# 1NC (2:10)

#### First, I experience the world radically beyond my comprehension and take in meaning from a multitude of perspectives. These other perspectives are defined by not being mine, so I have an obligation to respect them; I cannot justify anything else because the nature of the Other is beyond my experience. Blum

[Blum, Peter C. "Overcoming Relativism? Levinas's Return to Platonism." Journal of Religious Ethics 28.1 (2000): 91-117.] SHS ZS

The experience of transcendence is, at bottom, the experience of having my interiority brought into question ontologically, epistemologically, and morally. **Ontologically**, I find that **I am not the only** possible **source of reality**. **Although I am capable of creating**, **I experience a presence** within the world **that so overflows and escapes from my experience that I could not have created it**. Epistemologically, I find that **my perspective on the world is not the only possible perspective**. **There is a point of view that I can never occupy**, **because** the only way of defining it relative to my point of view is that **it is not mine**. Because **the Other** so radically escapes my cognition, it **simultaneously threatens my freedom** (to such a degree that I am inclined to murder) **and awakens my desire** (to such a degree that I am inclined to awe, and even to worship). The Other is at once the mysterium tremendum and the mysterium fascinans. If morality is understood as arising in the context of sociation, then the insight that the limits of my understanding become apparent precisely in this context would seem necessarily to have moral implications. Inasmuch as **the Other fundamentally escapes my understanding**, the forced totalization of the Other murder, in the extreme case is an imposition of my will for which a justification is, in principle, unavailable. As Levinas puts it, **murder is impossible**- not physically speaking, of course, but morally speaking (Levinas 1961/1969, 198-99). **If I kill someone**, **it is** fundamentally **because I wish to be rid of the limits that are imposed by his or her presence**. **The** cognitive and **moral limits** that are illuminated by the face, however, **are not eliminated by removing the face from the purview** of sensibility. **The infinite distance between myself and the Other**, once opened in my experience by the Other's epiphany, **will remain open**. My responsibility, once illuminated, is seen as a part of what I am. The commandment that was initially inscribed on the face of the Other is now inscribed on the heart of the same.19

#### Second, recognition of the Other forms the basis for subjectivity.

#### All agents are defined by their interactions with the Other. The “I” only comes into existence when the Other gives it a capacity to respond. Gehrke.

[Pat J Gehrke (associate professor in the Speech Communication and Rhetoric Program and the Department of English at the University of South Carolina), "Being for the Other-to-the-Other: Justice and Communication in Levinasian Ethics." Review of Communication 10.1 (2010): 5-19] SHS ZS

Levinas inverts Hegel by arguing that **the otherness of the Other**, her/his alterity, or most simply the fact that we are not one being and can never become one being, **is** both **essential to the possibility of the emergence of any** **will** and already bears one’s responsibility to and for the Other. **The very possibility for subjectivity** and individuality **comes in the approach of the Other**; **I become an “I”** only **in response to the Other’s approach**. The first event of will is always, for Levinas, to respond, and will exists only as response. Thus, in the Other giving to me my subjectivity, **I** already **find myself in a relationship of obligation and debt**. Unlike a Hegelian understanding of the will that exists and then encounters the world and another will, for Levinas **there is no possibility for will except as a response to** having **been approached by an Other**, and every moment of will or choice is due to (“due to” meaning both “because of” and “owed to”) this Other in front of me at this specific moment. **The first fact of the possibility of being**, then, **is a relationship of obligation**, **and that relationship precedes** (and exceeds) not only desire but **even the possibility of thought or language**. Preceding cognition and subjectivity, giving the possibility of cognition and subjectivity, means that b**oth the Other and my responsibility to the Other are beyond containing or schematizing in thought**. This is one reason why our study of Levinas\*and ethics generally\*can never yield a stable system or code of communication ethics The Gift of the Other The difference between the capitalized Other and the uncapitalized other is significant in reading Levinas. In the original French, Levinas uses two different terms, both of which are translated as other. The capitalized Other is used for autrui, which might best be described as “the personal other, the you,” whereas the uncapitalized other is used for autre, which simply means the common usage of other, such as another (Lingis, 1991, pp. 24􏴠25). The capitalization is significant, for Levinas does not mean that the Other is a collective or a generalized other, but this singular and unique Other before me: you as an individual, different from all other individuals, in this specific moment of appearance, different from every other moment, ultimately exceeding every attempt I might make to organize you into a system of meanings or responses**. I do not exist prior to this relation**. Rather, **I only come to be as an “I” when the Other approaches me**. This approach of the Other places me in a capacity to respond, which Levinas might call my responsibility. Thus, the self is constituted by and of responsibility. “For Levinas there can be no such thing as a self-constituting subjectivity. Instead **subjectivity is the accomplishment of a movement**\*a movement not within an I but **between an I and a thou**, whereby the thou is the locus from which the constitution of the I springs” (Vetlesen, 1995, p. 374). To be a free individual “does not mean to claim authorship for oneself, to be autonomous, to be the archaic principle of one’s life, but rather to respond (or not to respond) to an appeal coming from the exterior” (Benso, 1996, p. 136). In all these explications what becomes clear is that **subjectivity is a gift from the Other** that bears with it an obligation that cannot be declined.

#### Third, since the Other is inherently unknowable, we cannot attempt to define or totalize them. We must recognize that the Other is a complex being that demands a continual quest to understand them. Peperzak.

[Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, Dutch Philosopher, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, 1993, ///AHS PB] SHS ZS

Another comes to the fore as other if and only if his or her “appearance” breaks, pierces, destroys the horizon of my egocentric monism, that is, when **the other**’s invasion of my world **destroys the empire in** **which all phenomena are**, from the outset, **a priori**, condemned to function as moments of my universe. **The other’s face** (i.e., any other’s facing me) or the other’s **speech** (i.e., any other’s speaking to me) interrupts and **disturbs the order of my**, ego’s **world**; it makes a hole in it by disarraying my arrangements without ever permitting me to restore the previous order. For even if I kill the other or chase the other away in order to be safe from the intrusion, nothing will ever be the same as before. When Levinas meditates on the significance of the face, he does not describe the complex figure that could be portrayed by a picture or painting; rather, he tries to make us “experience” or “realize” what we see, feel, “know” when another, by looking at me, “touches” me: autrui me vise; the other’s visage looks at me, “regards” me. Similarly the word “language,” often used in this context, evokes the speech addressed to me by some living man or woman and not the linguistic structures or anonymous meanings that can be studied objectively or practiced by a style-con- scious author. Autrui me parle” primordially, it is not important what is said; even if the words are nonsensical, there is still their being addressed. Neither is it relevant who speaks to me; any other is the revelation of the Other, and peculiar features deserving special attention would only lead me away from the “absolute otherness” that is at stake. IN order to concentrate on the other’s otherness, Levinas often stresses the nakedness of the other’s face: if I am touched, if I am conscious of being concerned, it is not becau se of the other’s beauty, talents, performances, roles, or functions but only by the other’s (human) otherness. **As disrupting the horizon of** my egological—and thus, **ontological**—**ways of handling** and seeing **the world, the others resist a description that** would **present** **them as a** particular sort of phenomenon among other **phenomena within a universal order of beings**. Since **they “show”** and “present” precisely those **realities that do not fit into** the **universal openness** of consciousness, **they cannot be seized by the usual categories and models of phenomenology**. the other transcends the limits of (self-)consciousness and its horizon; the look and the voice that surprise me are “too much” for my capacity of assimilation. In this sense, **the other comes toward me as a total stranger** and from a dimension that surpasses me. The otherness of the other reveals a dimension of “height” (hauteur): he/she comes “from ons high.” Husserl’s theory of intentionality, based on an adequate and symmetric correlation between noésis and noéma, no longer fits. A forgotten element of Descartes’s analysis of consciousness, however, offers a formal structure much closer to the relation meant by Levinas. According to Descartes’ third Metaphysical Meditation, **all human consciousness** **contains** not only and not primarily the idea of itself but also and precedingly **the** irreducible “**idea of the infinite**,” that is, **an immediate** and a priori given relation of the conscious subject to a **reality** **that can neither be constituted nor embraced by this subject**. This means that the cogito from the outset is structured by a bipolarity other than the bipolarity of the noetico-noematic relation of phenomenology, in which an idea and its ideatum fit one another adequately. Descartes still knew (as all great metaphysicians before him) that consciousness “thinks more than [or beyond] that which it can think.” The infinite is different from any noéma or cogitatum, for it essentially surpasses our capacity for conception and embracing. Although Descartes identifies “the infinite” with “God” (i.e., the God of the traditional, late scholastic philosophy), we can consider the formal structure he discovers to be the structure of my relation to the other in the form of another human being. When I am confronted with another, I experience myself as an instance that tries to appropriate the world by labor, language, and experience, whereas this other instance does not permit me to monopolize the world because **the Other’s greatness does not fit into any enclosure**—**not even** that of **theoretical comprehension**. This resistance to all integration is not founded on the other’s will; before any possibility of choice and before all psychological considerations, **the mere** fact of another’s **existence is a “surplus**” **that cannot be reduced** to becoming a part or moment of the Same. The Other cannot be captured or grasped and is therefore, in the most literal sense of the word, incomprehensible. In all his works, Levinas has endeavored to show that the (human) other radically differs from all other beings in the world. The other’s coming to the fore cannot be seen as a variation of the general way of appearance by which **all other beings are phenomenal**. This is the reason why Levinas reserves the word “phenomenon” for realities that fit into the totality of beings ruled by egological understanding. Since the other cannot become a moment of such a totality, it is not a phenomenon but rather an “enigma.” However, if an enigma cannot be defined in phenomenological terms, we must ask: can it be defined at all? If “visibility,” in a broad and metaphorical sense, is a feature of every being that can become a phenomenon, one may even call the enigmatic other “invisible.”47 The other imposes its exceptional and enigmatic otherness on me by way of a command and a prohibition: you are not allowed to kill me; you must accord me a place under the sun and everything that is necessary to live a truly human life! Your facing me or your speaking to me—whatever form your addressing me might take—forbids me to suppress, enslave, or damage you; on the contrary, it obligates me to dedicate myself to your well-being. It is not your will or want or wish that makes me yours truly, but your emerging, your being there, as such. Independently of your or my desires, your presence reveals to me that I am “for you,” responsible for your life. We meet here an exceptional, extraordinary, and absolute fact: a fact that is and exists simultaneously and necessarily as a fact and as a command or norm. By seeing another looking at me, or by hearing someone’s voice, I “know” myself to be obliged. The scission between factuality (is) and normativity (ought)—a scission many philosophers since Hume have believed in—has not yet had the time to emerge here. The **immediate experience of another’s emergence contains the root of all possible ethics** as well as the source from which all insights of theoretical philosophy must start. **The other’s existence** as such **reveals to me the basis** and primary sense **of** my **obligations**.

#### Thus, the standard is rejecting the totalization of the other.

0:50

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Communication can only occur through the recognition of the Other, and universal conceptions of language foreclose the possibility of conversation since language contains a plurality of meaning. Levinas.

[Emmanuel Levinas, Lithuanian-French Philosopher, Totality and infinity, 1961 ///AHS PB] SHS ZS

Can objectivity and the universality of thought be founded on discourse? Is not **universal thought** of itself prior to discourse? Does not a mind in speaking evoke what the other mind already thinks, both of them participating in common ideas? But the community of thought ought to have **made language** as a relation **between beings impossible**. Coherent discourse is one. A **universal thought dispenses with communication**. A reason cannot be other for a reason. How can a reason be an I or an other, since its very being consists in renouncing singularity? European thought has always combated, as skeptical, the idea of man as measure of all things, although this idea contributes the idea of atheist separation and one of the foundations of discourse. For it the sentient I could not found Reason; the I was defined by reason. **Reason speaking** in the first person is not addressed to the other, **conducts a monologue**. And, conversely, it would attain to veritable personality, would recover the sovereignty characteristic of the autonomous person, only by becoming universal. **Separated thinkers become rational only in** the measure that their personal and particular acts of thinking figure as **moments of** this **unique and universal discourse**. There would be reason in the thinking individual only in the measure that he would himself enter into his own discourse, that thought would, in the etymological sense of the term, comprehend the thinker-that it would include him. But to make of the thinker a moment of thought is to limit the revealing function of language to its coherence, conveying the coherence of concepts. In this coherence the unique I of the thinker volatilizes. **The function of language would amount to suppressing "the other**," who breaks this coherence and is hence essentially irrational. A curious result: **language would** consist in suppressing the other, in **making the other agree with the same**! But in its expressive function language precisely maintains the other-to whom it is addl"ess~d, ~horn it calls upon or invokes. To be sure, language does not consist in invoking him as a being represented and thought. But this is why **language institutes a relation** irreducible to the subject-object relation: **the revelation of the other**. In this revelation only can language as a system of signs be constituted. The other called upon is not something represented, is not a given, is not a particular, through one side already open to generalization. **Language**, **far from presupposing universality** and generality, first **makes them possible**. **Language presupposes** interlocutors, a **plurality**. **Their commerce is not a representation of the one by the other**, nor a participation in universality, on the common plane of language. Their commerce, as we shall show shortly, is ethical.

#### [2] Education – Only through the application of Levinasian Ethics in educational spaces like debate can we learn how to respect the infinitely unknowable Other. Krall 14.

 [Krall, Leo. “The Pedagogy of Relationship: Applying Levinasian Ethics to the Classroom.” Levinas Seminar Paper Archive, 2014, pp. 10–13., seattleu, [www.seattleu.edu/media/college-of-arts-and-sciences/graduate-degrees/masterofartsinpsychology/documents/levinas-documents/Krall,-L.-Final-2014.pdf](http://www.seattleu.edu/media/college-of-arts-and-sciences/graduate-degrees/masterofartsinpsychology/documents/levinas-documents/Krall%2C-L.-Final-2014.pdf). // WHSRS] SHS ZS

In My Experience: Finding Levinas in the Classroom. Upon reflection there are elements of my own pedagogy that have Levinasian ethics. I believe **the relationship and connection** **with** the **students is** perhaps **the most important part of the** whole **educational process**. An example that I have attempted in my classroom to facilitate a Levinasian encounter is in our ‘introductions’ class activity at the beginning of the semester (or quarter), sometimes done with a follow up throughout the term. **I have students interview one classmate** and attempt **to be an ‘historian**.’ They conduct an oral interview of the person and then introduce the other person to the class. While I used to used my cliched quote from the Dalai Lama (which I still love) that “all human beings have at least one thing in common,” since encountering Levinas **I also want students to highlight the differences and the uniqueness between them**, or as Levinas would stress- **their alterity**. I have come to see this exercise as a rehearsal for a discussion of respect, but also one of alterity. I believe in having students see their classmates as unique Others, and I encourage their marveling at each other, and I might ask, “what were you surprised to learn about your partner in this exercise? Do you feel like you know enough about this person to say that fully know them?” This ismy somewhat subtle attempt at **letting them consider that their classmate is beyond their comprehension** (that is, Levinasian interruption); I want them to grow beyond a passive respect of their peers. This is not always easy, but I have felt the closest to it usually in this first week exercise. Levinas writes, “**the Other is a stranger I welcome into my home**” (Levinas 182). I like this exercise because it models welcoming and receiving. Of course the lesson is (in terms of curriculum) built around our discussion of primary and secondary sources and the ambiguity and challenge of gathering information in historical studies; I remind students about what is in fact knowable. Here incorporating Levinasian ethics fits naturally into pedagogy. The activity in and of itself is not new or perhaps remarkable, but **when the pedagogical approach is framed within Levinasian ethics it puts a certain twist and intention on the assignment** that makes it far more valuable. Although Levinasian concepts are embedded and highlighted in the exercise in fairly subtle ways (without any student knowledge of Levinas), this is an example of Levinasian pedagogy. I wonder how students would respond if I asked them if their classmates are infinite. Perhaps they would totalize me. Another example of an assignment that in retrospect had a Levinasian ethic underscoring it was a political survey assignment. **I had** my **8th graders** many years ago **go to three homes in their neighborhood** (safely, during the afternoon and with an adult) **to conduct their own political survey**. It was a presidential election year 2004, the election for Bush’s second term. **Students asked their neighbors about** their **primary concerns for America** as well as for the person’s definition of freedom. While this asignment centered on valuable socio-political research (albeit conducted by my precocious 8th graders), **it afforded students the opportunity to be ‘interrupted.’** **The classroom can be a stale and repititious place**, and **when students went** out **to encounter the Other, they had very personal encounters. Some were turned away or refused**, but many shared with the class about the degree to which people opened up to them, the humor they used to connect, and how they loved how the classroom ‘existed’ outside of school. Interestingly, **one student** (without their knowing) **interviewed Steve Lopez,** a fairly well-known journalist from the L.A. Times (writer of the movie The Soloist). **Lopez then wrote about the assignment in the L.A. Times saying how much he loved that there was ‘community’ in Pasadena** and that there was an ‘agora-like’ quality to students discussing politics and freedom in the neighborhood. I was thrilled that the student had this encounter; **he unknowingly touched this journalist and inspired a ripple of dialogue that was** perhaps in the end **read by thousands of students and readers**. I believe this happened because **the student and the reporter both saw the Face of the Other**, and that an unlikely encounter surprises us. One last example of Levinasian ethics was **leading a “Mix-it-up Day” at the high school** I taught at five years ago. **One ambitous senior wanted to take part in the national movement to have students mix up their lunch for the day**, eating with students they had never talked to and sharing about their backgrounds and interests. In the end we received mixed reviews, and it was quite an ordeal to plan (with over 500 students); however, **some students said that it opened up their little nuclear world, that they even forgot to ever talk to students outside of their circle of friends.** This to me was one of the better examples of interruption in my teaching career. It was an enforced encounter with students to meet the Other (and some did complain about this), but it was modeling a skill for students of Levinasian ethics, which is to be able to recognize that there is an Other and how that invisible Other is linked to each of us whether we acknowledge it or not. **It celebrated diversity, not simply forcing students to admit they are all in the same boat, trapped in a world of high school and awkwardness** (one of their favorite words), there was a growing sense of alterity. **Alterity was appreciated and the day’s theme was clearly about respect.** Those seniors were remarkable to model that to the student body. Some students resisted the exercise; I can only imagine that they were in fear of encountering the Other, or perhaps just feeling forced to do so. This can be a challenge for teenagers. That is why I was so glad that this event was student led and exemplified their own agency. Conclusion Levinas is clearly not only relevant to, but is needed in modern pedagogy. We as teachers are as Sousa wrote, “changing the brain daily,” and what better way to affect students’ brains than to have them more consciously encounter the Other? Empathy is a tough skill to teach, and while few dispute its value, it can be challenging to teach; however, I think **Levinasian pedagogy is not simply a discussion about empathy**. **Levinasian pedagogy rests** on **and begins with the teacher** and is about the teacher consciously incorporating it into the method in which they teach. As Joldersma suggested, **it starts with the teacher recognizing the “I” within the student, and from that a chain reaction will hopefully ensue.** **Levinasian** **pedagogy** is valuable because it **is epistemological**. Levinas is not simply saying to ‘feel’ other’s experience and suffering, **he’s asking us to acknowledge that the Other is beyond our ability to know**. **It’s a humble philosophy, one that has an incredible value to the classroom; teachers and students can ask and ponder the question of what is ‘knowable’ and what is worth knowing, and as they do so, they build relationship. This is education**, connection and relationship. Levinasian pedagogy is the nurturing of the quality relationships; it is a paradigmatic shift towards service and to a style of teaching which recognizes the infinitude of all students. Levinasian pedagogy is challenging, and perhaps will never show up on the standardized state exams, but it speaks to the essence of what education should be about- the joy of connection. together” (Todd 45).

#### [3] There’s an act omission distinction. A. Ethics cannot hold agents accountable for an infinite number of untaken decisions, otherwise that would impair action because agents would simultaneously have an infinite number of obligations. B. Illogical – we wouldn’t hold an agent who chooses a morally repugnant act equally culpable as an agent who chooses not to prevent a morally repugnant act C. Omissions aren’t intrinsic to the will because agents don’t proactively choose not to take certain actions, e.g. you don’t wake up and say, “Today is my day to not donate to charity!”

1:30

#### Negate:

#### [1] Bans are an instantiation of totalizing machines and relegating to an object. A. It assumes the static positionality of a LAW to only enact harm even though it can act in non-totalizing ways like targeting all subjects within a range B. Bans are constitutively totalizing because it prevents LAWs from being an agent and contributing to society – it’s the same logic that we use to exclude certain identity groups from society simply because of their perceived capabilities C. It forecloses our relationship with other LAWs which prevents us from developing as subjects under the framework.

#### And, machines are moral agents. Kellogg.

[Kellogg, Paul. “Do Machines Have Rights? Ethics in the Age of Artificial Intelligence.” Aurora Online. <http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/92/114>] SHS ZS

Gunkel: Let me respond with a preface and then get to your questions immediately thereafter. A lot of what we think about when we think technology is from an instrumental viewpoint. That is, technology is the tool that we use and in the field of communication that’s always seen as a kind of medium of human action or interaction. We’re communicating right now through the computer. The computer mediates our interaction with the use of Skype in this circumstance. So for a lot of our history, dealing with technology has always been dealing with something that is seen to be neutral. Technology isn’t a moral component. It is how it’s used that really matters and it is the human being who decides to use it for good or ill depending on how the technology is applied or not applied in various circumstances. What is happening right now **in this new century**, the 21stcentury, is that **machines** more and more **are** moving away from being intermediaries between human beings and **taking up a position as an interactive subject**. So the computer and other kinds of machines like the computer – robots, machines with Artificial Intelligence (**AI**) and algorithms – **are no longer just instruments** through which we act, **but** are **becoming “the other” with whom we interact**. If you look at statistics concerning web traffic for example, right now the majority of what transpires on the web is not human-to-human interaction: it’s machine-to-machine and machine-to-human interaction. So we’re already being pushed out by a kind of machine invasion where **machines are taking** over more and more of what normally would be considered **the human subject position** in communicative exchange and other kinds of social interaction. **This has led** a lot of **philosophers** recently **to think about** **the machine as a moral agent**. That is, is the machine culpable for things it does or doesn’t do? If the machine turns you down for credit, whose fault is that? Is it the credit agency and the person who programs that algorithm or is it the algorithm? There are all kinds of questions about agency that have recently bubbled to the surface in the last decade or so. But you’re right; my main concern is not with agency. I mean I think agency is a very important question and I think machine moral agency is a crucial component of dealing with the new position occupied by mechanisms in our current social environment. But I want to look at the flip side, what we call moral patiency, or what might be seen as the rights issue. If indeed we have machines now that we are considering rather seriously as being moral agents and asking whether or not they have responsibilities to us, the flip side of these questions is what about those machines makes them moral agents? Would we have any responsibilities to those machines? Would those machines have any rights conversely in a relationship with us? So you’re exactly right. My recent work and where I’m really situating a lot of my own research currently is on the question of machine rights. Having said that, your second question is very pertinent because the immediate response is: “what are you talking about? How can machines have rights?” We normally think about rights as something that belong to a conscious or at least sentient kind of creature, and machines are for all we know just dumb devices that we design to do certain things. And so the question of rights immediately butts heads with a long tradition in moral philosophy which typically only assigns rights to human beings and only recently has begun to think about the non-human animal as having any kind of rights. Some key websites with information on animal rights include: People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) [http://www.peta.org](http://www.peta.org/) Mercy for Animals Canada [http://www.mercyforanimals.ca](http://www.mercyforanimals.ca/) Animal Justice Canada [http://www.animaljustice.ca](http://www.animaljustice.ca/) The way that I counter that, or address that comment is to really tie it all to what is happening in animal rights philosophy. In animal rights we start to break open the humanist anthropocentric kind of ethics of our tradition and ask: “You know, what if non-human animals could also be a moral patient?” If you go back to the founding thinkers of the [Enlightenment](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/), in this case [**Descartes**](http://www.iep.utm.edu/descarte/), he **thought animals and machines were the same**. He thought in this term the bête machine, the animal machine, that machines and animals were ostensibly the same. **If we** begin to **open up consideration to animals**, if we follow the Enlightenment tradition, there’s the flip side of that which says **we should probably** **start thinking about** the rights of **machines**. So I pose it as a machine question because I don’t have right now the definitive answer to that particular query, but I do think it’s a query that we have to engage with seriously. We have to ask about the rights of machines right now at this particular moment **when machines are** more and more **becoming socially** **interactive subjects** that we involve ourselves with to a greater extent than we ever have previously. Aurora: I’m really glad you raised the issue of animal rights. I can remember 20-25 years ago when the question of rights for animals was posed, even in casual conversation around the dinner table, and people would respond with incomprehension because there was such a long tradition of animals being seen as instruments, as objects, as things that we use for food, or for our own human needs. One of the issues that changed this view was the question of the visibility of emotions that you can see in animals, especially around the hunting of seals. There is an emotive recognition that you can see because seal puppies have eyes and we can look into those eyes and it seems as if there is an emotional connection between the person and the animal. That kind of connection seems more difficult between humans and machines. So at one level there is a parallel, but then the parallel seems to me to maybe break down a bit. How does that fit in with your discussion? Gunkel: It’s a good question. From the outside it seems really difficult to connect those dots. But when you start to look at the way moral philosophy has developed and the way the logic been argued, it is really irrefutable in terms of following that thinking through in a consistent way: you can’t get a result other than the rights of machines. Let me explain why. **Moral philosophy has traditionally been** a sort of historic development of continually **opening itself up to** what had been **prior exclusions**. So for example, during the early period of Western thought, who counted as a **moral subject** were only other people like yourself. In Athens, those who counted **would have been white males**, and the excluded would have been slaves, barbarians, women, and children. It was only the male figure of the family who was considered a member of the moral community and therefore all these other things were considered property. So for example, when Odysseus returns home after his journeys, the first thing he does is hang all his slave girls, and he can do so because they are property, they are not considered human beings. What we’ve done over time is that **we’ve enlarged the** focus or the **scope of who is considered** a **human** being. By the Enlightenment period, who’s considered a human being are mainly white European males of any age, but who’s excluded are Aboriginal people, Africans, and still women. That slowly evolves to include these others, so with the Civil War in the United States the inclusion of African slaves or previous slaves into the community of moral subjects takes place. Slowly with [Mary Wollstonecraft](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wollstonecraft/) and other feminist women begin to be considered subjects of moral consideration, and then in the 20th century you have [Peter Singer](https://www.princeton.edu/~psinger/) and [Tom Regan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Case_for_Animal_Rights) arguing that animals now should be included in the community of moral subjects. Now there’s an important shift that happens with the animal, and you mentioned it, which I think is really crucial. Initially, as we tried to expand the community of moral subjects, it was always about an ability – it was about whether or not these others had the power of reason or in the Greek tradition, the zoon logon echon, the ability to speak or use language. It was argued for a long period of time that Aboriginals didn’t have reason and therefore they were not considered full participants in the human community, or women were not rationally thinking subjects like men and so could be excluded from the moral community. With animal rights we move away from an ability, to a passivity. [Derrida](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/derrida/) says the big move in animal rights thinking was when [Jeremy Bentham](http://www.iep.utm.edu/bentham/) asked not can they think, or can they reason, or can they speak, but can they suffer? Suffering is not an active component; it’s a passive one - the ability to passively suffer and to be affected. This, Derrida says, is the real shift in moral thinking in the 20thcentury because it moves away from the possession of an active ability to a passive capability of feeling pain or pleasure for that matter. So this, as you’ve pointed out, for some people was a very difficult move because it was a real shift in the way that we focused ethical thinking, from this ability of speech, language and logos to the passivity of suffering. In the 21st century now as we start to look at the question of the machine as a moral patient, we are again confronted with people throwing their arms up in the air and saying: “What are you talking about? Clearly machines don’t suffer. They don’t have anything that matters to them”. It isn’t like you can hurt your iPad. It doesn’t have any emotion. And that seems like a really good argument, except for the fact that engineers are designing machines with emotion. So we have an entire period now – the last two decades – in which engineers involved in robotics, AI and other kinds of marginally sentient kinds of mechanisms are designing machines with emotional capacities. To have emotions means they can talk to us and interact with us much more effectively since we are creatures with emotions. For example**,** [**Rod Brooks**](https://people.csail.mit.edu/brooks/) has **designed robots** that are **afraid of** the **light and feel pain** from light. It’s an affective response designed into the mechanism to make the machine seek out dark corners and avoid light areas. You have other individuals who are working on machines that can simulate human emotion to such an extent that it is almost indistinguishable from real human pain. There is a robotics company in Japan (Morita) that makes a [pain-feeling robot](http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/03/beware-emotional-robots-giving-feelings-artificial-beings-could-backfire-study-suggests) that is designed to help train dental students. So when the dental students don’t use the drill in the right way, the robot cries out in pain that you’re hurting it and most of the students say it is beyond simulation. It’s so close to what they recognize as pain that they imbue the object with pain. So what we encounter here are two things that are really important to point out. One is the “other minds” problem. How do I know that an object that gives evidence of pain, whether it be an animal, a human being or a machine, really is in pain? I can’t feel the pain of anything other than myself and so all I can do is read external signs and assume that those proceed from some kind of internal affectation. **Whether my dog is** **suffering or not is not** anything I can really know for **certain**. **I can only make** some **educated guess** based on the way it winces from being touched in a certain way or cries out, etc. And so the problem we are encountering here is if we design machines that give evidence of pain it’s a very difficult bar to cross to say well that’s not really pain because I could say the same of any other creature. I could say the same of the mouse: “Well that’s not really pain”. I was just in Maine recently and I was told it’s o.k. to boil the lobster because they don’t really feel pain. And my question is really? Do we know that? Aurora: Have we ever been a lobster? Gunkel: Exactly. How are we able to decide that yeah, indeed, we can boil a lobster alive because they don’t really feel anything? And so people working in animal studies are saying, yeah animals feel pain but it still results in an “other minds” problem. We don’t know whether anything that appears to suffer really does suffer. It is a statistical conjecture that we make, but we would have to extend the same sort of decision-making with regards to machines that are programmed to evince various pains or pleasures in their external affectation. The other thing – and let me mention this because it’s really crucial – Dan Dennett once wrote a really nice essay called “[Why You Can’t Make a Computer That Feels Pain](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20115302)”. And what he does is go through about 20 odd pages where he tries to design, through a thought experiment, a pain-feeling robot and at the end of the essay, he says, “You know what? We really can’t design a computer that feels pain.” But he draws that conclusion not from the fact that we can never really make a mechanism that feels pain, but from the fact that we don’t know what pain is, that this thing that is a deciding factor that we call pain is so subjective a quality that we don’t even know what it would be to design a pain-feeling robot. So he says you can’t design a computer that feels pain, not because we have an engineering problem but because we have a conceptual problem, we have a philosophical problem. This thing that we hang everything on, pain, is such a nebulous concept that it’s difficult to define exactly what that is or what it looks like. Aurora: Right, so you very much see your research fitting into the classic narrative about rights and the expansion of who counts as a moral subject – expanding from white males, to people of colour, to women, to animals. You’re posing an issue for inanimate objects such as machines. Now then the discussion you just raised about artificial intelligence raises another question for me. Do we have to separate artificially intelligent machines from other machines, which don’t have artificial intelligence? Or are you saying that as we expand artificial intelligence we can see more ethical issues being posed in terms of our responsibilities to these new units? Gunkel: That’s a crucial question because usually the way that we address these problems is to say: “well yeah of course, at some point we may have machines that are sentient enough or conscious enough to be recognized as having rights and that’s the AI thing.” So for example, in 2001: A Space Odyssey, Hal is clearly a well-designed AI. Whether he’s sentient or not, whether he feels pain or not, those are really deep questions in the narrative of the film and it’s the thing that viewers of the film have to grapple with. You know, O.K., so are we harming Hal when we shut him down? He says his mind is going. I can feel it. O.K., we might grant at that point rights are a crucial issue. But when we’re looking at, I don’t know a lawn mower or our automobile or our cell phone, clearly there’s not enough AI to consider rights being an issue. This is a very good argument because it has traction in the tradition insofar as we normally decide who has and who doesn’t have rights based on some internal capability: sentience, consciousness, the ability to feel pain, whatever the case is. So the argument goes when machines cross that sentient barrier, then we can talk rights, but until that time, they’re just instruments and we don’t need to do anything about it. And that, as I say, is a very solid philosophical argument from a traditionalist perspective. I would like to suggest that even before we get to the point of having Hal 9000 type AI, the rights of machines are an issue, and that’s because machines are socially interactive objects, in our world, that have an effect on us and our ability to act in the world irrespective of their intelligence. And so **I advocate an approach informed by** the philosophy of [Emmanuel **Lévinas**](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/levinas/) – a Lévinasian approach – which says, even **before I know the cognitive capabilities of another**, I’m confronted with another who confronts me as a moral problem. How should I respond? Lévinas says before we know anything about the cognitive capabilities of the other, **we have to make an ethical** **choice**. We have to choose whether **to respond to these challenges as an ethical subject or** as an **object**. This I think pushes the question downstream. In other words, we don’t have to wait for Hal 9000 before we start to answer these questions. **We have to start answering** them **now** when the machines are smart at best, maybe even dumb, but we need to **begin to think about the social standing of the machine because** ethics really is about us in relationship to others in a wider social capacity and not about me internally deciding how to deal with the other entities I encounter. So [Mark Coeckelbergh](https://coeckelbergh.wordpress.com/) makes the argument that **the relationship is what decides ethics, not the capabilities of the object in question.** I think he’s right. I think a lot of this has to do with how we relate to the things we find around us; animals, the environment, other people and machines.

#### [2] Ownership doesn’t imply use – A. Nothing about a LAW means that it will be used in a totalizing way, e.g a country could keep it simply for deterrence which means they would never totalize B. It’s consequentialist and assumes a use, whereas my offense is why a ban is constitutively bad which outweighs since it’s more inherent to the resolutional action.

# 2NR

## Overview

### Generic (0:17)

#### Extend the standard of rejecting the totalization of the other. All the agents external to us are infinitely unknowable because they exist outside of the plane of our existence. Since our interaction with the Other forms the basis for subjectivity, we must reject totalization which represents infinite violence under the framework, so that we can properly engage in ethics.

Write offense extension

## AT Util (0:30)

#### Levinas precludes util:

#### [1] Phenomenal introspection is false – since the Other is infinitely unknowable we can never verify or confirm that people to maximize pleasure. Masochists empirically prove this argument – some people value pain and it’s not intrinsic to the subject.

#### [2] Subjectivity – their theory doesn’t provide any account of the subject which means it’s incapable of deriving actions. Even if they win pleasure is an intrinsic good, it lacks the explanatory power for why we have an obligation to the Other to maximize their pleasure, so the entire theory is incoherent.

#### [3] Death is not a biological end but an inevitable reality of life. Death doesn’t foreclose the possibility of a relationship with the other but instead allows for more meaning. In fact, we only value death by having a coherent relation to the Other otherwise agents would not feel a moral obligation to prevent it. Peperzak.

[Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, Dutch Philosopher, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, 1993, ///AHS PB] SHS ZS

'Having shown that **the will**, as a free body, **is a** vulnerable **consciousness between** the immunity of **independent initiative and** the weaknesses of its exposition to **the forces of nature** and seduction, Levinas elaborates in a third subsection, “The Will and Death" (208-13/232-36), on its **mortality [is] as a typically human mode of temporality**. As a postponement of the last event, **the will is met by the inexorability of its disappearance**. **We are afraid of death because it puts an end to any further delay**. **The annihilation whereby death threatens a human life cannot be explained in terms of the categorical pair being versus nothingness**, as if they formed the ultimate horizon of the world. For **death is neither a being nor nothing; rather, we experience its threat as that of a murder coming from some sort of enemy. It comes from a dimension** beyond life and world: from the dimension of invisibility and otherness **over which we do not have any power**. Therefore, **death is not our last or ultimate possibility**, and we are not able to accept, to anticipate, or to welcome it. **Our fear originates in the will as still having** (some) **time by delaying the ultimate and absolute impossibility ofall possibilities**, but **the inexorability of death refutes any view on human** being according to which it is primarily an “l can," a possibility of possibilities. The invisibility of death does not lie in the nothingness with which it confronts us but in its not permitting us to grasp it, fight with it, and protect ourselves against it. **Death always comes too early and as a nonwelcomed murderer**. Since we cannot conceive of it as a possibility of our own, we cannot want it. And yet, **this enemy can receive a meaning precisely because it is not a moment of the world or any other totality composed ofbeings and their negations**. The absolute passivity revealed in our ultimate impossibility belongs to a life that is directed to a meaning beyond its own destruction. This meaning cannot be found in a life “after death" of some immortal soul, since this idea itself sticks to the ultimacy of the categories being and nothingness as constituting world and time. To live for a time beyond one's own life is to live for the other(s), and this is made possible by mortality; the necessity of losing one's life belongs to the structure of being-for-other(s). Thus, **the egoism of a fearful life can be converted into the obedience of having time for others**; the absolute violence from which nobody can escape can become the source of indestructible goodness. To lose one's life for the other(s) is to be meaningful in living for a time after one's own life. If death-and suffering-were a purely individual event, it would' be meaningless; its having a place within the horizon of the metaphysical (i.e., intersubjective) relation saves it from absurdity. HThe supreme ordeal of freedom" (or cCof the will") His not death, but suffering" (216/239). For whereas **death terminates the ambiguity of humanity's finite freedom**, suffering is the extreme experience of the discordance discovered in mortality as human temporality. This is shown in subsection 4, cCTime and the Will: Patience" (213-17/236-40). Since time is the ability of free consciousness (or CCthe will") to postpone death, it is also the possibility of keeping a distance from all fixations that would identify the will with a certain instant or present. **As long as there is time, nothing is definitive**; the will can always take or change its position with regard to what the subject has done, thought, become until now. **Ithas a distance toward the presence thanks to the many possibilities for a future that are still open.** The future is not a prolongation of the present but rather.the possibility of having a distance from it **Suffering reduces this distance and the difference between present and future**-as well as between fact and possibility or between fixation andfreedom-to a minimum. In itwe are backed up and glued to what we are, without possibility of fleeing it; a feared future has caught us, annulled our capacity of withdrawal, almosttakenaway our distance, and submitted ourconsciousness to utter passivity, without permitting it to die. A heroic will is a will that Ustands" this uimpossible" situation without giving in. It conquers by patience, i.e., by a disengagement within its forced engagement, thus still saving an ultimate mastery in the midst of almost total passivity. Patience is the experience of the limit of our will**. Suffering, much more so than death, reveals the ambivalence of finite freedom and self-consciousness**. But **suffering**, too, **receives its meaning from** the order ofdiscourse," that is, from its being endured for **the Other**. Even hate, as expressed, for instance, in torture or persecution, is better than complete isolation because it frees us from the egoistic absurdity of suffering for nobody, and without such a deliverance desire and goodness remain empty words.

### Extension

#### [Peperzak Extension] Extend Peperzak, it makes three claims:

#### [A] Since death is inevitable, we shouldn’t obtain moral value from the quantity of relationships we have but rather the quality of these relationships.

#### [B] Death is simply a form of transcending being into a different State, and we can still relate to the other through death which means there’s no moral imperative to minimize it.

#### [C] We only value death by having a coherent relationship to the Other, proven by the fact that you care more about a family member’s death than somebody you don’t know. Absent a coherent relation to the other there’s no moral imperative to minimize death.