## Framework (~3:40)

#### First, ethics are split between the deontic and the aretaic. Deontic theories classify actions as right or wrong through moral law, whereas aretaic theories build moral agents that make the right decisions. Gryz 11.

Gryz 11 [Jarek, professor in the department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at York University, Research Faculty Fellow at Center for Advanced Studies. “On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. November 2011, Issue 5.] SHS ZS

**There are two fundamental classes of** terms traditionally distinguished within **moral vocabulary**: **the deontic and the aretaic**. The terms from **the first** set **serve in the prescriptive function of** a **moral code**. This function consists in **providing answers to questions like: What am I** **(morally) required to do**? Answers to such questions usually have the grammatical form of an imperative and are called “prescriptions”, “moral norms”, “rules”, “precepts”, or “commands”. **They are expressed by means of** such terms as: ‘**right’, ‘obligation’, ‘duty’**, etc. **The second class contains terms used for a moral** **evaluation of an** action (or an **actor**). Such moral evaluation is not primarily intended to direct actions, although it seems capable of performing this function as well. **Terms used for evaluations include**: ‘**good’, ‘bad’, ‘blameworthy’, ‘praiseworthy’, ‘virtuous’**, etc. The ‘right’ is the key notion of the normative part of a moral theory; **the ‘good’ is used to express moral judgments**.

#### To clarify, deontic theories guide ethics by looking at the actions of moral actors, whereas aretaic theories guide ethics by looking at the character of moral actors themselves. By developing good moral character, good actions will naturally follow.

#### Prefer the aretaic:

#### [1] Descriptively – The aretaic provides an infinitely richer vocabulary for evaluating actions that extends beyond goodness and badness. Gryz 11.

[Gryz ’11 (Jarek, Prof in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at York University, “On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2011, 14:493–501, Springer)] SHS ZS  
The way we use words ‘good/bad’ and ‘right/wrong’ seems to support the above claims. **Goodness and badness come in degrees**, hence **we have words like ‘better’ and ‘worse’**; **we lack similar terms for** **deontically evaluated actions**. The availability of degree terms in the former case seems to indicate the presence of many criteria used in evaluation; **an all-or- nothing choice, implied by** the use of **‘right’ or ‘wrong’, suggests focusing on** only **one quantum quality**.12 But fine-grainedness is not only a property of particular aretaic terms, **the entire aretaic vocabulary is infinitely richer and allows us to draw much** **finer distinctions in act-evaluations than the deontic vocabulary**. For example, **by saying** that **something is praiseworthy we imply** that **it deserves approval** or favor: we assess it higher when we say that it is admirable, since then it should be also respected and honored. The meaning of the word ‘praiseworthy’ can be quite well conveyed by saying, that it is something that ought to be done, or that it is the right (in Ross’s understanding of ‘right’) thing to do: yet **expressing the word ‘admirable’ in deontic vocabulary seems** just **impossible**. From what has been said so far one can derive an encouraging conclusion for the advocates of attractive ethics. Sheer richness and fine-grainedness of aretaic vocabulary seems to be a good reason for believing that **all that can be said in deontic terms can be equally well expressed in aretaic terms**. This is not to say, however, that we can produce a translation manual which would provide us with a general method of expressing deontic notions in terms of aretaic ones for all possible cases. In particular, it does not seem possible, as we hope to have shown, to substitute ‘good’ for ‘right’ or ‘deplorable’ for ‘wrong’. The relation between the aretaic and the deontic seems to be somewhat similar to the relation between the physical and the mental in the mind-body problem. We can claim that deontic is supervenient on the aretaic without committing ourselves to the idea of complete definitional reduction. In other words, we may allow for token identity (each particular action can have an aretaic description that perfectly matches the deontic one) and deny the possibility of type identity (that there is aretaic sentence true of all and only the actions having some deontic property). If this analogy is correct then the idea of definitional reduction of the deontic to the aretaic, and in particular, Stocker’s identification of rightness and goodness, is doomed. But we can still pursue a more modest goal. **If our task is** just **to substitute** **every** particular **deontic evaluation with an aretaic** one, **there are no** logical **reasons that would make it impossible** (it would not work, of course, in the opposite direction). From that perspective, **attractive ethical theories seem** to be much **better** off **than the imperative ones**.

#### This outweighs – moral theories need to have the most explanatory power over the rightness of an action to guide choices.

#### [2] Deontic theories collapse – A. Engaging in ethics concedes to the authority of becoming a better person, otherwise we would have no reason to act ethically. B. If agents were conditioned properly, they would independently take the right actions, which proves there cannot be a net benefit to deontic theories. C. Infinite regress – we can always ask why to follow a deontic rule, but the terminus is always rooted in becoming a better person.

#### [3] Prerequisite – A. Philosophy has to frame who we are as individuals before dictating how we should act; I would not tell a serial killer to follow the categorical imperative but try to reform their character first. B. The origin of philosophy had to start through an aretaic paradigm since there were no preconceived notions or rules that we needed a guide towards the good; they chose to develop the good out of their own volition.

#### [4] Motivation – A. The aretaic improves citizens’ moral standing. People can always opt-out of a deontic theory but by focusing on the aretaic we improve the moral character of citizens, causing them to act ethically out of their own volition. B. The aretaic allows people to understand the intrinsic nature behind their actions; they are no longer following an abstract theory but making the choice they think is correct. The deontic fails to provide a motivating factor to follow the theory and thus fails. Sakellariouv 15.

[Sakellariouv, Alexandra M. “Virtue Ethics and its Potential as the Leading Moral Theory.” Discussions. [http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1385/virtue-ethics-and-moral-theory Published 2015](http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1385/virtue-ethics-and-moral-theory%20Published%202015).] SHS ZS

The main advantage **virtue ethics** has over other moral theories is that it **does not fall victim to 'moral schizophrenia'** as it does not compromise one's motivations and reasons. First, the problem moral schizophrenia poses, which most moral theories face, must be understood. Michael Stocker (1976) identifies the problem, which he calls 'moral schizophrenia', in **many** modern **moral theories** such as consequentialism and deontology. Moral schizophrenia, he explains, **causes a split between motives and reasons**, so an indicator of a 'good life' is having harmony between motives and reasons (p. 454). **If one wants to lead a good life one "should be moved by [one's] major values** and [one] should value what [one's] major motives seek" (p. 454). A moral theory should support personal motives. **However**, the **reasoning in many moral theories conflicts with personal motives**. They require that people do "what is right, obligatory, [their] duty no matter what [their] motive for so acting" (p. 454). Specifically**, the impartialist nature of most moral theories does not allow people to treat anyone else differently**. People cannot treat their family and friends any differently from strangers, even though moral intuitions support preferential treatment. Whatever personal motivation one may have to do something does not matter; one must always follow the reasoning of the moral theory, even if it conflicts with his or her motives. **Moral schizophrenia** in moral theories will **prevent the agents from ever achieving the good life**. Stocker explains that these moral theories "allow [people] the harmony of a morally impoverished life, a life deeply deficient in what is valuable ... people who do let them compromise their motives will, for that reason, have a life seriously lacking in what is valuable" (p. 455). **A life cannot be very fulfilling if everyone who performs his or her duty very rarely actually wants to**. Moral schizophrenia means that, in most situations**, individuals will end up discontent from following the reasoning of the moral theory.** Modern moral theories do not allow for personal pursuits such as love, friendship, and community, which are valuable sources of pleasure. These theories do not recognize the value people can bring to lives. Stocker writes "**there is a whole other area of values of personal and interpersonal relations and activities; and also of moral goodness, merit, and virtue**" (p. 453-456). People's motives need to be in harmony for these values to be realized. **Virtue ethics avoids moral schizophrenia because it allows for virtues that harmonize motives and reasons.** Recall that virtue ethics believes virtues are a plurality of intrinsic good; there are various reasons why certain virtues are valuable. It does not believe one overarching principle is the ultimate guide to live by, which generally would compromise other values in our life. **Virtues ethics considers traits such as love, friendship, and community as virtues that are important for the wellbeing of the individuals involved**. Specific varieties of virtue ethics will sometimes value certain virtues above others that are imperative to maintaining the personal and interpersonal connections other moral theories do not. **NeoAristotelian virtue ethics values what is good for the wellbeing of the individual**. Certainly acting upon personal motives is important for one's wellbeing, so it would value traits such as friendship and love that allow one to maintain personal connections. **Consider** the following example to help further explain. **A man** has recently **saved up** a considerable amount of **money** in order **to visit his friend in Iceland** for a week. **Instead** of spending money on the trip, **he could always donate it to a local homeless shelter** to help directly feed the hungry. **Surely donating** his money to such charitable efforts **would produce** **more happiness** than would spending the money to see his friend. It would most likely be agreed that **there is nothing wrong with him spending the money to see his friend**. He saved the money himself and would gain personal satisfaction from seeing his long-distance friend. **According to utilitarianism**, a theory plagued by moral schizophrenia, **the right thing to do is** **donate the money** because it would produce the most pleasure.**However**, think about what the **virtue ethicist** would say. The virtuous person would take all the virtues into account. They **would consider** the virtues of **love and friendship**. They would most likely conclude that **the right thing to do is take the trip to Iceland**. The reasons may include the fact that the person would be acting as a good friend or acting in their own best interest by going on the trip. This decision would satisfy the virtuous person because it harmonizes motives and reasons. **Virtue ethics allows people to maintain personal** and interpersonal **connections important for the good life.** Virtue ethics does not fall victim to moral schizophrenia, which is one advantage it has over most other moral theories.

#### This outweighs and hijacks other theories – A. Agents won’t abide by ethical theories that they lack the motivation to follow, which is terminal defense on other standards B. Proves that maximizing well-being is a fallacy that will result in the individual actor ending up less satisfied.

#### [5] The deontic fails – the rule following paradox prevents the application of deontic rules, even when properly justified. Langseth.

[Langesth, Jonathan. “Wittengenstein’s Account of Rule-Following and Its Implications”. Stance Vol 1, April 1, 2008. https://www.pdcnet.org/collection/fshow?id=stance\_2008\_0001\_0038\_0043&pdfname=stance\_2008\_0001\_0000\_0040\_0045.pdf&file\_type=pdf] SHS ZS

This section shows that **rules themselves do not determine how they are to be followed**. **There is nothing**, for example, **inherent in an arrow that shows us which way it is pointing** or directing us to go.2 Similarly, as the above quote shows, there is no means by which it can be known with com- plete certainty that, in following the arithmetical sequence 0, n, 2n, 3n, 4n... in line with the order “+1,” **a person** is **following the intended rule**, for he or she **may be** **following an alternative rule** that is compatible with the intended rule up to a certain point. **There must be something in addition to the rule that directs us in a particular manner** and indicates to us that we proceed accordingly. The argument Wittgenstein is making in Section 185 is dependent upon the fact that a rule, in order to be a rule, must be able to be broken. There must be correct and incorrect applications of a rule. The question that arises here is: What determines correct and incorrect application of a rule? Or, what justifies following a rule correctly? If a rule in itself does not show us how we are to follow it, then **our interpretation of a rule must also not determine correct use.** If interpretation was what determined correct use, there would be no incorrect application of a rule. This is the case **because any interpretation can be seen to be in accordance with a rule.** As section 185 points out, if there is nothing inherent in a rule that determines a correct interpretation of that rule then, for example, my interpretation of a pointing hand as pointing in the direction of finger-tip to wrist is perfectly compatible with the gesture of the pointing hand. There is nothing in the hand that says it is pointing in one direction rather than another. **Therefore, solely in relation to the rule, any interpretation can be justified.**

#### The aretaic solves – we don’t apply externalist ethics by evaluating individual actions against some rule, but build character so people make their own ethical decisions.

#### Next, the only ethics consistent with the aretaic is a virtue paradigm: This does not presuppose descriptive normative claims; we rather focus on developing agents to make them virtuous. Reader.

[Reader 2k (Reader, Soren. Late Professor of Philosophy, Durham University “New Directions in Ethics: Naturalism, Reasons, and Virtue.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 3, No. 4, Dec. 2000.)] SHS ZS  
**Virtue is a** free **disposition to act in certain ways under certain conditions**. Virtue ethics claims that **what is to count as a good action** or what is a good outcome **is** conceptually **dependent on claims about** **the virtue of an agent**. How is this dependence supposed to work? Where those after an explanatory account seek a conceptual connection with something like a normative 'in itself,’ **virtue ethicists** instead **explore the** concrete **dependence of moral activity on the possibility of learning from** already **virtuous agents**. They hold that **the key to moral rationality is** found **in moral education**. Ethics begins with the apprentice moral agent: the child, or the foreigner, or the damaged person in rehabilitation are all examples. These **beginner-agents learn from** the experienced, **wise moral agent by copying**, by mimicking in **their actions** the actions of the virtuous agent. This mimicking, or 'going on in the same way', does not presuppose that the learner agent acquires any representations of how the world is (i.e., beliefs), nor that they acquire the ability to report on or provide justifications for what they do. **Virtue is learned by cottoning on to virtuous ways of doing things**, going on to do the same, **then going on to do the same in new ways**, once they have mastered the skill.16 The way virtue and character is supposed to be basic here is simply displayed in the analogy: **there is and can be nothing 'behind' the expertise of** the phronimos **which can explain or justify it** (any more than there is anything 'behind' the expertise of the doctor or the navigator, to use Aristotle's examples at NE 1104b7-l 1). Of course, plenty more can be said about it, and shortcuts can be found to aid the learn ing of those who have already mastered other skills (so competent rule-fol lowers can learn from being given rules, just as competent grammarians can learn a new language from the grammar). But we should not confuse what it is possible to say about the skill of being moral, with what constitutes it.

#### Thus, the standard is promoting virtue.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Constitutiveness – moral questions are derived from the life-form of a particular entity, which justifies following our true form. This outweighs – just as I would say a knife is bad if it is blunt, humans would be bad if they do not follow their true form. Any deontic theories are simply a deviation from our form. Foot:

[Foot, Phillipa; “Natural Goodness”; Oxford University (2001)] SHS ZS

Anscombe writes, ‘[G]etting one another to do things without the application of physical force is a necessity for human life, and that far beyond what could be secured by…other means.’ Anscombe is pointing here to what she has elsewhere called **an ‘Aristotelian necessity’**: [is] that which **is necessary because** and in so far as **good hangs on it.** We invoke the same idea when we say that **it is necessary for plants to have water, for birds to build nests, for wolves to hunt in packs, and for lionesses to teach their cubs to kill**. These ‘**Aristotelian necessities’ depend on** what the **particular species of plants and animals** need, **[and] on their natural habitat**, and the ways of making out that there are in their repertoire. **These** things together **determine** **what** it is for members of **a particular species** to be as they **should be,** and to do that which they should do. And for all the enormous differences between [the] life [of] and humans and that of plants or animals, we can see **that human defects and excellences are similarly related to what human beings are and what they do.**

#### [2] Actor specificity – Virtue is impossible without impetus to act ethically: the state must provide conditions that facilitate virtue development. Ingrahm 13.

[Ingram 13 Andrew Ingram (The University of Texas School of Law, J.D.; The University of Texas at Austin, M.A. Philosophy; A.B. Brown University.) “A (Moral) Prisoner’s Dilemma: Character Ethics and Plea Bargaining” 2013 <http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/osjcl/files/2013/12/8.-Ingram.pdf> ] SHS ZS

Now there are some philosphers and lay people who may profess not to care about character. On the other hand, there are some who care about character a great deal. Though it is not a commonly held position today, there have been some thinkers who argued that **the purpose of the state is the development of virtue in the citizens.**23 For these theorists, the objective of the ideal state is to facilitate and cultivate the development of virtuous individuals. **This principle would extend to criminal-justice policy**. **A justice system which** deliberately **took steps** with a high chance **of rewarding dishonesty would not be** in keeping with the criteria for criminal justice in **the character-building state**. At a minimum, the state would be sending the wrong message to its citizens, declaring that it cares not for virtue and vice and will nonchalantly punish the relatively virtuous more than the comparatively vicious. Beyond this, **there is the problem that the state is encouraging vice and discouraging virtue** by incentivizing the one and penalizing the other. Strictly speaking, this is not my thesis, although it is suggested by the same phenomenon. The traditional position in virtue ethics is that **virtuous actions build virtue and vicious actions build vice**—just like other habits. **From the perspective of the** character-building **state**, **it is** obviously **unacceptable for it to be encouraging** betrayal given that such acts nourish **bad character**. Finally, **there is something** twisted and **cruel about** deliberately **putting a person to** a **choice between** her **conscience and** her **freedom**. Tracy, we imagined, was not someone who made the decision to turn state’s evidence lightly. There are, however, some people who do so easily, with utter indifference to their former partners or even malice in their hearts against them. **When the prosecutor offers to make a deal with** such **an awful character**, **his only hesitation will involve** just **how good of a deal he can bargain** to obtain. Now contrast this person with someone like Louisa who is honest or who has tender feelings and wishes not to harm another human being by increasing the amount of time that person will spend in prison. She is **caught between** the demands of her **compassion** or her honor on one hand, **and** the prospect of **years** of misery **behind bars** on the other. Moreover, Louisa must also be mindful of her duties as a mother. The thought of violating one’s principles or bringing harm to one’s former partner in crime (who could be a close friend or even a close family member as well) is tortuous for the woman of conscience. The same is true for the fear of prison; its deprivations are at least as miserable for the saint as they are for the sinner. In sum, the perverse reality is that the more honest or compassionate a person is, the more she will suffer from the dilemma the prosecutor has fashioned.

#### [3] Consequences fail – Ethical theories have to always guide action. Even if they work 99% of the time that is not sufficient because there would be instances where agents do not know what to do. A. Induction fails – the logic of looking to the past to predict the future is all premised in the past, so it’s circular. B. Aggregation fails – there’s no way to weigh between different forms of pain and pleasure. C. Butterfly effect – no way to know when we cut off looking at consequences. D. Culpability – there are an infinite number of pretenses for actions which means assigning culpability is impossible which is necessary for a moral theory to ascribe blame for actions.

#### [4] Education – Only a virtue ethicist methodology allows for teachers to cultivate epistemic virtues within their students which is necessary for true learning and allowing educators to achieve their true form. Carr.

[Carr, David. “Virtue Ethics and Education.” Oxford Handbooks Online. <https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199385195.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199385195-e-10?result=3&rskey=1fWPVQ>. Published February 2018] SHS ZS

IV. The Epistemic Virtues of Good Teaching. Having said this, a person might well be a fine moral example to others, but still not much of a teacher. The obvious reason for this is that **while** in the broader educational context, **good teaching may** well involve helping to **shape** the **characters** of others **through example**, **it is also no less concerned with the business of helping others to acquire the various kinds of academic knowledge and practical skills that are the key professional concern of teaching**. Still, this is not obviously reducible to simply possessing the required knowledge and skills. Thus, it is conceivable that **someone engaged as a teacher might well be liked and respected as a person by pupils—and also have the wide knowledge of a subject or skill acquired from a first-class university education—but nevertheless lack the capacities to teach very well what she is employed to teach**. To be sure, some of these capacities may come under the heading of so-called teaching skills, and helping prospective teachers to acquire such pedagogical techniques has long been the standard fare of schools of teacher training. For example, failure to speak loudly or clearly may inhibit or undermine the ability of a trainee teacher to communicate knowledge effectively, or she may also need some assistance to understand how to organize the content of her lessons in a perspicuous or learner-friendly way. Even so, **it is yet possible that a teacher might be well liked by pupils and a technically competent communicator of knowledge, but still lack capacities associated with the best conceivable teachers.** Perhaps the teacher in question was compelled by others to follow his or her university career and then entered teaching because no other career was readily available. It seems to be considerations of this sort that have drawn recent philosophers of education to some interest in the capacities that Aristotle distinguished from moral virtues as ‘epistemic virtues.’26 Unlike the moral virtues (governed by the intellectual virtue of phronesis) of main concern in this volume, the **epistemic virtues are not directly concerned with the formation of moral character, but with** the discernment or **discovery of truth**. Epistemic virtues would include such **attitudes or capacities as appetite for** (p. 653) **knowledge, intellectual curiosity, respect for truth, open-mindedness, scholarly rigor, academic scruple, and so forth**. While capacities such as respect for truth or (perhaps more simply) honesty might also be considered moral virtues in some contexts, they are by no means necessarily so, and a Dr. Faustus driven by the rigorous search for truth might well be an utterly morally unscrupulous person.27 Still, given that **it is surely a large part of the teacher’s role to inspire love of his or her subject in others** and to help them grasp the value of truth or excellence in academic inquiry or practical performance, it seems no less clear that **a morally virtuous agent who lacked such qualities would not count as much of a teacher no matter how much knowledge or skill he possessed.** It is in this light that a recent work of educational philosophy focused on the pedagogical significance of epistemic virtues has highlighted the professional significance for teachers of what it calls “epistemic presence” in the classroom.28 In any event, despite what one might still regard as the rather slow uptake of interest in the topic on the part of latter-day educational philosophers, **the case is undoubtedly strong for regarding virtue ethics as helpful for any full understanding of educational practice**—not just in relation to the wider moral education and character formation of pupils, but also regarding the development of the sort of attitudes and virtues needed by teachers to assist such formation and to prosecute **the key pedagogical task of inspiring pupils with a love of learning for its own sake**. In this regard, it is not just that recent tendencies to conceive education and schooling in narrowly instrumental terms of the transmission of economically useful knowledge and skills have neglected the wider character developmental dimensions of education, but that no less **recent attempts to reduce the occupation of teaching to a list of skill-based competences have failed to do justice to not only the intellectual**, but also the affective and motivational aspects and demands of good school and classroom practice. **Good teaching**—or being a good teacher —**is** more than just possessing knowledge and the skills for the mechanical transmission of such knowledge, but of **appropriate attitudes toward knowledge**, capacities for positive human association, and some measure of morally virtuous character, in the absence of which no instruction or pupil learning could be very educationally meaningful. In sum, **teaching**—especially in the contexts of contemporary schooling—**is a professionally complex activity requiring a wide and diverse range of personal qualities, abilities, and capacities**. To be sure, the most obvious professional requirements of teachers are some knowledge of what is to be taught—perhaps broader general knowledge in the case of primary teachers and more specialized knowledge in the case of secondary teachers—and some technical competence regarding the teaching of it. But **it would clearly miss much to conceive good teachers and teaching merely in terms of competent communication of secondhand knowledge**. Such teachers are also those who value knowledge and appreciate its significance for the broader moral and other personal formation of young people, and who therefore require singular qualities of personal relationship to both what is taught and those to whom it is taught. **To be a good teacher**— certainly qua educator—**is to be not just an effective knowledge transmitter, but a particular kind of person capable of distinctive personal relationships and (p. 654) passions.** As we have tried to show, the value of virtue ethics lies in the insights that it can afford—more, perhaps, than any other science or discipline—into these distinctive relationships and passions.

#### This outweighs on portability – only the aff provides us with a means of education and empowerment that we can use later on our lives to discover epistemic truth and learn.

## Offense (~1:05)

#### I affirm, Resolved: States ought to ban lethal autonomous weapons.

#### LAWs as defined by CRS.

[Congressional Research Service. “Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems.” <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11150.pdf> Published 25 June 2020] SHS ZS

Lethal autonomous weapon systems (**LAWS**) **are a** special **class of weapon systems that use** sensor suites and **computer algorithms to independently identify a target and employ an onboard weapon system to engage and destroy the target without** manual **human control of the system**. Although **these systems generally do not yet exist**, it is believed they would enable military operations in communications-degraded or -denied environments in which traditional systems may not be able to operate.

#### Now, affirm:

#### [1] Dignity – LAWs are incapable of respecting human dignity and compassion during interactions, necessary for virtuous relationships. HRW 18.

[Human Rights Watch. “Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots.” <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-killer-robots> Published 21 August 2018] SHS ZS

The Principles of Humanity **Due to their lack of emotion and legal and ethical judgment**, fully **autonomous weapons would face significant obstacles in complying with the principles of humanity.** Those principles require the humane treatment of others and **respect for human** life and human **dignity**. **Humans are motivated to treat each other humanely because they feel** compassion and **empathy** for their fellow humans. Legal and ethical judgment gives people the means to minimize harm; it enables them to make considered decisions based on an understanding of a particular context. As machines, **fully autonomous weapons would not be sentient beings capable of feeling compassion.** Rather than exercising judgment, such **weapons systems would base their actions on pre-programmed algorithms**, which do not work well in complex and unpredictable situations. Showing **respect for human life entails minimizing killing.** Legal and ethical judgment helps humans weigh different factors to prevent arbitrary and unjustified loss of life in armed conflict and beyond. It would be difficult to recreate such judgment, developed over both human history and an individual life, in fully autonomous weapons, and they could not be pre-programmed to deal with every possible scenario in accordance with accepted legal and ethical norms. Furthermore, **most humans possess an innate resistance to killing** that is based on their understanding of the impact of loss of life, which fully **autonomous weapons,** as inanimate machines, **could not share**. Even if fully autonomous weapons could adequately protect human life, they would be incapable of respecting human dignity. Unlike humans, these **robots would be unable to appreciate fully the value of a human life and the significance of its loss.** They would make life-and-death decisions based on algorithms, reducing their human targets to objects**. Fully autonomous weapons would thus violate the principles of humanity on all fronts.**

#### [2] Moral deskilling – LAWs shift the burden of warfighting from humans onto machines which prevents a generation of virtue on the battlefield. Vallor 13.

[Vallor, Shannon. “The Future of Military Virtue: Autonomous Systems and the Moral Deskilling of the Military.” Santa Clara University. <https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=phi> Published 2013] SHS ZS

Thus **while war itself cannot be virtuous**, because it characteristically impedes rather than supports human flourishing, **humans who take on the burdens of military service can be** - **insofar as they aspire to fight only in the manner of an excellent human being.** Of course, moral virtue is expressed differently according to the demands of particular circumstances; what compassion and courage call for in battle looks very different from what these demand in civic life. In writing on war and its apparent incompatibility with moral norms, Augustine wrote that precisely because war foments evil (“the desire for harming, the cruelty of revenge, the restless and implacable mind, the savageness of revolting, the lust for dominating”), **it is all the more essential that soldiers cultivate the virtuous dispositions of compassion and benevolence to accompany them in battle**, so that the “mutual bond of piety and justice” that constitutes common morality has not been irrevocably destroyed by the time that material conditions for peace return (Augustine 1994, 221-222). **Military virtue**, then, imperfect as its professional cultivation and practice may be, **functions to keep warfighters morally continuous with society. It allows us to see ourselves, and the other, as worthy of membership in a moral community**, even when engaged in conduct that is in itself destructive to moral community. When the professional cultivation of military virtue is not attempted or its aspirations are abandoned, as in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica, the aftermath of war is often precisely what we would expect from Augustine’s account: a shallow peace poisoned by deep distrust, resentment and fear lasting for generations. **Survivors of such a moral calamity** do not stop suffering when the bloodshed stops: they **are burdened with the crippling social degradation that comes from the death of civic norms** of trust, mercy, forgiveness, justice and goodwill. Such norms, once destroyed, are not easily reborn; while **military virtue** may not be able to shield them from assault, it **can keep them on life support**. For all of these reasons, then, it is essential to the mitigation of the harms of war that military virtue be preserved, both as a meaningful moral concept and as a practical and attainable commitment to ethical warfighting. In what follows I explain why the increasing automation of warfighting methods may jeopardize this imperative. AUTOMATED WARFARE, VIRTUE AND THE MORAL DESKILLING OF MILITARY PRACTICE Having offered reasons to take the concept of military virtue seriously, I turn to the primary burden of my argument: to show how **increasingly automated methods of warfighting challenge** the future of **military virtue** by potentially contributing to a moral deskilling of the military profession. First, let us **consider the link between virtues and skills**. Aristotle was clear that virtues and skills share many common features – both are acquired by habit and practice, both must be guided by intelligence, and both must be adapted to the demands of given situations. But he also reminds us that **virtue is more than just skill** or know-how; **it is a state in which that know-how is reliably put into action when called for**, and is done with the appropriate moral concern for what is good: “**The agent also must be in a certain condition when** he **does [virtuous acts];** in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes and thirdly his actions must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character” (1984, 1105a30-35). **Someone could have moral skills** in the sense of practical moral knowledge **but fail to be virtuous because they are unreliable in acting upon this knowledge**, or because they act well only for non- moral reasons. Still, moral skills are a necessary if not a sufficient condition for moral virtue. **Without the requisite cultivation of moral knowledge** and skill, even **a person who sincerely wishes to do well consistently** and for its own sake **will be unsuccessful.** It follows that if the advancing **automation of military conflict** **were** **to bring** about **a significant ‘moral deskilling’ of the profession**, the future of military virtue would be gravely endangered. What would a ‘moral deskilling’ of the military profession amount to, and how might the advancing automation of warfighting systems contribute to it? Deskilling is a familiar concept in the analysis of the social impact of technology; for example, we might think of the way in which the skills of machinists and other classes of mechanical labor were devalued by widespread factory adoption of automated machine tools (Braverman 1974). Or consider the worry that the professional work of highly skilled nurses is increasingly given over to a combination of less skilled aides and advanced medical monitoring and medication delivery technologies (Rinard 1996). However, the concept of deskilling has declined in academic usage in the last few decades, in large part because unlike the earlier automation of factory work, the information revolution has thus far seemed to deliver as much upskilling as deskilling –workers in many industries have been freed by computers to shift their duties from mindless tasks like filing, copying and collating to more challenging and knowledge-laden responsibilities. Yet some **new applications in information technology** may **warrant renewed concerns about deskilling**, including moral deskilling (Manders-Huits 2006). Whether any automated technology produces deskilling, then, is an empirical question that depends upon the particular context of use. Let us look more closely at the critical meaning of the concept, and how it may apply to the context of automated warfare. The concept of deskilling has at least two critical implications. The first and most commonly discussed implication is that the **deskilling** of a given profession **may decrease** the socioeconomic value, **autonomy and power enjoyed by workers**, potentially causing them significant psychological and economic harm. A second critical implication, the one I wish to highlight, is that at least for some professions, we may have reason to regret the loss of the professional context for cultivating the given skills because we think the skills themselves are intrinsically valuable. For example, many have mourned the declining skills of artistic handicraft lost to mass manufacture of ready-made objects (Roberts 2010), resulting in renewed interest in ‘handmade,’ ‘custom’ or ‘artisanal’ products. In this context, it is not only the economic welfare of the artisan that we value, and not only the quality of the end product, but also **the connection between an artifact and a human whose artistic excellence and knowledge was responsible for its production**. We think that it is good that humans are skilled at making beautiful and useful objects for their own living, and that even if machines could produce all such goods for us, it would be sad and regrettable if humans were no longer capable of doing the same. I suggest **that the intrinsic value of artisanal skills is** not only paralleled but **dwarfed by the intrinsic value of moral skills**. The concept of moral deskilling is only rarely employed used in the sociological literature on technology, in part because sociologists tend to shy away from normative judgments of ethics, and in part because concerns about moral deskilling are sometimes associated with reactionary ‘moral panics’ in reaction to technological change – for example, worries in the 1920’s that the telephone would result in crippling social isolation and the unravelling of people’s capacities for moral interaction. However, the concept remains meaningful, and I suggest that it may have profound significance with respect to the professional impact of military automation. While deskilling has been recognized with respect to the threatened obsolescence of abilities such as those cultivated by military snipers (Townsend and Charles 2008), **the more worrisome possibility of a moral deskilling of the military profession has yet to be widely acknowledged**. Consider the parallel drawn earlier with artisanal skills. Just as the widespread loss of such skills by humans would not be fully expunged by machines that produce comparable products, **a widespread loss of moral skills in the context of military conduct would not be rendered insignificant by the emergence of machines that produce equivalent, or arguably even better outcomes**. This fact has unfortunately been lost in the otherwise rich debate about the legal and ethical implications of automated warfare. **A world in which humans involved in warfighting are no longer skilled in the moral conduct of war is a world in which the concept of ‘military virtue’ has no meaning**. As I have argued elsewhere (2013), where this concept has lost its meaning, the recognition of soldiers as professionals devoted to the selfless service of the moral community is no longer possible.

#### This procedurally outweighs – LAWs prevent the cultivation of virtue at large, which comes before particular any substantive vice the aff might bring about. Vallor 13.

[Vallor, Shannon. “The Future of Military Virtue: Autonomous Systems and the Moral Deskilling of the Military.” Santa Clara University. <https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=phi> Published 2013] SHS ZS

Before I develop and support my claims, let me briefly explain what ‘virtue’ in the phrase ‘military virtue’ entails. The concept of **virtue is rooted in classical traditions** going as far back as the ancient Greek philosophies **of Plato and Aristotle** and, in the East, Confucian and Buddhist ethics. It endures today in the writings of contemporary virtue ethicists like Rosalind Hursthouse, Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum, and has found its way into various applied and professional codes of ethics, including business ethics, medical ethics, environmental and engineering ethics (Axtell and Olson 2012). **Virtues are habituated states of a person’s character** **that** reliably **dispose their holders to excel in specific contexts of action**, and to live well generally; so **moral virtues are states of character** that, once acquired, dispose their possessors to perform excellent moral actions of particular sorts, and, more broadly, to excel in moral living. Cardinal examples of moral virtues include wisdom, honesty, courage and moderation; others commonly recognized include loyalty, integrity, respect, honor, patience, compassion and benevolence, though this list is far from exhaustive. How particular virtues are defined and prioritized varies among cultures, historical periods and social roles; yet there is substantial overlap or convergence among diverse virtue traditions, indicating that the qualities seen as most supportive of human flourishing are, while not entirely universal, rooted in widely shared or similar human practices. **Because virtues are habituated rather than inborn, whether or not a person develops a particular virtue will** largely **depend on whether they engage** repeatedly **in the kinds of practices that cultivate it**. The virtue of **honesty**, for example, **can only be acquired through** repeated **practice of** **truth-telling**. Initially, **such practice requires guidance by a virtuous model**, e.g., someone who is already honest. Over time, repeated practice can lead a person to see for themselves what honesty is, to see it as good in itself and to embody it better and more easily; a person who has cultivated the virtue of honesty is not only consistently inclined to tell the truth, they have learned how to excel at truth-telling in any situation that might arise: who to tell the truth to, when and where, in what way, and to what extent. **Moral virtue thus requires more than good will and a steady desire to do the right thing – it requires the cultivation of a kind of practical wisdom** that directs this right desire intelligently, perceiving and quickly adapting to the unique moral demands of each situation. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle named this practical wisdom **phronesis**; a sort of ‘über-virtue’ that orchestrates one’s individual qualities of moral excellence and integrates them within a complete and flourishing life (1984, 1140a25-30;1145a). **The concept of virtue**, then, picks out those aspects of persons that **enable them to live as moral exemplars for others**, qualities of character that we ourselves can strive to cultivate through the same sorts of repeated practice. **The role of virtue in military ethics has long been recognized**, and a rich body of existing literature details the way in which virtues like courage, duty, integrity, honor, loyalty **and** service **have** historically **been inseparable from the ideal of the good soldier** (Olsthoorn 2011; Robinson 2007; Reichberg, Syse and Begby 2006; French 2003; Toner 2000). This does not mean that the enterprise of war itself can or should be seen as virtuous. Rather, **ideals of virtuous military character**, when exercised as normative expectations (not just indicators of supererogatory or heroic performance), **express a society’s unwillingness to** wholly **exclude its warfighters from the broader responsibilities and benefits of the moral community**.1 As I argue elsewhere (Vallor 2013), ideals of military virtue, when embedded in the practice and professional identity of military bodies, block the cultural displacement of war to an extra-moral realm where its conduct would be indistinguishable from criminal or mercenary violence. **The ideal serves as a kind of contract between warfighters and the larger community**, and when in force, it offers considerable benefits to soldiers and civilians alike. In addition to motivating restraint on the part of soldiers in inflicting civilian harms, **it can motivate limited restraint between enemy combatants when each recognizes the other as a professional fighting with honor and moral purpose**. It can also support the psychological integrity of soldiers themselves, by providing a moral context for what are, taken in themselves, brutal and deplorable actions. Finally, it preserves the sense of moral community between warfighters and civilians that allows returning soldiers to be welcomed home, and even valorized. To see the importance of this contingency, one need only be familiar with the starkly different experiences in the United States of veterans of World War II, treated to grand welcoming parades and to this day labelled “The Greatest Generation,” and veterans of the Vietnam War, who returned home to a largely indifferent and often hostile society no longer able to contextualize their service as virtuous.