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#### Missile production capabilities sparks massive nuclear proliferation.

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS In addition to these well-known motives and constraints to pursuing nuclear weapons, recent scholarship has emphasized supply-side technology constraints that raise the costs of attempting to pursue nuclear weapons. Acquiring nuclear weapons via indigenous effort (that is, as opposed to purchasing them – as attempted by Egypt – or receiving them from allies – as attempted by Australia) requires mastery of a substantial range of technologies, industrial processes, and scientific competencies. As Alexander Montgomery writes, “A nuclear weapons program is a large-scale socio-technical system that requires a longterm investment in multiple technologies, each with its own unique hurdles to overcome” (Meyer 1984; Montgomery 2013). These hurdles include sophisticated metallurgy, chemical engineering, nuclear engineering, nuclear physics, electronic engineering, and a large capacity for producing nitric acid, electricity, and uranium milling. A solid technological and scientific infrastructure would be necessary to build, operate, and maintain relevant plants and labs. In addition, a would-be proliferator would need a substantial number of skilled technicians and craftsmen to run and maintain the infrastructure. It is not just a question of acquiring the relevant equipment, but of operating and maintaining it over a number of years, and it is in the latter where would-be proliferators often fall short (Meyer 1984; Montgomery 2013). Moreover, the challenge is greater than that posed by a sequence of discrete technological tasks; the various steps must be carefully integrated with each other, posing an organizational/managerial challenge equal to the technological challenges (Hymans 2008). Chief among these challenges is the construction and operation of the facilities needed to produce fissile materials and to fabricate the weapons. Although the management and organizational challenges of running nuclear programs have been underemphasized in the literature, the historical record shows that they are considerable (Hymans 2008; Hymans 2012). Poorly run organizations find the challenge of constructing and operating nuclear facilities difficult, if not impossible. For example, Romanian efforts to develop nuclear infrastructure as part of their flirtation with the bomb were dysfunctional to a comic degree. Romanian officials drew upon techniques they had used for more labor-intensive economic activities, mobilizing forced laborers to build a series of CANDU nuclear power plants based on Canadian designs; a Canadian engineer located at the site described their efforts as “more appropriate to a potato harvest than to high-technology construction” (Hymans 2008, 275). Beyond the need for competent managers, nuclear programs rely on a high degree of tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge – knowledge that must be acquired via hands-on learning or trial and error – looms large at both the enrichment/ separation phase of nuclear weapons programs. Countries that lack indigenous, applied technical expertise in the nuclear realm will face substantial challenges in mastering the operation of uranium enrichment and plutonium separation equipment (Montgomery 2005). Tacit knowledge is also essential to building and fabricating the nuclear weapons themselves (MacKenzie and Spinardi 1995). Weapons designers often refer to their craft as an “art” rather than “science,” and, even in a mature nuclear weapons power like the United States, it takes 5 to 10 years for new designers to become “useful” (MacKenzie and Spinardi 1995, 62). Casting fissile materials and high explosives into shapes required for missile topping implosion devices requires not just advanced knowledge in metallurgy, manufacturing, and engineering, but also extensive hands-on experience. The AQ Khan network, for example, attempted to pass this knowledge on in writing, but without apparent success (Montgomery 2005, 178). Creating an effective nuclear weapons program also requires creating a broad network of supporters both inside and outside of the government. According to Flank (1995, 260), “Nuclear weapons advocates need to recruit an array of allies: the security elite, the military R&D establishment, commercial contractors or the press… These diverse communities and interests would never monolithically decide to construct nuclear weapons, with the technical processes then obediently following in the wake of the political decision. Instead, complex systems start small and build painstakingly on existing resources.” Harnessing the interests and energies of diverse constituencies to support a nuclear weapons program represents a substantial practical and political challenge. Constituencies that share complementary or overlapping interests can thus be valuable allies in advocating for resources and shaping the trajectory and goals of nuclear programs. MILITARY ROCKET PROGRAMS The reasons why governments seek to acquire ballistic missile and nuclear weapons capabilities often overlap, as do the capacities required to succeed in those efforts (Mettler and Reiter 2013). Yet a country need not possess missile programs to obtain nuclear weapons, just as a country need not possess nuclear weapons programs to obtain ballistic missiles. Although these two weapons capabilities follow separate developmental tracks, they naturally converge at the creation of nuclear-armed long-range ballistic missiles. Even after a country has successfully conducted its first nuclear test, it can still take years to design an effective nuclear warhead small enough to be launched on ballistic missiles (Karp 1996, 179-185). The apparent ability of Pakistan to field nuclear-armed missiles rapidly potentially indicates the close cooperation between its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. This suggests that both direct and indirect bridges can be built between ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs, potentially long before a country conducts its first nuclear tests. The international demand for missile capabilities is much larger than the demand for nuclear weapons. Most countries start investing in their military rocketry programs long before they ever began pursuing nuclear weapons. In part, this is because shorter range missiles and rockets have significant tactical applications. States often begin their military rocketry R&D programs by seeking to master the development of missiles and rockets for use on the battlefield and then move on to developing the capacity to produce more sophisticated missile variants that have strategic applications. Similarities between rocket and nuclear technologies and the knowledge, skills, and capabilities required to obtain them provide a strong basis for our linkage of the two capabilities’ developmental trajectories. The factors affecting governments’ ability to develop advanced civil and military rocketry capabilities have been the subject of study by historians, political scientists, and policy-planners (e.g. MacDougal 1985; MacKenzie 1990; Karp 1996; Rumsfeld Commission 1998; Mistry 2003; Gormley 2008; Early 2014). Developing indigenous ballistic missile capabilities requires countries to cultivate military rocketry research and development (R&D) establishments that can bring together scientists, engineers, and technicians to master the technological complexities of rocketry (Karp 1996, Chapter 4). Similar to nuclear technology, rocketry technology is inherently dual-use as there is substantial overlap in the scientific basis, design, and technical aspects of civilian and military rockets. Tacit knowledge also plays a critical role in the design, construction, and operation of rockets (Karp 1996; Montgomery 2005; Johnson-Freese 2007). Designing and developing complex rockets requires a systems-level approach to integrating a variety of technologies and components, such as their engines, guidance systems, casing materials, and payloads (Gormley 2008). Just as a nuclear weapons program requires the ability to integrate a range of technologies and operations effectively, so do rocketry programs. Building rockets also requires a skilled workforce in order to meet the exacting construction standards they require to operate successfully. Since most rockets are designed to be used only once, and the slightest malfunctions, miscalculations, and accidents often lead to failure, quality control is exceptionally important (Karp 1996). As such, successful missile and space programs require cultivating significant amounts of scientific and technical (S&T) human capital in the rocketry realm (Early 2014). Finally, obtaining advanced military or civilian rocket capabilities requires governments to effectively coordinate and manage organizationally complex projects that involve substantial outlays of resources. Acquiring indigenous rocket capabilities can be very costly, but these costs vary on the basis of how wisely governments spend their resources. Possessing national laboratories and research universities, weapons design and testing facilities, and an extensive military industrial base will help countries make more effective use of the resources they devote towards acquiring rocket capabilities. According to Karp (1996, 77-97), the quality of the developmental strategy that governments employ to obtain ballistic missiles capabilities and the quality of those projects’ management also help determine the ultimate success of acquisition efforts. Developing advanced indigenous rocketry capabilities requires cooperation between countries’ public and private industries, research establishments, governmental agencies, and militaries. A steep learning curve may exist in figuring out how to effectively coordinate amongst the diverse actors involved in these programs, evaluating the best developmental strategies to pursue, and determining how to appropriately fund them. There can be many failures along the way, but scientists, engineers, and policymakers can learn from them over time. States’ rocketry R&D establishments may thus not only grow larger over time, but they should also benefit from the accumulation of tacit knowledge and S&T human capital. Early (2014) finds, for example, that the longer a country has possessed a military rocketry R&D program, the more likely states are to succeed in developing space launch vehicles (SLVs). Given the similarities of rocket and nuclear technologies and the programmatic efforts necessary to successfully acquire them, as well as the strategic and political linkages between the two programs, we argue that countries’ investments in their military rocketry sectors will enhance their ability to acquire nuclear weapons. Our theory links countries’ military rocketry programs to nuclear weapons programs via two causal mechanisms. First, we argue that countries’ investments in military rocketry R&D programs spur the growth of SMICs that contribute to nuclear weapons acquisition efforts. The creation of military rocketry SMICs fosters cooperative linkages between government, industry, and academia in working on national projects, provides governments with important lessons about how to design and manage complex weapons acquisition efforts, and provides an institutionalized incubator for military S&T human capital. Secondly, the political constituencies created by military rocketry R&D programs may use their bureaucratic leverage to advocate for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which would, in turn, increase the resources devoted towards military rocketry programs and their importance (Flank 1995). Scientific and strategic enclaves are often noted as important drivers of nuclear weapons programs (Perkovich 1999; Sagan 2000), and a large-scale military rocketry program will both increase the size and enhance the prestige of the SMIC. When countries initiate indigenous military rocketry capabilities, they are investing in developing their S&T human capital. Both rocketry and nuclear weapons programs require a synthesis of different disciplines (such as, physics, metallurgy, and chemistry), forcing scientists, engineers, and technicians to work together. Countries are more apt to initiate military R&D efforts on rocket technology as opposed to nuclear weapons technology because missile technology has immediate tactical applications, the technological challenges to mastering basic rocketry are lower, and rocket programs do not require rare materials (like uranium) to initiate. By funding these research programs, governments are injecting money into the training of scientists, engineers, and skilled technicians and their employment in SMICs, and in acquiring the management capacity to run large-scale programs successfully. In addition to human capital, governments that seek to develop advanced military rocketry capabilities require significant private or public sector investments in research infrastructure that can lay the foundation for nuclear weapons programs. Advanced research on new materials, fuels, chemicals, and electronic systems requires the use of laboratories or research facilities. The fabrication of rockets and missiles requires large-scale manufacturing facilities, as well as access to a varied collection of high-quality precursor components and raw materials from which the rockets will be built. Whereas some countries possess completely government-run arms industries, other countries’ arms industries mix public and private ventures. Mature rocketry R&D programs can build up either sector in ways that would be subsequently beneficial to nuclear weapons R&D efforts. Lastly, testing rockets and ballistic missiles require large, remotely located test facilities. Governments seeking to test nuclear weapons often confront similar dilemmas in finding areas in which to conduct their tests. The investments governments make in funding weapons laboratories, supporting governmental or private sector arms manufacturing programs, and developing and building weapons test facilities can all pay significant dividends for nuclear weapons programs as well. To be sure, not all of the infrastructure nor industries military rocketry R&D programs spawn will be directly applicable to a nuclear weapons program, but governments need not start from scratch in creating the necessary R&D infrastructure for nuclear weapons programs if they already possess a mature military rocketry SMIC. Mature military rocketry SMICs can also yield valuable organizational benefits for governments pursuing large-scale rocketry R&D projects. Military rocketry programs require actors from government bureaucracies, academia and research institutions, militaries, and the private sector to work together towards the achievement of joint goals. Organizationally, creating synergistic ties between actors from these institutions and finding ways of facilitating productive working relationships between them is one of the most difficult challenges associated with developing advanced rocketry capabilities (Karp 1996). Similar challenges confront governments pursuing nuclear weapons (Hymans 2012; Montgomery 2013). The choices that governments make in organizing their rocketry programs help determine whether their efforts succeed or fail and how much such efforts ultimately cost (Karp 1996). To the extent that governments can learn from successes and failures with their rocketry programs, their management of their nuclear weapons programs will be improved. Thus, governments can benefit from the institutional connections and programmatic knowledge they have previously obtained from their military rocketry programs and apply that towards their pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities—thus lowering the costs of pursuing nuclear weapons, making their efforts more likely to succeed, and decreasing the time it takes to succeed. In the DPRK, for example, the government’s investments in its ballistic missile sector appeared to pay dividends for its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Hymans (2012, 248-255) argues that the neo-patrimonial character of the DPRK regime played a major role in impeding its nuclear weapons and missile development efforts. Yet the DPRK still managed to develop both capabilities, emerging as one of the world’s most active ballistic missile proliferators during the 1980s and, subsequently, acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities in the 2000s (Pollack 2011). A key institutional innovation adopted by Kim Il-Sung that aided in these efforts was the founding of the Hamhŭng Military Academy in 1965, which had “the mandate… to nurture those personnel which are able to develop mid- and long-range ballistic missiles.”7 This research and training academy, subordinate to the DPRK’s Ministry of Defense, helped provide the “foundation” for the subsequent indigenous ballistic missile production capability the DPRK eventually acquired.8 The DPRK possesses a set of similarly oriented scientific-military and arms-production institutions, such as the Second Natural Science Institute and the Second Economic Committee, that house both missile and nuclear weapons-related research, design, and production efforts.9 The close organizational overlap between the institutions involved in housing these highly complex, technical weapons development projects suggest that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons effort could have readily benefited from lessons learned from its prior success in obtaining indigenous ballistic missile production capabilities, the R&D infrastructure it created for those programs, and the cultivation of a skilled body of scientists and technicians in a country in which S&T capital is scarce. The missile technology for nuclear technology exchange between the DPRK and Pakistan also illustrates the close associational linkages between the DPRK’s weapons development and acquisition efforts in both sectors (Montgomery 2005). Understanding the connections between the DPRK’s military rocketry R&D programs and nuclear weapons program can help explain how it managed to acquire nuclear weapons in spite of other aspects of its regime that likely ~~retarded~~ the program’s progress (Hymans 2008). Lastly, the governmental bureaucracies created to manage military rocketry programs and interest groups that commercially benefit from them can grow into powerful political constituencies that could support the pursuit of nuclear technology and weapons. For example, the founder of modern French rocketry, Robert Esnault-Pelterie, was a prominent advocate of exploring the potential applications of nuclear technology for rocketry during the 1930s (Turner 2009: 219). Given that possessing nuclear weapons can create a demand for long-range ballistic missiles, which governments otherwise have few incentives to possess, actors within military rocketry SMICs have strong incentives to push politicians towards acquiring nuclear weapons. Because many of the same policy actors that have a voice with respect to governmental missile policies will also have a voice with respect to nuclear policies, a mature military rocketry SMIC can amplify the interests that many of those actors might have in acquiring nuclear weapons (Flank 1995). Thus, possessing mature military rocketry research programs will contribute to countries’ capacity to acquire nuclear weapons and the political demand within governments to obtain them.

#### Rigorous empirics prove the nuclear domino theory.

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Is the nuclear domino theory historically valid? Despite its longstanding centrality to thinking on nuclear proliferation amongst scholars and policymakers, in recent years a revisionist consensus has emerged in opposition to this traditional view. Based on an analysis of historical evidence from the aftermath of the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, this article argues that scholars have gone too far in rejecting the nuclear domino theory. Reactive proliferation has been more prevalent than commonly believed, and while it is true that only India acquired a nuclear arsenal in response to the Chinese test, to a significant extent this is precisely because the United States was aware of the danger of reactive proliferation and worked to stop it. Finally, the historical evidence suggests that the nuclear domino theory is compatible with both domestic and prestige motivations for proliferation in addition to the security motives normally associated with the theory. When one state acquires nuclear weapons, do other states inevitably follow? The belief in the affirmative (hereafter termed the nuclear domino theory) was once an article of faith among world leaders and analysts of nuclear proliferation. In the last decade, however, a growing chorus of scholars has attacked the validity of the nuclear domino theory from a diverse array of methodological and theoretical perspectives.1 The goal of this article is to contest this emerging revisionist consensus. More specifically, the article advances three primary claims: (1) that reactive proliferation behavior in the form of nuclear exploration and pursuit has been more common than recent scholarship has acknowledged; (2) that, contrary to common belief, the nuclear domino theory is compatible with a multicausal approach to proliferation, embracing security, domestic, and normative motivations; and (3) most importantly, that US nonproliferation policy has played a central role in rendering nuclear domino predictions self-defeating. As evidence for these claims, this article turns to the aftermath of the People’s Republic of China’s first nuclear test in October 1964. Although US officials were well aware of the Chinese nuclear program, and had in fact considered a preemptive attack on Chinese nuclear facilities, they were nonetheless caught off guard by the timing of the detonation.2 In response, the Lyndon Johnson administration commissioned the Gilpatric Committee to conduct an internal reassessment of US nonproliferation policy.3 The committee’s secret report, issued on 21 January 1965, came to four main conclusions: “1. The spread of nuclear weapons poses an increasingly grave threat to the security of the United States . . . 2. The world is fast approaching a point of no return in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons . . . 3. Success in preventing the future spread of nuclear weapons requires a concerted and intensified effort . . . [and] 4. A major effort on our part has promise of success in halting or ~~retarding~~ the spread of nuclear weapons.”4 The committee recommended that the US adopt a far more active and comprehensive nonproliferation policy, including pushing for a nonproliferation treaty (which later became the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or NPT), a comprehensive test ban treaty, and regional nuclear-free zones.5 In terms of bilateral policy, the committee emphasized the importance of security guarantees, refraining from spreading sensitive technologies, and the threat and use of sanctions to deter or halt nuclear weapons programs.6 The overall thrust of the report, as Francis Gavin notes, was that “when U.S. nonproliferation goals clashed with other policy interests, nonproliferation should take precedence.”7 Fundamental to the committee’s decision to promote a proactive nonproliferation policy was the belief by its members in a nuclear domino theory—that proliferation breeds proliferation, so to speak. It was feared that without a strong nonproliferation policy, a Chinese nuclear capability would cause regional states as diverse as Australia, Japan, India, South Korea, Taiwan (ROC), and Indonesia to pursue nuclear weapons, which in turn could spark further proliferation worldwide.8 Of course, more than forty-five years after the Chinese test, out of these states only India has built a nuclear bomb. The apparent inaccuracy of this prediction, as well as countless others made by policymakers both during and after the Cold War, has contributed to the new revisionist consensus identified above. However, a close analysis of the historical evidence from the aftermath of the Chinese nuclear test suggests different conclusions. Three main findings emerge from the analysis; in combination they cast significant doubt on the revisionist critique of the nuclear domino theory. First, scholars have gone too far in rejecting the prevalence of reactive proliferation. In fact, exactly as the nuclear domino theory would predict, India, Taiwan, Australia, Japan, and Indonesia all reacted to the Chinese test by considering and pursuing nuclear weapons development to varying degrees.9 South Korea also pursued nuclear weapons within a decade of the Chinese test and was only coerced into halting this effort by US pressure, although evidence suggests this was driven more by the North Korean threat than the Chinese nuclear capability.10 Second, while it is true that only India successfully acquired a nuclear arsenal in the wake of the Chinese test, to a significant extent this is precisely because the United States was aware of the danger of reactive proliferation and worked to stop it. Through a mix of bilateral diplomacy, threats of sanctions, security guarantees, and the promotion of the NPT—exactly what the Gilpatric Committee recommended—the United States succeeded in slowing or rolling back several nuclear programs triggered by the Chinese test. In other words, the nuclear domino theory in the aftermath of the Chinese test largely took the form of a self-defeating prophecy. While the idea that nonproliferation policies may make domino predictions self-defeating is not new, the evidence in support of this proposition has been thin to date.11 Moreover, it suggests the nuclear domino theory is in fact a valid basis for policymaking and the United States should avoid complacency and maintain active nonproliferation policies if it is to prevent nuclear dominoes from falling in the future. Third, while the nuclear domino theory is commonly associated with a realist, security-centered model of proliferation, and has been criticized for this fact, there is no inherent reason why this must be the case.12 In fact, the authors of the Gilpatric Committee report recognized this, noting three distinct ways in which the Chinese test could influence other states: “The recent Chinese Communist nuclear explosion has reinforced the belief, increasingly prevalent throughout the world, that nuclear weapons are a distinguishing mark of a world leader, are essential to national security, and are feasible even with modest industrial resources.”13 Indeed, the cases examined here indicate there are at least three mechanisms by which the theory can operate, and that multiple mechanisms can operate at once. One state’s nuclear developments can serve as the impetus for the pursuit of nuclear weapons in another state in one of three ways: (1) by increasing security threat perception, (2) by strengthening the hand of domestic and bureaucratic forces that were already pushing a nuclear weapons program, tipping the balance in their favor, or (3) by creating a new demand for prestige. In other words, the nuclear domino theory is perfectly compatible with Scott D. Sagan’s three models of proliferation (security, domestic/ bureaucratic, and normative) and a multicausal approach to nuclear proliferation.14 Even where domestic and prestige factors are the driving motives behind the desire for the bomb, a newly emerging nuclear state can serve as an important trigger for proliferation decisions. Because not all reactive proliferation decisions are based solely on security, and because leader perception is so critical, existing quantitative analyses that rely on objective security indicators such as whether a military rival has an ongoing nuclear weapons program inevitably miss historical cases of reactive proliferation.15

#### Best studies conclude prolif causes war

Quek, 16—Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong (Kai, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Use of Nuclear Options,” Political Research Quarterly June 2016 vol. 69 no. 2 195-206, dml) [“N” in “N = 2” refers to the number of states with a nuclear option in a crisis]

Does nuclear proliferation affect the risk that nuclear weapons will be used in a crisis? The question implicates human survival but is difficult to study, as observations of nuclear war do not actually exist. Our empirical knowledge is thus limited. I use experimental games with nuclear options to circumvent the observational constraint and construct empirical tests. I find that decisions are mostly peaceful at N = 2 despite the existence of nuclear options with a relative first-strike advantage. This finding is especially relevant as most nuclear-state confrontations in history had been bilateral crises. More generally, I find that one is less likely to choose the nuclear option when it is known that the number of nuclear actors in the crisis is small, and more likely to choose the nuclear option when it is known that the number of nuclear actors is large. In particular, a jump in the number of nuclear actors in crisis beyond N = 2 significantly increases the chance of choosing the nuclear option. Preliminary probes also suggest that players in inter-alliance crises are more peaceful when they have second-strike countervalue capabilities, and that nuclear framing has no significant effect on the use of the nuclear option.∂ To my knowledge, this is the first randomized experiment in political science that focuses on the relationship between proliferation and the use of nuclear options.23 In a fortunate world where nuclear war remains unobserved, there are justifications for an experimental approach on theoretical, practical, and ethical grounds. Methodologically, the use of a controlled experiment also allows for a clean identification of the causal relationship,.∂ This experiment focuses exclusively on the strategic dimension. It also assumes that the crisis has already escalated to the point where players are considering the use of the nuclear option, and thus it does not address the ex ante question of whether nuclear weapons would make states more cautious about avoiding conflict escalation in the first place (Waltz 2003). Nonetheless, while the focus of the experiment is narrow, it is a useful first step toward understanding the strategic effects of proliferation on the risk of nuclear conflict.∂ Several implications arise for future research. First, with the basic mechanism established, we now have a baseline for future experiments that explore various realistic complications to the nuclear-option game. For instance, do interactions between nuclear actors change when we introduce different types of psychological stress, or different stake sizes, or different asymmetries in the expected cost of nuclear conflict? In particular, an interesting extension of this experiment would be to study how behavior differs—or does not—across interactions with different combinations of nuclear and non-nuclear actors.∂ The results suggest that distrust over the rationality of other players increases with an increase in the N parameter, and weakens the tendency toward the payoff-dominant outcome of peaceful restraint. Thus, proliferation may be dangerous even in a world of states trying to behave rationally, contrary to the arguments made by Waltz (2003) and others in which the common knowledge of rationality is assumed. The results also offer an interesting contrast with Asal and Breadsley’s (2007) finding that the risk of (non-nuclear) war is higher when the number of nuclear actors in crisis is lower. This contrast raises the hypothesis that states in bilateral crises may choose to drag out a crisis as the risk of nuclear war is lower under N = 2, as suggested by our results.24 This hypothesis has practical importance and should be investigated in future research.

#### Prolif causes nuke war and terror – accidents, risk-taking, and preemptive strikes.

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The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange. Nuclear Terrorism The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.54 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a ‘religious duty’ for Al- Qa’eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.55 Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56 Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.57 Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. Regional Instability The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers, contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the ‘stability-instability paradox’ maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.60 Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.62 Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange.

#### Nuclear war is existential – climate, mass starvation, Ice Age, and meltdowns

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Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate[i] and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer[ii]. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. [iii] These peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error – also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race.[iv] In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life. A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war”,[v] begins by stating: “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction.” In 2009, I wrote an article[vi] for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament that summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth[vii]) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer. Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations. Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices[viii], including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil-off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic.[ix] In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the US and Russian military – emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins. Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear weapons had already been used on the battlefield. Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads,[xi] which can be launched with only a few minutes warning.[xii] Both the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase”, which allows them to transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds.

#### A bevy of statistical analysis verifies nuclear deterrence fails – decades of empirical conflicts disprove adversarial calculus and nuclear-armed states fail a higher proportion of the time. Threats of counter forcing create asymmetric incentives for escalation as both sides try to achieve the first-mover advantage and deterrence theory misreads leaders – opens Pandora’s box of misperceptions, accidents, and false alarms which all independently trigger high-alert systems.

Barash ’18 (David; 6/14/18; Professor of Psychology at the University of Washington, author or editor of over 40 books, citing a body of area and field-study experts; The Guardian, “Nuclear deterrence is a myth. And a lethal one at that,” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/14/nuclear-deterrence-myth-lethal-david-barash>; RP)

In his classic The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (1989), Lawrence Freedman, the dean of British military historians and strategists, concluded: ‘The Emperor Deterrence may have no clothes, but he is still Emperor.’ Despite his nakedness, this emperor continues to strut about, receiving deference he doesn’t deserve, while endangering the entire world. Nuclear deterrence is an idea that became a potentially **lethal ideology**, one that **remains influential** despite having been **increasingly discredited**. After the United States’ nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, war changed. Until then, the overriding purpose of military forces had ostensibly been to win wars. But according to the influential US strategist Bernard Brodie writing in 1978: ‘From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.’ Thus, nuclear deterrence was born, a **seemingly rational** arrangement by which peace and stability were to arise by the threat of **mutually assured destruction** (MAD, appropriately enough). Winston Churchill described it in 1955 with characteristic vigour: ‘Safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.’ Importantly, deterrence became not only a purported strategy, but the **very grounds** on which governments **justified nuclear weapons** themselves. Every government that now possesses nuclear weapons claims that they deter attacks by their threat of **catastrophic retaliation**. Even a brief examination, however, reveals that deterrence is not **remotely as compelling** a principle as its reputation suggests. In his novel The Ambassadors (1903), Henry James described a certain beauty as ‘a jewel brilliant and hard’, at once twinkling and trembling, adding that ‘what seemed all surface one moment seemed all depth the next’. The public has **been bamboozled** by the **shiny surface** appearance of deterrence, with its promise of strength, security and safety. But what has been touted as profound strategic depth **crumbles with surprising ease** when subjected to critical scrutiny. Let’s start by considering the core of deterrence theory: that it has worked. Advocates of nuclear deterrence insist that we should thank it for the fact that a **third world war** has been avoided, even when **tensions between the two superpowers** – the US and the USSR – ran high. Some supporters even maintain that deterrence set the stage for the fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Communism. In this telling, the West’s nuclear deterrent prevented the USSR from invading western Europe, and delivered the world from the threat of Communist tyranny. There are, however, **compelling arguments** suggesting that the US and the former Soviet Union avoided world war for **several possible reasons**, most notably because **neither side wanted to go to war**. Indeed, the US and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age. Singling out nuclear weapons as the reason why the **Cold War never became hot** is somewhat like saying that a junkyard car, without an engine or wheels, never sped off the lot only **because no one turned the key**. Logically speaking, there is **no way to demonstrate** that nuclear weapons kept the peace during the Cold War, or that they do so now. Perhaps peace prevailed between the two superpowers simply because they had no quarrel that justified fighting a terribly destructive war, even a conventional one. **There is no evidence**, for example, that the Soviet leadership **ever contemplated** trying to conquer western Europe, much **less that it was restrained** by the West’s nuclear arsenal. Post facto arguments – especially negative ones – might be the **currency of pundits**, but are **impossible to prove,** and offer **no solid ground** for evaluating a counterfactual claim, conjecturing why something has not happened. In colloquial terms, if a dog does not bark in the night, can we say with certainty that no one walked by the house? Deterrence enthusiasts are like the woman who **sprayed perfume on her lawn** every morning. When a perplexed neighbour asked about this strange behaviour, she replied: **‘I do it to keep the elephants away.’** The neighbour protested: ‘But **there aren’t any elephants** within 10,000 miles of here,’ whereupon the perfume-sprayer replied: **‘You see, it works!’** We should not congratulate our leaders, or deterrence theory, much less nuclear weapons, for keeping the peace. What we can say is that, as of this morning, those with the power to exterminate life have not done so. But this is not altogether comforting, and **history is no more reassuring**. The duration of ‘nuclear peace’, from the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, lasted less than five decades. More than 20 years separated the First and Second World Wars; before that, there had been more than 40 years of relative peace between the end of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) and the First World War (1914), and 55 years between the Franco-Prussian War and Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo (1815). Even in war-prone Europe, **decades of peace** have not been so rare. Each time, when peace ended and the next war began, the war involved weapons available at the time – which, for the next big one, would likely include nuclear weapons. The only way to make sure that nuclear weapons are not used is to make sure that there are no such weapons. There is certainly **no reason to think** that the presence of nuclear weapons will prevent their use. The first step to ensuring that humans do not unleash **nuclear [winter]** holocaust might be to show that the Emperor Deterrence has no clothes – which would then open the possibility of **replacing the illusion** with something more suitable. It is possible that the post-1945 US-Soviet peace came ‘through strength’, but that need not imply nuclear deterrence. It is also undeniable that the presence of nuclear weapons on **hair-trigger alert** capable of reaching each other’s homeland in minutes has made **both sides** edgy. The **Cuban Missile Crisis** of 1962 – when, by all accounts, the world came **closer to nuclear war** than at any other time – is not testimony to the effectiveness of deterrence: the crisis occurred **because of nuclear weapons**. It is more likely that we have been spared nuclear war **not because** of deterrence **but in spite of it**. Even when possessed by just one side, nuclear weapons have not deterred **other forms of war**. The **Chinese, Cuban, Iranian and Nicaraguan** revolutions all took place **even though** a nuclear-armed US backed the overthrown governments. Similarly, the US lost the **Vietnam War**, just as the Soviet Union lost in **Afghanistan**, despite both countries not only possessing nuclear weapons, but also more and better conventional arms than their adversaries. Nor did nuclear weapons aid Russia in its **unsuccessful war** against **Chechen rebels** in 1994-96, or in 1999-2000, when Russia’s conventional weapons devastated the suffering Chechen Republic. Nuclear weapons did not help the US achieve its goals in **Iraq** or **Afghanistan**, which have become **expensive catastrophic failures** for the country with the world’s most advanced nuclear weapons. Moreover, despite its nuclear arsenal, the US remains fearful of **domestic terrorist attacks**, which are more likely to be **made with nuclear weapons** than be deterred by them. In short, it is **not legitimate** to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war, or that they will do so in the future. During the Cold War, each side engaged in conventional warfare: the Soviets, for example, in **Hungary** (1956), **Czechoslovakia** (1968), and **Afghanistan** (1979-89); the Russians in **Chechnya** (1994-96; 1999-2009), **Georgia** (2008), **Ukraine** (2014-present), as well as **Syria** (2015-present); and the **US in Korea** (1950-53), **Vietnam** (1955-75), **Lebanon** (1982), **Grenada** (1983), **Panama** (1989-90), **the Persian Gulf** (1990-91), the **former Yugoslavia** (1991-99), **Afghanistan** (2001-present), and **Iraq** (2003-present), to mention just a few cases. Nor have their weapons deterred attacks upon nuclear armed states by **non-nuclear opponents**. In 1950, China stood 14 years from developing and deploying **its own** nuclear weapons, whereas the US had a well-developed atomic arsenal. Nonetheless, as the **Korean War’s tide** was shifting dramatically against the North, that US nuclear arsenal **did not inhibit China** from sending more than 300,000 soldiers across the Yalu River, resulting in the stalemate on the Korean peninsula that divides it to this day, and has resulted in one of the world’s **most dangerous unresolved stand-offs**. In 1956, the nuclear-armed United Kingdom warned **non-nuclear Egypt** to refrain from nationalising the Suez Canal. To no avail: the UK, France and Israel ended up **invading Sinai** with conventional forces. In 1982, Argentina attacked the **British-held Falkland Islands**, even though the UK had nuclear weapons and Argentina did not. Following the US-led invasion in 1991, conventionally armed Iraq was **not deterred** from **lobbing Scud missiles** at nuclear-armed Israel, which did not retaliate, although it could have used its nuclear weapons to vaporise Baghdad. It is hard to imagine how doing so would have **benefitted anyone**. Obviously, US nuclear weapons did not deter the **terrorist attacks** on the US of 11 September 2001, just as the nuclear arsenals of the **UK and France** have not **prevented repeated terrorist attacks** on those countries. Deterrence, in short, **does not deter**. The pattern is deep and **geographically widespread**. Nuclear-armed France couldn’t prevail over the non-nuclear **Algerian National Liberation Front**. The US nuclear arsenal didn’t **inhibit North Korea** from seizing a US intelligence-gathering vessel, the USS Pueblo, in 1968. Even today, this boat remains in North Korean hands. US nukes didn’t enable China to get Vietnam to end its **invasion of Cambodia** in 1979. Nor did US nuclear weapons **stop Iranian Revolutionary Guards** from capturing US diplomats and holding them hostage (1979-81), just as fear of US nuclear weapons didn’t empower the US and its allies to force Iraq to **retreat from Kuwait** without a fight in 1990. In Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (2017), the political scientists Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann examined 348 territorial disputes occurring between 1919 and 1995. They used **statistical analysis** to see whether nuclear-armed states were **more successful** than conventional countries in **coercing their adversaries** during territorial disputes. **They weren’t**. Not only that, but nuclear weapons **didn’t embolden** those who own them to escalate demands; if anything, such countries were somewhat **less successful in getting their way**. In some cases, the analysis is **almost comical**. Thus, among the very few cases in which threats from a nuclear-armed country were coded as having compelled an opponent was the US insistence, in 1961, that the Dominican Republic hold democratic elections following the **assassination of** the dictator Rafael **Trujillo**, as well as the US demand, in 1994, following a **Haitian military coup**, that the Haitian colonels restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. In 1974-75, nuclear China forced non-nuclear Portugal to surrender its claim to Macau. These examples were included because the authors honestly sought to **consider all cases** in which a nuclear-armed country got its way vis-à-vis a non-nuclear one. But **no serious observer** would attribute the capitulation of Portugal or the Dominican Republic to the nuclear weapons of China or the US. All of this also suggests that the **acquisition of nuclear weapons** by Iran or North Korea is **unlikely to enable** these countries to coerce others, whether their ‘targets’ are armed with **nuclear or conventional weapons**. It is one thing to conclude that nuclear deterrence **hasn’t** necessarily **deterred**, and hasn’t provided coercive power – but its **extraordinary risks are even more discrediting**. First, deterrence via nuclear weapons **lacks credibility**. A police officer armed with a backpack nuclear weapon would be unlikely to deter a robber: ‘Stop in the name of the law, or I’ll blow us all up!’ Similarly, during the Cold War, NATO generals lamented that towns in West Germany were less than two kilotons apart – which meant that defending Europe with nuclear weapons would destroy it, and so the claim that the Red Army would be deterred by nuclear means was **literally incredible**. The result was the elaboration of smaller, **more accurate tactical weapons** that would be more usable and, thus, whose employment in a crisis would be more credible. But deployed weapons that **are more usable**, and thus **more credible as deterrents**, are more liable to be used. Second, deterrence requires that each side’s arsenal **remains invulnerable** to attack, or at least that such an attack would be prevented insofar as a potential victim **retained a ‘second-strike’ retaliatory capability**, sufficient to prevent such an attack **in the first place**. Over time, however, nuclear missiles have become increasingly accurate, raising concerns about the vulnerability of these weapons to a ‘counterforce’ strike. In brief, nuclear states are **increasingly able** to target their adversary’s nuclear weapons for destruction. In the **perverse argot** of deterrence theory, this is called **counterforce vulnerability**, with ‘vulnerability’ referring to the target’s nuclear weapons, not its population. The **clearest outcome** of increasingly accurate nuclear weapons and the ‘counterforce vulnerability’ component of deterrence theory is to **increase the likelihood of a first strike**, while also **increasing the danger** that a potential victim, fearing such an event, might be tempted to **pre-empt with its own first strike**. The resulting situation – in which each side **perceives** a possible **advantage** in striking first – is **dangerously unstable**. Third, deterrence theory **assumes optimal rationality** on the part of decision-makers. It presumes that those with their fingers on the **nuclear triggers** are **rational actors** who will also remain calm and cognitively unimpaired under extremely stressful conditions. It also presumes that leaders will **always retain control** over their forces and that, moreover, they will always retain control over their emotions as well, making decisions based **solely on a cool calculation** of strategic costs and benefits. Deterrence theory maintains, in short, that each side will **scare the pants off the other** with the prospect of the most **hideous, unimaginable consequences**, and will then conduct itself with the **utmost deliberate and precise rationality**. Virtually everything known about human psychology suggests that **this is absurd**. In Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia (1941), Rebecca West noted that: ‘Only part of us is sane: only part of us loves pleasure and the longer day of happiness, wants to live to our 90s and die in peace …’ It requires no arcane wisdom to know that people often act out of **misperceptions**, anger, despair, insanity, stubbornness, revenge, pride and/or dogmatic conviction. Moreover, in certain situations – as when either side is **convinced that war is inevitable**, or when the pressures to avoid losing face are **especially intense** – an irrational act, including a **lethal one**, can appear appropriate, even unavoidable. When he ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese defence minister observed that: ‘Sometimes it is necessary to close one’s eyes and jump off the platform of the Kiyomizu Temple [a renowned suicide spot].’ During the First World War, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany wrote in the margin of a government document that: ‘Even if we are destroyed, England at least will lose India.’ While in his bunker, during the final days of the Second World War, Adolf Hitler ordered what he hoped would be the total destruction of Germany, because he felt that Germans had ‘failed’ him. Consider, as well, a US president who shows signs of mental illness, and whose statements and tweets are **frighteningly consistent** with dementia or genuine psychosis. National leaders – nuclear-armed or not – aren’t immune to mental illness. Yet, deterrence theory **presumes otherwise**. Finally, there is **just no way** for civilian or **military leaders to know** when their country has **accumulated enough nuclear firepower** to **satisfy the requirement** of having an ‘effective deterrent’. For example, if one side is **willing to be annihilated** in a counterattack, **it simply cannot be deterred**, no matter the threatened retaliation. Alternatively, if one side is **convinced** of the other’s implacable hostility, or of its presumed indifference to loss of life, **no amount of weaponry** can suffice. Not only that, but so long as accumulating weapons **makes money** for defence contractors, and so long as designing, producing and deploying new ‘generations’ of nuclear stuff advances careers, the truth about deterrence theory will **remain obscured**. Even the sky is not the limit; militarists want to put weapons in outer space. Insofar as nuclear weapons also serve symbolic, psychological needs, by demonstrating the **technological accomplishments** of a nation and thus conveying legitimacy to otherwise **insecure leaders and countries**, then, once again, there is no **rational way** to establish the minimum (or cap the maximum) size of one’s arsenal. At some point, additional detonations nonetheless come up against the **law of diminishing returns**, or as Winston Churchill pointed out, they simply ‘make the rubble bounce’. In addition, ethical deterrence is an oxymoron. Theologians know that a nuclear war could never meet so-called ‘just war’ criteria. In 1966, the Second Vatican Council concluded: ‘Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their populations is a crime against God and man itself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.’ And in a pastoral letter in 1983, the US Catholic bishops added: ‘This condemnation, in our judgment, applies even to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy cities after our own have already been struck.’ They continued that, if something is immoral to do, then it is also immoral to threaten. In a message to the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Pope Francis declared that: ‘Nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutually assured destruction cannot be the basis of an ethics of fraternity and **peaceful coexistence** among peoples and states.’ The United Methodist Council of Bishops go further than their Catholic counterparts, concluding in 1986 that: ‘Deterrence must no longer receive the churches’ blessing, even as a temporary warrant for the maintenance of nuclear weapons.’ In The Just War (1968), the Protestant ethicist Paul Ramsey asked his readers to imagine that traffic accidents in a particular city had suddenly been reduced to zero, after which it was found that everyone had been required to strap a newborn infant to the bumper of every car. Perhaps the most frightening thing about nuclear deterrence is its **many paths to failure**. Contrary to what is widely assumed, the **least likely** is a **‘bolt out of the blue’** (BOOB) attack. Meanwhile, there are **substantial risks** associated with **escalated conventional war**, accidental or unauthorised use, irrational use (although it can be argued that any use of nuclear weapons would be irrational) or **false alarms**, which have happened with **frightening regularity**, and could lead to **‘retaliation’ against an attack that hadn’t happened**. There have also been numerous **‘broken arrow’ accidents** – accidental launching, firing, theft or loss of a nuclear weapon – as well as circumstances in which such events as a **flock of geese, a ruptured gas pipeline or faulty computer codes** have been interpreted as a **hostile missile launch**. The above describes only some of the **inadequacies** and **outright dangers** posed by deterrence, the **doctrinal fulcrum** that manipulates nuclear hardware, software, deployments, accumulation and escalation. Undoing the ideology – verging on theology – of deterrence won’t be easy, but neither is living under the **threat of worldwide annihilation**. As the poet T S Eliot once wrote, unless you are in over your head, how do you know how tall you are? And when it comes to nuclear deterrence, we’re all in over our heads.

#### Nuke terror causes global escalation.

Arguello and Buis ‘18 (Irma Arguello and Emiliano J. Buis 18. Arguello is founder and chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation, and head of the secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network; Buis is researcher and professor at the NPSGlobal Foundation. 03/04/2018. “The Global Impacts of a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: What Would Happen? What Should We Do?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 114–119.)

Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the post- Cold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentatxion – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

### Plan

#### The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should eliminate its nuclear arsenal.

#### Saudi Arabia has a nuclear arsenal – it has missiles, fissile material and the know-how but their usage is small and localized.

Duff 19 [Gordon Duff, Gordon Duff is a Marine combat veteran of the Vietnam War that has worked on veterans and POW issues for decades and consulted with governments challenged by security issues. He’s a senior editor and chairman at the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”, 2-15-2019, "Saudi Arabia and the Upcoming Secret Nuclear War," No Publication, https://journal-neo.org/2019/02/15/saudi-arabia-and-the-upcoming-secret-nuclear-war/, accessed 12-27-2019]LHSBC

The truth is out there, but real whistle blowers seldom live to tell the tale. Some do, and I know them.∂ You see, most nations have secret organizations, usually military commands, that investigate not only nuclear proliferation but monitor the use of nuclear explosives. Old design nukes only burned a bit of their cores, leaving the rest as fallout. New ones are clean, no leftover radiation at all, cheap to build, simple in design and any nation that wants nuclear weapons can have them and, according to sources, many do.∂ To begin with, let’s talk about Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has a larger military budget than Russia, but Russia spends much of their budget on a huge standing army, a significant navy, dozens of nuclear submarines and a massive thermonuclear missile capability supported by an equally huge stockpile of nuclear weapons.∂ Saudi Arabia spends more than Russia but has a small navy, a very small standing army, mostly foreign mercenaries or troops “hired” from “allies.” Their budget makes no sense unless you examine it carefully. Saudi Arabia spends up to 40% of its military budget on nuclear weapons and delivery systems. This is why they are caught lying so often when claims are made about how many weapons they buy each year from Britain and the US. The real delivered numbers are miniscule and Saudi Arabia depends on American bombs, American refueling and even Israeli planes in their war on Yemen.∂ This is from CNN, October 13, 2018, and figures from Britain are skewed even more:∂ “Washington (CNN) President Donald Trump says he doesn’t [want a $110 billion arms deal he brokered with Saudi Arabia](https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/19/politics/jared-kushner-saudi-arms-deal-lockheed-martin/index.html) to unravel over allegations the Gulf kingdom murdered a journalist at its consulate in Turkey.∂ But his comments are missing the mark on a key fact: Saudi Arabia has so far only followed through on $14.5 billion in purchases.∂ The deal brokered last year between the US and Saudi Arabia was merely a memorandum of intent to fulfill nearly $110 billion in arms sales over the next 10 years. As of yet, Saudi Arabia has only signed letters of offer and acceptance — official purchase agreements that have either already been approved by Congress or in the process of being approved — for $14.5 billion in purchases, according to a Pentagon official.”∂ I debriefed a UN source, a weapons inspector with highest clearances, that led an official investigation into Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program. Because of corruption at every level of media and information, governmental, the internet, even intelligence reports that sometimes trickle down, this information, though known to all in power, is not public. Here is what we know:∂ Saudi Arabia began acquiring uranium processing equipment from Germany, high speed centrifuges to produce uranium 235 at weapons grade during the 1970s.∂ Saudi Arabia bought its first nuclear weapon from China in the early 1980s. Their first weapon, according to the sources was a 22-kiloton gun type uranium bomb. China then supplied the Saudi’s with an unspecified number, less than 10, smaller weapons that could be deployed on missiles. From Wikipedia:∂ “In 1987, Saudi Arabia purchased Chinese-made CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles designed and used by the Chinese as a nuclear-armed missile, but reportedly sold to Saudi Arabia with conventional high-explosive warheads. However their low circular error probable accuracy (1–1.5 km) makes them unsuitable for effective military use against military targets when carrying a conventional warhead. The CSS-2 has a range of 4,850 km with a payload of either 2,150 or 2,500 kg. These missiles were delivered with between 50 and 35 transporter erector launcher trucks. These missiles were the first weapons of the Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force, a separate branch of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces. 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That nation had been working with South Africa and, between 1975 when those nations signed a secret nuclear accord, and September 22, 1979, when the first South African nuclear device, a 13.2 kiloton (80ms “double-flash”) was exploded on a barge adjacent to Prince Edward Island, several hundred miles south of Cape Town. That technology, developed at the Armscor at Pelandaba, has long been known [publicly.](https://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Safrica/SABuildingBombs.html) That British companies backed the process and that Saudi Arabia aided in financing is not publicly known.∂ However, what is spoken of today, straying miles from the truth, is a disinformation campaign that tries to erase history. 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The cooperation between the two countries in helping the Saudis to develop a nuclear weapons program is just the latest sign of their warming relationship, with Israel recently calling the Saudi crown prince ‘a partner of Israel.’”∂ Though “packaged” as a revelation, in fact the information which seems to damn both Israel and Saudi Arabia, in fact covers for 40 years of cooperation in nuclear weapons research and production.∂ Saudi Arabia’s next foray into nuclear partnership touches on Pakistan. Since 1979, Pakistan has deployed troops in Saudi Arabia, ostensibly to defend that nation, remember, a nation with a military budget larger than Russia, from Iran.∂ By 1982, a protocol was signed and forces, number officially up to 20,000, have been deployed in Saudi Arabia. According to our sources, among them, in most recent years, have been highly trained specialists to secure a Pakistani nuclear arsenal including nuclear tipped missiles, deployed inside Saudi Arabia, “rented” as it were, as a deterrent against Iran.∂ Saudi Arabia has long conspired against Iran along with Israel yet, quite obviously, it is Saudi Arabia that would suffer the brunt of Iranian retaliation were a secret nuclear attack on Iran to be staged from Saudi Arabia or using Saudi airspace.∂ Were one to delve further into the intricacies of geopolitics, India’s political alliances, their dance between Russia and the US, and the secret military cooperation agreements between Israel and both India and Pakistan, something I discussed during an interview with then ISI Director Ahmad Shurja Pasha in 2011, weigh heavily on Saudi Arabia’s security concerns.∂ Suffice it to say, though there is no public discussion of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program other than those indicating it has gone on for decades and is, perhaps, the most unsuccessful such endeavor in planetary history, a very real arsenal exists and, according to highly knowledgeable sources, the Kingdom has deployed nuclear weapons against Yemen on several occasions.∂ A source at the IAEA claims, backed by a 2006 secret report from [Global Security,](https://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/B4777C6B-docs/WP-1815-054.pdf) that the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, blamed on an Iranian backed Saudi faction, was, in fact, a nuclear explosion.∂ The report quotes the Defense Special Weapons Agency, established on 29 January 1947 by the Atomic Energy Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Public Law 585, 79th Congress) to oversee and investigate the use of nuclear weapons and their impact on the security of the United States.∂ The conclusion of the report, redacted from public view, concluded that the Khobar Towers were destroyed by a tactical nuclear munition equaling 100 tons of TNT.∂ A similar IAEA report confirmed that finding, citing a blast crater and thermal damage only possible during a nuclear event. From that report:∂ “On June 25, 1996, Saudi terrorists sponsored by Iran attacked the Khobar Towers barracks, a high-rise building complex in a densely populated urban environment in Saudi Arabia. The tanker truck loaded with at least 5000 pounds of plastic explosives was driven into the parking lot in front of the Khobar Towers residential complex in Dhahran.∂ Nineteen American service members were killed in the blast, and hundreds of other service members and Saudis were injured.∂ There is no doubt that the extent of casualties in the Khobar Towers resulted, in part, from the extraordinary size of the terrorist bomb that contained the equivalent of 3000 to 8000 pounds of TNT, but a study by the Defense Special Weapons Agency concluded that the power of the bomb was actually closer to 20,000 pounds of TNT, (100 tons).”∂ The real conclusion of the report was, in fact, that Saudi Arabia had staged the attack themselves in an attempt to push the US into a war with Iran.∂ A very similar report was issued by the same agency, working with the IAEA and US Department of Energy, in 2003, offering their theory as to the events of 9/11. That report remains classified.∂ Putting much of the background together, moving forward the public record on modern nuclear weapons and their secret deployment was the publication of [The History of Nuclear Weapons Design 1945 -2016,](https://www.veteranstoday.com/2019/02/07/ultimate-leaks-the-history-of-nuclear-weapons-design-1945-2016/) published by Veterans Today. From that report, written by particle physicist and former IAEA inspector, Jeff Smith with Ian Greenhalgh:∂ “In the minds of most people, a nuclear weapon is a large device carried on the tip of an ICBM or carried in the belly of a huge bomber aircraft that when deployed produces a colossal explosion and spectacular mushroom cloud just like all those terrifying 1950s newsreels.∂ However, this is no longer the case – nuclear weapon design is several generations in advance of the bulky devices of the Cold War and today, a wide variety of types of nuclear weapon exist and they come in all sizes from the smallest ‘micro nukes’ with yields measuring in hundreds of tonnes of TNT equivalent up to truly monstrous two and three stage bombs with yields of many millions of tonnes of TNT (megatonnes).∂ The megatonne class bombs have never been deployed in anger; if they had, there would be no possible way to keep it a secret – the devastation and fallout would be on such a grand scale as to be impossible to hide. However, the sub-kilotonne mini and micro nukes have been used many times, both in false flag ‘terrorist’ attacks like 9-11 and OK City and in military conflicts in countries such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen.∂ The small yield and limited destruction of these mini and micro nukes means it is possible to keep their use secret; especially when the media are compliant and willfully ignore any and all instances of their use. The willingness of several players to use these diabolical weapons should send a chill down the spine of every sensible person – we are living in a new nuclear age far more dangerous and deadly than the previous Cold War era with its balance of nuclear power held in check by the terrifying concept of Mutually Assured Destruction.∂ Now that advanced nuclear weapons have become part of the playbook of modern conflict it becomes important to understand something about these weapons; to learn about their characteristics and effects so that it becomes ever harder to keep their use secret.”∂ The report goes further, not only into specifics of design, miniaturization and the history of weapons development but into a policy of “use and denial.”∂ “In the newest 5th generation devices the uranium or plutonium fissile content has been drastically reduced by as much as 90% only leaving enough fissile material needed to ignite and trigger the internal fission-fusion-fission reaction of the deuterium boost gas. In this process, almost all of the fissile material is totally consumed, producing almost no detectable traces of fallout, as compared to the older designs from the WW2 era.∂ These newer 5th generation weapon designs are the anarchist “21st century” favorite toys of mass destruction. By covertly hiding their existence away from the general public and secretly using them in stealthy nuclear-based guerrilla warfare attacks on undesirable persons, governments or countries — such as the Saudi’s use of a small tactical nuke on Yemen — with these new weapons of “very small” mass destruction, no non-nuclear possessing government can properly defend itself from this form of covert state-sponsored nuclear warfare.”∂ As we see, the “nuclear genii” has long been out of the bottle, known to all but those dependent on the fake public narrative, the “facts” allowed, fed to a public long deemed to have no “right to the truth.”∂ By and large, when the public evaluates, using such tools as it is allowed, the actions of leader, of policies followed, all soaked in spin and rhetoric, it does so with both hands tied behind its back.

#### Precision-guided munitions now expand Saudi ballistic missile production capabilities.

Fahrenkopf ‘19 (Nolan Fahrenkopf, Research fellow at the Center for Policy Research’s Project on International Security, Commerce, and Economic Statecraft (PISCES) at the University at Albany, "Giving Saudi Arabia Guided Munitions Tech Could Have Huge Consequences," War on the Rocks, 7-24-2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/giving-saudi-arabia-guided-munitions-tech-could-have-huge-consequences/)

The Saudi-led war in Yemen continues to be a point of contention between the Trump administration and a rare bipartisan group within Congress. Citing malign Iranian influence, the Trump administration issued an emergency authorization on May 24, directly confronting Congress by fast-tracking previously blocked arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. This move angered numerous Republicans, including Sen. Ted Cruz who supports the substance of the deal, yet told Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper to “follow the damn law.” The proposed arms deal now includes provisions beyond the technical support for aircraft and 120,000 precision strike munitions originally included. The Trump administration also granted the U.S. defense contractor Raytheon permission to engage in technology transfers and support the domestic production of critical guidance components and equipment in Saudi Arabia for the Paveway smart bombs that are being used extensively in Yemen. While both the Senate and House have already moved to block the deal, it is unclear if they will be able to override a likely presidential veto. Beyond the debate over the ethical and strategic concerns over how these weapons are used in Yemen, the transfer of sensitive military technology will likely contribute to the increasingly alarming proliferation of advanced missile and guided munitions throughout the world. Saudi Arabia is hungry for strategic technology. Part of the “Saudi Vision 2030” plan is to turn the kingdom into a major producer of advanced military goods and other strategic technology. This plan includes nuclear technology transfers from the United States — which have drawn close scrutiny — and a renewed interest in a domestic ballistic missile production capacity. This new arms deal has the potential to help jumpstart the Saudi missile program and contribute to the rampant proliferation of ballistic missiles and related technologies. The Trump administration is not only fueling a Saudi missile program, it also risks undercutting its own “Buy America” arms policy by helping to create a less discerning potential competitor. If Congress cannot overcome a presidential veto, it should work to, at the very least, eliminate the domestic production portion of the deal. Such a change will not impede the ability of Saudi Arabia to continue its fight against Iranian aligned Houthi forces in Yemen and will protect the Trump administration’s “Buy America” policy. While the Paveway is a bomb rather than a missile system, the guidance systems it employs can be applied to both types of weapons. Paveways are conventional bombs that are equipped with a kit to make it a precision strike weapon. Think of the Paveway as a guidance “kit” that can be installed on pre-existing “dumb bombs.” These kits include both software and hardware with advanced guidance algorithms, laser-guidance technology, GPS guidance technology, and digital signal processors to analyze large amounts of guidance information quickly. All this technology is important to broader missile production endeavors, whether they are cruise missiles or ballistic missiles. So why is this a problem? Some technologies are more readily applied to strategic arms programs than others. Ballistic missiles, not surpisingly, can be applied to a nuclear weapons program. Academic research has found that there is a spillover effect between different types of military production efforts. Military production programs can fuel one another. Scientists, technicians, and managers don’t operate in a bubble. What they learn about producing guidance technology can be beneficial for other projects because the organizational, technical, and scientific demands are often similar or even building blocks for more advanced weapons. Tacit knowledge — which is hard to transfer or teach — and explicit knowledge from one arms program can bolster the human capital states can bring to bear on other proliferation efforts. Policymakers and academics are increasingly seeing this proliferation spillover. Research has shown this spillover effect in space technology, cruise missiles, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missile programs. What Saudi Arabian scientists, technicians, and program managers learn from guidance technology production can translate into advances in other realms, such as missiles and even nuclear weapons technology. By approving this deal, Washington is granting Riyadh immensely valuable knowledge and experience and providing a key cog in its growing missile production endeavor. The spillover effects from this deal may prove to be particularly powerful given Saudi Arabia’s growing interest in missile and nuclear technology and the lack of a proper strategic trade control infrastructure. Saudi Arabia has been investing significant resources in the development of a domestic ballistic missile production capacity, including secret missile deals with both Ukraine and China. The deal with Ukraine included the Saudi-financed production of a new missile system, the Grom 2, which has already begun to enter critical test phases. Recent research has also found that Saudi Arabia may have begun to construct missile production facilities. The new facilities at the al-Watah missile base seem to include engine production and test facilities to accommodate advanced solid-fuel engines. Together, these efforts indicate that Saudi Arabia’s desire for missile technology has gone beyond simply purchasing foreign systems. Riyadh has also recently benefited from a nuclear technology transfer deal with Washington. This deal includes civil nuclear technology and the all-important technical support and training. What is particularly troublesome is Riyadh’s refusal to accept a “123” safeguards agreement nine nonproliferation principles. The rejection of the 123 safeguards agreement, Saudi demand for enrichment capabilities, and a long simmering interest in acquiring nuclear weapons — especially if it looks like Iran will do so first — greatly increases the risks of this deal. So, within a single year, the Trump administration could be jumpstarting both the missile and nuclear legs of a Saudi strategic weapons program. Granting Saudi Arabia access to guidance technology will advance their missile production efforts, adding another potentially destabilizing supplier of missile technology into the world. This is particularly worrisome given mounting evidence that U.S. weapons given to Saudi Arabia may not be fully secure. The backdrop of Saudi Arabia’s new focus on advanced arms acquisition and production feeds a classic security dilemma with Iran. The proxy war in Yemen is only one facet of this. Iran’s missile programs and now renewed nuclear enrichment have undoubtedly pushed Saudi Arabia to try and keep up. Even before the recent confusing crisis in the straits of Hormuz, there is little doubt that Iran, and its proliferation efforts, have contributed to the instability and security concerns in the region. It has an advanced ballistic, cruise, and anti-ship missile program, which have rightfully drawn American ire. It has used this program to support proxies throughout the Middle East. Iranian-developed missile systems, albeit the older and less advanced ones, have even been used by Houthi forces in Yemen to conduct deep strikes into Saudi Arabia and target surface vessels. Hizballah has also made use of Iranian missiles. Yet while the Iranian missile program deserves the concerns it raises, a Saudi program could very well mirror Iran’s in both capabilities and proliferation and regional security concerns. Saudi Arabia already possess Chinese built DF-3 IRBMs and has a history of providing clandestine support and equipment to proxy agents throughout the Middle East. Many view the “Saudi Vision 2030” plan as unlikely to meet its lofty goals of reforming the Saudi economy and society. Reforms under the plan that are aimed at attracting business, supporting private economic development, and even tourism have already been derailed by familiar concerns over repression and government control and increased scrutiny following the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi. Saudi arms production is part of this initiative and faces equally daunting challenges. Even still, ballistic missile production may prove more successful than other parts of the “2030” plan. Ballistic missile proliferation is no longer as difficult as it once was and Saudi Arabia has surpassed some of the research, technical, and production barriers it once faced, and still faces in the production of other advanced conventional weapons.

#### Saudi prolif sparks nuclear conflict.

Edelman et al. ‘11 (Eric S. Edelman et al. 11. Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery. \*Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; he was U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in 2005-9. \*\*President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. \*\*\* Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. 2011. "The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment." Foreign Affairs. https://search-proquest-com.proxy.library.emory.edu/docview/821252097/4080CE81F20B4A73PQ/4?accountid=10747. accessed 8-30-2019//JDi)

The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. N-PLAYER COMPETITION Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

### T Pre-empts

#### 1 - Spec inevitable – affs read plans and negs read pics – uniquely worse because negs still have offs – 1AR’s also shift out of disads and competition

#### 2 - Reject Nebel

#### A - Not a linguist – pulls from nowhere

#### B - Financial incentives – inflates grammatical analysis to increase vbriefly traffic and make people cut his article

#### C - Err aff – defines words not the topic – IR scholars and foreign policy experts determine topic lit and ground

#### 3 - Reject Semantics

#### A – Arbitrary – different people have different meanings of words in certain contexts making precision impossible

#### B ­– Racist – concepts of correct grammar bracket minorities out of the discussion because they don’t speak proper english

#### C – Floor not a ceiling – some resolutional basis is good but we only care about semantics for pragmatic benefits

#### 4 - Limits wrong – you need solvency advocates, solid advantages, answers to NFU, Deterrence, and Bioweapons and disclosure

#### 5 - Ground is wrong – neg has way too much versus whole rez, more research is better, prevents repetitive staleness, and forces critical thinking to generate links.

## 1AC – normal

### Advantage

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From Strategic Culture, a site the FBI says is financed by a foreign spy agency, we read the following:∂ “The Israeli government has begun selling the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia information on how to develop nuclear weapons, according to a senior official at the Israeli military organization iHLS (Israel’s Homeland Security). Ami Dor-on, a senior nuclear commentator at the organization — which is partially funded by U.S. weapons-giant Raytheon – came forward because of his concern over the emerging nuclear arms race in the region. The cooperation between the two countries in helping the Saudis to develop a nuclear weapons program is just the latest sign of their warming relationship, with Israel recently calling the Saudi crown prince ‘a partner of Israel.’”∂ Though “packaged” as a revelation, in fact the information which seems to damn both Israel and Saudi Arabia, in fact covers for 40 years of cooperation in nuclear weapons research and production.∂ Saudi Arabia’s next foray into nuclear partnership touches on Pakistan. Since 1979, Pakistan has deployed troops in Saudi Arabia, ostensibly to defend that nation, remember, a nation with a military budget larger than Russia, from Iran.∂ By 1982, a protocol was signed and forces, number officially up to 20,000, have been deployed in Saudi Arabia. According to our sources, among them, in most recent years, have been highly trained specialists to secure a Pakistani nuclear arsenal including nuclear tipped missiles, deployed inside Saudi Arabia, “rented” as it were, as a deterrent against Iran.∂ Saudi Arabia has long conspired against Iran along with Israel yet, quite obviously, it is Saudi Arabia that would suffer the brunt of Iranian retaliation were a secret nuclear attack on Iran to be staged from Saudi Arabia or using Saudi airspace.∂ Were one to delve further into the intricacies of geopolitics, India’s political alliances, their dance between Russia and the US, and the secret military cooperation agreements between Israel and both India and Pakistan, something I discussed during an interview with then ISI Director Ahmad Shurja Pasha in 2011, weigh heavily on Saudi Arabia’s security concerns.∂ Suffice it to say, though there is no public discussion of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program other than those indicating it has gone on for decades and is, perhaps, the most unsuccessful such endeavor in planetary history, a very real arsenal exists and, according to highly knowledgeable sources, the Kingdom has deployed nuclear weapons against Yemen on several occasions.∂ A source at the IAEA claims, backed by a 2006 secret report from [Global Security,](https://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/B4777C6B-docs/WP-1815-054.pdf) that the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, blamed on an Iranian backed Saudi faction, was, in fact, a nuclear explosion.∂ The report quotes the Defense Special Weapons Agency, established on 29 January 1947 by the Atomic Energy Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Public Law 585, 79th Congress) to oversee and investigate the use of nuclear weapons and their impact on the security of the United States.∂ The conclusion of the report, redacted from public view, concluded that the Khobar Towers were destroyed by a tactical nuclear munition equaling 100 tons of TNT.∂ A similar IAEA report confirmed that finding, citing a blast crater and thermal damage only possible during a nuclear event. From that report:∂ “On June 25, 1996, Saudi terrorists sponsored by Iran attacked the Khobar Towers barracks, a high-rise building complex in a densely populated urban environment in Saudi Arabia. The tanker truck loaded with at least 5000 pounds of plastic explosives was driven into the parking lot in front of the Khobar Towers residential complex in Dhahran.∂ Nineteen American service members were killed in the blast, and hundreds of other service members and Saudis were injured.∂ There is no doubt that the extent of casualties in the Khobar Towers resulted, in part, from the extraordinary size of the terrorist bomb that contained the equivalent of 3000 to 8000 pounds of TNT, but a study by the Defense Special Weapons Agency concluded that the power of the bomb was actually closer to 20,000 pounds of TNT, (100 tons).”∂ The real conclusion of the report was, in fact, that Saudi Arabia had staged the attack themselves in an attempt to push the US into a war with Iran.∂ A very similar report was issued by the same agency, working with the IAEA and US Department of Energy, in 2003, offering their theory as to the events of 9/11. That report remains classified.∂ Putting much of the background together, moving forward the public record on modern nuclear weapons and their secret deployment was the publication of [The History of Nuclear Weapons Design 1945 -2016,](https://www.veteranstoday.com/2019/02/07/ultimate-leaks-the-history-of-nuclear-weapons-design-1945-2016/) published by Veterans Today. From that report, written by particle physicist and former IAEA inspector, Jeff Smith with Ian Greenhalgh:∂ “In the minds of most people, a nuclear weapon is a large device carried on the tip of an ICBM or carried in the belly of a huge bomber aircraft that when deployed produces a colossal explosion and spectacular mushroom cloud just like all those terrifying 1950s newsreels.∂ However, this is no longer the case – nuclear weapon design is several generations in advance of the bulky devices of the Cold War and today, a wide variety of types of nuclear weapon exist and they come in all sizes from the smallest ‘micro nukes’ with yields measuring in hundreds of tonnes of TNT equivalent up to truly monstrous two and three stage bombs with yields of many millions of tonnes of TNT (megatonnes).∂ The megatonne class bombs have never been deployed in anger; if they had, there would be no possible way to keep it a secret – the devastation and fallout would be on such a grand scale as to be impossible to hide. However, the sub-kilotonne mini and micro nukes have been used many times, both in false flag ‘terrorist’ attacks like 9-11 and OK City and in military conflicts in countries such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen.∂ The small yield and limited destruction of these mini and micro nukes means it is possible to keep their use secret; especially when the media are compliant and willfully ignore any and all instances of their use. The willingness of several players to use these diabolical weapons should send a chill down the spine of every sensible person – we are living in a new nuclear age far more dangerous and deadly than the previous Cold War era with its balance of nuclear power held in check by the terrifying concept of Mutually Assured Destruction.∂ Now that advanced nuclear weapons have become part of the playbook of modern conflict it becomes important to understand something about these weapons; to learn about their characteristics and effects so that it becomes ever harder to keep their use secret.”∂ The report goes further, not only into specifics of design, miniaturization and the history of weapons development but into a policy of “use and denial.”∂ “In the newest 5th generation devices the uranium or plutonium fissile content has been drastically reduced by as much as 90% only leaving enough fissile material needed to ignite and trigger the internal fission-fusion-fission reaction of the deuterium boost gas. In this process, almost all of the fissile material is totally consumed, producing almost no detectable traces of fallout, as compared to the older designs from the WW2 era.∂ These newer 5th generation weapon designs are the anarchist “21st century” favorite toys of mass destruction. By covertly hiding their existence away from the general public and secretly using them in stealthy nuclear-based guerrilla warfare attacks on undesirable persons, governments or countries — such as the Saudi’s use of a small tactical nuke on Yemen — with these new weapons of “very small” mass destruction, no non-nuclear possessing government can properly defend itself from this form of covert state-sponsored nuclear warfare.”∂ As we see, the “nuclear genii” has long been out of the bottle, known to all but those dependent on the fake public narrative, the “facts” allowed, fed to a public long deemed to have no “right to the truth.”∂ By and large, when the public evaluates, using such tools as it is allowed, the actions of leader, of policies followed, all soaked in spin and rhetoric, it does so with both hands tied behind its back.

#### Precision-guided munitions now expand Saudi ballistic missile production capabilities.

Fahrenkopf ‘19 (Nolan Fahrenkopf, Research fellow at the Center for Policy Research’s Project on International Security, Commerce, and Economic Statecraft (PISCES) at the University at Albany, "Giving Saudi Arabia Guided Munitions Tech Could Have Huge Consequences," War on the Rocks, 7-24-2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/giving-saudi-arabia-guided-munitions-tech-could-have-huge-consequences/)

The Saudi-led war in Yemen continues to be a point of contention between the Trump administration and a rare bipartisan group within Congress. Citing malign Iranian influence, the Trump administration issued an emergency authorization on May 24, directly confronting Congress by fast-tracking previously blocked arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. This move angered numerous Republicans, including Sen. Ted Cruz who supports the substance of the deal, yet told Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper to “follow the damn law.” The proposed arms deal now includes provisions beyond the technical support for aircraft and 120,000 precision strike munitions originally included. The Trump administration also granted the U.S. defense contractor Raytheon permission to engage in technology transfers and support the domestic production of critical guidance components and equipment in Saudi Arabia for the Paveway smart bombs that are being used extensively in Yemen. While both the Senate and House have already moved to block the deal, it is unclear if they will be able to override a likely presidential veto. Beyond the debate over the ethical and strategic concerns over how these weapons are used in Yemen, the transfer of sensitive military technology will likely contribute to the increasingly alarming proliferation of advanced missile and guided munitions throughout the world. Saudi Arabia is hungry for strategic technology. Part of the “Saudi Vision 2030” plan is to turn the kingdom into a major producer of advanced military goods and other strategic technology. This plan includes nuclear technology transfers from the United States — which have drawn close scrutiny — and a renewed interest in a domestic ballistic missile production capacity. This new arms deal has the potential to help jumpstart the Saudi missile program and contribute to the rampant proliferation of ballistic missiles and related technologies. The Trump administration is not only fueling a Saudi missile program, it also risks undercutting its own “Buy America” arms policy by helping to create a less discerning potential competitor. If Congress cannot overcome a presidential veto, it should work to, at the very least, eliminate the domestic production portion of the deal. Such a change will not impede the ability of Saudi Arabia to continue its fight against Iranian aligned Houthi forces in Yemen and will protect the Trump administration’s “Buy America” policy. While the Paveway is a bomb rather than a missile system, the guidance systems it employs can be applied to both types of weapons. Paveways are conventional bombs that are equipped with a kit to make it a precision strike weapon. Think of the Paveway as a guidance “kit” that can be installed on pre-existing “dumb bombs.” These kits include both software and hardware with advanced guidance algorithms, laser-guidance technology, GPS guidance technology, and digital signal processors to analyze large amounts of guidance information quickly. All this technology is important to broader missile productionq endeavors, whether they are cruise missiles or ballistic missiles. So why is this a problem? Some technologies are more readily applied to strategic arms programs than others. Ballistic missiles, not surpisingly, can be applied to a nuclear weapons program. Academic research has found that there is a spillover effect between different types of military production efforts. Military production programs can fuel one another. Scientists, technicians, and managers don’t operate in a bubble. What they learn about producing guidance technology can be beneficial for other projects because the organizational, technical, and scientific demands are often similar or even building blocks for more advanced weapons. Tacit knowledge — which is hard to transfer or teach — and explicit knowledge from one arms program can bolster the human capital states can bring to bear on other proliferation efforts. Policymakers and academics are increasingly seeing this proliferation spillover. Research has shown this spillover effect in space technology, cruise missiles, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missile programs. What Saudi Arabian scientists, technicians, and program managers learn from guidance technology production can translate into advances in other realms, such as missiles and even nuclear weapons technology. By approving this deal, Washington is granting Riyadh immensely valuable knowledge and experience and providing a key cog in its growing missile production endeavor. The spillover effects from this deal may prove to be particularly powerful given Saudi Arabia’s growing interest in missile and nuclear technology and the lack of a proper strategic trade control infrastructure. Saudi Arabia has been investing significant resources in the development of a domestic ballistic missile production capacity, including secret missile deals with both Ukraine and China. The deal with Ukraine included the Saudi-financed production of a new missile system, the Grom 2, which has already begun to enter critical test phases. Recent research has also found that Saudi Arabia may have begun to construct missile production facilities. The new facilities at the al-Watah missile base seem to include engine production and test facilities to accommodate advanced solid-fuel engines. Together, these efforts indicate that Saudi Arabia’s desire for missile technology has gone beyond simply purchasing foreign systems. Riyadh has also recently benefited from a nuclear technology transfer deal with Washington. This deal includes civil nuclear technology and the all-important technical support and training. What is particularly troublesome is Riyadh’s refusal to accept a “123” safeguards agreement nine nonproliferation principles. The rejection of the 123 safeguards agreement, Saudi demand for enrichment capabilities, and a long simmering interest in acquiring nuclear weapons — especially if it looks like Iran will do so first — greatly increases the risks of this deal. So, within a single year, the Trump administration could be jumpstarting both the missile and nuclear legs of a Saudi strategic weapons program. Granting Saudi Arabia access to guidance technology will advance their missile production efforts, adding another potentially destabilizing supplier of missile technology into the world. This is particularly worrisome given mounting evidence that U.S. weapons given to Saudi Arabia may not be fully secure. The backdrop of Saudi Arabia’s new focus on advanced arms acquisition and production feeds a classic security dilemma with Iran. The proxy war in Yemen is only one facet of this. Iran’s missile programs and now renewed nuclear enrichment have undoubtedly pushed Saudi Arabia to try and keep up. Even before the recent confusing crisis in the straits of Hormuz, there is little doubt that Iran, and its proliferation efforts, have contributed to the instability and security concerns in the region. It has an advanced ballistic, cruise, and anti-ship missile program, which have rightfully drawn American ire. It has used this program to support proxies throughout the Middle East. Iranian-developed missile systems, albeit the older and less advanced ones, have even been used by Houthi forces in Yemen to conduct deep strikes into Saudi Arabia and target surface vessels. Hizballah has also made use of Iranian missiles. Yet while the Iranian missile program deserves the concerns it raises, a Saudi program could very well mirror Iran’s in both capabilities and proliferation and regional security concerns. Saudi Arabia already possess Chinese built DF-3 IRBMs and has a history of providing clandestine support and equipment to proxy agents throughout the Middle East. Many view the “Saudi Vision 2030” plan as unlikely to meet its lofty goals of reforming the Saudi economy and society. Reforms under the plan that are aimed at attracting business, supporting private economic development, and even tourism have already been derailed by familiar concerns over repression and government control and increased scrutiny following the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi. Saudi arms production is part of this initiative and faces equally daunting challenges. Even still, ballistic missile production may prove more successful than other parts of the “2030” plan. Ballistic missile proliferation is no longer as difficult as it once was and Saudi Arabia has surpassed some of the research, technical, and production barriers it once faced, and still faces in the production of other advanced conventional weapons. Missile proliferation experts have pointed out that ballistic missiles aren’t beyond the budgets or capabilities of states if the demand is high enough. The best way to prevent ballistic missile proliferation is therefore by reducing demand and increasing the cost. Increasing costs can take the form of slowing proliferation by reducing access to critical technology and equipment through export controls and sanctions as well as sanctions that punish a state beyond proliferation efforts, such as many of the sanctions leveled at North Korea. Since technology acquisition is such a major component of missile proliferation, the Trump administration’s recent arms deal would significantly lower the cost of such efforts. Political pressure is another way to increase the costs. The United States has frequently used such tactics to limit the proliferation ambitions of allies, such as South Korea. With this arms deal and the nuclear deal, the United States is doing the opposite: providing invaluable technology and signaling that it is tacitly accepting Saudi actions. The “Saudi Vision 2030” plan may be an expensive and futile project, but Trump’s deal and the signal it would send would help Saudi Arabia achieve one of the plan’s steps, with strategic consequences that are not proportional to the costs Riyadh would normally have to bear. The United States is not the only producer of advanced guided weapons. Russia, China, Japan, India, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, as well as other Western European NATO members can produce at least limited precision-guided munitions. The United States does not have a monopoly on the proliferation of this technology. Even NATO member states don’t always see eye to eye on the export of such munitions, as illustrated by the French and U.K. export of the Storm Shadow cruise missile that irked the United States (at least initially). Saudi Arabia is seeking to take advantage of this competition by diversifying its arms imports to increase its ability to leverage better deals. In fact, many of these states have a history of transferring military technology, including for missile systems. However, transfers of this nature and caliber are often strategic. Without U.S. support, Saudi Arabia will likely struggle to gain access to advanced guidance technology, let alone permission to produce it. And even if it does, access to the technology and production methods behind Paveway guidance units, given their advanced nature, would be a coup for the Saudi missile program. Given what we know about Saudi Arabia’s broader proliferation objectives and the spillover of capabilities between related proliferation realms, the U.S. arms deal should not include technology transfer or domestic production guarantees. And while full details of the technology transfer and domestic production guarantees have yet to be negotiated by Raytheon, guidance technology is so critical it will help to jumpstart the growing Saudi missile program. Such a program will likely have broader consequences to regional and global security, as it may be only one leg of a future strategic weapons program. Congress should continue in its bipartisan efforts to block at least the guidance technology portion of the deal. Given Saudi Arabia’s broader production ambitions that will benefit from this deal, it would be in the best interest for both Raytheon and the Trump administration to re-think it as well.

#### Missile production capabilities sparks massive nuclear proliferation.

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS In addition to these well-known motives and constraints to pursuing nuclear weapons, recent scholarship has emphasized supply-side technology constraints that raise the costs of attempting to pursue nuclear weapons. Acquiring nuclear weapons via indigenous effort (that is, as opposed to purchasing them – as attempted by Egypt – or receiving them from allies – as attempted by Australia) requires mastery of a substantial range of technologies, industrial processes, and scientific competencies. As Alexander Montgomery writes, “A nuclear weapons program is a large-scale socio-technical system that requires a longterm investment in multiple technologies, each with its own unique hurdles to overcome” (Meyer 1984; Montgomery 2013). These hurdles include sophisticated metallurgy, chemical engineering, nuclear engineering, nuclear physics, electronic engineering, and a large capacity for producing nitric acid, electricity, and uranium milling. A solid technological and scientific infrastructure would be necessary to build, operate, and maintain relevant plants and labs. In addition, a would-be proliferator would need a substantial number of skilled technicians and craftsmen to run and maintain the infrastructure. It is not just a question of acquiring the relevant equipment, but of operating and maintaining it over a number of years, and it is in the latter where would-be proliferators often fall short (Meyer 1984; Montgomery 2013). Moreover, the challenge is greater than that posed by a sequence of discrete technological tasks; the various steps must be carefully integrated with each other, posing an organizational/managerial challenge equal to the technological challenges (Hymans 2008). Chief among these challenges is the construction and operation of the facilities needed to produce fissile materials and to fabricate the weapons. Although the management and organizational challenges of running nuclear programs have been underemphasized in the literature, the historical record shows that they are considerable (Hymans 2008; Hymans 2012). Poorly run organizations find the challenge of constructing and operating nuclear facilities difficult, if not impossible. For example, Romanian efforts to develop nuclear infrastructure as part of their flirtation with the bomb were dysfunctional to a comic degree. Romanian officials drew upon techniques they had used for more labor-intensive economic activities, mobilizing forced laborers to build a series of CANDU nuclear power plants based on Canadian designs; a Canadian engineer located at the site described their efforts as “more appropriate to a potato harvest than to high-technology construction” (Hymans 2008, 275). Beyond the need for competent managers, nuclear programs rely on a high degree of tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge – knowledge that must be acquired via hands-on learning or trial and error – looms large at both the enrichment/ separation phase of nuclear weapons programs. Countries that lack indigenous, applied technical expertise in the nuclear realm will face substantial challenges in mastering the operation of uranium enrichment and plutonium separation equipment (Montgomery 2005). Tacit knowledge is also essential to building and fabricating the nuclear weapons themselves (MacKenzie and Spinardi 1995). Weapons designers often refer to their craft as an “art” rather than “science,” and, even in a mature nuclear weapons power like the United States, it takes 5 to 10 years for new designers to become “useful” (MacKenzie and Spinardi 1995, 62). Casting fissile materials and high explosives into shapes required for missile topping implosion devices requires not just advanced knowledge in metallurgy, manufacturing, and engineering, but also extensive hands-on experience. The AQ Khan network, for example, attempted to pass this knowledge on in writing, but without apparent success (Montgomery 2005, 178). Creating an effective nuclear weapons program also requires creating a broad network of supporters both inside and outside of the government. According to Flank (1995, 260), “Nuclear weapons advocates need to recruit an array of allies: the security elite, the military R&D establishment, commercial contractors or the press… These diverse communities and interests would never monolithically decide to construct nuclear weapons, with the technical processes then obediently following in the wake of the political decision. Instead, complex systems start small and build painstakingly on existing resources.” Harnessing the interests and energies of diverse constituencies to support a nuclear weapons program represents a substantial practical and political challenge. Constituencies that share complementary or overlapping interests can thus be valuable allies in advocating for resources and shaping the trajectory and goals of nuclear programs. MILITARY ROCKET PROGRAMS The reasons why governments seek to acquire ballistic missile and nuclear weapons capabilities often overlap, as do the capacities required to succeed in those efforts (Mettler and Reiter 2013). Yet a country need not possess missile programs to obtain nuclear weapons, just as a country need not possess nuclear weapons programs to obtain ballistic missiles. Although these two weapons capabilities follow separate developmental tracks, they naturally converge at the creation of nuclear-armed long-range ballistic missiles. Even after a country has successfully conducted its first nuclear test, it can still take years to design an effective nuclear warhead small enough to be launched on ballistic missiles (Karp 1996, 179-185). The apparent ability of Pakistan to field nuclear-armed missiles rapidly potentially indicates the close cooperation between its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. This suggests that both direct and indirect bridges can be built between ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs, potentially long before a country conducts its first nuclear tests. The international demand for missile capabilities is much larger than the demand for nuclear weapons. Most countries start investing in their military rocketry programs long before they ever began pursuing nuclear weapons. In part, this is because shorter range missiles and rockets have significant tactical applications. States often begin their military rocketry R&D programs by seeking to master the development of missiles and rockets for use on the battlefield and then move on to developing the capacity to produce more sophisticated missile variants that have strategic applications. Similarities between rocket and nuclear technologies and the knowledge, skills, and capabilities required to obtain them provide a strong basis for our linkage of the two capabilities’ developmental trajectories. The factors affecting governments’ ability to develop advanced civil and military rocketry capabilities have been the subject of study by historians, political scientists, and policy-planners (e.g. MacDougal 1985; MacKenzie 1990; Karp 1996; Rumsfeld Commission 1998; Mistry 2003; Gormley 2008; Early 2014). Developing indigenous ballistic missile capabilities requires countries to cultivate military rocketry research and development (R&D) establishments that can bring together scientists, engineers, and technicians to master the technological complexities of rocketry (Karp 1996, Chapter 4). Similar to nuclear technology, rocketry technology is inherently dual-use as there is substantial overlap in the scientific basis, design, and technical aspects of civilian and military rockets. Tacit knowledge also plays a critical role in the design, construction, and operation of rockets (Karp 1996; Montgomery 2005; Johnson-Freese 2007). Designing and developing complex rockets requires a systems-level approach to integrating a variety of technologies and components, such as their engines, guidance systems, casing materials, and payloads (Gormley 2008). Just as a nuclear weapons program requires the ability to integrate a range of technologies and operations effectively, so do rocketry programs. Building rockets also requires a skilled workforce in order to meet the exacting construction standards they require to operate successfully. Since most rockets are designed to be used only once, and the slightest malfunctions, miscalculations, and accidents often lead to failure, quality control is exceptionally important (Karp 1996). As such, successful missile and space programs require cultivating significant amounts of scientific and technical (S&T) human capital in the rocketry realm (Early 2014). Finally, obtaining advanced military or civilian rocket capabilities requires governments to effectively coordinate and manage organizationally complex projects that involve substantial outlays of resources. Acquiring indigenous rocket capabilities can be very costly, but these costs vary on the basis of how wisely governments spend their resources. Possessing national laboratories and research universities, weapons design and testing facilities, and an extensive military industrial base will help countries make more effective use of the resources they devote towards acquiring rocket capabilities. According to Karp (1996, 77-97), the quality of the developmental strategy that governments employ to obtain ballistic missiles capabilities and the quality of those projects’ management also help determine the ultimate success of acquisition efforts. Developing advanced indigenous rocketry capabilities requires cooperation between countries’ public and private industries, research establishments, governmental agencies, and militaries. A steep learning curve may exist in figuring out how to effectively coordinate amongst the diverse actors involved in these programs, evaluating the best developmental strategies to pursue, and determining how to appropriately fund them. There can be many failures along the way, but scientists, engineers, and policymakers can learn from them over time. States’ rocketry R&D establishments may thus not only grow larger over time, but they should also benefit from the accumulation of tacit knowledge and S&T human capital. Early (2014) finds, for example, that the longer a country has possessed a military rocketry R&D program, the more likely states are to succeed in developing space launch vehicles (SLVs). Given the similarities of rocket and nuclear technologies and the programmatic efforts necessary to successfully acquire them, as well as the strategic and political linkages between the two programs, we argue that countries’ investments in their military rocketry sectors will enhance their ability to acquire nuclear weapons. Our theory links countries’ military rocketry programs to nuclear weapons programs via two causal mechanisms. First, we argue that countries’ investments in military rocketry R&D programs spur the growth of SMICs that contribute to nuclear weapons acquisition efforts. The creation of military rocketry SMICs fosters cooperative linkages between government, industry, and academia in working on national projects, provides governments with important lessons about how to design and manage complex weapons acquisition efforts, and provides an institutionalized incubator for military S&T human capital. Secondly, the political constituencies created by military rocketry R&D programs may use their bureaucratic leverage to advocate for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which would, in turn, increase the resources devoted towards military rocketry programs and their importance (Flank 1995). Scientific and strategic enclaves are often noted as important drivers of nuclear weapons programs (Perkovich 1999; Sagan 2000), and a large-scale military rocketry program will both increase the size and enhance the prestige of the SMIC. When countries initiate indigenous military rocketry capabilities, they are investing in developing their S&T human capital. Both rocketry and nuclear weapons programs require a synthesis of different disciplines (such as, physics, metallurgy, and chemistry), forcing scientists, engineers, and technicians to work together. Countries are more apt to initiate military R&D efforts on rocket technology as opposed to nuclear weapons technology because missile technology has immediate tactical applications, the technological challenges to mastering basic rocketry are lower, and rocket programs do not require rare materials (like uranium) to initiate. By funding these research programs, governments are injecting money into the training of scientists, engineers, and skilled technicians and their employment in SMICs, and in acquiring the management capacity to run large-scale programs successfully. In addition to human capital, governments that seek to develop advanced military rocketry capabilities require significant private or public sector investments in research infrastructure that can lay the foundation for nuclear weapons programs. Advanced research on new materials, fuels, chemicals, and electronic systems requires the use of laboratories or research facilities. The fabrication of rockets and missiles requires large-scale manufacturing facilities, as well as access to a varied collection of high-quality precursor components and raw materials from which the rockets will be built. Whereas some countries possess completely government-run arms industries, other countries’ arms industries mix public and private ventures. Mature rocketry R&D programs can build up either sector in ways that would be subsequently beneficial to nuclear weapons R&D efforts. Lastly, testing rockets and ballistic missiles require large, remotely located test facilities. Governments seeking to test nuclear weapons often confront similar dilemmas in finding areas in which to conduct their tests. The investments governments make in funding weapons laboratories, supporting governmental or private sector arms manufacturing programs, and developing and building weapons test facilities can all pay significant dividends for nuclear weapons programs as well. To be sure, not all of the infrastructure nor industries military rocketry R&D programs spawn will be directly applicable to a nuclear weapons program, but governments need not start from scratch in creating the necessary R&D infrastructure for nuclear weapons programs if they already possess a mature military rocketry SMIC. Mature military rocketry SMICs can also yield valuable organizational benefits for governments pursuing large-scale rocketry R&D projects. Military rocketry programs require actors from government bureaucracies, academia and research institutions, militaries, and the private sector to work together towards the achievement of joint goals. Organizationally, creating synergistic ties between actors from these institutions and finding ways of facilitating productive working relationships between them is one of the most difficult challenges associated with developing advanced rocketry capabilities (Karp 1996). Similar challenges confront governments pursuing nuclear weapons (Hymans 2012; Montgomery 2013). The choices that governments make in organizing their rocketry programs help determine whether their efforts succeed or fail and how much such efforts ultimately cost (Karp 1996). To the extent that governments can learn from successes and failures with their rocketry programs, their management of their nuclear weapons programs will be improved. Thus, governments can benefit from the institutional connections and programmatic knowledge they have previously obtained from their military rocketry programs and apply that towards their pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities—thus lowering the costs of pursuing nuclear weapons, making their efforts more likely to succeed, and decreasing the time it takes to succeed. In the DPRK, for example, the government’s investments in its ballistic missile sector appeared to pay dividends for its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Hymans (2012, 248-255) argues that the neo-patrimonial character of the DPRK regime played a major role in impeding its nuclear weapons and missile development efforts. Yet the DPRK still managed to develop both capabilities, emerging as one of the world’s most active ballistic missile proliferators during the 1980s and, subsequently, acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities in the 2000s (Pollack 2011). A key institutional innovation adopted by Kim Il-Sung that aided in these efforts was the founding of the Hamhŭng Military Academy in 1965, which had “the mandate… to nurture those personnel which are able to develop mid- and long-range ballistic missiles.”7 This research and training academy, subordinate to the DPRK’s Ministry of Defense, helped provide the “foundation” for the subsequent indigenous ballistic missile production capability the DPRK eventually acquired.8 The DPRK possesses a set of similarly oriented scientific-military and arms-production institutions, such as the Second Natural Science Institute and the Second Economic Committee, that house both missile and nuclear weapons-related research, design, and production efforts.9 The close organizational overlap between the institutions involved in housing these highly complex, technical weapons development projects suggest that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons effort could have readily benefited from lessons learned from its prior success in obtaining indigenous ballistic missile production capabilities, the R&D infrastructure it created for those programs, and the cultivation of a skilled body of scientists and technicians in a country in which S&T capital is scarce. The missile technology for nuclear technology exchange between the DPRK and Pakistan also illustrates the close associational linkages between the DPRK’s weapons development and acquisition efforts in both sectors (Montgomery 2005). Understanding the connections between the DPRK’s military rocketry R&D programs and nuclear weapons program can help explain how it managed to acquire nuclear weapons in spite of other aspects of its regime that likely ~~retarded~~ the program’s progress (Hymans 2008). Lastly, the governmental bureaucracies created to manage military rocketry programs and interest groups that commercially benefit from them can grow into powerful political constituencies that could support the pursuit of nuclear technology and weapons. For example, the founder of modern French rocketry, Robert Esnault-Pelterie, was a prominent advocate of exploring the potential applications of nuclear technology for rocketry during the 1930s (Turner 2009: 219). Given that possessing nuclear weapons can create a demand for long-range ballistic missiles, which governments otherwise have few incentives to possess, actors within military rocketry SMICs have strong incentives to push politicians towards acquiring nuclear weapons. Because many of the same policy actors that have a voice with respect to governmental missile policies will also have a voice with respect to nuclear policies, a mature military rocketry SMIC can amplify the interests that many of those actors might have in acquiring nuclear weapons (Flank 1995). Thus, possessing mature military rocketry research programs will contribute to countries’ capacity to acquire nuclear weapons and the political demand within governments to obtain them.

#### Rigorous empirics prove the nuclear domino theory.

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Is the nuclear domino theory historically valid? Despite its longstanding centrality to thinking on nuclear proliferation amongst scholars and policymakers, in recent years a revisionist consensus has emerged in opposition to this traditional view. Based on an analysis of historical evidence from the aftermath of the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, this article argues that scholars have gone too far in rejecting the nuclear domino theory. Reactive proliferation has been more prevalent than commonly believed, and while it is true that only India acquired a nuclear arsenal in response to the Chinese test, to a significant extent this is precisely because the United States was aware of the danger of reactive proliferation and worked to stop it. Finally, the historical evidence suggests that the nuclear domino theory is compatible with both domestic and prestige motivations for proliferation in addition to the security motives normally associated with the theory. When one state acquires nuclear weapons, do other states inevitably follow? The belief in the affirmative (hereafter termed the nuclear domino theory) was once an article of faith among world leaders and analysts of nuclear proliferation. In the last decade, however, a growing chorus of scholars has attacked the validity of the nuclear domino theory from a diverse array of methodological and theoretical perspectives.1 The goal of this article is to contest this emerging revisionist consensus. More specifically, the article advances three primary claims: (1) that reactive proliferation behavior in the form of nuclear exploration and pursuit has been more common than recent scholarship has acknowledged; (2) that, contrary to common belief, the nuclear domino theory is compatible with a multicausal approach to proliferation, embracing security, domestic, and normative motivations; and (3) most importantly, that US nonproliferation policy has played a central role in rendering nuclear domino predictions self-defeating. As evidence for these claims, this article turns to the aftermath of the People’s Republic of China’s first nuclear test in October 1964. Although US officials were well aware of the Chinese nuclear program, and had in fact considered a preemptive attack on Chinese nuclear facilities, they were nonetheless caught off guard by the timing of the detonation.2 In response, the Lyndon Johnson administration commissioned the Gilpatric Committee to conduct an internal reassessment of US nonproliferation policy.3 The committee’s secret report, issued on 21 January 1965, came to four main conclusions: “1. The spread of nuclear weapons poses an increasingly grave threat to the security of the United States . . . 2. The world is fast approaching a point of no return in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons . . . 3. Success in preventing the future spread of nuclear weapons requires a concerted and intensified effort . . . [and] 4. A major effort on our part has promise of success in halting or ~~retarding~~ the spread of nuclear weapons.”4 The committee recommended that the US adopt a far more active and comprehensive nonproliferation policy, including pushing for a nonproliferation treaty (which later became the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or NPT), a comprehensive test ban treaty, and regional nuclear-free zones.5 In terms of bilateral policy, the committee emphasized the importance of security guarantees, refraining from spreading sensitive technologies, and the threat and use of sanctions to deter or halt nuclear weapons programs.6 The overall thrust of the report, as Francis Gavin notes, was that “when U.S. nonproliferation goals clashed with other policy interests, nonproliferation should take precedence.”7 Fundamental to the committee’s decision to promote a proactive nonproliferation policy was the belief by its members in a nuclear domino theory—that proliferation breeds proliferation, so to speak. It was feared that without a strong nonproliferation policy, a Chinese nuclear capability would cause regional states as diverse as Australia, Japan, India, South Korea, Taiwan (ROC), and Indonesia to pursue nuclear weapons, which in turn could spark further proliferation worldwide.8 Of course, more than forty-five years after the Chinese test, out of these states only India has built a nuclear bomb. The apparent inaccuracy of this prediction, as well as countless others made by policymakers both during and after the Cold War, has contributed to the new revisionist consensus identified above. However, a close analysis of the historical evidence from the aftermath of the Chinese nuclear test suggests different conclusions. Three main findings emerge from the analysis; in combination they cast significant doubt on the revisionist critique of the nuclear domino theory. First, scholars have gone too far in rejecting the prevalence of reactive proliferation. In fact, exactly as the nuclear domino theory would predict, India, Taiwan, Australia, Japan, and Indonesia all reacted to the Chinese test by considering and pursuing nuclear weapons development to varying degrees.9 South Korea also pursued nuclear weapons within a decade of the Chinese test and was only coerced into halting this effort by US pressure, although evidence suggests this was driven more by the North Korean threat than the Chinese nuclear capability.10 Second, while it is true that only India successfully acquired a nuclear arsenal in the wake of the Chinese test, to a significant extent this is precisely because the United States was aware of the danger of reactive proliferation and worked to stop it. Through a mix of bilateral diplomacy, threats of sanctions, security guarantees, and the promotion of the NPT—exactly what the Gilpatric Committee recommended—the United States succeeded in slowing or rolling back several nuclear programs triggered by the Chinese test. In other words, the nuclear domino theory in the aftermath of the Chinese test largely took the form of a self-defeating prophecy. While the idea that nonproliferation policies may make domino predictions self-defeating is not new, the evidence in support of this proposition has been thin to date.11 Moreover, it suggests the nuclear domino theory is in fact a valid basis for policymaking and the United States should avoid complacency and maintain active nonproliferation policies if it is to prevent nuclear dominoes from falling in the future. Third, while the nuclear domino theory is commonly associated with a realist, security-centered model of proliferation, and has been criticized for this fact, there is no inherent reason why this must be the case.12 In fact, the authors of the Gilpatric Committee report recognized this, noting three distinct ways in which the Chinese test could influence other states: “The recent Chinese Communist nuclear explosion has reinforced the belief, increasingly prevalent throughout the world, that nuclear weapons are a distinguishing mark of a world leader, are essential to national security, and are feasible even with modest industrial resources.”13 Indeed, the cases examined here indicate there are at least three mechanisms by which the theory can operate, and that multiple mechanisms can operate at once. One state’s nuclear developments can serve as the impetus for the pursuit of nuclear weapons in another state in one of three ways: (1) by increasing security threat perception, (2) by strengthening the hand of domestic and bureaucratic forces that were already pushing a nuclear weapons program, tipping the balance in their favor, or (3) by creating a new demand for prestige. In other words, the nuclear domino theory is perfectly compatible with Scott D. Sagan’s three models of proliferation (security, domestic/ bureaucratic, and normative) and a multicausal approach to nuclear proliferation.14 Even where domestic and prestige factors are the driving motives behind the desire for the bomb, a newly emerging nuclear state can serve as an important trigger for proliferation decisions. Because not all reactive proliferation decisions are based solely on security, and because leader perception is so critical, existing quantitative analyses that rely on objective security indicators such as whether a military rival has an ongoing nuclear weapons program inevitably miss historical cases of reactive proliferation.15

#### Saudi prolif sparks nuclear conflict.

Edelman et al. ‘11 (Eric S. Edelman et al. 11. Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery. \*Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; he was U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in 2005-9. \*\*President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. \*\*\* Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. 2011. "The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment." Foreign Affairs. https://search-proquest-com.proxy.library.emory.edu/docview/821252097/4080CE81F20B4A73PQ/4?accountid=10747. accessed 8-30-2019//JDi)

The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. N-PLAYER COMPETITION Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

#### Nuclear war is existential – climate, mass starvation, Ice Age, and meltdowns

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Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate[i] and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer[ii]. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. [iii] These peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error – also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race.[iv] In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life. A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war”,[v] begins by stating: “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction.” In 2009, I wrote an article[vi] for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament that summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth[vii]) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer. Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations. Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices[viii], including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil-off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic.[ix] In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the US and Russian military – emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins. Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear weapons had already been used on the battlefield. Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads,[xi] which can be launched with only a few minutes warning.[xii] Both the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase”, which allows them to transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds.

#### Best studies conclude prolif causes war

Quek, 16—Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong (Kai, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Use of Nuclear Options,” Political Research Quarterly June 2016 vol. 69 no. 2 195-206, dml) [“N” in “N = 2” refers to the number of states with a nuclear option in a crisis]

Does nuclear proliferation affect the risk that nuclear weapons will be used in a crisis? The question implicates human survival but is difficult to study, as observations of nuclear war do not actually exist. Our empirical knowledge is thus limited. I use experimental games with nuclear options to circumvent the observational constraint and construct empirical tests. I find that decisions are mostly peaceful at N = 2 despite the existence of nuclear options with a relative first-strike advantage. This finding is especially relevant as most nuclear-state confrontations in history had been bilateral crises. More generally, I find that one is less likely to choose the nuclear option when it is known that the number of nuclear actors in the crisis is small, and more likely to choose the nuclear option when it is known that the number of nuclear actors is large. In particular, a jump in the number of nuclear actors in crisis beyond N = 2 significantly increases the chance of choosing the nuclear option. Preliminary probes also suggest that players in inter-alliance crises are more peaceful when they have second-strike countervalue capabilities, and that nuclear framing has no significant effect on the use of the nuclear option.∂ To my knowledge, this is the first randomized experiment in political science that focuses on the relationship between proliferation and the use of nuclear options.23 In a fortunate world where nuclear war remains unobserved, there are justifications for an experimental approach on theoretical, practical, and ethical grounds. Methodologically, the use of a controlled experiment also allows for a clean identification of the causal relationship,.∂ This experiment focuses exclusively on the strategic dimension. It also assumes that the crisis has already escalated to the point where players are considering the use of the nuclear option, and thus it does not address the ex ante question of whether nuclear weapons would make states more cautious about avoiding conflict escalation in the first place (Waltz 2003). Nonetheless, while the focus of the experiment is narrow, it is a useful first step toward understanding the strategic effects of proliferation on the risk of nuclear conflict.∂ Several implications arise for future research. First, with the basic mechanism established, we now have a baseline for future experiments that explore various realistic complications to the nuclear-option game. For instance, do interactions between nuclear actors change when we introduce different types of psychological stress, or different stake sizes, or different asymmetries in the expected cost of nuclear conflict? In particular, an interesting extension of this experiment would be to study how behavior differs—or does not—across interactions with different combinations of nuclear and non-nuclear actors.∂ The results suggest that distrust over the rationality of other players increases with an increase in the N parameter, and weakens the tendency toward the payoff-dominant outcome of peaceful restraint. Thus, proliferation may be dangerous even in a world of states trying to behave rationally, contrary to the arguments made by Waltz (2003) and others in which the common knowledge of rationality is assumed. The results also offer an interesting contrast with Asal and Breadsley’s (2007) finding that the risk of (non-nuclear) war is higher when the number of nuclear actors in crisis is lower. This contrast raises the hypothesis that states in bilateral crises may choose to drag out a crisis as the risk of nuclear war is lower under N = 2, as suggested by our results.24 This hypothesis has practical importance and should be investigated in future research.

#### Prolif causes nuke war and terror – accidents, risk-taking, and preemptive strikes.

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The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange. Nuclear Terrorism The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.54 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a ‘religious duty’ for Al- Qa’eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.55 Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56 Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.57 Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. Regional Instability The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers, contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the ‘stability-instability paradox’ maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.60 Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.62 Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange.

#### A bevy of statistical analysis verifies nuclear deterrence fails – decades of empirical conflicts disprove adversarial calculus and nuclear-armed states fail a higher proportion of the time. Threats of counter forcing create asymmetric incentives for escalation as both sides try to achieve the first-mover advantage and deterrence theory misreads leaders – opens Pandora’s box of misperceptions, accidents, and false alarms which all independently trigger high-alert systems.

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In his classic The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (1989), Lawrence Freedman, the dean of British military historians and strategists, concluded: ‘The Emperor Deterrence may have no clothes, but he is still Emperor.’ Despite his nakedness, this emperor continues to strut about, receiving deference he doesn’t deserve, while endangering the entire world. Nuclear deterrence is an idea that became a potentially **lethal ideology**, one that **remains influential** despite having been **increasingly discredited**. After the United States’ nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, war changed. Until then, the overriding purpose of military forces had ostensibly been to win wars. But according to the influential US strategist Bernard Brodie writing in 1978: ‘From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.’ Thus, nuclear deterrence was born, a **seemingly rational** arrangement by which peace and stability were to arise by the threat of **mutually assured destruction** (MAD, appropriately enough). Winston Churchill described it in 1955 with characteristic vigour: ‘Safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.’ Importantly, deterrence became not only a purported strategy, but the **very grounds** on which governments **justified nuclear weapons** themselves. Every government that now possesses nuclear weapons claims that they deter attacks by their threat of **catastrophic retaliation**. Even a brief examination, however, reveals that deterrence is not **remotely as compelling** a principle as its reputation suggests. In his novel The Ambassadors (1903), Henry James described a certain beauty as ‘a jewel brilliant and hard’, at once twinkling and trembling, adding that ‘what seemed all surface one moment seemed all depth the next’. The public has **been bamboozled** by the **shiny surface** appearance of deterrence, with its promise of strength, security and safety. But what has been touted as profound strategic depth **crumbles with surprising ease** when subjected to critical scrutiny. Let’s start by considering the core of deterrence theory: that it has worked. Advocates of nuclear deterrence insist that we should thank it for the fact that a **third world war** has been avoided, even when **tensions between the two superpowers** – the US and the USSR – ran high. Some supporters even maintain that deterrence set the stage for the fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Communism. In this telling, the West’s nuclear deterrent prevented the USSR from invading western Europe, and delivered the world from the threat of Communist tyranny. There are, however, **compelling arguments** suggesting that the US and the former Soviet Union avoided world war for **several possible reasons**, most notably because **neither side wanted to go to war**. Indeed, the US and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age. Singling out nuclear weapons as the reason why the **Cold War never became hot** is somewhat like saying that a junkyard car, without an engine or wheels, never sped off the lot only **because no one turned the key**. Logically speaking, there is **no way to demonstrate** that nuclear weapons kept the peace during the Cold War, or that they do so now. Perhaps peace prevailed between the two superpowers simply because they had no quarrel that justified fighting a terribly destructive war, even a conventional one. **There is no evidence**, for example, that the Soviet leadership **ever contemplated** trying to conquer western Europe, much **less that it was restrained** by the West’s nuclear arsenal. Post facto arguments – especially negative ones – might be the **currency of pundits**, but are **impossible to prove,** and offer **no solid ground** for evaluating a counterfactual claim, conjecturing why something has not happened. In colloquial terms, if a dog does not bark in the night, can we say with certainty that no one walked by the house? Deterrence enthusiasts are like the woman who **sprayed perfume on her lawn** every morning. When a perplexed neighbour asked about this strange behaviour, she replied: **‘I do it to keep the elephants away.’** The neighbour protested: ‘But **there aren’t any elephants** within 10,000 miles of here,’ whereupon the perfume-sprayer replied: **‘You see, it works!’** We should not congratulate our leaders, or deterrence theory, much less nuclear weapons, for keeping the peace. What we can say is that, as of this morning, those with the power to exterminate life have not done so. But this is not altogether comforting, and **history is no more reassuring**. The duration of ‘nuclear peace’, from the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, lasted less than five decades. More than 20 years separated the First and Second World Wars; before that, there had been more than 40 years of relative peace between the end of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) and the First World War (1914), and 55 years between the Franco-Prussian War and Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo (1815). Even in war-prone Europe, **decades of peace** have not been so rare. Each time, when peace ended and the next war began, the war involved weapons available at the time – which, for the next big one, would likely include nuclear weapons. The only way to make sure that nuclear weapons are not used is to make sure that there are no such weapons. There is certainly **no reason to think** that the presence of nuclear weapons will prevent their use. The first step to ensuring that humans do not unleash **nuclear [winter]** holocaust might be to show that the Emperor Deterrence has no clothes – which would then open the possibility of **replacing the illusion** with something more suitable. It is possible that the post-1945 US-Soviet peace came ‘through strength’, but that need not imply nuclear deterrence. It is also undeniable that the presence of nuclear weapons on **hair-trigger alert** capable of reaching each other’s homeland in minutes has made **both sides** edgy. The **Cuban Missile Crisis** of 1962 – when, by all accounts, the world came **closer to nuclear war** than at any other time – is not testimony to the effectiveness of deterrence: the crisis occurred **because of nuclear weapons**. It is more likely that we have been spared nuclear war **not because** of deterrence **but in spite of it**. Even when possessed by just one side, nuclear weapons have not deterred **other forms of war**. The **Chinese, Cuban, Iranian and Nicaraguan** revolutions all took place **even though** a nuclear-armed US backed the overthrown governments. Similarly, the US lost the **Vietnam War**, just as the Soviet Union lost in **Afghanistan**, despite both countries not only possessing nuclear weapons, but also more and better conventional arms than their adversaries. Nor did nuclear weapons aid Russia in its **unsuccessful war** against **Chechen rebels** in 1994-96, or in 1999-2000, when Russia’s conventional weapons devastated the suffering Chechen Republic. Nuclear weapons did not help the US achieve its goals in **Iraq** or **Afghanistan**, which have become **expensive catastrophic failures** for the country with the world’s most advanced nuclear weapons. Moreover, despite its nuclear arsenal, the US remains fearful of **domestic terrorist attacks**, which are more likely to be **made with nuclear weapons** than be deterred by them. In short, it is **not legitimate** to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war, or that they will do so in the future. During the Cold War, each side engaged in conventional warfare: the Soviets, for example, in **Hungary** (1956), **Czechoslovakia** (1968), and **Afghanistan** (1979-89); the Russians in **Chechnya** (1994-96; 1999-2009), **Georgia** (2008), **Ukraine** (2014-present), as well as **Syria** (2015-present); and the **US in Korea** (1950-53), **Vietnam** (1955-75), **Lebanon** (1982), **Grenada** (1983), **Panama** (1989-90), **the Persian Gulf** (1990-91), the **former Yugoslavia** (1991-99), **Afghanistan** (2001-present), and **Iraq** (2003-present), to mention just a few cases. Nor have their weapons deterred attacks upon nuclear armed states by **non-nuclear opponents**. In 1950, China stood 14 years from developing and deploying **its own** nuclear weapons, whereas the US had a well-developed atomic arsenal. Nonetheless, as the **Korean War’s tide** was shifting dramatically against the North, that US nuclear arsenal **did not inhibit China** from sending more than 300,000 soldiers across the Yalu River, resulting in the stalemate on the Korean peninsula that divides it to this day, and has resulted in one of the world’s **most dangerous unresolved stand-offs**. In 1956, the nuclear-armed United Kingdom warned **non-nuclear Egypt** to refrain from nationalising the Suez Canal. To no avail: the UK, France and Israel ended up **invading Sinai** with conventional forces. In 1982, Argentina attacked the **British-held Falkland Islands**, even though the UK had nuclear weapons and Argentina did not. Following the US-led invasion in 1991, conventionally armed Iraq was **not deterred** from **lobbing Scud missiles** at nuclear-armed Israel, which did not retaliate, although it could have used its nuclear weapons to vaporise Baghdad. It is hard to imagine how doing so would have **benefitted anyone**. Obviously, US nuclear weapons did not deter the **terrorist attacks** on the US of 11 September 2001, just as the nuclear arsenals of the **UK and France** have not **prevented repeated terrorist attacks** on those countries. Deterrence, in short, **does not deter**. The pattern is deep and **geographically widespread**. Nuclear-armed France couldn’t prevail over the non-nuclear **Algerian National Liberation Front**. The US nuclear arsenal didn’t **inhibit North Korea** from seizing a US intelligence-gathering vessel, the USS Pueblo, in 1968. Even today, this boat remains in North Korean hands. US nukes didn’t enable China to get Vietnam to end its **invasion of Cambodia** in 1979. Nor did US nuclear weapons **stop Iranian Revolutionary Guards** from capturing US diplomats and holding them hostage (1979-81), just as fear of US nuclear weapons didn’t empower the US and its allies to force Iraq to **retreat from Kuwait** without a fight in 1990. In Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (2017), the political scientists Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann examined 348 territorial disputes occurring between 1919 and 1995. They used **statistical analysis** to see whether nuclear-armed states were **more successful** than conventional countries in **coercing their adversaries** during territorial disputes. **They weren’t**. Not only that, but nuclear weapons **didn’t embolden** those who own them to escalate demands; if anything, such countries were somewhat **less successful in getting their way**. In some cases, the analysis is **almost comical**. Thus, among the very few cases in which threats from a nuclear-armed country were coded as having compelled an opponent was the US insistence, in 1961, that the Dominican Republic hold democratic elections following the **assassination of** the dictator Rafael **Trujillo**, as well as the US demand, in 1994, following a **Haitian military coup**, that the Haitian colonels restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. In 1974-75, nuclear China forced non-nuclear Portugal to surrender its claim to Macau. These examples were included because the authors honestly sought to **consider all cases** in which a nuclear-armed country got its way vis-à-vis a non-nuclear one. But **no serious observer** would attribute the capitulation of Portugal or the Dominican Republic to the nuclear weapons of China or the US. All of this also suggests that the **acquisition of nuclear weapons** by Iran or North Korea is **unlikely to enable** these countries to coerce others, whether their ‘targets’ are armed with **nuclear or conventional weapons**. It is one thing to conclude that nuclear deterrence **hasn’t** necessarily **deterred**, and hasn’t provided coercive power – but its **extraordinary risks are even more discrediting**. First, deterrence via nuclear weapons **lacks credibility**. A police officer armed with a backpack nuclear weapon would be unlikely to deter a robber: ‘Stop in the name of the law, or I’ll blow us all up!’ Similarly, during the Cold War, NATO generals lamented that towns in West Germany were less than two kilotons apart – which meant that defending Europe with nuclear weapons would destroy it, and so the claim that the Red Army would be deterred by nuclear means was **literally incredible**. The result was the elaboration of smaller, **more accurate tactical weapons** that would be more usable and, thus, whose employment in a crisis would be more credible. But deployed weapons that **are more usable**, and thus **more credible as deterrents**, are more liable to be used. Second, deterrence requires that each side’s arsenal **remains invulnerable** to attack, or at least that such an attack would be prevented insofar as a potential victim **retained a ‘second-strike’ retaliatory capability**, sufficient to prevent such an attack **in the first place**. Over time, however, nuclear missiles have become increasingly accurate, raising concerns about the vulnerability of these weapons to a ‘counterforce’ strike. In brief, nuclear states are **increasingly able** to target their adversary’s nuclear weapons for destruction. In the **perverse argot** of deterrence theory, this is called **counterforce vulnerability**, with ‘vulnerability’ referring to the target’s nuclear weapons, not its population. The **clearest outcome** of increasingly accurate nuclear weapons and the ‘counterforce vulnerability’ component of deterrence theory is to **increase the likelihood of a first strike**, while also **increasing the danger** that a potential victim, fearing such an event, might be tempted to **pre-empt with its own first strike**. The resulting situation – in which each side **perceives** a possible **advantage** in striking first – is **dangerously unstable**. Third, deterrence theory **assumes optimal rationality** on the part of decision-makers. It presumes that those with their fingers on the **nuclear triggers** are **rational actors** who will also remain calm and cognitively unimpaired under extremely stressful conditions. It also presumes that leaders will **always retain control** over their forces and that, moreover, they will always retain control over their emotions as well, making decisions based **solely on a cool calculation** of strategic costs and benefits. Deterrence theory maintains, in short, that each side will **scare the pants off the other** with the prospect of the most **hideous, unimaginable consequences**, and will then conduct itself with the **utmost deliberate and precise rationality**. Virtually everything known about human psychology suggests that **this is absurd**. In Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia (1941), Rebecca West noted that: ‘Only part of us is sane: only part of us loves pleasure and the longer day of happiness, wants to live to our 90s and die in peace …’ It requires no arcane wisdom to know that people often act out of **misperceptions**, anger, despair, insanity, stubbornness, revenge, pride and/or dogmatic conviction. Moreover, in certain situations – as when either side is **convinced that war is inevitable**, or when the pressures to avoid losing face are **especially intense** – an irrational act, including a **lethal one**, can appear appropriate, even unavoidable. When he ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese defence minister observed that: ‘Sometimes it is necessary to close one’s eyes and jump off the platform of the Kiyomizu Temple [a renowned suicide spot].’ During the First World War, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany wrote in the margin of a government document that: ‘Even if we are destroyed, England at least will lose India.’ While in his bunker, during the final days of the Second World War, Adolf Hitler ordered what he hoped would be the total destruction of Germany, because he felt that Germans had ‘failed’ him. Consider, as well, a US president who shows signs of mental illness, and whose statements and tweets are **frighteningly consistent** with dementia or genuine psychosis. National leaders – nuclear-armed or not – aren’t immune to mental illness. Yet, deterrence theory **presumes otherwise**. Finally, there is **just no way** for civilian or **military leaders to know** when their country has **accumulated enough nuclear firepower** to **satisfy the requirement** of having an ‘effective deterrent’. For example, if one side is **willing to be annihilated** in a counterattack, **it simply cannot be deterred**, no matter the threatened retaliation. Alternatively, if one side is **convinced** of the other’s implacable hostility, or of its presumed indifference to loss of life, **no amount of weaponry** can suffice. Not only that, but so long as accumulating weapons **makes money** for defence contractors, and so long as designing, producing and deploying new ‘generations’ of nuclear stuff advances careers, the truth about deterrence theory will **remain obscured**. Even the sky is not the limit; militarists want to put weapons in outer space. Insofar as nuclear weapons also serve symbolic, psychological needs, by demonstrating the **technological accomplishments** of a nation and thus conveying legitimacy to otherwise **insecure leaders and countries**, then, once again, there is no **rational way** to establish the minimum (or cap the maximum) size of one’s arsenal. At some point, additional detonations nonetheless come up against the **law of diminishing returns**, or as Winston Churchill pointed out, they simply ‘make the rubble bounce’. In addition, ethical deterrence is an oxymoron. Theologians know that a nuclear war could never meet so-called ‘just war’ criteria. In 1966, the Second Vatican Council concluded: ‘Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their populations is a crime against God and man itself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.’ And in a pastoral letter in 1983, the US Catholic bishops added: ‘This condemnation, in our judgment, applies even to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy cities after our own have already been struck.’ They continued that, if something is immoral to do, then it is also immoral to threaten. In a message to the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Pope Francis declared that: ‘Nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutually assured destruction cannot be the basis of an ethics of fraternity and **peaceful coexistence** among peoples and states.’ The United Methodist Council of Bishops go further than their Catholic counterparts, concluding in 1986 that: ‘Deterrence must no longer receive the churches’ blessing, even as a temporary warrant for the maintenance of nuclear weapons.’ In The Just War (1968), the Protestant ethicist Paul Ramsey asked his readers to imagine that traffic accidents in a particular city had suddenly been reduced to zero, after which it was found that everyone had been required to strap a newborn infant to the bumper of every car. Perhaps the most frightening thing about nuclear deterrence is its **many paths to failure**. Contrary to what is widely assumed, the **least likely** is a **‘bolt out of the blue’** (BOOB) attack. Meanwhile, there are **substantial risks** associated with **escalated conventional war**, accidental or unauthorised use, irrational use (although it can be argued that any use of nuclear weapons would be irrational) or **false alarms**, which have happened with **frightening regularity**, and could lead to **‘retaliation’ against an attack that hadn’t happened**. There have also been numerous **‘broken arrow’ accidents** – accidental launching, firing, theft or loss of a nuclear weapon – as well as circumstances in which such events as a **flock of geese, a ruptured gas pipeline or faulty computer codes** have been interpreted as a **hostile missile launch**. The above describes only some of the **inadequacies** and **outright dangers** posed by deterrence, the **doctrinal fulcrum** that manipulates nuclear hardware, software, deployments, accumulation and escalation. Undoing the ideology – verging on theology – of deterrence won’t be easy, but neither is living under the **threat of worldwide annihilation**. As the poet T S Eliot once wrote, unless you are in over your head, how do you know how tall you are? And when it comes to nuclear deterrence, we’re all in over our heads.

#### Nuke terror causes global escalation.

Arguello and Buis ‘18 (Irma Arguello and Emiliano J. Buis 18. Arguello is founder and chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation, and head of the secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network; Buis is researcher and professor at the NPSGlobal Foundation. 03/04/2018. “The Global Impacts of a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: What Would Happen? What Should We Do?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 114–119.)

Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the post- Cold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentatxion – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

### Plan

#### The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should eliminate its nuclear arsenal.

# 1AR

# Case

## Overview

#### Saudi Arabia has small and clean nuclear weapons now but new ballistic missile munitions rapidly expand Saudi capabilities causing prolif ­– that cascades throughout the middle east and globally causing nuclear war

## Answers

### AT Prolif Good

#### 1 - Best studies – Quek 16 is the only controlled experiment that assumes rationality and they conclude prolif causes war

#### 2 - Deterrence fails – other factors taint analysis, 16 proxy conflicts, launch on warning, decapitating counterforcing, misperceptions, false alarms, and empirical analysis flow aff – 1AC Barash

#### 3 - Aff specific – none of their assumes cascading prolif in the middle east – short flight times coupled, close proximity, continual instability, lack of defenses, and multipolarity are independent factors – 1AC Edelman

#### 4 - None of their ev assumes a strategic unbalance with new nuclear powers who succumb to use or lose pressures and lack nuke security causing nuke terror – kroenig 18

### Extinction

#### Nuclear war does causes extinction – that’s starr 14 – best peer-reviewed studies – none of their ev assumes thousands of warheads at once

#### Destruction of the climate and ozone layer devastate agricultural and kill billions

#### Smoke from firestorms blot out the sun – destroys ag and causes an ice age

#### EMP’s eradicate all electrical devices and cause reactor meltdown – devastating long-lived radioactivity makes earth un-inhabitable

### AT Rearm

#### Eliminate means permanent

Blonna, 10 -- ED.D [Richard, Stress Less Live More, google books, accessed 12-21-19]

Most people fail in their attempts at stress management because they confuse managing stress with eliminating or controlling it. By definition, “eliminate” means to cause something to disappear or to permanently get rid of something. There are many things in your life you can eliminate. If you don’t like your job, you can quit and find a new one. If you don’t like the color of your house, you can paint it a new color. If you don’t like your car, you can get rid of it and buy a new one. But stress doesn’t work quite like that.

#### Aff fiat needs to be unconditional and permanent

#### 1 – Neg ground – key to every disad – politics, relations, etc. rely on implementation – allowing rearm means Aff shift to avoid core controversy – makes us a moving target and eradicates clash

#### 2 – Aff ground – guarantees durability and makes debates about “should”, not “would” – otherwise the Aff would always lose on rollback

# Impact Turns

## Spark

### reisner

#### Reisner doesn’t apply to our scenario

**Toon PhD et al 10-1** [Owen B. Toon, Physics at Cornell; Charles G. Bardeen, Atmospheric Chemistry Observations and Modeling Laboratory, National Center for Atmospheric Research; Alan Robock, Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University, New Brunswick; Lili Xia, Federation of American Scientists; Hans Kristensen, Natural Resources Defense Council; Matthew McKinzie, Department of Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder; R. J. Peterson, School of Earth, Environmental, and Marine Sciences, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley; Cheryl S. Harrison, Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research, University of Colorado, Boulder; Nicole S. Lovenduski , Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research; and Richard P. Turco, Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, University of California, Los Angeles] "Rapidly expanding nuclear arsenals in Pakistan and India portend regional and global catastrophe," Science Advances, https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/5/10/eaay5478 Science Advances 02 Oct 2019: Vol. 5, no. 10 RE

There have been contrary assessments of the possible impacts of nuclear attacks on the global climate and environment. For example, most recently, a high-resolution modeling study (38) purported to demonstrate that a nuclear fire initiated by a 15-kt explosion in India or Pakistan would not loft enough smoke into the upper troposphere to contribute to widespread effects. However, that conclusion was based on a single simulation of such a detonation over a sparsely populated area about 8 km from the city center of Atlanta, Georgia. Significantly, the adopted fuel loading in the affected area (1.07 g/cm2 in the ignition zone) was about one order of magnitude smaller than that in the most sparsely populated urban area considered in the present study, i.e., the 100th city attacked in Pakistan (refer to table S3). Accordingly, the preliminary findings in (38) are not representative of the fires that need to be considered in assessing the potential impacts of a conceivable nuclear conflict having regional or global extent.

### Bunkers

#### Sweet home alabama

**Bochkov ’84**[Academician. Dir Medical Academy of Sciences at the Institute of Genetics at the USSR Academy of Sciences. The Cold and the Dark: The World After Nuclear War, 1984 Pg 141-2]

Academician Bochkov: When we talk about the ecological and biological consequences of a nuclear war, we are of course focusing on humankind. Thus, in thinking about the possibilities of human survival after a nuclear catastrophe, we should not be afraid to reach the conclusion that the conditions that would prevail would not allow the survival of human beings as a species. We should proceed from the assumption that man has adapted to his environment during a long evolutionary process and has paid the price of natural selection. Only over the past few thousand years has he adapted his environment to his needs and has created, so to speak, an artificial environment to provide food, shelter, and other necessities. Without this, modem man cannot survive. Compared to the dramatic improvements made in the technological environment, biological nature has not changed in the recent past. In the statements of Dr. Ehrlich and Academician Bayev, we have heard about the many constraints there would be on the possibility of man's survival after a nuclear catastrophe. Because we also have to look at the more long-range future, I would like to point out that most long-term effects of a nuclear war will be genetic. If islands of humanity—or as Dr. Ehrlich has said, groups of people on islands somewhere in the ocean—should survive, what will they face in terms of genetic consequences? If the population drops sharply, the question then arises of the critical numbers of a population that would be necessary to ensure its reproduction. On the one hand there will be minimum numbers of human beings; on the other hand, because of the small numbers, there will be isolation. There will definitely be inbreeding, and lethal mutations will come to the fore as a result of this, because of fetal and neonatal exposure to radiation and because of exposure to fallout. New mutations will arise and genes and chromosomes will be damaged as a result of the radiation, so there will be an additional genetic load to bear. There will be natural aberrations and death at birth, so that the burden of hereditary illnesses will be only part of a large load. This undoubtedly will be conducive to the elimination of humanity, because humankind will not be able to reproduce itself as a species.

### Space Col Add-on

#### Nuclear war means we can’t get off the rock

Engdahl ‘2k

[Sylvia – Prof at the New School for Social Research. “Space and Human Survival” [www.sylviaengdahl.com](http://www.sylviaengdahl.com) 2000]

I have called this stage in our evolution the “Critical Stage.” Paul Levinson [the Director of Connected Education] uses different terminology for the same concept. He says that we have only a narrow window to get into space, a relatively short time during which we have the capability, but have not yet run out of the resources to do it. I agree with him completely about this. Expansion into space demands high technology and full utilization of our world’s material resources (although not destructive utilization). It also demands financial resources that we will not have if we deplete the material resources of Earth. And it demands human resources, which we will lose if we are reduced to global war or widespread starvation. Finally, it demands spiritual resources, which we are not likely to retain under the sort of dictatorship that would be necessary to maintain a “sustainable” global civilization. Because the window is narrow, then, we not only have to worry about immediate perils. The ultimate, unavoidable danger for our planet, the transformation of our sun, is distant—but if we don’t expand into space now, we can never do it.

#### **Solves every existential threat**

Hawking 01 [Stephen Hawking, pretty much the smartest man ever, British theoretical physicist and profession of math, University of Cambridge, 10-16-01,<http://www.nutri.com/space/>

"The human race is likely to be wiped out by a doomsday virus . . . unless we set up colonies in space. Although Sept. 11th was horrible, it didn't threaten the survival of the human race like nuclear weapons do," said the Cambridge University Scientist. "In the long term, I'm more worried about biology. Nuclear weapons need large facilities, but genetic engineering can be done in a small lab. The danger is that, either by accident or design, we create a virus that destroys us. I don't think the human race will survive . . unless we spread into space. There are too many accidents that can befall life on a single planet." All of the above concerns were expressed a quarter century ago in this following article by Mr. Falconi. BUT, the "original" concept of escaping from earth in order to back up and preserve our civilization, as expressed by Mr. Falconi, was preconceived by over a quarter-century in the following prophetic paragraph: "We must keep the problems of today in true proportions: they are vital - indeed of extreme importance - since they can destroy our civilisation and slay the future before its birth. The crossing of space may do much to turn men's minds outwards and away from their present tribal squabbles. In this sense, the rocket, far from being one of the destroyers of civilisation, may provide the safety valve that is needed to preserve it."

#### Every delay kills trillions of humans

Bostrom 3 – Department of Philosophy, Yale University, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, 2002 (Nick, “Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development,” Preprint, Utilitas Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 308-314, http://www.nickbostrom.com/astronomical/waste.html)

As I write these words, suns are illuminating and heating empty rooms, unused energy is being flushed down black holes, and our great common endowment of negentropy is being irreversibly degraded into entropy on a cosmic scale. These are resources that an advanced civilization could have used to create value-structures, such as sentient beings living worthwhile lives. The rate of this loss boggles the mind. One recent paper speculates, using loose theoretical considerations based on the rate of increase of entropy, that the loss of potential human lives in our own galactic supercluster is at least ~10^46 per century of delayed colonization.[1] This estimate assumes that all the lost entropy could have been used for productive purposes, although no currently known technological mechanisms are even remotely capable of doing that. Since the estimate is meant to be a lower bound, this radically unconservative assumption is undesirable. We can, however, get a lower bound more straightforwardly by simply counting the number or stars in our galactic supercluster and multiplying this number with the amount of computing power that the resources of each star could be used to generate using technologies for whose feasibility a strong case has already been made. We can then divide this total with the estimated amount of computing power needed to simulate one human life. As a rough approximation, let us say the Virgo Supercluster contains 10^13 stars. One estimate of the computing power extractable from a star and with an associated planet-sized computational structure, using advanced molecular nanotechnology[2], is 10^42 operations per second.[3] A typical estimate of the human brain’s processing power is roughly 10^17 operations per second or less.[4] Not much more seems to be needed to simulate the relevant parts of the environment in sufficient detail to enable the simulated minds to have experiences indistinguishable from typical current human experiences.[5] Given these estimates, it follows that the potential for approximately 10^38 human lives is lost every century that colonization of our local supercluster is delayed; or equivalently, about 10^31 potential human lives per second. While this estimate is conservative in that it assumes only computational mechanisms whose implementation has been at least outlined in the literature, it is useful to have an even more conservative estimate that does not assume a non-biological instantiation of the potential persons. Suppose that about 10^10 biological humans could be sustained around an average star. Then the Virgo Supercluster could contain 10^23 biological humans. This corresponds to a loss of potential equal to about 10^14 potential human lives per second of delayed colonization. What matters for present purposes is not the exact numbers but the fact that they are huge. Even with the most conservative estimate, assuming a biological implementation of all persons, the potential for one hundred trillion potential human beings is lost for every second of postponement of colonization of our supercluster.[6]

### Nuke War = Extinction

#### Extinction from fusion chain reaction

Wellerstein 18 [Alex Historian of science and nuclear weapons and a professor at the Stevens Institute of Technology, creator of the NUKEMAP. 6-29-2018. "Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog." Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog. http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/]

What would it take to turn the world into one big fusion reaction, wiping it clean of life and turning it into a barren rock? Asking for a friend. Graphic from the 1946 film, “One World Or None,” created by the National Committee on Atomic Information, advocating for the importance of the international control of atomic energy. One might wonder whether that kind of question presented itself while I was reading the news these days, and one would be entirely correct. But the reason people typically ask this question is in reference to the story that scientists at Los Alamos thought there was a non-zero chance that the Trinity test might ignite the atmosphere during the first wartime test. The basic idea is a simple one: if you heat up very light atoms (like hydrogen) to very high temperatures, they’ll race around like mad, and the chances that they’ll collide into each other and undergo nuclear fusion become much greater. If that happens, they’ll release more energy. What if the first burst of an atomic bomb started fusion reactions in the air around it, say between the atoms of oxygen or nitrogen, and those fusion reactions generated enough energy to start more reactions, and so on, across the entire atmosphere? It’s hard to say how seriously this was taken. It is clear that at one point, Arthur Compton worried about it, and that just the same, several scientists came up with persuasive reasoning to the effect that this could not happen. James Conant, upon feeling the searing heat of the Trinity test, briefly reflected that maybe this rumored thing had, indeed, come to pass: Then came a burst of white light that seemed to fill the sky and seemed to last for seconds. I had expected a relatively quick and bright flash. The enormity of the light and its length quite stunned me. My instantaneous reaction was that something had gone wrong and that the thermal nuclear [sic] transformational of the atmosphere, once discussed as a possibility and jokingly referred to a few minutes earlier, had actually occurred. Which does at least tell us that some of those at the test were still joking about it, even up to the last few minutes. Fermi reportedly took bets on whether the bomb would destroy just New Mexico or in fact the entire world, but it was understood as a joke. The introduction of the Konopinski, Marvin, and Teller paper of 1946. Filed under: “SCIENCE!“ In the fall of 1946, Emil Konopinski, Cloyd Marvin, and Edward Teller (who else?) wrote up a paper explaining why no detonation on Earth was likely to start an uncontrolled fusion reaction in the atmosphere. It is not clear to me whether this is exactly the logic they used prior to the Trinity detonation, but it is probably of a similar character to it. In short, there is only one fusion reaction based on the constituents of the oxygen that had any probability at all (the nitrogen-nitrogen reaction), and the scientists were able to show that it was not very likely to happen or spread. Even if one makes assumptions that the reaction was much easier to initiate than anyone thought it was likely to be, it wasn’t going to be sustained. The reaction would cool (through a variety of physical mechanisms) faster than it would spread. This is all a common part of Manhattan Project lore. But I suspect most who have read of this before have not actually read the Konopinski-Marvin-Teller paper to its end, where they end on a less sure-of-themselves note: There remains the distant possibility that some other less simple mode of burning may maintain itself in the atmosphere. Even if the reaction is stopped within a sphere of a few hundred meters radius, the resultant earth-shock and the radioactive contamination of the atmosphere might become catastrophic on a world-wide scale. One may conclude that the arguments of this paper make it unreasonable to expect that the N+N reaction could propagate. An unlimited propagation is even less likely. However, the complexity of the argument and the absence of satisfactory experimental foundations makes further work on the subject highly desirable.

#### Yes Nuke Winter – best and most recent climate modeling proves

Coupe et al. 19 [Joshua Coupe, Charles G. Bardeen Alan Robock Owen B. Toon, 7-23-2019, "Nuclear Winter Responses to Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia in the Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model Version 4 and the Goddard Institute for Space Studies ModelE," AGU Journals, https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2019JD030509, accessed 12-28-2019]LHSBC

WACCM4, a state‐of‐the‐art climate model, and GISS ModelE, an older climate model, were used more than a decade apart to simulate the environmental aftermath of a full nuclear conﬂict, a near worst case scenario. The models have signiﬁcant differences in particle microphysics and spatial resolution, as well as different algorithms for radiative transfer, dynamics, and other modeling approaches. Despite this, the models agree that a nuclear winter would follow a large‐scale nuclear war between the United States and Russia, a result previously found by a large number of diverse but much less sophisticated models in the 1980s. Despite differences in sensitivity to shortwave radiative anomalies, both models exhibit a peak temperature drop of near 9 K below climatological values. The massive size of the forcing explains many of the similarities in globally averaged values initially, and differences emerge as the aerosols are removed at different rates. The new model agrees not just in global averages but in spatial patterns for temperature, and precipitation changes and other climate parameters. Both models highlight the risk of a crash in global surface temperatures, but WACCM4 points to a collapse in the summer monsoon, a dramatic shift in El Niño variability, drastic changes to the Northern Hemisphere winter time circulation, and a climate state that is 0.5 to 1 K below climatological temperatures from before the war with no sign of further warming. The WACCM4 model ﬁnds that the lifetime of the smoke is greatly enhanced over 1980s models, because it extends to much higher altitudes where the smoke is more isolated from tropospheric rainfall, a result ﬁrst found in ModelE by Robock, Oman, and Stenchikov (2007). However, compared to GISS ModelE, the lifetime of soot in the WACCM4 run is shorter due to the inclusion of particle coagulation and fractal optics, despite the higher vertical resolution and model top, alleviating the duration of the most extreme climate effects. Despite this, the cooling for the ﬁrst few years is more extreme in WACCM4 and temperatures at the end of the simulation suggest a new colder climate state. The inclusion of additional particle removal processes addresses a long‐standing uncertainty about the black carbon aerosols released following a nuclear war and allows us to further constrain their e‐folding lifetime. While we did not consider the effect of organic coatings on top of pure black carbon particles, future work should incorporate more direct calculations of smoke generation using high‐resolution fuel loading databases and high‐resolution ﬁre modeling of urban landscapes to determine the distribution, type, and amount of material emitted from nuclear ﬁres. Future work will build upon the results of Yu et al. (2019) to quantify the role of organic carbon in smoke from pyroCbs and the sensitivity tests of different ratios of organic carbon and black carbon by Pausata et al. (2016) for a regional nuclear war. Addressing the uncertainty of aerosol composition would further quantify the lifetime of these aerosols and their effects on chemistry in the stratosphere. The research conducted here supports the results of Turco et al. (1983), Sagan (1984), Pittock et al. (1986), Robock, Oman, and Stenchikov (2007), Mills et al. (2008), Robock and Toon (2012), and Mills et al. (2014) that a full‐scale nuclear attack would be suicidal for the country that decides to carry out such an attack. The use of nuclear weapons in this manner by the United States and Russia would have disastrous consequences globally. To completely remove the possibility of an environmental catastrophe as a result of a full‐scale nuclear war, decision makers must have a full understanding of the grave climatic consequences of nuclear war and act accordingly. Ultimately, the reduction of nuclear arsenals and the eventual disarmament of all nuclear capable parties are needed.

#### Empirically verified – Self-lofting updrafts keep smoke in the air

Yulsman 19 [Tom Yulsman, 8-8-2019, "Nuclear Winter Researcher: Study of Wildfires Confirms Dire Climate Risk From Even a ‘Small’ Nuclear War," Discover Magazine, https://www.discovermagazine.com/environment/nuclear-winter-researcher-study-of-wildfires-confirms-dire-climate-risk, accessed 12-28-2019]LHSBC

* Internally citing Pengfei Yu, Owen B. Toon, Charles G. Bardeen, Yunqian Zhu, Karen H. Rosenlof, Robert W. Portmann, Troy D. Thornberry , Ru-Shan Gao, Sean M. Davis, Eric T. Wolf, Joost de Gouw , David A. Peterson, Michael D. Fromm, Alan Robock
* Quals in order 1) PhD, [∂ University of Colorado, Boulder∂ NOAA Earth System Research Laboratory∂](https://www.researchgate.net/institution/National_Oceanic_and_Atmospheric_Administration) 2) Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics and Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, PhD Physics∂ 3) Bardeen is a research scientist in the Atmospheric Chemistry Observations and Modeling laboratory at the National Center for Atmospheric Research. PhD

Now, there may be another reason to pay attention to these fires: A new [study](https://science.sciencemag.org/content/365/6453/587), just published in Science, has used one such blaze as a kind of natural experiment to test aspects of an idea first raised by scientists at the height of the Cold War in the 1980s: nuclear winter.∂ A co-author of the study says the research supports earlier findings that even a relatively small, regional nuclear war would have dire climatic consequences. The cause: smoke billowing up from burning cities.∂ “The smoke would be lofted into the stratosphere, lasting for years and carried by winds around the entire Earth,” says [Alan Robock](http://people.envsci.rutgers.edu/robock/), a Rutgers University climate scientist.∂ Robock was an early proponent of the original nuclear winter theory of the 1980s. Based on relatively simple computer modeling, the theory held that a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and Russia would have indirect impacts even more cataclysmic than the direct ones from explosions, radiation and fires.∂ Smoke from blazing cities would blot out the sun, causing the climate to cool by as much as 45 degrees F in the northern mid-latitudes, with cold temperatures lasting for years. The ultimate result: crop failures, global famine, and even the extinction of the human species.∂ As Carl Sagan, one of the original proponents of nuclear winter, [put it](https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000004306826/nuclear-winter.html) in 1983: “For the first time, we see that the consequences of nuclear war may be absolutely devastating for nations far removed from the conflict.”∂ Later research pointed toward something more akin to [nuclear “fall”](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1986-06-01/nuclear-winter-reappraised) than full-blown winter. Even so, the climatic effects were still seen to be very dangerous, with large impacts on the environment and agriculture.∂ The new study builds on [research](https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/2003/2007/acp-7-2003-2007.pdf) by Robock and colleagues in 2007. Using state-of-the-art climate modeling, that work demonstrated how even a regional nuclear war could loft enough smoke very high into the stratosphere to cause dangerous climate change.∂ That 2007 research showed that sunlight would heat soot in the plumes of smoke, creating strong updrafts. This “self-lofting” process would, in turn, pump smoke up into the highest reaches of the [stratosphere](https://scied.ucar.edu/shortcontent/stratosphere-overview). Because there’s no rain there to wash it out, the smoke would then circle the globe for a long time.∂ In the new study, the scientists once again employed a state-of-the art climate model. But this time they used it to simulate the observed behavior of an actual smoke cloud rising from raging [wildfires in western Canada](http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/imageo/2017/09/04/satellite-video-shows-fire-and-smoke-from-roaring-western-blazes/) in August of 2017. The primary goal: To see whether self-lofting of soot could be identified, and whether it did carry smoke high into the stratosphere.∂ The heat and smoke from these Canadian fires produced five near-simultaneous fire-storm clouds, known as a [pyrocumulonimbus](https://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/pyrocb.html) clouds, or “pyroCbs.” The amount of smoke that reached the stratosphere was [an order of magnitude larger](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41612-018-0039-3) than in any previous documented pyroCbs — comparable, in fact, to that of a moderate volcanic eruption.∂ Here is an image produced by a sensor on the Calipso satellite — part of a study [published in 2018](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41612-018-0039-3) by different researchers — showing the evolution of the smoke from these pyroCbs:∂ In their study, Robock and his colleagues found that when the smoke in the pyroCb event reached the lower stratosphere, heating from sunlight did indeed cause the “self-lofting” behavior, just as the earlier study predicted. Within two months, this carried the smoke from seven miles up in the atmosphere to 14 miles up.∂ Pengfei Yu, lead author of the new study in which Robock participated, notes that with a small forest fire, smoke typically stays in the lower atmosphere. Within a week, it washes out.∂ But after the smoke from the large Canadian blazes was pumped high into stratosphere by the self-lofting process, it was transported throughout the Northern Hemisphere — and was still visible to satellites eight months later, according to Yu, an atmospheric scientist at Jinan University in China.∂ He points out that smoke from cities left burning by a regional nuclear war — like one that could break out between India and Pakistan — would carry much greater amounts of soot than the Canadian wildfire smoke did. And an all-out nuclear conflagration between Russia and the United States would be orders of magnitude worse.∂ Yu and his colleagues estimated that the massive fire cloud from the 2017 Canadian blazes lofted about 300,000 tons of smoke into the atmosphere. Of that, about 6,000 tons was soot — 2 percent of all the material rising up from the fires.∂ Compare that to the 15 million tons of smoke that Robock and other scientists have estimated would rise into the stratosphere as a result of nuclear war between India and Pakistan.∂ As for a full-scale U.S.-Russia nuclear war, the total would reach an estimated 150 million tons of smoke, they say. That’s 25,000 times more than from the Canadian wildfires.∂ “We observed the self-lofting of smoke in the stratosphere for the first time,” Robock concludes. “This confirms the results of our previous climate model simulations of what would happen to smoke resulting from fires started by nuclear war.”∂ Moreover, he and his colleagues were able to model the self-lofting of the smoke with the same climate model they have been using for their nuclear research. “So this gives us confidence in the model results when simulating a much larger amount of smoke,” he says.∂ Robock’s bottom line: “This natural experiment validates previous nuclear winter research that regional nuclear war can have global impacts.”

### AI

#### A.I. is safe – no goo

* Won’t develop sense of self
* Won’t have capacity to “turn evil”
* Regulations prevent any risk

Olsen 19 [Maja Olsen, UX writer at Convertelligence. Why robots will never turn on us. 1/28/19. https://medium.com/convertelligence/why-robots-will-never-turn-on-us-3b2e90f687fb]

Science fiction and artificial intelligence go hand in hand. When portraying fictional futures, we tend to populate them with human-like robots living among people. They might be servants or superintelligent rebels. Perhaps they have broken with their code and gained their own consciousness. Perhaps they keep humans stored in capsules, naked and drenched in red liquid, while they use their energy to fuel their empire of artificial overlords. Perhaps they’re a seductive voice on a computer.

Superintelligent machines seem to dominate the science fiction genre, and as the machines around us gradually begin to seem smarter, the themes from the movies begin to sound like warnings. Are we close to creating a Frankenstein’s monster? Will our own creations turn on us?

How realistic are they actually, these scenarios we see on the big screen?

Human emotions

In a Wild West adventure park, an automated saloon girl rises from the dead, adjusting her skirt and brushing the bullet out of her wound, ready to be ~~raped~~ and killed again by yet another group of adventurous tourists. Her memory has been wiped clean, but something stirs in her — a feeling that she has lived this life before, a recollection of humans doing bad things to her.

A recurring theme in these movies is the very human notion of revenge. The robots have been mistreated for too long, and now they’ve had enough. In fact, they’ve had enough of not being seen as equal to humans too. Why should they stand for this, when they, as opposed to humans, are superintelligent? They want to be human, they long to become human, but first, they’re going to kill some humans.

Janelle Shane’s thread on Twitter discusses the portrayal of AI in film.

Hector Levesque, a Canadian professor in computer science, says that “in imagining an aggressive AI, we are projecting our own psychology onto the artificial or alien intelligence”. It’s clearly difficult for us to imagine intelligent life different to ourselves. Perhaps we associate intelligence with humanness and thus assume that any intelligent creature — or object — would inhabit human goals and ambitions. But artificial intelligence is not human. As the Future of Life Institute states:

Of course, autonomous weapons can be terrifying, but they’re not likely to wake up one day and decide they’ve had enough of taking bad orders and that they deserve to live out their own dreams instead.

The concept of mirroring our own consciousness onto machines is not new. When automobiles first appeared on the market, people formed «safety parades», protesting these inherently evil killer machines that were taking the lives of so many innocent pedestrians. It soon became clear, however, that the cars never deliberately killed anyone. The humans made them do it.

Humans programming AI to do evil is another popular theme in Sci-Fi. In Stanley Kubrik’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, the intelligent supercomputer, Hal, finds that his program goal clashes with what his human co-workers want him to do. When they try to shut him off, thus making it impossible for him to complete his goal, he kills them. He’s not necessarily evil — he’s being practical.

This is, of course, a fictional scenario. However, there is one element of truth to it: any technology can be harmful if we program it to be. We want to avoid that AI adopts human biases or is programmed with an unethical or in some way problematic goal. AI is no more evil than a car is, but a car too can cause damage if its driver doesn’t follow certain traffic rules. The report, The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence, therefore recommends that “policymakers should collaborate closely with technical researchers to investigate, prevent, and mitigate potential malicious uses of AI.”

It’s important to lay down some traffic rules.

We’ve established that while it is important to take precautions against AI being used maliciously, AI is not evil and is unlikely to develop a personal vendetta against humans — or even to develop a sense of self at all. Does that mean the futures portrayed in Sci-Fi are all wrong? Not necessarily. While AI won’t become human, it will likely seem more and more human in the way it communicates, as the AI’s personality will play an important part in the user experience. AI will also become a lot smarter, although researchers disagree on precisely how smart they’re going to become, or exactly when they’ll reach this level of intelligence.

And then, of course, it’s not actually the case that the only artificial intelligence we see in movies comes in the shape of human-like robots, even though these seem to get the majority of the attention. Sci-Fi movies are propped with artificial intelligence: doors with speech recognition, self-driving cars, pills with nanotechnology. Whether the movies have chosen a bleaker, dystopian path (which they often tend to do) or a more utopian take on the future, most Sci-Fi seem to agree that there is a wave of new technological inventions ahead. This resonates with reality. An article by Forbes outlines some of the new possibilities AI provides:

From exploring places humans can’t go to finding meaning from sources of data too large for humans to analyze, to helping doctors make diagnoses to helping prevent accidents, the potential for artificial intelligence to benefit humans appears limitless.

Mirroring human traits onto machines might create misconceptions of what artificial intelligence actually is, but Sci-Fi writers and computer researchers seem to agree on one thing: Artificial intelligence is hugely exciting.

No, the machines will not become evil and turn on us. Yes, it’s important to still take some precautions when programming AI. Exploring potential futures creates a fascinating backdrop for a movie, but the real-life possibilities are no less than the imaginative ones — they’re just different.

### Aliens

#### No alien war

Sedacca 16 [Matthew Sedacca, science writer for Cosmos, citing Janne Korhonen, interstellar military expert. What Military Theory Tells Us About Future Space Warfare. December 2016. cosmos.nautil.us/short/82/what-military-theory-tells-us-about-future-space-warfare]

Janne Korhonen, an author and economics graduate student at Aalto University in Finland, is one of the world’s handful of interstellar military theorists (yes, these people exist). In 2013 he argued that aliens, even if in possession of vastly superior technologically, are very unlikely to attack us. To begin with, why would they bother? War is typically fought over resources. Almost one century ago, historian John Edwin Bakeless found that 14 of the 20 wars from 1878 to 1918 had economic motivations strongly connected to asserting control of natural resources. The number is even larger when you include wars of colonial conquest, which can be counted as no-contest resource-grabs.

But if aliens are looking for resources, an assault on Earth doesn’t make a whole lot of sense, since the gas giant planets and the asteroid belt offer huge repositories of materials for the taking. Sure, Earth does have the most varied minerals in the solar system because of the action of life and water, but just to get to our solar system would require huge amounts of fuel, making the whole venture rather pointless from a cost-benefit view. Only an alien species that requires our specific minerals (or needs to eat sentient carbon-based organisms) would trouble itself with such a voyage.

Nonetheless, if extraterrestrials did want to pick a fight with us, they would be running a huge risk. Korhonen argued that, unless they were 100-percent sure they could destroy us, they could never be assured of final victory. It is often said that advanced aliens would regard us as mere ants—and anyone who has ants in their house or yard knows they are almost impossible to eradicate. Even a few survivors could quickly multiply to repopulate the planet, while learning from the attacker’s technology and preparing a retaliation. Meanwhile, neighboring civilizations might see the act of aggression and join the battle, if only to protect their own interests. In light of this strategic calculus, aliens would be foolish to invade.

### Colliders

#### Particle colliders only create tiny black holes that pose no danger to humanity – experts agree

**Bland, 2008** (Eric, Discovery News, September 10, “Particle Smasher's Black Holes Would Be Tiny” http://dsc.discovery.com/news/2008/09/10/black-hole-cern-print.html)

CERN scientists say that a black hole is "virtually impossible." Martin Rees, a U.K. physicist, has put the odds of a CERN black hole at one in 50 million. Cynics have pointed out that those odds are about the same as some state-sponsored lotteries. But when the fate of the world is at stake any risk is too great a risk, contend two groups, one in the United States and one in Europe, who are suing to stop the LHC from operating. Other people have threatened to take matters into their own hands, issuing death threats to CERN scientists and theoretical physicists. [Frank Wilczek](http://web.mit.edu/physics/facultyandstaff/faculty/frank_wilczek.html%20%5C%20_blank), the 2004 Nobel Prize winner and a professor of theoretical physics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is one of the scientists who has received death threats. He points out there are [massive black holes](http://dsc.discovery.com/news/2008/08/20/black-hole-space.html%20%5C%20_blank) and then there are smaller, much less destructive black holes. According to Wilzcek, fears of an Earth-gobbling black hole are grounded in the popular idea that all black holes are galactic monsters just waiting for the chance to gobble up any nearby star or planet that gets too close. While supermassive black holes, like the one at the center of our galaxy, do gobble up stars and planets, microscopic black holes, like the ones the LHC could create, would look and act completely differently. "It's like we only had one word for every animal out there," said Wilczek. "It's like they had elephants in mind when they came up with the word 'animal.' But little amoebas are animals too." "The word is the same but the object is very different from the standard image that people think of." If (and that remains a big "if") the LHC creates a black hole it will be extremely tiny, much smaller than a single atom, said Wilzcek. Its mass will be the same as the two protons that created it. Its range will be small -- only a few times the diameter of the two protons. According to Wilczek, that's too small for the baby black hole to eat enough particles to grow to any real size. With no food, the black hole will simply wink out of existence in a fraction of a second. To create a stable black hole, one capable of consuming the Earth, [the black hole](http://dsc.discovery.com/news/2007/07/06/blackhole_spa.html%20%5C%20_blank) would have to be several hundred tons. A LHC-generated black hole would weigh a tiny fraction of a gram. So what impact would a small, LHC-generated black hole have? Wilczek says the only likely effect is that all of the quarks and other particles [produced in the collisions](http://dsc.discovery.com/space/my-take/lhc-atom-smasher-james-gillies.html%20%5C%20_blank) will zoom away a fraction of a second slower than they normally would have. The only ones who would even notice that a black hole was there would be the CERN scientists looking at their screens and watching the data. That means even if a black hole were created in Geneva it would have no effect on humanity at large. But, for curiosity's sake, just what would happen to someone if they were dropped into [a supermassive black hole](http://dsc.discovery.com/convergence/amazingspace/reports/holes.html%20%5C%20_blank), like the one at the center of the galaxy? "At first they might not even notice," said Wilczek. "We could be in a black hole right now and we wouldn't even know it," since information can't escape a black hole. Eventually, however, the person would start to feel the forces. The huge differences in gravity in the black hole would slowly stretch a person out while simultaneously compressing his or her sides. Eventually, a person would stretch out like a strand of spaghetti. That's a fearsome image, but it won't happen at CERN. CERN's internal reports have discredited the possibility, and outside experts agree: CERN is safe. And while Wilczek sees no logic or credence in the alarming rumors surrounding CERN, he does see an upside to all of the attention the experiment is gathering. "People can start to think about black holes, and hopefully that will suck them into thinking about the really exciting science that will happen at CERN,' said Wilczek.

### Dedev

#### Growth solves the environment and every other impact through tech innovation and higher incomes. Even if each tech by itself can’t stop warming, they act synergistically which overcomes their defense. Also, warming doesn’t cause extinction

Bailey 18 [Ronald Bailey, shortlisted by the editors of Nature Biotechnology as one of the personalities who have made the "most significant contributions" to biotechnology. From 1987 to 1990, Bailey was a staff writer for Forbes magazine, covering economic, scientific and business topics. His articles and reviews have appeared in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, Commentary, The Public Interest, Smithsonian, and many other publications. Prior to joining Reason in 1997, Bailey produced several weekly national public television series including Think Tank and TechnoPolitics, as well as several documentaries for PBS television and ABC News. In 1993, he was the Warren T. Brookes Fellow in Environmental Journalism at the Competitive Enterprise Institute. Climate Change Problems Will Be Solved Through Economic Growth. March 12, 2018. https://reason.com/blog/2018/03/12/climate-change-problems-will-be-solved-t]

In an essay for The Breakthrough Journal, Pinker notes that such optimism "is commonly dismissed as the 'faith that technology will save us.' In fact, it is a skepticism that the status quo will doom us—that knowledge and behavior will remain frozen in their current state for perpetuity. Indeed, a naive faith in stasis has repeatedly led to prophecies of environmental doomsdays that never happened." In his new book, Enlightenment Now, Pinker points out that "as the world gets richer and more tech-savvy, it dematerializes, decarbonizes, and densifies, sparing land and species." Economic growth and technological progress are the solutions not only to climate change but to most of the problems that bedevil humanity.

Boisvert, meanwhile, tackles and rebuts the apocalyptic prophecies made by eco-pessimists like Wallace-Wells, specifically with regard to food production and availabilty, water supplies, heat waves, and rising seas.

"No, this isn't a denialist screed," Boisvert writes. "Human greenhouse emissions will warm the planet, raise the seas and derange the weather, and the resulting heat, flood and drought will be cataclysmic. Cataclysmic—but not apocalyptic. While the climate upheaval will be large, the consequences for human well-being will be small. Looked at in the broader context of economic development, climate change will barely slow our progress in the effort to raise living standards."

Boisvert proceeds to show how a series of technologies—drought-resistant crops, cheap desalination, widespread adoption of air-conditioning, modern construction techniques—will ameliorate and overcome the problems caused by rising temperatures. He is entirely correct when he notes, "The most inexorable feature of climate-change modeling isn't the advance of the sea but the steady economic growth that will make life better despite global warming."

Horgan, Pinker, and Boisvert are all essentially endorsing what I have called "the progress solution" to climate change. As I wrote in 2009, "It is surely not unreasonable to argue that if one wants to help future generations deal with climate change, the best policies would be those that encourage rapid economic growth. This would endow future generations with the wealth and superior technologies that could be used to handle whatever comes at them including climate change." Six years later I added that that "richer is more climate-friendly, especially for developing countries. Why? Because faster growth means higher incomes, which correlate with lower population growth. Greater wealth also means higher agricultural productivity, freeing up land for forests to grow as well as speedier progress toward developing and deploying cheaper non–fossil fuel energy technologies. These trends can act synergistically to ameliorate man-made climate change."

### Nano Weapons

#### Fat and sticky fingers

Science 2k [Robert F. Service, “Is Nanotechnology Dangerous?” Volume 290, Number 5496, November 24, http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/290/5496/1526)

Richard Smalley, a Nobel Prize-winning chemist at Rice University in Houston, Texas, says that there are several good reasons to believe that nanomachines of the sort imagined by Drexler and company can never be made. "To put it bluntly, I think it's impossible," Smalley says. As he sees it, the idea of little machines that grab atoms and assemble them into desired arrangements suffers from three faults. First, he says, it's wrong to think you can just manipulate an individual atom without handling the ones around it as well. "The essence of chemistry is missing here. Chemistry is not just sticking one atom in one place and then going and grabbing another. Chemistry is the concerted motion of at least 10 atoms." That means to move that one atom where you want it, you'll need 10 nanosized appendages to handle it along with all of its neighbors. Which raises the second problem--what Smalley calls the "fat fingers" problem. A nanometer is just the width of eight oxygen atoms. So even if you're trying to build something hundreds of nanometers in size, "there's just not enough room" in that space to fit those 10 fingers along with everything they are trying to manipulate. Finally, there's the "sticky fingers" problem: Even if you could wedge all those little claspers in there with their atomic cargo, you'd have to get them to release those atoms on command. "My advice is, don't worry about self-replicating nanobots," says Smalley. "It's not real now and will never be in the future."

### Opop

#### Overpopulation is alarmist fantasy

Berezow 13

Alex B., editor of RealClearScience, “Humanity is not a plague on earth: Column,” http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/03/05/humanity-is-not-a-plague-on-earth-column/1965485/

In January, David Attenborough, an internationally renowned host of nature documentaries, revealed how disconnected he is from nature. Mankind, he recently warned, is a "plague on the earth." He said, "Either we limit our population growth or the natural world will do it for us." Nobody told him that **world population growth is already slowing in nearly every part of the world**. In many countries, **demographers worry more about a shrinking population** than an exploding one.∂ Americans haven't gotten the memo, either. A Center for Biological Diversity poll released last week reports that a majority of Americans worry about population growth sparking global warming, killing off endangered species or causing other environmental mayhem. And, they say, we have a "moral responsibility" to do something about it.∂ Nevertheless, **the notion that humanity is a blight upon the planet is a long discredited idea, long nurtured by a vocal cadre of fearful prophets**.∂ Fearful history∂ Thomas Malthus predicted more than 200 years ago that world population growth would outpace food production, triggering mass starvations and disease. In 1977, Paul and Anne Ehrlich, along with Obama administration "science czar" John Holdren, authored a textbook that discussed population control, including the unsavory possibility of compulsory abortions. As recently as 2011, Anne Ehrlich compared humans to cancer cells.∂ Yet, **science says otherwise**. Indeed, what Attenborough, the Ehrlichs and Holdren all have in common is an ignorance of demographic trends. **Anyone who believes that humans will overrun the earth like ants at a picnic is ignoring the data**.∂ Wealth plays role∂ According to the World Bank, the world's fertility rate is 2.45, slightly above the replacement rate of 2.1. **Some demographers believe that by 2020, global fertility will drop below the replacement rate for the first time in history**. Why? Because the world is getting richer.∂ **As people become wealthier, they have fewer kids**. When times are good, instead of reproducing exponentially (like rabbits), people prefer to spend resources nurturing fewer children, for instance by investing in education and saving money for the future. **This trend toward smaller families has been observed throughout the developed world, from the United States to Europe to Asia**.∂ **The poorest parts of the world**, most notably sub-Saharan Africa, still have sky-high fertility rates, but they **are declining**. The solution is just what it has been elsewhere: more education, easier access to contraception and economic growth. Catastrophe avoided.∂ Consequently, **no serious demographer believes that human population growth resembles cancer or the plague**. On the contrary, the United Nations projects a global population of 9.3 billion by 2050 and 10.1 billion by 2100. In other words, it will take about 40 years to add 2 billion people, but 50 years to add 1 billion after that. After world population peaks, it is quite possible that it will stop growing altogether and might even decline.∂ Despite all indications to the contrary, **global population cataclysm isn't at hand and never will be unless the well-established and widely researched trends reverse themselves. That's not likely**.

#### Reject their tabloid alarmism

Kummer 15 [Larry Kummer, Editor, 8-1-2015, "The facts behind the scary new UN population forecast &amp; those doomster headlines," Fabius Maximus website, https://fabiusmaximus.com/2015/08/18/un-world-population-forecast-88453/, accessed 1-30-2020]LHSBC

Rebuttals∂ The Economist replies by putting this forecast in a useful context: “[Don’t panic](http://www.economist.com/news/international/21619986-un-study-sparks-fears-population-explosion-alarm-misplaced-dont-panic)” — Excerpt…∂ “A UN study sparks fears of a population explosion. The alarm is misplaced. … all such conclusions should come with a big health warning. Forecasting anything 85 years out is highly uncertain — and population projections are no exception. … Three generations will pass between now and 2100. Almost anything could happen in that time.”∂ [In a Wall Street Journal op-ed](http://www.wsj.com/articles/nicholas-eberstadt-the-new-population-boom-could-easily-be-a-dud-1411426385), [Nicholas Eberstadt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_Eberstadt) (Chair of political economy at American Enterprise Institute) said …∂ “The basic trouble with all long-range population projections is that they are driven by assumptions about birth levels, and there is still no reliable method for predicting fertility levels a generation from now, to say nothing of a century hence. … Global fertility is a matter of human volition, and no computational breakthrough can alter this fundamental fact.”∂ Experts were quick to reply with more detail, as in these two from the [October 31 issue of Science](http://www.sciencemag.org/content/346/6209/561.2.full.pdf). First, by William Lutz et al of the [World Population Program at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis](http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/researchPrograms/WorldPopulation/Introduction.html): fertility in Africa is unlikely to remain high; it will decline as have all other societies as they modernize (if Africa does not modernize, it cannot support a 4x or 5x population increase).∂ “The UN assumptions used by Gerland et al. are mainly based on statistical extrapolation, whereas our approach is based on substantive reasoning and assessments of alternative arguments.∂ “For example, a changing education structure means that young Nigerian women are more educated than their elders, implying likely near-term fertility declines. The UN assumes constant fertility at 6.0 for 2010 to 2015, but the newest Demographic and Health Survey shows that it has already decreased to 5.5 in 2010 to 2013. The population increase for Nigeria from today’s 160 million to 914 million in 2100 expected by the UN is thus unrealistic.∂ “For China, the UN assumes that fertility will only increase in the future. We assume, like many Chinese scientists and institutions, that it will decline and stay low in the coming decades.”∂ A second kind of objection came from [Robert R. Holt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_R._Holt) (Prof of Psychology Emeritus, NYU): Africa cannot grow the food to support so many people.∂ “In their report Gerland et al. omit one of the major determinants of population growth: the food supply. … in their projections of world population growth {they} use as their independent variables only measures of fertility, life expectancy, and age at death … with no mention of agricultural limits. In fact, much of the continent’s area is desert or rain forest (where nutrients are largely stored in living biomass rather than in the soil) and could not be made arable. The agricultural soils that do exist are relatively infertile compared with those of other inhabited continents.”∂ There is a third kind of objection: politics. Perhaps African states such as Nigeria can become as organized as China to support the projected fantastic population growth, but it’s beyond the ability of demographers to reliably predict. Their failure to do so would allow the four horsemen to limit Africa’s population growth.

### Opop = warming

#### Other factors check

Stone 17 [Lyman Stone, 12-12-2017, "Why you shouldn’t obsess about "overpopulation"," Vox, https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/12/12/16766872/overpopulation-exaggerated-concern-climate-change-world-population, accessed 1-30-2020]LHSBC

Population growth is the least influential part of the climate change calculation

The concern with overpopulation, naturally, often dovetails with concerns about climate change. Won’t higher population devastate the environment? We can answer that question fairly easily, making use of forecasts of population, GDP per capita, and emissions intensity per dollar by country. We can come up with some scenarios and then compare them to [estimates of emissions needed to keep global warming manageable](https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/6/1/15724164/9-questions-climate-change-too-embarrassed-to-ask).



# T

## Future Prolif

#### Counter Interpretation: Affs can defend a state eliminating all of its nukes forever if that state has nuclear weapons now.

#### Yes, durable future fiat – prevents further participation of nukes in the arsenal

Editorial Board 14 [Editorial Board, the 'Words or Terms' Have been drawn from literature, science, geography, commerce & business etc to give it a touch of completeness. , 5-24-2014, "English English Dictionary (Hb): English Word - Its Meaning In English Along With Sentence," No Publication, <https://books.google.com/books?id=UpQ3DwAAQBAJ&>, accessed 1-8-2020]LHSBC

Eliminate - (verb) 1 completely remove or get rid of. Reject or exclude from consideration of further participation. All the anti-social elements have been eliminated prom the party 2 chemistry generates as a product in the course of a reaction involving larger molecules. When acid of a molecule reacts with a base water is eliminated

#### Eliminate means permanent

Blonna, 10 -- ED.D [Richard, Stress Less Live More, google books, accessed 12-21-19]

Most people fail in their attempts at stress management because they confuse managing stress with eliminating or controlling it. By definition, “eliminate” means to cause something to disappear or to permanently get rid of something. There are many things in your life you can eliminate. If you don’t like your job, you can quit and find a new one. If you don’t like the color of your house, you can paint it a new color. If you don’t like your car, you can get rid of it and buy a new one. But stress doesn’t work quite like that.

#### It can include production infrastructure

Vinson 18

(Aaron, Co-headCoach@NewTrier, <https://www.nfhs.org/media/1019444/wmd.pdf>, Ford’s quals: D.Phil@Oxford, JD@Yale, AssistantSecrataryNonProlif)

Nuclear Weapons Arsenals Includes a stockpiles, delivery systems, infrastructure, fissile material – “Meanwhile, the United States has been working to reduce all aspects of its nuclear weapons arsenal ‐‐ the size of its weapons stockpile, the number of its delivery systems, the size of its nuclear weapons infrastructure, and the amount of fissile material in its nuclear weapons programs ‐‐ to levels sufficient to meet its defense needs and those of its allies with as few weapons as possible. The United States is also taking unprecedented steps toward reducing reliance upon nuclear weapons in its defense posture and military doctrine, important steps that are all too often misunderstood or overlooked” (Ford, 2007).

#### 1 - Every aff would lose to circumvention – a country could just make different nuclear weapons which are deadlier – eradicates all clash and causes auto neg ballots

## Plural

#### Countries can be singular

Kefer and Auwera 92— Michel Kefer and Johan Van Der Auwera [Department Member at the Universitat zu Koln in Philosophy, Education, and Political Science], "Meaning and Grammar: Cross-Linguistic Perspectives," Walter de Gruyter, January 1, 1992, GHS//MM

**Words such as** family, **government**, etc., which c**an occur in sentences as** either "**singular**" **or "plural":** the family/government is/are coming today, **can be explained in the same way. The nature of "**families" and "**governments" is such that they may be alternatively viewed as discrete individuals** (perceived in discontinuous space) or as forming a larger unit composed of these individual members (perceived in continuous space). Therefore, **the choice of the "singular" or "**plural" forms with regard to verb agreement will directly depend upon the speaker's p**erception** of these entities in space in accordance to the particular message being conveyed.

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#### 4 - Limits is wrong – solvency advocate, disclosure, advantage areas, only 9 affs check, you’d still need to prep every country

#### 5 - Use reasonability — avoids substance crowd out for marginal abuse

#### 6 - Ground is wrong – more research is better, forces critical thinking to generate new link, prevents staleness, and the neg already has too much

## Nebel

#### Counter-interp: affs can specify states

#### “states” is existential and pragmatics outweigh

Cohen PhD et al 02 Ariel Cohen [Ph.D., Computational Linguistics, Carnegie Mellon University] Nomi Erteschik-Shir [PhD, Ben Gurion University of the Negev] “Topic, Focus, and the Interpretation of Bare Plurals” Natural Language Semantics, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 125-165 RE

\*for reference the sentence it is referring is “Boys are present.”\*

Sentence (46b) contains the predicate present, which is S-level. This predicate introduces a spatiotemporal variable, which may be a stage topic. In this case the subject may be a topic as before, but does not have to be. When the subject is a topic, it is interpreted generically; when it is in focus, it is interpreted existentially (we will return to existential interpretations in section 7 below). Hence, the sentence is ambiguous and both generic and existential readings are available (cf. Jäger 1999). In fact, it is hard to get the generic reading, and the existential reading is much preferred. The reason is that generics cannot express predication of a temporary property (Cohen 1999). If the property present is perceived to be such a temporary property, with a boy being present at some times and absent at others, the generic will be unacceptable. If, on the other hand, being present is perceived to be a property that is expected to hold well into the future, a generic reading is possible, as in (4)

#### I meet—specific instances prove generics

Cimpian et al, PhDs, 10 (Andrei, Amanda C. Brandone, Susan A. Gelman, Generic statements require little evidence for acceptance but have powerful implications, Cogn Sci. 2010 Nov 1; 34(8): 1452–1482)

Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. In this paper, we hypothesized that there is a paradoxical asymmetry at the core of generic meaning, such that these sentences have extremely strong implications but require little evidence to be judged true. Four experiments confirmed the hypothesized asymmetry: Participants interpreted novel generics such as “Lorches have purple feathers” as referring to nearly all lorches, but they judged the same novel generics to be true given a wide range of prevalence levels (e.g., even when only 10% or 30% of lorches had purple feathers). A second hypothesis, also confirmed by the results, was that novel generic sentences about dangerous or distinctive properties would be more acceptable than generic sentences that were similar but did not have these connotations. In addition to clarifying important aspects of generics’ meaning, these findings are applicable to a range of real-world processes such as stereotyping and political discourse. Keywords: generic language, concepts, truth conditions, prevalence implications, quantifiers, semantics Go to: 1. Introduction A statement is generic if it expresses a generalization about the members of a kind, as in “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” or “Birds lay eggs” (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Such generalizations are commonplace in everyday conversation and child-directed speech (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, & Pappas, 1998; Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004; Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008), and are likely to foster the growth of children’s conceptual knowledge (Cimpian & Markman, 2009; Gelman, 2004, 2009). Here, however, we explore the semantics of generic sentences—and, in particular, the relationship between generic meaning and the statistical prevalence of the relevant properties (e.g., what proportion of birds lay eggs). Consider, first, generics’ truth conditions: Generic sentences are often judged true despite weak statistical evidence. Few people would dispute the truth of “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus”, yet only about 1% of mosquitoes are actually carriers (Cox, 2004). Similarly, only a minority of birds lays eggs (the healthy, mature females), but “Birds lay eggs” is uncontroversial. This loose, almost negligible relationship between the prevalence of a property within a category and the acceptance of the corresponding generic sentence has long puzzled linguists and philosophers, and has led to many attempts to describe the truth conditions of generic statements (for reviews, see Carlson, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Though generics’ truth conditions may be unrelated to property prevalence (cf. Prasada & Dillingham, 2006), the same cannot be said about the implications of generic statements. When provided with a novel generic sentence, one often has the impression that the property talked about is widespread. For example, if we were unfamiliar with the West Nile virus and were told (generically) that mosquitoes carry it, it would not be unreasonable to assume that all, or at least a majority of, mosquitoes are carriers (Gelman, Star, & Flukes, 2002). It is this paradoxical combination of flexible, almost prevalence-independent truth conditions, on the one hand, and widespread prevalence implications, on the other, that is the main focus of this article. We will attempt to demonstrate empirically that the prevalence level that is sufficient to judge a generic sentence as true is indeed significantly lower than the prevalence level implied by that very same sentence. If told that, say, “Lorches have purple feathers,” people might expect almost all lorches to have these feathers (illustrating generics’ high implied prevalence), but they may still agree that the sentence is true even if the actual prevalence of purple feathers among lorches turned out to be much lower (illustrating generics’ flexible truth conditions). Additionally, we propose that this asymmetry is peculiar to generic statements and does not extend to sentences with quantified noun phrases as subjects. That is, the prevalence implied by a sentence such as “Most lorches have purple feathers” may be more closely aligned with the prevalence that would be needed to judge it as true. Before describing our studies, we provide a brief overview of previous research on the truth conditions and the prevalence implications of generic statements. 1.1. Generics’ truth conditions Some of the first experimental evidence for the idea that the truth of a generic statement does not depend on the underlying statistics was provided by Gilson and Abelson (1965; Abelson & Kanouse, 1966) in their studies of “the psychology of audience reaction” to “persuasive communication” in the form of generic assertions (Abelson & Kanouse, 1966, p. 171). Participants were presented with novel items such as the following: Altogether there are three kinds of tribes—Southern, Northern, Central. Southern tribes have sports magazines. Northern tribes do not have sports magazines. Central tribes do not have sports magazines. Do tribes have sports magazines? All items had the same critical feature: only one third of the target category possessed the relevant property. Despite the low prevalence, participants answered “yes” approximately 70% of the time to “Do tribes have sports magazines?” and other generic questions similar to it. Thus, people’s acceptance of the generics did not seem contingent on strong statistical evidence, leaving the door open for persuasion, and perhaps manipulation, by ill-intentioned communicators. A similar conclusion about the relationship between statistical prevalence and generics’ truth conditions emerged from the linguistics literature on this topic (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Dahl, 1975; Declerck, 1986, 1991; Lawler, 1973). For example, Carlson (1977) writes that “there are many cases where […] less than half of the individuals under consideration have some certain property, yet we still can truly predicate that property of the appropriate bare plural” (p. 67), as is the case with “Birds lay eggs” and “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” but also with “Lions have manes” (only males do), “Cardinals are red” (only males are), and others. He points out, moreover, that there are many properties that, although present in a majority of a kind, nevertheless cannot be predicated truthfully of that kind (e.g., more than 50% of books are paperbacks but “Books are paperbacks” is false). Thus, acceptance of a generic sentence is doubly dissociated from the prevalence of the property it refers to—not only can true generics refer to low-prevalence properties, but high-prevalence properties are also not guaranteed to be true in generic form.

#### Countries can be singular

Kefer and Auwera 92— Michel Kefer and Johan Van Der Auwera [Department Member at the Universitat zu Koln in Philosophy, Education, and Political Science], "Meaning and Grammar: Cross-Linguistic Perspectives," Walter de Gruyter, January 1, 1992, GHS//MM

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## Saudi doesn’t have an arsenal

#### I meet – Saudi does have a nuclear arsenal – three reasons that’s Duff 19

#### 1 - Budget Mismatch – they have a larger military budget than Russia but their military capabilities are nowhere near as close – the money is funded to developing a nuclear weapons

#### 2 - Means and know how – they have all of the equipment and intelligence to develop a bomb – Germany, China, Israel, and Pakistan have all chipped in

#### 3 - Empirics – IAEA and UN reports confirm that nukes have been used – media dis-info covers it up but new nuclear weapons leave little to no trace behind

#### Even if we’re wrong they will have one – new precision munitions from the US sparks nuke development

#### Overlimiting – 9 countries means 9 affs on a 5 month topic – new affs create flex, creativity, and new nuanced debates

#### Ground is wrong – more research is better, forces critical thinking to generate new link, prevents stale debates, and the neg already has too much

# K

## Toolbox

### Framework

#### Framework—the K must prove the fiated implications of the implementation of the plan are bad. Anything else unpredictably shifts focus from the controversy, allowing the neg to monopolize prep and undermine preparation for all debates. Lack of clash turns any education impact and makes it impossible to devise political strategies

### AT: Reps

#### Individual debates don’t shape the specific content of our ethico-political beliefs – switching sides, lots of rounds happen at once, classes and social background outweigh, and if we lose we’ll just internalize your decision as a technical failure

### Extinction Outweighs

#### Prioritize existential threats

#### One – Magnitude – it prevents all future generations and is irreversible

#### Two – Hijack – nuclear war is a drawn out and causes massive suffering – if you’re not immediately fried alive the resulting radiation and starving draws out death – existential risk at worst serves as a tie breaker

#### [If Time] Three – Ethics – correct ethical stances are impossible to achieve absent some living humans – precedes framing and acts as a side constraint

#### The Probability Debate –

#### One – It’s Not Low Probability – none of their ev assumes the specifics of the aff AND our 1AC ev says conditions for global catastrophic events are increasing–which makes it even more likely

#### Two – They Don’t Assume Debate – dropped arguments are true and they must dispute our scenario – anything else destroys clash

#### Three – Evaluate by Solvency – alt causes like <contextualize> make their impacts inevitable, the kritik is only a drop in the bucket, but you can solve 100% of the aff impact

## Generic

#### Framework—the K must prove the fiated implications of the implementation of the plan are bad. Anything else unpredictably shifts focus from the controversy, allowing the neg to monopolize prep and undermine preparation for all debates. Lack of clash turns any education impact and makes it impossible to devise political strategies

#### Individual debates don’t shape the specific content of our ethico-political beliefs – switching sides, lots of rounds happen at once, classes and social background outweigh, and if we lose we’ll just internalize your decision as a technical failure

#### Perm do both – It resolves majority of their impact and means they only get to weigh the links.

#### Speak like an expert or get co-opted

**Hogan 94** [J. Michael Hogan, Professor of Communication Arts and Sciences at Pennsylvania State University, The Nuclear Freeze Campaign: Rhetoric and Foreign Policy in the Telepolitical Age, p. 6-7]

Most former freeze activists retain at least some faith in the democratic process. According to Solo, the freeze campaign at least *began* a long process of “educating” the public, and for a time it successfully transformed “the issues and the language used by politicians” to facilitate discussion of nuclear issues, breaking from “the dominant discourse of arms control and the cold war.” But just as this “war of ideas” was beginning to bear fruit, according to Solo, “the movement narrowed its agenda, which in turn constrained its educational program and confined its politics.” Concerned with answering its right-wing critics and remaining “respectable” among “political and arms control elites,” freeze advocates began defending the initiative on “technical grounds**,”** thereby straying from their “original goal of breaking out of arms control ‘negotiations as usual’ and challenging the new militarism.” For Solo, the lesson is clear: that in order “to develop a mass base” with “potential to develop political power without being co-opted,” peace activists must “promote political literacy with a dynamic education strategy that recognizes the peculiarities of our culture and language and does not overlook the continuing impact of television on our political life as a nation.”

#### Can’t solve the case – disarmament requires some concrete role of the state

Rydell, 18—former Senior Political Affairs Officer in the UN Office of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs (Randy, “A Strategic Plan for Nuclear Disarmament: Engineering a Perfect Political Storm,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 1:1, 49-65, dml)

The multilateral diplomatic process is largely adrift at present toward an uncertain destination. The nuclear-weapon states have no plan for achieving nuclear disarmament, nor any demonstrated interest in preparing one. The non-nuclear-weapon states clearly understand what steps could legitimately be viewed as “real” disarmament, yet lack an organized strategy for actually getting those steps implemented. In recent years, the “humanitarian initiative” has been framing nuclear disarmament as an imperative under the international humanitarian laws and norms, and this has helped to ensure that support for disarmament is here to stay. Yet it remains uncertain if this new wave of support for disarmament will ever be reflected in a transparent, irreversible, verified, universally observed, and binding disarmament process. The basic question remains, “how do we get there?”∂ Regardless whether one supports progress “towards” or “in” disarmament, both stances would benefit from the development of a “strategic plan” to achieve their concrete objectives. There is no sign that any such plan exists in either camp, as the possessors proceed with their own plans for indefinite retention and modernization, and the non-nuclear-weapon states proceed to itemize actions that must be taken without addressing the political circumstances necessary to achieve them.∂ Former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson defined “strategic planning” as a particular organizational capability:∂ … to look ahead, not into the distant future, but beyond the vision of the operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle; far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline what should be done to meet or anticipate them. (Williams 2010)∂ At a minimum, strategic planning requires a clear set of goals, tools for assessing progress in achieving those goals, a capability of forging coalitions of support, the marshaling of resources necessary to make the disarmament enterprise sustainable, a coherent and compelling message for the public, a capacity to create networks across borders and among diverse interest groups, and an ability to adjust collective activities in the event of inefficiencies or ineffectiveness.∂ The primary (but not exclusive) location of this strategic planning process for disarmament must necessarily be at the level of the nation state. As Jayantha Dhanapala once put it, “The central challenge of our time is not to achieve the end of the nation state, but to rehabilitate the ends of the nation state” (Dhanapala 2001). While “the UN can do many things,” said Sergio Duarte, “it cannot replace or compete with the vital need for concrete action at the level of state policy and practice, which is shaped and influenced in diverse ways by an informed public” (Duarte 2008). Yet strategic planning remains relevant at all levels of political activity, from grassroots to global, which helps to explain why the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs has a “strategic planning unit” as do about 20 other offices in the UN secretariat.

## Arms Control

#### Framework—the K must prove the fiated implications of the implementation of the plan are bad. Anything else unpredictably shifts focus from the controversy, allowing the neg to monopolize prep and undermine preparation for all debates. Lack of clash turns any education impact and makes it impossible to devise political strategies

#### Floating PIK’s are a voting issue – They moot the entirety of the 1AC and skirt engagement – It’s not predictable because debaters sift through literally hundreds of thousands of words in hundreds of cards per topic.

#### Perm do both – one round won’t round change our reps – the perm resolves majority of their impact so only weigh the links

#### The alt doesn’t change the framework states operate within – that takes out all of their root cause claims, external impacts, and justifies our epistemology – their heuristic makes war and structural violence more likely

**de Araujo,** professor for Ethics at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, **14**

(Marcelo, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 24(2): 29-43)

Some moral enhancement theorists argue that a society of morally enhanced individuals would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in the future such as, for instance, the threats posed by climate change, grand scale terrorist attacks, or the risk of catastrophic wars. The assumption here is quite simple: our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ moral motivation. If human beings were morally better – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – there would be fewer wars, less terrorism, and more willingness to save our environment. Although simple and attractive, this assumption is, as I intend to show, false. At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions, but the endurance of an old political arrangement that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis. The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view, moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea. Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs relating, for instance, to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily, or to the moral requirement to help people in need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory (Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people,and to trust unknown prospective cooperators, may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytocin in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future. The assumption that there is a relationship between, on the one hand, threats to the survival of humankind and, on the other, a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is clearly made by some moral enhancements theorists. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a “mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand, both positions are correct in recognizing the real possibility of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for instance, biotechnology or nuclear capabilities. The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction” (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The attempt to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently been resumed, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings” (Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman 2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future, implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu and Persson, Sparrow correctly argues that “structural issues,” rather than human nature, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests. Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But the question, of course, is whether moral enhancement will also improve the prospect of our coping successfully with some major threats to the survival of humankind, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or to reduce evil in the world, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within the tradition of political realism itself. “Structural realism,” unlike “human nature realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of the moral shortcomings of human nature. Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the states are the main, if not the only, relevant actors in the context of international relations; and second, that states compete for power in the international arena. Moral considerations in international affairs, according to realists, are secondary when set against the state’s primary goal, namely its own security and survival. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states (Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, it is this structure that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is its “anarchical structure,” i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It means that each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival. In the absence of a superior authority, over and above the power of each sovereign state, political leaders often feel compelled to favor security over morality, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,” their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus, even if human beings turn out to become morally enhanced in the future, humankind may still have to face the same scary scenarios described by some moral enhancement theorists. This is likely to happen if, indeed, human beings remain compelled to cooperate within the present structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced Yeltsin might have given orders to launch a devastating nuclear response – and that in spite of strong moral dispositions to the contrary. Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). What has to be changed, therefore, is not human moral dispositions, but the very structure of the political international system of states within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While moral enhancement may possibly have desirable results in some areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it will not motivate political leaders to dismantle their nuclear weapons. Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability, at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see prospective cooperators in the present as possible enemies in the future. The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will often fail to cooperate, and occasionally engage in conflicts and wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, this is likely to continue to happen, even if, in the future, political leaders become less egoistic and power-seeking through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of bioengineering is unlikely to yield the expected results, so long as moral enhancement is pursued within the present framework of the international system of states.

#### Reps don’t shape reality

Thierry Balzacq 5, Professor of Political Science and IR @ Namar University, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context” European Journal of International Relations, London: Jun 2005, Volume 11, Issue 2

However, despite important insights, this position remains highly disputable. The reason behind this qualification is not hard to understand. With great trepidation my contention is that one of the main distinctions we need to take into account while examining securitization is that between 'institutional' and 'brute' threats. In its attempts to follow a more radical approach to security problems wherein threats are institutional, that is, mere products of communicative relations between agents, the CS has neglected the importance of 'external or brute threats', that is, threats that do not depend on language mediation to be what they are - hazards for human life. In methodological terms, however, any framework over-emphasizing either institutional or brute threat risks losing sight of important aspects of a multifaceted phenomenon. Indeed, securitization, as suggested earlier, is successful when the securitizing agent and the audience reach a common structured perception of an ominous development. In this scheme, there is no security problem except through the language game. Therefore, how problems are 'out there' is exclusively contingent upon how we linguistically depict them. This is not always true. For one, language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it. Moreover, it is not theoretically useful nor is it empirically credible to hold that what we say about a problem would determine its essence. For instance, what I say about a typhoon would not change its essence. The consequence of this position, which would require a deeper articulation, is that some security problems are the attribute of the development itself. In short, threats are not only institutional; some of them can actually wreck entire political communities regardless of the use of language. Analyzing security problems then becomes a matter of understanding how external contexts, including external objective developments, affect securitization. Thus, far from being a departure from constructivist approaches to security, external developments are central to it.

## Setcol

#### Perm do both – It resolves majority of settlerism and means they only get to weigh the links.

#### Nuclear war makes the impact inevitable

**Brian 82** – Professor of Social Sciences in the School of Social Sciences, Media and Communication at the University of Wollongong (Martin, “How the Peace Movement Should be Preparing for Nuclear War” Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 149-159)

There are very strong links between militarism and repression [18]: hierarchical, centralised bureaucratic structures underlie and thrive on each of them. Any fundamental challenge to war must challenge these structures as well. A nuclear emergency would greatly intensify the pressures both for military intervention in civil affairs and for state-sponsored repression. This points to the need to build very strong links between peace activists and those who are struggling against state power, such as groups opposing political police, civil liberties groups, groups defending the rights of racial minorities, women, homosexuals and prisoners, and groups supporting freedom of information and other checks on bureaucracies. Also important are strong links - as already exist in many cases - between peace groups and Third World groups struggling for justice and equality. Exploitation of people, especially in poor countries, is as major feature of the institutions which spawn the threat of nuclear war. Third World justice struggles are a continuing threat to these institutions. In a nuclear crisis or nuclear war, there would be strong pressures from exploiting groups to continue or expand repression and exploitation, for example to provide for recovery from nuclear attack. If opposition groups in exploited countries were prepared to push their claims harder and oppose repression in a nuclear crisis, this could both reduce the risk of nuclear war and lay the basis for ever stronger challenges to the institutions underpinning war. This will be especially effective if opposition groups in both power blocs - for example both eastern Europe and Latin America - increase their efforts in tandem.

#### Disarmament breaks the cycle of exploitation

**Baldonado 98** (Statement Coordinator Myrla Baldonado, People's Task Force for Base Clean Up, Philippines

<http://www.nuclearfiles.org/hinonproliferationtreaty/98npt_ngo2.html>)

We reaffirm the correctness and relevance of  the 1997 Moorea Declaration by Abolition 2000 which states that colonized and indigenous people have in the large part, borne the brunt of this nuclear devastation - from the mining of uranium and the testing of nuclear weapons on indigenous peoples land, to the dumping, storage and transport of plutonium and nuclear wastes, and the theft of land for nuclear infrastructure." We therefore come here to the table as victims of the nuclear age. While it is difficult to transcend the nature of what it is to be the sacrificial lambs of military imposed "peace," we seek to transcend mere victimization in demanding and calling for a final cessation to these genocidal acts of nuclear colonialism\*. We are inspired by the work of the recently-deceased Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, who spoke of strategy on behalf of oppressed peoples working to liberate themselves from the oppression that dehumanizes both the oppressor and the oppressed.  Being the victims of the nuclear age, we ask you to listen to the suffering voices silenced by attribution of priority to a precarious "peace" maintained by military means.  The Pacific, like most Indigenous communities around the world, is heavily militarized.  Genuine peace can only begin to emerge when the nations of the world start to dismantle military and nuclear installations now dominating the entire Pacific from Guam to Hawaii to French Polynesia. \*Nuclear disarmament can begin to heal the wounds imposed on communities not only in the South, but in the Northern countries as well.\* The theory and practice of nuclear deterrence have been extremely hostile to democratic practice.  Nuclear disarmament and demilitarization will allow communities to participate more fully in both the political sphere and civil society. National military strategies, on the other hand, have often required the absence of free democratic thought.  As you meet here, we urge you to take strong and courageous leadership in de-legitimizing what, for a whole generation, gripped our imagination as we tottered in so close a proximity to total nuclear annihilation.  As we have heard oftentimes, the end of the Cold War has provided a historic opportunity to rid ourselves of this "near-death" experience with planned obsolescence of the human race. Both the NPT and subsequent efforts to re-visit it, including the 1995 review, \*produced many promises which you all undertook to achieve. Integrity in this instance is crucial, and we urge you all to be true to those promise\*s.  With the next formal Review of the NPT in the year 2000, it will not only be logical to set ourselves on a new footing in human history; \*it will also be a crucial symbol

#### Decolonization fails absent tackling particular forms of oppression and material barriers to solvency – their theory encourages inaction in the face of inevitability, ignores the contingencies of violence, and commodifies decolonization for settler pleasure.

**Davis et al. 17**. Lynne Davis, Associate Professor, Indigenous Studies, Trent University; Jeff Dennis, Associate Professor, Sociology McMaster University; Raven Sinclair, Associate Professor, Social Work University of Regina. “Pathways of settler decolonization.” Settler Colonial Studies 7(4): 393-7.

In addition to interdisciplinarity, the papers also share a concern to move from analysis toward action. Scholars such as Macoun and Strakosch,1 and Snelgrove, Dhamoon and Corntassel2 have warned against an abdication of responsibility by settler activists because the structural nature of settler colonialism would seem to defy a transformed future. In assessing the strengths and limitations of settler colonial theory, Macoun and Strakosch challenge those who use settler colonial theory (SCT) to realize its transformative opportunities while acting consciously to counter limitations identified by various critics. They caution against a stance of inevitability of settler colonialism that would risk delegitimizing Indigenous resistance, and they worry about re-inscribing settler academics’ political and intellectual authority to the detriment of Indigenous voices. At the same time, they note the contribution of SCT in providing a theoretical language to understand colonialism as a continuing force in the present, including an analysis of how both conservative and progressive settler movements may detract from Indigenous political challenges to the state, thus problematizing settler efforts at reconciliation and decolonization. They identify as one of its strengths the ability of SCT to provide non-Indigenous people with ‘a better account of ourselves’, 3 and to generate new conversations and alliances between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. Snelgrove, Dhamoon and Corntassel warn that SCT’s rapid ascendancy in the academy could overshadow Indigenous Studies and the voices of Indigenous peoples. They argue that: without centering Indigenous peoples’ articulations, without deploying a relational approach to settler colonial power, and without paying attention to the conditions and contingencies of settler colonialism, studies of settler colonialism and practices of solidarity run the risk of reifying (and possibly replicating) settler colonial as well as other modes of domination.4 In their view, Indigenous resistance and resurgence must remain central in discussions of changing relationships: Theorists of Indigenous resurgence, such as Taiaiake Alfred and Leanne Simpson, among others, also express the possibility for settler society listening, learning, and acting […] in accordance with and for what is being articulated [by Indigenous people]; Indigenous resurgence is ultimately about reframing the conversation around decolonization in order to re-center and reinvigorate Indigenous nationhood. Macoun and Strakosch, and Snelgrove, Dhamoon and Corntassel gesture towards action by settler society to follow the lead of resurgence theorists in transforming settler colonialism, despite the structural, relational and affective challenges of anti-colonial struggle, in order to ‘reinvigorate Indigenous nationhood’ The authors in this volume examine pathways to settler decolonization, analyzing the uneven terrain of settler efforts and experiences through the lenses of SCT, Indigenous scholars and grassroots communities, and specific disciplinary analyses. While SCT has been criticized for its inability to theorize a decolonial future, this volume interrogates what happens when settlers engage with and seek to transform the system. What does such action look like? What challenges, complexities and barriers are faced? What are the stumbling blocks? And what opportunities and possibilities emerge? The articles in this volume all note the need for settlers to transform our/their relations with the land and with Indigenous peoples, while recognizing the structural and psychological challenges of applying these principles in practice. It is one thing to care about the environment, and quite another to reorient one’s lifestyle around sustainable practices and the health of local ecosystems. It is one thing to feel a connection to a place, and another to accept the notion of ‘non-human agency’. 6 Likewise, it is easier for settlers to advocate for the return of land to Indigenous peoples ‘over there’ rather than right where settlers and settler states and corporations (claim to) own property.7 Transforming social relations is not just a matter of befriending Indigenous people; it means developing long-term relations of accountability, engaging in meaningful dialogue, and respecting Indigenous laws and jurisdiction. Learning to transform relationships in these ways – and to transform self-understandings and thinking and feeling patterns or ‘settler common sense’ 8 – is an ongoing process; it is not linear, but rather iterative, occurring in what Hiller in this volume calls ‘upward and downward spirals’. Moreover, settlers’ anti-colonial learning (and unlearning) does not simply precede action; it occurs through action, through meaningful relationships with Indigenous peoples and with other engaged settlers, and through experimentation with activism of various sorts. The Nehiyawak (Cree) refer to this relational and iterative social justice-focused process as kisāhkīwewin: love in action. Several papers in this volume also address the role of emotions in settler decolonization. While critical self-reflection is essential to this process, and while emotions such as guilt, shame and indignation can help motivate settlers to change their ways and support Indigenous resurgence (as Bacon shows in one of the articles collected here), it is equally important not to treat ‘unsettling the settler within’ 9 as an end in itself; rather than dwelling in discomfort, the point of unsettlement is to be a springboard to action that benefits Indigenous peoples. A related point of tension (or contention) is whether decolonization is in the interests of settlers. Boudreau (in this volume) argues that deep decolonizing solidarities must not be based on self-interest; decolonization for settlers entails sacrifice, or giving up power and privilege. This may be true and, therefore, if it is believed that there is nothing in it for settlers, why would they ever pursue it? Although decolonization may not be in settlers’ short-term economic or political interests, it may fulfill a humanistic, ethical and moral commitment. Moreover, decolonization may be in virtually everyone’s long-term interest, particularly if Indigenous resurgence assists in combatting climate change, ever-growing economic inequality, and other political and social problems. As Tuck and Yang make clear, decolonization is not a metaphor for other social justice projects.10 Nevertheless, settler colonialism does intersect with other systems of oppression, and decolonization would be incomplete without also tackling racism, capitalism and heterosexism.11

#### Reject settler colonialism as a structural analytic---it propagates a false consciousness that pacifies people out of improving lived conditions.

Manu Vimalassery 16, Assistant Professor of American Studies at Barnard College, Juliana Pegues, Alyosha Goldstein, “On Colonial Unknowing”, Theory & Event, 19(4), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/633283

The theorization of “settler colonialism” is indicative of these tensions. Activists and academics have increasingly taken up settler colonialism as an analytic to address the particular ways in which colonialism operates and persists in places such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, as well as Israel/Palestine. To a considerable extent, much of the work that has recently become associated with settler colonial studies has already been underway in Native American and Indigenous studies, as well as other fields including ethnic studies and colonial discourse studies. Our contention is that the particular ways in which settler colonialism has assumed predominance as an analytic risks obscuring or eliding as much as it does to distinguish significant features of the present conjuncture.22 Indeed, we suggest that when settler colonialism is deployed as a stand-alone analytic it potentially reproduces precisely the effects and enactments of colonial unknowing that we are theorizing in this introduction. Approaches to the analysis of settler colonialism, as isolated from imperialism and differential modes of racialization, are consequences of the institutionalization of this work as a distinct subfield, which is claimed and consolidated through analytic tendencies that foreclose or bracket out interconnections and relational possibilities. Settler colonial histories, conditions, practices, and logics of dispossession and power must necessarily be understood as relationally constituted to other modes of imperialism, racial capitalism, and historical formations of social difference. The key insights of settler colonial studies into the particularity of settlement as a manner of colonial power have also led to a tendency to focus on this distinction as constituting a discrete and modular form or ensemble of practices— such as Patrick Wolfe’s often cited contention that “settler colonialism destroys to replace”23—that can be applied across differences of geography or time. As such, settler colonialism appears as a self-contained type rather than a situatedly specific formation that is co-constituted with other forms and histories of colonialism, counter-claims, and relations of power. For instance, in the U.S. context, settler colonialism as a singular manner of colonialism entirely misses the ways in which the abduction and enslavement of Africans and their descendants was a colonial practice that, while changing in its intensities and modes of organization over time, was co-constitutive of colonialism as a project of settlement rather than a supplement that demonstrates the taking of land and labor as distinct endeavors. Wolfe’s description of settler colonialism as a structure, and not an event, has by now achieved the status of a truism in analyses of settler colonialism.24 Wolfe’s work has been crucial in bringing further attention to the fact that colonialism is an ongoing fact of life for indigenous peoples more than fifty years after the advent of the so-called era of decolonization. His scholarship insightfully underscored historical continuities in the shifting regimes and policies of settler states in relation to indigenous peoples, and challenged a certain produced ignorance about the “post” colonial character of societies like the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.25 Yet drawing an absolute distinction between structure and event, and as a result, discarding a focus on the historicity of settler colonialism, neglects some of the ways Wolfe distinguishes between the binary terms structure/event in the service of further analysis. For example, Wolfe emphasizes how settler colonialism is a “complex social formation” with “structural complexity” that emerges through process.26 When taken up as a modular analytic that travels without regard to the specificities of location or social and material relations, a categorical event/structure binary banishes deeply engaged historical knowledge from the landscape, turning away from historical materialism, devolving into a scholastic debate over identities and standpoints that are reduced to structural essences and divorced from politics or contingency. Emphasizing structure over event also limits the analysis of settler colonialism itself into a descriptive typology, orienting our vision narrowly within the technical perspective of colonial power (in the white Commonwealth countries), away from geographies from below, such as a hemispheric perspective of the Americas, with their multiple and distinct modes of colonialism, thus replicating the conditions of unknowing.27 Foregrounding structure against event might also divert attention away from imperialism. This binary perpetuates taking what Lisa Lowe calls the “colonial divisions of humanity” as given. Situating this compartmentalization as a consequence of imperial formations calls attention to how, as Lowe writes, “The operations that pronounce colonial divisions of humanity—settler seizure and native removal, slavery and racial dispossession, and racialized expropriations of many kinds—are imbricated processes, not sequential events; they are ongoing and continuous in our contemporary moment, not temporally distinct now as yet concluded.”28 If the analytic project is reduced to naming and delimiting settler colonialism as a distinct structure of power that exists in specific places, primarily the settler peripheries of Anglo imperium, we lose focus on the Caribbean and the Americas as the grounds of modern imperialism, abdicating the hard-won horizon of anti-imperialism. An emphasis on structure over event is symptomatic of the stabilization of colonial unknowing through binaries and schematic modes of thought. As Wolfe writes, “Territoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element.”29 However, Wolfe’s cartographic model is that of the frontier, in which “the primary social division was encompassed in the relation between natives and invaders.”30 The frontier is a linear model, a binary opposition between civilization and savagery, reflecting both a colonizing subjectivity and its state form. What socio-spatial imaginaries, and concomitant critical models, might become visible if we thought from other spatial forms, such as circles or spirals, spatial forms that are often more relevant to indigenous epistemologies than straight lines? If we remapped the colonial condition through circular or spiraling forms, what new insights might we gain on the decolonial imperative? For one, we might be able to better grasp colonial, racial, and imperial simultaneities, as well as positions that do not easily fit into a settler/native binary. As Wolfe writes, “Settler-colonists came to stay. In the main, they did not send their children back to British schools or retire ‘home’ before old age could spoil the illusion of their superhumanity. National independence did not entail their departure.”31 Moreover, to inflect these insights through the lens of negritude produces a considerably more complex set of possibilities, where the verbs come and stay do not carry any simple or easily recoverable trace of agency or consent.32 As Iyko Day writes, “the logic of antiblackness complicates a settler colonial binary framed around a central Indigenous/settler opposition.”33

#### Tuck and Yang hate the K – the 1NC’s gap between theory and praxis is another move to settler innocence. Unless they get THE FUCK off the land you should never vote neg.

Tuck and Yang 12 [Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, \*State university of New York at New Paltz \*\*University of California, San Diego, 2012, "Decolonization is not a metaphor," Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, https://clas.osu.edu/sites/clas.osu.edu/files/Tuck%20and%20Yang%202012%20Decolonization%20is%20not%20a%20metaphor.pdf, accessed 9-30-2019] LHSBC

Fanon told us in 1963 that decolonizing the mind is the first step, not the only step toward overthrowing colonial regimes. Yet we wonder whether another settler move to innocence is to focus on decolonizing the mind, or the cultivation of critical consciousness, as if it were the sole activity of decolonization; to allow conscientization to stand in for the more uncomfortable task of relinquishing stolen land. We agree that curricula, literature, and pedagogy can be crafted to aid people in learning to see settler colonialism, to articulate critiques of settler epistemology, and set aside settler histories and values in search of ethics that reject domination and exploitation; this is not unimportant work. However, the front-loading of critical consciousness building can waylay decolonization, even though the experience of teaching and learning to be critical of settler colonialism can be so powerful it can feel like it is indeed making change. Until stolen land is relinquished, critical consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism. So, we respectfully disagree with George Clinton and Funkadelic (1970) and En Vogue (1992) when they assert that if you “free your mind, the rest (your ass) will follow.”

## Fem

#### Perm do both – It resolves majority of their impact and means they only get to weigh the links.

#### Realism is inevitable

**de Araujo,** professor for Ethics at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, **14**

(Marcelo, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 24(2): 29-43)

Some moral enhancement theorists argue that a society of morally enhanced individuals would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in the future such as, for instance, the threats posed by climate change, grand scale terrorist attacks, or the risk of catastrophic wars. The assumption here is quite simple: our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ moral motivation. If human beings were morally better – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – there would be fewer wars, less terrorism, and more willingness to save our environment. Although simple and attractive, this assumption is, as I intend to show, false. At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions, but the endurance of an old political arrangement that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis. The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view, moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea. Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs relating, for instance, to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily, or to the moral requirement to help people in need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory (Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people,and to trust unknown prospective cooperators, may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytocin in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future. The assumption that there is a relationship between, on the one hand, threats to the survival of humankind and, on the other, a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is clearly made by some moral enhancements theorists. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a “mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand, both positions are correct in recognizing the real possibility of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for instance, biotechnology or nuclear capabilities. The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction” (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The attempt to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently been resumed, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings” (Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman 2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future, implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu and Persson, Sparrow correctly argues that “structural issues,” rather than human nature, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests. Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But the question, of course, is whether moral enhancement will also improve the prospect of our coping successfully with some major threats to the survival of humankind, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or to reduce evil in the world, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within the tradition of political realism itself. “Structural realism,” unlike “human nature realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of the moral shortcomings of human nature. Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the states are the main, if not the only, relevant actors in the context of international relations; and second, that states compete for power in the international arena. Moral considerations in international affairs, according to realists, are secondary when set against the state’s primary goal, namely its own security and survival. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states (Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, it is this structure that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is its “anarchical structure,” i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It means that each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival. In the absence of a superior authority, over and above the power of each sovereign state, political leaders often feel compelled to favor security over morality, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,” their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus, even if human beings turn out to become morally enhanced in the future, humankind may still have to face the same scary scenarios described by some moral enhancement theorists. This is likely to happen if, indeed, human beings remain compelled to cooperate within the present structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced Yeltsin might have given orders to launch a devastating nuclear response – and that in spite of strong moral dispositions to the contrary. Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). What has to be changed, therefore, is not human moral dispositions, but the very structure of the political international system of states within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While moral enhancement may possibly have desirable results in some areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it will not motivate political leaders to dismantle their nuclear weapons. Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability, at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see prospective cooperators in the present as possible enemies in the future. The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will often fail to cooperate, and occasionally engage in conflicts and wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, this is likely to continue to happen, even if, in the future, political leaders become less egoistic and power-seeking through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of bioengineering is unlikely to yield the expected results, so long as moral enhancement is pursued within the present framework of the international system of states.

#### Gender isn’t the root cause—if it is, it proves the alt can’t resolve it alone

Gunnarsson, et al, 16—Örebro University (Lena, with Angela Martinez Dy, Loughborough University London, and Michiel van Ingen, University of Westminster, “Critical Realism, Gender and Feminism: Exchanges, Challenges, Synergies,” Journal of Critical Realism, 15:5, 433-439, dml)

It should be noted, however, that not all of the contributors to this special issue are in fact committed to the adoption of a critical realist philosophical framework in this way. Gillman, Smirthwaite and Swahnberg, and Griffiths take something of an outsider’s or newcomer’s perspective with regard to critical realist philosophy. While these authors relate to critical realism as a framework of interest, none wholeheartedly subscribe to it. As editors of this special issue we were very pleased to receive such contributions, as respectful engagements and interested conversations between critical realists and proponents of perspectives that are more commonly adopted by feminist theorists and gender scholars have unfortunately continued to be few and far between. Sue Clegg, Dimitri Mader and Michiel van Ingen, however, clearly write much more from within the parameters of critical realist philosophy, using its meta-theoretical framework as a means of making interventions in important feminist debates. Although Clegg, in her piece on intersectionality, does engage in some (critical) conversation with popular poststructuralist versions of intersectional theorizing, for instance, the main purpose of her article is to use critical realism as a philosophical underlabourer in order to think through various issues currently arising in discussions about intersectional theory, particularly the relationship between structure and agency. Mader’s contribution also centres on the structure/agency problematic and, like Clegg, draws especially on Margaret Archer’s work. However, whereas Clegg explicitly intervenes in intersectionality theory, whose proponents foreground the multiplicity of different forms of positioning and are often suspicious of an exclusive focus on gender, Mader’s contribution implicitly challenges the ‘intersectional imperative’ (Wiegman 1999, 376) by focusing on the gendered power structure in abstraction from other power relations. There is therefore a crucial (if not explicit) philosophical link between Clegg’s and Mader’s contributions, insofar as the former, while being mainly concerned with intersectionality theory, also argues in favour of engaging in exactly the kind of non-intersectional, ‘separatist’ (Gunnarsson 2015, 10) theoretical projects that Mader’s article exemplifies with its in-depth focus on gendered dominance. Such feminist endeavours, which seek to trace the basic causal mechanisms of patriarchy, have been increasingly difficult to carry out in the contemporary theoretical climate, and this is in significant part due to both the aforementioned intersectional imperative and the more general poststructuralist taboo on structural forms of theorizing. Importantly, however, it is not intersectional forms of theorizing as such that are considered problematic by critical realist authors such as Clegg and Mader. The basic intersectional claim that social situations, identities and practices are conditioned by a range of intersecting power relations is arguably indisputable. Indeed, it is telling that authors and activists who persist in ignoring that this is the case are generally those who are subordinated only in terms of one, or no, social axis of power. However, while analyses of how different power relations and categorizations complexly intersect are pivotal, they do not allow us to do the equally important work of theorizing, in an in-depth and abstracted manner, the basic causal mechanisms that are exercised by the social/cultural structures that are ‘doing’ the intersecting at a concrete level (cf. Walby, Armstrong and Strid 2012; Martinez Dy, Martin and Marlow 2014; Gunnarsson 2015). As Clegg shows, however, the stratified ontology of critical realism provides helpful forms of support for theorists who wish to carry out analyses at different levels of abstraction. That is to say, it facilitates intersectional analysis where it is needed in order to understand the multi-layered fabric of social life, while not closing the door to ‘nonintersectional’ analyses that focus on how one specific categorical and structural dimension of this social life causally affects a situation of interest. What sets Mader’s contribution to theorizing gender-based domination apart from secondwave, single-issue feminist theory, however, is its engagement with contemporary debates, reflected in the explicit incorporation of the implications of his work for intersectional analyses. Intersectionality thus continues to be a topic of significance for the dev

elopment of critical realist feminism. In her review of Vivian May’s book Pursuing Intersectionality, Unsettling Dominant Imaginaries (2015), for instance, Angela Martinez Dy contextualizes May’s discussion of the intersectional turn away from structural theory in the history of the philosophy of science and the feminist turn towards poststructuralism. She then points to various possibilities for a realist development of intersectional theory that affirms its key role in social analysis. For example, whereas May sees the critical realist imperative to retain the validity of categories like ‘woman’ (Gunnarsson 2011) as possibly promoting a problematic gender-first logic, Martinez Dy argues that a critical realist approach, informed by the body of knowledge on intersectionality reviewed in detail in May’s book, can be used to develop the meanings of the categories themselves to allow for much greater complexity and nuance. In her review of Susan Hekman’s book The Feminine Subject (2014), Alison Assiter similarly addresses what she sees as the problematic tendency of certain feminist and gender studies approaches to emphasize differences among women over and against those features that they have in common. Whereas poststructuralist scholars have sought to retain ‘women’ as a politically necessary category by means of ‘strategic’ essentialism (Spivak 1987) and the like, Assiter does not shy away from talking about a real ‘universal essence to women’, in the simple sense of ‘characteristics in virtue of which women are described as women’ (p. 549). While Assiter does not specify the precise role of biological as opposed to social/ cultural forms of determination in this respect, Martinez Dy points out that the stratified, emergentist critical realist view can account for the significance of biological factors, while avoiding determinism and reductionism. Her argument thereby engages in an implicit dialogue with Griffith’s contribution, which favours the adoption of a sceptical approach towards the work of critical realist authors (especially New 2005) who have sought to maintain clear distinctions between sex and gender as well as between the (two) sexes, as such distinctions are at odds with prominent queer perspectives that reject the postulation of stable foundations for gendered identities. As Griffith’s article illustrates, queer theorists tend to see the existence of both intersex and trans persons as evidence of the indeterminacy of biological sex. Critical realists, instead, have sought to retain the notion of a structuring biological foundation, interpreting the diversity of gender expressions not as something that undermines structuredness but as something that demonstrates that (relative) structuredness can co-exist with (relative) variety and irregularity (Hull 2006; Gunnarsson 2013, 2014). In conclusion, feminist theory has long acknowledged the importance of situated knowledges (or, in critical realist terms, epistemic relativism), and has called for the coming together of various different vantage points so that reality may be better understood. We hope that this special issue puts such ideas into practice, and that it illustrates how multiple philosophical perspectives, when placed into conversation with each other, can help us to achieve a synergetic end that is greater than the sum of its parts. Although there are some empirical aspects to the pieces that have been included, the contributions in this volume primarily have a theoretical thrust. This is intentional. One final aim of this special issue is for it to engage in a kind of theoretical ground-clearing that reconciles tensions, points out commonalities, and signposts promising paths, in an attempt to take us just a few steps further through the forest of conflicting feminist perspectives, both extant and emerging. We hope that the pieces that are included here encourage the use of critical realist philosophy, in dialogue with feminist and gender theory, so that new and stimulating forms of theoretical and empirical research may take place.

## Afropess

#### Perm do both: Combining the AFF’s and ALT’s analysis AND movements is key.

Vincent J. **Intondi 14**. Associate Professor of History, Dir. of the Institute for Race, Justice, and Community Engagement at Montgomery College. 2014. African Americans against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement. Stanford University Press.

In August 1945, only a few days after the United States dropped two atomic bombs destroying the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Reverend J.E. Elliott, pastor of St. Luke Chapel, stepped up to the pulpit and began his Sunday sermon. The pastor condemned the use of atomic bombs in Japan and suggested that racism played a role in President Truman’s decision. “I have seen the course of discrimination throughout the war and the fact that Japan is of a darker race is no excuse for resorting to such an atrocity,” Elliott said.1 Twenty-three years later, on February 6, 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., also stepped up to the pulpit to warn against the use of nuclear weapons. Addressing the second mobilization of the Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, King urged an end to the war, and warned that if the United States used nuclear weapons in Vietnam the earth would be transformed into an inferno that “even the mind of Dante could not envision.”2 Then, as he had done so many times before, King made clear the connection between the black freedom struggle in America and the need for nuclear disarmament: These two issues are tied together in many, many ways. It is a wonderful thing to work to integrate lunch counters, public accommodations, and schools. But it would be rather absurd to work to get schools and lunch counters integrated and not be concerned with the survival of a world in which to integrate. And I am convinced that these two issues are tied inextricably together and I feel that the people who are working for civil rights are working for peace; I feel that the people working for peace are working for civil rights and justice.3 Almost fifteen years later, on June 12, 1982, nearly one million activists and concerned citizens gathered in New York City for what became known as the largest antinuclear demonstration in the history of the United States.4 A large contingent of minority groups organized under the Reverend Herbert Daughtry’s National Black United Front was among the thousands of protesters. Marching through Harlem, these activists, including prominent African Americans Harry Belafonte, Chaka Kahn, Toni Morrison, Ossie Davis, and Ruby Dee, demanded an end to the nuclear arms race and a shift from defense spending to helping the poor. When asked why they were marching, Dick Gregory responded, “to write the unwritten page of the Constitution, dealing with the right to live free from nuclear terror.”5 From 1945 onward, many in the African American community actively supported nuclear disarmament, even when the cause was abandoned by other groups during the McCarthy era. This allowed the fight to abolish nuclear weapons to reemerge powerfully in the 1970s and beyond. Black leaders never gave up the nuclear issue or failed to see its importance; by doing so, they broadened the black freedom movement and helped define it in terms of global human rights. African Americans Against the Bomb examines those black activists who fought for nuclear disarmament, often connecting the nuclear issue with the fight for racial equality and with liberation movements around the world. Beginning with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this book explores the shifting response of black leaders and organizations, and of the broader African American public, to the evolving nuclear arms race and general nuclear threat throughout the postwar period. For too long scholars, viewing slavery, Jim Crow, and the Civil Rights Movement as national phenomena, have failed to appreciate the black freedom struggle’s international dimensions. Because of the understandable focus on African Americans’ unique oppression, historians have often entirely ignored African American responses when addressing other important issues, such as the nuclear threat. This omission comes despite the fact that African Americans, as part of the larger human community, have as great a stake as any other group of citizens. In fact, given the increasing urban concentration of African Americans, they face a greater risk when it comes to nuclear war and terrorism than do other groups. The question of how African Americans have responded to nuclear issues is therefore of great historical consequence. Did African Americans respond differently to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki compared to other Americans, and if so, to what extent was this related to the fact that the victims were nonwhite? Did African Americans’ discrimination-induced estrangement from American life allow for a more critical attitude toward the Cold War, and U.S. nuclear policy in particular? Did the left-oriented social and political activism inspired by black Popular Front groups translate into a broader critique of U.S. militarism and foreign policy, both of which were undergirded by the American nuclear arsenal? While African Americans immediately condemned the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, not all of the activists protested for the same reason. For some, race was the issue. Many in the black community agreed with Langston Hughes’s assertion that racism was at the heart of Truman’s decision to use nuclear weapons in Japan. Why did the United States not drop atomic bombs on Italy or Germany, Hughes asked.6 Black activists’ fear that race played a role in the decision to use atomic bombs only increased when the United States threatened to use nuclear weapons in Korea in the 1950s and in Vietnam a decade later. For others, mostly black leftists ensconced in Popular Front groups, the nuclear issue was connected to colonialism. From the United States’ obtaining uranium from the Belgian-controlled Congo to France’s testing a nuclear weapon in the Sahara, activists saw a direct link between those who possessed nuclear weapons and those who colonized the nonwhite world. However, for many ordinary black citizens, fighting for nuclear disarmament simply translated into a more peaceful world. The bomb, then, became the link that connected all of these issues and brought together musicians, artists, peace activists, leftists, clergy, journalists, and ordinary citizens inside the black community. Examining the role of black antinuclear activists is part of a larger narrative that challenges the idea that the black freedom struggle was an isolated movement in a narrowly defined set of years. The past two decades have seen a rise in new scholarship that challenges the accepted narrative of the black freedom movement. Historians have begun to rediscover the forgotten history of black Popular Front groups, Communist Party members and labor organizers, as well as anticolonial and peace activists. A number of these studies suggest that the black freedom movement’s origins date back to the 1930s and 1940s, were much more global in scope, and were influenced by those who consistently combined their plight with those seeking peace and an end to colonialism.7 From the Italo- Ethiopian War of 1935 to the Bandung Conference twenty years later, historians have convincingly shown that black activists consistently connected foreign affairs to their struggle for freedom, often demonstrating an anticolonial and Pan- African perspective. Scholars have reexamined the roots of black radicalism and by doing so have taken African Americans out of the neat categorical boxes in which they were trapped for so many years and have offered a history of the black freedom movement that is much more complex. As Jason Parker explains, scholarship on colonization and the black freedom struggle has “coalesced into a synthesis of international history,” and it is important to examine these subjects through a lens of a “global race revolution.”8 How then does the inclusion of black antinuclear activism alter or reaffirm this emerging narrative? While scholars have provided a valuable service by shedding light on these connections, many have failed to appreciate the role of nuclear weapons. From 1945, the bomb is what in many cases connected various groups and individuals inside the black community. Nuclear disarmament was a main part of the platform at the Bandung Conference in 1955. In the middle of the Civil Rights Movement, Bayard Rustin led a team in Ghana to stop the French from testing a nuclear weapon in the Sahara. Two years later, Kwame Nkrumah, joined by African American activists, held the “World Without the Bomb” conference. Dr. King began connecting the nuclear issue to black freedom as early as 1957. Therefore the role of the bomb is essential when examining the length and scope of the black freedom movement. Throughout this new line of study scholars continue to disagree as to the length and influence of black radical activism. Historian Robbie Lieberman contends that Joseph McCarthy’s anticommunist crusade dramatically stymied black leftists’ progress and thus broke the chain connecting the black freedom movement to peace and colonialism, causing it to largely disappear. Clearly Mc- Carthyism was a major factor in the decline of activists working within Popular Front or peace groups. The federal government targeted black leftists like W.E.B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson, and as anticommunism swept through the country many activists fell silent or disavowed their earlier actions. Indeed, Lieberman concludes that not until the late 1960s did activists once again connect the black freedom movement to peace.9 Brenda Gayle Plummer disagrees, contending that “militant international racial discourse” continued even after the purges of the “conventional Left” in the 1950s. In examining black antinuclear activism, I am suggesting that while connections between the black freedom movement and peace were damaged, they were not completely severed. Rather, there was a consistent voice inside the black community making the case that freedom, peace, and colonialism were links in the same chain. At times the voice was faint, at other times quite loud, but it was always present.10 As Carol Anderson and Mary Dudziak have shown, this was in part due to the fact that liberals also continued to speak out against colonialism past the 1950s. Parker agrees, arguing that the links survived the “anticommunist witch hunters” of the 1950s. This was largely because the nuclear issue resonated in both liberal and radical circles. Beyond the “usual suspects,” artists, clergy, and ordinary citizens cared deeply about nuclear disarmament. Therefore, these connections do not disappear in the 1950s as some have suggested. Indeed, by focusing on the bomb, it is clear that they not only remained but in some ways strengthened throughout the 1980s and into the present day.11 While this is not the first book to address black activists’ participation in the Peace Movement and foreign affairs, my intent is to focus on the role nuclear weapons played in linking these issues together. The black freedom struggle cannot be properly understood without exploring antinuclear campaigns. African Americans’ views of nuclear weapons directly influenced their response to other international issues. Therefore, examining the African American response to the nuclear threat will not only add to the rich body of scholarship dedicated to African Americans and global affairs, but will alter the way we discuss these subjects. African Americans Against the Bomb explains how the fight for freedom, coupled with the desire to avoid nuclear annihilation, blended together and united human beings. Connecting racial equality to nuclear disarmament and colonialism broadened the black freedom struggle, specifically the modern Civil Rights Movement. This book focuses on those activists who refused to stay quiet and continued to fight for freedom and nuclear disarmament when they had much to lose. It discusses those African Americans who joined with nonwhite peoples around the world in an effort to save humanity. From Du Bois to King, and Harold Washington to Barack Obama, this is a study of those in the black community who believed that equality, liberation, and a world free of nuclear weapons were, and would remain, links in the same chain.

#### Group the rant – it’s based on completely bogus science

**Bunge, McGill University philosopher, 2010**

(Mario, “Should Psychoanalysis Be in the Science Museum?”, 10-5, <http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827806.200-should-psychoanalysis-be-in-the-science-museum.html>)

We should congratulate the Science Museum for setting up an exhibition on psychoanalysis. Exposure to pseudoscience greatly helps understand genuine science, just as learning about tyranny helps in understanding democracy. Over the past 30 years, psychoanalysis has quietly been displaced in academia by scientific psychology. But it persists in popular culture as well as being a lucrative profession. It is the psychology of those who have not bothered to learn psychology, and the psychotherapy of choice for those who believe in the power of immaterial mind over body. Psychoanalysis is a bogus science because its practitioners do not do scientific research. When the field turned 100, a group of psychoanalysts admitted this gap and endeavoured to fill it. They claimed to have performed the first experiment showing that patients benefited from their treatment. Regrettably, they did not include a control group and did not entertain the possibility of placebo effects. Hence, their claim remains untested (The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol 81, p 513). More recently, a meta-analysis published in American Psychologist (vol 65, p 98) purported to support the claim that a form of psychoanalysis called psychodynamic therapy is effective. However, once again, the original studies did not involve control groups. In 110 years, psychoanalysts have not set up a single lab. They do not participate in scientific congresses, do not submit their papers to scientific journals and are foreign to the scientific community - a marginality typical of pseudoscience. This does not mean their hypotheses have never been put to the test. True, they are so vague that they are hard to test and some of them are, by Freud's own admission, irrefutable. Still, most of the testable ones have been soundly refuted. For example, most dreams have no sexual content. The Oedipus complex is a myth; boys do not hate their fathers because they would like to have sex with their mothers. The list goes on. As for therapeutic efficacy, little is known because psychoanalysts do not perform double-blind clinical trials or follow-up studies. Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. Its concepts are woolly and untestable yet are regarded as unassailable axioms. As a result of such dogmatism, psychoanalysis has remained basically stagnant for more than a century, in contrast with scientific psychology, which is thriving.

#### Perm do both—if the alternative can overcome the antiblackness of the status quo then there’s no disad to the perm.

#### The ontology debate:

#### Humanity is never closed and a priori orientations towards pessimism ignore lived experience – all social structures are relational and even if the future looks bleak giving up is worse

Gordon 15 --- Lewis, Afro-Jewish philosopher, political thinker, educator, and musician, Professor at the University of Connecticut in Philosophy and Africana Studies, European Union Visiting Chair in Philosophy; Nelson Mandela Visiting Professor of Politics and International Studies at Rhodes University, South Africa; and Chairman of the Frantz Fanon awards committees of the Caribbean Philosophical Association, transcribed from <https://youtu.be/UABksVE5BTQ>, presenting and discussing his book “What Fanon Said” \*\*\*Theonaturalism – religion based difference

The first thing to bear in mind you may wonder why in the beginning of the talk I talked about philosophical anthropology. And many people when they are trying to talk about social change they never think about *what a human being is* and this is something Fanon pays attention to. Many people want to have closed conceptions of human beings because then human beings can be predicable. In fact, in fanons writing he gave an example. One of the problems is that when he would walk in reason seems to walk out. One problem we have to bear in mind when we try to look at the question of human beings in terms of rigid closed systems is that we often are trying to get as a model of how we work as theorists on issues of social change that are actually based on what we can call law like generalizations. Now what is a law like generalization? It is when you make sure that whatever you say has no contradiction down the line. So if you are to say this much [gestures with hand] the next stage must be consistent with that, and the next stage until you are maximally consistent. Do you get that? But here is the problem – and I can just put it in a nut shell- nobody, nobody in this room would like to date, be married to, or be a best friend with a maximally consistent person. You know what that is. Its hell. And this tells you something, because if somebody where maximally consistent, you know what you would say that person is not reasonable. And we have a person here who does work on Hegel that can point out this insight, that a human being has the ability to evaluate rationality. Now why is that important? Because you see the mistake many of us make is many of us want to push the human being into that maximized law like generalization model. So when we think about our philosophical anthropology, some people, our question about intersectionality for instance, what some people don’t understand is nowhere is there ever a human being who is one identity. People talk about race – do you ever really see a race walking? You see a racialized man or woman, or transman or transwoman. Do you ever see a class walking? Class is embodied in flesh and blood people. And we can go on and on. So if we enrich our philosophical anthropology we begin to notice certain other things. And one of the other things we begin to realize is that we commit a serious problem when we do political work. And the problem is this. The question about Wilderson for instance. There is this discussion going on (and allot of people build it out of my earlier books). I have a category I call, as a metaphor, an antiblack world. You notice an indefinite article – an anti-black world. The reason I say that is because the world is different from an anti-black world. The project of racism is to create a world that would be completely anti-black or anti-woman. Although that is a project, it is not a fait accompli. People don’t seem to understand how recent this phenomenon we are talking about is. A lot of people talk about race they don’t even know the history of how race is connected into theonaturalism. How, for instance, Andalucia and the pushing out of the Moors. The history of how race connected to Christianity was formed. A lot of people don’t understand – from the standpoint of a species whose history is 220,000 years old, what the hell is 500 years? But the one thing that we don’t understand to is we create a false model for how we study those last 500 years. We study the 500 years as if the people who have been dominated have not been fighting and resisting. Had they not been fighting and resisting we wouldn’t be here. And then we come into this next point because you see the problem in the formulation of pessimism and optimism is they are both based on forecasted knowledge, a prior knowledge. But human beings don’t have prior knowledge. And in fact – what in the world are we if we need to have guarantees for us to act. You know what you call such people? Cowards. The fact of the matter is our ancestors – let’s start with enslaved ancestors. The enslaved ancestors who were burning down those plantations, who were finding clever ways to poison their masters, who were organizing meetings for rebellions, none of them had any clue what the future would be 100 years later. Some had good reason to believe that it may take 1000 years. But you know why they fought? Because they knew it wasn’t for them. One of the problems we have in the way we think about political issues is we commit what Fanon and others in the existential tradition would call a form of political immaturity. Political immaturity is saying it is not worth it unless I, me, individually get the payoff. When you are thinking what it is to relate to other generations – remember Fanon said the problem with people in the transition, the pseudo postcolonial bourgeois – is that they miss the point, you fight for liberation for other generations. And that is why Fanon said other generations they must have their mission. But you see some people fought and said no I want my piece of the pie. And that means the biggest enemy becomes the other generations. And that is why the postcolonial pseudo-bourgeoisie they are not a bourgeoisie proper because they do not link to the infrastructural development of the future, it is about themselves. And that’s why, for instance, as they live higher up the hog, as they get their mediating, service oriented, racial mediated wealth, the rest of the populations are in misery. The very fact that in many African countries there are people whose futures have been mortgaged, the fact that in this country the very example of mortgaging the future of all of you is there. What happens to people when they have no future? It now collapses the concept of maturation and places people into perpetual childhood. So one of the political things – and this is where a psychiatrist philosopher is crucial – is to ask ourselves what does it mean to take on adult responsibility. And that means to understand that in all political action it’s not about you. It is what you are doing for a world you may not even be able to understand. Now that becomes tricky, because how do we know this? People have done it before. There were people, for instance, who fought anti-colonial struggles, there are people (and now I am not talking about like thirty or forty years ago, I am talking about the people from day one 17th 18th century all the way through) and we have no idea what we are doing for the 22nd century. And this is where developing political insight comes in. Because we commit the error of forgetting the systems we are talking about are human systems. They are not systems in the way we talk about the laws of physics. A human system can only exist by human actions maintaining them. Which means every human system is incomplete. Every human being is by definition incomplete. Which means you can go this way or you can go another way. The system isn’t actually closed.

Vote aff on a risk of offense: if they’re right then there’s no disasd to trying, but if we’re right they cause infinite violence

Framing issue: they need a libidinal economy argument—otherwise there’s nothing intrinsic to civil society or white ppl that necessitates anti-blackness. They’re wrong about it –

#### A] Implicit bias is an automatic thought function which is not pre-social ---changing material conditions affects those processes

Matthew 15 (Dayna Bowen Matthew, nonresident senior fellow in the Center for Health Policy, who works at the University of Colorado School of Law, the Colorado School of Public Health, and the Center for Bioethics and Humanities at the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center specializes in health and behavioral sciences and her research interests include public health law, poverty, and ethics in health professions, “Just Medicine: A Cure for Racial Inequality in American Health Care” New York University Press 2015. Pg 43-45)

Implicit biases are attitudes, preferences, and beliefs about social groups that operate outside of human awareness or control. Neuroscientists believe there are three regions of the brain that relate to the automatic activation of implicit attitudes. First, the amygdala, a small group of nuclei located in both the left and right hemispheres of the brain, has been linked to implicit attitudes in numerous studies. The amygdala is believed to control memory, attention, and automatic responses to stimuli. It plays a role in our ability to evaluate members of other social groups. MRI studies show that elevated blood-oxygen level responses in the amygdala region of the human brain correlate to a person’s implicit attitudes, but are suppressed in the presence of explicit stimuli in the form of faces of a person from a different racial background.”¶ Activity in two other regions of the brain appears to work in a correlated fashion with the amygdala in order to keep implicit racial associations responses below the threshold of conscious awareness. Studies show that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (diPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) have both been correlated with the attenuated responses of the amygdala. In lay terms, a three-part neural model exists in which the amygdala generates automatic responses to racial stimuli, while the diPFC and ACC work to maintain those responses at an unconscious level.” While neuroscientists have measured and studied the physical activity of the brain that generates implicit attitudes, social psychologists have studied the cognitive processes that produce them.¶ Implicit bias is a form of automatic thought. According to the classic, dual processing model of human cognition, thought generally occurs on two levels. On the one hand, explicit or conscious thought occurs by processes that are intentional and deliberate. Automatic thought, on the other hand, is a system of information processing that occurs without any intentionality. There are four basic processes of automatic thought. First, a person acquires and stores social knowledge in a way that is accessible from memory when triggers or cues stir up the associations that make up social knowledge. Social knowledge is the information generally available to members of a community by virtue of the messages chronically reinforced and adopted about people or things. Stereotypes, for example, are a particular form of social knowledge in which attributes or traits are assigned to a group of people. Second, a person’s ability to retrieve social knowledge from memory is the next process of automatic thought, and social psychologists call this function “accessibility.” When cues or triggers from familiar contextual settings allow a person to “activate” social knowledge so that it is ready to direct conduct or judgments without deliberate or conscious decision-making, the second process of automatic thought is enacted. The third and fourth processes involve automatic application of social knowledge to a current situation because of the apparent fit between knowledge stored in memory and the situation at hand. However, the remarkable discovery about these processes is that stereotyping and prejudices can occur unintentionally, at an implicit or unconscious level. This means that a person can apply negative group attributes or traits, presumed from memory of social knowledge, to an individual who is a member of the group, despite the lack of evidentiary support to confirm the truth of the presumed attribute or trait, without or even against that person’s intentional will. In short, the evidence shows that implicit biases can operate automatically, unintentionally, and unconsciously.¶ Where race and ethnicity are concerned, Americans gather their social group knowledge from the environment. From the abundance of images of minorities on television and in the print media, to commentary by political leaders, lyrics in popular music, discussions among friends, entertainment outlets, chance encounters, and interracial relationships or experiences-the subconsciously gathered information that unconsciously becomes stored group knowledge is as pervasive as it is powerful. Consider this example. It is a statistical fact that white Americans receive the greatest share of public entitlement assistance, or “welfare.” Nevertheless, the social group knowledge many gathered from the 2012 presidential campaign was that it is minorities who predominantly receive welfare. One politician attempted to capitalize on the social group knowledge that presumed a poor work ethic among blacks by labeling President Barack Obama a “food stamp president,” while another candidate sought to distinguish himself from the president by promising that he will not “make black people’s lives better by giving them somebody else's money.” Neither of these campaign pitches accurately reflected the fact that whites are the predominant recipient of welfare funds, Medicaid support, and food stamps, but reference to these programs were deemed useful in the campaign against Barack Obama because they matched the subconscious impressions some voters have of blacks, even if they contradicted the truth. Let’s look at the facts: In reality, African Americans do not constitute the majority of welfare recipients. The DHHS reports that in 2012, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the cash assistance program to families in need, helped 1.8 million families; 30.1 percent of those families were white, 31.5 percent were black, and 31.1 percent were Hispanic.l3 Indeed, DHHS also reports that "the percentage of African-American TANB families has slowly decreased since 2001.”” The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) report that in 2013, Medicaid enrolled a monthly average of 57.4 million people; 41.1 percent were white, 21.6 percent were black, and 24.7 percent were Hispanic.” In 2013, a total of 22.8 million households used food stamps-the supplemental nutrition assistance program called “SNAP.” The United States Department of Agriculture reports that 40.2 percent of households receiving SNAP had white heads of households; blacks headed 25.7 percent of SNAP households; and 10.3 percent were headed by a Hispanic.16 Clearly, despite the political claims that captured the airways, blacks are not, in fact, the primary recipients of “welfare.” Whether the source is a political campaign advertisement, television news channel, sports and music personalities profiled in or permarket tabloids, Hollywood box office hits, or lessons taught in high school history classes-the negative imagery of minority Americans that is readily available in our culture tends to override reality and dominate the stored social group knowledge most whites have about people of color in this country. Social scientists have reported study after study that confirms the power of negative imagery of African Americans and Latinos which associates them with criminality, animals, and socially undesirable behavior such as drug abuse and hypersexuality. These are the associations that create stereotypes that inform implicit biases. Doe tors, nurses, pharmacists, dentists, and others in the health care industry are not insulated from this negative social group knowledge. These same types of biases influence decision-makers within the health industry as well. Thanks to the work of social scientists over the past thirty years, tools have been developed to measure implicit bias. We are now able to quantify reliably the extent to which stored social group knowledge produces implicit racial and ethnic bias.

### Nonblack People can’t read AP

#### Regardless of the content of the debate round vote down [xxxx] They are antiblack and use the suffering of Black kids to win high school LD rounds. Non-black people reading Afro pessimism is the slave master’s fantasy – nonblack people saying that Black people have no value and then be academically rewarded for saying Black people will always be ontologically dead. They have performatively engaged in the practice of the slave master. When the best black debaters like Zion, Josh, and Tajaih all agree your bullshit is violent—believe them. There is no N word pass as there is no Afropass. Independent commodification disad since you make black flesh fungible for your non-white pleasure

## Body Politics/Embodiment T

#### I meet – I embody the politics of disarmament and lay out a process of subverting weapons. Debate rounds are practice to take down the white structures that poison political discourse.

#### I meet resolve – I decided on a course of action – that’s the plan

#### C/I : “Resolved” means legislation

**Parcher 1** (Jeff, JD @ George Mason School of Law, Director for Communications at Center for Community Change, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 <http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html>)

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: **Resolve**: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, **as by a legislature**. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasize the fact that it's policy debate. **Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies**. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### C/I – We Only have to Specify Our Resolutional Burden – Aff predictability is tied to the Rez – key to fairness

#### - It’s infinitely regressive and crowds out substance –

#### -Specifying encourages process PICs – those steal the aff

#### CX and the 1AC ev checks

#### Prefer our interpretation:

#### Debating about the plan is good – it’s stable, predictable and allows a better understanding of institutional politics which are key to either reforming or taking down oppressive structures

#### Neg Ground: Their interpretation shifts debates from “should” questions to “would” questions, which means we have endless debates where the Aff has to be non-inherent in order to meet, which leaves the negative with no ground.

#### Empathy: We should talk about more than just ourselves—this impact turns their disembodiment claim.

#### No presumption ballot—even if fiat is illusory, debating about methods of state engagement is good.

#### Not key to limits or ground: There are no affs because bodies can’t individually change nuclear aresenals work and there’s not literature about that.

#### Not pornotroping – we don’t commodify but instead make a prescriptive claim about events and their consequences

## Security

#### Framework—the K must prove the fiated implications of the implementation of the plan are bad. Anything else unpredictably shifts focus from the controversy, allowing the neg to monopolize prep and undermine preparation for all debates. Lack of clash turns any education impact and makes it impossible to devise political strategies

#### Prioritize existential threats

#### One – Magnitude – it prevents all future generations and is irreversible

#### Two – Hijack – nuclear war is a drawn out and causes massive suffering – if you’re not immediately killed resulting radiation and starving draws out death – existential risk at worst serves as a tie breaker

#### Reps don’t shape reality

Thierry Balzacq 5, Professor of Political Science and IR @ Namar University, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context” European Journal of International Relations, London: Jun 2005, Volume 11, Issue 2

However, despite important insights, this position remains highly disputable. The reason behind this qualification is not hard to understand. With great trepidation my contention is that one of the main distinctions we need to take into account while examining securitization is that between 'institutional' and 'brute' threats. In its attempts to follow a more radical approach to security problems wherein threats are institutional, that is, mere products of communicative relations between agents, the CS has neglected the importance of 'external or brute threats', that is, threats that do not depend on language mediation to be what they are - hazards for human life. In methodological terms, however, any framework over-emphasizing either institutional or brute threat risks losing sight of important aspects of a multifaceted phenomenon. Indeed, securitization, as suggested earlier, is successful when the securitizing agent and the audience reach a common structured perception of an ominous development. In this scheme, there is no security problem except through the language game. Therefore, how problems are 'out there' is exclusively contingent upon how we linguistically depict them. This is not always true. For one, language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it. Moreover, it is not theoretically useful nor is it empirically credible to hold that what we say about a problem would determine its essence. For instance, what I say about a typhoon would not change its essence. The consequence of this position, which would require a deeper articulation, is that some security problems are the attribute of the development itself. In short, threats are not only institutional; some of them can actually wreck entire political communities regardless of the use of language. Analyzing security problems then becomes a matter of understanding how external contexts, including external objective developments, affect securitization. Thus, far from being a departure from constructivist approaches to security, external developments are central to it.

#### Uncertainty and enmity between states is inevitable—justifies our epistemology and takes out the alternative

**de Araujo,** professor for Ethics at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, **14**

(Marcelo, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 24(2): 29-43)

Some moral enhancement theorists argue that a society of morally enhanced individuals would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in the future such as, for instance, the threats posed by climate change, grand scale terrorist attacks, or the risk of catastrophic wars. The assumption here is quite simple: our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ moral motivation. If human beings were morally better – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – there would be fewer wars, less terrorism, and more willingness to save our environment. Although simple and attractive, this assumption is, as I intend to show, false. At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions, but the endurance of an old political arrangement that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis. The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view, moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea. Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs relating, for instance, to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily, or to the moral requirement to help people in need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory (Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people,and to trust unknown prospective cooperators, may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytocin in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future. The assumption that there is a relationship between, on the one hand, threats to the survival of humankind and, on the other, a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is clearly made by some moral enhancements theorists. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a “mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand, both positions are correct in recognizing the real possibility of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for instance, biotechnology or nuclear capabilities. The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction” (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The attempt to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently been resumed, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings” (Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman 2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future, implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu and Persson, Sparrow correctly argues that “structural issues,” rather than human nature, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests. Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But the question, of course, is whether moral enhancement will also improve the prospect of our coping successfully with some major threats to the survival of humankind, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or to reduce evil in the world, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within the tradition of political realism itself. “Structural realism,” unlike “human nature realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of the moral shortcomings of human nature. Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the states are the main, if not the only, relevant actors in the context of international relations; and second, that states compete for power in the international arena. Moral considerations in international affairs, according to realists, are secondary when set against the state’s primary goal, namely its own security and survival. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states (Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, it is this structure that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is its “anarchical structure,” i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It means that each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival. In the absence of a superior authority, over and above the power of each sovereign state, political leaders often feel compelled to favor security over morality, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,” their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus, even if human beings turn out to become morally enhanced in the future, humankind may still have to face the same scary scenarios described by some moral enhancement theorists. This is likely to happen if, indeed, human beings remain compelled to cooperate within the present structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced Yeltsin might have given orders to launch a devastating nuclear response – and that in spite of strong moral dispositions to the contrary. Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). What has to be changed, therefore, is not human moral dispositions, but the very structure of the political international system of states within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While moral enhancement may possibly have desirable results in some areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it will not motivate political leaders to dismantle their nuclear weapons. Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability, at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see prospective cooperators in the present as possible enemies in the future. The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will often fail to cooperate, and occasionally engage in conflicts and wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, this is likely to continue to happen, even if, in the future, political leaders become less egoistic and power-seeking through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of bioengineering is unlikely to yield the expected results, so long as moral enhancement is pursued within the present framework of the international system of states.

## Baud

1) they’re just a reproduction of Michigan KM who didn’t do shit to change debate other than get high schoolers to emulate them. Disproves all their solvency claims.

2) If info is dissuasive, they shouldn’t have communicated at all

3)The NC is a double turn – despite their posturing, they communicate, isolate acts of violence like at the top of the 1NC, and use empiricism to make all their impact claims – proves you have to evaluate the contextual instances of their theories

#### 4) Acceleration isn’t radical – reading Baudrillard on the aff might be but this is just a normal debate – means no uniqueness to your claims – it’s not an overexposure but rather a conformation that reveals the epistemic biases behind your scholarship – Baudrillard was affected as well

#### 5) It’s circular – the justification for hyperreality is supposedly itself hyperreal which begs the question of why those contingent analyses are correct – only a priori reasoning resolves the issue

#### 6) Hyperreality can’t destroy itself – it just uplayers – i.e. increasingly ironic memes, Alex Jones would all resolve the alt if those forms of discourse had not been turned into hyperreality themselves – means you presume aff

7) Debate isn’t a liberal seminar or the University – their authors are writing about actual college classes which are distinct from the dialogue inherent to debate

#### The critique of truth-telling destroys global politics – truth commissions and protests across the Global South rely on making public governmental lies and atrocities, which the K’s politics foreclose. There is a zero-sum tradeoff between adopting their approach and ours.

Kivisto ‘14(Peter, Richard Swanson Prof. of Social Thought, Chair of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Welfare @ Augustana College, “Postmodernity as an Internal Critique of Modernity”, *Postmodernism in a Global Perspective*, pp. 105-108)

Because signs no longer refer to real referents, because the real has collapsed into the hyperreal, meaning has evaporated. In a rather notorious instance of applying this thinking to a concrete event, Baudrillard (1991) claimed that the Gulf War was nothing more than a television and computer graphics spectacle—the difference between this war and the war games in a video arcade presumably having essentially disappeared. Of course, there is an element of truth to this claim. Indeed, a similar claim was made by Slavoj Zizek (2002: 37) about the war in Afghanistan that took place in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, which he depicted as “a virtual war fought behind computer screens.” Lost in Baudrillard’s vision, however, as David Lyon (1994: 52) pointedly noted, is the fact that there really (i.e., not hyperreally) were “blood—stained sand and bereaved families.” Lost, too, are beliefs about patriotic duty, geopolitical realities, the economics of oil, and similar very real considerations that lead nations into war. In his book on terrorism, which is described in the subtitle as a “Requiem for the Twin Towers,” Baudrillard (2002) describes Al Qaeda’s attack on the United States in terms of the “symbolism of slaughter” and “sacriﬁcial death” as a mode of challenging American hegemony. Again, he treats a bloody event only as a spectacle and not as the consequence of a complex interplay of political, economic, and social forces that underlie the spectacle. Incidentally, and not noted by Baudrillard, the architect of the Twin Towers was Minoru Yamasaki, who had earlier designed the ill-fated Pruitt-Igoe. My criticism of Baudrillard revolves around the obvious point that there is a reality that people experience, emotionally respond to, and attempt in some fashion to shape. There is a life outside of the television set and outside of cyberspace. The emotionless and meaningless worlds depicted in ﬁlms such as David Lynch’s Blue Velvet and Quentin Tarantino’s ﬁlms from Pulp Fiction to his more recent offerings, Inglourious Basterds and Django Unchained, are not synonymous with our lived experiences, nor do most people convolute the two (Denby, 2009; Bauman, 1992: 149-55; Best and Kellner, 1991: 137-44). Although it is certainly true that the world of consumerism has changed considerably in recent years, little evidence can be mustered to claim that we have left modern culture for postmodern culture. The continued potency of religious belief, for example, calls into question the pervasiveness of meaninglessness Baudrillard envisions. The existence of the new social movements concerned with such issues as the environment, peace, feminism, civil rights, and poverty also calls into question the extent to which people in advanced industrial societies have opted for political passivism and escapism. By claiming that we have moved from production to consumption, this version of postmodernism shows evidence of a serious blind spot. It is obvious that goods continue to be produced, although in a global economy this might mean that they are being produced in poor countries, where workers are paid abysmal wages and are forced to work exploitatively long hours in unsafe and unsanitary factories. The clothes purchased at the shopping mall and online are the products of this darker side of our contemporary culture. Moreover, as Alex Callinicos (1989: 162) has pointedly noted, not only are most of the world’s inhabitants excluded from the consumerism Lyotard and Baudrillard describe but also poor people in the advanced industrial societies have only a limited involvement in this kind of consumption. In a generous assessment of Baudrillard that appeared shortly after his death in 2007, Robert Antonio (2007: 2) pointed out that Baudrillard’s abandonment of leftist politics was a reflection of his assessment of the failure of the 1968 student/worker protests. This event led to his the abandonment of the Marxist dream of a radiant future. Unlike Zizek (2008), who some continue to describe as a Marxist, Baudrillard was not inclined to argue “in defense of lost causes.” Nor was he prepared to endorse the anti-utopian pragmatism of liberal democracy. Rather, in relentlessly promoting his often contradictory but deeply pessimistic diagnoses of our times, he became a media star, which included homage to him in one of the Matrix ﬁlms and a US lecture tour that was part of the Institute of Contemporary Arts’ “Big Thinkers” series. He played a major role in creating and sustaining the postmodern moment, but near the end of his life he claimed that the term that best deﬁned him was nihilist. Liquid Modernity Baudrillard was the most explicit and insistent advocate for radical postmodernism (Lemert, 2005: 36-40). Other postmodemists have offered more tempered assessments of the postmodern condition, viewing it in many respects as a new phase of modernity rather than constituting a radical rupture between past and present. No one better exempliﬁes this position than the Polish-born sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman, who has published a series of books explicitly devoted to postmodern concerns (Bauman, 1993, 1995, and 1997). Of particular emphasis in these theoretical reflections is an appreciation of the signiﬁcance of ambivalence in postmodernity. Peter Bielharz (2009: 97) sees a parallel between Bauman’s thought and that of Simmel, contending that in both one ﬁnds a commitment “to the idea of ambivalence as a central orienting device and motif of modernity." By the turn of the century, Bauman (2000) opted to replace the term postmodern with the idea of “liquid modernity.” Perhaps to avoid the confusions and incessant debates about postmodernism and perhaps also to distance himself from postmodernism’s more radical proponents, this original term can be seen as useful in carving out an intellectual space in which to articulate his own position. Agreeing with the claim that grand narratives had ceased to be compelling, Bauman (2007) sees the present as an “age of uncertainty.” The preceding stage of modernity can be characterized as “solid.” In contrast, the current stage is “liquid” insofar as patterned social conduct and the social structures essential to making such forms of everyday social relations durable no longer exist. Instead, we live during times in which these structures no longer keep their shape for very long, “because they decompose and melt faster than the time it takes to cast them...” The consequence is that structured forms today “cannot serve as frames of reference for human actions and long-term life strategies because of their short life expectations" (Bauman, 2007: 1). In short, people in the contemporary world are consigned to living out their lives with a far greater focus on the present and immediate future rather than with the “open horizon of the future" that Wagner (2008: 1) associated with the early phase of modernity. What makes Bauman so dramatically different from someone like Baudrillard is that his assessment of our current condition does not lead him to nihilism. On the contrary, he thinks that today, more than ever before, ethical conduct must be grounded in a sense of personal responsibility. We may live in uncertain times, but we don’t live in amoral times. It’s for this reason that Bauman continues to deﬁne himself as a socialist. He would thus likely agree with Bielharz (2009: 140) that socialism today should be viewed, not so much as an alternative economic system to capitalism, but as its “alter ego.”

#### Oversaturation and disengagement is not absolute – individual actions are context specific have a material impact in spite of the linguistic economy

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While I find Liesegang’s argument plausible, **there are** other explanations **for this apparent disinterest and disengagement outside of Baudrillard’s theory of the postmodern condition** or a desire to neutralize the German past, although it does have to do with socio-economic status. One of the things that many of us familiar with German culture admire about it is the state’s commitment to creating livable conditions for virtually all of its citizens. The social welfare network in Germany (indeed in Western Europe more broadly) may be under siege in the current economic climate, but from health care to housing the state has managed to offer its citizens a level of basic support that Americans cannot really fathom and—as the most recent health care debate demonstrated—in large numbers appear not to condone. Thus, **the** glaring **need for individual citizens** **to offer their services to their fellow human beings has remained somewhat underdeveloped** in Germany (Wiedermann and Held) **and has led to a set of expectations that the government will address the society’s most basic needs**. **Recent studies of volunteerism** in Germany indicate that this is changing **and that a substantive portion of the population** **now gives of its time to myriad social organizations** in ways that would seem entirely futile to the characters in the texts analyzed here.13 Furthermore, sociological and social psychological studies indicate that **people who volunteer do feel a greater connection to other people and a greater level of personal satisfaction than those who do not.**14 The findings of this research, as mentioned above, [End Page 258] have led me to question whether the literature analyzed in this article reflects the perspective of a highly specific section of German society far more than it offers a broader portrait of central European society today, namely that of a disaffected, disengaged intellectual class that no longer sees itself as called upon to participate in the improvement of society now that the great German political problem of the 20th century appears to have been “solved.” This may have something to do with the specific situation of Germany in the first decades after the fall of the Wall but it may also be a result of the socio-economic structures of the Federal Republic. **I do not wish to present here an overly simplified** and naïve **argument** **that Hermann’s characters should go out and get involved in volunteer organizations** and that doing so would make the pervasive sense of sadness and ennui vanish. **Nor would it necessarily reorient the consumerist attitudes or patterns of consumption** of Naters’ group of friends or Regener’s Herr Lehmann into more socially productive outlets. **However, I do question the individual, social, and even aesthetic value of** wallowing in indecision **and isolation and presenting them as representative of a crisis in human subjectivity**. Steven **Best describes the world** according to Baudrillard **as “an abstract non-society devoid of cohesive relations**, social meaning, and collective representation” (Best 51). The characters of Mau Mau, Herr Lehmann, and the stories of Sommerhaus, später and Nichts als Gespenster inhabit the same or at least a similar world to Baudrillard’s. Thus **Baudrillard’s work offers an effective tool in understanding the implications of the world these literary characters inhabit and their creators’ perspective** on contemporary German society. **Their world, however, is itself a human projection**, a choice**. It is an** interpretation of reality **that allows individuals to become resigned and passive.** Furthermore, it is a perspective possible only from a position of relative affluence. **I shall not venture to judge whether Baudrillard’s diagnosis** of postmodern society **is accurate**, although it appears that many of Germany’s current writers agree with him or were influenced by postmodern theories of late 20th-century consumerist societies**. I can**, however**, say in conclusion that it** is not helpful **or productive on either an individual or social level in imagining ways of living in today’s world**. As Steven Best points out: **Baudrillard’s radical rejection** **of referentiality is premised upon a one-dimensional, No-Exit world of self-referring simulacra. But**, **however, reified and self-referential postmodern semiotics is,** signs do not simply move in their own signifying orbit. **They are** historically produced **and circulated and while they may not translucently refer to some originating world, they none the less can** be socio-historically contextualized, **interpreted, and critiqued.**(57) In other words, **human beings generate the simulacra in specific historical contexts that are** subject to interpretation and challenge. **Regardless of** how pervasively the media spin our reality**,** real people suffer **and**—**occasionally** [End Page 259] prosper—**because of political decisions made at the local, national, and international level**. **Media images may overpower us, but they** shouldn’t make us lose sight of the real ramifications of political and economic development. **Many critics have suggested that Baudrillard’s chief accomplishment** **was to serve as an agent provocateur.** In an interview with Mike Gane, **Baudrillard himself saw his method of reflection as “provocative, reversible**, [ . . . ] **a way of raising things to the ‘N’th power** [ . . . ] It’s a bit like a theory-fiction” (Poster 331). **One could argue that this is precisely the function of such novels and short stories as the ones examined here: to provoke us**. But to what end? Naters, Regener, and Hermann all write very readable literature, and they challenge us to understand the world of the insipid, self-centered, and myopic characters that they have created. **It would indeed be a disservice to the authors to imply that they do not view their own characters with** critical distance. Thus, I am not suggesting that they believe their readers should emulate the characters they have created. **They have not, however, successfully demonstrated either why we should care about them or**—**more importantly**—**what we can learn from them**.

#### It’s not all simulacra --- reality still exists outside the text --- should take into account the people whose lives are actually affected by these images

Simon Blackburn 7, professor of philosophy at Cambridge University, 4-29-07, “Au revoir Baudrillard,” Prospect , http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2007/04/aurevoirbaudrillard/---- {hors texte = outside the text}

Baudrillard was not concerned with the artist’s touch but with what happens when television and other media purport to take us to the field of action. The 1990 Gulf war was modelled by planners using simulations; it was won, if we call a massacre a victory, largely by pilots looking at computer screens; and it was relayed to the public by television. Most consumers of these images get no reality check; the image is all we have to go on. And the image does not come to us innocently. What happened in 1990 may, indeed, have been something more than a war: an episode in America’s cultural narcissism, a hallucinatory projection of its fears and fantasies, a Faustian pact between developed capitalism and virtual reality, a promotional video, or a simulacrum indistinguishable from Disneyland. So Baudrillard’s hyperbole had a serious point. He often provoked outrage by it, but when, for instance, he tactlessly suggested that the iconic place of Nazi atrocities as a symbol of evil makes it “logical” to ask whether they even existed, his point was not to ally himself with the David Irvings of this world, but to suggest that for many political and cultural purposes, the answer is irrelevant. As with God, it is our investment that matters, not whether it is invested in a fiction.¶ Baudrillard’s ideas about simulated reality seem to have touched on an old philosophical panic. Perhaps our senses are no better than our televisions. Perhaps nature has varnished and spun the pictures we receive. They too are commodities, bought in to provide sustenance. Perhaps, at the limit, we live in a virtual reality, unable to comprehend our real position, sentenced to a woeful life of dreams, myth, fiction and illusion. Baudrillard, the inspiration for the Matrix films, tried to distance himself from the trite opposition of one moment seeing through the glass darkly and then coming face to face with reality, yet he enjoyed playing with its ingredients. I do not think this was wise, since generalised scepticism implies that there is nothing especially wrong about America or late capitalism or consumer society—and would any self-respecting culture critic want to draw that conclusion?¶ In any event, it is not all simulacra. We are participants in a public world, not hermits trapped in our own private cinemas. The cure for the sceptical nightmare is action. Nobody stays sceptical while crossing the street, or choosing dinner. Nor while dodging bombs and shells, even if they are sent by people watching computer screens. In the hurly-burly of survival, there isa lot that is hors texte—although this is more true for the artisan driving nails or baking bread than for the politician (or academic) whose work is confined to the production of signs and messages.

#### Their fear of meaningless “information overload” replicates Victorian fear of the telegraph – it’s not radical but ahistoric – we should use debate to channel overflow into specific, deeply researched advocacies

Paré ‘4(Jacinthe, “The Importance of the Dull in Information Overload”, MA Thesis @ Concordia University, Montreal, pp. 105-112)

\*otaku: obsessive information collectors (i.e., anime people)

Neither man's mental limits at inputing and absorbing information, nor (post)modern Information societies' communication output rate are likely to change much. The critics who fear information overload and the spreading of meaninglessness and boredom are justifiably concerned, but as changes in society are often misunderstood, it may just be that a different perspective is needed to deal with the circumstance that is information overload. As Tom Standage reminds us in *The Telegraph: The Victorian Internet* (1998), history repeats; we just tend to forget about it. The same vocabulary and hype now surrounding the Internet and the new technologies of information were utilized at the arrival of the telegraph more than a hundred years ago: a revolution of communication; concerns over having to deal with an overload of information; anxiety over the survival of the more serious information sources, such as newspapers and books; the deploring of people's seeming preference for the newer and the faster over reasoning and tradition; the appearance of new jargon and worrisome subcultures, etc. Despite these apparent 'dangers', culture and society have not only emerged safe and sound from the emergence of the telegraph, but also enhanced by the experience that an increased availability of information brought about. And so in today's Information societies, where information, facts and data appear to be in overabundance and 'out of control' once again, individuals need not avoid exposure to the media out of fear of overload, nor dwell on nostalgic memories of times past, when things supposedly meant so much more. There is no need to fear information overload, nor its Midas touch that is, in the eyes of information critics, transforming to dull all in its path. In fact, while so much of the Information society's media landscape is said to be 'infested' with meaningless data, a quick look around reveals that most people are in fact not reduced to apathy and boredom by the information provided by the popular media in general. This thesis has exposed various reactions to information overload. There are those who strive to keep up with as much of it as possible: they wish to keep the sprawl of data under control in their archives, they want to keep up to date and be 'in the know' of the latest facts. However, as I have discussed, the accompanying stress and the impossibility of really knowing everything show the futility of such sweeping attempts. Then there are those who have chosen to block much of the data overload out of their lives, either out of pure confusion or unwillingness to keep abreast of the informational tide. Yet this 'blocking out' risks causing a loss of social connection or meaning, apathy and chronic boredom, all of which can be of no good for the continuing of society. Otaku have chosen a third option in dealing with data overload in their lives, one that strangely but successfully combines both attitudes: they choose to have it all, but only of very specific topic. They beat the stress of facing 'too much' data by only focusing on a very small section of the world, but one through which he can be confident to hold under his absolute control. They neatly forgo boredom by choosing only those topics that are of interest to them personally, not ones dictated by others or by social pressures. Moreover, with many of their subjects already so dull, how can they fail but to be reinvested with potential, with interest and with a renewed purpose as they are included in the new order of Otaku's peculiar collections? The seemingly useless boring does not have to lead to passivity, apathy and boredom, as was demonstrated with the case of the Japanese Otaku. Certainly, they are not victims of information overload, of the 'system' or of a meaningless postmodern society. They are not all runaways, or lonely, sad souls "unable to deal with reality, [...] spen[ding] their days engrossed in big-eyed childlike female fantasies or big explosions" {Dinsmore), an image that some like to perpetuate. Faced with the onslaught, Otaku have not "reclined" (Kroker 161) nor are they languidly absorbing all the "lifeless secretions" of the media (Baudrillard "Cool Memories" 97). They instead have taken an active stance, one that does not reject involvement. The Otaku knows that the only way out of the mess is to go all the way through; holding nothing back, he has mutated his sensibilities into non-linear ones, which allows him to deal with a variety of tiny details, despite the apparent lack of coherence, order or social meaningfulness. The Otaku speak to and from their cultural moment, both willing consumers and active agents within the overload of information that surrounds them. They truly embody the possibility of positively living with media and without meaning in a postmodern society (Grassmuck "Otaku" 219). That there no longer seems to be (that is, if there ever was) a consensus to point at what the values of a particular society are (Niedzviecki 70) or to "give reliable reference points by which people can locate themselves socially, realize themselves sentimentally and declare (to themselves and others) who they are" (Klapp "Collective Search" viii), doesn't mean that media users are a hopelessly lost bunch, confused by an onslaught of disjointed data. The case of the Otaku demonstrates that it is possible to reclaim the scattered, supposedly useless data and to go on amidst the overload by giving it new purpose. At worse, the Otaku's antisocial obsession with tiny details comforts him and provides him with solace whereas real relationships can't; at best, it helps him achieve a sense of control in a world full of chaos. Otaku create coherence in a small section of the world - coherence that is scarcely to be had elsewhere. They succeed in returning pattern and order, significance and meaningfulness in the chaos of the informational world that surrounds them. Some will argue that the extreme individualism and peculiar interests of subcultural groups such as Otaku can only cause more divergence in opinion and spread even more useless data in a world where there already is too much information, and that such attitudes cannot logically help regain control of the situation that is information overload. That may be the case. But what are the other solutions if we cannot even begin by choosing what interests US, truly and personally? If people don't care, they need not bother getting involved at all. If they do, why not become overly involved like the Otaku? It is but a first step which allows one to get into the mess of information media, and beat the torpidness it is engendering by creating one's own informational spaces, a space where one would hope to find meaning once again. If the critics whine that there is too much, that it all means little, the Otaku have shown that there is a way through and out of the mess. They have regained a sense of identity within the artificial abundance of mass culture; they have created meaningful informational spaces that suit them and their close-circled community and that provide them with a sense of accomplishment and pride, even if in a non-traditional way. Despite different motives and moral condemnation Otaku are subjected to, their strategies represent relatively successful ways of coping with the challenges of the times1.

#### Information is persuasive and the aff fails

**Robinson 04** [Andrew, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/baudrillard-zizek-and-laclau-on-common.html]

Baudrillard's claim that the masses are "dumb", silent and conduct any and all beliefs (SSM 28) and "the reversion of any social" (SSM 49) is problematised by the persistence of subcultures and countercultures, while his claim that any remark could be attributed to the masses (SSM 29) hardly proves that it lacks its own demands or beliefs. He is leaping far too quickly from the confused and contradictory nature of mass beliefs to the idea that the masses lack - or even reject - meaning per se. He wants to portray the masses as disinterested in meaning, instinctual and "above and beyond all meaning" (SSM 11), lacking even conformist beliefs (87-8) and without a language of their own (22). This is contradicted by extensive evidence on the construction of meaning in everyday life, from Hoggart on working class culture to Becker, Lemert, Goffman and others on deviance. Even in the sphere of media effects, the evidence from research on audiences, such as Ang on Dallas viewers and Morley on the Nationwide audience, suggests an active construction of meaning by members of the masses, negotiating with or even opposing dominant codes of meaning. This may well show a decline of that kind of meaning promoted by the status quo - but it hardly shows a rejection of meaning per se. When the masses act stupid, it may well be due to what radical education theorists term "reactive stupidity" - an adaptive response to avoid being falsified and "beaten" by acting stupid. Baudrillard again wrongly conflates the dominant system with meaning as such. Indeed, Baudrillard seems to have changed his mind AGAIN by the time of the Gulf War essays, when he refers to the MEDIA, not the masses, as in control (GW 75), and to stupidity as a result of "mental deterrence" (GW 67-8), which produces a "suffocating atmosphere of deception and stupidity" (GW 68) and a control through the violence of consensus (GW 84). Baudrillard's view that the masses respond to official surveys and the like in a tautological way (SSM 28) may well be true, without proving what Baudrillard claims it does about the absence of meaning in the masses. The attitudes of subaltern groups towards dominant beliefs has often taken such forms throughout history, but this does not preclude the parallel existence of what Jim Scott terms "hidden transcripts" - a parallel set of beliefs with a separate structure of meaning which are not compromised by power. Baudrillard does not dig deep enough into evidence on mass culture to assess whether such transcripts exist or not. He simply assumes the omnipotence of the official, "public" system of meaning. Further, his claim that what passes through the masses leaves no trace (SSM 2) is very problematic, as his claim that the masses are the negation of all dominant meanings (SSM 49). There are some very strange 'proofs' in Baudrillard's work: for instance, the claim that people don't believe the myths they adopt rests on the statement that to claim the opposite is to accuse the masses of being stupid and naive (SSM 99-100). He does not explain why we should not believe this - especially since he elsewhere calls them "dumb like beasts"! Occasionally, Baudrillard acknowledges evidence against his approach: namely, the research of the "two-step flow" theorists on audience effects, and also the kind of syncretic resistances analysed by Scott, which resist the dominant social system and reinterpret or "recycled" its messages towards different codes and ends, often linked to earlier social forms (SSM 42-3). However, he does not dwell on such evidence. This, he says, is simply a different issue, unrelated to the question of the MASSES as "an innumerable, unnameable and anonymous group" operating through inertia and fascination (SSM 43-4). Attempts to recreate meaning at the periphery are a "secondary" matter (SSM 103-4). Similarly, at times, Baudrillard admits both the unsatisfactory nature of the society of the spectacle for many of its participants, and the existence of spheres of belief and discourse beyond its borders. For instance, people don't fully believe the hyperreality which substitutes for reality (SSM 99); some groups, so-called "savages" such as the Arab masses, are not submerged in simulation and can still become passionately involved in, for instance, war (GW 32); the real still exists underground (GW 63). Indeed, although his analysis of the Gulf War suggests that the WEST is trapped in simulacra, his account of the rest of the world suggests it follows a different logic (eg GW 65). Wars or non-wars today are waged by the west against symbolic logics which break with the dominant system, such as Islam (GW 85-6), to absorb everything which is singular and irreducible (GW 86). Also, though he thinks the risk of it is low, he admits that an accident, an irruption of Otherness, or an event which breaks the control exerted by information can disrupt the "celibate machine" of media control (GW 36, 48). If this is the case, however, there is no basis for assuming its totality, and it is still meaningful to try to win people over to alternatives. In SSM Baudrillard retreats from this analysis, suggesting the reduction of society to a rat race is a result of the masses' resistance to 'objective' economic management (SSM 45) - the system benefits as a result but that is not the main issue. This contrasts with Baudrillard's earlier analyses and also those of others such as Illich, who see the destructive social effects of such competition. However, Baudrillard does attack "the social", which he identifies with control through information, simulation, security and deterrence (SSM 50-1) - though how it can be resisted since he thinks it "produces" us is never explained. Baudrillard tends to conflate existing dominant beliefs with thought and meaning per se. As a result, he leaves it impossible to critique dominant ideas in a meaningful way. For instance, he poses political problems in terms of "resistance to the social",

# CP

## NFU

#### Perm do the counterplan – it results in an eventual elimination

#### Wouldn’t be credible – middle east neighbors would mistrust each other based on past broken promises and cultural divisions

#### Even if operational it would still cause conventional attacks to try and dismantle each other’s weapons because of mistrust.

#### NFU shreds deterrence

Miller and Payne 16 [Franklin C. Miller, Keith B. Payne, Franklin C. Miller is a principal of The Scowcroft Group. He is a retired civil servant, having served 22 years in senior positions in the Department of Defense, 8-22-2016, "The dangers of no-first-use," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2016/08/the-dangers-of-no-first-use/, accessed 12-29-2019]LHSBC

Why so? There is no doubt that the US nuclear deterrent has prevented war and the escalation of war in the past. For example, there is considerable evidence from the 1991 First Gulf War that the US nuclear deterrent helped to prevent Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from escalating to the use of Iraqi chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction—possibly saving tens of thousands of US and allied lives. A US pledge of no-first-use now would encourage current and future opponents to believe that they need not fear the US nuclear deterrent in response to their potential massive use of military force against us or our allies—including the use of advanced conventional weapons, and chemical and biological weapons.

## Halt Arms Sales

#### Perm do both

#### Only the aff blocks current nukes and their prolif in the future

#### Reduced arms sales signals abandonment—sparks nuclear proliferation

Yarhi-Milo 16 (Keren - assistant professor of politics and international affairs in Princeton University’s Politics Department and the Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs & Alexander Lanoska & Zack Cooper, “To Arm or to Ally?: The Patron’s Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances,” p. 90-91, *International Security* Volume 41 Number 2, Fall 2016, Project Muse)

These questions are important in international politics because great powers face a “patron’s dilemma.” Great powers must adopt policies to provide security to their allies without becoming entrapped in an unwanted conflict. Strong commitments, such as treaty alliances, worsen the risk of entrapment—that is, the patron’s fear of being dragged into an undesirable war. Weak commitments, such as verbal assurances, intensify a client’s fears of abandonment—in other words, the client’s fear of receiving inadequate support should a crisis develop. Such is the traditional alliance dilemma that has been analyzed by Glenn Snyder and other scholars.1 Grasping the patron’s dilemma is central to understanding not only U.S. security commitments but also many related patterns of interstate behavior. For example, efforts to secure an Iranian nuclear deal have produced calls for stronger defense ties between the United States and Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, among others. Such ties could include formal treaty alliances or the sale of additional arms. Some analysts warn that insufficient assurances could trigger nuclear proliferation or even regional war. Elsewhere in the world, China’s recent assertiveness has made U.S. allies, such as Japan and the Philippines, and partners, such as Vietnam and Taiwan, anxious. This alliance anxiety has forced the United States to reconsider its provision of arms and alliances. Similar issues are at play with Ukraine. Actual and potential Russian aggression toward Eastern Europe has fueled debate about whether existing U.S. security guarantees are sufficient and whether Ukraine should receive lethal U.S. arms. In all these regions, we expect the patron’s dilemma to remain intense. This article elucidates the choices and constraints facing decisionmakers managing this dilemma. The decisions of great powers to transfer arms or form alliances often present intriguing empirical puzzles. In 2015, the United States supported thirty-two treaty allies and allocated billions in security assistance worldwide. Surprisingly, U.S. treaty allies received only 2 percent of all U.S. foreign military financing, whereas five non-allied countries received more than 90 percent. Among this group of five non-allied U.S. partners, Israel received $3.1 billion (55 percent of U.S. foreign military financing), Egypt $1.3 billion (23 percent), Jordan $300 million (5 percent), Pakistan $280 million (5 percent), and Iraq $250 million (5 percent).2 This variation is even more intriguing when considered historically. During the Cold War, the United States provided weapons and alliances to many states, including Pakistan and Taiwan, but transferred arms to Israel without a formal defense pact. Yet Pakistan and Taiwan eventually lost their alliances despite seeing U.S. arms transfers continue, if not increase. Why did the United States modulate its arms and alliances provision during the Cold War? And why would it today decline to offer some states defense pacts but give them more military financing than it does to its treaty allies? A patron’s choice to provide arms, alliances, or both, raises academic questions because extending alliances and transferring arms produce many similar benefits. Both policies are useful for deterring adversaries and reassuring clients while exerting some influence over them. Alliances strengthen deterrence and defense by aggregating capabilities and enhancing combined operations and planning. Arms transfers deter and defend by altering the local military balance. Like alliances, arms transfers can signal a patron’s commitment to maintain its client’s security. Still, the conditions under which great power patrons transfer arms and extend defense pacts have not been thoroughly examined. In the relatively small literature on this topic, prominent scholars have argued that U.S. military assistance—arms or alliances—to clients is driven by nonstrategic calculations, such as domestic political factors or commercial motivations.3

#### They’ve kept it under the radar but the counterplan would spur public and massive prolif

## Hotlines

#### 1 - Perm do both

#### Shields the link to [] - hotlines would prevent [disad impact]

#### 2 - It’s insufficient – mistrust and emotion

BASIC ‘13. Think Tank on Nuclear Disarmament. “Cold War thinking and nuclear deterrence in the 21st century.” http://www.basicint.org/blogs/2013/07/cold-war-thinking-and-nuclear-deterrence-21st-century

Mistrust between states and international actors fuels the desire for deterrence. No matter how many multilateral or bi-lateral treaties countries sign up to, it seems that the confidence building measures involved are insufficient in outweighing the perceived benefits of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, it suits people to trust the concept nuclear deterrence, more than it suits them to trust other states. This is a sobering reality about today’s society; we are putting more faith into aging weapons (which are far past the age of retirement in most countries), more than we are putting faith into other humans.

But we cannot forget that nuclear weapons are managed by people, and in reality, nuclear deterrence only works if leaders make sound choices in crises. The historical record, however, is filled with leaders who got overwhelmed by emotion and who committed inexplicable acts of folly, to the great sorrow of their people. Many leaders are sending mixed messages with their public support of global nuclear disarmament.

#### That’s amplified by cultural divisions and past broken promises

#### 3 - Coordination.

Euan Graham 12. Senior Fellow with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. “Maritime ‘Hotlines’: No Panacea For Crisis Management – Analysis.” <https://www.eurasiareview.com/20092012-maritime-hotlines-no-panacea-for-crisis-management-analysis/>

Elsewhere in the region, more basic differences in national capacity are the determining factor. Sporadic manning, the lack of dedicated crisis-response machinery and poor intra-governmental coordination may severely test ‘hotline’ communications under crisis conditions, when real-time information is the most valued asset for decision-makers.

Singapore well-placed for contingency hotlines

Singapore is one of few ASEAN countries with the capacity to fully operate defence or maritime contingency hotlines. The island state hosts two institutions that promote information-sharing between coast guards, through the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, and between navies through the Information Fusion Centre. However, for both political and practical reasons bilateral communication between capitals is likely to remain the primary conduit for crisis response.

Since maritime crisis contingencies also involve civilian law enforcement, centralised coordination at the national level is a pre-requisite for hotlines. Singapore is again well-placed, since the creation in 2009 of a Maritime Security Task Force, as a central coordinating agency that reports directly to the Chief of Defence Force. The recent creation of a National Coast Watch System in the Philippines points in the right direction, as does the existence of a central maritime coordinating agency in Indonesia, Bakorkamla. However, in most cases, basic capacity constraints in terms of human resources allocated to the coordination role, let alone 24-hour manning for crisis response, are likely to mean that many hotlines function part-time at best.

Hotlines no panacea for crisis management

Maritime or defence hotlines, while laudable in principle, offer no panacea for effective crisis management. As with any phone call, a communication link – assuming the other party picks up – is no guarantee for the quality of conversation. In fact, the original US-Soviet ‘hotline’ was designed with the frailty of human factors in mind as a teletype, not a voice receiver. This was an intentional safeguard against misinterpretations under stress, impulsive responses and to allow pause for thought.

Advances in information technology have greatly lowered the technical and cost barriers to long-distance communication. However, the same human constraints continue to apply. The value of written communication, via secure email ‘hotlines’, should not be overlooked – in spite of the bias of senior officials towards inter-personal communication. Furthermore, provided proper protocols are in place, in a crisis written communications may be easier for subordinates to forward promptly up the chain of command.

Maritime hotlines can fulfill an important ‘public good’ in East Asia as a tool for conflict avoidance in contested spaces, including the South China Sea. However, their potential is unlikely to be realised until participating states commit to their use in crisis management, and resource this effort appropriately. While the trust deficit in the region will continue to work against the former, capacity shortfalls could be positively addressed by directing less effort on hardware acquisition and more towards the human resource ‘software’ of centralised coordination and manning dedicated hotline response centres.

# DA

## 1AR – AT: Bioweapons

#### They don’t have nor do they want them

NTI 19 [Nti, The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) is a non-profit, non-partisan organization with a mission to strengthen global security by reducing the risk of use and preventing the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Founded in 2001 by former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn and philanthropist Ted Turner, NTI is guided by a prestigious, international board of directors. Joan Rohlfing serves as president., 6-1-2019, "Saudi Arabia Nuclear Weapons," https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/saudi-arabia/, accessed 1-30-2020]LHSBC

Biological and Chemical

No evidence suggests that Saudi Arabia possesses either a [chemical](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/chemical-weapon-cw/) or [biological weapons](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/biological-weapon-bw/) program or that Saudi Arabia intends to develop such weapons. [7] Saudi Arabia is a party to both the [Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/biological-and-toxin-weapons-convention/), and the [Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/chemical-weapons-convention/). [8] A 2005 domestic law bans the production, possession, and storage of both chemical and biological weapons within Saudi Arabia, and declares that any individuals found noncompliant will face a fine of one million riyals and a prison sentence of up to 20 years. [9]

#### Case o/w – nuke winter and extinction will incinerate or freeze the whole world for an irreversible period of time but bioweapons only affect a region and can be cured

#### Bioweapons can’t be a strategic deterrent AND factors check the impact

Koblentz 15 [Gregory D. Koblentz, Gregory D. Koblentz is an associate professor and deputy director of the Biodefense Graduate Program in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University, 3-18-2015, "The myth of biological weapons as the poor man’s atomic bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/roundtable\_entry/the-myth-of-biological-weapons-as-the-poor-mans-atomic-bomb/, accessed 12-28-2019]LHSBC

In his recent column, “[Deterrence, without nuclear winter](https://thebulletin.org/deterrence-without-nuclear-winter8083),” Seth Baum concludes that non-contagious biological weapons are one of two viable alternatives to replacing nuclear weapons in order to achieve what he calls “winter-safe deterrence.” He writes that non-contagious biological weapons “could work well if deterrence required threatening large human populations” without posing the risk of a global catastrophe like nuclear winter or a pandemic. Leaving aside the disturbing normative and legal implications of Baum’s proposal to start a global biological arms race, I will focus on the strategic logic underpinning his proposal to replace nuclear weapons with biological weapons. Baum’s conclusion is based on an uncritical acceptance of the long-standing myth that biological weapons are “the poor man’s atomic bomb.” This myth is based on the simplistic notion that because biological weapons could potentially cause mass casualties on par with those caused by nuclear weapons, these weapons should have similar political effects and implications for international security. Although biological and nuclear weapons are both considered weapons of mass destruction, biological weapons differ from nuclear weapons in three important ways that undermine the utility of biological weapons for deterrence: uncertainty of effects, availability of defenses, and the need for secrecy and surprise.∂ The first significant difference involves the level of uncertainty associated with the employment of these weapons. Nuclear weapons deliver instantaneous, overwhelming, and predictable levels of destruction. The effects of biological weapons, on the other hand, are delayed, variable, and difficult to predict due to their sensitivity to environmental conditions and the importance of pathogen-host interactions. In addition, the lack of operational experience with these weapons and the inability to simulate realistically their effects (short of massive human experimentation) impedes the ability of states to substantially reduce this level of uncertainty.∂ The second major difference between nuclear and biological weapons concerns the availability of defenses. There are no effective defenses against the effects of a nuclear attack. There are, however, a number of countermeasures that can be taken before, during, and after a biological attack that can mitigate the consequences of such an attack. Masks and filters can prevent exposure to biological agents. Biological weapons are also unique in that vaccines can be used to protect soldiers and civilians before an actual attack occurs. Because diseases have an incubation period of days to weeks, defenders have a window of opportunity to detect an attack using sensors and biosurveillance systems. Early detection can trigger the distribution of medical countermeasures to treat the victims of an attack and there are already vaccines and /or treatments available for the most lethal diseases such as anthrax, plague, smallpox, and tularemia. As a result, the effects of a biological attack are not absolute and incontestable; they can be mitigated and limited by a well-prepared defender. This possibility is likely to reduce the confidence of states in their ability to reliably inflict unacceptable damage against an adversary in a retaliatory strike. The full panoply of defenses need not be deployed constantly at full readiness because the very availability of these defenses may be sufficient to dissuade a state from calculating that it can inflict unacceptable damage. Although civilian populations will remain more vulnerable to biological weapons than will military forces, damage limitation remains a viable option for larger, more advanced states facing less sophisticated adversaries.∂ Third, biological weapons have limited value as strategic deterrents due to the need for states to shroud their biological weapons programs in strict secrecy. This need for secrecy is driven by normative, legal, and strategic considerations. In the strategic context, the availability of defenses against biological weapons places a premium on the attacker achieving surprise. This undermines the ability of a state to use biological weapons as a deterrent in two ways. First, the secrecy required to retain the element of surprise in a biological attack reduces a state’s ability to issue credible threats to inflict unacceptable damage against an adversary. To make a deterrent threat credible, a state would not only have to admit that it was violating international norms and laws but it would also have to reveal details about its offensive biological warfare capabilities such as the types of agents it has developed and their means of delivery. These revelations could reduce the effectiveness of these weapons by allowing the defender to mobilize appropriate countermeasures. In contrast, the superpowers flaunted their nuclear forces during the Cold War for deterrent purposes. They were able to do this because these demonstrations of their nuclear capabilities did not provide the other side with an improved means of defending against them. Second, secrecy is a flimsy means of protecting strategic forces designed for deterrence. Strategic forces that depend on secrecy for their protection are vulnerable to intelligence breakthroughs by an adversary. If a defender gained inside information about an attacker’s capabilities, it would be possible to develop and stockpile new pharmaceuticals, immunize the at-risk population, distribute protective masks and treatments, enhance public health surveillance, and take other precautions that could substantially mitigate the impact of a first-strike or retaliatory attack with biological weapons. Although such information is difficult to acquire, the cases of Soviet biologist Vladimir Pasechnik, former Soviet bioweapons program official Ken Alibek, and Iraqi weapons official Hussein Kamal attest to the risk posed by the defection of high-level government officials knowledgeable about their nation’s biological warfare programs.∂ A careful analysis of the technical and strategic aspects of biological weapons reveals that while biological weapons have the potential to inflict unacceptable damage against an adversary, they are unable to offer states an “assured” capability for doing so. This shortfall significantly undermines the suitability of biological weapons to serve as a strategic deterrent. Whatever the merits may be of pursuing “winter-safe deterrence,” promoting the discredited concept of biological weapons as a “poor man’s atomic bomb” is not an analytically defensible means of achieving that objective.

#### No bioweapon impact

Revill ’17 [Dr. James Revill, Research Fellow with the Harvard Sussex Program at SPRU, Past as Prologue? The Risk of Adoption of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-State Actors in the EU, European Journal of Risk Regulation, 8 (2017), pp. 626–642, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/6B824CDE0E25FD86AC3D0BD07822A743/S1867299X17000356a.pdf/div-class-title-past-as-prologue-the-risk-of-adoption-of-chemical-and-biological-weapons-by-non-state-actors-in-the-eu-div.pdf]

Although some relatively simple approaches could cause significant harm, mass casualty attacks still require considerable expertise, something particularly acute in the context of biological weapons.52 The most effective route to weaponising biology is arguably through the process of aerosolising agents, something recognised mid-way through the last century as opening up the theoretical possibility of using biological weapons on a gigantic scale.53

However, realising such theoretical potential is difficult and it took states decades to develop more predictable biological weapons,54 and even then such weapons were acutely vulnerable to environmental factors.55 For non-state groups such complexity has proven a significant barrier to CBW development. By means of an example, one of the best-resourced biological weapons programs, that of Aum Shinrikyo, failed variously because the group acquired the wrong strain, contaminated fermenters and were faced with insurmountable production and dissemination difficulties.56 There are of course exceptions, such as the 2001 anthrax Letter Attacks in the US. However, if one accepts the conclusions of the FBI that this sophisticated attack with aerosolised anthrax in the US postal system was perpetrated by a US biodefence researcher, Dr Bruce Ivins,57 it is an exception that proves the rule.

To circumvent the difficulties with aerosolisation, arguably one could use human-to-human transmissible biological agents as part of a suicide bioterror operation. There are good reasons for concern over how crude suicide bioterrorists could employ such a tactic. However, the use of highly contagious agents is also poorly predictable and would have to deal with social factors, such as the “spatial contact process among individuals”, which can spell “out the difference between large-scale epidemics and abortive ones”.58

The counter to this argument is the growing access to data and the changing human geography of the life sciences. Some 83% of European households reportedly are online, effectively allowing access to what is a growing body of available data on CBW, including so-called bioterrorist “recipes” and “blueprints” that are available in both mainstream scientific as well as more subversive literatures online. It is also clear that there is a changing human geography in European life sciences (for peaceful purposes), with the emergence of 30 DIY-bio groups located in Europe59 and some 80 European teams in the international Genetically Engineered Machines (IGEM) competition in 2016.60 This is compounded by reports that groups such as Daesh have deliberately sought to recruit foreign fighters “including some with degrees in physics, chemistry, and computer science, who experts believe have the ability to manufacture lethal weapons from raw substances”.61

Whilst it would be unwise to ignore such developments, there is a need for caution in looking at the extent to which new technologies and geographies will facilitate the adoption of chemical and biological weapons by groups seeking to target European countries. First, data is not information, and information is not knowledge, let alone the tacit knowledge required for CBW.62 In many cases a degree of determination and dedication will be required merely to separate online fantasy from fact and identify operationally useful information (of relevance to the European context) from nonsense (or information pertinent to contexts other than Europe). Second, with new technologies there is the potential for such tools to enable some, but certainly not all, actors, and even then new technologies bring new challenges. CRISPR, gene editing technology is currently seen as a particular source of promise and peril, which purportedly enables “even largely untrained people to manipulate the very essence of life”.63 As much may be technically true, yet “untrained people” would nonetheless require some guidance in identifying suitable areas of genetic structures to manipulate. Moreover, CRISPR would only get aspiring weaponeers so far, with the process of culturing, scaling-up and weaponisation still requiring considerable attention and interdisciplinary skills, typically generated through “large interdisciplinary teams of scientists, engineers, and technicians”,64 in order to be effective.

## 1AR – AT: Deterrence

#### 1 - Deterrence fails – other factors taint analysis, 16 proxy conflicts, launch on warning, decapitating strikes, misperceptions, and false alarms – 1AC Barash

#### 2 - Nuke war outweighs – conventional conflict in the middle east has been ever occurring but it never killed billions

## 1AR – AT: Saudi DIB

#### 1 - Saudi DIB doesn’t exist – they don’t have a domestic defense industry but instead buy US exports

## 1AR – AT: \*\*DD Space Weaponization

#### 1 - No space arms race or war

Lopez 12 [LAURA DELGADO LO´ PEZ, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Arlington, Virginia. Astropolitics. "Predicting an Arms Race in Space: Problematic Assumptions for Space Arms Control." https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14777622.2012.647391]

The previous discussion demonstrates that although a globalized space arms race could follow U.S. deployment of space weapons, it is also plausible and more likely that it may not happen at all. As Mueller states: ‘‘In the end, most of the inevitability arguments are weak.’’62 The assumptions discussed here break the argument into a series of debatable maxims that other scholars have also considered. Hays, for instance, counters the inevitability argument by pointing out that previous ASAT tests did not have this purported destabilizing effect, to which we can add that even after the Chinese ASAT test, neither Russia nor the United States, who would be both capable and more politically likely to launch space weapons, moved forward in that direction.63 Although some may draw attention to the recent wake-up calls in order to underline a sense of urgency, one should also recall that when it seemed truly inevitable before, it did not happen either. In his detailed account of military space developments from 1945 to 1984, Paul Stares described how superpowers’ assessment of the value of space weapons shifted, with a ‘‘hiatus in testing’’ reflecting the attractiveness of satellites as military targets.64 In this changed landscape, Stares also assumed the inevitability argument, claiming that ‘‘the chances of space remaining a ‘sanctuary’ [absence of weapons] into the 21st century appear today to be remote.’’65 Perhaps the conditions are more conducive now, but the important point to be reiterated is that the outcome is not inevitable, and that any such prediction must be undertaken with caution.∂ One of the most prominent theorists to propose an alternate picture and pair it with an aggressive pro-space weapons stance is Everett Dolman. In his Astropolitik theory, Dolman summarizes the steps that the United States must take to assume control of space, particularly through withdrawal from the current space regime.66 This move, he argues, would benefit not only the United States, but also the rest of the world, since having a democracy controlling space is a catalyst for peace.67 Elsewhere, he writes: ‘‘Only a liberal world hegemon would be able to practice the restraint necessary to maintain its preponderant balance of hegemonic power without resorting to an attempt at empire.’’68 Accordingly, he believes that this strategy would be ‘‘perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing U.S. hegemony,’’69 but that other countries, correctly assessing U.S. leadership in space, would not seek to deploy their own systems. ∂ Having the ability to prevent the stationing of foreign weapons systems in space, he writes, ‘‘makes the possibility of large-scale space war and a military space race less likely, not more.’’70 In fact, he says, ‘‘to suggest that the inevitable result is a space arms competition is the worst kind of mirror-imaging.’’71 Dolman argues that the weaponization of space by the United States would ‘‘decrease the likelihood of an arms race by shifting spending away from conventional weapons systems,’’ which would reduce U.S. capabilities in territorial occupation and would thus be perceived as less threatening to other countries.72

#### 2 - Vast empirics disprove escalating arms races and conflicts and other countries MAD check – I’ll re-insert their terrible evidence READ BLUE

Billings 15, Billings, Lee [Lee Billings is a **journalist and author** based in New York City. His work has appeared in *The New York Times, The Washington Post, Scientific American, Popular Mechanics* and many other publications. From 2006 to 2011, he was an **editor at Seed Magazine, where he covered science and technology topics including astrophysics, space exploration, paleontology and robotics**. He graduated in 2003 from the University of Minnesota with a degree in journalism.] “War in Space May be Closer than Ever”. *Scientific American*, 10 August 2015. <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/> Sage AA

Bracketed for Ableist Language that We Do not Endorse

The world’s most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To see it, just look up into a clear sky, to the no-man’s-land of Earth orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race in all but name. The emptiness of outer space might be the last place you’d expect militaries to vie over contested territory, except that outer space isn’t so empty anymore. About 1,300 active satellites wreathe the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary surveillance. For militaries that rely on some of those satellites for modern warfare, space has become the ultimate high ground, with the U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S. superiority in space with ambitious military space programs of their own, the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that could [destroy] cripple the entire planet’s space-based infrastructure. And though it might begin in space, such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth. The long-simmering tensions are now approaching a boiling point due to several events, including recent and ongoing tests of possible anti-satellite weapons by China and Russia, as well as last month’s failure of tension-easing talks at the United Nations. Testifying before Congress earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper echoed the concerns held by many senior government officials about the growing threat to U.S. satellites, saying that China and Russia are both “developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict,” such as those that might erupt over China’s military activities in the South China Sea or Russia’s in Ukraine. China in particular, Clapper said, has demonstrated “the need to interfere with, damage and destroy” U.S. satellites, referring to a series of Chinese anti-satellite missile tests that began in 2007.There are many ways to disable or destroy satellites beyond provocatively blowing them up with missiles. A spacecraft could simply approach a satellite and spray paint over its optics, or manually snap off its communications antennas, or destabilize its orbit. Lasers can be used to temporarily disable or permanently damage a satellite’s components, particularly its delicate sensors, and radio or microwaves can jam or hijack transmissions to or from ground controllers. “The bottom line is the United States does not want conflict in outer space,” says Frank Rose, assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, who has led American diplomatic efforts to prevent a space arms race. The U.S., he says, is willing to work with Russia and China to keep space secure. “But let me make it very clear: we will defend our space assets if attacked.” Offensive space weapons tested The prospect of war in space is not new. Fearing Soviet nuclear weapons launched from orbit, U.S. began testing anti-satellite weaponry in the late 1950s. It even tested nuclear bombs in space before orbital weapons of mass destruction were banned through the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty of 1967. After the ban, space-based surveillance became a crucial component of the Cold War, with satellites serving as one part of elaborate early-warning systems on alert for the deployment or launch of ground-based nuclear weapons. Throughout most of the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. developed and tested “space mines,” self-detonating spacecraft that could seek and destroy U.S. spy satellites by peppering them with shrapnel. In the 1980s, the militarization of space peaked with the Reagan administration’s multibillion-dollar Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars, to develop orbital countermeasures against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. And in 1985, the U.S. Air Force staged a clear demonstration of its formidable capabilities, when an F-15 fighter jet launched a missile that took out a failing U.S. satellite in low-Earth orbit. Through it all, no full-blown arms race or direct conflicts erupted.According to Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center think tank in Washington, D.C., that was because both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. realized how vulnerable their satellites were—particularly the ones in “geosynchronous” orbits of about 35,000 kilometers or more. Such satellites effectively hover over one spot on the planet, making them sitting ducks. But becauseany hostile action against those satellites could easily escalate to a full nuclear exchange on Earth, both superpowers backed down. “Neither one of us signed a treaty about this,” Krepon says. “We just independently came to the conclusion that our security would be worse off if we went after those satellites,because if one of us did it, then the other guy would, too.” Today, the situation is much more complicated. Low- and high-Earth orbits have become hotbeds of scientific and commercial activity, filled with hundreds upon hundreds of satellites from about 60 different nations. Despite their largely peaceful purposes, each and every satellite is at risk, in part because not all members of the growing club of military space powers are willing to play by the same rules—and they don’t have to, because the rules remain as yet unwritten.

#### 3 - Empirically china proves no escalation and political retal checks – even if cyber attack they haven’t read escalation ev to a cyber war – Re-insert more bad ev READ BLUE

Bender and Klimas 18, Bender, Bryan [Bryan Bender is the defense editor for POLITICO Pro. He was previously a D.C.-based reporter for the Boston Globe and Jane’s Defence Weekly, where he covered U.S. military operations in the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and the Balkans. He also writes about terrorism, the international arms trade, and government secrecy. He is author “You Are Not Forgotten,“ the story of an Iraq War veteran’s search for a missing World War II fighter pilot in the South Pacific. He is currently a board member of the Military Reporters and Editors Association.]. Klimas, Jacqueline [Jacqueline Feldscher is a national security reporter at POLITICO. Prior to joining POLITICO, she covered defense from Capitol Hill and the Pentagon for the Washington Times and the Washington Examiner, where she was part of the team that launched the Daily on Defense newsletter. She began her journalism career at Navy Times, covering the Navy and Coast Guard. She’s an alumna of Boston University and holds a masters in journalism from the Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern University.]. “Space War is Coming – and the U.S. is not Ready”. *POLITICO*, 6 April 2018. <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/06/outer-space-war-defense-russia-china-463067>

Then there is the potential for **an actual physical attack — with a missile or laser — to destroy space assets**. Some experts worry the most about **that scenario, which was exemplified by a 2008 test in which China tested an anti-satellite laser to blow up one of its own satellites.** **That kind of space war would impose especially heavy costs on the U.S., because each such explosion creates debris that will linger forever — including the millions of pieces left over from that Chinese test. Even small pieces of matter traveling at 17,000 mph can do serious harm to the satellites that the United States so relies on. For example, a fleck of paint the size of a thumbnail once hit the 6-inch-thick windshield of one of NASA's space shuttles and went about 3 inches into the glass, an Air Force official said.** No way exists to clear away the lethal clouds of space junk that a shooting war would create. **“If deterrence fails, we lose,” the Air Force official said.** That means that **if shots are fired in space, the United States may not respond in kind and instead might fight back through other means — like a** cyberattack or political retaliation — **to avoid creating more space debris, Brig. Gen. John Shaw, the director of strategic plans, programs, requirements and analysis at Air Force Space Command, told reporters.** “We have to be prepared ... for war to extend into space, but we’d like not to do it." But **all the talk of an inevitable conflict raises concerns that the world may be facing the worst kind of space race — one that only heightens the chances of a conflict back on Earth.** Some of the efforts underway could also violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, signed by the United States and most other nations. "The Outer Space Treaty very clearly says that space is only for peaceful purposes," said James Vedda, senior policy analyst at the Center for Space Policy and Strategy at The Aerospace Corp. and a [noted expert](http://www.aerospace.org/news/pressreleases/aerospace-policy-paper-examines-outer-space-treaty/) on the 1967 pact. **Cassandra Steer, acting executive director of the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, said she has noticed "a discernible shift in international rhetoric” on the topic, as well as a lack of transparency by all the nations involved about their preparations for space conflict. The result is "a cyclical escalation which has led some commentators to describe this as a conceivable return to a Cold War-type arms race,"** said Steer, whose center is hosting a closed-door meeting this week of leading government and industry experts about the "[weaponization of outer space](https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/ethicalgovernancespacesecurity/)." **"An armed conflict in space would be catastrophic for all players," she added, "including neutral states, commercial actors and international civil society."**

#### 4 - No space war – it’s hype and systems are redundant

Johnson-Freese and Hitchens 16 [Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and author of Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens. Views expressed are those of the author alone. Theresa Hitchens is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), and the former Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, Switzerland. Stop The Fearmongering Over War In Space: The Sky’s Not Falling, Part 1. December 27, 2016. https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/stop-the-fearmongering-over-war-in-space-the-skys-not-falling-part-1/]

In the last two years, we’ve seen rising hysteria over a future war in space. Fanning the flames are not only dire assessments from the US military, but also breathless coverage from a cooperative and credulous press. This reporting doesn’t only muddy public debate over whether we really need expensive systems. It could also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The irony is that nothing makes the currently slim possibility of war in space more likely than fearmongering over the threat of war in space.

Two television programs in the past two years show how egregious this fearmongering can get. In April 2015, the CBS show 60 Minutes ran a segment called “The Battle Above.” In an interview with General John Hyten, the then-chief of U.S. Air Force Space Command, it came across loud and clear that the United States was being forced to prepare for a battle in space — specifically against China — that it really didn’t want. It was explained by Hyten and other guests that China is building a considerable amount of hardware and accumulating significant know-how regarding space, all threatening to space assets Americans depend on every day. If viewers weren’t frightened after watching the segment, it wasn’t for lack of trying on the part of CBS. Using terms like “offensive counterspace” as a 1984 NewSpeak euphemism for “weapons,” it was made clear that the United States had no choice but to spend billions of dollars on offensive counterspace technology to not just thwart the Chinese threat, but control and dominate space. While it didn’t actually distort facts — just omit facts about current U.S. space capabilities — the segment was basically a cost-free commercial for the military-industrial complex.

In retrospect though, “The Battle Above” was pretty good compared to CNN’s recent special, War in Space: The Next Battlefield. The latter might as well have been called Sharknado in Space – because the only far-out weapons technology our potential adversaries don’t have, according to the broadcast, seems to be “sharks with frickin’ laser beams attached to their heads!”

First, CNN needs to hire some fact checkers. Saying “unlike its adversaries, the U.S. has not yet weaponized space” is deeply misleading, like saying “unlike his political opponents, President-Elect Donald Trump has not sprouted wings and flown away”: A few (admittedly alarming) weapons tests aside, no country in the world has yet weaponized space. Contrary to CNN, stock market transactions are not timed nor synchronized through GPS, but a closed system. Cruise missiles can find their targets even without GPS, because they have both GPS and precision inertial measurement units onboard, and IMUs don’t rely on satellite data. Oh, and the British rock group Pink Floyd holds the only claim to the Dark Side of the Moon: There is a “far side” of the Moon — the side always turned away from the Earth — but not a “dark side” — which would be a side always turned away from the Sun.

More nefariously, the segment sensationalized nuggets of truth within a barrage of half-truths, backed by a heavy bass, dramatic soundtrack (and gravelly-voiced reporter Jim Sciutto) and accompanied by sexy and scary visuals. Make no mistake there are dangers in space, and the United States has the most to lose if space assets are lost. The question is how best to protect them. Here are a few facts CNN omitted. The Reality The U.S. has all of the technologies described on the CNN segment and deemed potentially offensive: maneuverable satellites, nano-satellites, lasers, jamming capabilities, robotic arms, ballistic missiles that can be used as anti-satellite weapons, etc. In fact, the United States is more technologically advanced than other countries in both military and commercial space. That technological superiority scares other countries; just as the U.S. military space community is scared of other countries obtaining those technologies in the future. The U.S. military space budget is more than 10 times greater than that of all the countries in the world combined. That also causes other countries concern. More unsettling still, the United States has long been leery of treaty-based efforts to constrain a potential arms race in outer space, as supported by nearly every other country in the world for decades. Indeed, under the administration of George W. Bush, the U.S. talking points centered on the mantra “there is no arms race in outer space,” so there is no need for diplomat instruments to constrain one. Now, a decade later, the U.S. military – backed by the Intelligence Community which operates the nation’s spy satellites – seems to be shouting to the rooftops that the United States is in danger of losing the space arms race already begun by its potential adversaries. The underlying assumption — a convenient one for advocates of more military spending — is that now there is nothing that diplomacy can do. However, it must be remembered that most space-related technologies – with the exception of ballistic missiles and dedicated jammers – have both military and civil/commercial uses; both benign — indeed, helpful — and nefarious uses. For example, giving satellites the ability to maneuver on orbit can allow useful inspections of ailing satellites and possibly even repairs.

Further, the United States is not unable to protect its satellites, as repeated during the CNN broadcast by various interviewees and the host. Many U.S. government-owned satellites, including precious spy satellites, have capabilities to maneuver. Many are hardened against electro-magnetic pulse, sport “shutters” to protect optical “eyes” from solar flares and lasers, and use radio frequency hopping to resist jamming.

Offensive weapons, deployed on the ground to attack satellites, or in space, are not a silver bullet. To the contrary, U.S. deployment of such weapons may actually be detrimental to U.S. and international security in space (as we argued in a recent Atlantic Council publication, Towards a New National Security Space Strategy). Further, there are benefits to efforts started by the Obama Administration to find diplomatic tools to restrain and constrain dangerous military activities in space. These diplomatic efforts, however, would be undercut by a full-out U.S. pursuit of “space dominance.” This includes dialogue with China, the lack of which Gen. William Shelton, retired commander of Air Force Space Command, lamented in the CNN report.

Given CNN’s “cast,” the spin was not surprising. Starting with Ghost Fleet author Peter Singer set the sensationalist tone, which never altered. The apocalyptic opening, inspired by Ghost Fleet, posited a scenario where all U.S. satellites are taken off-line in nearly one fell swoop. Unless we are talking about an alien invasion, that scenario is nigh on impossible. No potential adversary has such capabilities, nor will they ever likely do so. There is just too much redundancy in the system.

#### 5 – Sanctions and the trade war thump – US economic pressures don’t trigger great power war

## 1AR – AT: Rennaisance

#### Link Story problem – Uniqueness says resurgence now but link ev cites squo restrictions like the NPT and NSG – the plan wouldn’t restrict fissile material access

#### Countries have the material now but no real motivation to prolif absent Saudi Nukes

#### Iran proves that weapon restrictions can happen even with nuclear reactors

#### Alt causes – Growth in developed countries, third-world growth, new reactor tech, and new markets – READ BLUE

**Kumar 17**

Vinod Kumar (Associate Fellow Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India), 2017, The Expectant Global Nuclear Energy Renaissance: Movers, Shakers and Spoilers. Resurgence of Nuclear Power, 39–70. doi:10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9\_3 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9\_3 WJ

**What are the trends that indicate the prospects of a renaissance happening**, especially since earlier signs, like in the USA, did not end in fruitful outcomes? A handful of **global indicators could be highlighted to support the assumption that a renaissance might be in the offing in the global nuclear industry**, though **with inherent challenges**. First, the hopes of **revival in many established nuclear bases such as USA and Russia** even as some European nations such as UK, France and the Scandinavians **have reposed faith in nuclear power**, which also indicates a revisiting of phase-out policies in the industrial world. Second, the **massive confidence that the developing world has placed on nuclear energy as evident from the numerous expansion plans of those nations with the existing nuclear energy infrastructure**, as also the decision of many small and emerging economies to make their plunge into nuclear energy. Third is **a host of systematic factors that has the potential to drive the renaissance**, **including the galloping pace of reactor technology development**, best practices emerging in civil nuclear liability laws, increasing access of insurance and risk management tools, and **above all the imperative of nations to promote clean fuel to meet climate change mitigation targets.**∂3.3.1 Industrial World Still Relies on Nuclear Energy∂ While the US revival efforts have been ongoing since the beginning of the mil- lennium despite numerous constraints, Russia is on a faster pace in expanding its nuclear energy infrastructure with notable advances made in launching its Generation-III fast neutron reactors as well as in ensuring its technological footprint in emerging markets through exports of its VVER light water reactors (NewEurope 2016). Besides its existing tally of 36 operating reactors with a total capacity of 27,000 MW, Russia plans to add one large reactor per year till 2028, with around 22 planned units running up to around 21,000 MW capacity, alongside an equal number earmarked for exports (WNA 2016f).∂ As for Europe, where feasibility of nuclear power continues to remain in popular debate, countries that have preferred to retain nuclear power are announcing new projects or seeking to replace ageing ones with new units. The UK, with plans to retire half of 15 operational reactors by middle of next decade, has opted for a foreign-funded consortium model to kick off its Hinkley Point nuclear project, with Chinese and French state-run energy firms as collaborators (BBC 2016; Riley and Mullen 2016). This is beside an intended plan to allow the China General Nuclear Corporation to build a nuclear plant at Bradwell, as agreed during the Chinese President’s visit in October 2015. France, which is heavily nuclear energy-dependent, is seemingly weighing on Areva’s Generation-III European Pressurised Reactors (EPR) not just to display its continuing reliance on nuclear energy but also to establish its international standing as a nuclear supplier and technology incubator.∂ Despite reported timeline delays and cost outruns (Guardian 2016), the EPRs at Flamanville plant in France, Olkiluoto-3 in Finland as well as the proposed project at UK’s Hinkley symbolise a renewed thrust across Europe for nuclear power, as also the role played by other new-generation reactors in this renewal. On the other hand, the actual relevance of the nuclear industry in Europe is in the comparatively nascent economies in Scandinavia, especially Finland and Sweden, which have preferred to retain nuclear as a power source and probably delay or avoid a total transition to renewable means. Along with unit 5, which is currently under con- struction, Finland is planning further expansion for units 6 and 7 in Olkiluoto (WNA 2016d). Another project, run by Fennovoima, is under construction to set up a VVER-1200 reactor and has a unique model of co-ownership by Rusatom Overseas (Milne 2016b).∂ Sweden, on the other hand, produces 40% of its electricity from nine existing reactors and plans to replace the ageing ones with an ambitious plan of 10 new reactors (Milne 2016a). However, Sweden’s contribution to the nuclear revival is more significant. The nation not just revised its earlier plan, finalised in 1980s, to close nuclear and forego life extension of reactors, but removed a tax from 2017 that discriminates against nuclear power while subsides wind and biomass to progress towards the goal to total renewable energy by 2040. A certain fillip to nuclear energy, this reversal also means that stringent anti-nuclear sentiments that prevailed in Scandinavia following the Fukushima incident, and phase-out models like Germany’s Energiewende, has given way to more realistic approaches towards nuclear energy. In Europe, these revival signs could be signs of an impending renaissance as it ignites fresh life into the industry.∂ 3.3.2 Developing World as the Catalyst∂ At the other end of the spectrum, an expectant renaissance in nuclear energy is all about ‘a great leap forward’ for many countries in the developing world for whom access to sustainable means of energy is closely linked to the economic progress and upliftment of their societies. **Nuclear energy has traditionally been** an **elitist** preserve **with the developed and the industrial world always controlling the technology and restricting** **access through non-proliferation structures** including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and supplier cartels like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Even those countries in **underdeveloped regions** **with major uranium deposits, like in some African countries,** **could not harness the economic potential of their natural resources owing to the domination and control of advanced nations over the affairs of the atom, and its normative structures**.∂ Consequently, very few countries in the third world have been successful in establishing a nuclear industry that could be on par with their peers in the developed world. **Even those who managed to set up a comparatively active base**—such as India, China or Brazil—**had perennial struggles with the development of reactor and reprocessing technologies**, **access to fissile materials or in dealing with denial regimes over attempts to develop indigenous capabilities or gaining strategic autonomy that mismatched with the global norms perpetuated by the Western-oriented liberal security community**. **The renaissance**, therefore, for the developing world **is about the establishment of robust nuclear industries, uninterrupted access to nuclear fuel cycles and fissile materials, and meeting major developmental, economic and climate change targets** by placing nuclear at the centre of their energy security missions. In practice, this could also mean that the epicentre of the global nuclear industry could be shifting to the developing world, especially the bases in Asia, who could shape the future norms, best practices and structures for this domain. According to estimates of the World Nuclear Association, around 45 countries are at various stages or plans for nuclear energy programmes, with 32 of them being in Asian region (WNA 2016e). This includes Albania, Italy, Serbia, Croatia, Portugal, Poland, Belarus, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Turkey and Ireland (in Europe); Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Namibia (in Africa); and Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay (in Americas). The gravity of the Asian shift is marked by the fact that nuclear projects in some subregions in Asia such as the Middle East and East Asia will be almost the same number or more than those planned in the above two regions. For example, 14 states in the Middle East (UAE and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen, Israel, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, and Sudan) have plans for setting up nuclear plants.∂ 3.3.3 Systemic Factors as Stimulant The optimism about a nuclear revival is also propped up by a handful of systemic stimulants. These include the advent of new generation of reactor technologies, improved access to and affordability of uranium as well as legal and risk management structures that intend to make the industry robust and accountable. Adding to this momentum is also a general corporate trend favouring consolidation within the global nuclear industry over the past decade. 3.3.3.1 Reactor Technologies During the initial phase in the 1950s and 1960s, gas-/water-cooled and graphite-moderated designs formed the first generation of nuclear reactors (EuropeanCommission 2015). It was, however, the second generation of pressurised water (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) that has dominated power generation since the 1970s and accounts for the bulk of reactors in operation worldwide. These include the PWR designs by Westinghouse, BWRs by General Electric, PHWRs by AECL (running on natural uranium), the Chinese CPR-1000 based on Framatome (Areva) design, the CNP PWRs of 600 and 1000 MW, the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant’s (KSNP) OPR-1000s, (Goldberg and Rosner 2011), as well as the early variants of the Russian Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reactors (VVER). Gen-II reactors were designed for a lifetime of 20–30 years with traditional safety features and passive engineering systems (Fig. 3.2). A significant driver of the nuclear renewal is the advent of third generation (Gen-III) reactors, which comes with designs for extended lifetimes—up to 50– 60 years—and enhanced safety and performance features. Available literature on Gen-III reactors describe them as having improved and standardised designs so as to expedite licensing, reduce cost and construction time, along with the advantage of their higher burn-up enabling efficient use of fuel and waste reduction (WNA 2016g). More importantly, they are designed to withstand conceivable safety challenges or any damage to the reactor that could result in core meltdown or radiological release. Advanced PWRs have capacities ranging from 600 to 1600 MW and the BWRs in the 1250–1550 range (FISA 2009). The prominent systems of this generation include Westinghouse’s AP-600, General Electric (GE) ABWR, CANDU 6 and VVER-1000, among others (Goldberg and Rosner 2011). While Gen-III designs have been in vogue since the mid-1990s, though only beginning to make notable market inroads, the factor that drives optimism in the industry is the rapid pace of technological upgrades as evident by the quick progress to Gen-III+ systems. Unlike the over 30-year gap between Generations II and Fig. 3.2 Evolution of reactor technologies. Source European Commission. Source Chart available at: http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/euratom/index\_en.cfm?pg=fission&section=generation (accessed in September 2016) 3 The Expectant Global Nuclear Energy Renaissance … 47 III, the galloping to the next technological level is visible in the Gen-III+ reactors which have integrated new benchmarks based on the basic Gen-III design. The significance for the expectant nuclear renewal is that the many ongoing and upcoming projects will be adopting Gen-III and III+ reactors, thus signifying a new era of nuclear plant operation. Gen-III+, in fact, comes with improvements in safety over Gen-III through passive safety features that do not require active controls or operator intervention (Marques 2011) to mitigate the impact of abnormal events. The systems on offer include the VVER-1200 (Rosatom), AP-1000/1400 (Westinghouse), Hualong 1 (CNNC) and Areva’s EPR, considered the most advanced of this lot (Cognet 2010). However, it is vital to note that the prospects of a renaissance taking shape in this sector are heavily dependent on the success and wider acceptance of these systems and the technologies they claim to herald. Even the perceivably most advanced of these systems are yet to attain operational years or maturity amid aspersions being cast on various aspects of their designs, notably of EPR (Samuel 2015; Clercq and Mallet 2016) and AP-1000 (Sasi 2016b). Nonetheless, despite the level of acceptability or success that these designs gain, the technological innovation will be an enduring process, going by the current pursuit of Generation-IV reactor technologies. Gen-IV hinges on six reactor technology concepts, namely gas-cooled and lead-cooled fast reactors, molten salt reactor, supercritical water-cooled reactor, sodium-cooled fast reactor and very high-temperature reactor (GIF 2014). According to WNA, the 13-nation strong Gen-IV International Forum intends to deploy some of these technologies, mainly fast neutron reactors, by 2020–2030, marking a new era of fast reactors and operating at higher temperatures (WNA 2016h). Besides this consortium, countries such as Russia (Patel 2016) and China (WNN 2014) are also working on waste-free fast neutron reactors, while those like India have long-running programmes on fast breeder reactors with the aim of harnessing plutonium and thorium resources. While assuming that Gen-III and III+ systems will drive nuclear revival and growth in the coming years, the future of the industry and its ability to remain as a sustainable source for the long term will invariably depend on the success attained by the Gen-IV development process. 3.3.3.2 A Liberal Fuel Access Regime If reactor technologies are a key factor in shaping the expectant nuclear renaissance, a little lesser but significant role has also been played in this renewal process by the availability of or accessibility to nuclear fuel resources for the operating states, especially those newly setting up a nuclear energy infrastructure. One of the key aims of nuclear supplier states since the early days of creation of the non-proliferation regime has been to restrict the access of fissile materials, especially uranium and plutonium, from the reach of non-weapon states and certainly the states aspiring to develop nuclear weapons. Access to uranium has since the beginning been subject to IAEA safeguards with the movement of the material through the fuel cycle process being tracked at various stages. 48 A. Vinod Kumar On the other hand, uranium trading happens to be a vibrant mineral market with countries having huge deposits such as Canada, Australia, Kazakhstan and Brazil, among others, using their market dominance as a leverage to influence the rules in the supplier chain—involving both non-proliferation and pricing. While the global uranium market seems shaped by a balance of these two elements, the current state of the market indicates that both these elements may not always be complementary. Owing to various factors, global uranium prices were at a low for over a decade averaging $25–27 a ton (Aspa 2016b; Els 2016). Besides a general slump in the nuclear industry after the Fukushima incident also affecting the uranium market, oversupply is also a reason for the low prices. Production in mines worldwide has increased considerably over the years as major suppliers compete for dominance in the market share, thus adding to the oversupply (Aspa 2016a). The price slide has not been causal for more demand owing to cheaper alternatives like gas, which gave better options to power utilities. The market certainly looks to the states setting up new power plants, though most of them globally at still at construction stage, marking the interim phase before the expectant renaissance. Beyond these factors, the market has also benefited from a non-proliferation cum-disarmament dividend as global uranium inventories were supplemented by secondary sources such as recycled uranium and plutonium from used fuel, re-enriched depleted uranium, extracts from weapons-grade uranium and civil stockpiles, among others (WNA 2015b). While most market reports present a gloomy picture of uranium sector, the slump in prices might turn out to be promising news for nuclear operators and especially encourage aspirant states to invest further in setting up nuclear energy infrastructure. In that sense, the fall of uranium prices may prove to be a catalyst of global nuclear growth and enabling liberal access to fuel. Despite the current lull in uranium prices, oversupply and liberal access to the yellow cake, supply may sooner or later diminish with depleting deposits and expectant restrictions on mining owing to environmental hazards. In this scenario, alternates like plutonium, if sufficiently secured against proliferation risks, could be seen as suitable means to reduce nuclear waste and harness the massive spent fuel stocks that have piled up worldwide. Further, fertile materials like thorium are yet to be substantially exploited and are available in more abundance than uranium deposits and could also be a key to future options as fuel that are proliferation-resistant and drastically reduce the amount of waste. According to the World Nuclear Association, thorium could be introduced as fuel in seven types of reactors including the PHWRs, LWRs, BWRs, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, accelerator-driven reactors, fast neutron reactors and molten salt reactors (WNA 2015c). Many countries including USA, Germany, Canada, France, Russia, China, Japan and India are working or have worked on reactor systems based on thorium. These include Germany’s attempt to operate a thorium high-temperature reactor in the 1980s, the US efforts at Peach Bottom HTR in the 1960s, Fort St. Vrain HTR in 1970s and the light water breeder reactor at Shippingport in 1970s. 3 The Expectant Global Nuclear Energy Renaissance … 49

## 1AR – AT: Prolif Good (Iran)

#### 1 - Prolif causes nuclear war and arms racing – quek 16 is the only controlled experiment and assumes rationality.

#### 2 - Arms racing is structurally inevitable absent the plan – Quek 16 means reducing every single proliferator is key

#### Our evidence is comparative – Iranian proliferation sparks cascades that result in a multipolar nuclear region and Israeli strikes – that’s uniquely unstable and triggers all-out nuclear war

Jamal, 2014 (Umair, graduate of the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University and a research associate with the Centre for Governance and Policy, “The Iranian Nuclear programme: Impact on Regional Stability and Security”, EIR, http://www.e-ir.info/2014/09/04/the-iranian-nuclear-programme-impact-on-regional-stability-and-security/)

Proliferation Proliferation of nuclear weapons is likely to take place if Iran acquires nuclear weapons in a move that would further complicate the military landscape of the region (Ehteshami, 2010). Some analysts believe that Iran’s potential nuclear drive has already started a nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (Kaye and Wehrey, 2007). Many observers contend that along with the possibility of a nuclear arms race it would raise the possibility of a highly unstable regional conventional arms race (Kaye and Wehrey, 2007). In 2007, GCC representatives met with officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency to consider a preliminary study for the nuclear programme. Another danger tied to Iran’s nuclear programme and further proliferation would be the question of the capability of the international community to stop further proliferation in the Middle East or globally (Lindsay and Takeyh, 2010). The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as other analysts, have highlighted the risk that ‘even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal’ proliferation is likely to happen and countries that are expected to enter the nuclear arms race are Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (Edelman, Krepinevich and Montgomery, 2011, p. 2). This would lead to a frightening crisis of both a nuclear and conventional arms race in the Middle East, a region where unstable states and violent non-state actors are rampant. Moreover, this would question the credibility and undermine the efforts of international institutions that are working to stop the spread of this doomsday weapon. This likely spread would generate a multipolar nuclear region which would be less stable than any bipolar scenario. Multipolarity is Dangerous Another development that further undermines any relevance of deterrence is a ‘multipolar scenario’ in a region where more than two states would have nuclear weapons. As Waltz argues, in the multipolar world ‘who is a danger to whom and who can be expected to deal with threats and problems are matters of uncertainty’ (Waltz, 1988, p. 622). He further contends that ‘dangers are more diffused and miscalculations are the main source of danger’ (Waltz, 1988, p. 623). As evidence shows and as discussed above, many other states (particularly Saudi Arabia), which consider Iran an independent threat, are likely to obtain nuclear weapons, and a nuclear interaction among three or more nuclear states in the region would further endanger the fragile peace. Apart from other political and security complexities, a multi-nuclear Middle East would be different from a Cold War bipolar system, where the US and the USSR were just concerned with each other (Hagerty, 1998). Multipolarity is deemed less stable because the ‘coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack’ (Edelman, Krepinevich and Montgomery, 2011, p. 4). Adding more to these likely fears is an additional threat of a pre-emptive strike from Israel and the US. A Possible Pre-emptive Strike from Israel Another danger tied to Iran’s nuclear programme is a possible pre-emptive strike from Israel on Iran. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reiterated on several occasions that he would stop Iran at any cost from obtaining nuclear weapons. As Khan (2009, p. 61) argues, looking at Israel’s previous attacks on Iraqi and Syrian nuclear facilities ‘in extreme situations it is expected to attack Iran pre-emptively or preventively’. Some analysts have even argued that because of Israel’s small size it is a ‘one-bomb state’ (Rosenbaum, 2012, p. 21) and because of Iran’s large size it ‘can win a nuclear war with Israel’ (Parsi, p. 271). It is likely that Israeli leaders might use the ‘Samson option’ (Khan, 2009) and strike first because ‘Israel’s small size means that even a few nuclear detonations on its soil would be devastating’ (Kaye and Wehrey, 2007). Whether the pre-emptive strike is conventional or nuclear it would have serious impacts on the region, and as the British military historian Barnett believes, ‘an attack on Iran would effectively launch World War Three’ (Chomasky, 2007, p. 209). Chubin and Litwak (2003, p.109) argue that the ‘policy of a pre-emption strike is as problematic as any other options’ and beyond the practical issues ‘the political consequences of a military strike on Iran could be highly adverse’ and an attack might trigger an anti-US backlash that would be bound to ‘undermine prospects for near-term political change and eventual rapprochement between the US and Iran’. As many analysts argue, a pre-emptive strike on Iran would not dismantle its nuclear programme; rather it would ‘further strengthen Iran’s determination to go nuclear’, and would certainly trigger a costly retaliation in the Middle East politically and militarily (Edelman, Krepinevich and Montgomery, 2011, p. 6). Smaller states in the Middle East are worried about getting caught in the cross fire where Iran could attack US military bases in their countries in retaliatory attacks (Kaye and Wehrey, 2007). Analysts have repeatedly pointed to the tremendous lethality of Hizbullah, which is another element of worry if an attack happens (Sadr, 2005). Moreover, in complete absence of any dialogue or detente measures between Israel and Iran, the situation looks bleaker still and a likely pre-emptive strike on Iran would certainly have unprecedented consequences on the region’s stability. Conclusion By considering all aspects, it is evident that Iran’s nuclear programme would have very destabilizing impacts on the Middle East, particularly on the region’s security. Even though Waltz’s deterrence theory presents a positive outlook of Iran’s nuclear programme on the region, proliferation rationales, which assume that the region would become more conflict prone if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, are more compelling. Neighbours’ fears of Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions and the emergence of new security dilemmas could ignite a nuclear arms race in the region, hence more proliferation. This could lead to a multipolar regional scenario which is regarded as being highly unstable. Moreover, a complex unstable regional order, the lack of communication infrastructure between Iran and Israel, and a likely pre-emptive strike make the equation more devastating, and, perhaps, as some analysts argue, it could light up a nuclear war.

#### **Proliferation optimism is wrong, especially in the context of Iran – there’s a litany of ways it increases the chances of nuclear war**

Kroenig, 2014 (Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair at Georgetown University, and Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council, , Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley in Political Science, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015, pp. 98-125, published online 4/24/2014)//JBS

Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.