# AC (All Theory args on the bottom)

#### 1. The resolution is an ought not statement, which means any reason the statement “The United States ought to provide military aid to authoritarian regimes” is false is a reason you vote aff since it denies the proactive obligation, which means any argument that denies the ability to create an obligation to take an action affirms. This also means any reason the US cannot take an action affirms since it’d be impossible for them to provide aid.

#### 2. Resolved is defined as[[1]](#footnote-1) firm in purpose or intent; determined.

#### 3. The role of the ballot is to endorse the debater who proves the truth or falsity of the resolution – a. Inclusion- Any offense can function under truth testing whereas your specific role of the ballot excludes all strategies but yours, truth testing solves because we can both do what we are good at. b. Fundamentals- denying truth testing denies the fundamental thesis of the debate activity since every underlying principle is the acquisition of knowledge which is derived from conceptions of truths, thus denying truth testing is impossible because it is impossible gain any knowledge. C. The resolution is the constitutive feature of debate and the only preset burden so A) ignoring it justifies unlimited judge intervention and B) it’s impossible to change the rules of the game inside the game, so denying the res is incoherent. D) Textuality - five dictionaries[[2]](#footnote-2) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[3]](#footnote-3) as to prove true which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the resolution’s truth or falsity E) All statements collapse into questions of truth and falsity

**.** **Frege,** Frege, Gottlob. “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry” in Logicism and the Philosophy of Language: Selections from Frege and Russell. Broadview Press. March 2003. Pg. 204. It may nevertheless be thought that **we cannot recognize a property of a thing without** at the same time **realizing** the thought that **this thing has the property to be true**. So **with every property of a thing is joined a property** of thought, namely, that **of truth**. It is also worthy of notice that **the sentence “I smell the scent of violets” has** just **the same content as** the sentence **“it is true that I smell the scent of violets”**. So, it seems, then, that nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing it the property of truth.

#### 4. There are infinite worlds, the aff is true in one which is sufficient. Vaidman 02[[4]](#footnote-4), The reason for adopting the MWI is that it avoids the collapse of the quantum wave. (Other non-collapse theories are not better than MWI for various reasons, e.g., nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics; and the disadvantage of all of them is that they have some additional structure.) The collapse postulate is a physical law that differs from all known physics in two aspects: it is genuinely random and it involves some kind of action at a distance. According to the collapse postulate the outcome of a quantum experiment is not determined by the initial conditions of the Universe prior to the experiment: only the probabilities are governed by the initial state. Moreover, Bell 1964 has shown that there cannot be a compatible local-variables theory that will make deterministic predictions. There is no experimental evidence in favor of collapse and against the MWI. And, Truth Statements function under an ‘if-then’ format in which it is true if a) All of its premises are true, even if they are inconsistent b) If all premises are true, even if the conclusion is false c) At least one of its premises is true, even if the conclusion is false. The terms of the resolution exist so the statement is true because a false conclusion cannot be drawn from two true statements. A statement is only false if the condition is true and the consequent is false. But, if the condition is false, then the possibility the statement is false has not been obtained. This means the statement is true. Thus if aff is winning, I get the ballot, even if aff isn’t winning, I get the ballot.

#### 5. Principle of explosion – The existence of one contradiction justifies every statement being true since contradictions don’t exist in a sliding scale they are either justifiable or they aren’t, thus if both if us have offense you affirm since it generates a contradiction.

#### And moral and non-natural oughts are unknowable:

Hallvard Lillehammer, Professor of philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London, Queerness, Argument from, 21 June 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee060.pub2> ///AHS PB BRACKETED FOR CLARITY

In its epistemological aspect, the argument from queerness asks how objective values could possibly be known. Objective values are supposed to be intrinsically normative entities, irreducibly distinct from the natural entities of the causal nexus postulated by the descriptive natural sciences. It might therefore seem that knowledge of objective values [them] would require us to have some special faculty of evaluative intuition that connects us to this realm of nonnatural and causally inert entities (see intuitionism, moral). But we do not possess any such special faculty of evaluative intuition. Hence, we would not be able to know about objective values, even if they did exist. Yet, an unknowable objective value is as good as an objective value that does not exist. Therefore, we should not believe that objective values exist.

#### Further, the moral ought, which succumbs to the is ought fallacy, ought statement’s do not prescribe action but indicate factual states of the world.

Grey, Grey, JW. "The Is/Ought Gap: How Do We Get "Ought" from "Is?"" *Ethical Realism*. N.p., 19 July 2011. Web. 28 Oct. 2015.

The is/ought gap is a problem in moral philosophy where what is the case and what ought to be the case seem quite different, and it presents itself as the following question to David Hume: How do we know what morally ought to be the case from what is the case? Hume posed the question in A Treatise of Human Nature Book III Part I Section I: In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs, when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason shou’d be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. It is here that Hume points out that philosophers argue about various nonmoral facts, then somehow conclude what ought to be the case (or what people ought to do) based on those facts (about what is the case). For example, we might find out that arsenic is poisonous and conclude that we ought not consume it. But we need to know how nonmoral facts can lead to [and] moral conclusions. These two things seem unrelated. The is/ought gap [isn’t] doesn’t seem like a problem for nonmoral oughts—what we ought to do to accomplish our goals, fulfill our desires, or maintain our commitments. For example, we could say, “If you want to be healthy, you ought not consume arsenic.” However, it might be morally wrong to consume arsenic. If it is, we have some more explaining to do.

#### The solution is the functional ought, which instead of indicating an obligation or rule, describes the function of the actor as to fulfill a particular purpose. This bridges the Is-Ought gap as it comes from the material property and purpose of objects.

G. E. M. Anscombe, British analytic philosopher, Modern Moral Philosophy, journal Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 124, 1958, <https://www.pitt.edu/~mthompso/readings/mmp.pdf> ///AHS PB

The terms “should” or “ought” or “needs” relate to good and bad: e.g. machinery needs oil, or should or ought to be oiled, in that running without oil is bad for it, or it runs badly without oil. According to this conception, of course, "should" and "ought" are not used in a special "moral" sense when one says that a man should not bilk. (In Aristotle's sense of the term "moral" [ήθικός], they are being used in connection with a moral subject matter: namely that of human passions and [non\_technical] actions.) But they have now acquired a special so\_called "moral" sense-\_i.e. a sense in which they imply some absolute verdict (like one of guilty/not guilty on a man) on what is described in the "ought" sentences used in certain types of context: not merely the contexts that Aristotle would call "moral"\_-passions and actions\_-but also some of the contexts that he would call "intellectual.” The ordinary (and quite indispensable) terms "should," "needs," "ought," "must"\_-acquired this special sense by being equated in the relevant contexts with "is obliged," or "is bound," or "is required to," in the sense in which one can be obliged or bound by law, or something can be required by law.

#### Thus the standard is fulfilling the practical actions of agents: The burden of the affirmative is to show it is a function of the United States to not provide military aid, and the burden of the negative is to deny this. Prefer:

#### [A] Goodness and badness only make sense in terms of particular functions, for example if I shoot someone with a gun I might be a bad person, but it has served its function as a good gun. To view what things ought to do independent of this theory is impossible as we try to impose a universal upon a contextual ought.

#### [B] Indeterminacy: rules can’t secure their own application, If you see the sequence 2, 4, 6 then you suppose the next number is 8 based on past usage as plus, but there is no way to know that rule would hold true. Only functionalism solves, as we don’t apply a prior rule to new instances but instead derive the rule on what that actor ought to do from its constitutive functions.

#### [C] Moral judgments are only legitimate if they are meta-ethically applied to the agents form. Geach[[5]](#footnote-5), I can now state my first thesis about good and evil: ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are always attributive, not predicative, adjectives.  This is fairly clear about ‘bad’ because ‘bad’ is something like an alienans adjective; we cannot safely predicate of a bad A what we predicate of an A, any more than we can predicate of a forged banknote or a putative father what we predicate of a banknote or a father.  We actually call forged money ‘bad’; and we cannot infer e.g. that because food supports life bad food supports life.  For ‘good’ the point is not so clear at first sight, since ‘good’ is not alienas—whatever holds true of an A as such holds true of a good A.  But consider the contrast in such a pair of phrases as ‘red car’ and ‘good car’.  I could ascertain that a distant object is a red car because I can see it is red[,] and a keener sighted but colour-blind friend can see it is a car; [but] there is no such possibility of ascertaining that a thing is a good car by pooling independent information that it is good and that it is a car.  This sort of example shows that ‘good’ like ‘bad’ is essentially an attributive adjective.  Even when ‘good’ or ‘bad’ stands by itself as a predicate, and is thus grammatically predicative, some substantive has to be understood; there is no such thing as being just good or bad, there is only being a good or bad so-and-so.  (If I say that something is a good or bad thing, either ‘thing’ is a mere proxy for a more descriptive noun to be supplied from the context; or else I am trying to use ‘good’ or ‘bad’ predicatively, and its being grammatically attributive is a mere disguise.  The latter attempt is, on my thesis, illegitimate.)

#### I contend that aid is inconsistent with the function of the US.

#### [1] Governments only have obligations to their citizens.

**Dugan,** Dugan, Maire. "Legitimacy | Beyond Intractability." *Legitimacy | Beyond Intractability*. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 June 2016. <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/legitimacy>. Wellman, Christopher Heath, [Professor of Philosophy, Washington University St. Louis], “Im- migration”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/immigration/ A second view, however, contends that **legitimacy exists** primarily **at the level of the individual actor** rather than the community. That is, **a particular rule or norm is legitimate if it enjoys support from the relevant set of actors.** Democratic governance provides another potential link between self-determination and controls on immigration. Given that democracy’s **[governments’] principal virtue is** thought to be its connection to self- determination, democrats often favor bounded groups-which enjoy **dominion over their own affairs**. As Frederick Whelan puts it, “democracy **[government] requires that people be divided into peoples** (each people hopefully enjoying its own democratic institutions), **with each unit distinguishing between its own citizens**—understood in a political sense as those eligible to exercise democratic political rights here—and others, who are regarded as aliens here, although (hopefully) citizens somewhere else.” (Whelan 1988: 28) The basic idea here is that, **in order** for democracies **to function, there must be rule by the same people upon whom the rule is imposed**.

#### [2] The government only exists due to contracts formed between the government and the people. Contracts are only binding to agents that form the contract, which means any individual or organization that exist outside the contract does not have claim to an obligation. Since providing aid to an authoritarian regime a) Gives aid to individuals outside the US people who have formed a contract b) Engages in aid with regimes that are not part of any contract and c) are authoritarian and have not formed a binding contract with their own citizens it is not within the governments function to provide military aid to those regimes or their people.

#### Underview

#### [1] Aff gets no RVI, Drop the debater, competing interps, 1AR Theory a) infinite abuse since otherwise it would be impossible to check NC abuse b) 1AR is insufficient to win multiple layers, no RVI, and competing interpretations on spikes and shells since the 2n can dump on reasonability. And, reject arguments about spikes because they mutually indict each other, but prefer mine because you had time to comply. AFF fairness issues come prior to NC arguments a) the 1ar is to short to win both substance and theory so aff theory needs to come first and b) Sets up an invincible 2n since there are a million of unfair things you can collapse to win every round.

#### [2] Additionally, the neg may not read combination shells A) strat skew, allows you to invalidate the entire AC with one arg and infinitely add planks B) Infinite abuse- the interp says one thing but the shell does not warrant explicitly each standard which means it always results in me losing on unwarranted arguments. Also, all neg interpretations are counter interpretations since I take an implicit stance on norms by reading the 1AC.

#### [3] The neg may not read necessary but insufficient burdens a) Strat Skew- You can uplayer with 7 minutes of NIBs I have to beat back before I can access offense which is terrible for a 4 min 1ar, it is impossible for aff to overwhelm the neg because you always have longer times and reactive speeches to overcome any unfairness b) Norms- It would justify infinite neg abuse because neg would just read 7 min of auto-negate arguments which is infinite abuse. Further, I get to extend arguments directly from the 1ac to the 2ar, because the 4 minute 1ar is too short to respond to NC args and fully extend case.

#### [4] Aff I-meets trigger an RVI as otherwise 1) negs can exploit the 1ar by reading a bunch of shells I meet, and then when I waste time covering them, extending the I-meet as terminal defense. And, Time skew first a) we can’t make arguments if we don’t have time b) its structural so it frames substantive evaluation.

#### [5] Affirming is harder 4-6-3 time scew, reactivity advantage, 1 less speech to extend args, and 3% side bias on the Jan Feb topic give the neg the advantage. Aff theory o/w and I get ROB choice and Aff Flex, I have to compensate.

#### [6] No 2n theory arguments or paradigm issues a) overloads the 2AR with a massive clarification burden b) you have 6 minutes to develop implicit responses and weighing which kills my ability to accurately check abuse. There will always be multiple conflicting interpretations of the resolution but the aff has to start somewhere, which means you should accept mine as I speak first. Evaluate the theory debate after the 1AR since a) the 6 min 2n can dump on theory making the 3 min 2AR impossible b) we both get 1 speech on theory.

#### [7] The neg may not contest 1AC theory arguments or offer alternative paradigm issues because they A) invalidate AC speech time and B) cause us to both use contrasting norms making stable clash impossible.

#### [8] Allow new 2ar responses to nc arguments but not new 2n responses the nc has 7 minutes of rebuttal time while I only have 4 minutes, the 2ar makes it 7-7.

#### [9] The neg may not make analytic arguments since I don’t have time to cover 100 blippy arguments in the NC since you can read 7 min of analytics and extend any of them to win- this o/w since its infinite abuse since the 1ar becomes impossible.

#### [10] Neg theory functions under reasonability with a Brightline of textuality: A) otherwise the aff always justifies a violation, leading to infinite abuse B) the neg can pick the weakest part of the AC and collapse to 6mins on risk of offense. The resolution is the only thing the aff knows before my first speech, so I o/w on predictability. And, Evaluate neg shells under text of the interp as the 6 minute 2n allows the neg to always avoid I-meets with by collapsing to spirit of the interp and recontextualizing the shell, leading to infinite abuse.

#### [11] All K’s must defend a concrete policy alternative, Policy alts are better for your kritik, it allows us the ability to engage in productive discussions rather than endless critic of each other’s reps without solutions. Further, only evaluate topical K links because they force a focus on material change instead of abstraction. All K Links must quote explicit lines in the because they are an infinite amount of things the AC can implicitly justify reciprocally exploding neg ground. And you must check all K links in CX a) Regress – infinite number of indirect things the aff can link to, which means you’d always have something to read b) Critical education -we learn absolutely nothing if the k ends up not linking which controls the internal link to the ROB.

#### [12] To defend a counter-advocacy that isn’t the squo the neg must prove that if we don’t do the aff, we’ll do their advocacy. For example, if Professor Procrastinate is asked to write a review that he’s best qualified to write, but knows that if he says “yes” he’ll never actually complete the review, he ought to say no since this is better than the actual alternative. Additionally, the negative may read either an alternative framing mechanism or an alternative action besides the squo but not both. Key to strat skew and clash because it allows the 4 minute 1ar to focus on one layer of the debate, instead of loosing to 2nr collapse on an under covered layer that either excludes or solves the entirety of the aff. Counterplans and alternatives must be entirely mutually exclusive with the affirmative advocacy otherwise they steal aff ground and allow you to cherry pick a trivial issue that makes affirming impossible. Reject disads with different authors because it makes sure that the entire of the position is logically consistent instead of just picking and choosing authors who believe in one part.

http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/

1. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolved [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2002. "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics." [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Geach, P. T. Good and Evil. Print. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)