#### The Meta-Ethic is moral non-naturalism. Objective Moral properties exist like goodness and can not be defined as a natural, and observable property (such as “pleasure”). Instead they exist as concepts in and of themselves. Prefer this account of ethics:

#### [1] The Naturalistic Fallacy: It is impossible to reduce goodness to an observable property, since the two are fundamentally separate. For example, if we believe an action that produces pleasure is good, it does not logically follow that pleasure and goodness are the same property, since the fact they describe the same thing does not make them the same thing.

#### [2] The Open Question argument: Suppose goodness was synonymous with a observable property like “X”. It is impossible to answer to question “is X good” since either A) X is the exact same thing as good, in which case our answer is the meaningless tautology “good is good” or B) X is not the same as good in which case non-naturalism is true.

#### Only a system of intuitions is able to derive moral value

Michael Lacewing, Director of Research and Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Heythrop College, University of London, Ethical non-naturalism, No Date, <http://s3-euw1-ap-pe-ws4-cws-documents.ri-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/9781138793934/A22014/ethical_language/Ethical%20non-naturalism.pdf> ///AHS PB

If moral properties are not natural properties, then how do we discover them? How do we know what is good? In Mill’s ‘proof’ of utilitarianism, he claims that we cannot prove what is good or not. To prove a claim is to deduce it from some other claim that we have already established. Moore agrees. But unlike Mill, he does not think that we can argue inductively from evidence either. All we can do is consider the truth of the claim, such as ‘pleasure is good’, itself. Moore calls such claims ‘intuitions’. What does this mean? The claim that some truths can be known by rational ‘intuition’ is made by rationalism. But what is an intuition, and how can we tell if it is true? Are we supposed to have some special faculty of moral intuition? Moore leaves these questions open: ‘when I call such propositions Intuitions, I mean merely to assert that they are incapable of proof; I imply nothing whatever as to the manner or origin of our cognition of them’. However, he has already said more than this. He has argued that these claims are not analytically true. And he has argued that we cannot know them through empirical investigation. So they must be some variety of synthetic a priori knowledge. He claims that we know claims about what is good to be true (or false) by considering the claim itself. Intuitions are ‘self-evident’ propositions. A self-evident judgement rests on the ‘evidence’ of its own plausibility, which is grasped directly. This doesn’t necessarily mean that everyone can immediately see that it is true. ‘Self-evident’ is not the same as ‘obvious’. Our ability to make a self-evident judgement needs to develop first, and we need to consider the issue very carefully and clearly. Because moral intuitions are not known through the senses, the self-evidence of a moral intuition will be more like the self-evidence of a necessary truth, such as mathematics or claims about what is logically possible, than the self-evidence of a perceptual truth, such as the claim that there is a table in front of me. So, intuitionism does not need to claim that we have a faculty of intuition that ‘detects’ whether something is good or not, a bit like a supernatural sense. Intuitionism is simply a form of ethical non-naturalism that claims that some of our moral judgements are synthetic yet self-evident.

#### Thus the standard is consistency with moral intuitionism: Prefer:

#### [1] Infinite regress--

#### [2] Only intuitions are motivational.

**Jindal,** Jindal, Bobby. Former Louisiana governor and Republican presidential candidate, Louisiana Law Review, 1999. Web. <http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5780&context=lalrev>.

Modem political philosophers ranging from Robert Nozick to John Rawls have attempted to discern the principles of justice that should guide societal arrangements. This project is of vital importance since it informs society of its obligations to its weakest and most vulnerable members. Yet, the question of **why one should be just is** an **intelligible** one to ask and deserves some response. This paper argues that the political-legal **obligation to be just is derivative from** man's more general duty to be moral, a commitment grounded in **intuitions** which are themselves based on transcendental values, i.e., values that exist apart from a particular society. Those **political theories** that lack a transcendental notion of morality **lack binding force; the theorist who persuades without asserting truth is helpless** to convince or judge those committed to different principles. Modem liberalism, with its explicit commitment to neutrality, has nothing to say to individuals who do not share its values; similarly, communitarianism, with its cultural relativism, cannot critique an unjust society from the outside. Many liberals and communitarians underpin principles of justice, which require an individual to sacrifice his interests to secure the welfare of others, with that justification available to convince one that his preference for vanilla ice cream is mistaken; yet, justice, unlike ice cream, is not merely a matter of taste. **Principles of justice not based on objective moral principles are arbitrary at best and prejudicial at worst, without binding** authority or persuasive **moral force**. Though Rawls claims the "conception of justice is a practical social task rather than an epistemological or metaphysical problem,"1 **there must be some a priori, non-subjective commitment** to justice, as well as positive laws, **that compels individuals to sacrifice their self-interest**. Transcendental morality alone provides a substantial answer to those-anarchists, narcissists, libertarians, individualists, racists, isolationists, and others-who question the obligation to serve the common good, i.e., sacrifice one's interests for others. Merely discerning the claims of justice is not enough; these claims must be legitimized. **The gap** between "is" and "ought" **reflects the distance between** factual claims and moral ones, between truth and motivation, between **description and obligation. Even if rationality informs** man **of** political **obligations** to his fellow citizens, **only moral intuitions can motivate** him **to act** accordingly.

#### [3] Rule Following Paradox: When interpretating rules a problem arises in determining which interpretation is correct. This cannot be regulated by the rule itself, as the nature of the rule does not tell you how it ought to be followed. For example, there’s nothing inherent in an arrow that delineates a certain direction. Thus, establish codified moral rules are nonsensical. Instead, the way to explain moral goodness is to simply point to things that are thought of as good, and act on what one thinks is good in the same way that you point to yellow objects to try to explain yellowness.

#### [4] Only a reliance on intuitions avoids skeptical conclusions—nothing else can definitely prove it false.

Bryan Caplan, Professor of Economics at George Mason University and blogger for EconLog, Common Sense and the Self-Refutation of Skepticism, 1993, <http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/commonsense.pdf> ///AHS PB

To give an example from my own field, the French economist Frederic Bastiat noted that many people thought that labor-saving machinery was bad because it destroyed jobs. He suggested that it would therefore be a wise policy to destroy all machinery, and thereby create even more jobs. Bastiat presents a premise that many people believe, coupled with an implication of it that no one believes. But how should we choose rationally? Consider the premise and the conclusion and decide whether it makes more sense for the conclusion to be true or the premise to be false. It turns out that the conclusion is so absurd that both it and the premise must be wrong. How does this relate to skepticism? Every valid skeptical argument, like all valid arguments, gives us two choices: either reject the premises or accept the conclusion. For example, Hume shows that the distinction between matters of fact and relations of ideas implies skepticism about induction. This doesn't prove that induction isn't valid. It just shows that either we must reject the distinction or become skeptics about induction. So too with Descartes: either we must reject his theory of perception or become skeptics about the external world. At this point, I return to the observation that skeptical arguments never "inspire conviction." Humean philosophers and scientists don't abandon inductive arguments. Hume himself admitted that he couldn't believe his conclusions for more than a few moments at a time. What does this show? It shows that even radical skeptics seriously doubt their conclusions. And often their doubt is not a mere feeling of unease, but serious intellectual doubt. Thus, skeptical scientists find themselves unable to believe Hume's critique of induction as they unemotionally make scientific arguments. The doubt is intellectual, spurred by the inability to rationally forego inductive argument. And what about the premises? They would have to be mightily evident to retain belief even after they yielded such counterintuitive conclusions. Yet they are not at all evident; they are fairly abstract and each can be (and has been) reasonably criticized. From these two observations I draw this conclusion: Skepticism is irrational because it always involves rejecting an obvious conclusion in favor of a highly dubious premise. That inductive arguments are valid is quite evident; the distinction between matters of fact and relations of ideas isn't. The existence of the external world is evident; the representationalist theory of perception isn't. Of course, taken by themselves, it would take some effort to refute the latter two views. But when they imply manifestly false propositions, we should immediately conclude that the premises must be false. Indeed, this is one of the best tests of dubious premises: see whether they imply anything absurd. If they do, then the premises should be rejected. To do otherwise is to select a less evident over a more evident conclusion. Another fact to consider is that all philosophical premises are difficult and abstract. They may seem obvious after a while, but nevertheless, they remain difficult and abstract. It would be easy to err in this area: for naturally, the likelihood of error grows with the difficulty and abstractness of the subject matter. In contrast, the propositions of common sense are indeed simple and easy. Almost everyone understands them -- not just brilliant philosophers. Given this contrast - between the simplicity of common sense and the difficulty of philosophy - where are we more likely to mistake a falsehood for the truth? Let me state the argument another way. Common sense tells us, among other things, that induction is valid and that there is an external world. These propositions are simple and evident. Now in order to argue against them, one would naturally have to begin with premises that are even more evident; for it would be impossible to refute a more evident principle with a less evident one. After all, if a less evident principle conflicts with a more evident one, then it is the less evident one that must go. And yet, there are no premises more evident than the ones of common sense — especially not in philosophy, where the arguments are difficult and abstract. If a philosophical theory implies skepticism, we should take it as a reductio ad absurdum, not a proof of skepticism. 3. Objections Answered 1. "You haven't argued for the truth of common sense; you've just asserted it." The problem with this objection is that it assumes that either one produces an argument or makes an unjustified assertion. But these are not the only possibilities. As I explained, it may be possible to justify a claim not by arguing for it (which would lead to an infinite regress), but rather by carefully and honestly applying one's intellect to it until its truth becomes immediately evident. As an example, consider mathematics. You will notice that while mathematicians produce proofs, they don't produce separate and additional proofs for each step of the proof. Instead, they think about each step carefully and honestly and decide whether it is valid; and if it is, they make that step. And if someone else couldn't see it, the mathematician wouldn't conclude that math was unjustified; he would conclude that the person in question wasn't very good at math. Using the intellect to evaluate common sense is actually easier, since even Hume and other skeptics demonstrate that they can't persistently deny common sense, whereas there really are some people who don't understand any mathematics.

### Offense

#### First, we have an fundamental psychological intuition that competition with each other is good

Mathew Hutson, Science writer and published author based in New York City, Why We Compete, pub 2015, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/10/why-we-compete/403201/#5> ///AHS PB

No wonder we constantly measure ourselves against our peers. In a survey of faculty, students, and staff at the Harvard School of Public Health, nearly half of the respondents said they’d prefer to live in a world where the average salary was $25,000 and they earned $50,000 than one where they earned $100,000 but the average was $200,000. Similarly, a majority favored relative over absolute advantage when it came to their own intelligence and attractiveness, their child’s intelligence and attractiveness, or praise from a superior. Apparently the survey respondents would rather the planet be filled with stupid, ugly children than have their own child left behind [1]. H. L. Mencken was on to something when he defined wealth as “any income that is at least $100 more a year than the income of one’s wife’s sister’s husband.” According to one analysis of labor statistics, sisterly competition may have contributed to rising female employment after World War II. Among grown sisters not in the workforce, a woman was more likely to get a job if her brother-in-law outearned her husband [2].People also suffer from a phenomenon known as “last-place aversion.” Although players in an economics game tended to give money to those with fewer assets, this tendency waned when a player was ranked second-to-last. The researchers who ran the game also found that in real life, people making just above the minimum wage were among the least supportive of a minimum-wage hike [3]. And yet, competitive though we clearly are, we underestimate the influence of social comparison. In one study, call-center employees said that achieving mastery at their job was more important than achieving superiority (ranking better than peers). But in reality, relative rankings affected their self-evaluations, and mastery did not [4]. Our desire for relative advantages is not irrational: Such advantages may make us happier. In 1974, Richard Easterlin, an economist, found that although a country’s richer citizens are happier than its poorer ones, as countries become richer, their citizens do not become happier—a contradiction known as the Easterlin paradox. Happiness, Easterlin reasoned, must depend on one’s wealth relative to one’s compatriots: When everyone gets richer, no one gets happier [5]. A study of 12,000 British citizens would seem to support Easterlin’s conclusion, revealing that increased income boosted life satisfaction only when income rose relative to peers of a similar age, educational level, or region [6].

#### Second, on aggregate more people have the intuition that the aff is bad

Susan Page and Deborah Barfield Berry, Poll from the Suffolk Political Research Center of 1,000 registered voters, taken March 13-17 by landline and cell phone, has a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points., Poll: Americans say even the legal breaks for college admission are rigging the system, 3/20/2019, <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/poll-americans-say-even-the-legal-breaks-for-college-admission-are-rigging-the-system/ar-BBUZXN4> ///AHS PB

Poll from the Suffolk Political Research Center of 1,000 registered voters, taken March 13-17 by landline and cell phone, has a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points.

Meanwhile, those surveyed overwhelmingly support colleges' use of standardized tests like the SAT and the ACT to screen applicants. By 65-27 percent, they say the tests should continue to be used. Some critics have argued the tests can be a disadvantage for minority students, and some colleges no longer require applicants to take them. In the admissions scandal, some parents are accused of intervening to raise their children's test scores. In the poll, younger respondents were more likely than older ones to say the tests shouldn't be used, though a solid majority of all age groups endorsed them. Just one-fifth of those 65 and older oppose the use of the tests, while one-third of those 18 to 34 years old oppose them – that is, the age group most likely to have recently had to take them.