year. Populations of most large fish are down to only 10 percent of what they were in 1950. Many primates and all the great apes - our closest relatives - are nearly gone from the wild.     And we know that extinction and global warming act synergistically. Extinction exacerbates global warming: By burning rainforests, we're not only polluting the atmosphere with carbon dioxide (a major greenhouse gas) but destroying the very plants that can remove this gas from the air. Conversely, global warming increases extinction, both directly (killing corals) and indirectly (destroying the habitats of Arctic and Antarctic animals). As extinction increases, then, so does global warming, which in turn causes more extinction - and so on, into a downward spiral of destruction.     Why, exactly, should we care? Let's start with the most celebrated case: the rainforests. Their loss will worsen global warming - raising temperatures, melting icecaps, and flooding coastal cities. And, as the forest habitat shrinks, so begins the inevitable contact between organisms that have not evolved together, a scenario played out many times, and one that is never good. Dreadful diseases have successfully jumped species boundaries, with humans as prime recipients. We have gotten aids from apes, sars from civets, and Ebola from fruit bats. Additional worldwide plagues from unknown microbes are a very real possibility.     But it isn't just the destruction of the rainforests that should trouble us. Healthy ecosystems the world over provide hidden services like waste disposal, nutrient cycling, soil formation, water purification, and oxygen production. Such services are best rendered by ecosystems that are diverse. Yet, through both intention and accident, humans have introduced exotic species that turn biodiversity into monoculture. Fast-growing zebra mussels, for example, have outcompeted more than 15 species of native mussels in North America's Great Lakes and have damaged harbors and water-treatment plants. Native prairies are becoming dominated by single species (often genetically homogenous) of corn or wheat. Thanks to these developments, soils will erode and become unproductive - which, along with temperature change, will diminish agricultural yields. Meanwhile, with increased pollution and runoff, as well as reduced forest cover, ecosystems will no longer be able to purify water; and a shortage of clean water spells disaster.     In many ways, oceans are the most vulnerable areas of all. As overfishing eliminates major predators, while polluted and warming waters kill off phytoplankton, the intricate aquatic food web could collapse from both sides. Fish, on which so many humans depend, will be a fond memory. As phytoplankton vanish, so does the ability of the oceans to absorb carbon dioxide and produce oxygen. (Half of the oxygen we breathe is made by phytoplankton, with the rest coming from land plants.) Species extinction is also imperiling coral reefs - a major problem since these reefs have far more than recreational value: They provide tremendous amounts of food for human populations and buffer coastlines against erosion.     In fact, the global value of "hidden" services provided by ecosystems - those services, like waste disposal, that aren't bought and sold in the marketplace - has been estimated to be as much as $50 trillion per year, roughly equal to the gross domestic product of all countries combined. And that doesn't include tangible goods like fish and timber. Life as we know it would be impossible if ecosystems collapsed. Yet that is where we're heading if species extinction continues at its current pace.     Extinction also has a huge impact on medicine. Who really cares if, say, a worm in the remote swamps of French Guiana goes extinct? Well, those who suffer from cardiovascular disease. The recent discovery of a rare South American leech has led to the isolation of a powerful enzyme that, unlike other anticoagulants, not only prevents blood from clotting but also dissolves existing clots. And it's not just this one species of worm: Its wriggly relatives have evolved other biomedically valuable proteins, including antistatin (a potential anticancer agent), decorsin and ornatin (platelet aggregation inhibitors), and hirudin (another anticoagulant).     Plants, too, are pharmaceutical gold mines. The bark of trees, for example, has given us quinine (the first cure for malaria), taxol (a drug highly effective against ovarian and breast cancer), and aspirin. More than a quarter of the medicines on our pharmacy shelves were originally derived from plants. The sap of the Madagascar periwinkle contains more than 70 useful alkaloids, including vincristine, a powerful anticancer drug that saved the life of one of our friends.     Of the roughly 250,000 plant species on Earth, fewer than 5 percent have been screened for pharmaceutical properties. Who knows what life-saving drugs remain to be discovered? Given current extinction rates, it's estimated that we're losing one valuable drug every two years.     Our arguments so far have tacitly assumed that species are worth saving only in proportion to their economic value and their effects on our quality of life, an attitude that is strongly ingrained, especially in Americans. That is why conservationists always base their case on an economic calculus. But we biologists know in our hearts that there are deeper and equally compelling reasons to worry about the loss of biodiversity: namely, simple morality and intellectual values that transcend pecuniary interests. What, for example, gives us the right to destroy other creatures? And what could be more thrilling than looking around us, seeing that we are surrounded by our evolutionary cousins, and realizing that we all got here by the same simple process of natural selection? To biologists, and potentially everyone else, apprehending the genetic kinship and common origin of all species is a spiritual experience - not necessarily religious, but spiritual nonetheless, for it stirs the soul.     But, whether or not one is moved by such concerns, it is certain that our future is bleak if we do nothing to stem this sixth extinction. We are creating a world in which exotic diseases flourish, but natural medicinal cures are lost; a world in which carbon waste accumulates while food sources dwindle; a world of sweltering heat, failing crops, and impure water. In the end, we must accept the possibility that we ourselves are not immune to extinction. Or, if we survive, perhaps only a few of us will remain, scratching out a grubby existence on a devastated planet. Global warming will seem like a secondary problem when humanity finally faces the consequences of what we have done to nature: not just another Great Dying, but perhaps the greatest dying of them all.

## Israel Iron Dome PIC

### 1NC – Greenhill

#### The United States federal government should

#### provide military aid for missile defense programs to Israeli authoritarian regimes

#### cease all other military aid to Israeli authoritarian regimes

#### It’s military aid.

Ran Dagoni 18 [reporter, Washington] “US Senate approves $500m for Israel's missile defense program” June 19, 2018. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-us-senate-approves-500m-for-israels-missile-defense-program-1001242016 IB recut

The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act passed by the US Senate yesterday allocates $500 million for Israeli missile programs and $50 million for a joint US-Israeli program for combating the tunnels threat. This is the first time that military aid to Israel has been determined under the memorandum of understanding between Israel and the US governing the US aid package for ten years from 2019. Israel will receive $3.8 billion annually in total - $3.3 billion for financing military procurement and $500 million for the rocket and missile defense programs Iron Dome, Arrow 2, Arrow 3, and David's Sling (Magic Wand).

#### Military aid key—it’s strictly defensive

Sharp 14 Jeremy M. Sharp [Jeremy M. Sharp has been a Specialist in Middle East Affairs at the Congressional Research Service where he provides analysis on Arab political, military and diplomatic affairs, and on U.S. policy in the Middle East, to members of Congress and their staffs. Mr. Sharp is the author of many congressional reports on U.S. bilateral relations with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Yemen as well as studies on U.S. foreign aid to the Middle East, the promotion of democracy in the region, and the Arab Spring. He has publicly appeared before many groups, including the Woodrow Wilson Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. His research has been cited by the Washington Post, New York Times, and Wall Street Journal, among other media outlets. Several of his articles on Yemen have been published by the Carnegie Endowment. In 2002, Mr. Sharp received his Master’s Degree in Middle East History from Princeton University and was named a Presidential Management Fellow by the federal government's Office of Personnel Management] “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel” CRS, April 11, 2014. IB recut

Iron Dome In order to counter rockets fired from the Gaza Strip, Syria, Lebanon, or the Sinai Peninsula, Israel has developed a short-range anti-rocket system, dubbed “Iron Dome.” Iron Dome is designed to intercept very short-range rocket threats between two and forty-five miles. Iron Dome’s selective targeting system and radar are designed to fire its Tamir interceptors only at incoming projectiles that pose threats to population centers– it is not configured to fire on rockets headed toward uninhabited areas. In order to expand Iron Dome’s population coverage, Israel claims that it requires between ten to fifteen Iron Dome batteries in operation at all times (Iron Dome is portable and can be transported by truck to areas in need of coverage). To date, the United States has provided over $704 million to Israel for Iron Dome batteries, interceptors, co-production costs, and general maintenance. Congress appropriated $235.309 million for Iron Dome in P.L. 113-76, the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act, including $15 million for “non-recurring engineering costs in connection with the establishment of a capacity for co-production in the United States by industry of the United States of parts and components for the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense program.” In March 2014, the United States and Israeli governments signed a co-production agreement to enable components of the Iron Dome system to be manufactured in the United States, while also providing the U.S. Missile Defense Agency with full access to what had been proprietary Iron Dome technology. Iron Dome was originally developed by Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, which is expected to partner with U.S.-based Raytheon for co-production in the United States.31 Section 234 of P.L. 113-66, the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act, requires the Missile Defense Agency to report to Congress on the implementation of the Iron Dome co-production agreement. It also requires the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on the status of missile defense cooperation between the United States and Israel, including a description of how the governments of the United States and Israel are working to improve the “coordination, interoperability, and integration of the missile defense capabilities.” David’s Sling In August 2008, Israel and the United States officially signed a “project agreement” to co-develop the David’s Sling system. David’s Sling (aka Magic Wand) is a short/medium-range system designed to counter long-range rockets and slower-flying cruise missiles fired at ranges from 40 km to 300 km, such as those possessed by Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as by Syria. David’s Sling is designed to intercept missiles with ranges and trajectories for which Israel’s Arrow ballistic missile interceptor is not optimally configured. It is being developed jointly by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Raytheon. David’s Sling uses Raytheon’s Stunner missile for interception, and each launcher can hold up to 16 missiles. In November 2013, almost a year after Israel announced the first successful test of the Stunner interceptor, David’s Sling passed its second intercept trial, downing a short-range ballistic missile at a test range in southern Israel. According to Israel’s Defense Ministry, “David’s Sling will allow, in the near future, the State of Israel to deal with threats with far higher efficiency.”32 The Arrow and Arrow II Since 1988, Israel and the United States have been jointly developing the Arrow Anti-Missile System.33 Arrow is designed to counter short-range ballistic missiles. The United States has funded just under half of the annual costs of the development of the Arrow Weapon System, with Israel supplying the remainder. The Arrow II program (officially referred to as the Arrow System Improvement Program or ASIP), a joint effort of Boeing and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), is designed to defeat longer-range ballistic missiles. One Arrow II battery is designed to protect large swaths of Israeli territory.

#### Defense systems prevent innocent deaths

Frantzman 18 Seth Frantzman has been covering conflict in the Middle East since 2010 as a researcher, analyst and correspondent for different publications. In recent years he has focused on the international coalition against the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, and he is the executive director of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis. “Israel activated its David’s Sling missile system for the first time. Will more sales start booming?” July 31, 2018. https://www.defensenews.com/smr/space-missile-defense/2018/07/27/davids-sling-missile-system-used-for-first-time-by-israel/ IB recut

JERUSALEM ― Israel’s first-time activation of its David’s Sling Weapon System could serve as the catalyst for export marketing efforts. The missile defense system was fired July 23 to counter a missile threat. It launched two interceptors to counter two SS-21 ballistic missiles that had been fired by Syrian government forces during fighting against rebels near the Golan Heights. The Syrian missiles fell within Syrian territory. One of the interceptors self-destructed over the Golan Heights. According to The Jerusalem Post, the event is being investigated to determine if the system operated successfully. With Iron Dome shown to be successful and an Arrow missile used to down a Syrian surface-to-air missile in March 2017, all the layers of Israel’s advanced missile defense have been put to use. David’s Sling was co-developed by Raytheon and Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. Raytheon was chosen in 2004 as a partner by Israel’s Ministry of Defense, and the company worked to develop the system’s Stunner interceptor missile, which is designed to intercept missiles, drones, aircraft and other ordnance. In contrast to Israel’s Iron Dome system and its Tamir missiles, the Stunner uses hit-to-kill technology, which is designed to maneuver and strike an incoming threat, rather than detonate in proximity to it. The first-time use of David’s Sling may increase the ability to sell and export the system if it can be shown to be successful. Recently, Rafael signed a cooperation agreement with Romania that involves Iron Dome, which could potentially lead to more sales. Ballistic missile threats launched by Houthi rebels in Yemen at Saudi Arabia, as well as uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula, offer other potential markets. David’s Sling includes an active electronically scanned array, multimission radar, which works to identify an incoming threat, target and guide the interception. The radar was designed by Elta Systems, a subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries. Elisra, a subdivision of Elbit, developed the command-and-control components. The system was tested to confront groups of threats that might emerge, such as a salvo of rockets and ballistic missiles. In May, 20 Iranian Grad and Fajr rockets were fired at Israel from Syria and intercepted by Iron Dome. The David’s Sling was designed to be one part of Israel’s expanding multilayered missile defense. Operating at longer ranges than the Iron Dome, it is designed to confront medium-range threats from 40-155 miles, while the Arrow confronts longer-range threats. Israel is eyeing a new 10-year, $8 billion plan to bolster its missile defenses. According to Raytheon, “teams in nearly 30 U.S. states across the U.S. are dedicated to producing the [David’s Sling] missile and its firing unit.” The system was tested five times between 2012 and January 2017 before being declared fully operational in April 2017. It was initially developed to counter threats from Hezbollah’s arsenal, including the Zelzal, the Iranian Fajr-5 and Fateh 110, and Syria’s M600, as well as Scud missiles. Hezbollah’s rockets had fallen on Israel with impunity in the 2006 conflict, and Israel’s Defense Ministry indicated in 2013 that it had high hopes for David’s Sling to give Israel the ability to “deal with threats with far higher efficiency.”

## Abolish Police CP

#### **Counterplan text: The United States should abolish all police forces.**

Smith 15 Mychal Denzel Smith, 4-9-2015, "Abolish the Police. Instead, Let’s Have Full Social, Economic, and Political Equality.," Nation, <https://www.thenation.com/article/abolish-police-instead-lets-have-full-social-economic-and-political-equality/> SJ recut MM

I’ve said this before: there is no justice where there are dead black people. I’ll continue saying it, because if we’re satisfied with charges and potential prison time, we’ve missed the entire point of #BlackLivesMatter. This isn’t about getting “better” police, ones who exercise discretion in using force, but getting away from “needing” police altogether. In 1966, [James Baldwin wrote for The Nation:](http://www.thenation.com/article/report-occupied-territory) “…the police are simply the hired enemies of this population. They are present to keep the Negro in his place and to protect white business interests, and they have no other function.” This remains as true today as it was in 1966, only now we have bought into the myth of police “serving and protecting” wholesale. What do you do with an institution whose core function is the control and elimination of black people specifically, and people of color and the poor more broadly? You abolish it. In 1964, Malcolm X told the students of Oxford Union: “You’re living at a time of extremism, a time of revolution, a time when there’s got to be a change. People in power have misused it and now there has to be change and a better world has to be built. And the only way it’s going to be built is with extreme methods.” Abolishing the police is an extreme measure, but as a measure of justice, it should be our ultimate goal. We don’t consider the abolition of police a viable position to take because we believe they’re the only thing standing between upstanding citizens and the violence of the deranged. We’re afraid of being attacked on the street, of having our homes shot at, and being left without access to equally violent retribution. But does this mean we want police, or safety and security? Safety and security are ideas, ones that may never be fully achieved, and the police are an institution that have proved themselves capable of only providing the illusion of safety and security to a select few. The bulk of their jobs has nothing to do with violence prevention. They spend most of their time doing things like Slager did in his initial contact with Scott—stopping people for broken taillights. Writing for Gawker, [David Graeber of the London School of Economics says](http://gawker.com/ferguson-and-the-criminalization-of-american-life-1692392051): The police spend very little of their time dealing with violent criminals—indeed, police sociologists report that only about 10% of the average police officer’s time is devoted to criminal matters of any kind. Most of the remaining 90% is spent dealing with infractions of various administrative codes and regulations: all those rules about how and where one can eat, drink, smoke, sell, sit, walk, and drive. If two people punch each other, or even draw a knife on each other, police are unlikely to get involved. Drive down the street in a car without license plates, on the other hand, and the authorities will show up instantly, threatening all sorts of dire consequences if you don’t do exactly what they tell you. The police, then, are essentially just bureaucrats with weapons. Their main role in society is to bring the threat of physical force—even, death—into situations where it would never have been otherwise invoked, such as the enforcement of civic ordinances about the sale of untaxed cigarettes. Ninety percent of an officer’s time isn’t devoted to our safety, but rather to things we may find annoying (or in the case of things like untaxed cigarettes, create a black market for goods that threaten the profits of businesses), inserting the potential for violence where there is cause for none. And when it comes to preventing heinous acts of violence (or holding the perpetrators accountable) that should be condemned by all, like domestic violence and sexual assault, the police are largely ineffectual. The police are not performing the function we say they are, and there are real ways to achieve a world with less violence that don’t include the police. We simply haven’t tried. Until we invest in full employment, universal healthcare that includes mental health services, free education at every level, comprehensive sex education that teaches about consent and bodily autonomy, the decriminalization of drugs and erasure of the stigma around drug use, affordable and adequate housing, eliminating homophobia and transphobia—things that actually reduce the amount of violence we witness—I don’t want to hear about how necessary the police are.

#### Give up on reform

Oparah 08 – Julia Chinyere Oparah, (formerly Julia Sudbury, is a professor and department chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College in Oakland California)"Maroon abolitionists: Black gender-oppressed activists in the anti-prison movement in the US and Canada." Meridians: feminism, race, transnationalism 9.1 (2008): 1-29.

Whereas white abolitionists were guided by moral convictions, for ex-slaves and their loved ones abolition was the only avenue for liberation from the threat of captivity, torture, and social death. Hence, slaves and those who had escaped slavery rejected white abolitionists' calls for gradual emancipation through indentureship that would keep formerly enslaved African Americans tied to the land; they demanded nothing less than the immediate end of slavery. Popular histories tend to focus on formerly enslaved African Americans who sought to win white support through speeches and slave narratives, while less attention is paid to the slave rebellions, mass escapes, and maroon insurgencies that fundamentally challenged the viability and hastened the demise/restriction of chattel slavery. Twenty- first-century maroon abolitionism is also rooted in the survival imperative, guided by a sense of urgency and informed by an understanding of the prison- industrial complex as a war on black communities. Samia articulated her vision of abolitionist work as a form of self-defense: In terms of prisons and the penal system, I think that it's at the center of a lot of our oppression. So my options are to live oppressed or to fight this. So I prefer to fight it. I think that as people of color we have no option but to fight it. It's a matter of survival. I also think that we are at war, that we are under attack, through different institutions and cultures and social practices. And when you are at war you have no option but to fight back. By conceptualizing state policies toward disenfranchised communities as a war, Samia implicitly refutes a prison-reform agenda, and pushes us to adopt an uncompromising position against the prison-industrial complex. As Dylan Rodriguez points out, the state has long declared a series of domestic "wars"- against crime, drugs, gangs, and now terror- involving official declarations, mobilizations, and body counts, which have been waged in the streets and homes of low-income communities of color and immigrant communities (Rodriguez 2008). In claiming the language of war and mobilizing it against the state, Samia brings a radical positionality and sense of urgency common to the political visions articulated by the participants in the study.

# Extra 1NC Shit

## Theory Hedge

### Short

#### Theory hedge:

#### 1AR theory is skewed towards the aff— A] the 2NR must cover substance and over-cover theory, since they get the collapse and persuasiveness advantage of a 3 minute 2AR B] their responses to my counter interp will be new, which means 1AR theory necessitates intervention. Implications—

#### A] 1AR theory can’t be a legitimate check for abuse and you should reject it B] dropping the argument minimizes the chance the round is decided unfairly C] if intervention will happen on theory debates, then judges should intervene in a way that decreases the asinine nature of LD theory

## Competition

### Competitive Regimes

#### \_\_\_\_ is competitive – list in the doc

EIU 18 “Democracy Index.” 2018. <https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/>

\*\*Evaluated on electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture

167=Most Authoritarian, 116=Least Authoritarian

167 North Korea 166 Syria 165 Chad 164 Central African Republic 163 Democratic Republic of Congo 162 Turkmenistan 161 Equatorial Guinea 159 Saudi Arabia 159 Tajikistan 158 Uzbekistan 157 Guinea-Bissau 156 Yemen 155 Sudan 154 Libya 153 Burundi 151 Eritrea 151 Laos 150 Iran 149 Afghanistan 148 Azerbaijan 147 United Arab Emirates 146 Bahrain 145 Djibouti 144 Swaziland 143 Oman 142 Togo 141 Kazakhstan 140 Vietnam 139 China 138 Belarus 137 Guinea 136 Zimbabwe 135 Russia 133 Rwanda 133 Qatar 132 Republic of the Congo 131 Cuba 130 Egypt 129 Ethiopia 128 Algeria 126 Cameroon 126 Gabon 125 Angola 124 Cambodia 123 Comoros 122 Niger 121 Mauritania 120 Myanmar 119 Kuwait 117 Venezuela 117 Jordan 116 Ivory Coast

### Humanitarian Aid = Military

#### It’s military aid

Blanchard, 8 (Analyst in Africa Affairs, MA in Security Studies from Georgetown, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” *CRS Report for Congress*, CRS-17, 4-10-2008, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/104287.pdf)

U.S. Military Assistance and Security Cooperation in Africa: An Expanding Role

The Department of Defense conducts a wide variety of activities in Africa in support of U.S. national interests. Operational activities may include, but are not limited to, humanitarian relief,61 peacekeeping, counter-narcotics, sanctions enforcement, demining, non-combatant evacuations (NEOs), and maritime interdiction operations (MIOs).

### CT is Aid

#### It’s competitive

ICIJ 7 The Int'l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, “A citizen’s guide to understanding U.S. foreign military aid,” [http://www.publicintegrity.org/2007/05/22/5772/citizen-s-guide-understanding-us-foreign-military-aid /](http://www.publicintegrity.org/2007/05/22/5772/citizen-s-guide-understanding-us-foreign-military-aid%20/) MM

For the “Collateral Damage” investigative study, the Center for Public Integrity created a database that tracks a subset of those financial flows: taxpayer-funded programs or assistance that contribute to a nation’s offensive military capabilities. The database does not include certain large nuclear non-proliferation programs or expenditures such as Foreign Military Sales or Direct Commercial Sales, which are not supported directly with taxpayer dollars. The database is also limited to tracking funds appropriated to either the Defense Department or the State Department. For this report, these are the criteria for “foreign military assistance” or “foreign military aid.” Funds appropriated to the State Department and Defense Department represent the vast majority of unclassified military aid and assistance. This report does not attempt to track smaller overseas programs where funding is appropriated to the Justice Department, Drug Enforcement Agency, or Department of Homeland Security. The public does not have any way of tracking classified programs administered by the U.S. intelligence community. These classified programs likely command large amounts of funding, especially after the 9/11 attacks, and oversight is limited to members of congressional intelligence committees. Programs included in the Center’s database: Coalition Support Funds (CSF): created after 9/11 to reimburse key allied countries for providing assistance to the U.S. in the global war on terror. Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP): created after 9/11 to give the Defense Department its own funding to train and educate foreign military officers in counterterrorism techniques. In practice, CTFP has evolved into a program very similar to IMET (see definition below). Department of Defense Counterdrug Funding: assists foreign militaries and security forces to combat drug trafficking around the world; also known as Section 1004 appropriations. Economic Support Fund (ESF): provides grants to foreign governments to support economic stability. ESF is often used for non-military purposes, but the grants are commonly viewed as a way to help offset military expenditures. They have historically been earmarked for key security allies of the United States. Israel and Egypt are the two largest recipients of ESF. Foreign Military Financing (FMF): finances foreign governments’ acquisition of U.S. military articles, services and training. International Military Education and Training (IMET): educates foreign military personnel on issues ranging from democracy and human rights to technical military techniques and training on U.S. weapons systems. International Narcotics and Law Enforcement/Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI): the primary State Department funding effort for countering drugs, including the large Colombian initiatives. Military Assistance Program (MAP): provides military material and services to foreign countries; the U.S. government is not reimbursed. MAP includes “emergency drawdowns,” which are emergency transfers authorized by the president for weapons, ammunition, parts and military equipment to foreign governments. Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related Activities (NADR): supports de-mining, anti-terrorism, and nonproliferation training and assistance. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO): supports programs that improve foreign militaries’ peacekeeping capabilities.