# Framework

#### The resolution asks a question if a particular type of policing and legal punishment is justified. Prefer narrow frameworks that define the morality of criminal justice: (a) semantics—the resolution contextualizes the meaning of the word ‘unjust; (b) goodness is contextual the subject matter: IE restricting speech is just for kindergarteners but not for democracy (c) parsimony--narrow frameworks are more likely true since they take on less theoretical baggage and assumptions.

#### All moral systems begin with assigning responsibility for an action back to an agent. For example, we would say “John stole a cookie” and then establish If stealing was right or wrong, based on what John did. Thus, moral culpability is a prerequisite to any theory of the good.

Garrath Williams, Lancaster University, Responsibility, No Date, <https://www.iep.utm.edu/responsi/> ///AHS PB

In assigning responsibility for an outcome or event, we may simply be telling a causal story. This might or might not involve human actions. For example: the faulty gasket was responsible for the car breaking down; his epileptic fit was responsible for the accident. Such usages do not imply any assignment of blame or desert, and philosophers often distinguish them by referring to "causal responsibility." More commonly, however, responsibility attribution is concerned with the morality of somebody’s action(s). Among the many different causes that led to an outcome, that action is identified as the morally salient one. If we say the captain was responsible for the shipwreck, we do not deny that all sorts of other causes were in play. But we do single out the person who we think ought to be held responsible for the outcome. Philosophers sometimes distinguish this usage, by speaking of "liability responsibility." Retrospective responsibility usually involves, then, a moral (or perhaps legal) judgment of the person responsible. This judgment typically pictures the person as liable to various consequences: to feeling remorse (or pride), to being blamed (or praised), to making amends (or receiving gratitude), and so forth. This topic is an old concern of philosophers, predating the term "responsibility" by at least two millennia. The classic analysis of the issues goes back to Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, where he investigates the conditions that exculpate us from blame and the circumstances where blame is appropriate. Among conditions that excuse the actor, he mentions intoxication, force of circumstances, and coercion: we cannot be held responsible where our capacity to choose was grossly impaired or where there was no effective choice open to us (though perhaps we can be blamed for getting into that condition or those circumstances). We can be blamed for what we do when threatened by others, but not as we would be if coercion were absent. In each case, the issue seems to be whether or not we are able to control what we do: if something lies beyond our control, it also lies beyond the scope of our responsibility.

#### And praising or blaming someone for something they didn’t do is both illogical and destroys morality because there is no relationship between having taken an action and being held responsible for it. IE a penguin in Antarctica would be just as responsible for the holocaust as Hitler.

#### And this forms the basis for holding people criminally responsible for their actions. Legal punishment is justified by the fact that a person who has taken a morally wrong action ought to be held responsible for the action.

George P. Fletcher, Columbia Law School, What is punishment imposed for?, published 1994, <https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2050&context=faculty_scholarship> ///AHS PB

In this article I wish to pose a different sort of question: What is punishment imposed for? When those convicted of crime are punished properly, I assume that they are being punished for something. Yet it is not clear what this "something" is. In tort cases, we ordinarily say that compensation is paid for the injury suffered by the plaintiff. Note that this connection between the injury and compensation holds regardless of the purpose one advocates for tort liability. Even those who subscribe to the programs for promoting efficient behavior would not say that compensation is paid for the efficient consequences of imposing liability. Compensation can be paid only for something that has already happened. When x (compensation, punishment) is imposed for y, then y must be a state of affairs that has already occurred. Even if one believes, as I do, that punishment is an expression of solidarity for victims, 2 the expression of solidarity could not satisfy the requirements of the variable y. The grammar here is interesting. It would be correct to say that compensation is required "for the sake" of deterrence or that punishment is imposed "for the sake" of solidarity, but not correct to say that either form of liability is imposed simply for deterrence or solidarity. In this context the preposition "for" demands not a goal but an untoward state of affairs.

#### Thus the standard is consistency with retributive punishment. This means that we should only punish people for actions they took and are culpable for, Even if other moral systems like Util or Hobbes are substantively true in dictating how we should, my theory is a metaethical side constraint on any account of ethics since nothing else can allocate responsibility. Prefer the standard:

####  [1] Theories of punishment not connected to culpability justify unlimited permissibility and a moral obligation to oppress innocents.

David Boonin, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado Boulder and Director of the Department's Center for Values and Social Policy , The Problem of Punishment-Cambridge University Press, Published 2008, ///AHS PB

The most common and powerful objection to the act-utilitarian solution is as follows. If punishing Larry for robbing a liquor store is morally justified because it produces more overall utility than would any available alternative, then in at least some circumstances, deliberately punishing an innocent person is also morally justified because it produces more overall utility than would any available alternative. But since this implication is plainly unacceptable, so, too, is the act-utilitarian solution to the problem of punishment. I will refer to this as the ‘‘punishing the innocent objection.’’3 Examples designed to establish the soundness of the punishing the innocent objection to consequentialist theories of punishment are ubiquitous in the literature on punishment.4 One can imagine, for example, cases in which the state must deliberately punish an innocent person who is widely believed to be guilty in order to prevent a riot from occurring if he is acquitted. There can be cases in which the state frames an innocent person and punishes her for a particular offense in order to deter others from committing that offense. A state might determine that punishing both an offender and his children or other relatives would more effectively deter others from committing such offenses in the future than would merely punishing the offender himself. The authorities might frame and punish an innocent person for a particular offense to tempt the actual perpetrators to become less cautious and to be caught in the future, and so on. There seems to be no shortage of scenarios in which the state could, on the whole, do more good by punishing an innocent person than by not punishing him.5 According to the proponent of the act-utilitarian solution, the right act for you to perform in these cases (as in every case) is the one with the highest overall expected utility. An act-utilitarian would, of course, take into account the interests of the innocent person. But she would also have to weight these interests equally with those of everyone else. And once this is done, it will become clear that, on the act-utilitarian account, it will be morally permissible to punish an innocent person for an offense he did not commit. Indeed, strictly speaking, the act-utilitarian will have to conclude not merely that doing so would be permissible, but that the state would have a positive duty to punish the innocent person, that it would be positively impermissible for the state to refrain from doing this. Even more strikingly, it will follow that the innocent person himself will have a moral duty to go along with the charade (to falsely confess to the offense, to waive his right to an appeal, etc.) in order to contribute maximally to the social good.6 And the act-utilitarian solution will entail all of this not only in cases where intentionally punishing an innocent person would be necessary to avert a catastrophe, but in every instance in which punishing an innocent person would, on the whole, produce even a little more utility than not doing so. But surely this cannot be right. And so, the actutilitarian solution to the problem of punishment cannot be right either.

#### This also means your theory is incapable of proving the specific question of the resolution true or false.

David Boonin, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado Boulder and Director of the Department's Center for Values and Social Policy , The Problem of Punishment-Cambridge University Press, Published 2008 [2], ///AHS PB

The deeply counterintuitive nature of the punishing the innocent implication should suffice to motivate most people to reject the biting the bullet response. But for those who are willing to accept the counterintuitiveness of the results, there is a second and deeper problem. This second reason for rejecting the biting the bullet response has nothing to do with our moral intuitions. Instead, it has to do with the nature of punishment. For if the defender of the act-utilitarian solution concedes that the reason she has given for deliberately harming guilty people by, for example, incarcerating and executing them is also a reason for sometimes deliberately harming innocent people by, for example, incarcerating and executing them, then her position does not justify punishment in the first place, even of those who are guilty. It justifies deliberately inflicting harm on many people who are guilty, of course, but this is not the same thing as justifying their punishment. And since this is so, accepting the implication that actutilitarianism would justify punishing innocent people would render the act-utilitarian solution unable to pass the entailment test. Even if the implication does not make a proponent of the act-utilitarian moral theory reject it as a moral theory, that is, it must still make her reject the actutilitarian solution to the problem of punishment. Since the claim that simply biting the bullet renders the act-utilitarian unable to justify punishment may seem a bit unclear,18 an analogy may be of use. So, consider first an extreme case. Suppose that a defender of punishment sought, in particular, to justify the claim that capital punishment is morally permissible in the case of murder. And suppose that, in support of this claim, he offered an argument demonstrating that it would be morally permissible to kill every human being on earth. Perhaps the argument is grounded in foundational principles concerning the rights of animals and the environment that are threatened by humanity. One reason to reject his argument, of course, is that most people would find its implications morally repugnant. But a distinct reason to reject it would be this: there is a difference between saying that all murderers should be killed and saying that all murderers should be killed because they are guilty of murder. This biocentric argument for killing all human beings would justify the former claim but not the latter, and it is the latter that one must justify in order to justify capital punishment. As we saw in Section 1.1.5, punishment is essentially retributive in nature. It involves not simply harming an offender,but harming an offender because she has committed an offense. A biocentric argument in defense of killing all human beings would, by its very nature, be incapable of justifying this claim. And so we would, at least in this extreme case, clearly be entitled to say that even if the argument succeeded in justifying the claim that all murderers should be killed, it could not succeed in justifying the claim that all (or even any) murderers should be punished. The argument, even if it were accepted as sound, could not be accepted as a solution to the problem of (capital) punishment

#### [2] Requirement Test: Inflicting pain through punishment is only justified when it is the only way to achieve the goal of the punishment, as otherwise there is no reason to cause harm when a less harmful action is available. Retributive punishment fulfills this since it’s a direct reaction to crime, but predictive punishment doesn’t.

Kenneth Einar Himma, Seattle Pacific University, Philosophy of Law, No Date, <https://www.iep.utm.edu/law-phil/#SH2c> ///AHS PB

The preventive justification argues that incarcerating a person for wrongful acts is justified insofar as it prevents that person from committing wrongful acts against society during the period of incarceration. The rehabilitative justification argues that punishment is justified in virtue of the effect that it has on the moral character of the offender. Each of these justifications suffers from the same flaw: prevention of crime and rehabilitation of the offender can be achieved without the deliberate infliction of discomfort that constitutes punishment. For example, prevention of crime might require detaining the offender, but it does not require detention in an environment that is as unpleasant as those typically found in prisons.

#### [4] Consequentialism is incoherent under the standard since it holds agents responsible for external factors outside of their control. Independently consequences cannot provide the basis for ethics since A] All consequences trigger more consequences, which means there is no bright line for when agents stop being responsible B] past experiences have no effect on causality; the proposition that the moon comes up every night is not warranted by the fact that the moon appeared in the night sky last night C] A consequentialist theory can never say certain things like slavery are always intrinsically wrong, since that wrongness is contingent on the consequences of a particular event and D] Infinite universe means no consequence causes an aggregative change, Bostrom 08[[1]](#footnote-1): Recent cosmological evidence suggests that the world is probably infinite. Moreover, [I]f the totality of physical existence [it] is indeed infinite, in the kind of way that modern cosmology suggests it is, then it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets. If there are an infinite number of planets then there is, with probability one, an infinite number of people. Infinitely many of these people are happy, infinitely many are unhappy. Likewise for other local properties that are plausible candidates for having value, pertaining to person‐states, lives, or entire societies, ecosystems, or civilizations—there are infinitely many democratic states, and infinitely many that are ruled by despots, etc. Suppose the world [does] contains an infinite number of people and a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value ε such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena (this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences, characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value ≥ ε and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ≤ (‒ ε). Call such a world canonically infinite. Ethical theories that hold that value is aggregative imply that a canonically infinite world contains an infinite quantity of positive value and an infinite quantity of negative value. This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. We can do only a finite amount of good or bad. **E] Independently my offense outweighs under util since you wouldn’t hold an agent responsible for an consequence they didn’t cause**

#### [5] Enforced political structures are definitionally unjust since they punish agents due to the factors of temporality and dialectics outside of their control.

Peter Baker, Prof at Towson University, Deconstruction and the Question of Violence: Fictions Legitimes versus Pulp Fiction, symplokē, Vol. 4, No. 1/2, special issue: Rhetoric and the Human Sciences (1996), pp. 21- 40, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40550382> ///AHS PB

The impossibility of justice is a way of talking about the necessity for transformative interpretations in the "here and now" in which presence is denied. This leads to the three aporias of responsibility that Derrida outlines in "Force of Law" (cf. Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit 133ff.). The first is what he calls épokhè, or the suspension of the rule. That is to say, in part, a decision-making machine is not imaginable. Any system of justice requires a judge who both invokes and suspends the law as unbending rule.17 Or, as Derrida says, "Each case is other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely unique interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely" (1992, 23). This is obviously not the same as saying that the judge makes it up as she goes along, which would be a denial of the increased sense of responsibility called for in the transformative interpretation of deconstruction. It is rather a statement of aporia, a restatement of the Pascalian paradox: "It follows from this paradox that there is never a moment that we can say in the present that a decision is just, ... or that someone is a just man even less, 7 am just'" (1992, 23). We might relate this to the Greek apothegm concerning happiness: call no man happy until his life is at an end. Seen deconstructively, this paradox is a restatement of the theme that there is no justice outside of context, no metalanguage that serves as a guarantee of lightness of judgment, no divine oversight grounding judgment in a realm of eternal and immutable truth. Derrida's second aporia is a restatement of the first in terms of the "undecidable." Derrida denies that undecidability is an endless regress or oscillation between two equally valid constructions of meaning. Rather it is a means of accounting for the aspect of the impossible, the increase in the sense of responsibility called for by deconstructive interpretation. In terms of the judge's decision, Derrida says: "A decision that didn't go through the ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmable application or unfolding of a calculable process. It might be legal; it would not be just" (1992, 24). And, of course, there are many decisions made all the time, by judges and others, that viewed within the context of the legal system are perfectly coherent and rule-bound - and just as clearly unjust. But even this judgment cannot be made with certainty on the spot. Justice is what is deconstructible, not what has an inherent self-present justification. In fact, as a wide range of legal scholars now increasingly recognize, the whole legal framework founded on self-presence of the self to the self, known in one of its aspects as intentionality, is largely responsible for the crisis of legitimation in the legal field with respect to rape law, the insanity defense, and many other areas.18 As Derrida notes (in the form of a classical aporia): The whole subjectal axiomatic of responsibility, of conscience, of intentionality, of property that governs today's dominant juridical discourse and the category of decision right down to its appeals to medical expertise is so theoretically weak and crude that I need not emphasize it here. And the effects of these limitations are massive and concrete enough that I don't have to give examples. [The obscure dogmatism that characterizes the discourses about the responsibility of the defendant, his or her mental state, the passionate character, premeditated or not, of the crimes, the unbelievable depositions of witnesses or 'experts' on this subject should suffice to attest, in truth to prove, that no critical or criterialogical rigor, no knowledge can be attained on this subject]. (1992, 25; 1994, 55; bracketed passage added to French edition) As in a classical aporia, Derrida does then go on to say what he says he will not, giving several instances in which the legal system is clearly hampered by the guiding model of intentionality inherited from traditional humanism, in a tone which betrays an unusual (for him) level of sarcastic invective. Derrida's third aporia rhymes with his recent thinking on apocalypse and other themes: what he calls urgency. The urgent need for justice paradoxically "obstructs the horizon of knowledge" (1992, 26). As he says: "But justice, however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait. It is that which must not wait. To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: a just decision is always required immediately, 'right away"\* (1992, 26). Obviously, a whole range of present concerns can be made to resonate (and this would always be the case, productively, in any future moment) in this statement, whether it be the urgency of racial justice in Los Angeles, the face-off with apocalyptic religious extremists in Waco, or the seemingly unconscionable delays in the international response to the civil war in Bosnia. The urgency embodied in the current slogan "No Justice, No Peace" recalls an earlier generation of Americans dissatisfied with their government who chanted "Peace Now." As radical, or empowering, as these slogans may be, they also have a tendency to take on apocalyptic or messianic tones that threaten rational decision. Or as Derrida says, citing Kierkegaard: "The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard. This is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics'\* (1992, 26). But, paradoxically, this is not just a danger, but also a promise. In the language that Derrida borrows (and transforms) from the speechact theorists, the call for justice is never simply a constative, or statement of fact, but also and always a performative.

# Contention

#### I affirm that predictive policing is unjust.

#### [1] Under my standard punishing agents for actions they didn’t take is incoherent since they are not responsible. Predictive policing violates this punishes and treats people differently solely based on the possibility of future action.

J[ohn Eligon](http://www.nytimes.com/by/john-eligon), Trinidad and Tobagon American NYT national correspondent covering race, and [Timothy Williams](http://www.nytimes.com/by/timothy-williams), NYT reporter, Police Program Aims to Pinpoint Those Most Likely to Commit Crimes, Sept. 24, 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/us/police-program-aims-to-pinpoint-those-most-likely-to-commit-crimes.html?_r=0&auth=login-google&ref=us> ///AHS PB

Ezekiel Edwards, the director of the Criminal Law Reform Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, said predictive policing tended to legitimize the profiling of racial minorities who live in poor, high-crime neighborhoods, and prompted officers to enforce laws selectively. “Our concern is guilt by association,” Mr. Edwards said. “Because you live in a certain neighborhood or hang out with certain people, we are now going to be suspicious of you and treat you differently, not because you have committed a crime or because we have information that allows us to arrest you, but because our predictive tool shows us you might commit a crime at some point in the future.”

#### [2] Presentism or the view that only the present exists is true.

**Smith,** Smith, Walter. “The Metaphysics of Time.” *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 11, no. 4, 1902, pp. 372–391. *JSTOR*, JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/2176471](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2176471). Scopa recut AHS PB

Another characteristic of the **time-form** is that it **represents different degrees of reality**. The **present is real; that is, since on analysis reality resolves itself into tangibility or solidity, the objects perceived around us are thought of as tangible or solid**. Even the ideas of the mind, when thought of as present, have tangibility associated with them. **When** objects or **ideas are referred to the past they appear as unreal; they are unsolid, in- tangible**. It is true, the **image of the past may come before the mind with the familiar sense of reality; but** in such a case **the sense of its pastness is not present to the mind**. Again, when we think of the past history of objects which still exist, the sense of the unreality of the past may be somewhat obscured; but when we think of objects that are no more, or of the vanished aspects of present objects, the sense is vivid. This unreality associated with the images that represent the past distinguishes very clearly the space of time or succession from that of co-existence. The objects in our environment are real, however distant they may be. A mountain seen twenty miles away is real to us, because were our arms long enough, we could touch it; and if the faint appearance of the distant mountain may suggest un- reality, it is because it calls to mind other appearances which have proved spectral. On the other hand, **the past, however near, is unreal. A man may have the most vivid images of the past, but if he realizes that they are past, there joins itself to them an idea**, overwhelming in proportion to their very vividness, of **their loss of reality**. It is the past that has been referred to. The future also is unreal, though its unreality is of a somewhat different aspect. **The past is irrevocable**; the image of the future suggests what is unreal but is about to become real.

#### This affirms under the standard since if the future doesn’t exist agents cant be responsible for it, and predictive policing is illogical since you also cant predict nonexistent events.

#### And the resolution uses the word is which means even if presentism is metaphysically false, its grammatically true.

Travis Matthew Figg, Wayne State University,How To Understand The Debate Over Presentism And Eternalism, 1-1-2017, <https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2801&context=oa_dissertations> ///AHS PB

An English sentence containing the word ‘are’, ‘is’, or ‘exists’ unmodified by a tensed auxiliary verb like ‘did’ or ‘will’, is typically understood to be present-tensed and hence to indicate what exists or is the case now. Thus, a person who says “There are over seven billion people on the earth” would typically be understood as saying that there are over seven billion people on the earth now. 14 Consequently, if we are following the standard grammatical conventions of English, the statement, Everything exists at the present time, would be interpreted so that ‘exists’ is present-tensed, and hence as the trivial assertion that Everything that now exists, exists at the present time. Thus, presentism would be something of a grammatical truth of ordinary English.

#### Two additional implications: [1] Proving presentism false also affirms since it would entail the future already exists, which means predictive policing is definitionally illogical since you cant predict and preemptively regulate something that has already happened. [2] Any reason why knowing future states of the world is impossible means you automatically vote affirmative since predictive policing is impossible if we cant predict the end states of peoples actions.

# Add maybe like 5 whole res util cards about how PP fails

# Underview

#### [1] Interpretation: the negative must concede the affirmative framework and role of the ballot. A] Strat Scew: New framing forces a 1ar restart, but the 2N can dump for 6 minutes, framing out all my substantive offense B] Framework debates are irresolvable since truths are indexed to a particular system and you only prove a moral system false from the perspective of another moral system’s vocabulary. For example, Kantianism is false according to utilitarianism, and vice versa, but there is no way to adjudicate between them because there is no external standard because there is no external standard to appeal too. C] Topic ED: AFC forces you to actually engage the topic instead of just going for preclusive framing every round, uniquely true with my aff since utilitarian vs retributive justice is a key controversy about predictive policing. D] Reading theory on why the particular framework chosen is bad, checks against arguments that auto affirm E] Switch Side Debate solves back all of your offense since 1] you can discuss what you want when you affirm and 2] We both affirm 3 rounds so an unbeatable aff is 100% fair.

#### [2] The Role of the ballot is to test the truth or falsity of the resolution. This means most K’s affirm since they prove predictive policing is bad.

**[A] Text – five dictionaries define negate as to deny the truth of**[[2]](#footnote-2)**. Text first – Text comes first – a) Controls the internal link to fairness since it’s the basis of things like predictability and prep b) Key to jurisdiction since the judge can only endorse what is within their burden c) Even if another role of the ballot is better for debate, that is not a reason it ought to be the role of the ballot, just a reason we ought to discuss it.**

**[B] Inclusion: a) other ROBs open the door for personal lives of debaters to factor into decisions and compare who is more oppressed which causes violence in a space where some people go to escape. b) Anything can function under truth testing insofar as it proves the resolution either true or false. Specific role of the ballots exclude all offense besides those that follow from their framework which shuts out people without the technical skill or resources to prep for it.**

**[C] Critical pedagogy forces the judge into the role of coercer.**

**Rickert,** (Thomas, “"Hands Up, You're Free": Composition in a Post-Oedipal World”, JacOnline Journal, wbem) **An example of the connection between violence and pedagogy is implicit in** the notion of being "schooled" as it has been conceptualized **by Giroux [is]** and Peter Mcl.aren. They explain, **"Fundamental to** the principles that inform **critical pedagogy is the conviction that schooling for self- and social empowerment** is ethically prior to questions of epistemology or to a mastery oftechnical or social skills that are primarily tied to the logic of the marketplace" (153-54). **A presumption here is that it is the teacher who knows (best)**, and **this** orientation gives the concept of schooling a particular bite: though it presents itself as oppositional to the state and the dominant forms of pedagogy that serve the state and its capitalist interests, it nevertheless **reinscribes an authoritarian model that is congruent with any number of oedipalizing pedagogies that "school" the student in proper behavior.** As Diane Davis notes, radical, feminist, and **liberatory pedagogies** "often **camouflage pedagogical violence in their move from one mode of 'normalization' to another" and "function within a disciplinary matrix of power**, a covert carceral system, **that aims to create useful subjects for particular political agendas" (212).** Such oedipalizing pedagogies are less effective in practice than what the claims for them assert; indeed, the attempt to "school" students in the manner called for by Giroux and McLaren is complicitous with the malaise of postmodern cynicism.Students will dutifully go through their liberatory motions, producing the proper assignments, but it remains an open question whether they carry an oppositional politics with them. The "critical distance" supposedly created with liberatory pedagogy also opens up a cynical distance toward the writing produced in class.

#### [D] Only the exact text of the resolution provides a mutually accessible stasis point for debaters coming into round. Anything else is entirely unpredictable and infinitely regressive since there is no brightline for how much we should care about the resolution.

#### [E] Your role of the ballot collapses into truth testing - all statements devolve into some conception of truth and falsity.

Frege ’03. Frege, Gottlob. “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry” in Logicism and the Philosophy of Language: Selections from Frege and Russell. Broadview Press. March 2003. Pg. 204.// AHS-DM

“It may nevertheless be thought that **we cannot recognize a property of a thing without at the same time realizing the thought that this thing has this property to be [is] true.** So **with every property of a thing is joined a property of** a thought, namely, that of **truth.** It is also worthy of notice that the sentence **“I smell the scent of violets” has** just **the same content as the sentence “it is true that I smell the sc[[3]](#footnote-3)ent of violets”.** So it seems, then, that **nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth.** And yet is it not a great result when the scientist after much hesitation and careful inquiry, can finally say “ what I supposed is true ” The meaning of the word “ true ” seems to be altogether unique. May we not be dealing here with something which cannot, in the ordinary sense, be called a quality at all? In spite of this doubt I want ﬁrst to express myself in accordance with ordinary usage, as if truth were a quality, until something more to the point is found.”

#### [3] Predictive policing is defined as[[4]](#footnote-4)

Predictive policing is the application of analytical techniques—particularly quantitative techniques—to identify likely targets for police intervention and prevent crime or solve past crimes by making statistical predictions. Several predictive policing methods are currently in use in law enforcement agencies across the United States, and much has been written about their effectiveness. Another term used to describe the use of analytic techniques to identify likely targets is forecasting. Although there is a difference between prediction and forecasting, for the purposes of this guide, we use them interchangeably.1

#### This means that the negative must prove that as a general principle predictive policing is just. Individual instances don’t negate since the resolution is questions the validity of a general category. In the same way proving Perry ought to join debate doesn’t prove students ought to join debate, semantically proving one part of the category IE x=p in the equation xyz=p, does not prove the consequent true.

#### [4] Permissibility and presumption affirm:

1. Nick Bostrom (Professor at University of Oxford, director of Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute, PhD from London School of Economics), “The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggregative Ethics,” 2008, http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate, http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate] [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR233/RAND_RR233.sum.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-4)