# TOC19 Virtue Ethics NC

## 1NC - Deontic v Aretaic

### 1NC – Aretaic – Short

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1 Introduction There are two fundamental classes of terms traditionally distinguished within moral vocabulary: the deontic and the aretaic. The terms from the first set serve in the prescriptive function of a moral code. This function consists in providing answers to questions like: What am I (morally) required to do? Answers to such questions usually have the grammatical form of an imperative and are called “prescriptions”, “moral norms”, “rules”, “precepts”, or “commands”. They are expressed by means of such terms as: ‘right’, ‘obligation’, ‘duty’, etc. The second class contains terms used for a moral evaluation of an action (or an actor). Such moral evaluation is not primarily intended to direct actions, although it seems capable of performing this function as well. Terms used for evaluations include: ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘blameworthy’, ‘praiseworthy’, ‘virtuous’, etc. The ‘right’ is the key notion of the normative part of a moral theory; the ‘good’ is used to express moral judgments.

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The way we use words ‘good/bad’ and ‘right/wrong’ seems to support the above claims. Goodness and badness come in degrees, hence we have words like ‘better’ and ‘worse’; we lack similar terms for deontically evaluated actions. The availability of degree terms in the former case seems to indicate the presence of many criteria used in evaluation; an all-or- nothing choice, implied by the use of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, suggests focusing on only one quantum quality.12 But fine-grainedness is not only a property of particular aretaic terms, the entire aretaic vocabulary is infinitely richer and allows us to draw much finer distinctions in act-evaluations than the deontic vocabulary. For example, by saying that something is praiseworthy we imply that it deserves approval or favor: we assess it higher when we say that it is admirable, since then it should be also respected and honored. The meaning of the word ‘praiseworthy’ can be quite well conveyed by saying, that it is something that ought to be done, or that it is the right (in Ross’s understanding of ‘right’) thing to do: yet expressing the word ‘admirable’ in deontic vocabulary seems just impossible. From what has been said so far one can derive an encouraging conclusion for the advocates of attractive ethics. Sheer richness and fine-grainedness of aretaic vocabulary seems to be a good reason for believing that all that can be said in deontic terms can be equally well expressed in aretaic terms. This is not to say, however, that we can produce a translation manual which would provide us with a general method of expressing deontic notions in terms of aretaic ones for all possible cases. In particular, it does not seem possible, as we hope to have shown, to substitute ‘good’ for ‘right’ or ‘deplorable’ for ‘wrong’. The relation between the aretaic and the deontic seems to be somewhat similar to the relation between the physical and the mental in the mind-body problem. We can claim that deontic is supervenient on the aretaic without committing ourselves to the idea of complete definitional reduction. In other words, we may allow for token identity (each particular action can have an aretaic description that perfectly matches the deontic one) and deny the possibility of type identity (that there is aretaic sentence true of all and only the actions having some deontic property). If this analogy is correct then the idea of definitional reduction of the deontic to the aretaic, and in particular, Stocker’s identification of rightness and goodness, is doomed. But we can still pursue a more modest goal. If our task is just to substitute every particular deontic evaluation with an aretaic one, there are no logical reasons that would make it impossible (it would not work, of course, in the opposite direction). From that perspective, attractive ethical theories seem to be much better off than the imperative ones.

#### This commits us to the task of determining the qualities of a good actor.

#### However, it is impossible to derive ethics from pure academic reflection— A] the development of all such academic frameworks presuppose those prior values which were not yet been derived, e.g. the value of truth and honesty, the good of scholarship, etc. B] you would have to presuppose the proper way to make the derivation which smuggles in a hidden non-derived moral premise and it would simply end up describing the way the world is, not the way it ought to be.

#### The result is a virtue paradigm—ethics is a developmental social phenomenon that is established via inculcation.

Reader 2K: Soren, Late Professor of Philosophy, Durham University. “New Directions in Ethics: Naturalism, Reasons, and Virtue.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 3, No. 4, Dec. 2000.

**Virtue is a** free **disposition to act in certain ways under certain conditions.** Virtue ethics claims that what is to count as a good action or what is a good outcome is conceptually dependent on claims about the virtue of an agent. How is this dependence supposed to work? **Where those after an explanatory account seek a conceptual connection with something like a normative 'in itself,’ virtue ethicists instead explore the concrete dependence of moral activity on the possibility of learning from already virtuous agents.** They hold that **the key to moral rationality is found in moral education. Ethics begins with the apprentice moral agent: the child, or the foreigner,** or the damaged person in rehabilitation are all examples. **These** beginner-**agents learn from the experienced, wise moral agent by** copying, by **mimicking** in **their actions** the actions of the virtuous agent. **This** mimicking, or 'going on in the same way', **does not presuppose that the learner agent acquires any representations of how the world is** (i.e., beliefs), **nor that they acquire the ability to** report on or **provide justifications for what they do.** **Virtue is learned by cottoning on to virtuous ways of doing things, going on to do the same, then going on to do the same in new ways, once they have mastered the skill.**16 **The way virtue and character is supposed to be basic here is simply displayed in the analogy: there is and can be nothing 'behind' the expertise of the phronimos which can explain or justify it** (any more than there is anything 'behind' the expertise of the doctor or the navigator, to use Aristotle's examples at NE 1104b7-l 1). Of course, plenty more can be said about it, and shortcuts can be found to aid the learning of those who have already mastered other skills (so competent rule-fol lowers can learn from being given rules, just as competent grammarians can learn a new language from the grammar). But we should not confuse what it is possible to say about the skill of being moral, with what constitutes it.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the cultivation of virtue. Impact calc – the NC is not consequentialist – it’s centered around who we ought to be and not simply do since ethics aren’t reducible to end states.

#### [insert as much of IMET as you want to]

#### Negate – IMET exists to instill fundamental virtues of moral courage, wisdom, and justice.

**Dagher 18** Jean Dagher [Maj. Jean Dagher is an international military officer from the Lebanese Army and a part of the International Military Education and Training program. He is currently a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies, in Fort Leavenworth, KS], 6-17-2018, "America's Strength: Teaching International Military Students," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-strength-teaching-international-military-students-26299> // ash

Interactions between allies and partner nations require a common language, shared understanding and mutual trust. Furthermore, interoperability between militaries has become more important to accomplish unified efforts and achieve the military objectives of collaborating coalitions. The United States invites international military students from various countries to study all aspects of the profession funded through security assistance programs such as the International Military Education and Training program. This whole effort contributes to the United States’ strategic objectives outlined in its latest National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.

The critical thinking and decisionmaking these students learn require an understanding of ethical and moral philosophy. This complex reasoning encounters profound contradictions in practice when these military professionals attempt to implement these philosophical values in their home countries. Regardless some devastating consequences to the careers of a few international military students, most outcomes of inviting them to the United States to study are promising and represent an investment with high returns for both parties.

Today’s complex operational environment imposes on military professionals arranging, recommending, and advancing theories of right and wrong conduct in situations where their moral or ethical judgments are in play. In addition, the sensitivity of their decisions and the consequences they have make military decision making even more dependent on ethical and moral grounds. When an ethical choice is between rights and wrong, deciding to do what is right is more of an issue of moral courage. In most situations, the ethical choice that military leaders have to make is trading in the shades of grey or between two rights, which make their decisions much more difficult. Further, every time a serious moral judgment is made, the military leader making the judgment becomes that judgment.

When bringing the ethical principles and moral values that they learn in their education in the United States back to their home countries, international military students find themselves in an ethical dilemma. The inconsistencies with the entrenched political interests in their motherlands impede these military professionals’ ability to improve their countries’ military organizations. Their decisionmaking skills, based upon their new ethical mindset, conflict with their country’s military organizational culture developed from their own social construction of reality and manifest in their resistance to implementing change in the organization. Furthermore, this ideal way of thinking based on ethical principles and moral values and the reality found back in their home countries sometimes contradicts with their organizations’ interests or some political parties’ agendas.

Some consequences of these contradictions could be devastating to the careers of international military students and might escalade to life-threatening. This raised the voices against inviting military professionals to the United States to study. In some illustrations, military officers from Turkey sought political asylum in the United States after the 2016 failed coup attempt in their home country. Most of their families and belongings were left back in Turkey, and were abandoned. What they learned during their professional education in the U.S. military was not compatible with what they have back home. In another example, an aborted coup led to the death of another graduate student from U.S. military institution. A Gambian officer was trying to bring change to his people, advance democracy in his country and modernize his military organization. His beliefs of mirroring those ethical principles and moral values that he acquired in his studies with the U.S. military had a reverse effect when faced with corruption and political repression.

Nonetheless, the U.S. military education for international students advances the profession of arms by teaching foreign military leaders how to be successful in solving complex problems based on doing the right thing. Educating international military students develops good “cardinal virtues” of character that Plato advanced such as wisdom and justice that would regulate their emotions and avoids acquiring bad character traits like cowardice and injustice. Yet, international military organizations need assistance to reach these virtues in decision making and to resolve ethical issues and problems. The U.S. military education represents these means to attain these qualities and according to the universal rules and principles of “duty theory” that Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and W.D. Ross advance, the U.S. military is responsible and has an obligation toward other foreign militaries of sharing their knowledge, experience, and education.

On the other hand, international military students do not wait until they become mature decision-makers and in a position where they can impose changes. These professionals are not changing agents as soon as they arrive at their home countries. They have to possess self-discipline and strategic patience to wait the right moment and the correct timing when then can influence decisions to employ those ethical perspectives and impose changes that would improve their countries’ militaries. Meanwhile, they can succeed in the complicated business of ethical thinking by knowing how to balance between employing ethics theories and entrenched unethical organizational culture at hand. This requires some level of self-awareness to know the nature of the decision and understand the values and perspectives of their respective organizations to advance the thought process they acquired and employ them for decisions and their justifications.

### 1NC – Aretaic – Long

#### Ethical evaluations can be split into two classes—the deontic and the aretaic. The deontic attempts to answer the question “what should I do” while the aretaic asks “what kind of person should I be” in order to determine the qualities of a good actor.

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#### Virtue is impossible without impetus to act ethically: the state must provide conditions that facilitate virtue development

**Ingram 13** Andrew Ingram (The University of Texas School of Law, J.D.; The University of Texas at Austin, M.A. Philosophy; A.B. Brown University.) “A (Moral) Prisoner’s Dilemma: Character Ethics and Plea Bargaining” 2013 <http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/osjcl/files/2013/12/8.-Ingram.pdf>

Now there are some philosphers and lay people who may profess not to care about character. On the other hand, there are some who care about character a great deal. Though it is not a commonly held position today, there have been some thinkers who argued that the purpose of the state is the development of virtue in the citizens.23 For these theorists, the objective of the ideal state is to facilitate and cultivate the development of virtuous individuals. This principle would extend to criminal-justice policy. A justice system which deliberately took steps with a high chance of rewarding dishonesty would not be in keeping with the criteria for criminal justice in the character-building state. At a minimum, the state would be sending the wrong message to its citizens, declaring that it cares not for virtue and vice and will nonchalantly punish the relatively virtuous more than the comparatively vicious. Beyond this, there is the problem that the state is encouraging vice and discouraging virtue by incentivizing the one and penalizing the other. Strictly speaking, this is not my thesis, although it is suggested by the same phenomenon. The traditional position in virtue ethics is that virtuous actions build virtue and vicious actions build vice—just like other habits. From the perspective of the character-building state, it is obviously unacceptable for it to be encouraging betrayal given that such acts nourish bad character. Finally, there is something twisted and cruel about deliberately putting a person to a choice between her conscience and her freedom. Tracy, we imagined, was not someone who made the decision to turn state’s evidence lightly. There are, however, some people who do so easily, with utter indifference to their former partners or even malice in their hearts against them. When the prosecutor offers to make a deal with such an awful character, his only hesitation will involve just how good of a deal he can bargain to obtain. Now contrast this person with someone like Louisa who is honest or who has tender feelings and wishes not to harm another human being by increasing the amount of time that person will spend in prison. She is caught between the demands of her compassion or her honor on one hand, and the prospect of years of misery behind bars on the other. Moreover, Louisa must also be mindful of her duties as a mother. The thought of violating one’s principles or bringing harm to one’s former partner in crime (who could be a close friend or even a close family member as well) is tortuous for the woman of conscience. The same is true for the fear of prison; its deprivations are at least as miserable for the saint as they are for the sinner. In sum, the perverse reality is that the more honest or compassionate a person is, the more she will suffer from the dilemma the prosecutor has fashioned.

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## 1NC - RFP

### 1NC – Rule Following Paradox

#### Rule based ethics fail – warranting rules leads to either vicious regress or circularity

**Cullity** Cullity, Garret. Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 2, No. 3, Ethics: Meta, Normative and Applied. (sep., 1999), pp. 277-294. NP 8/26/15.

￼VIRTUE ETHICS, THEORY,AND WARRANT 281 On this picture, justification presupposes the existence of rules. If the application of a moral concept C to a given object is to be justified, it must instantiate a rule for applying C, and if I am to be justified in applying C to that object, I must be following that rule. For only the existence of a rule governing a practice prevents it from being arbitrary, and the arbitrariness of a practice precludes any talk of justification in relation to it. Now there is away of taking this that makes it incontrovertible. That there is a right way and a wrong way of applying a given concept is just equivalent to the existence of a rule ruling in some ways and ruling out others. The principal claim here concerns constitutive justification: (a) What makes it right to apply concept C to this object is its instantiating the rule for the application of C. And from this, a claim concerning warrant for judgement seems to follow[s]. Provided I possess the concept of following a rule, claim (a) tells me that I will have a warrant for believing that I am right to apply C to this object whenever I have a warrant for believing that there is a rule for the application of C that I would be following if I did so.5 If so, then, at least for those who do have that concept, we also have: (b)What warrants me in judging that C applies to this object is my warrant for judging that I am following the rule for the application of C. However, it can be tempting to construe (a) and (b) in a way which makes them far from incontrovertible. This happens when it is assumed ? This assumption can tempt people to think that if the practice of applying C is to be non-arbitrary, there must be some further rule governing it, and that I am warranted in judging that I am rightly applying C only if I am warranted in thinking that I am guided by such a rule. And according to 'virtue-ethical' opponents of ethical theory, it is this thought that encourages the view that warranting ethical judgements about contentious cases requires a theory. In order to warrant my judgement about the application of C in a contested case, I must produce and justify a rule supporting my practice; and such rules, and their justifications, are supplied by ethical theories. The complaint is that this further reading of (a) and (b) is not only unsupported by the thoughts about arbitrariness; it looks highly dubious. If the application of a concept is not to be arbitrary, there must be right and wrong ways of applying it, so there must be a rule ruling in right and ruling out wrong ways of applying it. But all this requires is that, if there are to be right and wrong ways of applying C, then (R) must itself constitute a genuine rule, rather than ruling out nothing. It does not require a further, independently articulable rule for when one counts as following (R). After all, a general requirement of this kind would apply to the concepts employed in any further rule, producing either circularity or a vicious regress – vicious because either would yield an infinite and therefore unfulfillable chain of relationships of dependence. There must, therefore, be some concepts for which there are no independently articulable rules; and if so, we have been given no argument for thinking that moral concepts must be governed by such rules. From this conclusion, which concerns constitutive justification, a conclusion concerning warrant for judgement follows, as before. If no independently articulable rule governs the application of a concept, my being warranted in applying it as I do can hardly depend on my being warranted in judging that there is such a rule.

#### Thus, we must ground knowledge in truth conduciveness, e.g. if doing math is impossible, but I have a friend and a calculator, and the calculator has better accuracy than my friend, the calculator is more truth conducive, I ought to use the calculator. This applies to moral rules –regulative epistemology is key since it tells us how to be better people in the real world, and it avoids infinite regression – this leads us to virtue ethics.

**Woods and Roberts 10** Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology 2010 JW

Nicholas Wolterstorff distinguishes two kinds of epistemology, which he calls “analytic” and “regulative” . Analytic epistemology aims to produce theories of knowledge, rationality, warrant, justification, and so forth, and proceeds by attempting to define these terms. The English-speaking epistemology of the twentieth century is chiefly of this kind, and all of the virtue epistemologies of the last twenty-five years have been attempts to turn the intellectual virtues to the purposes of analytic epistemology. Regulative epistemology, which is the kind mostly practiced by Locke and Descartes and others of their period, does not aim to produce a theory of knowledge (though something like classical foundationalism does get produced as a by-product by Locke and Descartes). Instead, it tries to generate[s] guidance for epistemic practice, “ how we ought to conduct our understandings, what we ought to do by way of forming beliefs” (p. xvi). Regulative epistemology [and] is a response to perceived deficiencies in people’s epistemic conduct, and thus is strongly practical and social, rather than just an interesting theoretical challenge for philosophy professors and smart students. This kind of epistemology aims to change the (social) world. According to Wolterstorff, Locke’s regulative epistemology was a response to the social and intellectual crisis created by the breakup of medieval Christendom’s intellectual consensus. As Locke and others saw it, people’s intellectual lives needed to be reformed-— based on reason, rather than tradition or passions— because only thus could disagreements about the most fundamental issues, along with the resulting social conflicts, be resolved. But Locke also saw the need for reformation as perennial and genetically human: “I think there are a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment.” Since “we are all short sighted” , seeing things from our own particular angle and not possessing comprehensive faculties, **we** need to learn the habit and inclination to consult others whose opinions differ from our own and read outside our discipline.21 In effect, Wolterstorff distinguishes two kinds of regulative epistemology, a rule-oriented kind and a habit-oriented kind (see pp. 152—4). Rule oriented epistemology, exemplified by Descartes’s Discourse on Method and Rules for the Direction of the Mind, provides procedural directions for acquiring knowledge, avoiding error, and conducting oneself rationally.22 By contrast, Locke’s regulative epistemology, as exemplified in Book IV of Ills Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Of the Conduct of the Understanding, aims less at the direct regulation of epistemic conduct than at the description of the habits of mind of the epistemicaily rational person. As Locke comments, Nobody is made anything by hearing of rules, or laying them up in his memory... and you may as well hope to make a good painter or musician, extempore, by a lecture and instruction in the arts of music and painting, as a coherent thinker, or a strict reasoner, by a set of rules, showing him wherein right reasoning consists. (Conduct, §4, p. 175) We need not rule-books, but a training that nurtures people in the right intellectual dispositions. Wolterstorff emphasizes that Locke focuses not on the belief-producing mechanisms or faculties that are native to the human mind, but instead on the ways in which such natural faculties are employed in more complex intellectual practices, which have a social dimension and are culturally shaped. Locke aims to reform that culture, to reshape the practices, and thus to foster in his contemporaries habits that support the reshaped practices. It is implicit in Locke’s discussions, and often explicit as well, that the habits in question are not mere habits, but virtues. Many habits are nothing more than skills— expertise in plying methods and techniques— but the habits that Locke describes are in many cases “ habits of the heart” , determinate dispositional states of concern, desire, and pleasure and pain, rather than mere habituated aptitudes. We will return to Locke when we take up the topic of intellectual practices in Chapter 5 The virtues epistemology of this book is a return to this tradition of the seventeenth century, to a regulative epistemology which, like Locke’s, describes the personal dispositions of the agent rather than providing direct rules of epistemic action. It focuses on forming the practitioner’s character and is strongly education-oriented. The stress on intellectual virtues that has arisen among us is a start that can be felicitously developed in the regulative direction. Like Locke’s, our book is a response to a perception of deficiency in the epistemic agents of our time. But it is not a response to any particular historical upheaval or social crisis. We see a perennial set of deficiencies which in every generation need to be corrected, and a perennial positive need for formation in dispositions of intellectual excellence. Our response to pluralism of belief systems differs from that of Locke and his fellow promoters of the life of “ reason”. Our regulative epistemology does not aim at quieting fundamental disagreement. Virtues presuppose one or another particular metaphysical or world-view background, and the prospect of securing universal agreement about that is dim. However, several of the virtues that we will discuss in Part II broaden minds and civilize intellectual exchange. The formation of excellent intellectual agents is clearly the business of schools and parents. They are the chief educators of character. But Locke and Descartes think that philosophers have a role as well, and we agree. What is that role, and how does it work? How do philosophers contribute to the regulation of intellectual character? The role that we picture for ourselves both resembles and diverges from the one that epistemologists in the twentieth century implicitly accepted for themselves.

#### Virtue is impossible without impetus to act ethically: the state must provide conditions that facilitate virtue development

**Ingram 13** Andrew Ingram (The University of Texas School of Law, J.D.; The University of Texas at Austin, M.A. Philosophy; A.B. Brown University.) “A (Moral) Prisoner’s Dilemma: Character Ethics and Plea Bargaining” 2013 <http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/osjcl/files/2013/12/8.-Ingram.pdf>

Now there are some philosphers and lay people who may profess not to care about character. On the other hand, there are some who care about character a great deal. Though it is not a commonly held position today, there have been some thinkers who argued that the purpose of the state is the development of virtue in the citizens.23 For these theorists, the objective of the ideal state is to facilitate and cultivate the development of virtuous individuals. This principle would extend to criminal-justice policy. A justice system which deliberately took steps with a high chance of rewarding dishonesty would not be in keeping with the criteria for criminal justice in the character-building state. At a minimum, the state would be sending the wrong message to its citizens, declaring that it cares not for virtue and vice and will nonchalantly punish the relatively virtuous more than the comparatively vicious. Beyond this, there is the problem that the state is encouraging vice and discouraging virtue by incentivizing the one and penalizing the other. Strictly speaking, this is not my thesis, although it is suggested by the same phenomenon. The traditional position in virtue ethics is that virtuous actions build virtue and vicious actions build vice—just like other habits. From the perspective of the character-building state, it is obviously unacceptable for it to be encouraging betrayal given that such acts nourish bad character. Finally, there is something twisted and cruel about deliberately putting a person to a choice between her conscience and her freedom. Tracy, we imagined, was not someone who made the decision to turn state’s evidence lightly. There are, however, some people who do so easily, with utter indifference to their former partners or even malice in their hearts against them. When the prosecutor offers to make a deal with such an awful character, his only hesitation will involve just how good of a deal he can bargain to obtain. Now contrast this person with someone like Louisa who is honest or who has tender feelings and wishes not to harm another human being by increasing the amount of time that person will spend in prison. She is caught between the demands of her compassion or her honor on one hand, and the prospect of years of misery behind bars on the other. Moreover, Louisa must also be mindful of her duties as a mother. The thought of violating one’s principles or bringing harm to one’s former partner in crime (who could be a close friend or even a close family member as well) is tortuous for the woman of conscience. The same is true for the fear of prison; its deprivations are at least as miserable for the saint as they are for the sinner. In sum, the perverse reality is that the more honest or compassionate a person is, the more she will suffer from the dilemma the prosecutor has fashioned.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the cultivation of virtue. Impact calc – the NC is not consequentialist – it’s centered around who we ought to be and not simply do since ethics aren’t reducible to end states.

#### [insert as much of IMET as you want to]

#### Negate – IMET exists to instill fundamental virtues of moral courage, wisdom, and justice.

**Dagher 18** Jean Dagher [Maj. Jean Dagher is an international military officer from the Lebanese Army and a part of the International Military Education and Training program. He is currently a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies, in Fort Leavenworth, KS], 6-17-2018, "America's Strength: Teaching International Military Students," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-strength-teaching-international-military-students-26299> // ash

Interactions between allies and partner nations require a common language, shared understanding and mutual trust. Furthermore, interoperability between militaries has become more important to accomplish unified efforts and achieve the military objectives of collaborating coalitions. The United States invites international military students from various countries to study all aspects of the profession funded through security assistance programs such as the International Military Education and Training program. This whole effort contributes to the United States’ strategic objectives outlined in its latest National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.

The critical thinking and decisionmaking these students learn require an understanding of ethical and moral philosophy. This complex reasoning encounters profound contradictions in practice when these military professionals attempt to implement these philosophical values in their home countries. Regardless some devastating consequences to the careers of a few international military students, most outcomes of inviting them to the United States to study are promising and represent an investment with high returns for both parties.

Today’s complex operational environment imposes on military professionals arranging, recommending, and advancing theories of right and wrong conduct in situations where their moral or ethical judgments are in play. In addition, the sensitivity of their decisions and the consequences they have make military decision making even more dependent on ethical and moral grounds. When an ethical choice is between rights and wrong, deciding to do what is right is more of an issue of moral courage. In most situations, the ethical choice that military leaders have to make is trading in the shades of grey or between two rights, which make their decisions much more difficult. Further, every time a serious moral judgment is made, the military leader making the judgment becomes that judgment.

When bringing the ethical principles and moral values that they learn in their education in the United States back to their home countries, international military students find themselves in an ethical dilemma. The inconsistencies with the entrenched political interests in their motherlands impede these military professionals’ ability to improve their countries’ military organizations. Their decisionmaking skills, based upon their new ethical mindset, conflict with their country’s military organizational culture developed from their own social construction of reality and manifest in their resistance to implementing change in the organization. Furthermore, this ideal way of thinking based on ethical principles and moral values and the reality found back in their home countries sometimes contradicts with their organizations’ interests or some political parties’ agendas.

Some consequences of these contradictions could be devastating to the careers of international military students and might escalade to life-threatening. This raised the voices against inviting military professionals to the United States to study. In some illustrations, military officers from Turkey sought political asylum in the United States after the 2016 failed coup attempt in their home country. Most of their families and belongings were left back in Turkey, and were abandoned. What they learned during their professional education in the U.S. military was not compatible with what they have back home. In another example, an aborted coup led to the death of another graduate student from U.S. military institution. A Gambian officer was trying to bring change to his people, advance democracy in his country and modernize his military organization. His beliefs of mirroring those ethical principles and moral values that he acquired in his studies with the U.S. military had a reverse effect when faced with corruption and political repression.

Nonetheless, the U.S. military education for international students advances the profession of arms by teaching foreign military leaders how to be successful in solving complex problems based on doing the right thing. Educating international military students develops good “cardinal virtues” of character that Plato advanced such as wisdom and justice that would regulate their emotions and avoids acquiring bad character traits like cowardice and injustice. Yet, international military organizations need assistance to reach these virtues in decision making and to resolve ethical issues and problems. The U.S. military education represents these means to attain these qualities and according to the universal rules and principles of “duty theory” that Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and W.D. Ross advance, the U.S. military is responsible and has an obligation toward other foreign militaries of sharing their knowledge, experience, and education.

On the other hand, international military students do not wait until they become mature decision-makers and in a position where they can impose changes. These professionals are not changing agents as soon as they arrive at their home countries. They have to possess self-discipline and strategic patience to wait the right moment and the correct timing when then can influence decisions to employ those ethical perspectives and impose changes that would improve their countries’ militaries. Meanwhile, they can succeed in the complicated business of ethical thinking by knowing how to balance between employing ethics theories and entrenched unethical organizational culture at hand. This requires some level of self-awareness to know the nature of the decision and understand the values and perspectives of their respective organizations to advance the thought process they acquired and employ them for decisions and their justifications.

## 1NC – Add-ons

### 1NC - EC vs EM

# Frontlines

## FW Interactions

### \*\*AT: Util\*\*

### O/V

### AT: Bostrom

### AT: Actor Specificity

### AT: Parfit

### AT: Pain/Pleasure = Known to Individuals

### \*\*AT: SV\*\*

## \*\*2NR – FW Frontlines\*\*

### 2NR – XT – Best

The contention level debate –

IMET exists to teach foreign leaders to deliberate between hard ethical conflicts, exhibit courage, and combat injustices in their home country.

I’ll win IMET’s successful but even if they win their turns they don’t link since the intent and structure of IMET is to promote virtue, regardless of the consequences.

### 2NR – XT - Aretaic

### AT: Not Normative

### AT: Some Situations Bad

### AT: What Action is Legitimate

### AT: What is Virtue

### AT: Conflict Problem

### AT: Societies Differ