# Saudi Arabia AC

## To-Do List

1. DA
   1. Agenda Ptx
      1. 2020 predictions too far
      2. No Trump PC
   2. Prolif updates
   3. Fill in updates
      1. Ishan – UAE specific stuff
2. Theory
   1. Better PICs bad
   2. Uq PIC bad
   3. Actor CP bad
   4. A prioris bad
3. Kritiks
   1. **Ableism**
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   5. Cap
   6. Weird ass K that LHP reads
4. NCs
   1. Skep

## Plan Texts:

#### The plan: The executive branch of the United States federal government should end military aid to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

#### The plan: The executive branch of the United States federal government should end military aid to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates

#### The plan: The executive branch of the United States federal government should end military aid to authoritarian regimes involved in the Saudi-Emirati intervention in Yemen

#### The United States ought not provide military aid to Saudi Arabia

## 1AC Executive Branch Plan

### Advantage

#### The war in Yemen is the worst humanitarian crisis in modern history

Ward 19 [Alex is the staff writer covering international security and defense issues, as well as a co-host of Vox's "Worldly" podcast. Before joining Vox, Alex was an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and US foreign policy, Alex Ward, 1-30-2019, "Yemen’s humanitarian catastrophe, in one chart," Vox, <https://www.vox.com/2019/1/30/18203857/yemen-war-deaths-injured-chart-intelligence?fbclid=IwAR2Gr1FSMuKhdvEKieLOqJmjwgwzkljknhxi0wvrl0CUNutf9aQGp-HSFac> / MM

The war in Yemen — a bloody, ongoing conflict in which the US has played an important role — has fallen out of the news. But a new US intelligence report shows exactly why it shouldn’t. The annual Worldwide Threat Assessment report — which “reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community” including the CIA, the National Security Agency, the FBI, and many other federal bodies — contains a chart showing just how horrifying conditions for the Yemeni people have become. Of the nearly 29 million people in the country, about 22 million — nearly 76 percent of the population — need some form of humanitarian assistance. Among them, 16 million don’t have reliable access to drinking water or food, and more than 1 million Yemenis now suffer from cholera. Those figures, which apparently come from US intelligence and mostly comport with publicly available numbers, show how the war has caused one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. And it’s a crisis that the United States has helped fuel. “The only losers are the people — their grave suffering presents generational risk to Yemen’s future,” Dave Harden, a former US official leading humanitarian development response to Yemen, told me. Yemen’s humanitarian crisis is horrible — and it’s likely to get worse Since 2015, the US has backed Saudi Arabia’s coalition and supported its war in Yemen against the Houthi rebels. It has helped coalition forces push back on Iran, the Houthis’ main supplier for weapons and funds. But until last November, the US refueled Saudi warplanes that drop bombs on Yemen — many of which killed civilians, including children. While the US has said it doesn’t do this anymore, it continues to provide other support to coalition forces including training and intelligence sharing, the Defense Department told me last November. The war has claimed tens of thousands of lives, with estimates ranging from around 13,500 to 80,000 dead. The problem is those numbers, like the chart’s figures, are just estimates, as conditions on the ground are so bad that no one can do an official count. What’s worse, the intelligence report — which, again, represents the consensus view of different US agencies involved in collecting and analyzing intelligence — indicates that the situation in Yemen won’t improve anytime soon. The warring parties “remain far apart in negotiating an end to the conflict, and neither side seems prepared for the kind of compromise needed to end the fighting, suggesting the humanitarian crisis will continue,” the report states. Harden, who now runs the Georgetown Strategy Group in Washington, also noted how the document fails to mention all the other problems in Yemen. For example, the ceasefire in Hodeidah, a vital port city in western Yemen that the Houthis have controlled since 2014, is falling apart, and the economy has ground to a halt. And there are other sources of conflict in the country, like America’s efforts against ISIS and al-Qaeda. Last November, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis called for fighters to reach a peace deal by the end of the month. That, however, hasn’t happened, and Mattis — whom many saw as the driving force for ending the war and America’s involvement — is gone. Still, Cmdr. Rebecca Rebarich, a Pentagon spokesperson, told me on Wednesday that “an enduring solution will only come through a comprehensive political agreement, which will require compromise from all sides.” Multiple congressional efforts have also failed to stop America’s involvement in the fight, and it’s unclear if another one, launched Wednesday by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA), will have enough support to overcome a certain veto by President Donald Trump. The reality, then, is that the horror in Yemen won’t get better anytime soon — meaning the report’s statistics will only become more daunting.

#### The UAE is just as responsible

Turse 19 Nick Turse, Nick Turse is an American investigative journalist, historian, and author. He is the associate editor and research director of the blog TomDispatch and a fellow at The Nation Institute, 1-16-2019, "Despite denials, documents reveal U.S. training UAE forces for combat in Yemen," No Publication, <https://news.yahoo.com/despite-denials-documents-reveal-u-s-training-uae-forces-combat-yemen-171513437.html?fbclid=IwAR1Vlew7EXaGkRELSWsL1agSQeH3LhwbOnp25eUo1h9oP_J4kgGrLM9eZHM> / MM brackets for gendered language

When the Pentagon announced last November that it was ceasing aerial refueling of Saudi-led coalition aircraft operating in Yemen, the move appeared to be a major step back from U.S. support for the war there. But newly obtained documents reveal that the United States has also been training coalition military personnel from the United Arab Emirates for the air war in Yemen. The documents underscore the continuing frustrations for critics of the war, including those in Congress, over the lack of transparency around U.S. military support for a war that has killed thousands of civilians and pushed the country to the brink of famine. The United States is “not a participant in the civil war in Yemen nor are we supporting one side or the other,” Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said last month, echoing a long-held position in the Pentagon. But official Air Force documents obtained by Yahoo News show that the U.S. military has been even more deeply involved in that war than previously indicated. Despite unambiguous claims by the U.S. military to the contrary, the United States has trained members of the Saudi-led coalition, specifically, according to the files, “for combat operations in Yemen.” The files, obtained from Air Forces Central Command via the Freedom of Information Act, appear to tell a different story. “Escorted 6 UAE F-16s to RED FLAG” — reads a December 2017 Air Force document referring to an advanced aerial combat training exercise held for U.S. and allied pilots — “assisted 150 [air staff] in challenging exercise to prepare for combat ops in Yemen.” The document goes on to detail additional support provided by the U.S. Air Force’s Air Warfare Center at Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates. “Unit fighter personnel advanced the UAE’s F-16 fighter pilot training program; 3 pilots flew 243 instructor sorties/323 hrs that created 4 new instructors & 29 combat [fighters] who immediately deployed for combat operations in Yemen.” The training is, in essence, an essential part of the war effort, according to William Hartung, the director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center​ ​for​ ​International​ ​Policy. “Training pilots who go on to bomb civilian targets in Yemen is yet another U.S. form of complicity in a brutal war that has gone on for far too long,” says Hartung. “If the Trump administration is serious about getting Saudi Arabia and the UAE to negotiate in good faith for peace in Yemen, they should cut off training and other forms of military support until they play their part in ending the war.” Despite those documents, the Pentagon continues to insist that the training is not part of the Yemen war. The United States has not, said Lt. Col. Earl Brown, a Central Command spokesperson, “conducted exercises with members of the [Saudi-led coalition] to prepare for combat operations in Yemen.” When asked for clarification, Lt. Col. Josh Jacques, also from CENTCOM, repeated the denial. “As we said before in our statement, we do not conduct exercises with members of the [Saudi-led coalition] to prepare for combat operations in Yemen,” he told Yahoo News. Brown and CENTCOM’s media arm, known as the Communication Integration Directorate, did not address the discrepancy when asked to comment specifically on the Air Force documents, which appear to contradict this claim. “We remain committed to providing the Saudi armed forces with the equipment, training, and follow-on support necessary to protect Saudi Arabia, and the region, from the destabilizing effects of terrorism and other threats,” the directorate wrote in response, describing the Pentagon’s assistance as “limited non-combat support.” The UAE’s Ministry of Defense did not respond to multiple requests comment. Since 2015, the United States has backed the Saudi- and UAE-led coalition’s war against the Houthis providing weaponry, logistical assistance — including air-to-air refueling — intelligence sharing and advisory support. It also provides support to the war through a classified operation called “Yukon Journey.” A report by the United Nations Group of Regional and International Eminent Experts on Yemen determined that at least 16,706 civilians have been killed or wounded as of August 2018, although it noted that “the real figures are likely to be significantly higher.” Saudi-led coalition air strikes, which have hit residential areas, “have caused most of the documented civilian casualties,” according to the report. “We are thoroughly aligned with the Saudi and Emerati actions in Yemen — both the war against the Houthis and the counterterrorism campaign [against ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] — and it’s really important that we not only make claims about expecting our partners to abide by high standards of conduct, but also that we can prove that they are doing so,” says Luke Hartig, formerly the senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council and now a fellow in New America’s International Security program. While U.S. support for Saudi Arabia has garnered headlines**,** U.S. assistance to the UAE has received far less press coverage. Since 2009, however, the United States has made offers of close to $30 billion worth of weaponry to the UAE under the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales, including about $7.2 billion in bombs and missiles. “The UAE’s role is often overlooked, but they, and the militias they train, arm and finance, have been implicated in widespread human rights abuses, including torture,” the Center​ ​for​ ​International​ ​Policy’s Hartung told Yahoo News. “The UAE is a least as responsible as Saudi Arabia for the slaughter in Yemen, but it has not been held responsible for its actions in any significant way.”

#### The US is essential for intervention

Morris 17 Brett Morris 12-1-2017, "How the United States Is Helping Saudi Arabia Destabilize the Middle East," [https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3 /](https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3%20/) MM

At around two in the morning on August 25, 2017, a five-year-old girl named Buthaina lost her entire family. Saudi Arabia had dropped a bomb on her home and several others in Sana’a, the capital of Yemen, as part of its ongoing campaign against Houthi rebels. The attack killed 16 people, including Buthaina’s parents and four siblings, and injured 17 others. Now under the care of her aunt and uncle, Buthaina herself was one of the injured. Images of Buthaina trying to open her bruised eyes went viral after the attack. Where does Saudi Arabia get the bombs it uses to kill all these people? For the most part, they come from the United States, with the United Kingdom and France also supplying substantial amounts. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, from 1950 to 2016, the United States provided Saudi Arabia with more than $34 billion worth of arms, while the United Kingdom provided more than $10 billion, and France provided more than $7 billion. The United States is the world’s leading arms exporter, and Saudi Arabia is its top client. The bomb that injured Buthaina and killed her family originated in the United States, as an Amnesty International investigation found. Buthaina and her family are just a few of the victims of the long-standing U.S.-Saudi alliance—an alliance that has allowed Saudi Arabia to remain one of the worst human rights abusers in the world, export its odious Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, and inspire jihadist movements throughout the world, at the cost of thousands of lives. Oil, Money, and the “Threat” of Iran. The basis for the U.S.-Saudi alliance is the fact that Saudi Arabia sits on top of a lot of oil, as well as its opposition to actors and movements in the region that run counter to U.S. hegemonic ambitions. Nowadays, the United States gets most of its oil through domestic production or from Canada. (The United States is now the world’s leading oil producer, with Saudi Arabia a close second.) Just 11 percent of the oil that the United States imports comes from Saudi Arabia. Despite this, the United States — under both Republican and Democratic administrations — has backed Saudi Arabia and will likely continue to do so in the future. Although the United States is currently enjoying its own oil boom, it’s likely to be short-lived. Domestic oil production will probably begin to decline around 2020, as the United States has proven reserves of just 10 billion barrels. The Saudis and their OPEC partners, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, have proven reserves of 460 billion barrels. In 1945, the State Department identified Saudi Arabia’s oil resources as “a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.” That hasn’t changed — and there’s no reason Washington won’t want Saudi Arabia to remain firmly inside its camp. In addition, if all those massive arms deals between Washington and Riyadh were suddenly to stop, defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and General Dynamics would stand to lose lots of money. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s extremist variant of Islam has been very useful for the United States. Despite the rhetoric about a “clash of civilizations” supposedly happening between the West and Islam, the United States has, for the most part, traditionally sided with extremist sects of Islam against their more secular enemies for the simple reason that those secular enemies would rather remain independent of U.S. domination. The U.S.-Saudi relationship began in the 1930s but strengthened after Gamal Abdel Nasser became president of Egypt in 1956. Nasser, a neutralist and secularist during the Cold War, nationalized many of Egypt’s industries and instituted social welfare measures. For these crimes, he was considered “an extremely dangerous fanatic” with a “Hitler-ite personality” by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Since Nasser had widespread prestige throughout the Arab world for his anti-imperialism and independence, the United States needed a counterweight in the region. “The people are on Nasser’s side,” as Eisenhower complained. That counterweight was Saudi Arabia, an absolute monarchy and the only country in the world named after a ruling family (the Al Saud family). The U.S.-Saudi relationship took on new urgency in 1979, when Iran overthrew its U.S.-installed dictator. The United States and United Kingdom had overthrown Iran’s democratically elected government in 1953, because its secular leader, Mohammed Mossadegh, had nationalized Iran’s oil industry. With the loss of its ally in Iran, U.S. support for Saudi Arabia would now be based not only on the kingdom’s opposition to secular nationalist movements and governments, but also against the Shia theocracy in Iran. U.S. opposition to Iran has nothing to do with Iran’s human rights record or its authoritarian government. If it were, the United States would not be supporting Saudi Arabia, which has a much worse human rights record and a more authoritarian government. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran has actual elections, women have some kind of rights, and there is a liberal opposition. Nor is U.S. opposition to Iran based on Iran’s support for “extremist” groups abroad — because, again, Saudi Arabia supports and inspires much worse extremist groups abroad. Watch this dumbfounded State Department official trying to explain the contradiction between U.S. support for Saudi Arabia while opposing Iran: The truth is, Iran just isn’t a threat to the United States. Its military budget is $13 billion, equivalent to about 2 percent of the U.S. military budget of $611 billion, the highest in the world. (Saudi Arabia’s military budget is $64 billion, the fourth highest in the world.) Iran does not have nuclear weapons, nor does it have a nuclear weapons program. As the Defense Department has pointed out, “Iran’s military doctrine is primarily defensive.” Why, then, does the United States take such an antagonistic attitude toward Iran? The answer is simple: Iran refuses to subordinate itself to U.S. hegemony. Anybody who doesn’t follow orders is an enemy.

#### Thus, the plan: The executive branch of the United States federal government should end military aid to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates

#### DoD is normal means

AP 3/14 Associated Press, 3-14-2019, "US suspends some military aid to Guatemala over vehicle use," Military Times, <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/03/15/us-suspends-some-military-aid-to-guatemala-over-vehicle-use/> / MM

The U.S. Defense Department has suspended military aid to Guatemalan police over the questionable use of armored vehicles donated by Washington, officials said Thursday. The U.S. Embassy said via text message that since August, Guatemala's Interior Ministry "has repeatedly used (the vehicles) in an incorrect way." Therefore, it continued the department "has ceased transfer of equipment and training to the task forces," which are under the purview of the Interior Ministry and are charged with things like border enforcement and fighting smuggling and crime.

#### The plan grounds the RSAF and stops bombing runs

Riedel 18 Bruce Riedel [Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Center for Middle East Policy, Director - The Intelligence Project] “After Khashoggi, US arms sales to the Saudis are essential leverage” October 10, 2018. [https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/10/after-khashoggi-us-arms-sales-to-the-saudis-are-essential-leverage /](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/10/after-khashoggi-us-arms-sales-to-the-saudis-are-essential-leverage%20/) IB Recut MM

The **Saudis** have continued to **buy spare parts, munitions, and technical support** for the enormous amount of American equipment they have bought from previous administrations. **The** Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) is entirely dependent on American and British support for its air fleet of F15 fighter jets, Apache helicopters, and Tornado aircraft. If either Washington or London halts the flow of logistics, the RSAF will be grounded. The Saudi army and the Saudi Arabian National Guard are similarly dependent on foreigners (the Saudi Arabian National Guard is heavily dependent on Canada). The same is also true for the Saudis allies like Bahrain. That resolves mass violence and ends air strikes on civilians

#### Cutting aid forces peace talks and negotiations

Feltman 18, 11-26-18 (Jeffrey, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He was United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs from July 2012 until April 2018 and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from 2009 to 2012) <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2018-11-26/only-way-end-war-yemen>

Charged with the difficult task of getting meaningful peace talks off the ground, Martin Griffiths, the UN special envoy for Yemen since February 2018, has focused his efforts on several fronts at once. He seeks to secure humanitarian access to the Red Sea port of Hodeidah, through which more than 70 percent of Yemen’s imports flow. At the same time, Griffiths is seeking to persuade the Saudi-led coalition to refrain from air strikes in response to Houthi restraint from cross-border missile and rocket attacks. The envoy is working to build confidence on both sides through steps such as prisoner exchanges, and he is leading political talks addressing transitional arrangements and the threat of southern secession. Griffiths’ approach seems sensible. Leaders on both sides can more easily accept (and the UN can more easily monitor) a quid pro quo cessation of Houthi missile strikes and Saudi air strikes than a comprehensive cease-fire. Griffiths is wise to begin political discussions without waiting for a cessation of hostilities or an answer to the “who goes first” question. Further, he has set forward his agenda for Yemen at exactly the moment the United States was most receptive. He seems to have won support from Trump administration officials during his recent consultations in Washington, including one with Mattis just days before the secretary of defense announced his support for peace talks at the Manama Dialogue, an annual high-profile security forum in Bahrain, sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. But the problem with Griffiths’ step-by-step negotiation strategy is that it will take too long. In Yemen, a catastrophic war drags on, and nearly half the population faces a potential famine. This is no time for bickering, yet bickering is precisely what Griffiths’ process is likely to invite. That is in part because any of the belligerents could hold the negotiations hostage to unreasonable demands; and attempts to negotiate a cease-fire could easily get tangled up with the question of transitional leadership. Unpopular and in poor health, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, the president of Yemen, is widely considered dispensable. He knows that his patrons—Saudi Arabia and the United States—would happily trade him for a solution to the conflict, and this knowledge makes him a difficult and paranoid negotiator. But replacing Hadi will be complicated. His vice president, General Ali Mohsen, is hated by the Houthis for his role in the brutal wars against them from 2004 to 2009 and distrusted by the Emiratis for being a member of Islah, Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood party. Without an obvious candidate for transitional leadership who could win support of a broad spectrum of Yemenis and their outside patrons, conditioning a cease-fire on a succession agreement prolongs the fighting. THE ROAD TO PEACE RUNS THROUGH RIYADH Unilaterally ending its military campaign would serve Riyadh’s interests as much as it would everyone else’s. Not only would such a halt stanch the bloodshed in Yemen, it could slow or stop the slide in Saudi Arabia’s global reputation. If Saudi Arabia waits to end the conflict through talks aimed at a cease-fire, the Houthis may decide that the kingdom loses more in a continuation of hostilities than they do. The Houthis could gain the upper hand in negotiations and hold them hostage by making unreasonable demands on the Saudis. Yet the Saudis do not seem to be moving in this direction. They answered the calls for peace from Pompeo and Mattis with more air strikes. The Trump administration’s November cessation of midair refueling of Saudi-coalition flights does not seem to have changed Saudi calculations. Clearly, the United States needs other means to persuade them. There have been frequent calls to suspend arms sales to Riyadh. But Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, has pointed out that suspending the sale of military spare parts to Saudi Arabia would quickly ground the Saudi air force and be more effective. The U.S. Congress is currently willing to take punitive actions against Saudi Arabia, and the Trump administration can use this as leverage. A unilateral Saudi cessation is risky. The Houthis—who sparked the war with their military takeover in 2014—would undoubtedly exploit it to trumpet the victory of their “resistance” against the greater firepower unleashed against them. And there is a chance this could be construed as a victory for Iran. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates exaggerated the degree of Iranian influence on the Houthis at the beginning of the war as part of their justification for intervening. But today, even though the Houthis are still not quite a subsidiary of Iran in the same way as, say, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iranian influence in Yemen has grown significantly. The threat of expanding Iranian influence is not a reason to delay a cease-fire, however. While ending the war unilaterally and focusing on UN-sponsored political talks will not eliminate Iranian influence, such steps could halt its expansion. A drawn-out war in Yemen, on the other hand, will only produce the same result as the wars in Iraq and Lebanon: a permanently entrenched Iranian presence that operates through military proxies and is eventually able to direct domestic policy. A Saudi cease-fire is not a panacea. There is no guarantee that the Houthis would respond by agreeing to share power with Saudi-backed Yemeni leaders or that the south would stop trying to secede. Lower-level domestic fighting would likely continue, even if the Saudi-Houthi war ends. But Saudi Arabia stands to benefit from ceasing its military operations even if the Houthis respond by continuing to fire missiles across the border: the role reversal would be in the Saudis’ favor. The world would turn its attention to the Houthis as the aggressors and spoilers, and Saudi self-defense would be widely tolerated. AFTER THE FIGHTING STOPS Yemen’s war has deep roots in a politics laced with distrust. From 2004 until his ouster in November 2011, former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, backed by Saudi Arabia, instigated multiple military campaigns against Ansar Allah, the Houthis’ political movement. Saleh promised quick victories but was repeatedly undercut by surprisingly strong Houthi resistance, foreshadowing the Saudis’ fate in the current war. In 2011, the Houthis participated in popular protests against Saleh, convincing the Gulf Cooperation Council countries—concerned with maintaining stability—that he had to go. The GCC, with strong encouragement from the United States, helped nudge Saleh aside in favor of Hadi, his vice president at the time. Hadi took control of a transitional government that eventually morphed into the internationally recognized but virtually powerless one he leads today. The UN convened a 2013–14 conference charged with ending the transition period and reaching agreements on elections and power sharing. The Houthis were wary participants, and since then it has become clear that the Houthi delegation either failed to negotiate in good faith or never had the support of its political leadership. In September 2014, the Houthis exploited the opportunity of popular demonstrations against fuel prices to seize power by force. In February 2015, they fully occupied Sanaa. Saleh, the Houthis’ former adversary, provided critical assistance in this effort. Probably nursing a grudge from having been pushed aside in favor of Hadi in 2011, Saleh infuriated his former Saudi patrons by aligning himself and armed forces loyal to him with the Houthis, whom he had demonized and fruitlessly pummeled, with Saudi help, for years. (Saleh, in turn, was killed by the Houthis in December 2017 when he tried to switch sides again and join the Saudi fight against the Houthis.) The avowed purpose of the Saudi-led military campaign that began in March 2015 was to restore the internationally recognized, but now exiled, Hadi government to Sanaa. The United Kingdom and the United States pushed a resolution that provided cover to Saudi Arabia through the UN Security Council (Russia, presciently, abstained). Resolution 2216 demanded that the Houthis “immediately and unconditionally” withdraw their forces from all areas they had captured; relinquish arms seized from the state; and “cease all actions that are exclusively within the authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen.” Resolution 2216 demanded something close to unconditional surrender from a movement that had repeatedly proven its military resilience. Rather than providing a formula for a negotiated end to the conflict, Resolution 2216 became an unhelpful litmus test in Saudi and Emirati hands: if a UN envoy, for example, did not sufficiently emphasize the terms of the resolution, the Saudis and Emiratis would darkly hint that he or she held Houthi sympathies. If an envoy did emphasize the terms of 2216, on the other hand, it would play into Houthi suspicions and provoke Houthi boycotts of UN meetings. If Saudi Arabia decides to endits military operations, the Security Council should pass a new resolution in support of that decision, which would provide Griffiths and his UN team with a more realistic mandate for talks. CUTTING LOSSES After three and a half years, the Saudi-led coalition’s goals remain elusive, while conditions on the ground deteriorate: the humanitarian situation is worsening, disease is spreading, the Houthis are more entrenched than ever, and Iranian influence has grown. Yemen desperately needs good-faith negotiations on long-term political and security arrangements. Support from Pompeo and Mattis for UN-sponsored political talks is a welcome development. But negotiations will not outpace the coming humanitarian calamity or distract the world from Saudi Arabia’s questionable conduct in this war. The security risks to Saudi Arabia from an increasingly sophisticated Hezbollah-like militia and growing Iranian military presence just across the Saudi border are clear and become more acute as the war continues. A unilateral Saudi cease-fire will save lives and could change the narrative of the war to focus on these very real threats. But Saudi Arabia is unlikely to make this move **u**nless the United States demonstrates to it that continuing the war will come at a cost to the relationship between the two countries.

#### Ethical evaluations matter

Burke et al 14 Anthony, Associate Professor of International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia, Katrina Lee-Koo is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the Australian National University, and Matt McDonald is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Queensland “Ethics and Global Security” pg 1-4 / MM

With its world wars, cold wars, proxy wars, colonial wars, guerrilla wars, civil wars, drug wars, and new wars, not to mention its genocides, nuclear weapons, economic crises, gender-based violence, refugees, famines and environmental disasters, the twentieth century was a century of chronic and endemic insecurity. What will the twenty-first century become? It certainly has not started out well. Its first decade alone saw aircraft smashing into New York’s World Trade Center, a new global war on terror, the near-death of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Indian Ocean and Japanese tsunamis, Cyclone Nargis, the war in Iraq, genocide in the Sudan, and three brutal wars in Palestine and Lebanon. The picture beyond that does not improve when we add global stalemate on climate change, mass slaughter in the Congo, Islamist terrorism in Pakistan and India, a craze for walls and “border protection”, and strategic anxiety about Iran, North Korea, the rise of China, and a future of drone, cyber and space war. All of these examples have been riven with moral anxiety and exemplified particular ethical choices: whether to use poison gas against enemy forces to protect one’s own; whether to bomb populated areas to shorten a war or degrade an enemy’s industrial capacity; whether to develop and deploy weapons that can destroy cities in a few seconds and kill millions; whether to use starvation as a weapon of war; whether to support Islamic extremists in a proxy war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, in the face of warnings about how they were likely to turn on their masters afterwards; and when that time came, whether to fight such extremists by systemic violations of the international laws of war and human rights. The debates over these issues reflect many things: their inherent moral complexity, competing ethics and norms, and a global interest in their rightness and long-term impact. None of these ethical questions and dilemmas are new, but the field of security studies has been slow to address them, and it has not established a tradition of ethical thought (Burke 2010; for new research see Floyd 2007; Hayden 2005; Robinson 2011; Roe 2012). This book attempts to address that gap, and to contribute to a dialogue about the possibilities for a genuinely global security orientation and practice in international politics. We survey a range of ethical perspectives and arguments relating to diverse problems on the global security agenda, so that we can begin to understand how ethical commitments shape security relationships and outcomes: how poor or compromised ethics can contribute to insecurity; and how good ethical arguments and decisions might be able to improve the situation. While examining elements of existing ethical perspectives (such as realism, liberalism and just war theory), we push on to argue for a specifically cosmopolitan ethics. A cosmopolitan ethics aims to ensure the security of all states and communities through time, by aiming for the elimination rather than just the management of grave insecurities. We regard such an ethics as not merely morally desirable, but as strategically necessary, and with this objective, we develop ethical guidelines for the decisions and policies of all security actors. We list these principles here in Box 1.1 below, and explain them in the section entitled ‘Key Principles of a Cosmopolitan Security Ethics’. BOX 1.1 Cosmopolitan security principles A cosmopolitan global security system recognizes that contemporary insecurities take a myriad of forms that cross national boundaries and cannot be addressed by states alone or by conventional geopolitical and military means. Contemporary insecurities are the result of long-range processes, which arise from historical practices of industry, economics, military activity, non-state action, and more. They have complex manifestations that persevere unpredictably through time. A cosmopolitan global security system holds that the security of all states and human beings is of equal weight, and that we have a fundamental responsibility to ensure that the global ecology is preserved. It is committed to ensuring that all states and communities can benefit and participate equally in the creation of a system that supports their needs without prejudice. Principle 1 – Global security responsibility The responsibility of all states and security actors is to create deep and enduring security for all human beings in a form that harmonises human social, economic, cultural and political activity with the integrity of global ecosystems. Principle 2 – Future security responsibility All states and security actors have a fundamental responsibility to future generations and the long-term integrity and survival of global ecosystems; a responsibility to consider the impact of their decisions, choices and commitments through time. Principle 3 – Global categorical imperative of security All states and security actors bear a responsibility to act as if both the principles and consequences of their action or policy will become global, across space and through time, and to ensure that their actions will have positive consequences that can be borne by the world as a whole. The Importance of Ethics If practices of global security politics raise ethical questions at the conceptual level, they have also precipitated broader debate and contestation in the “real world” of international security. The Burmese military’s refusal to allow foreign aid to enter the country after the 2008 cyclone, which killed 140,000, provoked global outrage, calls for foreign intervention, and active regional diplomacy (Evans 2008b; Kouchner 2008). After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which killed more than 280,000, the United Nations and ASEAN moved to create an early warning system and response capability in recognition of the failure to have such a system in place beforehand or to even put such threats on the region’s security agenda (Burke and McDonald 2007: 1). Some of the scientists who built the first atomic bombs questioned their use in warfare and opposed the later development of fusion weapons, while scores of former national security policymakers have supported calls for total nuclear disarmament (Bird 2005: 426; Burke 2009; Oppenheimer 1984: 113; Schweber 2000). The 2011 tsunami and nuclear accident at Fukushima led many Japanese (and four European countries) to question the role of nuclear power in their energy supply, and brought calls for stronger global regulation of the industry (Fackler 2012). The widespread bombing and targeting of civilians in war have provoked major innovations in International Humanitarian Law (IHL), including the classification of area bombing and rape as war crimes, and new treaties outlawing land mines and cluster weapons. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established to prosecute major international crimes including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression. Aggression has been defined in such a way (‘the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations’) that it would have put the US, Britain and Australia in the dock had it been in force at the time of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Amendments to the Rome Statute 2010). The moral anxiety and debate in such cases—just a few of many—suggests something important. Ethics matters. In this book, we contend that the nature of global insecurity in the last century, and the kinds of security that the world will be able to achieve in this century, depends significantly on ethics: on the ethics we bring to our analysis, policymaking and decisions; on the ethics that underpins our understanding of what security is and to whom it is owed; and on the ethics that shapes the realities we accept or deny. Whether people live or die, whether they suffer or prosper—which people live and prosper and where they are able to do so—are ethical questions. How these questions are answered in the real world will be the results of particular ethical frameworks, rules and decisions; the result of the ways in which ethical dilemmas are posed, and how they are addressed and resolved. Is it right to attack—or target—cities with nuclear weapons? Is it right to even possess them? Is it right to detain asylum seekers, push their boats out to sea, or return them to the places from which they fled? Is it right to target terrorists and insurgents with remote-controlled robotic aircraft and missiles, even if those killed include civilians and if their operators aim—and kill—without risk? Is it right to invade a foreign country to stop crimes against humanity, end a famine, build a state, or remove a regime, and if so, what are the right ways of going about it? Is it right to use torture, or suspend habeas corpus or the rule of law, to protect our security? What forms of reasoning, what criteria and ends, should govern such decisions?

### Framing

#### Debate requires discussions of material oppression

Curry 14 Dr. Tommy J, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Affiliated Professor of Africana Studies, and a Ray A. Rothrock Fellow at Texas A&M University; first Black JV National Debate champion (for UMKC) and was half of the first all Black CEDA team to win the Pi Kappa Delta National Debate Tournament. “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century.” 2014.

Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics)**;** [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set] against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics.’ How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

#### Thus, the standard is minimizing oppression

#### Linear structural impacts outweigh

Nixon 13 Rachel Carson Professor of English and an affiliate of the Nelson Institute Center for Culture, History and Environment (Rob, “Book excerpt: Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor,” In Common, Fall/Winter 13, <http://nelson.wisc.edu/news/in-common/fall-winter2013/story.php?s=1439&page=1>) / MM

When Lawrence Summers, then president of the World Bank, advocated that the bank develop a scheme to export rich nation garbage, toxic waste, and heavily polluting industries to Africa, he did so in the calm voice of global managerial reasoning. Such a scheme, Summers elaborated, would help correct an inefficient global imbalance in toxicity. Underlying his plan is an overlooked but crucial subsidiary benefit that he outlined: offloading rich-nation toxins onto the world’s poorest continent would help ease the growing pressure from rich-nation environmentalists who were campaigning against garbage dumps and industrial effluent that they condemned as health threats and found aesthetically offensive.¶ Summers thus rationalized his poison-redistribution ethic as offering a double gain: it would benefit the United States and Europe economically, while helping appease the rising discontent of rich-nation environmentalists. Summers’ arguments assumed a direct link between aesthetically unsightly waste and Africa as an out-of-sight continent, a place remote from green activists’ terrain of concern. In Summers’ win-win scenario for the global North, the African recipients of his plan were triply discounted: discounted as political agents, discounted as long-term casualties of what I call in this book “slow violence,” and discounted as cultures possessing environmental practices and concerns of their own. I begin with Summers’ extraordinary proposal because it captures the strategic and representational challenges posed by slow violence as it impacts the environments and the environmentalism of the poor.¶ Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink politically, imaginatively, and theoretically what I call “slow violence.” By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all.¶ Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings—the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war’s toxic aftermaths or introduction climate change—are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory.¶ Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions — from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts insituations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded. Politically and emotionally, different kinds of disaster possess unequal heft. Falling bodies, burning towers, exploding heads, avalanches, volcanoes, and tsunamis have a visceral, eye-catching and page-turning power that tales of slow violence, unfolding over years, decades, even centuries, cannot match. Stories of toxic buildup, massing greenhouse gases, and accelerated species loss due to ravaged habitats are all cataclysmic, but they are scientifically convoluted cataclysms in which casualties are postponed, often for generations.¶ In an age when the media venerate the spectacular, when public policy is shaped primarily around perceived immediate need, a central question is strategic and representational: how can we convert into image and narrative the disasters that are slow moving and long in the making, disasters that are anonymous and that star nobody, disasters that are attritional and of indifferent interest to the sensation-driven technologies of our image-world? How can we turn the long emergencies of slow violence into stories dramatic enough to rouse public sentiment and warrant political intervention, these emergencies whose repercussions have given rise to some of the most critical challenges of our time?¶ Slow Violence¶ In this book, I have sought to address our inattention to calamities that are slow and long lasting, calamities that patiently dispense their devastation while remaining outside our flickering attention spans and outside the purview of a spectacle-driven corporate media. The insidious workings of slow violence derive largely from the unequal attention given to spectacular and unspectacular time. In an age that venerates instant spectacle, slow violence is deficient in the recognizable special effects that fill movie theaters and boost ratings on TV. Chemical and radiological violence, for example, is driven inward, somatized into cellular dramas of mutationthat particularly in the bodies of the poor remain largely unobserved, undiagnosed, and untreated. From a narrative perspective, such invisible, mutagenic theater is slow paced and open ended, eluding the tidy closure, the containment, imposed by the visual orthodoxies of victory and defeat.¶ Let me ground this point by referring, in conjunction, to Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. In 1962 Silent Spring jolted a broad international public into an awareness of the protracted, cryptic, and indiscriminate casualties inflicted by dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT). Yet, just one year earlier, Fanon, in the opening pages of Wretched of the Earth, had comfortably invoked DDT as an affirmative metaphor for anticolonial violence: he called for a DDT-filled spray gun to be wielded as a weapon against the “parasites” spread by the colonials’ Christian church.¶ Fanon’s drama of decolonization is, of course, studded with the overt weaponry whereby subjugation is maintained (“by dint of a great array of bayonets and cannons”) or overthrown (“by the searing bullets and bloodstained knives”) after “a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists.” Yet his temporal vision of violence and of what Aimé Césaire called “the rendezvous of victory” was uncomplicated by the concerns that an as-yet inchoate environmental justice movement (catalyzed in part by Silent Spring) would raise about lopsided risks that permeate the land long term, blurring the clean lines between defeat and victory, between colonial dispossession and official national self-determination. We can certainly read Fanon, in his concern with land as property and as fount of native dignity, retrospectively with an environmental eye. But our theories of violence today must be informed by a science unavailable to Fanon, a science that addresses environmentally embedded violence that is often difficult to source, oppose, and once set in motion, to reverse.¶ Attritional catastrophes that overspill clear boundaries in time and space are marked above all by displacements temporal, geographical, rhetorical, and technological displacements that simplify violence and underestimate, in advance and in retrospect, the human and environmental costs. Such displacements smooth the way for amnesia, as places are rendered irretrievable to those who once inhabited them, places that ordinarily pass unmourned in the corporate media. Places like the Marshall Islands, subjected between 1948 and 1958 to sixty-seven American atmospheric nuclear “tests,” the largest of them equal in force to 1,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs. In 1956 the Atomic Energy Commission declared the Marshall Islands “by far the most contaminated place in the world,” a condition that would compromise independence in the long term, despite the islands’ formal ascent in 1979 into the ranks of self-governing nations. The island republic was still in part governed by an irradiated past: well into the 1980s its history of nuclear colonialism, long forgotten by the colonizers, was still delivering into the world “jellyfish babies” headless, eyeless, limbless human infants who would live for just a few hours.¶ If, as Said notes, struggles over geography are never reducible to armed struggle but have a profound symbolic and narrative component as well, and if, as Michael Watts insists, we must attend to the “violent geographies of fast capitalism,” we need to supplement both these injunctions with a deeper understanding of the slow violence of delayed effects that structures so many of our most consequential forgettings. Violence, above all environmental violence, needs to be seen and deeply considered as a contest not only over space, or bodies, or labor, or resources, but also over time. We need to bear in mind Faulkner’s dictum that “the past is never dead. It’s not even past.” His words resonate with particular force across landscapes permeated by slow violence, landscapes of temporal overspill that elude rhetorical cleanup operations with their sanitary beginnings and endings.¶ Kwame Anthony Appiah famously asked, “Is the ‘Post-’ in ‘Postcolonial’ the ‘Post-’ in ‘Postmodern’?” As environmentalists we might ask similarly searching questions of the “post” in postindustrial, post–Cold War, and postconflict. For if the past of slow violence is never past, so too the post is never fully post: industrial particulates and effluents live on in the environmental elements we inhabit and in our very bodies,which epidemiologically and ecologically are never our simple contemporaries. Something similar applies to so-called postconflict societies whose leaders may annually commemorate, as marked on the calendar, the official cessation of hostilities, while ongoing intergenerational slow violence (inflicted by, say, unexploded landmines or carcinogens from an arms dump) may continue hostilities by other means.¶ Ours is an age of onrushing turbo-capitalism, wherein the present feels more abbreviated than it used to at least for the world’s privileged classes who live surrounded by technological time-savers that often compound the sensation of not having enough time. Consequently, one of the most pressing challenges of our age is how to adjust our rapidly eroding attention spans to the slow erosions of environmental justice. If, under neoliberalism, the gulf between enclaved rich and outcast poor has become ever more pronounced, ours is also an era of enclaved time wherein for many speed has become a self-justifying, propulsive ethic that renders “uneventful” violence (to those who live remote from its attritional lethality) a weak claimant on our time. The attosecond pace of our age, with its restless technologies of infinite promise and infinite disappointment, prompts us to keepflicking and clicking distractedly in an insatiable and often insensate quest for quicker sensation.¶ The oxymoronic notion of slow violence poses a number of challenges: scientific, legal, political, and representational. In the long arc between the emergence of slow violence and its delayed effects, both the causes and the memory of catastrophe readily fade from view as the casualties incurred typically pass untallied and unremembered. Such discounting in turn makes it far more difficult to secure effective legal measures for prevention, restitution, and redress.¶ Casualties from slow violence are, moreover, out of sync not only with our narrative and media expectations but also with the swift seasons of electoral change. Politicians routinely adopt a “last in, first out” stance toward environmental issues, admitting them when times are flush, dumping them as soon as times get tight. Because preventative or remedial environmental legislation typically targets slow violence, it cannot deliver dependable electoral cycle results, even though those results may ultimately be life saving. Relative to bankable pocketbook actions there’ll be a tax rebate check in the mail next August environmental payouts seem to lurk on a distant horizon. Many politicians and indeed many voters routinely treat environmental action as critical yet not urgent. And so generation after generation of two- or four-year cycle politicians add to the pileup of deferrable actions deferred. With rare exceptions, in the domain of slow violence “yes, but not now, not yet” becomes the [normal approach.]

#### Institutional engagement is essential

**Taylor 17** Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, assistant professor of African American studies at Princeton University [“Home Is the Crucible of Struggle,” American Quarterly, Vol. 69, No. 2, June 2017, p. 229-233, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries

Creating home, or what may also be described as a struggle to belong, has always been political in the United States. In a country founded on the extermination of its indigenous population, whose wealth was derived from the forced labor of the enslaved, and for whom that wealth was multiplied a trillion times over through the violent expropriation of waves upon waves of immigrant labor—to stay or belong has been brutally contested and valiantly fought to achieve. In other words, we share a history of repression and resistance in the elemental, human struggle to belong, to be home. Those various battles over land rights and citizenship; the right to work and housing; the right to vote, speak, and organize have all been in an effort to reshape or reform the injustice and oppression that shapes the daily lives of most people in this country. In this persistent quest, we now enter into a period of both certainty and uncertainty. We can be certain that the administration of Donald Trump will pursue policies that will make the lives of ordinary people substantially harder. We can be certain that his administration will attack immigrants. He has promised to restore law and order, which appears to be an invitation for the police to continue their assaults on Black and Brown communities. Trump has bragged about sexually assaulting women while decrying their rights to reproductive freedom. Trump and his cohort have all but declared war on Muslims in the United States and beyond. We have seen a revival of the white supremacist Right and an unleashing of open racial animus. In the month after the election of Trump, over one thousand hate crimes across the country were reported. Since he has taken office, Jewish cemeteries have been desecrated; mosques have been burned; and swastikas have been brandished in acts of vandalism and intimidation. What is uncertain is the extent to which Trump will be able to follow through on his threats against a variety of communities. This uncertainty is not with Trump's intention to inflict as much pain and harm on the most vulnerable people in the United States; rather, it is based on a calculation that our ability to organize and build movements will complicate, blunt, and, in some cases, thwart the Trump agenda. [End Page 229] The challenge is in using the spaces we occupy in the academy to approach this task. There will be many different kinds of organizing spaces developed in the coming years, but there is a particular role we can play in this moment. This organizing possibility exists only when we recognize the academy, itself, as a site of politics and struggle. Those who ignore that reality do so because they have the luxury to or because they are so constrained by compartmentalization that they ignore the very world they are living in. In the last two years we have seen the flowering of campus struggles against racism, rape, and sexual violence, amid campaigns for union recognition and the right of faculty to control the atmosphere of their classrooms. Whether or not we on campus see them as political spaces, the right wing certainly does. They have raged against "safe spaces" and what they refer to as "political correctness." While reasonable people may debate the merits and meaning of concepts like safe spaces, we should not confuse those discussions with an attack from the right that is intended to create "unsafe spaces" where racial antagonism, sexual predation, and homophobia are considered rites of passage or, as the new president describes as it, "locker room" behavior. These, unfortunately, are only smaller battles happening within the larger transformation of colleges and universities into the leading edge of various neoliberal practices**, from** the growing use of "contingent labor" to the proliferation of online education, to certificate and master's programs that are only intended to increase the coffers while adding little to nothing to the intellect or critical thinking capacities of its participants. Robin Kelley reminds us that universities will "never be engines for social transformation," but they are places that often reflect, and in some situations magnify, the tensions that exist in society more generally. There is a relationship between the two. The struggles for academic units in Black and Chicano studies in the 1960s were born of the political insurgencies that captivated those communities while shaking the entire country to its core. Robert Warrior reminds us that in Native studies there is a commitment to crash through the firewall that is often intended to silo scholarship from the communities it is often derived from. He writes that a "clear predominance exists in Native studies of scholarship that obligates itself in clear ways to being connected to the real lives of real peoples living in real time. More than just connected, a hallmark of Native studies scholarship is a preoccupation with how the work of scholars and scholarship translates itself into the process of making the Indigenous world a better, more just, and more equitable place to live, thrive, and provide for future generations." Scholarship alone is not politics, but the study of history, theory, and politics can imbue our political practice with depth and confidence. Today there is a [End Page 230] need to connect the legacy of resistance, struggle, and transformation with a new generation of students and activists who are desperately looking for hope that their world is not coming to an end. To be sure, there is deep malaise and fear about the meaning of a Trump presidency. It is not to be underestimated. Anyone who is so open about his antipathy and disgust with entire populations of people should be believed when he promises to amplify the suffering in this society. And we should not underestimate the obstacles that confront a political Left that is deeply fractured and politically divided. But we should also remember that the future is not already written. It has yet to be cast in stone. The stories of our demise have been predicted over and over again. The marches that erupted in the immediate aftermath of the Trump victory give a sense of the resistance to come. Who could have predicted that the day after Trump's inauguration between three and four million people in the United States would take to the streets to defiantly resist and oppose the new president? In fact, we have already seen in the last decade the eruption of mass struggle embodied in the Occupy movement and most recently the rise of Black Lives Matter. The challenge to Trump, however, will demand more than moral outrage. It requires a strategy, and strategy can be developed only when we have political clarity on the nature of Trumpism. The queer theorist Lisa Duggan made an important observation at the association's annual meeting last November in Denver. In an emergency session assessing the US presidential election, there was a sense of urgency that we have talked enough and now is the time to act. But Duggan made the important observation that while action is always necessary, we must also create the political and intellectual spaces necessary for debate, argument, and discussion. We cannot act in intelligent ways without understanding why we are acting and what we are acting against. In other words, politics and ideas matter as much as the action necessary to transform conditions we abhor. This may seem like a minor or even self-evident point, but there is a constant critique that we are often "preaching to the choir" or a question about the usefulness of sitting in yet "another" meeting. But this most recent electoral season has also shown that the choir has different pitches and cadences. The choir can be off-key. This is not to suggest that we should all agree or mute the areas of disagreement and tension, but we should be clear about those differences. Just as we should be clear on what is agreed on and what are the bases on which we can overcome differences and unite. These various position s cannot be intuited; they are discovered through patient debate. Beyond the culture of respectful internal debate and discussion, academics also have something to contribute. The confidence necessary to effectively [End Page 231] engage in struggle is not easily attained in an atmosphere of defeat and defensiveness. Those are the moments to draw on the history of resistance in the movements of the oppressed. Often the political establishment better understands the power of this history than those who are its rightful inheritors. There is a reason that the federal government invested so heavily in the repression of the Black liberation movement of the 1960s. The point was not only to defeat the struggle; it was intended to snuff out its legacy. In significant ways the repression has carried on until this very day. There is a reason sixty-nine-year-old Assata Shakur remains a political exile in Cuba and our government continues to keep a $2 million bounty on her head while shamefully including her on the misnamed terrorist watch list. It is the same reason that the Angola Three—Robert King, Albert Woodfox, and Herman Wallace, Black Panther members held in the infamous prison in Louisiana—collectively spent 113 years in solitary confinement as political punishment for their ideas. It is the same reason 45 years after the Attica Prison Rebellion in 1971, federal and state officials continue to hide the truth of its brutal repression. The most important, and thus damning, archives that the historian Heather Ann Thompson used to write her book on Attica have, once again, disappeared from public scrutiny. Not only does the political establishment want to punish and demonize the voices for Black liberation, but more important, they want to bury the legacy, the history, and politics of the movement itself. It is clear to understand why. It is not irrational hatred of African Americans; it is quite simply because when Black people go into struggle, it unravels the dominant narrative, or the fabrications at the heart of American mythology—that we are a democratic and just society. Only a cursory knowledge of Black history—and the history of indigenous people in this land—shatters the United States' obsession with its own self-idealization as an "exceptional" society. In doing so, Black struggles are examples of how the "margins" can upend and destabilize the supposed center. And perhaps even more important is how those struggles within the various iterations of the Black Freedom movement become a platform for other liberation struggles to emerge. This was the legacy of the Black insurgency of the 1960s. As a result, the political establishment distorts this history and distorts its radical content, its radical leaders, and their voices. This is not just a lesson of who gets to tell history; this legacy of repression affects the movements of today. The attempt to distort and bury the struggles from a previous period of Black rebellion deprives the current generation of the politics, strategy, and tactics of our movement historically. It diminishes the analyses and the political tools necessary to help forge a way forward in [End Page 232] this political moment. But perhaps, most perniciously, the efforts to disconnect people, especially young people, moving into struggle from their radical roots and history, are to dramatically limit our political imaginations so that we believe that the best we can hope for in this life is a Black president or a more responsive and less inept Democratic Party: the establishment wants us to believe that life as it currently is, is the best we can hope for. This is why, for example, the scholar and activist Angela Davis is so important because she is a connection to our radical history. She is the living legacy of a political movement that put liberation at its center. And you can see her political and intellectual fingerprints all over our movement today—from the politics of Black feminism and the concept of intersectionality to the demand of abolition and the rejection of the very normative idea that humans should be surveilled, caged, or killed by the state. It is no wonder that her politics and activism have deeply influenced many of the Black queer women at the heart of the Black Lives Matter movement. She compels us to think more deeply, to get to the root of the matter, to be radical in our analysis, and to struggle harder—not just in the world as it is but for the world as we want it to be. Davis is but a single example. There are many other examples where those from a previous era of struggle whom we respect and honor connect our searching present with a previous moment of insurgency and struggle. In our lifetimes, we have never been more in need of the inspiration, the lessons, and the strength of those who have bequeathed to us the certainties and uncertainties of home today. The challenge continues to lie in our abilities to transcend, through argument, debate, and struggle, the many paths that crisscross and potentially divide our resistance to hatred, bigotry, and oppression. This is a call for solidarity, but not on the basis of papering over the different experiences that create different levels of consciousness within our society. Solidarity is most palpable when there is recognition that our fates are connected and that an injury to one is an injury to all. Another world is truly possible, but only if we are willing to struggle for it.

#### Methodological pluralism is good

Bleiker 14 [Roland, professor of international relations at the university of Queensland. “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2. June 17, 2014]

This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement. For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

## 1AC No Actor

### The Advantage is Yemen

#### The war in Yemen is the worst humanitarian crisis in modern history

Ward 1/30 [Alex is the staff writer covering international security and defense issues, as well as a co-host of Vox's "Worldly" podcast. Before joining Vox, Alex was an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and US foreign policy, Alex Ward, 1-30-2019, "Yemen’s humanitarian catastrophe, in one chart," Vox, <https://www.vox.com/2019/1/30/18203857/yemen-war-deaths-injured-chart-intelligence?fbclid=IwAR2Gr1FSMuKhdvEKieLOqJmjwgwzkljknhxi0wvrl0CUNutf9aQGp-HSFac> / MM

The war in Yemen — a bloody, ongoing conflict in which the US has played an important role — has fallen out of the news. But a new US intelligence report shows exactly why it shouldn’t. The annual Worldwide Threat Assessment report — which “reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community” including the CIA, the National Security Agency, the FBI, and many other federal bodies — contains a chart showing just how horrifying conditions for the Yemeni people have become. Of the nearly 29 million people in the country, about 22 million — nearly 76 percent of the population — need some form of humanitarian assistance. Among them, 16 million don’t have reliable access to drinking water or food, and more than 1 million Yemenis now suffer from cholera. Those figures, which apparently come from US intelligence and mostly comport with publicly available numbers, show how the war has caused one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. And it’s a crisis that the United States has helped fuel. “The only losers are the people — their grave suffering presents generational risk to Yemen’s future,” Dave Harden, a former US official leading humanitarian development response to Yemen, told me. Yemen’s humanitarian crisis is horrible — and it’s likely to get worse Since 2015, the US has backed Saudi Arabia’s coalition and supported its war in Yemen against the Houthi rebels. It has helped coalition forces push back on Iran, the Houthis’ main supplier for weapons and funds. But until last November, the US refueled Saudi warplanes that drop bombs on Yemen — many of which killed civilians, including children. While the US has said it doesn’t do this anymore, it continues to provide other support to coalition forces including training and intelligence sharing, the Defense Department told me last November. The war has claimed tens of thousands of lives, with estimates ranging from around 13,500 to 80,000 dead. The problem is those numbers, like the chart’s figures, are just estimates, as conditions on the ground are so bad that no one can do an official count. What’s worse, the intelligence report — which, again, represents the consensus view of different US agencies involved in collecting and analyzing intelligence — indicates that the situation in Yemen won’t improve anytime soon. The warring parties “remain far apart in negotiating an end to the conflict, and neither side seems prepared for the kind of compromise needed to end the fighting, suggesting the humanitarian crisis will continue,” the report states. Harden, who now runs the Georgetown Strategy Group in Washington, also noted how the document fails to mention all the other problems in Yemen. For example, the ceasefire in Hodeidah, a vital port city in western Yemen that the Houthis have controlled since 2014, is falling apart, and the economy has ground to a halt. And there are other sources of conflict in the country, like America’s efforts against ISIS and al-Qaeda. Last November, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis called for fighters to reach a peace deal by the end of the month. That, however, hasn’t happened, and Mattis — whom many saw as the driving force for ending the war and America’s involvement — is gone. Still, Cmdr. Rebecca Rebarich, a Pentagon spokesperson, told me on Wednesday that “an enduring solution will only come through a comprehensive political agreement, which will require compromise from all sides.” Multiple congressional efforts have also failed to stop America’s involvement in the fight, and it’s unclear if another one, launched Wednesday by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA), will have enough support to overcome a certain veto by President Donald Trump. The reality, then, is that the horror in Yemen won’t get better anytime soon — meaning the report’s statistics will only become more daunting.

#### The US is essential for intervention

Morris 17 Brett Morris 12-1-2017, "How the United States Is Helping Saudi Arabia Destabilize the Middle East," [https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3 /](https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3%20/) MM

At around two in the morning on August 25, 2017, a five-year-old girl named Buthaina lost her entire family. Saudi Arabia had dropped a bomb on her home and several others in Sana’a, the capital of Yemen, as part of its ongoing campaign against Houthi rebels. The attack killed 16 people, including Buthaina’s parents and four siblings, and injured 17 others. Now under the care of her aunt and uncle, Buthaina herself was one of the injured. Images of Buthaina trying to open her bruised eyes went viral after the attack. Where does Saudi Arabia get the bombs it uses to kill all these people? For the most part, they come from the United States, with the United Kingdom and France also supplying substantial amounts. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, from 1950 to 2016, the United States provided Saudi Arabia with more than $34 billion worth of arms, while the United Kingdom provided more than $10 billion, and France provided more than $7 billion. The United States is the world’s leading arms exporter, and Saudi Arabia is its top client. The bomb that injured Buthaina and killed her family originated in the United States, as an Amnesty International investigation found. Buthaina and her family are just a few of the victims of the long-standing U.S.-Saudi alliance—an alliance that has allowed Saudi Arabia to remain one of the worst human rights abusers in the world, export its odious Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, and inspire jihadist movements throughout the world, at the cost of thousands of lives. Oil, Money, and the “Threat” of Iran. The basis for the U.S.-Saudi alliance is the fact that Saudi Arabia sits on top of a lot of oil, as well as its opposition to actors and movements in the region that run counter to U.S. hegemonic ambitions. Nowadays, the United States gets most of its oil through domestic production or from Canada. (The United States is now the world’s leading oil producer, with Saudi Arabia a close second.) Just 11 percent of the oil that the United States imports comes from Saudi Arabia. Despite this, the United States — under both Republican and Democratic administrations — has backed Saudi Arabia and will likely continue to do so in the future. Although the United States is currently enjoying its own oil boom, it’s likely to be short-lived. Domestic oil production will probably begin to decline around 2020, as the United States has proven reserves of just 10 billion barrels. The Saudis and their OPEC partners, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, have proven reserves of 460 billion barrels. In 1945, the State Department identified Saudi Arabia’s oil resources as “a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.” That hasn’t changed — and there’s no reason Washington won’t want Saudi Arabia to remain firmly inside its camp. In addition, if all those massive arms deals between Washington and Riyadh were suddenly to stop, defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and General Dynamics would stand to lose lots of money. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s extremist variant of Islam has been very useful for the United States. Despite the rhetoric about a “clash of civilizations” supposedly happening between the West and Islam, the United States has, for the most part, traditionally sided with extremist sects of Islam against their more secular enemies for the simple reason that those secular enemies would rather remain independent of U.S. domination. The U.S.-Saudi relationship began in the 1930s but strengthened after Gamal Abdel Nasser became president of Egypt in 1956. Nasser, a neutralist and secularist during the Cold War, nationalized many of Egypt’s industries and instituted social welfare measures. For these crimes, he was considered “an extremely dangerous fanatic” with a “Hitler-ite personality” by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Since Nasser had widespread prestige throughout the Arab world for his anti-imperialism and independence, the United States needed a counterweight in the region. “The people are on Nasser’s side,” as Eisenhower complained. That counterweight was Saudi Arabia, an absolute monarchy and the only country in the world named after a ruling family (the Al Saud family). The U.S.-Saudi relationship took on new urgency in 1979, when Iran overthrew its U.S.-installed dictator. The United States and United Kingdom had overthrown Iran’s democratically elected government in 1953, because its secular leader, Mohammed Mossadegh, had nationalized Iran’s oil industry. With the loss of its ally in Iran, U.S. support for Saudi Arabia would now be based not only on the kingdom’s opposition to secular nationalist movements and governments, but also against the Shia theocracy in Iran. U.S. opposition to Iran has nothing to do with Iran’s human rights record or its authoritarian government. If it were, the United States would not be supporting Saudi Arabia, which has a much worse human rights record and a more authoritarian government. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran has actual elections, women have some kind of rights, and there is a liberal opposition. Nor is U.S. opposition to Iran based on Iran’s support for “extremist” groups abroad — because, again, Saudi Arabia supports and inspires much worse extremist groups abroad. Watch this dumbfounded State Department official trying to explain the contradiction between U.S. support for Saudi Arabia while opposing Iran: The truth is, Iran just isn’t a threat to the United States. Its military budget is $13 billion, equivalent to about 2 percent of the U.S. military budget of $611 billion, the highest in the world. (Saudi Arabia’s military budget is $64 billion, the fourth highest in the world.) Iran does not have nuclear weapons, nor does it have a nuclear weapons program. As the Defense Department has pointed out, “Iran’s military doctrine is primarily defensive.” Why, then, does the United States take such an antagonistic attitude toward Iran? The answer is simple: Iran refuses to subordinate itself to U.S. hegemony. Anybody who doesn’t follow orders is an enemy.

### Solvency

#### The United States ought not provide military aid to Saudi Arabia

#### The US encourages peace talks and creates concessions

Bandow 18 Doug Bandow, 12-18-2018, "It's Time to End U.S. Support for the Saudi War on Yemen," Cato Institute, [https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/its-time-end-us-support-saudi-war-yemen /](https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/its-time-end-us-support-saudi-war-yemen%20/) MM

The ongoing peace talks offer some hope. They have advanced further than previous attempts, and have reached some positive agreements, such as prisoner exchange, though implementation remains. The fact that Western nations have turned against the war encouraged the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to start making concessions, necessary to reach a more enduring peace. So long as Riyadh can count on a blank check from Washington—it turns out the United States wasn’t even charging enough for refueling Saudi aircraft—the kingdom has no reason to temper its policy. Which means the administration should take the next step and end all support for the war; MbS and his companions should bear the full burden of what amounts to imperial warmongering.

#### Ethical evaluations matter

Burke et al 14 Anthony, Associate Professor of International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia, Katrina Lee-Koo is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the Australian National University, and Matt McDonald is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Queensland “Ethics and Global Security” pg 1-4 / MM

With its world wars, cold wars, proxy wars, colonial wars, guerrilla wars, civil wars, drug wars, and new wars, not to mention its genocides, nuclear weapons, economic crises, gender-based violence, refugees, famines and environmental disasters, the twentieth century was a century of chronic and endemic insecurity. What will the twenty-first century become? It certainly has not started out well. Its first decade alone saw aircraft smashing into New York’s World Trade Center, a new global war on terror, the near-death of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Indian Ocean and Japanese tsunamis, Cyclone Nargis, the war in Iraq, genocide in the Sudan, and three brutal wars in Palestine and Lebanon. The picture beyond that does not improve when we add global stalemate on climate change, mass slaughter in the Congo, Islamist terrorism in Pakistan and India, a craze for walls and “border protection”, and strategic anxiety about Iran, North Korea, the rise of China, and a future of drone, cyber and space war. All of these examples have been riven with moral anxiety and exemplified particular ethical choices: whether to use poison gas against enemy forces to protect one’s own; whether to bomb populated areas to shorten a war or degrade an enemy’s industrial capacity; whether to develop and deploy weapons that can destroy cities in a few seconds and kill millions; whether to use starvation as a weapon of war; whether to support Islamic extremists in a proxy war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, in the face of warnings about how they were likely to turn on their masters afterwards; and when that time came, whether to fight such extremists by systemic violations of the international laws of war and human rights. The debates over these issues reflect many things: their inherent moral complexity, competing ethics and norms, and a global interest in their rightness and long-term impact. None of these ethical questions and dilemmas are new, but the field of security studies has been slow to address them, and it has not established a tradition of ethical thought (Burke 2010; for new research see Floyd 2007; Hayden 2005; Robinson 2011; Roe 2012). This book attempts to address that gap, and to contribute to a dialogue about the possibilities for a genuinely global security orientation and practice in international politics. We survey a range of ethical perspectives and arguments relating to diverse problems on the global security agenda, so that we can begin to understand how ethical commitments shape security relationships and outcomes: how poor or compromised ethics can contribute to insecurity; and how good ethical arguments and decisions might be able to improve the situation. While examining elements of existing ethical perspectives (such as realism, liberalism and just war theory), we push on to argue for a specifically cosmopolitan ethics. A cosmopolitan ethics aims to ensure the security of all states and communities through time, by aiming for the elimination rather than just the management of grave insecurities. We regard such an ethics as not merely morally desirable, but as strategically necessary, and with this objective, we develop ethical guidelines for the decisions and policies of all security actors. We list these principles here in Box 1.1 below, and explain them in the section entitled ‘Key Principles of a Cosmopolitan Security Ethics’. BOX 1.1 Cosmopolitan security principles A cosmopolitan global security system recognizes that contemporary insecurities take a myriad of forms that cross national boundaries and cannot be addressed by states alone or by conventional geopolitical and military means. Contemporary insecurities are the result of long-range processes, which arise from historical practices of industry, economics, military activity, non-state action, and more. They have complex manifestations that persevere unpredictably through time. A cosmopolitan global security system holds that the security of all states and human beings is of equal weight, and that we have a fundamental responsibility to ensure that the global ecology is preserved. It is committed to ensuring that all states and communities can benefit and participate equally in the creation of a system that supports their needs without prejudice. Principle 1 – Global security responsibility The responsibility of all states and security actors is to create deep and enduring security for all human beings in a form that harmonises human social, economic, cultural and political activity with the integrity of global ecosystems. Principle 2 – Future security responsibility All states and security actors have a fundamental responsibility to future generations and the long-term integrity and survival of global ecosystems; a responsibility to consider the impact of their decisions, choices and commitments through time. Principle 3 – Global categorical imperative of security All states and security actors bear a responsibility to act as if both the principles and consequences of their action or policy will become global, across space and through time, and to ensure that their actions will have positive consequences that can be borne by the world as a whole. The Importance of Ethics If practices of global security politics raise ethical questions at the conceptual level, they have also precipitated broader debate and contestation in the “real world” of international security. The Burmese military’s refusal to allow foreign aid to enter the country after the 2008 cyclone, which killed 140,000, provoked global outrage, calls for foreign intervention, and active regional diplomacy (Evans 2008b; Kouchner 2008). After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which killed more than 280,000, the United Nations and ASEAN moved to create an early warning system and response capability in recognition of the failure to have such a system in place beforehand or to even put such threats on the region’s security agenda (Burke and McDonald 2007: 1). Some of the scientists who built the first atomic bombs questioned their use in warfare and opposed the later development of fusion weapons, while scores of former national security policymakers have supported calls for total nuclear disarmament (Bird 2005: 426; Burke 2009; Oppenheimer 1984: 113; Schweber 2000). The 2011 tsunami and nuclear accident at Fukushima led many Japanese (and four European countries) to question the role of nuclear power in their energy supply, and brought calls for stronger global regulation of the industry (Fackler 2012). The widespread bombing and targeting of civilians in war have provoked major innovations in International Humanitarian Law (IHL), including the classification of area bombing and rape as war crimes, and new treaties outlawing land mines and cluster weapons. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established to prosecute major international crimes including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression. Aggression has been defined in such a way (‘the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations’) that it would have put the US, Britain and Australia in the dock had it been in force at the time of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Amendments to the Rome Statute 2010). The moral anxiety and debate in such cases—just a few of many—suggests something important. Ethics matters. In this book, we contend that the nature of global insecurity in the last century, and the kinds of security that the world will be able to achieve in this century, depends significantly on ethics: on the ethics we bring to our analysis, policymaking and decisions; on the ethics that underpins our understanding of what security is and to whom it is owed; and on the ethics that shapes the realities we accept or deny. Whether people live or die, whether they suffer or prosper—which people live and prosper and where they are able to do so—are ethical questions. How these questions are answered in the real world will be the results of particular ethical frameworks, rules and decisions; the result of the ways in which ethical dilemmas are posed, and how they are addressed and resolved. Is it right to attack—or target—cities with nuclear weapons? Is it right to even possess them? Is it right to detain asylum seekers, push their boats out to sea, or return them to the places from which they fled? Is it right to target terrorists and insurgents with remote-controlled robotic aircraft and missiles, even if those killed include civilians and if their operators aim—and kill—without risk? Is it right to invade a foreign country to stop crimes against humanity, end a famine, build a state, or remove a regime, and if so, what are the right ways of going about it? Is it right to use torture, or suspend habeas corpus or the rule of law, to protect our security? What forms of reasoning, what criteria and ends, should govern such decisions?

### Framing

#### Only a non-ideal model of ethical evaluations is productive – debate should deal with discussions of material oppression

Curry 14 Dr. Tommy J, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Affiliated Professor of Africana Studies, and a Ray A. Rothrock Fellow at Texas A&M University; first Black JV National Debate champion (for UMKC) and was half of the first all Black CEDA team to win the Pi Kappa Delta National Debate Tournament. “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century.” 2014.

Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics)**;** [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set] against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics.’ How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

#### Thus, the standard is minimizing oppression

#### Linear structural impacts outweigh

Nixon 13 Rachel Carson Professor of English and an affiliate of the Nelson Institute Center for Culture, History and Environment (Rob, “Book excerpt: Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor,” In Common, Fall/Winter 13, <http://nelson.wisc.edu/news/in-common/fall-winter2013/story.php?s=1439&page=1>) / MM

When Lawrence Summers, then president of the World Bank, advocated that the bank develop a scheme to export rich nation garbage, toxic waste, and heavily polluting industries to Africa, he did so in the calm voice of global managerial reasoning. Such a scheme, Summers elaborated, would help correct an inefficient global imbalance in toxicity. Underlying his plan is an overlooked but crucial subsidiary benefit that he outlined: offloading rich-nation toxins onto the world’s poorest continent would help ease the growing pressure from rich-nation environmentalists who were campaigning against garbage dumps and industrial effluent that they condemned as health threats and found aesthetically offensive.¶ Summers thus rationalized his poison-redistribution ethic as offering a double gain: it would benefit the United States and Europe economically, while helping appease the rising discontent of rich-nation environmentalists. Summers’ arguments assumed a direct link between aesthetically unsightly waste and Africa as an out-of-sight continent, a place remote from green activists’ terrain of concern. In Summers’ win-win scenario for the global North, the African recipients of his plan were triply discounted: discounted as political agents, discounted as long-term casualties of what I call in this book “slow violence,” and discounted as cultures possessing environmental practices and concerns of their own. I begin with Summers’ extraordinary proposal because it captures the strategic and representational challenges posed by slow violence as it impacts the environments and the environmentalism of the poor.¶ Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink politically, imaginatively, and theoretically what I call “slow violence.” By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all.¶ Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings—the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war’s toxic aftermaths or introduction climate change—are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory.¶ Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions — from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts insituations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded. Politically and emotionally, different kinds of disaster possess unequal heft. Falling bodies, burning towers, exploding heads, avalanches, volcanoes, and tsunamis have a visceral, eye-catching and page-turning power that tales of slow violence, unfolding over years, decades, even centuries, cannot match. Stories of toxic buildup, massing greenhouse gases, and accelerated species loss due to ravaged habitats are all cataclysmic, but they are scientifically convoluted cataclysms in which casualties are postponed, often for generations.¶ In an age when the media venerate the spectacular, when public policy is shaped primarily around perceived immediate need, a central question is strategic and representational: how can we convert into image and narrative the disasters that are slow moving and long in the making, disasters that are anonymous and that star nobody, disasters that are attritional and of indifferent interest to the sensation-driven technologies of our image-world? How can we turn the long emergencies of slow violence into stories dramatic enough to rouse public sentiment and warrant political intervention, these emergencies whose repercussions have given rise to some of the most critical challenges of our time?¶ Slow Violence¶ In this book, I have sought to address our inattention to calamities that are slow and long lasting, calamities that patiently dispense their devastation while remaining outside our flickering attention spans and outside the purview of a spectacle-driven corporate media. The insidious workings of slow violence derive largely from the unequal attention given to spectacular and unspectacular time. In an age that venerates instant spectacle, slow violence is deficient in the recognizable special effects that fill movie theaters and boost ratings on TV. Chemical and radiological violence, for example, is driven inward, somatized into cellular dramas of mutationthat particularly in the bodies of the poor remain largely unobserved, undiagnosed, and untreated. From a narrative perspective, such invisible, mutagenic theater is slow paced and open ended, eluding the tidy closure, the containment, imposed by the visual orthodoxies of victory and defeat.¶ Let me ground this point by referring, in conjunction, to Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. In 1962 Silent Spring jolted a broad international public into an awareness of the protracted, cryptic, and indiscriminate casualties inflicted by dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT). Yet, just one year earlier, Fanon, in the opening pages of Wretched of the Earth, had comfortably invoked DDT as an affirmative metaphor for anticolonial violence: he called for a DDT-filled spray gun to be wielded as a weapon against the “parasites” spread by the colonials’ Christian church.¶ Fanon’s drama of decolonization is, of course, studded with the overt weaponry whereby subjugation is maintained (“by dint of a great array of bayonets and cannons”) or overthrown (“by the searing bullets and bloodstained knives”) after “a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists.” Yet his temporal vision of violence and of what Aimé Césaire called “the rendezvous of victory” was uncomplicated by the concerns that an as-yet inchoate environmental justice movement (catalyzed in part by Silent Spring) would raise about lopsided risks that permeate the land long term, blurring the clean lines between defeat and victory, between colonial dispossession and official national self-determination. We can certainly read Fanon, in his concern with land as property and as fount of native dignity, retrospectively with an environmental eye. But our theories of violence today must be informed by a science unavailable to Fanon, a science that addresses environmentally embedded violence that is often difficult to source, oppose, and once set in motion, to reverse.¶ Attritional catastrophes that overspill clear boundaries in time and space are marked above all by displacements temporal, geographical, rhetorical, and technological displacements that simplify violence and underestimate, in advance and in retrospect, the human and environmental costs. Such displacements smooth the way for amnesia, as places are rendered irretrievable to those who once inhabited them, places that ordinarily pass unmourned in the corporate media. Places like the Marshall Islands, subjected between 1948 and 1958 to sixty-seven American atmospheric nuclear “tests,” the largest of them equal in force to 1,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs. In 1956 the Atomic Energy Commission declared the Marshall Islands “by far the most contaminated place in the world,” a condition that would compromise independence in the long term, despite the islands’ formal ascent in 1979 into the ranks of self-governing nations. The island republic was still in part governed by an irradiated past: well into the 1980s its history of nuclear colonialism, long forgotten by the colonizers, was still delivering into the world “jellyfish babies” headless, eyeless, limbless human infants who would live for just a few hours.¶ If, as Said notes, struggles over geography are never reducible to armed struggle but have a profound symbolic and narrative component as well, and if, as Michael Watts insists, we must attend to the “violent geographies of fast capitalism,” we need to supplement both these injunctions with a deeper understanding of the slow violence of delayed effects that structures so many of our most consequential forgettings. Violence, above all environmental violence, needs to be seen and deeply considered as a contest not only over space, or bodies, or labor, or resources, but also over time. We need to bear in mind Faulkner’s dictum that “the past is never dead. It’s not even past.” His words resonate with particular force across landscapes permeated by slow violence, landscapes of temporal overspill that elude rhetorical cleanup operations with their sanitary beginnings and endings.¶ Kwame Anthony Appiah famously asked, “Is the ‘Post-’ in ‘Postcolonial’ the ‘Post-’ in ‘Postmodern’?” As environmentalists we might ask similarly searching questions of the “post” in postindustrial, post–Cold War, and postconflict. For if the past of slow violence is never past, so too the post is never fully post: industrial particulates and effluents live on in the environmental elements we inhabit and in our very bodies,which epidemiologically and ecologically are never our simple contemporaries. Something similar applies to so-called postconflict societies whose leaders may annually commemorate, as marked on the calendar, the official cessation of hostilities, while ongoing intergenerational slow violence (inflicted by, say, unexploded landmines or carcinogens from an arms dump) may continue hostilities by other means.¶ Ours is an age of onrushing turbo-capitalism, wherein the present feels more abbreviated than it used to at least for the world’s privileged classes who live surrounded by technological time-savers that often compound the sensation of not having enough time. Consequently, one of the most pressing challenges of our age is how to adjust our rapidly eroding attention spans to the slow erosions of environmental justice. If, under neoliberalism, the gulf between enclaved rich and outcast poor has become ever more pronounced, ours is also an era of enclaved time wherein for many speed has become a self-justifying, propulsive ethic that renders “uneventful” violence (to those who live remote from its attritional lethality) a weak claimant on our time. The attosecond pace of our age, with its restless technologies of infinite promise and infinite disappointment, prompts us to keepflicking and clicking distractedly in an insatiable and often insensate quest for quicker sensation.¶ The oxymoronic notion of slow violence poses a number of challenges: scientific, legal, political, and representational. In the long arc between the emergence of slow violence and its delayed effects, both the causes and the memory of catastrophe readily fade from view as the casualties incurred typically pass untallied and unremembered. Such discounting in turn makes it far more difficult to secure effective legal measures for prevention, restitution, and redress.¶ Casualties from slow violence are, moreover, out of sync not only with our narrative and media expectations but also with the swift seasons of electoral change. Politicians routinely adopt a “last in, first out” stance toward environmental issues, admitting them when times are flush, dumping them as soon as times get tight. Because preventative or remedial environmental legislation typically targets slow violence, it cannot deliver dependable electoral cycle results, even though those results may ultimately be life saving. Relative to bankable pocketbook actions there’ll be a tax rebate check in the mail next August environmental payouts seem to lurk on a distant horizon. Many politicians and indeed many voters routinely treat environmental action as critical yet not urgent. And so generation after generation of two- or four-year cycle politicians add to the pileup of deferrable actions deferred. With rare exceptions, in the domain of slow violence “yes, but not now, not yet” becomes the [normal approach.]

#### Take the simplest path possible – bottom up approaches create sacrifices and can’t resolve oppression

Bassiouni 03 (M. Cherif Distinguished Research Professor of Law, President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University College of Law; President, International Institute for Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (Siracusa, Italy); President, International Association of Penal Law (Paris, France). Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Spring, 2003) / MM

At the end of the Second World War, the world collectively pledged "never again." While the intention of this global promise may have been sincere, its implementation has proved elusive. There have been over 250 conflicts in the twentieth century alone, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 75 to 170 million persons. Both State and non-state actors routinely commit extra-judicial execution, torture, rape and other violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. In most cases, political considerations permit perpetrators of gross violations of human rights to operate with impunity. Yet, alongside the sad truth of our consistently violent world stands the moral commitment of the post-war pledge and the related vision of peace, justice and truth. The human rights arena is defined by a constant tension between the attraction of realpolitik and the demand for accountability. Realpolitik involves the pursuit of political settlements unencumbered by moral and ethical limitations. As such, this approach often runs directly counter to the interests of justice, particularly as understood from the perspective of survivors of gross violations of human rights. Impunity, at both the international and national levels, is commonly the outcome of realpolitik which favors expedient political ends over the more complex task of confronting responsibility. Accountability, in contrast, embodies the goals of both retributive and restorative justice. This orientation views conflict resolution as premised upon responsibility and requires sanctions for those responsible, the establishment of a clear record of truth and efforts made to provide redress to survivors. The pursuit of realpolitik may settle the more immediate problems of a conflict, but, as history reveals, its achievements are frequently at the expense of long-term peace, stability, and reconciliation. It is difficult to achieve genuine peace without addressing survivors' needs and without [\*192] providing a wounded society with a sense of closure. A more profound vision of peace requires accountability and often involves a series of interconnected activities including: establishing the truth of what occurred, punishing those most directly responsible for human suffering, and offering redress to survivors. Peace is not merely the absence of armed conflict; it is the restoration of justice, and the use of law to mediate and resolve inter-social and inter-personal discord. The pursuit of justice and accountability fulfills fundamental human needs and expresses key values necessary for the prevention and deterrence of future conflicts. For this reason, sacrificing justice and accountability for the immediacy of realpolitik represents a short-term vision of expediency over more enduring human values.

#### Institutional engagement is essential

**Taylor 17** Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, assistant professor of African American studies at Princeton University [“Home Is the Crucible of Struggle,” American Quarterly, Vol. 69, No. 2, June 2017, p. 229-233, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries

Creating home, or what may also be described as a struggle to belong, has always been political in the United States. In a country founded on the extermination of its indigenous population, whose wealth was derived from the forced labor of the enslaved, and for whom that wealth was multiplied a trillion times over through the violent expropriation of waves upon waves of immigrant labor—to stay or belong has been brutally contested and valiantly fought to achieve. In other words, we share a history of repression and resistance in the elemental, human struggle to belong, to be home. Those various battles over land rights and citizenship; the right to work and housing; the right to vote, speak, and organize have all been in an effort to reshape or reform the injustice and oppression that shapes the daily lives of most people in this country. In this persistent quest, we now enter into a period of both certainty and uncertainty. We can be certain that the administration of Donald Trump will pursue policies that will make the lives of ordinary people substantially harder. We can be certain that his administration will attack immigrants. He has promised to restore law and order, which appears to be an invitation for the police to continue their assaults on Black and Brown communities. Trump has bragged about sexually assaulting women while decrying their rights to reproductive freedom. Trump and his cohort have all but declared war on Muslims in the United States and beyond. We have seen a revival of the white supremacist Right and an unleashing of open racial animus. In the month after the election of Trump, over one thousand hate crimes across the country were reported. Since he has taken office, Jewish cemeteries have been desecrated; mosques have been burned; and swastikas have been brandished in acts of vandalism and intimidation. What is uncertain is the extent to which Trump will be able to follow through on his threats against a variety of communities. This uncertainty is not with Trump's intention to inflict as much pain and harm on the most vulnerable people in the United States; rather, it is based on a calculation that our ability to organize and build movements will complicate, blunt, and, in some cases, thwart the Trump agenda. [End Page 229] The challenge is in using the spaces we occupy in the academy to approach this task. There will be many different kinds of organizing spaces developed in the coming years, but there is a particular role we can play in this moment. This organizing possibility exists only when we recognize the academy, itself, as a site of politics and struggle. Those who ignore that reality do so because they have the luxury to or because they are so constrained by compartmentalization that they ignore the very world they are living in. In the last two years we have seen the flowering of campus struggles against racism, rape, and sexual violence, amid campaigns for union recognition and the right of faculty to control the atmosphere of their classrooms. Whether or not we on campus see them as political spaces, the right wing certainly does. They have raged against "safe spaces" and what they refer to as "political correctness." While reasonable people may debate the merits and meaning of concepts like safe spaces, we should not confuse those discussions with an attack from the right that is intended to create "unsafe spaces" where racial antagonism, sexual predation, and homophobia are considered rites of passage or, as the new president describes as it, "locker room" behavior. These, unfortunately, are only smaller battles happening within the larger transformation of colleges and universities into the leading edge of various neoliberal practices**, from** the growing use of "contingent labor" to the proliferation of online education, to certificate and master's programs that are only intended to increase the coffers while adding little to nothing to the intellect or critical thinking capacities of its participants. Robin Kelley reminds us that universities will "never be engines for social transformation," but they are places that often reflect, and in some situations magnify, the tensions that exist in society more generally. There is a relationship between the two. The struggles for academic units in Black and Chicano studies in the 1960s were born of the political insurgencies that captivated those communities while shaking the entire country to its core. Robert Warrior reminds us that in Native studies there is a commitment to crash through the firewall that is often intended to silo scholarship from the communities it is often derived from. He writes that a "clear predominance exists in Native studies of scholarship that obligates itself in clear ways to being connected to the real lives of real peoples living in real time. More than just connected, a hallmark of Native studies scholarship is a preoccupation with how the work of scholars and scholarship translates itself into the process of making the Indigenous world a better, more just, and more equitable place to live, thrive, and provide for future generations." Scholarship alone is not politics, but the study of history, theory, and politics can imbue our political practice with depth and confidence. Today there is a [End Page 230] need to connect the legacy of resistance, struggle, and transformation with a new generation of students and activists who are desperately looking for hope that their world is not coming to an end. To be sure, there is deep malaise and fear about the meaning of a Trump presidency. It is not to be underestimated. Anyone who is so open about his antipathy and disgust with entire populations of people should be believed when he promises to amplify the suffering in this society. And we should not underestimate the obstacles that confront a political Left that is deeply fractured and politically divided. But we should also remember that the future is not already written. It has yet to be cast in stone. The stories of our demise have been predicted over and over again. The marches that erupted in the immediate aftermath of the Trump victory give a sense of the resistance to come. Who could have predicted that the day after Trump's inauguration between three and four million people in the United States would take to the streets to defiantly resist and oppose the new president? In fact, we have already seen in the last decade the eruption of mass struggle embodied in the Occupy movement and most recently the rise of Black Lives Matter. The challenge to Trump, however, will demand more than moral outrage. It requires a strategy, and strategy can be developed only when we have political clarity on the nature of Trumpism. The queer theorist Lisa Duggan made an important observation at the association's annual meeting last November in Denver. In an emergency session assessing the US presidential election, there was a sense of urgency that we have talked enough and now is the time to act. But Duggan made the important observation that while action is always necessary, we must also create the political and intellectual spaces necessary for debate, argument, and discussion. We cannot act in intelligent ways without understanding why we are acting and what we are acting against. In other words, politics and ideas matter as much as the action necessary to transform conditions we abhor. This may seem like a minor or even self-evident point, but there is a constant critique that we are often "preaching to the choir" or a question about the usefulness of sitting in yet "another" meeting. But this most recent electoral season has also shown that the choir has different pitches and cadences. The choir can be off-key. This is not to suggest that we should all agree or mute the areas of disagreement and tension, but we should be clear about those differences. Just as we should be clear on what is agreed on and what are the bases on which we can overcome differences and unite. These various position s cannot be intuited; they are discovered through patient debate. Beyond the culture of respectful internal debate and discussion, academics also have something to contribute. The confidence necessary to effectively [End Page 231] engage in struggle is not easily attained in an atmosphere of defeat and defensiveness. Those are the moments to draw on the history of resistance in the movements of the oppressed. Often the political establishment better understands the power of this history than those who are its rightful inheritors. There is a reason that the federal government invested so heavily in the repression of the Black liberation movement of the 1960s. The point was not only to defeat the struggle; it was intended to snuff out its legacy. In significant ways the repression has carried on until this very day. There is a reason sixty-nine-year-old Assata Shakur remains a political exile in Cuba and our government continues to keep a $2 million bounty on her head while shamefully including her on the misnamed terrorist watch list. It is the same reason that the Angola Three—Robert King, Albert Woodfox, and Herman Wallace, Black Panther members held in the infamous prison in Louisiana—collectively spent 113 years in solitary confinement as political punishment for their ideas. It is the same reason 45 years after the Attica Prison Rebellion in 1971, federal and state officials continue to hide the truth of its brutal repression. The most important, and thus damning, archives that the historian Heather Ann Thompson used to write her book on Attica have, once again, disappeared from public scrutiny. Not only does the political establishment want to punish and demonize the voices for Black liberation, but more important, they want to bury the legacy, the history, and politics of the movement itself. It is clear to understand why. It is not irrational hatred of African Americans; it is quite simply because when Black people go into struggle, it unravels the dominant narrative, or the fabrications at the heart of American mythology—that we are a democratic and just society. Only a cursory knowledge of Black history—and the history of indigenous people in this land—shatters the United States' obsession with its own self-idealization as an "exceptional" society. In doing so, Black struggles are examples of how the "margins" can upend and destabilize the supposed center. And perhaps even more important is how those struggles within the various iterations of the Black Freedom movement become a platform for other liberation struggles to emerge. This was the legacy of the Black insurgency of the 1960s. As a result, the political establishment distorts this history and distorts its radical content, its radical leaders, and their voices. This is not just a lesson of who gets to tell history; this legacy of repression affects the movements of today. The attempt to distort and bury the struggles from a previous period of Black rebellion deprives the current generation of the politics, strategy, and tactics of our movement historically. It diminishes the analyses and the political tools necessary to help forge a way forward in [End Page 232] this political moment. But perhaps, most perniciously, the efforts to disconnect people, especially young people, moving into struggle from their radical roots and history, are to dramatically limit our political imaginations so that we believe that the best we can hope for in this life is a Black president or a more responsive and less inept Democratic Party: the establishment wants us to believe that life as it currently is, is the best we can hope for. This is why, for example, the scholar and activist Angela Davis is so important because she is a connection to our radical history. She is the living legacy of a political movement that put liberation at its center. And you can see her political and intellectual fingerprints all over our movement today—from the politics of Black feminism and the concept of intersectionality to the demand of abolition and the rejection of the very normative idea that humans should be surveilled, caged, or killed by the state. It is no wonder that her politics and activism have deeply influenced many of the Black queer women at the heart of the Black Lives Matter movement. She compels us to think more deeply, to get to the root of the matter, to be radical in our analysis, and to struggle harder—not just in the world as it is but for the world as we want it to be. Davis is but a single example. There are many other examples where those from a previous era of struggle whom we respect and honor connect our searching present with a previous moment of insurgency and struggle. In our lifetimes, we have never been more in need of the inspiration, the lessons, and the strength of those who have bequeathed to us the certainties and uncertainties of home today. The challenge continues to lie in our abilities to transcend, through argument, debate, and struggle, the many paths that crisscross and potentially divide our resistance to hatred, bigotry, and oppression. This is a call for solidarity, but not on the basis of papering over the different experiences that create different levels of consciousness within our society. Solidarity is most palpable when there is recognition that our fates are connected and that an injury to one is an injury to all. Another world is truly possible, but only if we are willing to struggle for it.

#### Saying the case “doesn’t solve enough” is unethical – before saying “reform is impossibe” consider what the affirmative does

Delgado 9 Chair of Law at the University of Alabama Law School, J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, his books have won eight national book prizes, including six Gustavus Myers awards for outstanding book on human rights in North America, the American Library Association’s Outstanding Academic Book, and a Pulitzer Prize nomination.  Professor Delgado’s teaching and writing focus on race, the legal profession, and social change, 2009, “Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want, Arguing about Law”, p. 588-590

The CLS critique of piecemeal reform Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale reformation that must occur to create a decent society. Even worse, an unfair social system survives by using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize oppression. Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair and just. In fact, Crits believe that teaching the common law or using the case method in law school is a disguised means of preaching incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure.“ To avoid this, CLS scholars urge law professors to abandon the case method, give up the effort to ﬁnd rationality and order in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political fashion. The CLS critique of piecemeal reform is familiar, imperialistic and wrong. Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the Promised Land is at hand. The critique is imperialistic in that it tells minorities and other oppressed peoples how they should interpret events affecting them. A court order directing a housing authority to disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing may postpone the revolution, or it may not. In the meantime, the order keeps a number of poor families warm. This may mean more to them than it does to a comfortable academic working in a warm office. It smacks of paternalism to assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty of heat now, unless there is evidence for that possibility. The Crits do not offer such evidence. Indeed, some incremental changes may bring revolutionary changes closer, not push them further away. Not all small reforms induce complacency; some may whet the appetite for further combat. The welfare family may hold a tenants’ union meeting in their heated living room. CLS scholars’ critique of piecemeal reform often misses these possibilities, and neglects the question of whether total change, when it comes, will be what we want

## 1AC Lay Whole Res

### Framing

#### I affirm – Resolved: The United States ought not provide military aid to authoritarian regimes

#### I value morality because the word ought in the resolution implies a moral obligation

#### Only a non-ideal model of ethical evaluations is productive – debate should deal with discussions of material oppression

Curry writes Dr. Tommy J, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Affiliated Professor of Africana Studies, and a Ray A. Rothrock Fellow at Texas A&M University; first Black JV National Debate champion (for UMKC) and was half of the first all Black CEDA team to win the Pi Kappa Delta National Debate Tournament. “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century.” 2014.

Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics)**;** [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set] against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics.’ How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

#### Thus, the value criterion is minimizing oppression

#### Your ballot should prioritize preventing systemic violence – the impacts are slow, painful, and accumulate over time

Nixon writes Rachel Carson Professor of English and an affiliate of the Nelson Institute Center for Culture, History and Environment (Rob, “Book excerpt: Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor,” In Common, Fall/Winter 13, <http://nelson.wisc.edu/news/in-common/fall-winter2013/story.php?s=1439&page=1>) / MM

When Lawrence Summers, then president of the World Bank, advocated that the bank develop a scheme to export rich nation garbage, toxic waste, and heavily polluting industries to Africa, he did so in the calm voice of global managerial reasoning. Such a scheme, Summers elaborated, would help correct an inefficient global imbalance in toxicity. Underlying his plan is an overlooked but crucial subsidiary benefit that he outlined: offloading rich-nation toxins onto the world’s poorest continent would help ease the growing pressure from rich-nation environmentalists who were campaigning against garbage dumps and industrial effluent that they condemned as health threats and found aesthetically offensive.¶ Summers thus rationalized his poison-redistribution ethic as offering a double gain: it would benefit the United States and Europe economically, while helping appease the rising discontent of rich-nation environmentalists. Summers’ arguments assumed a direct link between aesthetically unsightly waste and Africa as an out-of-sight continent, a place remote from green activists’ terrain of concern. In Summers’ win-win scenario for the global North, the African recipients of his plan were triply discounted: discounted as political agents, discounted as long-term casualties of what I call in this book “slow violence,” and discounted as cultures possessing environmental practices and concerns of their own. I begin with Summers’ extraordinary proposal because it captures the strategic and representational challenges posed by slow violence as it impacts the environments and the environmentalism of the poor.¶ Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink politically, imaginatively, and theoretically what I call “slow violence.” By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all.¶ Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings—the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war’s toxic aftermaths or introduction climate change—are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory.¶ Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions — from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts insituations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded. Politically and emotionally, different kinds of disaster possess unequal heft. Falling bodies, burning towers, exploding heads, avalanches, volcanoes, and tsunamis have a visceral, eye-catching and page-turning power that tales of slow violence, unfolding over years, decades, even centuries, cannot match. Stories of toxic buildup, massing greenhouse gases, and accelerated species loss due to ravaged habitats are all cataclysmic, but they are scientifically convoluted cataclysms in which casualties are postponed, often for generations.¶ In an age when the media venerate the spectacular, when public policy is shaped primarily around perceived immediate need, a central question is strategic and representational: how can we convert into image and narrative the disasters that are slow moving and long in the making, disasters that are anonymous and that star nobody, disasters that are attritional and of indifferent interest to the sensation-driven technologies of our image-world? How can we turn the long emergencies of slow violence into stories dramatic enough to rouse public sentiment and warrant political intervention, these emergencies whose repercussions have given rise to some of the most critical challenges of our time?¶ Slow Violence¶ In this book, I have sought to address our inattention to calamities that are slow and long lasting, calamities that patiently dispense their devastation while remaining outside our flickering attention spans and outside the purview of a spectacle-driven corporate media. The insidious workings of slow violence derive largely from the unequal attention given to spectacular and unspectacular time. In an age that venerates instant spectacle, slow violence is deficient in the recognizable special effects that fill movie theaters and boost ratings on TV. Chemical and radiological violence, for example, is driven inward, somatized into cellular dramas of mutationthat particularly in the bodies of the poor remain largely unobserved, undiagnosed, and untreated. From a narrative perspective, such invisible, mutagenic theater is slow paced and open ended, eluding the tidy closure, the containment, imposed by the visual orthodoxies of victory and defeat.¶ Let me ground this point by referring, in conjunction, to Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. In 1962 Silent Spring jolted a broad international public into an awareness of the protracted, cryptic, and indiscriminate casualties inflicted by dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT). Yet, just one year earlier, Fanon, in the opening pages of Wretched of the Earth, had comfortably invoked DDT as an affirmative metaphor for anticolonial violence: he called for a DDT-filled spray gun to be wielded as a weapon against the “parasites” spread by the colonials’ Christian church.¶ Fanon’s drama of decolonization is, of course, studded with the overt weaponry whereby subjugation is maintained (“by dint of a great array of bayonets and cannons”) or overthrown (“by the searing bullets and bloodstained knives”) after “a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists.” Yet his temporal vision of violence and of what Aimé Césaire called “the rendezvous of victory” was uncomplicated by the concerns that an as-yet inchoate environmental justice movement (catalyzed in part by Silent Spring) would raise about lopsided risks that permeate the land long term, blurring the clean lines between defeat and victory, between colonial dispossession and official national self-determination. We can certainly read Fanon, in his concern with land as property and as fount of native dignity, retrospectively with an environmental eye. But our theories of violence today must be informed by a science unavailable to Fanon, a science that addresses environmentally embedded violence that is often difficult to source, oppose, and once set in motion, to reverse.¶ Attritional catastrophes that overspill clear boundaries in time and space are marked above all by displacements temporal, geographical, rhetorical, and technological displacements that simplify violence and underestimate, in advance and in retrospect, the human and environmental costs. Such displacements smooth the way for amnesia, as places are rendered irretrievable to those who once inhabited them, places that ordinarily pass unmourned in the corporate media. Places like the Marshall Islands, subjected between 1948 and 1958 to sixty-seven American atmospheric nuclear “tests,” the largest of them equal in force to 1,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs. In 1956 the Atomic Energy Commission declared the Marshall Islands “by far the most contaminated place in the world,” a condition that would compromise independence in the long term, despite the islands’ formal ascent in 1979 into the ranks of self-governing nations. The island republic was still in part governed by an irradiated past: well into the 1980s its history of nuclear colonialism, long forgotten by the colonizers, was still delivering into the world “jellyfish babies” headless, eyeless, limbless human infants who would live for just a few hours.¶ If, as Said notes, struggles over geography are never reducible to armed struggle but have a profound symbolic and narrative component as well, and if, as Michael Watts insists, we must attend to the “violent geographies of fast capitalism,” we need to supplement both these injunctions with a deeper understanding of the slow violence of delayed effects that structures so many of our most consequential forgettings. Violence, above all environmental violence, needs to be seen and deeply considered as a contest not only over space, or bodies, or labor, or resources, but also over time. We need to bear in mind Faulkner’s dictum that “the past is never dead. It’s not even past.” His words resonate with particular force across landscapes permeated by slow violence, landscapes of temporal overspill that elude rhetorical cleanup operations with their sanitary beginnings and endings.¶ Kwame Anthony Appiah famously asked, “Is the ‘Post-’ in ‘Postcolonial’ the ‘Post-’ in ‘Postmodern’?” As environmentalists we might ask similarly searching questions of the “post” in postindustrial, post–Cold War, and postconflict. For if the past of slow violence is never past, so too the post is never fully post: industrial particulates and effluents live on in the environmental elements we inhabit and in our very bodies,which epidemiologically and ecologically are never our simple contemporaries. Something similar applies to so-called postconflict societies whose leaders may annually commemorate, as marked on the calendar, the official cessation of hostilities, while ongoing intergenerational slow violence (inflicted by, say, unexploded landmines or carcinogens from an arms dump) may continue hostilities by other means.¶ Ours is an age of onrushing turbo-capitalism, wherein the present feels more abbreviated than it used to at least for the world’s privileged classes who live surrounded by technological time-savers that often compound the sensation of not having enough time. Consequently, one of the most pressing challenges of our age is how to adjust our rapidly eroding attention spans to the slow erosions of environmental justice. If, under neoliberalism, the gulf between enclaved rich and outcast poor has become ever more pronounced, ours is also an era of enclaved time wherein for many speed has become a self-justifying, propulsive ethic that renders “uneventful” violence (to those who live remote from its attritional lethality) a weak claimant on our time. The attosecond pace of our age, with its restless technologies of infinite promise and infinite disappointment, prompts us to keepflicking and clicking distractedly in an insatiable and often insensate quest for quicker sensation.¶ The oxymoronic notion of slow violence poses a number of challenges: scientific, legal, political, and representational. In the long arc between the emergence of slow violence and its delayed effects, both the causes and the memory of catastrophe readily fade from view as the casualties incurred typically pass untallied and unremembered. Such discounting in turn makes it far more difficult to secure effective legal measures for prevention, restitution, and redress.¶ Casualties from slow violence are, moreover, out of sync not only with our narrative and media expectations but also with the swift seasons of electoral change. Politicians routinely adopt a “last in, first out” stance toward environmental issues, admitting them when times are flush, dumping them as soon as times get tight. Because preventative or remedial environmental legislation typically targets slow violence, it cannot deliver dependable electoral cycle results, even though those results may ultimately be life saving. Relative to bankable pocketbook actions there’ll be a tax rebate check in the mail next August environmental payouts seem to lurk on a distant horizon. Many politicians and indeed many voters routinely treat environmental action as critical yet not urgent. And so generation after generation of two- or four-year cycle politicians add to the pileup of deferrable actions deferred. With rare exceptions, in the domain of slow violence “yes, but not now, not yet” becomes the [normal approach.]

#### Other frameworks inherently ignore material violence – debates HAVE to be about what is happening in the status quo

Kidner writes professor of psychology at Nottingham Trent University and internationally renowned scholar on nature-culture relationships.(nature and psyche p. 65-7) / MM

In addition, the deconstructive bent of discursive approaches limits their capacity to challenge the structure of modern industrialism. Just as science has been reluctant to recognize the holistic qualities of nature, so we have been slow to appreciate that the power of industrialism and its resultant near-hegemony in the modern world is largely the result of its ability to integrate science, politics, and everyday social life within a structure that appears complete and self-sufficient. This structure cannot be challenged without reference to alternative structures. To celebrate choice and free play without also celebrating the frames of meaning within which they take place is simply to guarantee our assimilation to and absorption within industrialism, and so represents a philosophy of surrender. For example, “freedom” has little meaning in the absence of a framework of democratic laws which protect the vulnerable against the “freedom” of the powerful to exploit, intimidate, and mislead. Similarly, my freedom to explore an area of wilderness is negated if energy companies and off-road vehicle clubs also have the freedom to use the area as they see fit. Freedom is all to often interpreted as the absence of structure; and structure gives meaning and implies responsibilities and limitations. One of the most insidious aspects of the colonization of the world is industrialism's silent but lethal elimination of structures that could challenge it. The widespread lack of appreciation within academia of the way in which postmodern approaches involving deconstruction promote this insidious *conceptual* assimilation to industrialism is an index of the urgent need to develop a psychocultural dimension to our environmental understanding. Finally, we should not ignore the possibility that an emphasis on language serves particular defensive functions for the social scientist. Noam Chomsky has noted that it”it's too hard to deal with real problems,” some academics tend to “go off on wild goose chases that don't matter . . . [or] get involved in academic cults that are very divorced from any reality and that provide a defense against dealing with the world as it actually is.”71 An emphasis on language can serve this sort of defensive function; for the study of discourse enables one to stand aside from issues and avoid any commitment to a cause or idea, simply presenting all sides of a debate and pointing out the discursive strategies involved. As the physical world appears to fade into mere discourse, so it comes to seem less real than the language used to describe it; and environmental issues lose the dimensions of urgency and tragedy and become instead the proving grounds for ideas and attitudes. Rather than walking in what Aldo Leopold described as a “world of wounds,” the discursive theorist can study this world dispassionately, safely insulated from the emotional and ecological havoc that is taking place elsewhere. Like experimentalism, this is a schizoid stance that exemplifies rather than challenges the characteristic social pathology of out time; and it is one that supports Melanie Klein's thesis that the internal object world can serve as a psychotic substitute for an external “real” world that is either absent or unsatisfying.72 Ian Craib's description of social construction as a “social psychosis”73 therefore seems entirely apt. But what object relations theorists such as Klein fail to point out is the other side of this dialectic: that withdrawing from the external world and substituting an internal world of words or fantasies, because of the actions that follow from this state of affairs, makes the former even less satisfying and more psychologically distant, so contributing to the vicious spiral that severs the “human from the “natural” and abandons nature to industrialism.

### My sole contention is that military aid has justified Saudi Arabia’s unethical intervention in Yemen

#### Military aid is fueled under a guise of “national security” - that encourages endless intervention by Saudi Arabia in Yemen and unethical violence

Khanna writes Ro Khanna, 10-20-2018, "Congress must end U.S. military aid to Saudi war in Yemen," [https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/Congress-must-end-U-S-military-aid-to-Saudi-war-13319536.php /](https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/Congress-must-end-U-S-military-aid-to-Saudi-war-13319536.php%20/) MM

Every ghastly new detail we learn about the disappearance of journalist Jamal Khashoggi suggests that this was a premeditated murder, carried out at the direction of the highest level of the Saudi dictatorship. The cascading revelations rival the gore of horror films, from the 15 Saudis who flew into Turkey, lying in wait for Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, to the bone-saw-equipped forensics specialist who reportedly dismembered Khashoggi’s body wearing headphones and recommending that others listen to music as well. Just weeks before, Khashoggi had publicly pleaded with the de facto ruler of the Saudi regime, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to curb his propensity for violence. Khashoggi’s September column for the Washington Post was headlined “Saudi Arabia’s crown prince must restore dignity to his country — by ending Yemen’s cruel war.” “Cruel” is, if anything, an understatement. Since 2015, the Saudis have launched an estimated 18,000 air strikes on Yemen, attacking hospitals, schools, water treatment plants, funerals, markets and even farms. The Saudis also imposed a blockade on food, fuel and medicine from freely entering the country in what can only be described as a deliberate effort to starve the civilian population into submission. Buried by the news of Khashoggi’s slaying was a grim new warning by Lise Grande, the U.N.’s humanitarian coordinator for Yemen: The nation could experience the world’s worst famine in 100 years, with 12 million to 13 million innocent civilians at risk of dying from the lack of food within months. Related Stories US & WorldKey battle in Yemen’s war risks tipping country into famine OpinionEditorial: Is Trump selling out to the Saudis? As early as 2015, Foreign Policy magazine reported the Saudi coalition’s “daily bombing campaign would not be possible without the constant presence of U.S. Air Force tanker planes refueling coalition jets.” Yet there was never a debate or vote by the people’s elected congressional representatives, as required by the Constitution, as to whether the U.S. military should participate in the Saudi government’s genocidal war. As the architect of this hideous military strategy, Mohammed bin Salman reacted to Khashoggi’s criticisms the way he knew best. MbS, as he’s known, probably ordered the assassination of Khashoggi and then — just as the Saudi regime did after bombing a school bus filled with Yemeni children last month — issued ever-shifting and contradictory lies, relying on the Trump administration’s full backing and clumsy assistance in the cover-up. Unlimited Digital Access for 99¢ Read more articles like this by subscribing to the San Francisco Chronicle SUBSCRIBE MbS’ campaign of killing Yemenis and Saudis alike must come to an end. Congressional Progressive Caucus co-chair Mark Pocan, D-Wis., and I are leading dozens of our colleagues, including top House Democrats, in demanding answers from the Trump administration about its possible complicity in Khashoggi’s killing. We also are working to force a vote in Congress to decisively shut down unconstitutional U.S. participation in the Saudi regime’s gruesome war in Yemen within weeks. Partnering with Sen. Bernie Sanders, independent-Vermont, we aim to secure majorities in both chambers of Congress as soon as we return to Washington to direct the president to remove U.S. forces from unauthorized hostilities in Yemen. We are invoking the War Powers Resolution with the aim of passing House Congressional Resolution 138 and Senate Joint Resolution 54. These resolutions have priority over other foreign policy considerations in the chambers, and the votes on them cannot be blocked by Republican leadership. Never before has such a feat been attempted in both houses of Congress at once — but the War Power Resolution allows members of Congress to force votes to end illegal U.S. military participation in this war. When we succeed, the Saudi campaign will inevitably collapse. If our moral compass is to guide our country after the butchering of Jamal Khashoggi, the incineration of thousands of Yemenis in U.S.-Saudi air strikes, and the quiet deaths of more than 100,000 Yemeni children who succumbed to war-triggered hunger and disease over the past two years, Congress must pass these resolutions. America’s founders deliberately broke with the unchecked power enjoyed by Europe’s monarchs by vesting Congress with the sole authority over the question of war and peace. By forcing long-overdue sunlight and public participation into the now-secret realm of war, these resolutions will help restore our republic and end America’s complicity in such incomprehensibly immense human suffering. Today’s leaders owe it to all those who have sacrificed for a fairer world to bring an end to the worst humanitarian crisis on Earth.

#### US-Saudi intervention has resulted in human rights violations and regional destabilization – prevention now is KEY

Morris writes Brett Morris 12-1-2017, "How the United States Is Helping Saudi Arabia Destabilize the Middle East," [https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3 /](https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3%20/) MM

At around two in the morning on August 25, 2017, a five-year-old girl named Buthaina lost her entire family. Saudi Arabia had dropped a bomb on her home and several others in Sana’a, the capital of Yemen, as part of its ongoing campaign against Houthi rebels. The attack killed 16 people, including Buthaina’s parents and four siblings, and injured 17 others. Now under the care of her aunt and uncle, Buthaina herself was one of the injured. Images of Buthaina trying to open her bruised eyes went viral after the attack. Where does Saudi Arabia get the bombs it uses to kill all these people? For the most part, they come from the United States, with the United Kingdom and France also supplying substantial amounts. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, from 1950 to 2016, the United States provided Saudi Arabia with more than $34 billion worth of arms, while the United Kingdom provided more than $10 billion, and France provided more than $7 billion. The United States is the world’s leading arms exporter, and Saudi Arabia is its top client. The bomb that injured Buthaina and killed her family originated in the United States, as an Amnesty International investigation found. Buthaina and her family are just a few of the victims of the long-standing U.S.-Saudi alliance—an alliance that has allowed Saudi Arabia to remain one of the worst human rights abusers in the world, export its odious Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, and inspire jihadist movements throughout the world, at the cost of thousands of lives. Oil, Money, and the “Threat” of Iran. The basis for the U.S.-Saudi alliance is the fact that Saudi Arabia sits on top of a lot of oil, as well as its opposition to actors and movements in the region that run counter to U.S. hegemonic ambitions. Nowadays, the United States gets most of its oil through domestic production or from Canada. (The United States is now the world’s leading oil producer, with Saudi Arabia a close second.) Just 11 percent of the oil that the United States imports comes from Saudi Arabia. Despite this, the United States — under both Republican and Democratic administrations — has backed Saudi Arabia and will likely continue to do so in the future. Although the United States is currently enjoying its own oil boom, it’s likely to be short-lived. Domestic oil production will probably begin to decline around 2020, as the United States has proven reserves of just 10 billion barrels. The Saudis and their OPEC partners, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, have proven reserves of 460 billion barrels. In 1945, the State Department identified Saudi Arabia’s oil resources as “a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.” That hasn’t changed — and there’s no reason Washington won’t want Saudi Arabia to remain firmly inside its camp. In addition, if all those massive arms deals between Washington and Riyadh were suddenly to stop, defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and General Dynamics would stand to lose lots of money. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s extremist variant of Islam has been very useful for the United States. Despite the rhetoric about a “clash of civilizations” supposedly happening between the West and Islam, the United States has, for the most part, traditionally sided with extremist sects of Islam against their more secular enemies for the simple reason that those secular enemies would rather remain independent of U.S. domination. The U.S.-Saudi relationship began in the 1930s but strengthened after Gamal Abdel Nasser became president of Egypt in 1956. Nasser, a neutralist and secularist during the Cold War, nationalized many of Egypt’s industries and instituted social welfare measures. For these crimes, he was considered “an extremely dangerous fanatic” with a “Hitler-ite personality” by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Since Nasser had widespread prestige throughout the Arab world for his anti-imperialism and independence, the United States needed a counterweight in the region. “The people are on Nasser’s side,” as Eisenhower complained. That counterweight was Saudi Arabia, an absolute monarchy and the only country in the world named after a ruling family (the Al Saud family). The U.S.-Saudi relationship took on new urgency in 1979, when Iran overthrew its U.S.-installed dictator. The United States and United Kingdom had overthrown Iran’s democratically elected government in 1953, because its secular leader, Mohammed Mossadegh, had nationalized Iran’s oil industry. With the loss of its ally in Iran, U.S. support for Saudi Arabia would now be based not only on the kingdom’s opposition to secular nationalist movements and governments, but also against the Shia theocracy in Iran. U.S. opposition to Iran has nothing to do with Iran’s human rights record or its authoritarian government. If it were, the United States would not be supporting Saudi Arabia, which has a much worse human rights record and a more authoritarian government. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran has actual elections, women have some kind of rights, and there is a liberal opposition. Nor is U.S. opposition to Iran based on Iran’s support for “extremist” groups abroad — because, again, Saudi Arabia supports and inspires much worse extremist groups abroad. Watch this dumbfounded State Department official trying to explain the contradiction between U.S. support for Saudi Arabia while opposing Iran: The truth is, Iran just isn’t a threat to the United States. Its military budget is $13 billion, equivalent to about 2 percent of the U.S. military budget of $611 billion, the highest in the world. (Saudi Arabia’s military budget is $64 billion, the fourth highest in the world.) Iran does not have nuclear weapons, nor does it have a nuclear weapons program. As the Defense Department has pointed out, “Iran’s military doctrine is primarily defensive.” Why, then, does the United States take such an antagonistic attitude toward Iran? The answer is simple: Iran refuses to subordinate itself to U.S. hegemony. Anybody who doesn’t follow orders is an enemy.

#### Reject US support – it allows for state-sanctioned violence on innocent populations

Morris writes Brett Morris 12-1-2017, "How the United States Is Helping Saudi Arabia Destabilize the Middle East," [https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3 /](https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3%20/) MM

Today, Saudi Arabia is creating a humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen, with U.S. support. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has been bombing Yemen to defeat the Houthis, a group that Saudi Arabia accuses of being proxies for Iran — an exaggerated claim. In addition to bombing civilian targets such as homes, schools, hospitals, mosques, and markets, Saudi Arabia has instituted a blockade on Yemen, “making an already catastrophic situation far worse,” according to the World Health Organization, the World Food Programme, and UNICEF. At least 10,000 people have died in the conflict, with another 3 million people displaced. Saudi Arabia’s bombing campaign and blockade have helped cause a cholera epidemic in Yemen that “has become the largest and fastest-spreading outbreak of the disease in modern history, with a million cases expected by the end of the year and at least 600,000 children likely to be affected,” as the Guardian reports. As Zeeshan Aleem writes for Vox, Saudi Arabia’s campaign has “contributed to a malnutrition crisis of colossal proportions: Close to 80 percent of Yemen’s population lacks reliable access to food, and the United Nations estimates that 7 million of the country’s population of 28 million people are facing famine.” None of this would be possible without U.S. support. As Alex Emmons writes for the Intercept: The U.S. has had the power to pull the plug on the intervention since the beginning. Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a 30-year veteran of the CIA, explained last year that “if the United States and the United Kingdom, tonight, told King Salman [of Saudi Arabia], ‘This war has to end,’ it would end tomorrow. The Royal Saudi Air Force cannot operate without American and British support.” In his final days in office, Obama halted some arms sales to Saudi Arabia (when everyone knew Trump could simply reauthorize them when taking office, which he did), but other than this, both the Obama and Trump administrations have strongly backed Saudi Arabia and its campaign in Yemen, with massive arms deals, intelligence sharing, and refueling Saudi planes as they continue to bomb Yemeni civilians. Even putting all moral questions aside — which we shouldn’t — it’s clear that what the United States is doing with Saudi Arabia is undermining its own national security. Policies such as arming and supporting the Saudi tyranny to kill thousands of innocent Muslims in Yemen have a tendency to drive recruitment for terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. Thankfully, there is growing congressional opposition toward U.S. support for Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s tyrannical government and despicable actions — and U.S. support for them — are immoral and destabilizing.

#### Without US support, the Saudi war effort would collapse – the US is the only one who can provide them quality arms

Paul writes Rand Paul, 10-10-2018, "Stop Military Aid to Saudi Arabia," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/stop-funding-saudi-arabia-until-jamal-khashoggi-returns/572692/> / MM

For years, I have decried our country’s involvement in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are a state sponsor of radical Islam, and their war on Yemen, a poor Arab country, has led to many thousands of civilian deaths. The Saudis have provided at least 2,500 fighters to the Islamic State in Syria, making them the second-largest source of foreign fighters for the group on a per capita basis, after Tunisia. News reports from 2013 stated that the Saudis offered more than 1,200 death-row inmates a pardon and a monthly stipend for their families to go fight the Syrian government. In 2009, U.S. officials said Saudi Arabia was the “most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide.” And in 2014, those same officials wrote that Qatar and Saudi Arabia were “providing clandestine financial and logistic support to [the Islamic State] and other radical Sunni groups.” So why is America selling arms to a country that has supported terror, has a poor human-rights record, and has waged a reckless war in Yemen? As they say, follow the money. But no amount of oil business or arms deals justifies our collusion with a regime that sponsors jihadism around the world. Furthermore, if America is not at war with Yemen—which, technically, we are not—why are we enabling Saudi Arabia to prosecute a war that has killed tens of thousands and left 8 million more “on the brink of famine,” according to The Washington Post? I’m not just talking about bombs being dropped on innocent civilians that bear the words “Made in the U.S.A.” Without American intelligence, logistics, training, and equipment, the Saudi war effort would have fallen apart long ago. I have spoken out loudly on this for some time, and I’ve also introduced legislation to halt U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. I have been deeply disappointed with those of my colleagues in Congress who don’t seem to care that Yemenis are being massacred by U.S.-backed-and-armed Saudis. But I’m giving them another chance. A chance to stand up to Saudi Arabia and say, “America will not tolerate these heinous acts.” This week, I intend to introduce another measure to cut all funding, training, advising, and any other coordination to and with the military of Saudi Arabia until the journalist Jamal Khashoggi is returned alive. This oppressive regime must be held accountable for its actions. The United States has no business supporting it, either directly or indirectly.

#### Every question in this debate should be secondary to the question of whether bombing innocent civilians is ethical or not – your ballot should send an ethical statement that this violence isn’t justified

Burke writes Anthony, Associate Professor of International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia, Katrina Lee-Koo is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the Australian National University, and Matt McDonald is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Queensland “Ethics and Global Security” pg 1-4 / MM

With its world wars, cold wars, proxy wars, colonial wars, guerrilla wars, civil wars, drug wars, and new wars, not to mention its genocides, nuclear weapons, economic crises, gender-based violence, refugees, famines and environmental disasters, the twentieth century was a century of chronic and endemic insecurity. What will the twenty-first century become? It certainly has not started out well. Its first decade alone saw aircraft smashing into New York’s World Trade Center, a new global war on terror, the near-death of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Indian Ocean and Japanese tsunamis, Cyclone Nargis, the war in Iraq, genocide in the Sudan, and three brutal wars in Palestine and Lebanon. The picture beyond that does not improve when we add global stalemate on climate change, mass slaughter in the Congo, Islamist terrorism in Pakistan and India, a craze for walls and “border protection”, and strategic anxiety about Iran, North Korea, the rise of China, and a future of drone, cyber and space war. All of these examples have been riven with moral anxiety and exemplified particular ethical choices: whether to use poison gas against enemy forces to protect one’s own; whether to bomb populated areas to shorten a war or degrade an enemy’s industrial capacity; whether to develop and deploy weapons that can destroy cities in a few seconds and kill millions; whether to use starvation as a weapon of war; whether to support Islamic extremists in a proxy war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, in the face of warnings about how they were likely to turn on their masters afterwards; and when that time came, whether to fight such extremists by systemic violations of the international laws of war and human rights. The debates over these issues reflect many things: their inherent moral complexity, competing ethics and norms, and a global interest in their rightness and long-term impact. None of these ethical questions and dilemmas are new, but the field of security studies has been slow to address them, and it has not established a tradition of ethical thought (Burke 2010; for new research see Floyd 2007; Hayden 2005; Robinson 2011; Roe 2012). This book attempts to address that gap, and to contribute to a dialogue about the possibilities for a genuinely global security orientation and practice in international politics. We survey a range of ethical perspectives and arguments relating to diverse problems on the global security agenda, so that we can begin to understand how ethical commitments shape security relationships and outcomes: how poor or compromised ethics can contribute to insecurity; and how good ethical arguments and decisions might be able to improve the situation. While examining elements of existing ethical perspectives (such as realism, liberalism and just war theory), we push on to argue for a specifically cosmopolitan ethics. A cosmopolitan ethics aims to ensure the security of all states and communities through time, by aiming for the elimination rather than just the management of grave insecurities. We regard such an ethics as not merely morally desirable, but as strategically necessary, and with this objective, we develop ethical guidelines for the decisions and policies of all security actors. We list these principles here in Box 1.1 below, and explain them in the section entitled ‘Key Principles of a Cosmopolitan Security Ethics’. BOX 1.1 Cosmopolitan security principles A cosmopolitan global security system recognizes that contemporary insecurities take a myriad of forms that cross national boundaries and cannot be addressed by states alone or by conventional geopolitical and military means. Contemporary insecurities are the result of long-range processes, which arise from historical practices of industry, economics, military activity, non-state action, and more. They have complex manifestations that persevere unpredictably through time. A cosmopolitan global security system holds that the security of all states and human beings is of equal weight, and that we have a fundamental responsibility to ensure that the global ecology is preserved. It is committed to ensuring that all states and communities can benefit and participate equally in the creation of a system that supports their needs without prejudice. Principle 1 – Global security responsibility The responsibility of all states and security actors is to create deep and enduring security for all human beings in a form that harmonises human social, economic, cultural and political activity with the integrity of global ecosystems. Principle 2 – Future security responsibility All states and security actors have a fundamental responsibility to future generations and the long-term integrity and survival of global ecosystems; a responsibility to consider the impact of their decisions, choices and commitments through time. Principle 3 – Global categorical imperative of security All states and security actors bear a responsibility to act as if both the principles and consequences of their action or policy will become global, across space and through time, and to ensure that their actions will have positive consequences that can be borne by the world as a whole. The Importance of Ethics If practices of global security politics raise ethical questions at the conceptual level, they have also precipitated broader debate and contestation in the “real world” of international security. The Burmese military’s refusal to allow foreign aid to enter the country after the 2008 cyclone, which killed 140,000, provoked global outrage, calls for foreign intervention, and active regional diplomacy (Evans 2008b; Kouchner 2008). After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which killed more than 280,000, the United Nations and ASEAN moved to create an early warning system and response capability in recognition of the failure to have such a system in place beforehand or to even put such threats on the region’s security agenda (Burke and McDonald 2007: 1). Some of the scientists who built the first atomic bombs questioned their use in warfare and opposed the later development of fusion weapons, while scores of former national security policymakers have supported calls for total nuclear disarmament (Bird 2005: 426; Burke 2009; Oppenheimer 1984: 113; Schweber 2000). The 2011 tsunami and nuclear accident at Fukushima led many Japanese (and four European countries) to question the role of nuclear power in their energy supply, and brought calls for stronger global regulation of the industry (Fackler 2012). The widespread bombing and targeting of civilians in war have provoked major innovations in International Humanitarian Law (IHL), including the classification of area bombing and rape as war crimes, and new treaties outlawing land mines and cluster weapons. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established to prosecute major international crimes including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression. Aggression has been defined in such a way (‘the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations’) that it would have put the US, Britain and Australia in the dock had it been in force at the time of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Amendments to the Rome Statute 2010). The moral anxiety and debate in such cases—just a few of many—suggests something important. Ethics matters. In this book, we contend that the nature of global insecurity in the last century, and the kinds of security that the world will be able to achieve in this century, depends significantly on ethics: on the ethics we bring to our analysis, policymaking and decisions; on the ethics that underpins our understanding of what security is and to whom it is owed; and on the ethics that shapes the realities we accept or deny. Whether people live or die, whether they suffer or prosper—which people live and prosper and where they are able to do so—are ethical questions. How these questions are answered in the real world will be the results of particular ethical frameworks, rules and decisions; the result of the ways in which ethical dilemmas are posed, and how they are addressed and resolved. Is it right to attack—or target—cities with nuclear weapons? Is it right to even possess them? Is it right to detain asylum seekers, push their boats out to sea, or return them to the places from which they fled? Is it right to target terrorists and insurgents with remote-controlled robotic aircraft and missiles, even if those killed include civilians and if their operators aim—and kill—without risk? Is it right to invade a foreign country to stop crimes against humanity, end a famine, build a state, or remove a regime, and if so, what are the right ways of going about it? Is it right to use torture, or suspend habeas corpus or the rule of law, to protect our security? What forms of reasoning, what criteria and ends, should govern such decisions?

#### There are no alternatives – pulling US military aid forces these countries to reconcile their abuses – they won’t turn to Russia or China

Guay writes Guay, Terrence. [Clinical Professor of International Business, Pennsylvania State University]. “Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in the Khashoggi affair.” The Conversation: Economy + Business. October 19, 2018. <https://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998>

While it’s true that Russia and China are [indeed major exporters](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/yb_18_summary_en_0.pdf) of armaments, the claim that U.S. weapons can easily be replaced by other suppliers is not – at least not in the short term. First, once a country is “locked in” to a specific kind of weapons system, such as planes, tanks or naval vessels, the cost to [switch](http://doi.org/10.1257/jep.8.4.65) to a different supplier can be huge. Military personnel must be retrained on new equipment, spare parts need to be replaced, and operational changes may be necessary. After being so reliant on U.S. weapons systems for decades, the [transition costs](http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a498941.pdf) to buy from another country could be prohibitive even for oil-rich Saudi Arabia. The second problem with Trump’s argument is that armaments from Russia, China or elsewhere are simply not as sophisticated as U.S. weapons, which is why they are usually cheaper – though the quality gap is quickly decreasing. To maintain its military superiority in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has opted to purchase virtually all of its weapons from American and European companies. That is why the U.S. has significant leverage in this aspect of the relationship. Any [Saudi threat](http://fortune.com/2018/10/14/saudis-threaten-retaliation-jamal-khashoggi/) to retaliate against a ban on U.S. arms sales by buying weapons from countries that have not raised concerns about the Khashoggi disappearance would not be credible. And is probably why, despite worries in the White House, such a threat has not yet been made.

#### **Conditions on aid don’t work – the US becomes dependent on the recipient country and fails to influence reform**

Sullivan writes (Patricia, Associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a 2015-2017 Andrew Carnegie Fellow. She teaches courses in foreign policy, international conflict, national security policy, and research design. “IS MILITARY AID AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY?” Scholars Strategy Network. May 2012. <https://scholars.org/sites/scholars/files/ssn_key_findings_sullivan_on_military_aid_and_foreign_policy_1.pdf>) / NE

The United States spends billions of dollars every year on military aid to foreign governments around the world, in the hope that aid will boost national security and increase American influence. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, military assistance has increased and gone to more countries. In the fight against terrorism, U.S. authorities have sent military aid to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Oman, Yemen, Uzbekistan, and Columbia, among other nations. Does giving military aid work? Sometimes, the benefits are clear. After America enormously increased aid to (the former Soviet republic of) Georgia, that country sent 2,000 soldiers to support the U.S. war effort in Iraq. But at other times, the United States gives aid without gaining new leverage. Pakistan, for example, is widely believed to have channeled a portion of billions in U.S. military aid dollars to extremist groups, and Pakistan’s military retains ties to the very same Haqqani network and Taliban militants who are killing U.S. soldiers fighting in Afghanistan. Can Military Aid Buy Cooperation? Scholars offer competing theories about the impact of military aid: • Arms for Influence. This theory predicts that a foreign government’s level of cooperation will grow as U.S. military aid increases. Accordingly, U.S. authorities should continue military aid to cooperative countries and reduce or eliminate aid when governments fail to support American foreign policy positions. • The Lonely Superpower theory posits that dependence on a powerful state can fuel defiance. Governments receiving significant amounts of military aid may temper their cooperation with the United States, or even openly defy our leaders, in an attempt to avoid being viewed as “American puppets” by domestic and international audiences. • The Reverse Leverage model suggests that, paradoxically, a powerful nation can become dependent on countries it aids. In this way of thinking, the amount of military aid granted to a foreign government reflects the extent to which the U.S. is reliant on that nation – for things like oil exports, intelligence, bases for troops, and military cooperation. In this perspective, it could be easier for a nation receiving assistance to obtain military aid elsewhere than for a superpower like the United States to find an equally valuable strategic partner. Rather than inducing compliance, generous U.S. military funding runs the risk of creating strong clients who are able to ignore U.S. interests and play us off against other powers. What the Evidence Shows The world is much more complicated than any one model can capture. Each nation receiving major military aid has a unique relationship with the United States that changes over time. Nevertheless, a thorough investigation of the connections between U.S. military aid and the level of foreign policy cooperation exhibited by the governments that received aid between 1990 and 2004 reveals a pattern largely consistent with the Reverse Leverage model. • In general, U.S. military aid proved to be negatively correlated with cooperation by the nations receiving the aid. In fact, national governments that received aid exhibited less cooperative behavior toward the United States than governments given no military aid. • Some countries that received U.S. military aid became more cooperative with increased levels of assistance. But aid was less likely to induce cooperation from formal U.S. allies. • In practice, the United States did not punish defiance with reductions in aid; nor did it reward greater cooperation with increases in military aid. The opposite pattern prevailed, because higher levels of cooperation from nations we assisted were correlated with decreased military aid in subsequent years, while reductions in cooperative behavior were often followed by increased aid. Can Military Aid Advance American Foreign Policy Goals? Given these patterns, U.S. policymakers face a difficult dilemma. Providing military assistance may be the only way to gain influence in key countries – such as Pakistan – located in strategically crucial parts of the world. Even if aid does not have a positive effect on the level of cooperation with the United States overall, the U.S. may still get specific benefits. Policymakers, however, still have to cope with the limited utility of military aid for inspiring cooperation with overall foreign-policy goals. Providing military assistance may at times allow the United States to avoid the costs of direct military interventions, but leaders should take care not to hurt longterm American security interests. U.S. leaders must: • Have realistic expectations. Realize that military aid might achieve short-term security goals, but will not usually induce general cooperation. • Acknowledge constraints on flexibility. Military aid is not a very effective carrot or stick, because it cannot easily be turned on and off. Immediate U.S. security needs may impel aid, but don’t imagine that flows of aid can be calibrated over time to change a foreign government’s policy preferences. • Be cognizant of the risks. Providing military aid to foreign governments can backfire. Arms transfers to developing countries have been linked to increases in human rights abuses and may impede democratization. Military assistance can enable client states to aggress against their neighbors – which may hurt American interests in the region. Finally, when alliances shift or governments are replaced, America can find itself in combat against an enemy equipped with U.S-made weapons sent at an earlier time. That is what happened in Afghanistan. We gave arms to Afghans and Arabs to fight the Soviets in the 1980s, only to see many of the same fighters turn against us in 9/11 and afterwards.

## 1AC Lay Plan Aff

### Framing

#### I affirm and value morality because the word ought in the resolution implies a moral obligation

#### Only a non-ideal model of ethical evaluations is productive – debate should deal with discussions of material oppression

Curry writes Dr. Tommy J, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Affiliated Professor of Africana Studies, and a Ray A. Rothrock Fellow at Texas A&M University; first Black JV National Debate champion (for UMKC) and was half of the first all Black CEDA team to win the Pi Kappa Delta National Debate Tournament. “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century.” 2014.

Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics)**;** [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set] against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics.’ How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

#### Thus, the value criterion is minimizing oppression

#### Your ballot should prioritize preventing systemic violence – the impacts are slow, painful, and accumulate over time

Nixon writes Rachel Carson Professor of English and an affiliate of the Nelson Institute Center for Culture, History and Environment (Rob, “Book excerpt: Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor,” In Common, Fall/Winter 13, <http://nelson.wisc.edu/news/in-common/fall-winter2013/story.php?s=1439&page=1>) / MM

When Lawrence Summers, then president of the World Bank, advocated that the bank develop a scheme to export rich nation garbage, toxic waste, and heavily polluting industries to Africa, he did so in the calm voice of global managerial reasoning. Such a scheme, Summers elaborated, would help correct an inefficient global imbalance in toxicity. Underlying his plan is an overlooked but crucial subsidiary benefit that he outlined: offloading rich-nation toxins onto the world’s poorest continent would help ease the growing pressure from rich-nation environmentalists who were campaigning against garbage dumps and industrial effluent that they condemned as health threats and found aesthetically offensive.¶ Summers thus rationalized his poison-redistribution ethic as offering a double gain: it would benefit the United States and Europe economically, while helping appease the rising discontent of rich-nation environmentalists. Summers’ arguments assumed a direct link between aesthetically unsightly waste and Africa as an out-of-sight continent, a place remote from green activists’ terrain of concern. In Summers’ win-win scenario for the global North, the African recipients of his plan were triply discounted: discounted as political agents, discounted as long-term casualties of what I call in this book “slow violence,” and discounted as cultures possessing environmental practices and concerns of their own. I begin with Summers’ extraordinary proposal because it captures the strategic and representational challenges posed by slow violence as it impacts the environments and the environmentalism of the poor.¶ Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink politically, imaginatively, and theoretically what I call “slow violence.” By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all.¶ Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings—the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war’s toxic aftermaths or introduction climate change—are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory.¶ Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions — from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts insituations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded. Politically and emotionally, different kinds of disaster possess unequal heft. Falling bodies, burning towers, exploding heads, avalanches, volcanoes, and tsunamis have a visceral, eye-catching and page-turning power that tales of slow violence, unfolding over years, decades, even centuries, cannot match. Stories of toxic buildup, massing greenhouse gases, and accelerated species loss due to ravaged habitats are all cataclysmic, but they are scientifically convoluted cataclysms in which casualties are postponed, often for generations.¶ In an age when the media venerate the spectacular, when public policy is shaped primarily around perceived immediate need, a central question is strategic and representational: how can we convert into image and narrative the disasters that are slow moving and long in the making, disasters that are anonymous and that star nobody, disasters that are attritional and of indifferent interest to the sensation-driven technologies of our image-world? How can we turn the long emergencies of slow violence into stories dramatic enough to rouse public sentiment and warrant political intervention, these emergencies whose repercussions have given rise to some of the most critical challenges of our time?¶ Slow Violence¶ In this book, I have sought to address our inattention to calamities that are slow and long lasting, calamities that patiently dispense their devastation while remaining outside our flickering attention spans and outside the purview of a spectacle-driven corporate media. The insidious workings of slow violence derive largely from the unequal attention given to spectacular and unspectacular time. In an age that venerates instant spectacle, slow violence is deficient in the recognizable special effects that fill movie theaters and boost ratings on TV. Chemical and radiological violence, for example, is driven inward, somatized into cellular dramas of mutationthat particularly in the bodies of the poor remain largely unobserved, undiagnosed, and untreated. From a narrative perspective, such invisible, mutagenic theater is slow paced and open ended, eluding the tidy closure, the containment, imposed by the visual orthodoxies of victory and defeat.¶ Let me ground this point by referring, in conjunction, to Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. In 1962 Silent Spring jolted a broad international public into an awareness of the protracted, cryptic, and indiscriminate casualties inflicted by dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT). Yet, just one year earlier, Fanon, in the opening pages of Wretched of the Earth, had comfortably invoked DDT as an affirmative metaphor for anticolonial violence: he called for a DDT-filled spray gun to be wielded as a weapon against the “parasites” spread by the colonials’ Christian church.¶ Fanon’s drama of decolonization is, of course, studded with the overt weaponry whereby subjugation is maintained (“by dint of a great array of bayonets and cannons”) or overthrown (“by the searing bullets and bloodstained knives”) after “a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists.” Yet his temporal vision of violence and of what Aimé Césaire called “the rendezvous of victory” was uncomplicated by the concerns that an as-yet inchoate environmental justice movement (catalyzed in part by Silent Spring) would raise about lopsided risks that permeate the land long term, blurring the clean lines between defeat and victory, between colonial dispossession and official national self-determination. We can certainly read Fanon, in his concern with land as property and as fount of native dignity, retrospectively with an environmental eye. But our theories of violence today must be informed by a science unavailable to Fanon, a science that addresses environmentally embedded violence that is often difficult to source, oppose, and once set in motion, to reverse.¶ Attritional catastrophes that overspill clear boundaries in time and space are marked above all by displacements temporal, geographical, rhetorical, and technological displacements that simplify violence and underestimate, in advance and in retrospect, the human and environmental costs. Such displacements smooth the way for amnesia, as places are rendered irretrievable to those who once inhabited them, places that ordinarily pass unmourned in the corporate media. Places like the Marshall Islands, subjected between 1948 and 1958 to sixty-seven American atmospheric nuclear “tests,” the largest of them equal in force to 1,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs. In 1956 the Atomic Energy Commission declared the Marshall Islands “by far the most contaminated place in the world,” a condition that would compromise independence in the long term, despite the islands’ formal ascent in 1979 into the ranks of self-governing nations. The island republic was still in part governed by an irradiated past: well into the 1980s its history of nuclear colonialism, long forgotten by the colonizers, was still delivering into the world “jellyfish babies” headless, eyeless, limbless human infants who would live for just a few hours.¶ If, as Said notes, struggles over geography are never reducible to armed struggle but have a profound symbolic and narrative component as well, and if, as Michael Watts insists, we must attend to the “violent geographies of fast capitalism,” we need to supplement both these injunctions with a deeper understanding of the slow violence of delayed effects that structures so many of our most consequential forgettings. Violence, above all environmental violence, needs to be seen and deeply considered as a contest not only over space, or bodies, or labor, or resources, but also over time. We need to bear in mind Faulkner’s dictum that “the past is never dead. It’s not even past.” His words resonate with particular force across landscapes permeated by slow violence, landscapes of temporal overspill that elude rhetorical cleanup operations with their sanitary beginnings and endings.¶ Kwame Anthony Appiah famously asked, “Is the ‘Post-’ in ‘Postcolonial’ the ‘Post-’ in ‘Postmodern’?” As environmentalists we might ask similarly searching questions of the “post” in postindustrial, post–Cold War, and postconflict. For if the past of slow violence is never past, so too the post is never fully post: industrial particulates and effluents live on in the environmental elements we inhabit and in our very bodies,which epidemiologically and ecologically are never our simple contemporaries. Something similar applies to so-called postconflict societies whose leaders may annually commemorate, as marked on the calendar, the official cessation of hostilities, while ongoing intergenerational slow violence (inflicted by, say, unexploded landmines or carcinogens from an arms dump) may continue hostilities by other means.¶ Ours is an age of onrushing turbo-capitalism, wherein the present feels more abbreviated than it used to at least for the world’s privileged classes who live surrounded by technological time-savers that often compound the sensation of not having enough time. Consequently, one of the most pressing challenges of our age is how to adjust our rapidly eroding attention spans to the slow erosions of environmental justice. If, under neoliberalism, the gulf between enclaved rich and outcast poor has become ever more pronounced, ours is also an era of enclaved time wherein for many speed has become a self-justifying, propulsive ethic that renders “uneventful” violence (to those who live remote from its attritional lethality) a weak claimant on our time. The attosecond pace of our age, with its restless technologies of infinite promise and infinite disappointment, prompts us to keepflicking and clicking distractedly in an insatiable and often insensate quest for quicker sensation.¶ The oxymoronic notion of slow violence poses a number of challenges: scientific, legal, political, and representational. In the long arc between the emergence of slow violence and its delayed effects, both the causes and the memory of catastrophe readily fade from view as the casualties incurred typically pass untallied and unremembered. Such discounting in turn makes it far more difficult to secure effective legal measures for prevention, restitution, and redress.¶ Casualties from slow violence are, moreover, out of sync not only with our narrative and media expectations but also with the swift seasons of electoral change. Politicians routinely adopt a “last in, first out” stance toward environmental issues, admitting them when times are flush, dumping them as soon as times get tight. Because preventative or remedial environmental legislation typically targets slow violence, it cannot deliver dependable electoral cycle results, even though those results may ultimately be life saving. Relative to bankable pocketbook actions there’ll be a tax rebate check in the mail next August environmental payouts seem to lurk on a distant horizon. Many politicians and indeed many voters routinely treat environmental action as critical yet not urgent. And so generation after generation of two- or four-year cycle politicians add to the pileup of deferrable actions deferred. With rare exceptions, in the domain of slow violence “yes, but not now, not yet” becomes the [normal approach.]

#### Other frameworks inherently ignore material violence – debates HAVE to be about what is happening in the status quo

Kidner writes professor of psychology at Nottingham Trent University and internationally renowned scholar on nature-culture relationships.(nature and psyche p. 65-7) / MM

In addition, the deconstructive bent of discursive approaches limits their capacity to challenge the structure of modern industrialism. Just as science has been reluctant to recognize the holistic qualities of nature, so we have been slow to appreciate that the power of industrialism and its resultant near-hegemony in the modern world is largely the result of its ability to integrate science, politics, and everyday social life within a structure that appears complete and self-sufficient. This structure cannot be challenged without reference to alternative structures. To celebrate choice and free play without also celebrating the frames of meaning within which they take place is simply to guarantee our assimilation to and absorption within industrialism, and so represents a philosophy of surrender. For example, “freedom” has little meaning in the absence of a framework of democratic laws which protect the vulnerable against the “freedom” of the powerful to exploit, intimidate, and mislead. Similarly, my freedom to explore an area of wilderness is negated if energy companies and off-road vehicle clubs also have the freedom to use the area as they see fit. Freedom is all to often interpreted as the absence of structure; and structure gives meaning and implies responsibilities and limitations. One of the most insidious aspects of the colonization of the world is industrialism's silent but lethal elimination of structures that could challenge it. The widespread lack of appreciation within academia of the way in which postmodern approaches involving deconstruction promote this insidious *conceptual* assimilation to industrialism is an index of the urgent need to develop a psychocultural dimension to our environmental understanding. Finally, we should not ignore the possibility that an emphasis on language serves particular defensive functions for the social scientist. Noam Chomsky has noted that it”it's too hard to deal with real problems,” some academics tend to “go off on wild goose chases that don't matter . . . [or] get involved in academic cults that are very divorced from any reality and that provide a defense against dealing with the world as it actually is.”71 An emphasis on language can serve this sort of defensive function; for the study of discourse enables one to stand aside from issues and avoid any commitment to a cause or idea, simply presenting all sides of a debate and pointing out the discursive strategies involved. As the physical world appears to fade into mere discourse, so it comes to seem less real than the language used to describe it; and environmental issues lose the dimensions of urgency and tragedy and become instead the proving grounds for ideas and attitudes. Rather than walking in what Aldo Leopold described as a “world of wounds,” the discursive theorist can study this world dispassionately, safely insulated from the emotional and ecological havoc that is taking place elsewhere. Like experimentalism, this is a schizoid stance that exemplifies rather than challenges the characteristic social pathology of out time; and it is one that supports Melanie Klein's thesis that the internal object world can serve as a psychotic substitute for an external “real” world that is either absent or unsatisfying.72 Ian Craib's description of social construction as a “social psychosis”73 therefore seems entirely apt. But what object relations theorists such as Klein fail to point out is the other side of this dialectic: that withdrawing from the external world and substituting an internal world of words or fantasies, because of the actions that follow from this state of affairs, makes the former even less satisfying and more psychologically distant, so contributing to the vicious spiral that severs the “human from the “natural” and abandons nature to industrialism.

### Thus, the advocacy:

#### The United States ought not provide military aid to Saudi Arabia

### My sole contention is that military aid has justified Saudi Arabia’s unethical intervention in Yemen

#### Military aid is fueled under a guise of “national security” - that encourages endless intervention by Saudi Arabia in Yemen and unethical violence

Khanna writes Ro Khanna, 10-20-2018, "Congress must end U.S. military aid to Saudi war in Yemen," [https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/Congress-must-end-U-S-military-aid-to-Saudi-war-13319536.php /](https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/Congress-must-end-U-S-military-aid-to-Saudi-war-13319536.php%20/) MM

Every ghastly new detail we learn about the disappearance of journalist Jamal Khashoggi suggests that this was a premeditated murder, carried out at the direction of the highest level of the Saudi dictatorship. The cascading revelations rival the gore of horror films, from the 15 Saudis who flew into Turkey, lying in wait for Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, to the bone-saw-equipped forensics specialist who reportedly dismembered Khashoggi’s body wearing headphones and recommending that others listen to music as well. Just weeks before, Khashoggi had publicly pleaded with the de facto ruler of the Saudi regime, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to curb his propensity for violence. Khashoggi’s September column for the Washington Post was headlined “Saudi Arabia’s crown prince must restore dignity to his country — by ending Yemen’s cruel war.” “Cruel” is, if anything, an understatement. Since 2015, the Saudis have launched an estimated 18,000 air strikes on Yemen, attacking hospitals, schools, water treatment plants, funerals, markets and even farms. The Saudis also imposed a blockade on food, fuel and medicine from freely entering the country in what can only be described as a deliberate effort to starve the civilian population into submission. Buried by the news of Khashoggi’s slaying was a grim new warning by Lise Grande, the U.N.’s humanitarian coordinator for Yemen: The nation could experience the world’s worst famine in 100 years, with 12 million to 13 million innocent civilians at risk of dying from the lack of food within months. Related Stories US & WorldKey battle in Yemen’s war risks tipping country into famine OpinionEditorial: Is Trump selling out to the Saudis? As early as 2015, Foreign Policy magazine reported the Saudi coalition’s “daily bombing campaign would not be possible without the constant presence of U.S. Air Force tanker planes refueling coalition jets.” Yet there was never a debate or vote by the people’s elected congressional representatives, as required by the Constitution, as to whether the U.S. military should participate in the Saudi government’s genocidal war. As the architect of this hideous military strategy, Mohammed bin Salman reacted to Khashoggi’s criticisms the way he knew best. MbS, as he’s known, probably ordered the assassination of Khashoggi and then — just as the Saudi regime did after bombing a school bus filled with Yemeni children last month — issued ever-shifting and contradictory lies, relying on the Trump administration’s full backing and clumsy assistance in the cover-up. Unlimited Digital Access for 99¢ Read more articles like this by subscribing to the San Francisco Chronicle SUBSCRIBE MbS’ campaign of killing Yemenis and Saudis alike must come to an end. Congressional Progressive Caucus co-chair Mark Pocan, D-Wis., and I are leading dozens of our colleagues, including top House Democrats, in demanding answers from the Trump administration about its possible complicity in Khashoggi’s killing. We also are working to force a vote in Congress to decisively shut down unconstitutional U.S. participation in the Saudi regime’s gruesome war in Yemen within weeks. Partnering with Sen. Bernie Sanders, independent-Vermont, we aim to secure majorities in both chambers of Congress as soon as we return to Washington to direct the president to remove U.S. forces from unauthorized hostilities in Yemen. We are invoking the War Powers Resolution with the aim of passing House Congressional Resolution 138 and Senate Joint Resolution 54. These resolutions have priority over other foreign policy considerations in the chambers, and the votes on them cannot be blocked by Republican leadership. Never before has such a feat been attempted in both houses of Congress at once — but the War Power Resolution allows members of Congress to force votes to end illegal U.S. military participation in this war. When we succeed, the Saudi campaign will inevitably collapse. If our moral compass is to guide our country after the butchering of Jamal Khashoggi, the incineration of thousands of Yemenis in U.S.-Saudi air strikes, and the quiet deaths of more than 100,000 Yemeni children who succumbed to war-triggered hunger and disease over the past two years, Congress must pass these resolutions. America’s founders deliberately broke with the unchecked power enjoyed by Europe’s monarchs by vesting Congress with the sole authority over the question of war and peace. By forcing long-overdue sunlight and public participation into the now-secret realm of war, these resolutions will help restore our republic and end America’s complicity in such incomprehensibly immense human suffering. Today’s leaders owe it to all those who have sacrificed for a fairer world to bring an end to the worst humanitarian crisis on Earth.

#### US-Saudi intervention has resulted in human rights violations and regional destabilization – prevention now is KEY

Morris writes Brett Morris 12-1-2017, "How the United States Is Helping Saudi Arabia Destabilize the Middle East," [https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3 /](https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3%20/) MM

At around two in the morning on August 25, 2017, a five-year-old girl named Buthaina lost her entire family. Saudi Arabia had dropped a bomb on her home and several others in Sana’a, the capital of Yemen, as part of its ongoing campaign against Houthi rebels. The attack killed 16 people, including Buthaina’s parents and four siblings, and injured 17 others. Now under the care of her aunt and uncle, Buthaina herself was one of the injured. Images of Buthaina trying to open her bruised eyes went viral after the attack. Where does Saudi Arabia get the bombs it uses to kill all these people? For the most part, they come from the United States, with the United Kingdom and France also supplying substantial amounts. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, from 1950 to 2016, the United States provided Saudi Arabia with more than $34 billion worth of arms, while the United Kingdom provided more than $10 billion, and France provided more than $7 billion. The United States is the world’s leading arms exporter, and Saudi Arabia is its top client. The bomb that injured Buthaina and killed her family originated in the United States, as an Amnesty International investigation found. Buthaina and her family are just a few of the victims of the long-standing U.S.-Saudi alliance—an alliance that has allowed Saudi Arabia to remain one of the worst human rights abusers in the world, export its odious Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, and inspire jihadist movements throughout the world, at the cost of thousands of lives. Oil, Money, and the “Threat” of Iran. The basis for the U.S.-Saudi alliance is the fact that Saudi Arabia sits on top of a lot of oil, as well as its opposition to actors and movements in the region that run counter to U.S. hegemonic ambitions. Nowadays, the United States gets most of its oil through domestic production or from Canada. (The United States is now the world’s leading oil producer, with Saudi Arabia a close second.) Just 11 percent of the oil that the United States imports comes from Saudi Arabia. Despite this, the United States — under both Republican and Democratic administrations — has backed Saudi Arabia and will likely continue to do so in the future. Although the United States is currently enjoying its own oil boom, it’s likely to be short-lived. Domestic oil production will probably begin to decline around 2020, as the United States has proven reserves of just 10 billion barrels. The Saudis and their OPEC partners, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, have proven reserves of 460 billion barrels. In 1945, the State Department identified Saudi Arabia’s oil resources as “a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.” That hasn’t changed — and there’s no reason Washington won’t want Saudi Arabia to remain firmly inside its camp. In addition, if all those massive arms deals between Washington and Riyadh were suddenly to stop, defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and General Dynamics would stand to lose lots of money. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s extremist variant of Islam has been very useful for the United States. Despite the rhetoric about a “clash of civilizations” supposedly happening between the West and Islam, the United States has, for the most part, traditionally sided with extremist sects of Islam against their more secular enemies for the simple reason that those secular enemies would rather remain independent of U.S. domination. The U.S.-Saudi relationship began in the 1930s but strengthened after Gamal Abdel Nasser became president of Egypt in 1956. Nasser, a neutralist and secularist during the Cold War, nationalized many of Egypt’s industries and instituted social welfare measures. For these crimes, he was considered “an extremely dangerous fanatic” with a “Hitler-ite personality” by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Since Nasser had widespread prestige throughout the Arab world for his anti-imperialism and independence, the United States needed a counterweight in the region. “The people are on Nasser’s side,” as Eisenhower complained. That counterweight was Saudi Arabia, an absolute monarchy and the only country in the world named after a ruling family (the Al Saud family). The U.S.-Saudi relationship took on new urgency in 1979, when Iran overthrew its U.S.-installed dictator. The United States and United Kingdom had overthrown Iran’s democratically elected government in 1953, because its secular leader, Mohammed Mossadegh, had nationalized Iran’s oil industry. With the loss of its ally in Iran, U.S. support for Saudi Arabia would now be based not only on the kingdom’s opposition to secular nationalist movements and governments, but also against the Shia theocracy in Iran. U.S. opposition to Iran has nothing to do with Iran’s human rights record or its authoritarian government. If it were, the United States would not be supporting Saudi Arabia, which has a much worse human rights record and a more authoritarian government. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran has actual elections, women have some kind of rights, and there is a liberal opposition. Nor is U.S. opposition to Iran based on Iran’s support for “extremist” groups abroad — because, again, Saudi Arabia supports and inspires much worse extremist groups abroad. Watch this dumbfounded State Department official trying to explain the contradiction between U.S. support for Saudi Arabia while opposing Iran: The truth is, Iran just isn’t a threat to the United States. Its military budget is $13 billion, equivalent to about 2 percent of the U.S. military budget of $611 billion, the highest in the world. (Saudi Arabia’s military budget is $64 billion, the fourth highest in the world.) Iran does not have nuclear weapons, nor does it have a nuclear weapons program. As the Defense Department has pointed out, “Iran’s military doctrine is primarily defensive.” Why, then, does the United States take such an antagonistic attitude toward Iran? The answer is simple: Iran refuses to subordinate itself to U.S. hegemony. Anybody who doesn’t follow orders is an enemy.

#### Reject US support – it allows for state-sanctioned violence on innocent populations

Morris writes Brett Morris 12-1-2017, "How the United States Is Helping Saudi Arabia Destabilize the Middle East," [https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3 /](https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3%20/) MM

Today, Saudi Arabia is creating a humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen, with U.S. support. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has been bombing Yemen to defeat the Houthis, a group that Saudi Arabia accuses of being proxies for Iran — an exaggerated claim. In addition to bombing civilian targets such as homes, schools, hospitals, mosques, and markets, Saudi Arabia has instituted a blockade on Yemen, “making an already catastrophic situation far worse,” according to the World Health Organization, the World Food Programme, and UNICEF. At least 10,000 people have died in the conflict, with another 3 million people displaced. Saudi Arabia’s bombing campaign and blockade have helped cause a cholera epidemic in Yemen that “has become the largest and fastest-spreading outbreak of the disease in modern history, with a million cases expected by the end of the year and at least 600,000 children likely to be affected,” as the Guardian reports. As Zeeshan Aleem writes for Vox, Saudi Arabia’s campaign has “contributed to a malnutrition crisis of colossal proportions: Close to 80 percent of Yemen’s population lacks reliable access to food, and the United Nations estimates that 7 million of the country’s population of 28 million people are facing famine.” None of this would be possible without U.S. support. As Alex Emmons writes for the Intercept: The U.S. has had the power to pull the plug on the intervention since the beginning. Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a 30-year veteran of the CIA, explained last year that “if the United States and the United Kingdom, tonight, told King Salman [of Saudi Arabia], ‘This war has to end,’ it would end tomorrow. The Royal Saudi Air Force cannot operate without American and British support.” In his final days in office, Obama halted some arms sales to Saudi Arabia (when everyone knew Trump could simply reauthorize them when taking office, which he did), but other than this, both the Obama and Trump administrations have strongly backed Saudi Arabia and its campaign in Yemen, with massive arms deals, intelligence sharing, and refueling Saudi planes as they continue to bomb Yemeni civilians. Even putting all moral questions aside — which we shouldn’t — it’s clear that what the United States is doing with Saudi Arabia is undermining its own national security. Policies such as arming and supporting the Saudi tyranny to kill thousands of innocent Muslims in Yemen have a tendency to drive recruitment for terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. Thankfully, there is growing congressional opposition toward U.S. support for Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s tyrannical government and despicable actions — and U.S. support for them — are immoral and destabilizing.

#### Without US support, the Saudi war effort would collapse – the US is the only one who can provide them quality arms

Paul writes Rand Paul, 10-10-2018, "Stop Military Aid to Saudi Arabia," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/stop-funding-saudi-arabia-until-jamal-khashoggi-returns/572692/> / MM

For years, I have decried our country’s involvement in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are a state sponsor of radical Islam, and their war on Yemen, a poor Arab country, has led to many thousands of civilian deaths. The Saudis have provided at least 2,500 fighters to the Islamic State in Syria, making them the second-largest source of foreign fighters for the group on a per capita basis, after Tunisia. News reports from 2013 stated that the Saudis offered more than 1,200 death-row inmates a pardon and a monthly stipend for their families to go fight the Syrian government. In 2009, U.S. officials said Saudi Arabia was the “most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide.” And in 2014, those same officials wrote that Qatar and Saudi Arabia were “providing clandestine financial and logistic support to [the Islamic State] and other radical Sunni groups.” So why is America selling arms to a country that has supported terror, has a poor human-rights record, and has waged a reckless war in Yemen? As they say, follow the money. But no amount of oil business or arms deals justifies our collusion with a regime that sponsors jihadism around the world. Furthermore, if America is not at war with Yemen—which, technically, we are not—why are we enabling Saudi Arabia to prosecute a war that has killed tens of thousands and left 8 million more “on the brink of famine,” according to The Washington Post? I’m not just talking about bombs being dropped on innocent civilians that bear the words “Made in the U.S.A.” Without American intelligence, logistics, training, and equipment, the Saudi war effort would have fallen apart long ago. I have spoken out loudly on this for some time, and I’ve also introduced legislation to halt U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. I have been deeply disappointed with those of my colleagues in Congress who don’t seem to care that Yemenis are being massacred by U.S.-backed-and-armed Saudis. But I’m giving them another chance. A chance to stand up to Saudi Arabia and say, “America will not tolerate these heinous acts.” This week, I intend to introduce another measure to cut all funding, training, advising, and any other coordination to and with the military of Saudi Arabia until the journalist Jamal Khashoggi is returned alive. This oppressive regime must be held accountable for its actions. The United States has no business supporting it, either directly or indirectly.

#### Every question in this debate should be secondary to the question of whether bombing innocent civilians is ethical or not – your ballot should send an ethical statement that this violence isn’t justified

Burke writes Anthony, Associate Professor of International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia, Katrina Lee-Koo is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the Australian National University, and Matt McDonald is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Queensland “Ethics and Global Security” pg 1-4 / MM

With its world wars, cold wars, proxy wars, colonial wars, guerrilla wars, civil wars, drug wars, and new wars, not to mention its genocides, nuclear weapons, economic crises, gender-based violence, refugees, famines and environmental disasters, the twentieth century was a century of chronic and endemic insecurity. What will the twenty-first century become? It certainly has not started out well. Its first decade alone saw aircraft smashing into New York’s World Trade Center, a new global war on terror, the near-death of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Indian Ocean and Japanese tsunamis, Cyclone Nargis, the war in Iraq, genocide in the Sudan, and three brutal wars in Palestine and Lebanon. The picture beyond that does not improve when we add global stalemate on climate change, mass slaughter in the Congo, Islamist terrorism in Pakistan and India, a craze for walls and “border protection”, and strategic anxiety about Iran, North Korea, the rise of China, and a future of drone, cyber and space war. All of these examples have been riven with moral anxiety and exemplified particular ethical choices: whether to use poison gas against enemy forces to protect one’s own; whether to bomb populated areas to shorten a war or degrade an enemy’s industrial capacity; whether to develop and deploy weapons that can destroy cities in a few seconds and kill millions; whether to use starvation as a weapon of war; whether to support Islamic extremists in a proxy war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, in the face of warnings about how they were likely to turn on their masters afterwards; and when that time came, whether to fight such extremists by systemic violations of the international laws of war and human rights. The debates over these issues reflect many things: their inherent moral complexity, competing ethics and norms, and a global interest in their rightness and long-term impact. None of these ethical questions and dilemmas are new, but the field of security studies has been slow to address them, and it has not established a tradition of ethical thought (Burke 2010; for new research see Floyd 2007; Hayden 2005; Robinson 2011; Roe 2012). This book attempts to address that gap, and to contribute to a dialogue about the possibilities for a genuinely global security orientation and practice in international politics. We survey a range of ethical perspectives and arguments relating to diverse problems on the global security agenda, so that we can begin to understand how ethical commitments shape security relationships and outcomes: how poor or compromised ethics can contribute to insecurity; and how good ethical arguments and decisions might be able to improve the situation. While examining elements of existing ethical perspectives (such as realism, liberalism and just war theory), we push on to argue for a specifically cosmopolitan ethics. A cosmopolitan ethics aims to ensure the security of all states and communities through time, by aiming for the elimination rather than just the management of grave insecurities. We regard such an ethics as not merely morally desirable, but as strategically necessary, and with this objective, we develop ethical guidelines for the decisions and policies of all security actors. We list these principles here in Box 1.1 below, and explain them in the section entitled ‘Key Principles of a Cosmopolitan Security Ethics’. BOX 1.1 Cosmopolitan security principles A cosmopolitan global security system recognizes that contemporary insecurities take a myriad of forms that cross national boundaries and cannot be addressed by states alone or by conventional geopolitical and military means. Contemporary insecurities are the result of long-range processes, which arise from historical practices of industry, economics, military activity, non-state action, and more. They have complex manifestations that persevere unpredictably through time. A cosmopolitan global security system holds that the security of all states and human beings is of equal weight, and that we have a fundamental responsibility to ensure that the global ecology is preserved. It is committed to ensuring that all states and communities can benefit and participate equally in the creation of a system that supports their needs without prejudice. Principle 1 – Global security responsibility The responsibility of all states and security actors is to create deep and enduring security for all human beings in a form that harmonises human social, economic, cultural and political activity with the integrity of global ecosystems. Principle 2 – Future security responsibility All states and security actors have a fundamental responsibility to future generations and the long-term integrity and survival of global ecosystems; a responsibility to consider the impact of their decisions, choices and commitments through time. Principle 3 – Global categorical imperative of security All states and security actors bear a responsibility to act as if both the principles and consequences of their action or policy will become global, across space and through time, and to ensure that their actions will have positive consequences that can be borne by the world as a whole. The Importance of Ethics If practices of global security politics raise ethical questions at the conceptual level, they have also precipitated broader debate and contestation in the “real world” of international security. The Burmese military’s refusal to allow foreign aid to enter the country after the 2008 cyclone, which killed 140,000, provoked global outrage, calls for foreign intervention, and active regional diplomacy (Evans 2008b; Kouchner 2008). After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which killed more than 280,000, the United Nations and ASEAN moved to create an early warning system and response capability in recognition of the failure to have such a system in place beforehand or to even put such threats on the region’s security agenda (Burke and McDonald 2007: 1). Some of the scientists who built the first atomic bombs questioned their use in warfare and opposed the later development of fusion weapons, while scores of former national security policymakers have supported calls for total nuclear disarmament (Bird 2005: 426; Burke 2009; Oppenheimer 1984: 113; Schweber 2000). The 2011 tsunami and nuclear accident at Fukushima led many Japanese (and four European countries) to question the role of nuclear power in their energy supply, and brought calls for stronger global regulation of the industry (Fackler 2012). The widespread bombing and targeting of civilians in war have provoked major innovations in International Humanitarian Law (IHL), including the classification of area bombing and rape as war crimes, and new treaties outlawing land mines and cluster weapons. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established to prosecute major international crimes including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression. Aggression has been defined in such a way (‘the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations’) that it would have put the US, Britain and Australia in the dock had it been in force at the time of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Amendments to the Rome Statute 2010). The moral anxiety and debate in such cases—just a few of many—suggests something important. Ethics matters. In this book, we contend that the nature of global insecurity in the last century, and the kinds of security that the world will be able to achieve in this century, depends significantly on ethics: on the ethics we bring to our analysis, policymaking and decisions; on the ethics that underpins our understanding of what security is and to whom it is owed; and on the ethics that shapes the realities we accept or deny. Whether people live or die, whether they suffer or prosper—which people live and prosper and where they are able to do so—are ethical questions. How these questions are answered in the real world will be the results of particular ethical frameworks, rules and decisions; the result of the ways in which ethical dilemmas are posed, and how they are addressed and resolved. Is it right to attack—or target—cities with nuclear weapons? Is it right to even possess them? Is it right to detain asylum seekers, push their boats out to sea, or return them to the places from which they fled? Is it right to target terrorists and insurgents with remote-controlled robotic aircraft and missiles, even if those killed include civilians and if their operators aim—and kill—without risk? Is it right to invade a foreign country to stop crimes against humanity, end a famine, build a state, or remove a regime, and if so, what are the right ways of going about it? Is it right to use torture, or suspend habeas corpus or the rule of law, to protect our security? What forms of reasoning, what criteria and ends, should govern such decisions?

#### There are no alternatives – pulling US military aid forces these countries to reconcile their abuses – they won’t turn to Russia or China

Guay writes Guay, Terrence. [Clinical Professor of International Business, Pennsylvania State University]. “Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in the Khashoggi affair.” The Conversation: Economy + Business. October 19, 2018. <https://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998>

While it’s true that Russia and China are [indeed major exporters](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/yb_18_summary_en_0.pdf) of armaments, the claim that U.S. weapons can easily be replaced by other suppliers is not – at least not in the short term. First, once a country is “locked in” to a specific kind of weapons system, such as planes, tanks or naval vessels, the cost to [switch](http://doi.org/10.1257/jep.8.4.65) to a different supplier can be huge. Military personnel must be retrained on new equipment, spare parts need to be replaced, and operational changes may be necessary. After being so reliant on U.S. weapons systems for decades, the [transition costs](http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a498941.pdf) to buy from another country could be prohibitive even for oil-rich Saudi Arabia. The second problem with Trump’s argument is that armaments from Russia, China or elsewhere are simply not as sophisticated as U.S. weapons, which is why they are usually cheaper – though the quality gap is quickly decreasing. To maintain its military superiority in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has opted to purchase virtually all of its weapons from American and European companies. That is why the U.S. has significant leverage in this aspect of the relationship. Any [Saudi threat](http://fortune.com/2018/10/14/saudis-threaten-retaliation-jamal-khashoggi/) to retaliate against a ban on U.S. arms sales by buying weapons from countries that have not raised concerns about the Khashoggi disappearance would not be credible. And is probably why, despite worries in the White House, such a threat has not yet been made.

#### **Conditions on aid don’t work – the US becomes dependent on the recipient country and fails to influence reform**

Sullivan writes (Patricia, Associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a 2015-2017 Andrew Carnegie Fellow. She teaches courses in foreign policy, international conflict, national security policy, and research design. “IS MILITARY AID AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY?” Scholars Strategy Network. May 2012. <https://scholars.org/sites/scholars/files/ssn_key_findings_sullivan_on_military_aid_and_foreign_policy_1.pdf>) / NE

The United States spends billions of dollars every year on military aid to foreign governments around the world, in the hope that aid will boost national security and increase American influence. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, military assistance has increased and gone to more countries. In the fight against terrorism, U.S. authorities have sent military aid to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Oman, Yemen, Uzbekistan, and Columbia, among other nations. Does giving military aid work? Sometimes, the benefits are clear. After America enormously increased aid to (the former Soviet republic of) Georgia, that country sent 2,000 soldiers to support the U.S. war effort in Iraq. But at other times, the United States gives aid without gaining new leverage. Pakistan, for example, is widely believed to have channeled a portion of billions in U.S. military aid dollars to extremist groups, and Pakistan’s military retains ties to the very same Haqqani network and Taliban militants who are killing U.S. soldiers fighting in Afghanistan. Can Military Aid Buy Cooperation? Scholars offer competing theories about the impact of military aid: • Arms for Influence. This theory predicts that a foreign government’s level of cooperation will grow as U.S. military aid increases. Accordingly, U.S. authorities should continue military aid to cooperative countries and reduce or eliminate aid when governments fail to support American foreign policy positions. • The Lonely Superpower theory posits that dependence on a powerful state can fuel defiance. Governments receiving significant amounts of military aid may temper their cooperation with the United States, or even openly defy our leaders, in an attempt to avoid being viewed as “American puppets” by domestic and international audiences. • The Reverse Leverage model suggests that, paradoxically, a powerful nation can become dependent on countries it aids. In this way of thinking, the amount of military aid granted to a foreign government reflects the extent to which the U.S. is reliant on that nation – for things like oil exports, intelligence, bases for troops, and military cooperation. In this perspective, it could be easier for a nation receiving assistance to obtain military aid elsewhere than for a superpower like the United States to find an equally valuable strategic partner. Rather than inducing compliance, generous U.S. military funding runs the risk of creating strong clients who are able to ignore U.S. interests and play us off against other powers. What the Evidence Shows The world is much more complicated than any one model can capture. Each nation receiving major military aid has a unique relationship with the United States that changes over time. Nevertheless, a thorough investigation of the connections between U.S. military aid and the level of foreign policy cooperation exhibited by the governments that received aid between 1990 and 2004 reveals a pattern largely consistent with the Reverse Leverage model. • In general, U.S. military aid proved to be negatively correlated with cooperation by the nations receiving the aid. In fact, national governments that received aid exhibited less cooperative behavior toward the United States than governments given no military aid. • Some countries that received U.S. military aid became more cooperative with increased levels of assistance. But aid was less likely to induce cooperation from formal U.S. allies. • In practice, the United States did not punish defiance with reductions in aid; nor did it reward greater cooperation with increases in military aid. The opposite pattern prevailed, because higher levels of cooperation from nations we assisted were correlated with decreased military aid in subsequent years, while reductions in cooperative behavior were often followed by increased aid. Can Military Aid Advance American Foreign Policy Goals? Given these patterns, U.S. policymakers face a difficult dilemma. Providing military assistance may be the only way to gain influence in key countries – such as Pakistan – located in strategically crucial parts of the world. Even if aid does not have a positive effect on the level of cooperation with the United States overall, the U.S. may still get specific benefits. Policymakers, however, still have to cope with the limited utility of military aid for inspiring cooperation with overall foreign-policy goals. Providing military assistance may at times allow the United States to avoid the costs of direct military interventions, but leaders should take care not to hurt longterm American security interests. U.S. leaders must: • Have realistic expectations. Realize that military aid might achieve short-term security goals, but will not usually induce general cooperation. • Acknowledge constraints on flexibility. Military aid is not a very effective carrot or stick, because it cannot easily be turned on and off. Immediate U.S. security needs may impel aid, but don’t imagine that flows of aid can be calibrated over time to change a foreign government’s policy preferences. • Be cognizant of the risks. Providing military aid to foreign governments can backfire. Arms transfers to developing countries have been linked to increases in human rights abuses and may impede democratization. Military assistance can enable client states to aggress against their neighbors – which may hurt American interests in the region. Finally, when alliances shift or governments are replaced, America can find itself in combat against an enemy equipped with U.S-made weapons sent at an earlier time. That is what happened in Afghanistan. We gave arms to Afghans and Arabs to fight the Soviets in the 1980s, only to see many of the same fighters turn against us in 9/11 and afterwards.

## Extra 1AC Shit

### Impact Add On

#### Don’t let their impacts prevent you from preventable, material violence – the horrific violence in Yemen outweighs all their scenarios

Larison 4/18 (Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and was a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and resides in Dallas, “Cholera Outbreak Continues to Surge in Yemen,” 4/18/19, The American Conservative, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/cholera-outbreak-continues-to-surge-in-yemen/>, accessed: 4/25/19) KED

According to Oxfam, the number of cases from the new cholera outbreak in Yemen has continued to surge: Some 195,000 people are suspected to have contracted the disease so far this year, of which more than 38,000 are in districts that are hard for aid agencies to reach. If that figure is correct, the number of cholera cases has jumped by more than 80,000 in less than a month. When I wrote about the outbreak in late March, the number was 110,000. In a couple of weeks at the current rate, it will be twice that. The threat to the civilian population in Yemen is real and rapidly growing, and the need for a halt to the fighting and unimpeded humanitarian aid is extremely urgent. Almost 18 million Yemenis are without access to clean water and sanitation. That is more than half the population of the entire country. Almost as many are also malnourished and starving. Between the breakdown in sanitation from the bombing of treatment plants and non-payment of salaries for sanitation workers, the extensive destruction of health care facilities, the fuel shortage that prevents the pumping of clean drinking water, and the ongoing starvation of millions of people, the conditions are ripe for another explosion of cholera that could claim thousands more lives. Young children are among the most likely to be at risk, and children under the age of 5 make up a quarter of new cases. It shouldn’t be possible for a treatable, preventable disease like this one to flourish in the modern world year after year, but the warring parties including the Saudi coalition and the U.S. have so devastated Yemen’s infrastructure and economy that innocent civilians in the hundreds of thousands and potentially in the millions are still in danger of being infected with cholera. Oxfam issued a new report on the cholera outbreak today, and they warn that if the outbreak keeps spreading at its current rate it will be even worse at its height than the one in 2017: Oxfam has calculated that if suspected new cases continue to be identified at current rates for the rest of the year, this spike in the outbreak will exceed that of 2017. Muhsin Siddiquey, Oxfam’s Yemen Country Director, said: “The people of Yemen have already endured the worst cholera outbreak in history, amid more than four years of war and the collapse of the country’s economy. “Unfortunately instead of siding with Yemeni people demanding peace and struggling to survive, the Trump administration this week doubled down on its support for one side of this conflict. This war is causing disease, hunger, and death, and its keeping us from reaching some of those in most risk and need. The international community urgently needs to ensure safe, secure and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid for all people in need across the country.” Oxfam and other aid agencies are doing all they can to combat Yemen’s multiple, overlapping humanitarian crises, and their work is saving many lives, but aid alone will not be enough to end these crises. Yemen needs peace, an end to the Saudi coalition’s economic war and blockade, and a concerted international effort to stabilize and revive the country’s battered economy. The U.S. and the rest of the world are still failing the people of Yemen, whose country we have helped to wreck over the last four years. That has to start changing, or many more tens of thousands of Yemenis will die from preventable causes.

### Advantage

#### US arms end up in the hands of AQAP and Iran

Smith et al 19 [Nima Elbagir, Salma Abdelaziz, Mohamed Abo El Gheit, and Laura Smith-Spark, CNN, 2-3,19, "US arms sold to Saudi Arabia and UAE end up in wrong hands," <https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/02/middleeast/yemen-lost-us-arms/?utm_term=link&utm_source=fbCNN&utm_content=2019-02-05T00%3A00%3A24&utm_medium=social&fbclid=IwAR3DoAaY3YBd808ACfxdaS9C562EAaX-nhF5QaDipwBgVW0RbTOsgG3VzoM>] / MM brackets for gendered language\*\*

Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners have transferred American-made weapons to al Qaeda-linked fighters, hardline Salafi militias, and other factions waging war in Yemen, in violation of their agreements with the United States, a CNN investigation has found. The weapons have also made their way into the hands of Iranian-backed rebels battling the coalition for control of the country, exposing some of America's sensitive military technology to Tehran and potentially endangering the lives of US troops in other conflict zones. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, its main partner in the war, have used the US-manufactured weapons as a form of currency to buy the loyalties of militias or tribes, bolster chosen armed actors, and influence the complex political landscape, according to local commanders on the ground and analysts who spoke to CNN. By handing off this military equipment to third parties, the Saudi-led coalition is breaking the terms of its arms sales with the US, according to the Department of Defense. After CNN presented its findings, a US defense official confirmed there was an ongoing investigation into the issue. The revelations raise fresh questions about whether the US has lost control over a key ally presiding over one of the most horrific wars of the past decade, and whether Saudi Arabia is responsible enough to be allowed to continue buying the sophisticated arms and fighting hardware. Previous CNN investigations established that US-made weapons were used in a series of deadly Saudi coalition attacks that killed dozens of civilians, many of them children. The developments also come as Congress, outraged with Riyadh over the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi last year, considers whether to force an end to the Trump administration's support for the Saudi coalition, which relies on American weapons to conduct its war. In 2015, Riyadh launched a coalition to oust Iranian-supported Houthi rebels from the country's capital and reinstate the internationally recognized government of President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi. The war split the country in two, and with it came the weapons -- not just guns, but anti-tank missiles, armored vehicles, heat-seeking lasers and artillery -- all flooding into an unruly and complex state. Since then, some of America's "beautiful military equipment," as US President Donald Trump once called it, has been passed on, sold, stolen or abandoned in Yemen's state of chaos, where murky alliances and fractured politics mean little hope for any system of accountability or tracking. Some terror groups have gained from the influx of US arms, with the barrier of entry to advanced weaponry now lowered by the laws of supply and demand. Militia leaders have had ample opportunity to obtain military hardware in exchange for the [power] to fight the Houthi militias. Arms dealers have flourished, with traders offering to buy or sell anything, from a US-manufactured rifle to a tank, to the highest bidder. And Iran's proxies have captured American weapons they can exploit for vulnerabilities or reverse-engineer for native production. 'Do you have American guns here?' In the narrow, ramshackle streets of Taiz's historic district, weapons shops lie tucked between women's clothing stores. Arms markets are illegal in Yemen, but that doesn't stop them operating openly in this large, mountainous city in the country's southwest. To one side hang veils, abayas and colorful dresses for sale; to the other are pistols, hand grenades, and US assault rifles available on special order. In one arms market, sweets were displayed among the ammunition. "Do you have American guns here?" CNN asked. "The American guns are expensive and sought after," the weapons trader replied, in an exchange captured by undercover CNN cameras. In another of the city's markets, a very young-looking boy handled weapons like an expert. Men joked and chewed khat, a commonly used drug, and the atmosphere was casual. But these shops don't just take individual orders, they can supply militias -- and it's this not-so-hidden black market that in part is driving the demand for hi-tech American weapons and perpetuating the cycle of violence in Yemen. Once the intellectual heart of the country, Taiz is now a tinder box that set off a war within a war last year, when the various militias backed by the Saudi-led coalition turned their guns on each other. Amid the chaos of the broader war, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) made its way to the frontlines in Taiz in 2015, forging advantageous alliances with the pro-Saudi militias they fought alongside. One of those militias linked to AQAP, the Abu Abbas brigade, now possesses US-made Oshkosh armored vehicles, paraded in a 2015 show of force through the city. Abu Abbas, the founder, was declared a terrorist by the US in 2017, but the group still enjoys support from the Saudi coalition and was absorbed into the coalition-supported 35th Brigade of the Yemeni army. “Oshkosh Defense strictly follows all US laws and regulations relating to export control," the firm told CNN. And there are deadlier forms of weaponry that have made their way into the city. In October 2015, military forces loyal to the government boasted on Saudi- and UAE-backed media that the Saudis had airdropped American-made TOW anti-tank missiles on the same frontline where AQAP had been known to operate at the time.

#### UAE counterterror doesn’t work – they support AQAP

Fenton-Harvey 18 Jonathan Fenton-Harvey, 7-28-2018, "How the UAE is destroying Yemen," Middle East Eye, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/how-uae-destroying-yemen?fbclid=IwAR1sopjCTLscI59idzBBYLVXyDPWXTeXYVzSvbN3vy4uaHahvx1_EZfR6Co> / MM

The UAE's "stabilising" policies have also significantly increased Yemen's internal divide. Abu Dhabi's backing of southern secessionists and other military proxies has inflamed tensions in an already fragmented country. In January, the southern militias it backs clashed with Hadi government forces in Aden. The UAE's support for southern independence has failed to create any kind of unity, as Abu Dhabi has backed different groups, such as the Hadrami Elite Forces, which want an independent Hadramaut rather than a unified southern Yemen and have committed abuses such as arbitrary detentions. The UAE's rift with Saudi Arabia has also been problematic. Riyadh has supported Islah, Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood branch, as a stable ally on the ground. But the UAE opposes the Brotherhood, instead backing militants who maintain non-hostile relations with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) - which it is supposed to be fighting - to counteract Islah, researcher Helen Lackner notes in her book Yemen in Crisis. As such, the UAE is in a proxy war with Saudi Arabia in Yemen.

#### Counterterror fails

Hartig 18 Luke Hartig, a fellow in New America’s International Security program. He is also executive director of National Journal’s Network Science Initiative, a research effort that maps policy influencers and the connections among them, 12-7-2018, "Full Accounting Needed of US-UAE Counterterrorism Partnership in Yemen," Just Security, <https://www.justsecurity.org/61761/full-accounting-needed-us-uae-counterterrorism-partnership-yemen/> / MM

President Donald Trump’s first significant action on counterterrorism once in office was to dial up the pressure in Yemen by leaning into the partnership with the UAE. During his first week in the White House, he authorized a joint U.S.-Emirati raid in Yemen that went awry, leaving Navy SEAL Ryan Owens and. several Yemeni civilians dead The raid and its outcome raised serious questions about how the new administration was going to manage counterterrorism deployments. (Subsequent deaths of U.S. special operators in Somalia and the Sahel reinforced these concerns.) Yet while commentators, myself included, focused on the president’s mismanagement of high-risk operations, the administration was, for the most part, continuing and intensifying the counterterrorism playbook the Obama administration had established in Yemen over the previous year.

#### US aid gives Iran a reason to keep going

Byman 18 Daniel Byman, Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, 7-28-2018, "How the U.S. Is Empowering Iran in Yemen," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-07-26/how-us-empowering-iran-yemen/> / MM

The Trump administration’s top goal in the Middle East is clear: counter Iran, which U.S. President Donald Trump and his senior officials have denounced as a duplicitous and murderous state sponsor of terrorism and sower of regional chaos. In May, the Trump administration invoked Tehran’s regional ambitions to justify U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Just this week, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned that Iran’s regime was bent upon “the export of Islamic revolution and the destruction of its neighbors.” Yet such warnings of the Iranian threat miss a key factor: the United States’ own policies have at times advanced rather than hindered Tehran’s regional ambitions. Nowhere is this clearer than in Yemen. U.S. support for a brutal Saudi-led military campaign in the country has created a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions, while offering an opening for Iran to expand its influence in the country. Military intervention has made insurgents more reliant on support from Tehran and is turning civilians against U.S. partners. If Washington wants to counter Iranian influence, it needs to reverse course—ending its disastrous support for the Saudi-led coalition and throwing its weight behind peace talks. Doubling down on the military effort will serve only to further Iran’s regional ascendance. UNEXPECTED COSTS The roots of the current conflict in Yemen trace back to the early 2000s, when Houthi rebels from the northern region of Saada repeatedly rebelled against the regime of then resident Ali Abdullah Saleh, hoping to increase their share of state patronage. Arab Spring protests in 2011 forced Saleh to step down and hand power to his second-in-command, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Behind the scenes, however, Saleh schemed with loyal military forces to retain his influence. Taking advantage of the ensuing chaos, Houthi rebels conquered the capital, Sanaa, in 2014. By the following year, they controlled much of Yemen. Fighting against the Houthis—and among each other—were supporters of Hadi’s government, a local al Qaeda branch, southern separatists, and a collective of local actors. Blithely ignoring this complexity, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates entered the war in March 2015, seeking to put Hadi back in power and fight the Houthis, whom they saw as a proxy of their archenemy, Iran. Saudi and Emirati leaders feared that, through the Houthis, Iran would gain a foothold in Yemen much as it had done in Lebanon, where Tehran has a powerful proto-state ally in the form of Hezbollah. Saudi leaders predicted that the intervention would quickly tip the scales and that the civil war would end after only a few weeks. Three years later, what was supposed to be a short, decisive intervention has ground on, with no end in sight. The campaign has reclaimed parts of southern Yemen from the Houthis. But the insurgents have kept control over the capital, Sanaa, and still boast tens of thousands of armed fighters. There has been good reason for policymakers in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Washington to worry about Iranian ascendance across the region. Tehran’s closest ally, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, has made steady headway against insurgent groups, including forces backed by the United States and its allies. In May, elections in Iraq and Lebanon boosted the influence of Iranian-backed groups, while the United States’ and the Saudis’ favored candidates suffered setbacks. An Iranian member of parliament has famously boasted that his country controls “four Arab capitals”—Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and now Sanaa. Yet it’s easy to overstate Iran’s hold on the region overall—and on Yemen in particular. In reality, the Houthis and Iran are allies of convenience against the U.S.-backed Saudi military campaign. Although the Houthis are commonly referred to as Shiites, their faith more closely resembles Sunnism than Shiism as practiced in Iran. Unlike the Lebanese Hezbollah, they do not profess loyalty to Iran’s Supreme Leader. The Persian-Arab divide, the Houthis’ focus on accessing state patronage in Yemen, and a strong sense of Yemeni independence also complicate the idea that the Houthis are Tehran’s proxies. But because of the Saudi-led campaign meant to push back on Iran, Tehran now has an opening in Yemen it might otherwise not have had. Iran gives the Houthis arms, including short-range ballistic missiles, and in exchange the Houthis have offered it an entry into a part of the world where its influence had once been limited. Houthis have threatened ships off the Yemeni coast with Iranian missiles, even hitting a Turkish ship delivering humanitarian aid. And their slogans, speeches, and media strategy increasingly echo those of Hezbollah, lending some support to Saudi fears that the group may be turning into a Yemeni version of Iran’s Lebanese proxy. In addition, Shiites in other countries are embracing the Houthi cause as part of what they see as a larger struggle against Sunni hegemony. The UAE has deployed significant ground forces, while Riyadh has flown over 100,000 sorties and spends $5 billion to $6 billion a month on the war—far more than Tehran spends on support for the Houthis. The war has killed around 10,000 people, and a Saudi blockade of Yemeni ports has exacted a bitter humanitarian toll. Last year, Yemen suffered the world’s largest cholera outbreak. Starvation and disease have killed more than 50,000 children, and hundreds of thousands more are malnourished. The blockade has been loosened, but the damage it brought has turned many Yemenis, long distrustful of their Saudi neighbor, even more hostile. It has also hurt Saudi Arabia’s image in Europe and other parts of the world that care about the suffering of the Yemeni people. Even as Yemen implodes, U.S. allies sink into the quagmire, and Iran’s influence grows as a result, the United States has provided tacit support for the Saudi-led military campaign. Under Barack Obama, U.S. policy in Yemen was often confused, struggling to balance humanitarian concerns with a desire not to alienate U.S. allies. When Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates launched their intervention in 2015, the Obama administration neither wholeheartedly embraced nor strongly opposed it, eventually settling into lukewarm acceptance. Quietly, the United States—along with France and the United Kingdom—provided intelligence and air refueling along with other logistical support. Before leaving office, Obama gave the Saudis a symbolic wrist slap, halting the sale of smart bombs to the kingdom because of the war. This proved to be the worst of both worlds, angering allies while doing nothing to stop the intervention or improve the situation in Yemen. Trump quickly lifted Obama’s smart bomb ban, but his administration has not veered dramatically from Obama’s policy of cautious and grudging support, especially after a botched special operations forces raid in Yemen led to the death of a U.S. Navy SEAL and perhaps over 20 civilians in early 2017. In June, the United States rebuffed a request to join the UAE-led offensive on Hodeidah, a crucial port through which food and other supplies go into Houthi-held areas. Still, the International Crisis Group has described the U.S. State Department’s messaging on the offensive as a subdued “yellow light” that allies can confidently ignore. More broadly, the Saudis and the UAE feel empowered by the strong embrace the Trump administration has given them up to this point and see no need to change course in Yemen. Washington should end its casual support for its allies’ ill-fated and destructive efforts. Doing so is in its own strategic interest: Iran is stronger in Yemen than it was at the outset of the Saudi-led intervention. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have spent tens of billions on the war, and many Yemeni hate them for the destruction they have brought. Even with a Houthi defeat in Hodeidah, the war will likely drag on.

#### **Attacks keep the Houthis going – Byman cosigned this article**

Al Hamdani 4/7/19 (Sama’a, a Yemen researcher. She is a visiting fellow at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University and the director of the Yemen Cultural Institute for Heritage and the Arts. “Understanding the Houthi Faction in Yemen” Lawfare Institute in cooperation with the Brookings Institute. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-houthi-faction-yemen>) / MM

[Put away your, but Dan Byman said “…”. He cosigned this article.]

The Houthis are waging battles on many fronts, including internally. The military branch appears to be fighting with the political branch and desires absolute control over the Houthi movement. In April 2018, Saleh al-Sammad, the president of the Houthi state and head of its political council, was killed by a coalition airstrike that required sophisticated intelligence obtained from infiltration of the Houthi leadership. It’s possible that members of the military wing provided that information to remove Sammad. Further evidence of the breakdown in internal Houthi dynamics can be found in recent credible reports of mounting tensions between Mahdi al-Mashat, Sammad’s replacement, and Mohammed al-Houthi, head of the Revolutionary Committee, and allegations that Houthi attempted to assassinate Mashat. The military branch of the Houthi movement could easily take advantage of its powerful wartime role to crush its rivals in the political arm. Doing so, however, would hinder the possibility of reconciliation with other Yemeni groups postwar and would complicate the possibility of peace. If the war were to end tomorrow, though, the tensions within the Houthi bloc would be left unresolved and would likely weaken the movement from within. As long as the divisions persist, they will present opportunities for outside groups—including current enemies. The Houthis’ military wing is eager for Saudi support, and it might be a shrewd move for the Saudis to deliver and draw some of the Houthis to their side while weakening the movement as a whole.

#### Trump Syria pullout thumps Iran

Gerecht and Dubowitz 18— Reuel Marc Gerecht [Senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies] and Mark Dubowitz [Chief executive officer for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies], 12-24-2018, "Trump Delivers a Victory to Iran," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/us-withdrawal-syria-hands-victory-iran/578962/

Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria, concurrently with his intention to drastically reduce the number of American soldiers in Afghanistan and the likely soon-to-be-announced further drawdown of U.S. personnel in Iraq, has made mincemeat of the administration’s efforts to contain Iran. If you add up who wins locally by this decision (the clerical regime in Iran, Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite radicals, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) and who loses (Jordan, Israel, the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds and Sunni Arabs, everyone in Lebanon resisting Hezbollah, the vast majority of the Iraqi Shia, the Gulf States), it becomes clear that the interests of the United States have been routed. Before Trump pulled the plug in Syria, the rhetorical center of the president’s Iran policy was the “New Iran Strategy” speech by Pompeo at the Heritage Foundation on May 21, 2018. The 12 demands that Pompeo issued to Tehran are not historically provocative—they were, until the coming of Obama, essentially what the United States had always sought: to deny the mullahs nuclear weapons and stop them from spreading their version of Islamic militancy. Washington hadn’t been brilliantly successful in countering Tehran and only occasionally efficient in bringing real pain to the mullahs and their praetorians, the Revolutionary Guards, who are responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American soldiers since they first drew blood in Lebanon in 1983. But Pompeo, by redrawing the lines, clearly signaled that the United States wasn’t giving up, that a campaign of “maximum pressure” was still coming. It is clear now, however, that the secretary’s speech was a bridge too far for Trump, who may never have read it. To be fair to the president: The administration’s developing approach was probably never his. A close read of Pompeo’s Heritage speech reveals the tactical quandary that has always been at the core of the Trump presidency’s approach. The secretary put forth a lot of “don’ts” for the regime: “Iran must end support to Middle Eastern terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad … respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi Government … end its military support for the Houthi militia [in Yemen] … must withdraw all forces under Iranian command throughout the entirety of Syria … end support for the Taliban and other terrorists in Afghanistan … cease harboring senior al-Qaeda leaders … and end its threatening behavior against its neighbors.” But he did not clearly indicate that the United States would do anything to punish the Islamic Republic for its malign actions other than use sanctions. It is an excellent guess that Pompeo, Bolton, McMaster, and Haley were willing to apply more pressure than just sanctions, and would have given speeches to that effect if they’d been allowed to do so. Even Secretary of Defense James Mattis, who was more reticent about committing U.S. troops to an anti-Iran mission, would have likely been more forward-leaning if he had trusted Trump to stay the course in Syria and Iraq. All these officials certainly agreed that U.S. forces in Syria, which don’t cost much and have incurred few casualties, should stay. Those troops and civilians were the hinge of long-term Iranian containment—a low-cost use of American soldiers, backed up by allied European special-operations units, that had checked the advance of much larger and more costly Iranian, Russian, and Syrian-regime forces. To their credit, Pompeo, Bolton, McMaster, Haley, and Mattis removed the rhetorical legerdemain surrounding the reasons for American troops being in Syria: They were there to squash the Islamic State and prevent its rebirth, and they were there to check Russia and Iran, which controls Syrian-regime ground forces as well as the indispensable foreign Shiite militias. This American engagement was easily the best bang for the buck that Washington had gotten in the region since 2001. Nor were Bolton, McMaster, Pompeo, Haley, and Mattis operating outside congressional authorization: At any time, Congress could have cut off funding for U.S. forces if it thought they were straying too far from their original mandate. Congress didn’t do so. Syria may be the one locale where congressional Democrats and Republicans largely agreed about the use of American military power. And if the president were ever serious about rebuilding a transatlantic alliance against the Islamic Republic, Syria was the place to do it. But Trump just couldn’t buy in. It’s ironic that the president snapped when discussing Syria with Turkey’s President Erdoğan, who is modern Turkey’s first real Islamist ruler and certainly not a friend of the United States. The president’s tweets are a muddle: At one moment, he thinks the Islamic State is destroyed, and therefore our soldiers can come home; at another, he suggests that ending the Islamic State isn’t even America’s business because the group is aligned against the Syrian regime, Iran, and Russia. (“Why are we fighting for our enemy, Syria, by staying & killing isis for them, Russia, Iran & other locals?”) All one can conclude is that the president just wants out of Syria, regardless of the consequences. Even more than Obama, Trump is post-post-9/11. Which leaves the administration’s Iran policy centered on sanctions. Sanctions have many things going for them as a foreign-policy tool. Against Iran, they eliminated the surreality under Obama of the United States returning money that could be used to support the clerics’ imperialism for, at best, a short-term surcease to our nuclear anxieties. Tehran now has tens of billions less in hard currency to further its ambitions than it did when Trump took office. And Trump was right: Iranian aggression abroad got much worse after the nuclear deal was concluded. But sanctions aren’t strategy. If they encourage Americans to stop thinking about the other factors required to counter the Islamic Republic, they become a delusion, an appealing, inexpensive choice for those not quite ready to admit they no longer have the intestinal fortitude to play hardball in the Middle East. Without the complementary use of other instruments of national power, they serve the same purpose that nuclear diplomacy and the JCPOA did for Obama: They are cover for our continuing retreat. When Trump won the presidential election, Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic, speculated on the potential upside of his victory: Trump might actually follow through on what he’d preached—an American withdrawal from the Middle East. Surrounded by Bolton, Pompeo, and Mattis, Trump’s promise seemed to dim. But Khamenei, who is the most accomplished dictator in modern Middle Eastern history, in part because he can see and exploit the weaknesses and strengths in both his enemies and friends, appears again to have seen his adversary correctly: Trump’s desire to be done with the Muslim Middle East (and so much else) is deep. And unlike the Iranian cleric, who imbibed radical European literature and melded it to the revolutionary Islamist ethos of his heroes, Sayyid Qutb and Ruhollah Khomeini, Trump has no grand vision. He has the sense of a populist politician who knows America will, without leaders arguing otherwise, always go with less, not more, in foreign affairs. Trump has gutted and left powerless his senior officials, who have tried hard to give some coherence and mundane effect to his waves of emotion and disconnected data points. It’s hard to think of a time when an American president has so publicly stripped his most senior advisers of their credibility. Although Khamenei didn’t say so, it’s a good guess that if given the choice between dealing with American sanctions or America staying in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, he’d take the former. Trump’s withdrawal has severely weakened his own Iran policy, signaling boredom, fickleness, fatigue, and fear. He’s weakened American allies in the region and probably obliged the Kurds who fought with us in Syria to seek protection from Iran and Russia. The great Iranian-American tug-of-war, which has defined so much of Khamenei’s life, may well be over. It is odd and wry that many Americans, on the right and left, may believe that what is good for Khamenei could possibly be good for the United States, too.

#### No fill in

Caverley 18 Jonathan D. Caverley, 10-12-2018, [associate professor at the United States Naval War College and a research scientist at M.I.T.] "Opinion," <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html>

Saudi Arabia is in the middle of a major war, and more than 60 percent of its arms deliveries over the past five years came from the United States. The Saudi military relies not just on American tanks, planes and missiles but for a daily supply of maintenance, training and support, such as intelligence and refueling. In the longer term, almost all of Saudi Arabia’s remaining exports come from Europe. To truly squeeze Saudi Arabia, a coordinated embargo — much like the one now in place against Russia — would be necessary but relatively easy. European governments already feel strong domestic political pressure not to export to regimes like Saudi Arabia. Transforming the Saudi military to employ Russian, much less Chinese, weapons would cost a fortune even by Gulf standards, would require years of retraining and would greatly reduce its military power for a generation. Russia cannot produce next-generation fighter aircraft, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for its own armed forces, much less for the export market. China has not produced, never mind exported, the sophisticated aircraft and missile defense systems Saudi Arabia wants.

#### The plan increases HR cred and democratic leadership

Kramer and Stack 18 David J. Kramer and John F. Stack Jr., 12-3-2018, [David J. Kramer is senior fellow of the Vaclav Havel Program on Human Rights and Diplomacy at Florida International University’s Steven J. Green School of International & Public Affairs and a former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. John F. Stack, Jr. is the founding dean of FIU’s Green School and professor of politics, international relations, and law.] "Human Rights Suffers a Major Blow," American Interest, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/12/03/human-rights-suffers-a-major-blow/>

Fast forward to the current Administration. President Trump’s clear affinity for strongmen leaders, his failure to fill the position at the State Department responsible for democracy, human rights, and labor two years into his term, his undemocratic rhetoric, and his efforts to cut aid in this field have done enormous harm to the leadership role played by the United States over the years. Despite the problems associated with Bush’s Freedom Agenda and Obama’s seeming lack of interest in the issue, human rights activists and dissidents still turned to the United States for moral, financial, and political support. These days, they are not sure where to turn. Under the current Administration, human rights simply are not a priority, a position made crystal clear by Trump’s recent comments concerning Saudi Arabia, despite the Kingdom’s abominable treatment of human beings and the murder of Khashoggi. Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson warned that prioritizing American values (human rights) could harm other American interests, a position for which he was roundly criticized. Trump’s admiration for leaders like Egypt’s Sisi, the Philippines’ Duterte, Russia’s Putin, and North Korea’s Kim is demoralizing to human rights advocates everywhere. Despite Kim’s unparalleled brutality in North Korea, Trump at a campaign rally said that he and Kim “fell in love” through their various exchanges; one can only imagine if Obama had said such a thing. There are two positive exceptions to this record: 1) the current Administration has maintained sanctions under the Magnitsky Act on Russian officials and imposed additional sanctions under the global version of it, albeit under Congressional pressure, and 2) the Administration has spoken out on the abuses committed by the Maduro, Castro and Ortega regimes in Latin America. What Is to Be Done? Supporting human rights and democratic governance around the world does not and should not mean imposing American values on others or staging military interventions. Each country, if given the opportunity, will develop in its own unique way. But our support does involve peacefully aiding local activists who look to the United States for moral, political, diplomatic, and sometimes material support. These activists often risk prison, torture, and death struggling for a more democratic society; helping them reflects our own highest principles. It is the least we can do. Today, with the current wave of nationalism and populism, human rights are facing new challenges from some unexpected places, including the United States—but don’t expect advocates to quit. NATO and the European Union, along with the OSCE have played a key role on the European continent in supporting the cause of human rights and freedom; while not a member of the European Union, the United States is a key member of NATO and the OSCE. In the Western Hemisphere, despite a long history of authoritarian rule, sometimes aided and abetted by the United States, individuals have challenged human rights abuses. With the support of the Organization of American States (OAS), the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in 1948 established a vehicle for the investigation of human rights abuses throughout the hemisphere with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which was followed 20 years later by the establishment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Here, too, the United States has played an important role. Safeguarding the institutionalization of human rights within these organizations is absolutely critical to guarantee that defenders and advocates have a strong voice. As long as they keep on taking the risks to do so, they deserve to have the United States standing with them. But this requires speaking out consistently when abuses occur. It mandates placing human rights and advancing the cause of freedom high on the foreign policy priorities list. It means distancing ourselves from authoritarian regimes, recognizing that the way they treat their own people is often indicative of how they will behave in foreign policy and toward other countries. It means not whitewashing gross human rights abuses. In his address before the UN General Assembly this past September, President Trump underscored the idea of sovereignty, declaring: “We will never surrender America’s sovereignty to an unelected, unaccountable global bureaucracy. America is governed by Americans. We reject the ideology of globalism. And we embrace the doctrine of patriotism.” Trump went on to inform his fellow leaders that “the United States will not tell you how to live or work or worship. We only ask that you honor our sovereignty in return.” Such a declaration both misrepresents what the United States had sought to do over the past seven-plus decades in maintaining and nurturing the international order—which has largely been a huge net gain for human rights and democracy, albeit with significant exceptions—and telegraphed to authoritarian leaders that they could get away with bloody murder without worrying about repercussions from the United States, either bilaterally or through multilateral organizations. That became even more explicit with the murder of Khashoggi. “Democracy has spread and endured,” writes Robert Kagan in his most recent book, The Jungle Grows Back, “because it has been nurtured and supported: by the norms of the liberal order, by the membership requirements of liberal institutions like the European Union and NATO, by the fact that the liberal order has been the wealthiest part of the world, and by the security provided by the world’s strongest power, which happens to be a democracy.” And yet, in 2018, as Patricia O’Toole writes in her book, The Moralist: Woodrow Wilson and the World He Made, “as Woodrow Wilson’s 100 years came to an end, the peaceful world order of his dreams was nowhere in sight. Nationalism and autocracy were on the rise and democracy was under attack in some of the most democratic countries on earth, including the United States.” President Trump’s latest dismissal of human rights as a matter of interest will be welcomed not only by the Saudi Kingdom but by authoritarian regimes around the world. Buy enough arms and pledge to invest enough in the United States and the Trump Administration will turn a blind eye to gross human rights abuses. Human rights defenders, by contrast, will feel abandoned. They need and deserve the support of the United States and that of other democracies. American leadership, hard to envision right now, must be restored to carry on this indispensable mission.

#### No alt causes – other countries are pulling out

Dewan 18 Angela Dewan [Digital News Producer with CNN International in London] “These are the countries still selling arms to Saudi Arabia” November 23, 2018. [https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/22/middleeast/arms-exports-saudi-arabia-intl/index.html](https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/22/middleeast/arms-exports-saudi-arabia-intl/index.html%20/)

A number of countries have restricted arms sales to Saudi Arabia since the kingdom began airstrikes on Yemen in 2015, in a war that the UN describes as the world's worst man-made humanitarian disaster. Calls for more restrictions on arms exports have been growing, particularly in Europe, since the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Turkey last month. US President Donald Trump, however, has repeatedly pointed to the US' lucrative arms deals with the Saudis as a reason to stand by the kingdom. Denmark and Finland on Thursday became the latest countries to suspend new arms deals with Saudi Arabia. Denmark's Foreign Ministry said it was freezing new deals over both Khashoggi and Yemen, while the Finnish Foreign Ministry mentioned only Yemen. Finland also banned new arms sales to the United Arab Emirates, which is part of the Saudi-led coalition in the conflict. Their announcements came just two days after Germany said it was stopping all arms transfers to the kingdom. Denmark and Finland are not major suppliers of weapons to Saudi Arabia, but Germany certainly is. It had already suspended new arms deals to Saudi Arabia, but on Monday it widened that ban to include the transfers of weapons on existing orders as well. So where is Saudi Arabia getting its weapons from? Arms deals are often done in secret or with little publicity. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) tries to track deals involving major weapons, and a database of Saudi imports from the last decade shows the United States as the biggest supplier, followed by the United Kingdom, France, Spain and then Germany. But a lot of exporters still selling to the Saudis have dramatically decreased their supply in recent years. The United Kingdom, for example, transferred arms worth an estimated $843 million in 2016 but almost halved that value to $436 million last year, according to SIPRI. (The database uses values constant with 1990 prices to eliminate currency fluctuations and inflation.) French exports of major weapons to Saudi Arabia were worth $174 million in 2015 but dropped to $91 million in 2016 and $27 million last year. The value of Spanish exports also dramatically decreased in that time period, but the Spanish government confirmed this year it would go ahead with arms deals it had previously suggested it would freeze, bowing to pressure from Spanish manufacturers, according to reports. US dwarfs other exporters Despite these decreases, the overall value of Saudi weapons imports actually increased by 38% between 2016 and 2017. That was almost entirely because of a huge uptick in transfers from the United States, which almost doubled its exports in terms of value from $1.8 billion to $3.4 billion in that time. Germany also multiplied its exports from $14 million to $105 million, although it is expected to be much lower this year following its suspension. Overall, no country comes close to the United States in major weapons supply. Over the past five years, for example, the US accounted for 61% of major arms sales to the Saudis. The UK was a distant second, with a 23% share, while France, in third place, was a mere 4%. In a statement on Tuesday, Trump said that canceling major arms contracts with the Saudis would be foolish, and that "Russia and China would be the enormous beneficiaries" if the US halted its sales. China supplies a negligible amount of major weaponry to Saudi Arabia, SIPRI data shows, but it is on the increase. Russia supplies so little it is not included in the organization's database. "Russia has tried hard in the past 10 to 15 years to get into the large Saudi arms market, but it has not been very successful. Saudi Arabia has acquired Russian rifles and may have bought some other items, but such deals have been very small," said Pieter Wezeman, a senior researcher with SIPRI's arms transfers and military expenditure program. "China has made some more substantial inroads into the Saudi arms market, in particular selling armed drones," Wezeman said. "The details are shady and we may very well have underestimated China's role as an arms exporter to Saudi Arabia. But China doesn't come anywhere near the USA, UK or even France as arms suppliers. Still, the important point here is that Saudi Arabia has explored the possibility of diversifying its supplier base."

#### No prolif— intervening actors and it’s too hard

Fitzpatrick 15, Director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, ‘15 (Mark, "Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Nuclear Rumour Mill," May, www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2015-932e/may-7114/saudi-arabia-pakistan-and-the-nuclear-rumour-mill-1419

Wanting enrichment is a far cry from possessing it, however. How would the Saudis acquire enrichment technology? Their nascent nuclear industry is at a rudimentary stage. They have no facilities relating to enrichment and no known research programme or specialists in this field. Developing uranium enrichment on their own would take 15 years or more. If they really want to match Iran’s enrichment programme, they naturally would want to buy the technology, but who would sell it? The 49 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have agreed not to transfer any nuclear technology that would contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is no standard interpretation of this clause, but clearly it would apply to a Saudi enrichment programme that was initiated to contribute to a weapons option. Although the NSG guidelines are voluntary, the ‘non-proliferation principle’, as it is called, has become an entrenched norm. Any inclination to violate it would put the would-be exporter under intense international pressure. Five nations that possess enrichment technology are outside the NSG: India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. Iran obviously would not empower its Gulf rival in this way, and neither would Israel. India, which seeks NSG membership, prides itself on not allowing proliferation-sensitive exports and has strong reasons to keep its export record clean. North Korea may have no compunction against selling nuclear technology to any would-be buyer, but it has no connections with Saudi Arabia and every major intelligence agency is watching to ensure that none develop. Pakistan is the usual suspect. It has close ties with Saudi Arabia and benefitted from Saudi munificence when its nuclear weapons programme was getting off the ground. Every couple of years a media scoop alleges that Pakistan is on the verge of transferring nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia. A thinly sourced article in the Sunday Times on 15 May was the latest in this line, claiming that Saudi Arabia has taken a ‘strategic decision’ to acquire ‘off-the-shelf’ nuclear weapons from Pakistan. Whatever the Saudis may have decided, however, a transfer requires a willing supplier. As I argued last year in my Adelphi book, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers, Pakistan has strong strategic, political and economic incentives to keep its nuclear weapons to itself. Just as the Pakistanis resolutely refused Saudi Arabia’s request for aircraft and ground forces to support the Yemen intervention, so too they would refuse a nuclear weapons transfer.Very little in the Sunday Times article is credible. Take this line, purportedly from a US intelligence official: ‘We know this stuff is available to them off the shelf’. The US intelligence community includes 17 separate agencies and over 800,000 US officials hold top-secret clearances. No doubt reporters can find at least one of them whom they can quote repeating what has been in previous press reports. But responsible intelligence officials do not speak that way. Those who know something about Pakistan’s nuclear programme know that it has no nuclear weapons ‘on the shelf’ waiting for delivery to Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is focused entirely on India. Opening up a second front on its west by becoming involved in the Saudi–Iran dispute would be a strategic blunder.

#### Iran sanctions thump oil – this ev assumes your oversupply responses

**Larison 4/21** (Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and was a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and resides in Dallas, “Our Iran Policy Is Run By Fanatics,” 4/21/19, The American Conservative, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/our-iran-policy-is-run-by-fanatics/>, accessed 4/25/19) KED

The Trump administration won’t be issuing any more waivers to importers of Iranian oil: The Trump administration is poised to tell five nations, including allies Japan, South Korea and Turkey, that they will no longer be exempt from U.S. sanctions if they continue to import oil from Iran. U.S. officials say Secretary of State Mike Pompeo plans to announce on Monday that the administration will not renew sanctions waivers for the five countries when they expire on May 2. Refusing to offer new sanctions waivers is the latest sign that Trump is once again giving in to the most extreme Iran hawks. When sanctions on Iran’s oil sector went into effect last November, the administration initially granted waivers to the top importers of Iranian oil to avoid a spike in the price of oil, but that is now coming to an end. The economic war that the U.S. has been waging against Iran over the last year is about to expand to include some of the world’s biggest economies and some of America’s leading trading partners. It is certain to inflict more hardship on the Iranian people, and it will damage relations between the U.S. and other major economic powers, including China and India, but it will have no discernible effect on the Iranian government’s behavior and policies. India, China, and Turkey are practically guaranteed to ignore U.S. demands that they eliminate all Iranian oil imports. Josh Rogin reported on the same story: The decision to end waivers has implications for world oil markets, which have been eagerly anticipating President Trump’s decision on whether to extend waivers. The officials said market disruption should be minimal for two reasons: supply is now greater than demand and Pompeo is also set to announce offsets through commitments from other suppliers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Trump spoke about the issue Thursday with the UAE’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan. Between the administration’s Venezuela and Iran oil sanctions and increased instability in Libya (also supported by the Trump administration), oil prices are nonetheless likely to rise. Even if they don’t, Trump’s Iran obsession is causing significant economic dislocation for no good reason as part of a regime change policy that can’t and won’t succeed. It cannot be emphasized enough that the reimposition of sanctions on Iran is completely unwarranted and represents a betrayal of previous U.S. commitments to Iran and our allies under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The decision to refuse any new sanctions waivers is a clear sign that the most fanatical members of the Trump administration have prevailed in internal debates and U.S. Iran policy is held hostage to their whims.

#### No oil backlash— it hurts them more than anyone else

Wald 18— Ellen Wald, [author of Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom’s Pursuit of Profit and Power] 10-18-2018, " Saudi Arabia Has No Leverage," NYT, [https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/opinion/saudi-arabia-economy-united-states.html /](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/opinion/saudi-arabia-economy-united-states.html%20/) MM

What about oil? Whereas Saudi Arabia could once shock the world economy by cutting oil exports or production to raise prices, it no longer has that power. The oil market today is significantly more diverse than it was in 1973, when Saudi Arabia and other Arab petroleum exporters unilaterally raised the price of oil and unsettled the American economy. In fact, the United States now produces more oil than Saudi Arabia, and imports make up a smaller percentage of domestically refined crude oil. Saudi Arabia cannot embargo or unilaterally raise oil prices for the United States without doing greater harm to its own industry and revenues. If Riyadh directed the national oil company, Saudi Aramco, to halt exports to the United States today, it would primarily hurt Aramco itself. Aramco owns Motiva, the largest refinery in the United States, and Motiva is more reliant on Saudi oil than any other part of America’s energy ecosystem. If Aramco tried to raise prices by cutting oil production or exports, it would face irate customers in Asia and hurt its own refineries in China and Korea, too.

#### Normal means doesn’t remove demining

Thul 18, Prak Chan Thul, experienced Correspondent with a demonstrated history of working in the media in Cambodia. Skilled in writing, investigative reporting, and strong media and communication professional with a Bachelor of Arts in English.

2-28-2018, "Cambodia 'shocked' by 'disrespectful' U.S. aid cut, says democracy...," U.S., [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-politics-usa/cambodia-shocked-by-disrespectful-u-s-aid-cut-says-democracy-intact-idUSKCN1GC0X0 /](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-politics-usa/cambodia-shocked-by-disrespectful-u-s-aid-cut-says-democracy-intact-idUSKCN1GC0X0%20/) MM

Cambodia said on Wednesday it was saddened and shocked by a “disrespectful” U.S. decision to rein back aid programs because of perceived democratic setbacks and defended its record on democracy. The White House said on Tuesday it was suspending or curtailing several Treasury, USAID and military assistance programs that support Cambodia’s military, taxation department and local authorities - all of which, it said, shared blame for recent instability. A Cambodian court on Tuesday ordered the seizure of the headquarters of the main opposition party, pending the payment of damages to Prime Minister Hun Sen, the latest blow to the dissolved opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party. Hun Sen, who has ruled Cambodia for more than 30 years, has forced the closure of an English-language newspaper and jailed government critics, including opposition leader Kem Sokha, whom he has accused of conspiring with the United States to overthrow him. Rights groups and Western nations have decried the crackdown on the opposition ahead of a general election set for July 29. “Besides being saddened and shocked over the decision by the friendly nation over development assistance, Cambodia is proud to maintain and continue democracy with energy,” government spokesman Phay Siphan told Reuters on Wednesday. Phay Siphan called the aid cut “disrespectful” and “dishonest” as it builds democracy. “Democracy belongs to the people, not to the party that is already dissolved,” he said. “Cambodia had a bitter experience during the interventions of the United States and Western nations, which tried to set up democracy between 1970 and 1975, and they failed,” he said. A defiant Guaido returns home to Venezuela Hun Sen has never forgiven the United States for dropping bombs on Cambodia during the Vietnam War, which ended in 1975. Cambodia ranks among the world’s nations most littered with unexploded ordnance, says the Mines Advisory Group, which helps find and destroy unexploded devices that kill or injure an average of two Cambodians every week. The White House said that Washington had spent more than $1 billion in support for Cambodia and that assistance in health, agriculture and mine-clearing will continue.

#### Terrorists won’t use nukes

Kapur ‘8 [S. Paul, associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. pg. 32]

Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes to engage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter 2004; U.S. Government 2002). However, **it is not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear devices**. Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity (Laqeuer 1999: 4-5), **extensive empirical evidence indicates** that **terrorist groups** in fact **behave rationally**, adopting strategies designed **to achieve particular ends** (Crenshaw 1995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on whether doing so is likely to further their goals. Under what circumstances could nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? **For** certain types of terrorist **objectives, nuclear weapons could be too destructive**. Large-scale **devastation could negatively influence audiences** important to the terrorist groups. Terrorists often rely on populations sympathetic to their cause for political, financial, and military support. The horrific destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienate segments of this audience. People who otherwise would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that in using a nuclear device terrorists had gone too far and were no longer deserving of support. The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, if a terrorist orga- nization were struggling with another group for control of their common home- land, the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy group would devastate the terrorists' own home territory**. Using nuclear weapons would be extremely counter- productive** for the terrorists in this scenario. It is thus not obvious that all terrorist groups would use nuclear weapons. Some groups would probably not. The propensity for nuclear acquisition and use by ter- rorist groups must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

#### Congress cut IMET to Saudi from the 2019 budget – thumps every disad

Harris 1/23 (Bryant Harris, 1-23-19, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/01/congress-cuts-deal-mideast-aid-package-saudi-arabia-turkey.html)

Although **Congress** has yet to coalesce around a path out of the monthlong government shutdown, it has at least **reached a consensus on a Middle East aid package for 2019. The compromise contains good news for several US allies** — namely Egypt, Morocco and Turkey — as it undoes significant setbacks they faced when the House passed a different spending bill earlier this year. **But it also** contains a significant blow to Saudi Arabia by shutting the kingdom out of a key US military training program. The **provisions were all in the Democratic-held House’s spending** bill, which passed 234-180 today. **The** Republican-controlled Senate **is set to vote on its own version** of the bill on Thursday, **but foreign aid provisions** are identicalto the House bill. The dueling bills differ on immigration and border security, so neither is likely to become law this week as the two chambers remain mired in partisan gridlock. Still, the Middle East aid provisions have already been agreed to in both chambers, **indicating that they’ll likely become law when the shutdown** eventually **ends.** The agreement comes after the House passed a different spending bill on Jan. 3 that would have cut Egyptian military aid, rebuked Morocco over its occupation of the Western Sahara and banned the transfer of F-35 jets to Turkey. Although that bill originated in the Republican-held Senate last year, the upper chamber did not include President Donald Trump’s more recent demand for funding to build a wall along the US-Mexico border. Notably, the House and Senate have agreed to a new provision in **today’s bill** that would cut Saudi Arabia off from the State Department-run International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. While the Saudis only receive a few thousand dollars in **IMET** assistance every year, **participation makes Riyadh eligible for savings on other US training programs** needed to operate its US-made military arsenal.

#### Cease-fire failed

MacMilan and Aldroubi 2/7 [Arthur, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent for The National, Mina, journalist for The National, “Talks on Yemen ceasefire break off without final agreement,” published 02/07/19, accessible online at <https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/talks-on-yemen-ceasefire-break-off-without-final-agreement-1.823064>] / MM

One part of a twin-pronged UN effort to push forward peace in Yemen failed to break the deadlock on Thursday as talks in Hodeidah broke off **without any final agreement** on how to redeploy rival forces as part of a stumbling ceasefire. The head of the UN monitoring mission in Hodeidah, Major General Michael Lollesgaard, this week chaired discussions between government and Houthi representatives to try and preserve the limited **truce**, which has been **undermined by** numerous and persistent breaches by the **rebels** during the six weeks it has been in force. A spokesman for UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres said plans were being made for more talks between the two sides as although “challenges remain, not least because of the complex nature of the current frontlines” in Hodeidah, a compromise had been agreed in principle. The details, which were not disclosed, would now go to government and Houthi leaders for approval. The talks about the withdrawal of all forces from the city and its three Red Sea ports started on Monday on a ship docked in the inner harbour of Hodeidah port, reflecting the high level of distrust between the two sides, who agreed to the ceasefire at UN-brokered talks in Sweden in December. Major General Lollesgaard chairs the joint Redeployment Coordination Committee which was later established to ensure the ceasefire is fully implemented. Repeated promises to do so **have not materialised**, **raising fears of** an **escalation** in the conflict. The agreed ceasefire **applies only to Hodeidah**. “To help overcome these issues, the RCC chair tabled a proposal that proved acceptable, in principle, to both parties to move forward on the implementation of the Hodeidah agreement,” the UN spokesman told reporters in New York on Thursday, confirming that this week's talks had ended. “A preliminary compromise was agreed, pending further consultation by the parties with their respective leaders. The RCC chair expects to reconvene the RCC within the next week, with the aim of finalising details for redeployments.” There is, however, **deep skepticism** about whether the ceasefire will come into full effect. On Thursday the UN's humanitarian aid chief, Mark Lowcock, said the Houthis were still refusing to grant access to the Red Sea Mills in Hodeidah, which hold tens of thousands of tonnes of grain which is urgently needed to feed millions of starving people. “Access to the mills grows ever more urgent as time passes and the risk of spoilage to the remaining grain increases,” Mr Lowcock said in a statement. Last week, the Arab-led coalition that backs Yemen's government sent a letter to the UN Security Council that outlined hundreds of incidents where the rebels had breached the ceasefire. The plan for talks on the ship to save the ceasefire was announced hours later. “The negotiations came to an end because the Houthis are **refusing to withdraw** their forces from Hodeidah and the ports,” a Yemeni government official told The National on Thursday.

#### Plan stops expansion of Iranian influence

Feltman 18 11/26/18 (Jeffery, American diplomat and former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. As head of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs Feltman oversaw the UN's diplomatic efforts to prevent and mitigate conflict worldwide, M.A. in Law and Diplomacy from Tufts University, “The Only Way to End the War in Yemen,” Foreign Affairs,

A unilateral Saudi cessation is risky. The Houthis—who sparked the war with their military takeover in 2014—would undoubtedly exploit it to trumpet the victory of their “resistance” against the greater firepower unleashed against them. And there is a chance this could be construed as a victory for Iran. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates exaggerated the degree of Iranian influence on the Houthis at the beginning of the war as part of their justification for intervening. But today, even though the Houthis are still not quite a subsidiary of Iran in the same way as, say, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iranian influence in Yemen has grown significantly.

The threat of expanding Iranian influence is not a reason to delay a cease-fire, however. While ending the war unilaterally and focusing on UN-sponsored political talks will not eliminate Iranian influence, such steps could halt its expansion. A drawn-out war in Yemen, on the other hand, will only produce the same result as the wars in Iraq and Lebanon: a permanently entrenched Iranian presence that operates through military proxies and is eventually able to direct domestic policy.

#### Ignore negative evidence – they’re on Saudi’s payroll

WP Editorial Board 18 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/does-saudi-money-leave-room-for-an-honest-debate/2018/10/24/678654c2-d7bb-11e8-aeb7-ddcad4a0a54e\_story.html?utm\_term=.ecdabd07f4fe

WASHINGTON NEEDS to have a thorough debate about Saudi Arabia and whether the bilateral relationship as it now stands serves U.S. interests. That raises a difficult question: **Is it possible to have an honest discussion when** so many **American experts are**, in one way or another, on the Saudi payroll? **Many countries spend heavily to influence Congress** or U.S. public opinion, **but the Saudi operation dwarfs most of them**. In the decade after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, in which 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals, the regime spent more than $100 million to rebuild its image here, according to Ben Freeman of the Center for International Policy. Last year alone **it spent $27.3 million on lobbyists and consultants**, according to public records; more than 200 people have registered as Saudi agents. Prominent Washington think tanks, including the Middle East Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, have accepted millions in Saudi money; so have universities**,** museums and other cultural organizations. U.S. financial firms are brokering big deals for the Saudi government, which is effectively controlled by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Members of Congress or journalists looking for expert advice on Saudi Arabia might typically turn to former **ambassadors or** former **chiefs of the Pentagon’s Central Command.** But a number of them **are connected to those think tanks or financial firms**. According to Mr. Freeman, lobbyists made nearly $400,000 in campaign contributions last year to Senate and House members they contacted on behalf of the Saudis; in 11 cases, the contributions were made on the same day as the contact.One of those lobbyists is Norm **Coleman**, a former Republican senator. He **told The Post that “the relationship with Saudi Arabia is critically important,** and its partnership in confronting the Iranian threat is critical for U.S. security.” That’s an oft-made and legitimate argument**.** But do those who hear it take into account the fact that Mr. **Coleman** is paid to represent Saudi rather than U.S. interests?

#### **Conditions on aid don’t work – the US becomes dependent on the recipient country and fails to influence reform**

Sullivan 12 (Patricia, Associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a 2015-2017 Andrew Carnegie Fellow. She teaches courses in foreign policy, international conflict, national security policy, and research design. “IS MILITARY AID AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY?” Scholars Strategy Network. May 2012. <https://scholars.org/sites/scholars/files/ssn_key_findings_sullivan_on_military_aid_and_foreign_policy_1.pdf>) / NE

The United States spends billions of dollars every year on military aid to foreign governments around the world, in the hope that aid will boost national security and increase American influence. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, military assistance has increased and gone to more countries. In the fight against terrorism, U.S. authorities have sent military aid to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Oman, Yemen, Uzbekistan, and Columbia, among other nations. Does giving military aid work? Sometimes, the benefits are clear. After America enormously increased aid to (the former Soviet republic of) Georgia, that country sent 2,000 soldiers to support the U.S. war effort in Iraq. But at other times, the United States gives aid without gaining new leverage. Pakistan, for example, is widely believed to have channeled a portion of billions in U.S. military aid dollars to extremist groups, and Pakistan’s military retains ties to the very same Haqqani network and Taliban militants who are killing U.S. soldiers fighting in Afghanistan. Can Military Aid Buy Cooperation? Scholars offer competing theories about the impact of military aid: • Arms for Influence. This theory predicts that a foreign government’s level of cooperation will grow as U.S. military aid increases. Accordingly, U.S. authorities should continue military aid to cooperative countries and reduce or eliminate aid when governments fail to support American foreign policy positions. • The Lonely Superpower theory posits that dependence on a powerful state can fuel defiance. Governments receiving significant amounts of military aid may temper their cooperation with the United States, or even openly defy our leaders, in an attempt to avoid being viewed as “American puppets” by domestic and international audiences. • The Reverse Leverage model suggests that, paradoxically, a powerful nation can become dependent on countries it aids. In this way of thinking, the amount of military aid granted to a foreign government reflects the extent to which the U.S. is reliant on that nation – for things like oil exports, intelligence, bases for troops, and military cooperation. In this perspective, it could be easier for a nation receiving assistance to obtain military aid elsewhere than for a superpower like the United States to find an equally valuable strategic partner. Rather than inducing compliance, generous U.S. military funding runs the risk of creating strong clients who are able to ignore U.S. interests and play us off against other powers. What the Evidence Shows The world is much more complicated than any one model can capture. Each nation receiving major military aid has a unique relationship with the United States that changes over time. Nevertheless, a thorough investigation of the connections between U.S. military aid and the level of foreign policy cooperation exhibited by the governments that received aid between 1990 and 2004 reveals a pattern largely consistent with the Reverse Leverage model. • In general, U.S. military aid proved to be negatively correlated with cooperation by the nations receiving the aid. In fact, national governments that received aid exhibited less cooperative behavior toward the United States than governments given no military aid. • Some countries that received U.S. military aid became more cooperative with increased levels of assistance. But aid was less likely to induce cooperation from formal U.S. allies. • In practice, the United States did not punish defiance with reductions in aid; nor did it reward greater cooperation with increases in military aid. The opposite pattern prevailed, because higher levels of cooperation from nations we assisted were correlated with decreased military aid in subsequent years, while reductions in cooperative behavior were often followed by increased aid. Can Military Aid Advance American Foreign Policy Goals? Given these patterns, U.S. policymakers face a difficult dilemma. Providing military assistance may be the only way to gain influence in key countries – such as Pakistan – located in strategically crucial parts of the world. Even if aid does not have a positive effect on the level of cooperation with the United States overall, the U.S. may still get specific benefits. Policymakers, however, still have to cope with the limited utility of military aid for inspiring cooperation with overall foreign-policy goals. Providing military assistance may at times allow the United States to avoid the costs of direct military interventions, but leaders should take care not to hurt longterm American security interests. U.S. leaders must: • Have realistic expectations. Realize that military aid might achieve short-term security goals, but will not usually induce general cooperation. • Acknowledge constraints on flexibility. Military aid is not a very effective carrot or stick, because it cannot easily be turned on and off. Immediate U.S. security needs may impel aid, but don’t imagine that flows of aid can be calibrated over time to change a foreign government’s policy preferences. • Be cognizant of the risks. Providing military aid to foreign governments can backfire. Arms transfers to developing countries have been linked to increases in human rights abuses and may impede democratization. Military assistance can enable client states to aggress against their neighbors – which may hurt American interests in the region. Finally, when alliances shift or governments are replaced, America can find itself in combat against an enemy equipped with U.S-made weapons sent at an earlier time. That is what happened in Afghanistan. We gave arms to Afghans and Arabs to fight the Soviets in the 1980s, only to see many of the same fighters turn against us in 9/11 and afterwards.

#### Saudi meets conditions, but then ignores them and continues the war anyways

Meyers 18 [Joshua Meyers (Joshua Myers is an Advocacy Intern at ADHRB)Saudi Arabia Dishes Out Aid to Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen as PR Stunt November 27, 2018]

On 30 October 2018, documents concerning an agreement made between the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) and Saudi Arabia regarding humanitarian aid were leaked. The Guardian [reported](https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/30/saudis-demanded-good-publicity-over-yemen-aid-leaked-un-document-shows) that foreign aid from Saudi Arabia came with so many strings attached that it could be considered ‘paid publicity’. While all states plan to enjoy some positive recognition for donating to humanitarian efforts, states mainly provide aid because they believe it is their moral obligation. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, required specific concessions in exchange for the $930 million dollars of humanitarian aid, in the form of favorable news in equal measure to their donation. Thus, the kingdom transformed humanitarian aid into a service transaction, shown in the leaked documentation detailing Saudi Arabia’s requirement for aid to “be tied to the amount of beneficial publicity given to Saudi Arabia.” Though ostensibly the Saudi government intervened in the Yemen conflict in 2015 to aid the government officially recognized by the UN against insurrection, their true reason behind engaging was to ensure Saudi’s sphere of influence was maintained in the region. Three years into the civil war, Saudi Arabia’s intervention is seen as having created a humanitarian catastrophe on a monumental scale. So far over [10,000 civilians](http://yemendataproject.org/data/) have been killed from bombings, famine, and other trappings of war, including a [bus full of children](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/02/saudis-admit-yemen-strike-on-bus-carrying-children-unjustified) who were killed by a Saudi air-strike in August 2018. According to The Guardian, the terms for Saudi Arabia’s 2018 humanitarian budget for Yemen, referred to as the Visibility Plan, showed OCHA was put under extreme pressure to abide by the public relations requirements desired by the kingdom. Saudi Arabia is only concerned with providing aid to Yemen to bolster its own public image, not out of a desire to alleviate the suffering and pain caused by its own role in the conflict The publicity garnered from these donations was not meant to simply be a thank you for a generous contribution. Instead, the intention was to counterbalance the bad press Saudi Arabia was receiving for causing Yemen’s humanitarian crisis in the first place. [Stories](https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/un-receives-nearly-1-billion-saudi-arabia-uae-humanitarian-response-yemen-crisis) praising Saudi Arabia were to be published in newspapers such as the New York Times and the Guardian, the paper that broke this story. The publicity was to be specifically targeted towards countries that hold weight in the international community and also sell arms to the Saudi government, such as the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). Additionally, in the agreement with OCHA, Saudi Arabia adds: “We consider it very important to ensure that our dear fellow Yemenis are all aware of our donations. More emphasis should be placed on strengthening the local visibility plan by engaging local media … so that donors get deserved recognition and not to be overshadowed by the recipient’s agencies’ visibility.” This report comes at a time when US Senators are [pushing](https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/418320-sanders-to-force-vote-this-week-on-us-support-for-saudi-arabia-in-yemen) for a stop to arms sales to Saudi Arabia – centered around the planned assassination of journalist [Jamal Khashoggi](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/22/the-khashoggi-fallout-a-timeline-of-events.html) by the Saudi government. This new information surrounding Saudi Arabia treating humanitarian aid, a necessity for the most vulnerable, as a PR campaign for its own gain should be included in their decision making. As Saudi Arabia is the cause of much of the suffering in Yemen, this is another factor that should add weight to a necessary move in rebuking Saudi Arabia for its role in the Yemen crisis.

#### Conditioning fails – no consistent metrics, opacity, conflicting agency authorities, and no political follow-through

Lauren Ploch Blanchard 15, Specialist in African Affairs, Congressional Research Service, “Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Hearing: U.S. Security Assistance in Africa,” Congressional Research Service, June 4, 2015, [https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/060415\_Blanchard\_Testimony.pdf //](https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/060415_Blanchard_Testimony.pdf%20//) JW

Assessing the impact and effectiveness of U.S. security assistance is difficult. Neither the State Department nor DOD have used consistent metrics to systematically measure progress or evaluate the results of such assistance over time. Instead, for some State Department programs, such as PREACT and TSCTP, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that the agencies appear to have relied primarily on informal feedback from U.S. embassy staff to determine progress.45 Other programs, like GPOI, which has its own evaluation team, have considered the number of individuals trained as one of several measures of success. DOD developed a qualitative assessment framework for evaluating Section 1206 programs and first reported on its results in 2013; its internal assessments, however, have not been publicly released. The lack of comprehensive assessment criteria, analysis, and supporting documentation poses challenges not only for conducting qualitative assessments, but also for the Departments’ decisionmaking on future programming and resource allocation, and for congressional oversight. Several assessments have raised concerns with the timeliness of security cooperation programs, the “patchwork” nature of current authorities, programs, and resources; and some partner nations’ capacity to absorb such assistance.46Analysts have identified other shortfalls in the planning and implementation of U.S. security assistance programs in Africa, including insufficient efforts to track the trajectory of participants in military training engagements and persistent interagency disagreements as to where identified threats rank among U.S. national security priorities.47 Both Departments have undertaken efforts to improve program monitoring and evaluation, although the result of those efforts, and the extent to which they are coordinated among agencies, are unclear at this time.48 Measuring longer-term impacts for some capacity building programs may remain a challenge, given varying degrees of capability and political will on the part of recipient countries to bear sustainment costs, and limited U.S. resources and authorities for maintaining the capabilities built under programs like those funded under 10 U.S.C. 2282 authority.49

#### Conditioning fails – we have no monitoring capacity or the guts to disengage upon failure

Clist 12 [The Continued Use and Failure of Conditional Aid Paul Clist (School of International Development, University of East Anglia, UK) 29/10/12 https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db\_name=res\_phd\_2013&paper\_id=80}//LC

Conditionality failure, the failure of donors to enforce their own conditions, is widely recognised. It has been well documented by Kanbur, Collier, and many others. Empirical evidence is more difficult to obtain, but shows that unmet conditions are not a barrier to continued disbursement for either the IMF or the World Bank (Marchesi and Sabani, 2007; Kilby, 2009)1 . Various competing accounts share three explanations. First, the donor’s inequality aversion stymies its ability to withhold aid from a recipient for fear of punishing the poor. Second, the donor does not possess commitment technology and so cannot credibly bind itself to withhold aid from recipients that renege on promised policy reforms. Third, a recipient’s signal of reform effort is unverifiable (or noisy), and so a donor cannot know with certainty whether a recipient truly deserves punishment or praise. The first two explanations lend themselves to a Samaritan’s Dilemma framework, well recognised in economics since Buchanan (1975) and formally applied to conditional aid in the seminal work of Svensson (2000). Here a recipient’s anticipation of future charity will adversely affect its current behaviour, yet the donor cannot credibly threaten to withhold charity in the future period as it does not posses commitment technology

#### The US excessive support of Saudi Arabia reduces US leverage, causes oil shocks, terror, regional instability, and prolif

**Walt 18** (Stephen, Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “The Islamic Republic of Hysteria,” Foreign Policy, 1/16/18, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/the-islamic-republic-of-hysteria-iran-middle-east-trump/>, accessed 1/20/19) KED

Fortunately, no state inside or outside the Middle East was then — or is today — in a position to control it. As a result, the United States does not have to do much to maintain a regional balance of power. Instead of giving Saudi Arabia or Israel a blank check to counter some mythical Iranian hegemon, Washington should seek more balanced relations with all states in the region, Iran included. This more equitable approach would facilitate cooperation on issues where U.S. and Iranian interests align, such as Afghanistan. The prospect of better relations with the United States would give Tehran an incentive to moderate its behavior. Past U.S. efforts to isolate the clerical regime encouraged it to play a spoiler’s role instead, with some degree of success. This approach would also discourage America’s present allies from taking U.S. support for granted and encourage them to do more to retain its favor. America’s current regional allies (and their domestic lobbies) would surely protest vehemently if Washington stopped backing them to the hilt and sought even a modest détente with Iran. But that is ultimately their problem, not America’s. Excessive U.S. support encourages allies to behave recklessly, as Israel does when it expands illegal settlements and as Saudi Arabia is doing with its military campaign in Yemen, its diplomatic squabble with Qatar, and its bungled attempt to reshape politics inside Lebanon. If U.S. allies understood that Washington was talking to everyone, however, they would have more reason to listen to America’s advice lest it curtail its support and look elsewhere. Having many options is the ultimate source of leverage. Playing balance-of-power politics in the Middle East does not require Washington to abandon its current allies completely or tilt toward Tehran. Rather, it means using U.S. power to maintain a rough balance, discourage overt efforts to alter the status quo, and prevent any state from dominating the region while helping local powers resolve their differences. Lowering the temperature in this way would safeguard access to oil, dampen desire in the region for weapons of mass destruction, and give these states less reason to fund extremists and other proxies.

#### No leverage arguments – MbS doesn’t listen to us telling him not to bomb children


**Walsh and Schmitt 12/25** (Declan and Eric, “Arms Sales to Saudis Leave American Fingerprints on Yemen’s Carnage,” The New York Times, 12/25/18, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/25/world/middleeast/yemen-us-saudi-civilian-war.html>, accessed 1/20/19) KED

For decades, the United States sold tens of billions of dollars in arms to Saudi Arabia on an unspoken premise: that they would rarely be used. The Saudis amassed the world’s third-largest fleet of F-15 jets, after the United States and Israel, but their pilots almost never saw action. They shot down two Iranian jets over the Persian Gulf in 1984, two Iraqi warplanes during the 1991 gulf war and they conducted a handful of bombing raids along the border with Yemen in 2009. The United States had similar expectations for its arms sales to other Persian Gulf countries. “There was a belief that these countries wouldn’t end up using this equipment, and we were just selling them expensive paperweights,” said Andrew Miller, a former State Department official now with the Project on Middle East Democracy. Then came Prince Mohammed bin Salman. When the prince, then the Saudi defense minister, sent fighter jets to Yemen in March 2015, Pentagon officials were flustered to receive just 48 hours notice of the first strikes against Houthi rebels, two former senior American officials said. American officials were persuaded by Saudi assurances the campaign would be over in weeks. But as the weeks turned to years, and the prospect of victory receded, the Americans found themselves backing a military campaign that was exacting a steep civilian toll, largely as a result of Saudi and Emirati airstrikes. American military officials posted to the coalition war room in Riyadh noticed that inexperienced Saudi pilots flew at high altitudes to avoid enemy fire, military officials said. The tactic reduced the risk to the pilots but transferred it to civilians, who were exposed to less accurate bombings. Coalition planners misidentified targets and their pilots struck them at the wrong time — destroying a vehicle as it passed through a crowded bazaar, for instance, instead of waiting until it reached an open road. The coalition routinely ignored a no-strike list — drawn up by the United States Central Command and the United Nations — of hospitals, schools and other places where civilians gathered. At times, coalition officers subverted their own chain of command. In one instance, a devastating strike that killed 155 people in a funeral hall was ordered by a junior officer who countermanded an order from a more senior officer, a State Department official said. The Americans offered help. The State Department financed an investigative body to review errant airstrikes and propose corrective action. Pentagon lawyers trained Saudi officers in the laws of war. Military officers suggested putting gun cameras on Saudi and Emiratis warplanes to see how strikes were being conducted. The coalition balked. In June 2017, American officials extracted new promises of safeguards, including stricter rules of engagement and an expansion of the no-strike list to about 33,000 targets — provisions that allowed the secretary of state, then Rex W. Tillerson, to win support in Congress for the sale of more than $510 million in precision-guided munitions to the kingdom. But those measures seemed to make little difference. Just over a year later, in August 2018, a coalition airstrike killed at least 40 boys on a packed school bus in northern Yemen.

**The executive can do it --- they have the authority, are faster than the State Department and control most of the aid now --- we’ll insert this chart**

Ryan 16Missy Ryan, Reporter covering the Pentagon, military issues and national security, for the Washington Post, “State Department and Pentagon tussle over control of foreign military aid,” The Washington Post. July 10, 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/state-department-and-pentagon-tussle-over-control-of-foreign-military-aid/2016/07/10/ddc98f3e-42b0-11e6-88d0-6adee48be8bc_story.html?utm_term=.9a5f308162e0>//rjp

President Obama’s most senior advisers convened last month to consider changes to the way the United States provides security aid to foreign nations, as **a long-running struggle for control between the State and Defense departments intensifies**. At the heart of the controversy is **whether the State Department will retain its historic jurisdiction over security aid, or whether the Pentagon, which Congress has bestowed with increasing autonomy and resources over the past decade, will eclipse Foggy Bottom** in taking greater responsibility for engagement with allied nations overseas. The June 30 meeting of Cabinet officials centered on execution of [**Obama’s 2013 directive**](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-policy) **on security assista**nce, which **sought to ensure that the billions of aid dollars the United States provides to allied nations each year are used more effectively.** Adding to concerns at the State Department is a series of proposals in **this year’s defense authorization bill**, which **would give the Pentagon permanent control over certain aid programs** **and greater flexibility in supporting counterterrorism activities overseas**. [[U.S. will seek billions more to support Afghan military efforts](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-us-will-be-seeking-billions-more-from-other-countries-to-help-support-afghanistan-efforts/2016/06/17/3b6bb0b8-2f3d-11e6-b9d5-3c3063f8332c_story.html)] The discussions are part **of an effort to reform the United States’ unwieldy system for providing assistance to foreign security forces**, which includes more than 100 different legislative authorities and accounted for at least $20 billion in U.S. spending in 2015. State Department officials fear that an expansion in Pentagon control over security assistance would impair diplomatic efforts and move the United States further from the Obama administration’s goal of getting the military out of foreign aid. Diplomats also say that military-led programs, without adequate input from the State Department, can overlook key human rights or governance concerns and heighten tensions with nations such as China and Russia, because foreign governments see assistance delivered by the U.S. military, rather than civilian agencies, as a potential threat. “We’ve got to balance the various components of our foreign policy,” said a senior State Department official who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. “The more money and more authority you move out of traditional accounts we have used for decades to work with our partners, the more you lose the ability to balance.” [[Outside the wire: How U.S. Special Operations troops secretly help foreign forces target terrorists](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/outside-the-wire-how-us-special-operations-troops-secretly-help-foreign-forces-target-terrorists/2016/04/16/a9c1a7d0-0327-11e6-b823-707c79ce3504_story.html)] After World War II, the United States provided substantial aid to countries such as Egypt, Israel and Jordan, to help those nations build up their own militaries’ powers and, equally, to secure U.S. influence in support of key U.S. goals. That picture became more complicated after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, as Congress authorized new programs to help the U.S. military train and equip Iraqi and Afghan forces and assist allies in combating terrorism. The bulk of new programs were given to the Pentagon to lead, although the State Department retains a veto right over many of them. **Pentagon officials**, meanwhile, **warn of State Department micromanagement of programs they see not as aid but activities central to U.S. military objectives**. They consider certain joint training exercises, for instance, primarily as a vehicle for ensuring the readiness of U.S. troops, rather than a means to build up foreign militaries. Defense officials say the State Department has used the 2013 order, called a Presidential Policy Directive, to advance an “incredibly broad” definition of what security assistance is, a move that if supported by the White House could increase State Department say over certain programs. “A lot of what is going on here right now is this disconnect where the State Department has viewed our programs and our authorities and our resources as being in direct competition with theirs, whereas we view them very differently,” one senior defense official said. [[After more than $1.6 billion in U.S. aid, Iraq’s army still struggles](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqs-army-is-still-a-mess-two-years-after-a-stunning-defeat/2016/06/09/0867f334-1868-11e6-971a-dadf9ab18869_story.html)] **The Pentagon has** also **complained for years that the State Department**, **which lacks a vast staff to oversee aid programs, is not as fast or nimble as it might be in processing aid proposals**. **Robust and flexible funding for such programs, defense officials say, will not only help them combat global terrorism threats but will compensate for a shrinking U.S. force.** Gordon Adams, a former White House budget official who is a fellow at the Stimson Center, said the **seemingly arcane bureaucratic competition had wide-reaching effects. “Who owns the ball matters here because it colors the way the U.S. engages overseas**,” he said. “If American engagement wears a uniform . . . that’s one form of interaction. If it involves the ambassador and the [U.S. Agency for International Development] and people doing governance work, it’s a different set of missions and there’s a hugely different perception.” **In practice, the Defense Department often executes even programs that are primarily State Department authorities.** The Obama administration has threatened to veto both the Senate and House versions of the defense bill over multiple concerns, including what the White House said were excessive changes to security assistance programs. Officials said the recent meeting did not produce an immediate resolution to the issue of what programs will be subject to new assistance guidelines. No matter the final outcome, Michael McNerney, a former Pentagon official who is a scholar at the Rand Corp., said **the trend of increasing Pentagon activity with foreign militaries was unlikely to be reversed.** The Obama administration has prioritized efforts to build the skills of partner nations so they, often with U.S. support, can fight militant groups overseas, in part to avoid having to deploy American forces. **Many of the initiatives that support that goal are overseen by the Pentagon. “The toothpaste can’t go back in the tube,”** McNerney said. “It’s not realistic to make things the way they were before 9/11.”



#### DoD is normal means

**McBride 18** James McBride, Deputy Editor at Council on Foreign Relations, a master’s degree from Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, “How Does the U.S. Spend Its Foreign Aid?” Council on Foreign Relations, October 1, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-spend-its-foreign-aid

The Department of Defense plays a major role as the agency primarily responsible for implementing traditional military aid, though the State Department also funds and influences many security assistance programs. The Department of Health and Human Services implements many health-related programs, including the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The Treasury Department helps manage funding of global financial institutions, as well as programs for debt relief and economic reforms in poor countries. There is also a plethora of other agencies and autonomous organizations, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Peace Corps, and the African Development Foundation, involved in aid work.

#### DoD controls withdrawal

BINETTI 8 A Monograph by MAJ Michael R. Binetti United States Army, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas AY 2008 ["Institutionalizing Security Force Assistance ", https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a484764.pdf] bcr 12-4-2018

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE GUIDANCE Security assistance is very complex, derived from many different inputs and executed through many different outputs. The President of the United States, through the National Security Council (NSC), produce the National Security Strategy (NSS) outlining the major areas of concern and very broad ideas to address the issues and convey additional national level guidance through such documents as the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The resources used to execute these goals are predicated on the amount of funding expected from the Congress. These documents are used in the development of other policy guidance such as the National Defense Strategy which in turn provides guidance for the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism and the National Military Strategy. Even though the Department of States is responsible for direct foreign military aid, the Department of Defense is essentially subcontracted to provide security assistance. For example, in FY 2005, the DoD managed approximately $4.7 billion of total foreign aid spending.84 This necessitates the Secretary of Defense also publish Security Cooperation Guidance to provide guidance to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and combatant commanders, while the Department of State is responsible for publishing its Strategic Plan. While not directly stated in the DoS Strategic Plan, they allude to the large role the DoD plays in the execution of SA, stating, *Defense coordinates closely on counterterrorism and counter-narcotics programs, and provides the military-to-military contacts, assistance, and training that strengthen military and alliance relationships, play an important role in the management of arms transfers and the Excess Defense Articles program, and support the evacuation of non-combatants from crisis or disaster sites….85* Each Combatant Commander (CC) is responsible for developing their individual Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) as part of their larger theater strategy. It incorporates the national, defense and military strategies customized for the specific geographic combatant commanders’ area and is therefore ideally nested with higher guidance and regionally focused.86 The combatant commander’s theater strategy should be developed in conjunction with the Department of State (DoS) country team but because of different geographical boundaries, the DoS country teams representatives being military members and the combatant commander having great authority, the strategy is not always properly nested.87 Each US Embassy, under the Security Assistance Officer (SAO) soon to be Security Cooperation Officer (SCO), is supposed to develop a two year training plan for the country that is also nested with the CC. While it is the DoS that possess the authority for international engagement, it is the DoD that has the resources and as a result the DoD tends to have a larger voice than the DoS in execution.88 Each CC must submit their TSCP to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for annual review, but there is no national level process that ensures all the CCs TSCPs are nested or unified across the JIIM. riorities.”90 89 A recent report to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations noted that aid programs run by both the DoS and DoD, “..are in need of strong guidance from the embassies if they are to be coordinated with other programs the U.S. Government is supporting and are to be consistent with U.S. foreign policy priorities.”90

#### Veto won’t pass fam

Liesniewski 4-22-19 (Niels, Senior Senate Staff Writer at CQ and Roll Call specializing in reporting Congressional action, “Bernie Sanders makes plea for Senate to override Donald Trump’s Yemen veto” Roll Call, March 22, 2019. <https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/bernie-sanders-override-trump-yemen-veto>) NE

President Donald Trump’s veto of a joint resolution to put an end to U.S. support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen is going to kick the matter back to senators when they return to the Capitol next week. With recess continuing this week, senators are in their home states, on congressional delegations abroad and on the presidential campaign trail. But Vermont independent Sen. Bernie Sanders , one of the many Democratic presidential candidates, took a moment Monday to circulate a dear colleague letter seeking support for overriding the Trump veto. “For far too long Congress, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, has abdicated its Constitutional role with regard to the authorization of war,” Sanders wrote to his Senate colleagues. “The historic passage of this resolution, the first time since the 1973 War Powers Resolution was passed that it has been successfully used to withdraw the United States from an unauthorized war, was a long overdue step by Congress to reassert that authority.” “The Congress must now act to protect that constitutional responsibility by overriding the president’s veto,” Sanders wrote. Sanders, who has been out on the presidential campaign trail himself, wrote in the letter that supporters of the American involvement in Saudi Arabia’s Yemen campaign should seek a floor debate and and vote on that effort. The resolution gained significant momentum last year in the aftermath of the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. The Senate is likely going to have to take up the veto override vote, though given that the underlying resolution only passed with a 54-46 vote under an expedited process, it its not expected to prevail. There are a number of procedural options available to senators for dispensing with veto messages. Motions to refer the president’s message to committee or to table the matter entirely are possible (though unlikely to work given the support of a majority of senators for the resolution itself). While it’s unusual to try to force a cloture vote on a veto override effort, it would be possible to debate the Yemen resolution to death since the 60 votes needed for cloture is a greater number than the number of senators supporting the joint resolution. The most straightforward way to dispense with the Yemen resolution would be to reach a unanimous consent agreement to set up a direct vote on overriding the Trump veto, which would require 67 votes of all of the senators that are in attendance that day. The president’s message, which was released oh April 16, contends that the War Powers resolution is not necessary since U.S. troops are not directly engaged in Yemen except for possible counter-terrorism operations. Trump’s message also said that the proposed restrictions would would be dangerous and counterproductive to foreign policy. “The Congress should not seek to prohibit certain tactical operations, such as in-flight refueling, or require military engagements to adhere to arbitrary timelines,” the message said. “Doing so would interfere with the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and could endanger our service members by impairing their ability to efficiently and effectively conduct military engagements and to withdraw in an orderly manner at the appropriate time.” Regardless, the Democratic-led House of Representatives in not expected to ever get a chance to see the veto message, since it’s on a joint resolution that was first introduced in the Senate.

#### Current bills get circumvented

Anderson 18 Scott R. Anderson [is a David M. Rubenstein fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. He previously served as an Attorney-Adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State and as the legal advisor for the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq]., 12-5-2018, "Taking Stock of the Yemen Resolution," Lawfare, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/taking-stock-yemen-resolution> RE

The operative language of S.J. Res. 54 is short, simple, and to the point: It “directs the President to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen” within 30 days, except for those “engaged in operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces[.]” This parrots the language of the WPR’s expedited procedures provision, ensuring that the joint resolution as a whole qualifies for the privileged status and limited debate periods for which that provision provides. Yet this narrow scope is a double-edged sword. The Trump administration has argued that the activities it is pursuing in support of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen—namely, “defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties”—do not constitute “hostilities” for the purposes of the WPR. Even if S.J. Res. 54 were enacted, the Trump administration contends, it would have no legal effect. This interpretation may not be correct; indeed, in its preamble, S.J. Res. 54 expresses a contrary view of what constitutes “hostilities.” But it should be taken seriously. The Trump administration’s position is consistent with long-standing executive branch practice in regard to the WPR’s related reporting requirements. Moreover, it’s arguably consistent with certain public positions adopted by the Obama administration. These factors—and the congressional acquiescence they arguably imply—may weigh heavily in the government’s favor, even if the federal courts were to overcome their usual reticence and rule on the matter. And perhaps more importantly, by virtue of its constitutional authority over the military and law enforcement, the executive branch’s views on what constitutes “hostilities” are likely to remain operational unless and until a federal court holds to the contrary. As a result, it’s unclear whether S.J. Res. 54 will have the effect intended, even if it is ultimately enacted into law.

#### Aid is sloppy and outdated – it provides zero leverage or influence

Walsh and Schmitt 18 [Walsh, Cairo Bureau chief, and Schmitt, national security writer, 12-25-18, Declan and Eric, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/25/world/middleeast/yemen-us-saudi-civilian-war.html] / MM

For decades, the United States sold tens of billions of dollars in arms to Saudi Arabia on an unspoken premise: that they would rarely be used. The Saudis amassed the world’s third-largest fleet of F-15 jets, after the United States and Israel, but their pilots almost never saw action. They shot down two Iranian jets over the Persian Gulf in 1984, two Iraqi warplanes during the 1991 gulf war and they conducted a handful of bombing raids along the border with Yemen in 2009. The United States had similar expectations for its arms sales to other Persian Gulf countries. “There was a belief that these countries wouldn’t end up using this equipment, and we were just selling them expensive paperweights,” said Andrew Miller, a former State Department official now with the Project on Middle East Democracy. Then came Prince Mohammed bin Salman. **When the prince**, then the Saudi defense minister, **sent fighter jets to Yemen** in March 2015, Pentagon officials were flustered to receive just 48 hours notice of the first strikes against Houthi rebels, two former senior American officials said. American **officials were persuaded by Saudi assurances the campaign would be over in** weeks. But as the weeks turned to years, and the prospect of victory receded, the Americans found themselves backing a military campaign that was exacting a steep civilian toll, largely as a result of Saudi and Emirati airstrikes. American military officials posted to the coalition war room in Riyadh noticed that inexperienced Saudi pilots flew at high altitudes to avoid enemy fire, military officials said. The tactic reduced the risk to the pilots but transferred it to civilians, who were exposed to less accurate bombings. **Coalition planners** misidentified targets and their pilots struck them at the wrong time — destroying a vehicle as it passed through a crowded bazaar, for instance, instead of waiting until it reached an open road. The coalition **routinely ignored a no-strike list** — drawn up by the United States Central Command and the United Nations — of hospitals, schools and other places where civilians gathered. At times, **coalition officers** subverted their own **chain of command.** In one instance, a devastating strike that killed 155 people in a funeral hall was ordered by a junior officer who countermanded an order from a more senior officer, a State Department official said. The Americans offered help. The State Department financed an investigative body to review errant airstrikes and propose corrective action. Pentagon lawyers trained Saudi officers in the laws of war. Military officers suggested putting gun cameras on Saudi and Emiratis warplanes to see how strikes were being conducted. The coalition balked. In June 2017, **American officials extracted new promises of safeguards**, including stricter rules of engagement and an expansion of the no-strike list to about 33,000 targets — provisions that allowed the secretary of state, then Rex W. Tillerson, to win support in Congress for the sale of more than $510 million in precision-guided munitions to the kingdom. But those measures seemed to make little difference. Just over a year later, in August 2018, a coalition airstrike killed at least 40 boys on a packed school bus in northern Yemen. **Still, American leaders ins**isted they need to keep helping **the** Saudi **coalition.** America’s role in the war was “absolutely essential” to safeguard civilians, the general in charge of Central Command, Gen. Joseph L. Votel, told a charged Senate hearing in March. “I think this does give us the best opportunity to address these concerns,” he said.

#### The aff is inherent

Davis and Schmitt 18 Davis, Julie Hirschfeld. Schmitt, Eric. “Senate Votes to Limit War Powers in Yemen, Angered by Saudi Killing of Journalist.” The New York Times. December 13, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/politics/yemen-saudi-war-pompeo-mattis.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur> / MM

Senate voted resoundingly on Thursday to withdraw American military assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, issuing the latest in a series of stinging bipartisan rebukes of President Trump for his defense of the kingdom amid outrage in both parties over Riyadh’s role in the killing of a dissident journalist. The 56-to-41 vote was a rare move by the Senate to limit presidential war powers and send a potent message of official disapproval for a nearly four-year conflict that has killed thousands of civilians and brought famine to Yemen. Its immediate effect was largely symbolic, after the House earlier this week moved to scuttle it, all but assuring that the measure will expire this year without making it to Mr. Trump’s desk.

#### There are no alternatives for Saudi

Guay 18 Guay, Terrence. [Clinical Professor of International Business, Pennsylvania State University]. “Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in the Khashoggi affair.” The Conversation: Economy + Business. October 19, 2018. <https://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998>

While it’s true that Russia and China are [indeed major exporters](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/yb_18_summary_en_0.pdf) of armaments, the claim that U.S. weapons can easily be replaced by other suppliers is not – at least not in the short term. First, once a country is “locked in” to a specific kind of weapons system, such as planes, tanks or naval vessels, the cost to [switch](http://doi.org/10.1257/jep.8.4.65) to a different supplier can be huge. Military personnel must be retrained on new equipment, spare parts need to be replaced, and operational changes may be necessary. After being so reliant on U.S. weapons systems for decades, the [transition costs](http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a498941.pdf) to buy from another country could be prohibitive even for oil-rich Saudi Arabia. The second problem with Trump’s argument is that armaments from Russia, China or elsewhere are simply not as sophisticated as U.S. weapons, which is why they are usually cheaper – though the quality gap is quickly decreasing. To maintain its military superiority in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has opted to purchase virtually all of its weapons from American and European companies. That is why the U.S. has significant leverage in this aspect of the relationship. Any [Saudi threat](http://fortune.com/2018/10/14/saudis-threaten-retaliation-jamal-khashoggi/) to retaliate against a ban on U.S. arms sales by buying weapons from countries that have not raised concerns about the Khashoggi disappearance would not be credible. And is probably why, despite worries in the White House, such a threat has not yet been made.

### Framing

#### **Total** extinction is laughable

**Naam 13** Ramez Naam was the [CEO](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CEO) of Apex Nanotechnologies. He currently holds a seat on the advisory board of the Institute for Accelerating Change, is a member of the World Future Society, a Senior Associate of the [Foresight Institute](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foresight_Institute), and a fellow of the [Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institute_for_Ethics_and_Emerging_Technologies). (Naam, Ramez. "Can Humans Survive Mass Extinction? | Guest Blog, Scientific American Blog Network." Can Humans Survive Mass Extinction? | Guest Blog, Scientific American Blog Network. N.p., 31 May 2013. Web. 03 June 2013. <http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2013/05/31/can-humans-survive-mass-extinction/>.)

Threats that could wipe out the bulk of life on earth abound. Planetary catastrophe could come in the form of a killer asteroid impact, the eruption of massive supervolcanoes, a nearby gamma ray burst that sterilizes the earth, or by human-driven environmental collapse. Yet life will endure, says Annalee Newitz, and so will humanity. In her new book, [Scatter, Adapt, and Remember: How Humans Will Survive a Mass Extinction](http://amzn.to/112IuZ7), Newitz surveys billions of years of history and five previous mass extinctions to draw lessons about how catastrophe comes and how – and why – life abides.¶ The breadth of the book is truly astounding, ranging from the planet’s first mass extinction – as cyanobacteria exhaled massive amounts of oxygen into the Earth’s atmosphere, poisoning most other life even as they paved the way for the ecosystem we see today – to the techniques that grey whales, Jewish communities, and plague survivors have used to ensure their survival. In between we see the Earth freeze over then then thaw again. We watch as dinosaurs rise and fall, mammals come to dominate the world, and primates evolve into hominids and eventually modern humanity with all its varied challenges. The scale starts at billions of years, then zooms down to millions, then thousands, and then into the present day, before zipping ahead into the future.¶ Newitz came to this topic with a pessimistic outlook, she writes, believing that humanity was doomed, and intent on producing a book with that slant. Yet her research convinced her that the opposite is true – that while global risks abound, and while we humans ourselves are potentially the greatest threat to both our own species and other life on Earth – we will nevertheless (probably) find ways to survive and bounce back from even the worse catastrophes.¶ In the introduction she tells us that disaster, whether human created or not, is inevitable – but doom is not. How can she believe this? In her words:¶ Because the world has been almost completely destroyed half a dozen times. [..] Earth has been shattered by asteroid impacts, choked by extreme greenhouse gases, locked up in ice, bombarded with cosmic radiation, and ripped open by megavolcanoes so massive they are almost unimaginable. Each of these disasters caused mass extinctions, during which more than 75% of the species on Earth died out. And yet every single time, living creatures carried on, adapting to survive under the harshest of conditions.¶ Humans, Newitz says, have also adapted: to past episodes of climate change, to new locales, to new diets, and to persecution at the hands of other humans. That repeated pattern of survival and adaptation – of life as a whole and of humanity in particular – convinces Newitz that we can do it again.

#### Science disproves a priori ethics.

Greene ’10 Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University. “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul” published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, 2010.

**What** **turn-of-the-millennium science** **is telling us is that human** **moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise**, that our **moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is** **exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions**. Moreover, **anyone who claims to have such a theory**, or even part of one, **almost certainly doesn't**. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. **A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by** **counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process**. **Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that** **give equal weight to everyone's interests**, **i.e. that are impartial**. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be.

#### Default to util if there’s any uncertainty

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 14 [American philosopher. He specializes in ethics, epistemology, and more recently in neuroethics, the philosophy of law, and the philosophy of cognitive science], "Consequentialism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed), BE

Even if consequentialists can accommodate or explain away common moral intuitions, that might seem only to answer objections without yet giving any positive reason to accept consequentialism. However, **most people begin with the presumption that we morally ought to make the world better when we can. The question then is only whether any moral constraints or moral options need to be added to the basic consequentialist factor in moral reasoning.** (Kagan 1989, 1998) **If no objection reveals any need for anything beyond consequences, then consequences alone seem to determine what is morally right or wrong, just as consequentialists claim.**

#### Death and suffering come first

Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### Be a good person and do good things now

Karnofsky 14 - Executive Director of the Open Philanthropy Project degree in Social Studies from Harvard University (Holden Karnofsky, 7/3/14, “The Moral Value of the Far Future” <https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/moral-value-far-future>) / MM

I broadly accept the idea that the bulk of our impact may come from effects on future generations, and this view causes me to be more interested in scientific research funding, global catastrophic risk mitigation, and other causes outside of aid to the developing-world poor. (If not for this view, I would likely favor the latter and would likely be far more interested in animal welfare as well.) However, I place only limited weight on the specific argument given by Nick Bostrom in Astronomical Waste - that the potential future population is so massive as to clearly (in a probabilistic framework) dwarf all present-day considerations. More I reject the idea that placing high value on the far future - no matter how high the value - makes it clear that one should focus on reducing the risks of catastrophes such as extreme climate change, pandemics, misuse of advanced artificial intelligence, etc. Even one who fully accepts the conclusions of “Astronomical Waste” has good reason to consider focusing on shorter-term, more tangible, higher-certainty opportunities to do good - including donating to GiveWell’s current top charities and reaping the associated flow-through effects. More I consider “global catastrophic risk reduction” to be a promising area for a philanthropist. As discussed previously, we are investigating this area actively. More Those interested in related materials may wish to look at two transcripts of recorded conversations I had on these topics: a conversation on flow-through effects with Carl Shulman, Robert Wiblin, Paul Christiano, and Nick Beckstead and a conversation on existential risk with Eliezer Yudkowsky and Luke Muehlhauser. The importance of the far future As discussed previously, I believe that the general state of the world has improved dramatically over the past several hundred years. It seems reasonable to state that the people who made contributions (large or small) to this improvement have made a major difference to the lives of people living today, and that when all future generations are taken into account, their impact on generations following them could easily dwarf their impact in their own time. I believe it is reasonable to expect this basic dynamic to continue, and I believe that there remains huge room for further improvement (possibly dwarfing the improvements we’ve seen to date). I place some probability on global upside possibilities including breakthrough technology, space colonization, and widespread improvements in interconnectedness, empathy and altruism. Even if these don’t pan out, there remains a great deal of room for further reduction in poverty and in other causes of suffering. In Astronomical Waste, Nick Bostrom makes a more extreme and more specific claim: that the number of human lives possible under space colonization is so great that the mere possibility of a hugely populated future, when considered in an “expected value” framework, dwarfs all other moral considerations. I see no obvious analytical flaw in this claim, and give it some weight. However, because the argument relies heavily on specific predictions about a distant future, seemingly (as far as I can tell) backed by little other than speculation, I do not consider it “robust,” and so I do not consider it rational to let it play an overwhelming role in my belief system and actions. (More on my epistemology and method for handling non-robust arguments containing massive quantities here.) In addition, if I did fully accept the reasoning of “Astronomical Waste” and evaluate all actions by their far future consequences, it isn’t clear what implications this would have. As discussed below, given our uncertainty about the specifics of the far future and our reasons to believe that doing good in the present day can have substantial impacts on the future as well, it seems possible that “seeing a large amount of value in future generations” and “seeing an overwhelming amount of value in future generations” lead to similar consequences for our actions. Catastrophic risk reduction vs. doing tangible good Many people have cited “Astronomical Waste” to me as evidence that the greatest opportunities for doing good are in the form of reducing the risks of catastrophes such as extreme climate change, pandemics, problematic developments related to artificial intelligence, etc. Indeed, “Astronomical Waste” seems to argue something like this: For standard utilitarians, priority number one, two, three and four should consequently be to reduce existential risk. The utilitarian imperative “Maximize expected aggregate utility!” can be simplified to the maxim “Minimize existential risk!”. I have always found this inference flawed, and in my recent discussion with Eliezer Yudkowsky and Luke Muehlhauser, it was argued to me that the “Astronomical Waste” essay never meant to make this inference in the first place. The author’s definition of existential risk includes anything that stops humanity far short of realizing its full potential - including, presumably, stagnation in economic and technological progress leading to a long-lived but limited civilization. Under that definition, “Minimize existential risk!” would seem to potentially include any contribution to general human empowerment. I have often been challenged to explain how one could possibly reconcile (a) caring a great deal about the far future with (b) donating to one of GiveWell’s top charities. My general response is that in the face of sufficient uncertainty about one’s options, and lack of conviction that there are good (in the sense of high expected value) opportunities to make an enormous difference, it is rational to try to make a smaller but robustly positive difference, whether or not one can trace a specific causal pathway from doing this small amount of good to making a large impact on the far future. A few brief arguments in support of this position: I believe that the track record of “taking robustly strong opportunities to do ‘something good’ ” is far better than the track record of “taking actions whose value is contingent on high-uncertainty arguments about where the highest utility lies, and/or arguments about what is likely to happen in the far future.” This is true even when one evaluates track record only in terms of seeming impact on the far future. The developments that seem most positive in retrospect - from large ones like the development of the steam engine to small ones like the many economic contributions that facilitated strong overall growth - seem to have been driven by the former approach, and I’m not aware of many examples in which the latter approach has yielded great benefits. I see some sense in which the world’s overall civilizational ecosystem seems to have done a better job optimizing for the far future than any of the world’s individual minds. It’s often the case that people acting on relatively short-term, tangible considerations (especially when they did so with creativity, integrity, transparency, consensuality, and pursuit of gain via value creation rather than value transfer) have done good in ways they themselves wouldn’t have been able to foresee. If this is correct, it seems to imply that one should be focused on “playing one’s role as well as possible” - on finding opportunities to “beat the broad market” (to do more good than people with similar goals would be able to) rather than pouring one’s resources into the areas that non-robust estimates have indicated as most important to the far future. The process of trying to accomplish tangible good can lead to a great deal of learning and unexpected positive developments, more so (in my view) than the process of putting resources into a low-feedback endeavor based on one’s current best-guess theory. In my conversation with Luke and Eliezer, the two of them hypothesized that the greatest positive benefit of supporting GiveWell’s top charities may have been to raise the profile, influence, and learning abilities of GiveWell. If this were true, I don’t believe it would be an inexplicable stroke of luck for donors to top charities; rather, it would be the sort of development (facilitating feedback loops that lead to learning, organizational development, growing influence, etc.) that is often associated with “doing something well” as opposed to “doing the most worthwhile thing poorly.” I see multiple reasons to believe that contributing to general human empowerment mitigates global catastrophic risks. I laid some of these out in a blog post and discussed them further in my conversation with Luke and Eliezer. For one who accepts these considerations, it seems to me that: It is not clear whether placing enormous value on the far future ought to change one’s actions from what they would be if one simply placed large value on the far future. In both cases, attempts to reduce global catastrophic risks and otherwise plan for far-off events must be weighed against attempts to do tangible good, and the question of which has more potential to shape the far future will often be a difficult one to answer. If one sees few robustly good opportunities to “make a huge difference to the far future,” the best approach to making a positive far-future difference may be “make a small but robustly positive difference to the present.” One ought to be interested in “unusual, outstanding opportunities to do good” even if they don’t have a clear connection to improving the far future.

#### Securitizing threats re-creates all of the impacts they try and prevent

Gupta 14 Asha Gupta, 2014, Poli Sci PhD @ University of Delhi, Militarizing International Relations, <http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_30926.pdf>) / MM

We need to go into the depth of militarization and militarism still prevailing in the 21st century. It has to be seen as a ‘manifestation of global political economy that has breached the limits of wider environmental and natural resource systems in which it is embedded’. Conventional approach is to view the multiple crises in the form of ‘climate change’, ‘energy depletion’, ‘food scarcity’ and ‘economic instability’ as independently, whereas these happen to be ‘interconnected’ and ‘interwoven’. No wonder, the conventional International Relations missed this interconnection and focused on the ‘securitization’ of these crises ‘as amplifiers of traditional security threats, requiring counter-productive militarized responses and/or futile interstate negotiations’. In a way it justified ‘reifying militarization of policy responses, and naturalizing the proliferation of violent conflicts’ and ‘humanitarian disasters’ (Ahmed, 2011: 335-336). In coming decades, wars are unlikely to be fought over claim on territories. Rather, the current global crisis, such as, demographic expansion, environmental degradation and energy depletion are likely to lead to ‘geopolitical conflicts’ over dominant strategic resources, such as, food, water and energy. For instance, the UN International Panel on Climate Change reported in 2007 that the increase of fossil fuel emissions at the then rate would result in the rise of global average temperature by 6°C by the end of 21st century making the planet earth mostly ‘uninhabitable’ (IPCC Report, 2007). To retain a safe climate, it would be necessary to contain it at 2°C, though we have already crossed this danger limit despite the risk of ‘catastrophic’ and ‘irreversible climate change’ (Hansen et al, 2008). Similarly, excessive exploitation of fossil fuel, such as, oil, gas and coal, has also led to depletion of essential resources. The crude oil production cannot meet the current demands. According to the Oilwatch Monthly, ‘world conventional oil production fell by almost one million barrels per day from July to August 2008’. Both nuclear power and coal were also facing similar fate accompli. According to the Strategic Survey (2007: 47-60), the ‘existential security threat’ that ‘will come increasingly to the forefront as countries begin to see falls in available resources and economic vitality, increased stress on their armed forces, greater instability in regions of strategic import, increases in ethnic rivalries, and a widening gap between rich and poor’. Climate change and other crises are studied today in the context of their strategic implications in ‘exacerbating vulnerability to violent conflict’ or in the context of ‘interstate negotiations and global governance’ (Deuchars, 2010). Whereas some scholars focus on the role of natural resource shortage or abundance in creating situation of anarchy and violence, others go deeper by investigating the capacity or inability of the states to negotiate ‘viable cooperative international regulatory frameworks to prevent or respond to crises’ (Ahmed, 2011: 344). To O’Keefe (2009: 1-2), biophysical environment plays an important role in ‘triggering and prolonging the structural conditions that result in conflict’. To her, environmental anarchy occurs in weak state that lack ‘active government regulation’ of internal distribution of natural resources, resulting into a ‘tragedy of the commons’. Resource scarcities often lead to ‘security dilemmas’ over ownership of resources often settled by ‘resort to violence’ (O’Keefe, 2009: 1-2). Such a theory fails to understand the interstate system today that itself exploits the biophysical environment. It is interesting to note that violence occurs not only in weaker states but also in ‘resource abundant states’ where greed plays a pivotal role rather than the needs. For instance, intra-state conflicts were financed by the export of commodities, such as, diamonds in the case of Angola and Sierra Leone and tropical timber in the case of West Africa (Bannon and Collier, 2013: 8-16). The neoliberal policy of structural adjustments, economic liberalization and privatization also led to the erosion of the state structures and generation of social crisis resulting into identity politics (Kaldor, 2007: 58). Often under traditional neo-realist logic, it was assumed that to deal with such crisis, it was necessary to expand the state-military capabilities under centralized governance. Neo-realism took ‘interstate competition, rivalry and warfare as inevitable functions of the states’ (Lacy, 2005).

#### “1% risk” collapses all policymaking

**Meskill 09** (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html)

Tom Friedman's piece today in the Times on the environment (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?\_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" (which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant. It is intellectually incoherent because it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk (Cheney's original scenario), the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs. But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? Why not also choose between them and other, much more cotidien, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five \*past\* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements - for example the early Jesus movement - have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action. None of this is to deny - at least this is my current sense - that human action is contributing to global warming. But what our response to this news should be is another matter entirely.

#### Reliability means that consequences matter

Nagel 86 Thomas Nagel 86, The View from Nowhere, HUP, 1986: 156-168. / MM BRACKETS FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE\*\*

I shall defend the unsurprising claim that sensory **pleasure is good and pain bad, no matter who** they are. The point of the exercise is to see how the pressures of objectification operate in a simple case. Physical pleasure and pain do not usually depend on activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification and value. They are just sensory experiences in relation to which we are fairly passive, but toward which we feel involuntary desire or aversion**.** Almost **everyone takes** the **avoidance of** [their] own **pain and** the **promotion of** [their] own **pleasure as subjective reasons for action** in a fairly simpleway; they are not back up by any further reasons. On the other hand if someone pursues pain or avoids pleasure, either it as a means to some end or it is backed up by dark reasons like guilt or sexual masochism**.** What sort of general value, if any, ought to be assigned to pleasure and pain when we consider these facts from an objective standpoint? What kind of judgment can we reasonably make about 2these things when we view them in abstraction from who we are? We can begin by asking why there is no plausibility in the zero position, that pleasure and pain have no value of any kind that can be objectively recognized. That would mean that I have no reason to take aspirin for a severe headache, however I may in fact be motivated; and that looking at it from outside, you couldn't even say that someone had a reason not to put his hand on a hot stove, just because of the pain. Try looking at it from the outside and see whether you can manage to withhold that judgment. If the idea of objective practical reason makes any sense at all, so that there is some judgment to withhold, it does not seem possible. If the general arguments against the reality of objective reasonsare no good, then **it is at least possible that I have a reason**, and not just an inclination, **to refrain from putting my hand on a hot stove.** But given the possibility, it seems meaningless to deny that this is so. Oddly enough, however, we can think of a story that would go with such a denial. It might be suggested that the aversion to pain is a useful phobia—having nothing to do with the intrinsic undesirability of pain itself—which helps us avoid or escape the injuries that are signaled by pain. (The same type of purely instrumental value might be ascribed to sensory pleasure: the pleasures of food, drink, and sex might be regarded as having no value in themselves, though our natural attraction to them assists survival and reproduction.) There would then be nothing wrong with pain in itself, and someone who was never motivated deliberately to do anything just because he knew it would reduce or avoid pain would have nothing the matter with him. [They] **would have involuntary avoidance reactions**, otherwise it would be hard to say that [they] felt pain at all. **And** [they] **would be motivated to reduce pain** for other reasons—**because it was an effective way to avoid** the **danger** being signaled, or because interfered with some physical or mental activity that was important to [them]. He just wouldn't regard the pain as itself something he had any reason to avoid, even though he hated the feeling just as much as the rest of us. (And of course he wouldn't be able to justify the avoidance of pain in the way that we customarily justify avoiding what we hate without reason—that is, on the ground that even an irrational hatred makes its object very unpleasant!) There is nothing self-contradictory in this proposal, but it seems nevertheless insane. Without some positive reason to think there is nothing in itself good or bad about having an experience you intensely like or dislike, we can't seriously regard the common impression to the contrary as a collective illusion. Such things are at least good or bad for us, if anything is. What seems to be going on here is that we cannot from an objective standpoint withhold a certain kind of endorsement of the most direct and immediate subjective value judgments we make concerning the contents of our own consciousness. We regard ourselves as too close to those things to be mistaken in our immediate, nonideological evaluative impressions. **No objective view** we can attain **could possibly overrule our subjective authority** in such cases.There can be no reason to reject the appearances here.

#### Intent-based frameworks ignore material oppression

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In addition, the deconstructive bent of discursive approaches limits their capacity to challenge the structure of modern industrialism. Just as science has been reluctant to recognize the holistic qualities of nature, so we have been slow to appreciate that the power of industrialism and its resultant near-hegemony in the modern world is largely the result of its ability to integrate science, politics, and everyday social life within a structure that appears complete and self-sufficient. This structure cannot be challenged without reference to alternative structures. To celebrate choice and free play without also celebrating the frames of meaning within which they take place is simply to guarantee our assimilation to and absorption within industrialism, and so represents a philosophy of surrender. For example, “freedom” has little meaning in the absence of a framework of democratic laws which protect the vulnerable against the “freedom” of the powerful to exploit, intimidate, and mislead. Similarly, my freedom to explore an area of wilderness is negated if energy companies and off-road vehicle clubs also have the freedom to use the area as they see fit. Freedom is all to often interpreted as the absence of structure; and structure gives meaning and implies responsibilities and limitations. One of the most insidious aspects of the colonization of the world is industrialism's silent but lethal elimination of structures that could challenge it. The widespread lack of appreciation within academia of the way in which postmodern approaches involving deconstruction promote this insidious *conceptual* assimilation to industrialism is an index of the urgent need to develop a psychocultural dimension to our environmental understanding. Finally, we should not ignore the possibility that an emphasis on language serves particular defensive functions for the social scientist. Noam Chomsky has noted that it”it's too hard to deal with real problems,” some academics tend to “go off on wild goose chases that don't matter . . . [or] get involved in academic cults that are very divorced from any reality and that provide a defense against dealing with the world as it actually is.”71 An emphasis on language can serve this sort of defensive function; for the study of discourse enables one to stand aside from issues and avoid any commitment to a cause or idea, simply presenting all sides of a debate and pointing out the discursive strategies involved. As the physical world appears to fade into mere discourse, so it comes to seem less real than the language used to describe it; and environmental issues lose the dimensions of urgency and tragedy and become instead the proving grounds for ideas and attitudes. Rather than walking in what Aldo Leopold described as a “world of wounds,” the discursive theorist can study this world dispassionately, safely insulated from the emotional and ecological havoc that is taking place elsewhere. Like experimentalism, this is a schizoid stance that exemplifies rather than challenges the characteristic social pathology of out time; and it is one that supports Melanie Klein's thesis that the internal object world can serve as a psychotic substitute for an external “real” world that is either absent or unsatisfying.72 Ian Craib's description of social construction as a “social psychosis”73 therefore seems entirely apt. But what object relations theorists such as Klein fail to point out is the other side of this dialectic: that withdrawing from the external world and substituting an internal world of words or fantasies, because of the actions that follow from this state of affairs, makes the former even less satisfying and more psychologically distant, so contributing to the vicious spiral that severs the “human from the “natural” and abandons nature to industrialism.

#### Reductionism – empirics prove.

Parfit 84 Derek Parfit, cool hair. “Reasons and Persons” 1984. / MM BRACKETS FOR GENDER\*\*

Some recent medical cases provide striking evidence in favour of the Reductionist View. Human beings have alower brain and two upper hemispheres, which are connected by a bundle of fibres. In treating a few people with severe epilepsy, **surgeons have cut these fibres.** The aim was to reduce the severity of epileptic fits, by confining their causes to a single hemisphere. This aim was achieved. But the operations had another unintended consequence. **The effect**, in the words of one surgeon, **was the creation of** ‘two separate spheres of consciousness.’ **This effect was revealed by** various **psychological tests.** These made use of two facts. We control our right arms with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. And what is in the right halves of our visual fields we see with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. When someone’s hemispheres have been disconnected, **psychologists can thus present** to this person two different written **questions in the two halves of [their] visual field and can receive** two different answers written by this person’s two hands.

#### Magnitude first risk calculus is state fear-mongering that perpetuates structural violence

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It may have once been the case that being attacked by another country was a major threat to the lives of ordinary people. It may also be true that there are still some pretty serious dangers out there associated with the spread of nuclear weapons. For the most part, however, most of what you’ve been told about national security and all the big threats which can supposedly kill you is one big con designed to distract you from the things that can really hurt you, such as the poverty, inequality and structural violence of capitalism, global warming, and the manufacture and proliferation of weapons – among others.¶ The facts are simple and irrefutable: you’re far more likely to die from lack of health care provision than you are from terrorism; from stress and overwork than Iranian or North Korean nuclear missiles; from lack of road safety than from illegal immigrants; from mental illness and suicide than from computer hackers; from domestic violence than from asylum seekers; from the misuse of legal medicines and alcohol abuse than from international drug lords. And yet, politicians and the servile media spend most of their time talking about the threats posed by terrorism, immigration, asylum seekers, the international drug trade, the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, computer hackers, animal rights activism, the threat of China, and a host of other issues which are all about as equally unlikely to affect the health and well-being of you and your family. Along with this obsessive and perennial discussion of so-called ‘national security issues’, the state spends truly vast sums on security measures which have virtually no impact on the actual risk of dying from these threats, and then engages in massive displays of ‘security theatre’ designed to show just how seriously the state takes these threats – such as the x-ray machines and security measures in every public building, surveillance cameras everywhere, missile launchers in urban areas, drones in Afghanistan, armed police in airports, and a thousand other things. This display is meant to convince you that these threats are really, really serious.¶ And while all this is going on, the rulers of society are hoping that you won’t notice that increasing social and economic inequality in society leads to increased ill health for a growing underclass; that suicide and crime always rise when unemployment rises; that workplaces remain highly dangerous and kill and maim hundreds of people per year; that there are preventable diseases which plague the poorer sections of society; that domestic violence kills and injures thousands of women and children annually; and that globally, poverty and preventable disease kills tens of millions of people needlessly every year. In other words, they are hoping that you won’t notice how much structural violence there is in the world.¶ More than this, they are hoping that you won’t notice that while literally trillions of dollars are spent on military weapons, foreign wars and security theatre (which also arguably do nothing to make any us any safer, and may even make us marginally less safe), that domestic violence programmes struggle to provide even minimal support for women and children at risk of serious harm from their partners; that underfunded mental health programmes mean long waiting lists to receive basic care for at-risk individuals; that drug and alcohol rehabilitation programmes lack the funding to match the demand for help; that welfare measures aimed at reducing inequality have been inadequate for decades; that health and safety measures at many workplaces remain insufficiently resourced; and that measures to tackle global warming and developing alternative energy remain hopelessly inadequate.¶ Of course, none of this is surprising. Politicians are a part of the system; they don’t want to change it. For them, all the insecurity, death and ill-health caused by capitalist inequality are a price worth paying to keep the basic social structures as they are. A more egalitarian society based on equality, solidarity, and other non-materialist values would not suit their interests, or the special interests of the lobby groups they are indebted to. It is also true that dealing with economic and social inequality, improving public health, changing international structures of inequality, restructuring the military-industrial complex, and making the necessary economic and political changes to deal with global warming will be extremely difficult and will require long-term commitment and determination. For politicians looking towards the next election, it is clearly much easier to paint immigrants as a threat to social order or pontificate about the ongoing danger of terrorists. It is also more exciting for the media than stories about how poor people and people of colour are discriminated against and suffer worse health as a consequence. Viewed from this vantage point, national security is one massive confidence trick – misdirection on an epic scale. Its primary function is to distract you from the structures and inequalities in society which are the real threat to the health and wellbeing of you and your family, and to convince you to be permanently afraid so that you will acquiesce to all the security measures which keep you under state control and keep the military-industrial complex ticking along. Keep this in mind next time you hear a politician talking about the threat of uncontrolled immigration, the risk posed by asylum seekers or the threat of Iran, or the need to expand counter-terrorism powers. The question is: when politicians are talking about national security, what is that they don’t want you to think and talk about? What exactly is the misdirection they are engaged in? The truth is, if you think that terrorists or immigrants or asylum seekers or Iran are a greater threat to your safety than the capitalist system, you have been well and truly conned, my friend. Don’t believe the hype: you’re much more likely to die from any one of several forms of structural violence in society than you are from immigrants or terrorism. Somehow, we need to challenge the politicians on this fact.

#### Prioritize systemic violence—it’s footnoted in favor of sensational impacts, eventually cumulating in masse

Nixon 13—Rachel Carson Professor of English and an affiliate of the Nelson Institute Center for Culture, History and Environment (Rob, “Book excerpt: Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor,” In Common, Fall/Winter 13, http://nelson.wisc.edu/news/in-common/fall-winter2013/story.php?s=1439&page=1)//JLE

When Lawrence Summers, then president of the World Bank, advocated that the bank develop a scheme to export rich nation garbage, toxic waste, and heavily polluting industries to Africa, he did so in the calm voice of global managerial reasoning. Such a scheme, Summers elaborated, would help correct an inefficient global imbalance in toxicity. Underlying his plan is an overlooked but crucial subsidiary benefit that he outlined: offloading rich-nation toxins onto the world’s poorest continent would help ease the growing pressure from rich-nation environmentalists who were campaigning against garbage dumps and industrial effluent that they condemned as health threats and found aesthetically offensive.¶ Summers thus rationalized his poison-redistribution ethic as offering a double gain: it would benefit the United States and Europe economically, while helping appease the rising discontent of rich-nation environmentalists. Summers’ arguments assumed a direct link between aesthetically unsightly waste and Africa as an out-of-sight continent, a place remote from green activists’ terrain of concern. In Summers’ win-win scenario for the global North, the African recipients of his plan were triply discounted: discounted as political agents, discounted as long-term casualties of what I call in this book “slow violence,” and discounted as cultures possessing environmental practices and concerns of their own. I begin with Summers’ extraordinary proposal because it captures the strategic and representational challenges posed by slow violence as it impacts the environments and the environmentalism of the poor.¶ Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink politically, imaginatively, and theoretically what I call “slow violence.” By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all.¶ Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings—the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war’s toxic aftermaths or introduction climate change—are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory.¶ Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions — from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts insituations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.¶ Politically and emotionally, different kinds of disaster possess unequal heft. Falling bodies, burning towers, exploding heads, avalanches, volcanoes, and tsunamis have a visceral, eye-catching and page-turning power that tales of slow violence, unfolding over years, decades, even centuries, cannot match. Stories of toxic buildup, massing greenhouse gases, and accelerated species loss due to ravaged habitats are all cataclysmic, but they are scientifically convoluted cataclysms in which casualties are postponed, often for generations.¶ In an age when the media venerate the spectacular, when public policy is shaped primarily around perceived immediate need, a central question is strategic and representational: how can we convert into image and narrative the disasters that are slow moving and long in the making, disasters that are anonymous and that star nobody, disasters that are attritional and of indifferent interest to the sensation-driven technologies of our image-world? How can we turn the long emergencies of slow violence into stories dramatic enough to rouse public sentiment and warrant political intervention, these emergencies whose repercussions have given rise to some of the most critical challenges of our time?¶ Slow Violence¶ In this book, I have sought to address our inattention to calamities that are slow and long lasting, calamities that patiently dispense their devastation while remaining outside our flickering attention spans and outside the purview of a spectacle-driven corporate media. The insidious workings of slow violence derive largely from the unequal attention given to spectacular and unspectacular time. In an age that venerates instant spectacle, slow violence is deficient in the recognizable special effects that fill movie theaters and boost ratings on TV. Chemical and radiological violence, for example, is driven inward, somatized into cellular dramas of mutationthat particularly in the bodies of the poor remain largely unobserved, undiagnosed, and untreated. From a narrative perspective, such invisible, mutagenic theater is slow paced and open ended, eluding the tidy closure, the containment, imposed by the visual orthodoxies of victory and defeat.¶ Let me ground this point by referring, in conjunction, to Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. In 1962 Silent Spring jolted a broad international public into an awareness of the protracted, cryptic, and indiscriminate casualties inflicted by dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT). Yet, just one year earlier, Fanon, in the opening pages of Wretched of the Earth, had comfortably invoked DDT as an affirmative metaphor for anticolonial violence: he called for a DDT-filled spray gun to be wielded as a weapon against the “parasites” spread by the colonials’ Christian church.¶ Fanon’s drama of decolonization is, of course, studded with the overt weaponry whereby subjugation is maintained (“by dint of a great array of bayonets and cannons”) or overthrown (“by the searing bullets and bloodstained knives”) after “a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists.” Yet his temporal vision of violence and of what Aimé Césaire called “the rendezvous of victory” was uncomplicated by the concerns that an as-yet inchoate environmental justice movement (catalyzed in part by Silent Spring) would raise about lopsided risks that permeate the land long term, blurring the clean lines between defeat and victory, between colonial dispossession and official national self-determination. We can certainly read Fanon, in his concern with land as property and as fount of native dignity, retrospectively with an environmental eye. But our theories of violence today must be informed by a science unavailable to Fanon, a science that addresses environmentally embedded violence that is often difficult to source, oppose, and once set in motion, to reverse.¶ Attritional catastrophes that overspill clear boundaries in time and space are marked above all by displacements temporal, geographical, rhetorical, and technological displacements that simplify violence and underestimate, in advance and in retrospect, the human and environmental costs. Such displacements smooth the way for amnesia, as places are rendered irretrievable to those who once inhabited them, places that ordinarily pass unmourned in the corporate media. Places like the Marshall Islands, subjected between 1948 and 1958 to sixty-seven American atmospheric nuclear “tests,” the largest of them equal in force to 1,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs. In 1956 the Atomic Energy Commission declared the Marshall Islands “by far the most contaminated place in the world,” a condition that would compromise independence in the long term, despite the islands’ formal ascent in 1979 into the ranks of self-governing nations. The island republic was still in part governed by an irradiated past: well into the 1980s its history of nuclear colonialism, long forgotten by the colonizers, was still delivering into the world “jellyfish babies” headless, eyeless, limbless human infants who would live for just a few hours.¶ If, as Said notes, struggles over geography are never reducible to armed struggle but have a profound symbolic and narrative component as well, and if, as Michael Watts insists, we must attend to the “violent geographies of fast capitalism,” we need to supplement both these injunctions with a deeper understanding of the slow violence of delayed effects that structures so many of our most consequential forgettings. Violence, above all environmental violence, needs to be seen and deeply considered as a contest not only over space, or bodies, or labor, or resources, but also over time. We need to bear in mind Faulkner’s dictum that “the past is never dead. It’s not even past.” His words resonate with particular force across landscapes permeated by slow violence, landscapes of temporal overspill that elude rhetorical cleanup operations with their sanitary beginnings and endings.¶ Kwame Anthony Appiah famously asked, “Is the ‘Post-’ in ‘Postcolonial’ the ‘Post-’ in ‘Postmodern’?” As environmentalists we might ask similarly searching questions of the “post” in postindustrial, post–Cold War, and postconflict. For if the past of slow violence is never past, so too the post is never fully post: industrial particulates and effluents live on in the environmental elements we inhabit and in our very bodies,which epidemiologically and ecologically are never our simple contemporaries. Something similar applies to so-called postconflict societies whose leaders may annually commemorate, as marked on the calendar, the official cessation of hostilities, while ongoing intergenerational slow violence (inflicted by, say, unexploded landmines or carcinogens from an arms dump) may continue hostilities by other means.¶ Ours is an age of onrushing turbo-capitalism, wherein the present feels more abbreviated than it used to at least for the world’s privileged classes who live surrounded by technological time-savers that often compound the sensation of not having enough time. Consequently, one of the most pressing challenges of our age is how to adjust our rapidly eroding attention spans to the slow erosions of environmental justice. If, under neoliberalism, the gulf between enclaved rich and outcast poor has become ever more pronounced, ours is also an era of enclaved time wherein for many speed has become a self-justifying, propulsive ethic that renders “uneventful” violence (to those who live remote from its attritional lethality) a weak claimant on our time. The attosecond pace of our age, with its restless technologies of infinite promise and infinite disappointment, prompts us to keepflicking and clicking distractedly in an insatiable and often insensate quest for quicker sensation.¶ The oxymoronic notion of slow violence poses a number of challenges: scientific, legal, political, and representational. In the long arc between the emergence of slow violence and its delayed effects, both the causes and the memory of catastrophe readily fade from view as the casualties incurred typically pass untallied and unremembered. Such discounting in turn makes it far more difficult to secure effective legal measures for prevention, restitution, and redress.¶ Casualties from slow violence are, moreover, out of sync not only with our narrative and media expectations but also with the swift seasons of electoral change. Politicians routinely adopt a “last in, first out” stance toward environmental issues, admitting them when times are flush, dumping them as soon as times get tight. Because preventative or remedial environmental legislation typically targets slow violence, it cannot deliver dependable electoral cycle results, even though those results may ultimately be life saving. Relative to bankable pocketbook actions there’ll be a tax rebate check in the mail next August environmental payouts seem to lurk on a distant horizon. Many politicians and indeed many voters routinely treat environmental action as critical yet not urgent. And so generation after generation of two- or four-year cycle politicians add to the pileup of deferrable actions deferred. With rare exceptions, in the domain of slow violence “yes, but not now, not yet” becomes the modus operandi.

#### The future is unpredictable – the best way to preserve future value is to do good things now

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I broadly accept the idea that the bulk of our impact may come from effects on future generations, and this view causes me to be more interested in scientific research funding, global catastrophic risk mitigation, and other causes outside of aid to the developing-world poor. (If not for this view, I would likely favor the latter and would likely be far more interested in animal welfare as well.) However, I place only limited weight on the specific argument given by Nick Bostrom in Astronomical Waste - that the potential future population is so massive as to clearly (in a probabilistic framework) dwarf all present-day considerations. More I reject the idea that placing high value on the far future - no matter how high the value - makes it clear that one should focus on reducing the risks of catastrophes such as extreme climate change, pandemics, misuse of advanced artificial intelligence, etc. Even one who fully accepts the conclusions of “Astronomical Waste” has good reason to consider focusing on shorter-term, more tangible, higher-certainty opportunities to do good - including donating to GiveWell’s current top charities and reaping the associated flow-through effects. More I consider “global catastrophic risk reduction” to be a promising area for a philanthropist. As discussed previously, we are investigating this area actively. More Those interested in related materials may wish to look at two transcripts of recorded conversations I had on these topics: a conversation on flow-through effects with Carl Shulman, Robert Wiblin, Paul Christiano, and Nick Beckstead and a conversation on existential risk with Eliezer Yudkowsky and Luke Muehlhauser. The importance of the far future As discussed previously, I believe that the general state of the world has improved dramatically over the past several hundred years. It seems reasonable to state that the people who made contributions (large or small) to this improvement have made a major difference to the lives of people living today, and that when all future generations are taken into account, their impact on generations following them could easily dwarf their impact in their own time. I believe it is reasonable to expect this basic dynamic to continue, and I believe that there remains huge room for further improvement (possibly dwarfing the improvements we’ve seen to date). I place some probability on global upside possibilities including breakthrough technology, space colonization, and widespread improvements in interconnectedness, empathy and altruism. Even if these don’t pan out, there remains a great deal of room for further reduction in poverty and in other causes of suffering. In Astronomical Waste, Nick Bostrom makes a more extreme and more specific claim: that the number of human lives possible under space colonization is so great that the mere possibility of a hugely populated future, when considered in an “expected value” framework, dwarfs all other moral considerations. I see no obvious analytical flaw in this claim, and give it some weight. However, because the argument relies heavily on specific predictions about a distant future, seemingly (as far as I can tell) backed by little other than speculation, I do not consider it “robust,” and so I do not consider it rational to let it play an overwhelming role in my belief system and actions. (More on my epistemology and method for handling non-robust arguments containing massive quantities here.) In addition, if I did fully accept the reasoning of “Astronomical Waste” and evaluate all actions by their far future consequences, it isn’t clear what implications this would have. As discussed below, given our uncertainty about the specifics of the far future and our reasons to believe that doing good in the present day can have substantial impacts on the future as well, it seems possible that “seeing a large amount of value in future generations” and “seeing an overwhelming amount of value in future generations” lead to similar consequences for our actions. Catastrophic risk reduction vs. doing tangible good Many people have cited “Astronomical Waste” to me as evidence that the greatest opportunities for doing good are in the form of reducing the risks of catastrophes such as extreme climate change, pandemics, problematic developments related to artificial intelligence, etc. Indeed, “Astronomical Waste” seems to argue something like this: For standard utilitarians, priority number one, two, three and four should consequently be to reduce existential risk. The utilitarian imperative “Maximize expected aggregate utility!” can be simplified to the maxim “Minimize existential risk!”. I have always found this inference flawed, and in my recent discussion with Eliezer Yudkowsky and Luke Muehlhauser, it was argued to me that the “Astronomical Waste” essay never meant to make this inference in the first place. The author’s definition of existential risk includes anything that stops humanity far short of realizing its full potential - including, presumably, stagnation in economic and technological progress leading to a long-lived but limited civilization. Under that definition, “Minimize existential risk!” would seem to potentially include any contribution to general human empowerment. I have often been challenged to explain how one could possibly reconcile (a) caring a great deal about the far future with (b) donating to one of GiveWell’s top charities. My general response is that in the face of sufficient uncertainty about one’s options, and lack of conviction that there are good (in the sense of high expected value) opportunities to make an enormous difference, it is rational to try to make a smaller but robustly positive difference, whether or not one can trace a specific causal pathway from doing this small amount of good to making a large impact on the far future. A few brief arguments in support of this position: I believe that the track record of “taking robustly strong opportunities to do ‘something good’ ” is far better than the track record of “taking actions whose value is contingent on high-uncertainty arguments about where the highest utility lies, and/or arguments about what is likely to happen in the far future.” This is true even when one evaluates track record only in terms of seeming impact on the far future. The developments that seem most positive in retrospect - from large ones like the development of the steam engine to small ones like the many economic contributions that facilitated strong overall growth - seem to have been driven by the former approach, and I’m not aware of many examples in which the latter approach has yielded great benefits. I see some sense in which the world’s overall civilizational ecosystem seems to have done a better job optimizing for the far future than any of the world’s individual minds. It’s often the case that people acting on relatively short-term, tangible considerations (especially when they did so with creativity, integrity, transparency, consensuality, and pursuit of gain via value creation rather than value transfer) have done good in ways they themselves wouldn’t have been able to foresee. If this is correct, it seems to imply that one should be focused on “playing one’s role as well as possible” - on finding opportunities to “beat the broad market” (to do more good than people with similar goals would be able to) rather than pouring one’s resources into the areas that non-robust estimates have indicated as most important to the far future. The process of trying to accomplish tangible good can lead to a great deal of learning and unexpected positive developments, more so (in my view) than the process of putting resources into a low-feedback endeavor based on one’s current best-guess theory. In my conversation with Luke and Eliezer, the two of them hypothesized that the greatest positive benefit of supporting GiveWell’s top charities may have been to raise the profile, influence, and learning abilities of GiveWell. If this were true, I don’t believe it would be an inexplicable stroke of luck for donors to top charities; rather, it would be the sort of development (facilitating feedback loops that lead to learning, organizational development, growing influence, etc.) that is often associated with “doing something well” as opposed to “doing the most worthwhile thing poorly.” I see multiple reasons to believe that contributing to general human empowerment mitigates global catastrophic risks. I laid some of these out in a blog post and discussed them further in my conversation with Luke and Eliezer. For one who accepts these considerations, it seems to me that: It is not clear whether placing enormous value on the far future ought to change one’s actions from what they would be if one simply placed large value on the far future. In both cases, attempts to reduce global catastrophic risks and otherwise plan for far-off events must be weighed against attempts to do tangible good, and the question of which has more potential to shape the far future will often be a difficult one to answer. If one sees few robustly good opportunities to “make a huge difference to the far future,” the best approach to making a positive far-future difference may be “make a small but robustly positive difference to the present.” One ought to be interested in “unusual, outstanding opportunities to do good” even if they don’t have a clear connection to improving the far future.

#### You can’t predict black swan events

Chadefaux 17 [Thomas Chadefaux (Department of Political Science, Trinity University); 20 February 2017; Data Science Journal; “Conflict forecasting and its limits”; <https://content.iospress.com/articles/data-science/ds002> //BWSWJ]

The question of predictability ultimately hinges on the underlying nature of conflict. In the words of Popper, does it more closely resemble the world of clouds – “highly irregular, disorderly, and more or less unpredictable” – or the one of clocks – “regular, orderly, and highly predictable in their behaviour” (Popper [37]). Unfortunately we do not yet know which we are facing. On most days, international and domestic interactions resemble a clock. Small deviations are corrected in a reversion to the mean, and the stochastic process of daily events and tensions that may emerge on a local or global level is trendstationary. Yet there are also rare shocks that do not follow this clock-like pattern. These are, of course, the events of interest here – conflicts, coups, acts of terrorism – that may start a cascade and change the clock into a cloud and the trend-stationary time series into unit-root processes (Doran [17]). There is yet a third possibility: that conflicts are neither clouds nor clocks, but black swans (Taleb [53]). Black swans are game-changing events with such low probability that they cannot be predicted (even though experts often claim to have found obvious warning signs for them ex post). Black swans are different from simple rare events. While rare events occur infrequently, their probability is not low conditional on the relevant set of variables. On the other hand, black swans have a low probability even conditional on other variables. Where conflict processes should be located on the clock-cloud-swan continuum matters. With clocks, predictions are possible, whether they be point or probabilistic predictions.7 With clouds, the marginal cost of better predictions would be increasing, but we could at least learn about the aggregate distribution and data-generating process (e.g. Clauset, Young, and Gleditsch [16] on the frequency of terrorist events). With black swans, however, attempting to predict would be a fool’s game. Several factors make it particularly challenging to predict conflict, and in fact may impose insuperable limits to our forecasts. First, our data are, almost by definition, prone to error and imprecision (e.g. Shellman, Hatfield, and Mills [47]). Part of it is due to poor measuring. But part of it is caused by strategic misrepresentation and concealing on the part of the relevant governments. A second reason for the difficulty to predict conflicts is that their structure, and more generally the structure of international relations, are constantly evolving. The end of the cold war, for example, was largely unanticipated and challenged many of the structures and patterns that formed parts of the existing models. Even within a given conflict, the dynamic can dramatically change and necessitate a different model (e.g. the surge in Iraq, Bhavnani et al. [4]). The difficulty is that these changes are difficult to anticipate – they are often black swans themselves – such that our ability to forecast may be limited to the short-term. The long term, on the other hand, would be the result of too many compounding shocks to a point where predictions become futile. Ideally, our predictions would be able to accomodate these changes. This may require two-level predictions in which the structure itself is first predicted, and within that structure the short-term events would be forecasted with a different model. But of course this would compound the uncertainty about our model specification and data. Another difficulty relates to the strategic nature of international relations and politics in general. First, actors are forward looking. They form their own predictions about the future, and act accordingly today. As a result, these predictions can affect their behavior today and invalidate these original predictions. As observers, then, we may have the right logic but end up not observing the phenomenon. Consider for example the problem of the onset of wars. If their contemporaries identify the underlying conditions as ripe for war, they may take additional steps to either prevent it, postpone its onset, or on the contrary speed it up, such that the initial predictions will be invalidated (e.g. Chadefaux [13] for empirical evidence of this pattern). The same logic also applies to the conduct and termination of war. The anticipations of forthcoming peace negotiations, for example, may lead certain actors – spoilers – to try harder to disrupt the peace process, thus reducing the prospects for peace (Kydd and Walter [31]). Mixed strategies are another difficulty. States or domestic actors cannot always respond to the same situation in the same way, else their response becomes predictable and may be exploited by the adversary. Just like a tennisman will not always serve in the same place to prevent the opponent from anticipating his actions, leaders must vary their threats and responses to events. As a result, the same conditions and sequence of events may lead to different reactions, some potentially leading to wars whereas others do not. In such cases, probabilistic predictions remain possible, but point predictions are inherently impossible. While a large number of observations may bring us close to an estimate of the underlying probability distribution, the predictive value of our forecasts will be bound upward by a fundamental limit. In fact, uncertainty itself may be necessary for the onset and continuation of war. Indeed, one of the central rationalist explanations for why bargaining might break down into war is incomplete information of at least one of the participants. As a result, “we cannot predict in individual cases whether states will go to war, because war is typically the consequence of variables that are unobservable ex ante, both to us as researchers and to the participants” (Gartzke [19], p. 567). Conflicts and the processes leading to them may also be path-dependent. A small event may lead to a cascading effect and ultimately to war. Yet the same underlying structure could possibly have accomodated an alternate equilibrium in which peace prevailed. Self-reinforcing processes mean that international interactions may magnify the effects of chance. Looking back, we may be able to trace the explosion of a keg – conflict – to a single spark (though this is itself debatable, as evidenced by the unfaltering scholarship on the causes of WWI), but looking forward, we are unable to know which spark will ignite the keg. In the same way, seismologists understand the causes of earthquakes and are able to monitor seismological variations with high precision but still cannot predict their onset with much early warning.8

#### Truth testing makes up rules to constrain relevant discussions and is honestly just stupid

Overing and Scoggin 15 “In Defense of Inclusion”; September 10, 2015; John Scoggin (coach for Loyola in Los Angeles and former debater for the Blake School in Minneapolis. His students have earned 77 bids to the Tournament of Champions in the last 7 years. He’s coached 2 TOC finalists, a TOC quarterfinalist, and champions of many major national tournaments across the country) and Bob Overing (former debater for the USC Trojan Debate Squad, and current student at Yale Law School. As a senior in high school, he was ranked #1, earned 11 bids and took 2nd at TOC. In college, he cleared at CEDA and qualified to the NDT. His students have earned 98 career bids, reached TOC finals, and won many championships.); <http://premierdebatetoday.com/2015/09/10/in-defense-of-inclusion-by-john-scoggin-and-bob-overing/>

In establishing affirmative and negative truth burdens, truth-testing forecloses important discussions even of the resolution itself. Consider the fact that in 1925-1926, there were two college policy topics, one for men and one for women. Men got to debate child labor laws, and women had to debate divorce law. On the truth-testing view, the women debating the women’s topic would be barred from discussing the inherent sexism of the topic choice and the division of topics to begin with. Or consider the retracted 2010 November Public Forum topic, “Resolved: An Islamic cultural center should be built near Ground Zero.” Many debaters would feel uncomfortable arguing that resolution, just like they did on the 2012 January/February LD topic about domestic violence. We both know individuals who felt the domestic violence topic was so triggering that they did not want to compete at all. We can draw two conclusions from examples like these. First, there are good reasons to not debate a particular topic. These reasons have been spelled out over decades of debate scholarship ranging from Broda-Bahm and Murphy (1994) to Varda and Cook (2007) to Vincent (2013). Second, truth-testing prevents either team from making the argument that the topic is offensive or harmful. A hypothetical case, such as a resolution including an offensive racial epithet, makes the problem more obvious. Maybe the idea behind the resolution is good, but there’s something left out by analysis that stops there and ignores the use of a derogatory slur. Truth-testing makes irrelevant the words in the topic and the words used by the debaters. Thus, it fails to capture the reasons that any good person would “negate” or even refuse to debate an offensive topic. Clearly, there are elements of a topical advocacy beyond its truth that are worthy of questioning. Nebel (2015) acknowledges that some past resolutions were potentially harmful to debate (1.2, para. 5). Rather than exclude affected students as ‘not following the rules’ of semantics or truth-testing, we conclude that they should not be required to debate the topic. Nebel grapples with harmful topics in the following passage: I don’t think there is a magic-bullet response to critiques of the topic…I think they must be answered on a case-by-case basis, in their own terms…The question boils down to whether or not the topic is harmful for students to debate, and whether those harms justify breaking, or making an exception to, the topicality rule (1.2, para. 5) This statement is hard to square with Nebel’s thesis that semantic interpretations of the resolution come “lexically prior” (in other words, they always come first). He wants to allow exceptions, but doing so proves that harmfulness concerns can and do trump the topicality rule. As Nebel’s struggle with the critique of topicality illustrates, every article that claims to espouse a comprehensive view of debate must allow some exceptions to comply with our intuitions. The exceptions do not prove the rule. They prove there is a high level of concern in debate for affording dignity and respect to different kinds of arguments and modes of argumentation. There is no one principle of proper debate. Once the door is open for external factors like harmfulness, the inference to the priority of pragmatics is an easy one to make. If we care about the effects of debating the resolution on the students debating it, then other values like exclusion, education, and fairness start to creep in. If we can justify avoiding discussion of a bad topic on pragmatic grounds, we can also justify promoting discussion of a good topic. Any advantage to allowing discursive kritiks, performances, and roles of the ballot further justifies this pragmatic view against truth-testing. NDT champion Elijah Smith (2013) warns that without these argument forms, we “distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day”. Christopher Vincent (2013) built on that idea, arguing that universal moral theory “drowns out the perspectives of students of color that are historically excluded from the conversation” (para. 3). While we don’t agree wholesale with these authors, their work unequivocally demonstrates the value of departures from pure truth-testing. While we may not convince our opposition that they should presume value in kritik-based strategies, they should remain open to them. In a recent article for the Rostrum, Pittsburgh debate coach Paul Johnson (2015) extolled the ‘hands-off’ approach. Let the debaters test whether the arguments have merit, rather than deciding beforehand: In a debate round, one may argue the impertinence of theses about structural racism with regards to a particular case…But when we explicitly or implicitly suggest such theses have little to no value by deciding in advance that they are inaccurate, we are forswearing the hard, argumentative work of subjecting our own beliefs to rigorous testing and interrogation (p. 90) Suggesting that non-topical, race-based approaches are “vigilantist” and “self-serving” “adventure[s]” is to demean the worth of these arguments before the debate round even starts (Nebel 2015, 1.1, para. 2). The claim that they ‘break the rules’ or exist ‘outside the law’ otherizes the debaters, coaches, and squads that pursue non-traditional styles. Especially given that many of these students are students of color, we should reject the image of them as lawless, self-interested vigilantes. Students work hard on their positions, often incorporating personal elements such as narrative or performance. To defend a view of debate that excludes their arguments from consideration devalues their scholarship and the way they make debate “home.” That’s unacceptable. Branse notes “the motivation for joining the activity substantially varies from person to person” yet excludes some debaters’ motivations while promoting others (5, para. 4). We agree with Smith on the very tangible effects of such exclusion: “If black students do not feel comfortable participating in LD they will lose out on the ability to judge, coach, or to force debate to deal with the truth of their perspectives” (para. 5). Of course, we do not believe that Nebel or Branse intend their views to have these effects, but they are a concern we need to take seriously. III. Changing the Rules In Round One thought is that rejecting truth-testing is the wrong solution. Instead, we should create a better topic-selection process or an NSDA-approved topic change when the resolution is particularly bad. These solutions, however, are not exclusive of a rejection of truth-testing. An offensive topic might be reason to reform the selection process and to stop debating it immediately. Good role of the ballot arguments are the best solution because they pinpoint exactly why a debater finds the resolution inadequate. They highlight the problems of the proposed topic of discussion, and outline reasons why a different approach is preferable. While Branse believes these examples of in-round rule-making are problematic, we think debate rounds are an excellent location for discussing what debate should be. The first reason is the failure of consensus. Because there are a wide variety of supported methods to go about debating, we should be cautious about paradigmatic exclusion. While we don’t defend the relativist conclusion that all styles of debate are equally valuable, there is significant disagreement that our theories must account for. Truth-testing denies a number of ways to debate that many find valuable. The second reason is the internalization of valuable principles. Even people who do not think kritiks are the right way to debate have taken important steps like removing gendered language from their positions. NDT champion Elijah Smith (2013) identified hateful arguments and comments “you expect to hear at a Klan rally” as commonplace in LD rounds and the community (para. 2). We’d like to think those instances are at least reduced by the argumentation he’s encouraged. For instance, the much-maligned “you must prove why oppression is bad” argument now sees little play in high-level circuit rounds. Truth-testing forecloses this kind of learning from the opposition. Roles of the ballot and theory interpretations are examples of how in-round argumentation creates new rules of engagement. We welcome these strategies, and debaters should be prepared to justify their proposed rules against procedural challenges. The arguments we have made thus far are objections to truth-testing as a top-down worldview used to exclude from the get-go, not in-round means of redress against certain practices. There is a major difference between a topicality argument in a high school debate round and a prominent debate coach and camp director’s glib dismissal of non-topical argument as follows: [Y]ou can talk about whatever you want, but if it doesn’t support or deny the resolution, then the judge shouldn’t vote on it (Nebel 2015, 1.2, para. 4) Branse is equally ideological: Within the debate, the judge is bound by the established rules. If the rules are failing their function, that can be a reason to change the rules outside of the round. However, in round acts are out of the judge’s jurisdiction (2, para. 12) We take issue with debate theorists’ attempts to define away arguments that they don’t like. At one point, Jason Baldwin (2009) actually defended truth-testing for its openness, praising the values of the free market of ideas: That’s how the marketplace of ideas is supposed to work. But it is supposed to be a free marketplace where buyers (judges) examine whatever sellers (debaters) offer them with an open mind, not an exclusive marketplace where only the sellers of some officially approved theories are welcome (p. 26) Unfortunately for the truth-tester, debate has changed, and it will change again. What was once a model that allowed all the arguments debaters wanted to make – a prioris, frameworks, and meta-ethics – is now outdated in the context of discursive kritiks, performance, and alternative roles of the ballot. IV. Constitutivism, Authority, and the Nature of Debate Branse’s goal is to derive substantive rules for debate from the ‘constitutive features’ of debate itself and the roles of competitors and judges. We’ll quote him at length here to get a full view of the argument: [P]ragmatic benefits are constrained by the rules of the activity….education should not be promoted at the expense of the rules since the rules are what define the activity. LD is only LD because of the rules governing it – if we changed the activity to promoting practical values, then it would cease to be what it is (2, para. 7) Internal rules of an activity are absolute. From the perspective of the players, the authority of the rules are non-optional. (2, para. 12) The resolution, in fact, offers one of the only constitutive guidelines for debate. Most tournament invitations put a sentence in the rules along the lines of, “we will be using [X Resolution].” Thus, discussion confined to the resolution is non-optional (3, para. 5) [T]he delineation of an “affirmative” and a “negative” establishes a compelling case for a truth testing model…two debaters constrained by the rules of their assignment – to uphold or deny the truth of the resolution…[J]udging the quality of the debaters requires a reference to their roles. The better aff is the debater who is better at proving the resolution true. The better neg is the debater who is better at denying the truth of the resolution. The ballot requests an answer to “who did a comparatively better job fulfilling their role”, and since debaters’ roles dictate a truth-testing model, the judge ought to adjudicate the round under a truth testing model of debate. The judge does not have the jurisdiction to vote on education rather than truth testing (3, para. 7-8) Once a judge commits to a round in accordance with a set of rules…the rules are absolute and non-optional (4, para. 4) Similarly, Nebel uses contractual logic – appealing to the tournament invitation as binding agreement – to justify truth-testing: “The “social contract” argument holds that accepting a tournament invitation constitutes implicit consent to debate the specified topic….given that some proposition must be debated in each round and that the tournament has specified a resolution, no one can reasonably reject a principle that requires everyone to debate the announced resolution as worded. This appeals to Scanlon’s contractualism (1.1, para. 2) This approach is attractive because it seeks to start from principles we all seem to agree on and some very simple definitions. The primary problem is that the starting point is very thin, but the end point includes very robust conclusions. The terms “affirmative” and “negative” are insufficient to produce universal rules for debate, and certainly do not imply truth-testing (Section I, paragraph 3.) Branse does some legwork in footnoting several definitions of “affirm” and “negate,” but does little in the way of linguistic analysis. We won’t defend a particular definition but point out that there are many definitions that vary and do not all lend themselves to truth-testing. On a ballot the words “speaker points” are as prominently displayed as the words “affirmative” or “negative,” but neither Branse nor Nebel attempt to make any constitutive inference from their existence. Further, to find the constitutive role of a thing, one needs to look at what the thing actually is, rather than a few specific words on a ballot. Looking at debates now, we see that they rarely conform to the truth-testing model. It is simply absurd to observe an activity full of plans, counterplans, kritiks, non-topical performances, theory arguments, etc. and claim that its ‘constitutive nature’ is to exclude these arguments. Not only that, but the truth-testing family has been heavily criticized in both the policy and LD communities (Hynes Jr., 1979; Lichtman & Rohrer, 1982; Mangus, 2008; Nelson, 2008; O’Donnell, 2003; O’Krent, 2014; Palmer, 2008; Rowland, 1981; Simon, 1984; Snider, 1994; Ulrich, 1983). The empirical evidence also points toward argumentative inclusion in three important ways. The first is argument trends. The popularity of kritiks, a prioris, meta-ethics, etc. confirm that at different times the community at large has very different views of what constitutes not only a good argument but also a good mode of affirming or negating. The second is argument cycles. An alternate view would suggest that debate evolves and leaves bad arguments by the wayside. Nevertheless, we see lots of arguments pop in and out of the meta-game, suggesting that we have not made a definitive verdict on the best way to debate. The third is judge deference. While people’s views on proper modes of debate shift, we retain a strong deference to a judge’s decision. Judges have different views of debate; if there were some overarching principle that all judges should follow, we would expect tournament directors to enforce such a rule. In sum, there is no way to view debate as a whole and see truth-testing as the general principle underlying our practices. The existence of a judge and a ballot are also insufficient to produce universal rules for debate. Branse thinks “[t]he ballot requests an answer to ‘who did a comparatively better job fulfilling their role.’” While that may be a valid concern, it is dependent on what the judge views the roles of debaters to be. The absence of any sort of instruction other than determining the ‘better debating’ or the ‘winner’ most naturally lends itself to a presumption of openness. In fact, many practices very explicitly deviate from the constitutive roles Branse lays out. Some counterplans (PICs, PCCs, topical CPs and the like) may do more to prove the resolution than disprove it, yet are generally accepted negative arguments. Another type of objection to Branse’s view is an application of David Enoch’s “agency shmagency” argument. Enoch (2011) summarizes in his paper “Shmagency revisited”: [E]ven if you find yourself engaging in a kind of an activity…inescapably…and even if that activity is constitutively governed by some norm or…aim, this does not suffice for you to have a reason to obey that norm or aim at that aim. Rather, what is also needed is that you have a reason to engage in that activity…Even if you somehow find yourself playing chess, and even if checkmating your opponent is a constitutive aim of playing chess, still you may not have a reason to (try to) checkmate your opponent. You may lack such a reason if you lack a reason to play chess. The analogy is clear enough: Even if you find yourself playing the agency game, and even if agency has a constitutive aim, still you may not have a reason to be an agent (for instance, rather than a shmagent) (p. 5-6) The application to chess helps us see the application to debate. Truth-testing may be the constitutive aim of doing debate, but it does not follow that our best reasons tell us to test the truth of the resolution. In fact, you may have no reasons to be a truth-testing debater in the first place. If “affirmative” means “the one who proves the resolution true,” we’ve demonstrated times when it’s better to be “shmaffirmative” than “affirmative.” Finally, we think one of the most important (perhaps constitutive) features of debate is its unique capacity to change the rules while playing within the rules. Education-based arguments and non-topical arguments are just arguments – they’re pieces on the chess board to be manipulated by the players. Branse concedes that in APDA debate, the resolution is “contestable through a formal, in-round mechanism (3, para. 9). LD and policy debate also have this mechanism through theory arguments, kritiks, and alternative roles of the ballot. Branse is right that in soccer and chess, there is no way to kick a ball or move a chess piece that would legitimately change the rules of the game. Debate is different. While soccer and chess have incontrovertible empirical conditions for victory (checkmates, more goals at fulltime), debate does not. In fact, discussing the win conditions is debating! Whenever a debater reads a case, they assume or justify certain win conditions and not others. This deals with Branse’s “self-defeatingness” objection because debate about the rules does not create a “free-for-all” — it creates a debate (6, para. 1). The truth-testing judge does not get to pick and choose what makes a good debate; to do so is necessarily interventionist. This demonstrates truth-testing is more arbitrary and subjective [2] than the education position Branse criticizes (4, para. 4; 5, para. 2, 5). To be truly non-interventionist, we should accept them as permissible arguments until proven otherwise in round. Of course, not all rules are up for debate. There is a distinction between rules like speech times (call these procedural rules) and rules like truth-testing (call these substantive rules). The former are not up for the debate in the sense that the tournament director could intervene if a debater refused to stop talking. The latter are debate-able and have been for some time. No tournament director enforces their pet paradigm. Because the tournament director, not the judge, has ultimate authority, we liken her to the referee in soccer. On this view, the judge is not the referee tasked with enforcing “the rules”; she should decide only on the basis of arguments presented in the debate. Tournaments are not subject to any form of higher authority and are not obligated to follow NSDA rules, TOC guidelines, or anything else to determine a winner. Something is only a procedural rule if it is enforced by the tournament, and truth-testing has not and shouldn’t be enforced in this manner. To our knowledge, no bid tournament director has ever imposed a truth-testing burden on all competitors. If anything is a binding contract, it is the judge paradigm. Judge philosophies or paradigms are explicitly agreed to in writing because each judge establishes their own, and there is no coercion at play. Most tournaments mandate or strongly encourage written paradigms, have time to review them, and accept judge services instead of payment for hiring a judge. These norms establish a clearer contractual agreement in favor of judge deferral than universal truth-testing. We have tested the constitutive and contractual arguments by considering how truth-testing is not a procedural rule like speech times. As such, it cannot accrue the benefits of bindingness, authority, and non-arbitrariness. We can also test the argument in the opposite direction. There are some rules that seem even more “constitutive” of debate than the resolution but are not examples of procedural rules. For instance, every judge and debate theorist would likely reject completely new arguments in the 2AR, but there is nothing within Branse’s constitutive rules (speech times, the resolution, the aff and neg) to justify the norm. The no-new-arguments rule does not need to be written in a rulebook to have a lot of force. V. Pragmatic Justifications for Truth-testing With the priority of pragmatics established and constitutive arguments well addressed, we turn to some hybrid arguments that attempt to justify truth-testing by appealing to pragmatics. Nebel argues that the advantages stemming from truth-testing must be weighed against all exceptions to it and that the advantages of debating the ‘true meaning’ of the topic nearly always outweigh: It would be better if everyone debated the resolution as worded, whatever it is, than if everyone debated whatever subtle variation on the resolution they favored. Affirmatives would unfairly abuse (and have already abused) the entitlement to choose their own unpredictable adventure, and negatives would respond (and have already responded) with strategies that are designed to avoid clash…people are more likely to act on mistaken utility calculations and engage in self-serving violations of useful rules (1.1, para. 2) However, the advantages of topicality for the semantic/truth-testing view hold on the pragmatic view as well. We agree that the reasons to debate the meaning of the topic are strong. The only difference is that the pragmatic theory can explain the possibility of exceptions to the rule without interpretive contortion. It makes much more sense to understand that strict topicality is just a very good practice than to tout it as an absolute, lexically prior, constitutively- and contractually-binding rule. Ultimately, all benefits to topicality and debating something other than the resolution are weighed on the same scale, so we should adopt the theory that explicitly allows that scale. We are unconvinced that direct appeals to pragmatic considerations would be worse on pragmatic grounds than an external and absolute rule like ‘always be topical.’ If topicality is as important and beneficial as Nebel says it is, then it should be easy to defend within a particular debate, avoiding the worst slippery slope scenarios. Nebel also argues that the pragmatic view “justifies debating propositions that are completely irrelevant to the resolution but are much better to debate” (1.1, para. 5). Branse makes the same claim about education: “Education as a voting issue legitimizes reading positions and debating topics that have no association with the resolution” (5, para. 3). This alarmism we’ve answered with our discussion of harmful resolutions. There is no empirical indication of a slippery slope to a world where no one discusses the topic. The disadvantages to one debate round departing from topical debate are quite small, and we have no problem biting the bullet here. Sometimes (and it may be very rare), it’s better not to debate the resolution. There may also be reasons to debate something else even when the resolution is very good. Black students should not have to wait for a reparations topic to talk about race in America. As conversations about racial oppression and police brutality grow louder and louder, it becomes increasingly unreasonable to defend a view of debate that ignores their relevance to the everyday lives of our students. It should be clear that the pragmatic view takes no absolute stance on topicality or burdens. A debate practice may be pragmatic in one context but not another. For that reason, we reject the narrowness of truth-testing.

### Framing – Phil Debaters

#### Discussions of material oppression are the only productive option

Curry 14 Dr. Tommy J, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Affiliated Professor of Africana Studies, and a Ray A. Rothrock Fellow at Texas A&M University; first Black JV National Debate champion (for UMKC) and was half of the first all Black CEDA team to win the Pi Kappa Delta National Debate Tournament. “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century.” 2014.

Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics)**;** [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set] against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics.’ How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

#### Thus, the standard is minimizing oppression

#### To clarify, the round is weighed under magnitude, i.e. someone thinking taxes are oppressive isn’t as bad as the aff

#### Prefer it -

#### Reductionism

Parfit 84 Derek Parfit, cool hair. “Reasons and Persons” 1984. / MM BRACKETS FOR GENDER\*\*

Some recent medical cases provide striking evidence in favour of the Reductionist View. Human beings have alower brain and two upper hemispheres, which are connected by a bundle of fibres. In treating a few people with severe epilepsy, **surgeons have cut these fibres.** The aim was to reduce the severity of epileptic fits, by confining their causes to a single hemisphere. This aim was achieved. But the operations had another unintended consequence. **The effect**, in the words of one surgeon, **was the creation of** ‘two separate spheres of consciousness.’ **This effect was revealed by** various **psychological tests.** These made use of two facts. We control our right arms with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. And what is in the right halves of our visual fields we see with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. When someone’s hemispheres have been disconnected, **psychologists can thus present** to this person two different written **questions in the two halves of [their] visual field and can receive** two different answers written by this person’s two hands.

#### Only consequences explain degrees of rightness and wrongness for an action – breaking a promise to wear a certain shirt today is less wrong than breaking a promise to bring a dying person to hospital

#### No act omission distinction – choosing to omit is an act itself – people psychologically decide not to act which means being presented with the aff creates a choice between two actions, neither of which is an omission

#### Lexical Prerequisite – suffering creates lifelong conditions and threats on life that preclude the ability of actors being able to engage in other ethical evaluations since they are in a constant state of crisis.

#### Reject ideal theory

#### Ideal philosophies aren’t crafted for real-world procedures – they’re created for ideal circumstances, not how the government actually takes actions

#### Empirically denied – no government uses ethical evaluations that aren’t consequentialist

#### Allow 2ar responses to blippy 1nc tricks—key to protect time-crunched 1ars and disincentivize blip-storms that aren’t complete arguments. Evaluate every speech in the debate – key to assessing the better debater, otherwise one debater always wins because the other doesn’t get a response

#### Reject calc indicts and util triggers permissibility

#### Empirically denied—both individuals and policymakers carry out effective cost-benefit analysis which means even if decisions aren’t always perfect it’s still better than not acting at all

#### Theory - They’re functionally NIBs that everyone knows are silly but skew the aff and move the debate away from the topic and actual phil debate

#### Permissibility isn’t a reason why the framework fails – just a reason why it’s hard to use – they need warrants as to why it would allow every action to be permissibility

#### If the negative tries to trigger presumption or permissibility – they affirm

#### Skew - means the aff has to answer 7 minutes of offense and hedge against a 6-minute 2nr collapse, if the neg can’t prove the aff false you should presume its true

#### You presume statements true unless proven false – If I tell you my name is Matt you believe me unless you have evidence to the contrary

#### Truth testing makes up rules to constrain relevant discussions and is honestly just stupid

Overing and Scoggin 15 “In Defense of Inclusion”; September 10, 2015; John Scoggin (coach for Loyola in Los Angeles and former debater for the Blake School in Minneapolis. His students have earned 77 bids to the Tournament of Champions in the last 7 years. He’s coached 2 TOC finalists, a TOC quarterfinalist, and champions of many major national tournaments across the country) and Bob Overing (former debater for the USC Trojan Debate Squad, and current student at Yale Law School. As a senior in high school, he was ranked #1, earned 11 bids and took 2nd at TOC. In college, he cleared at CEDA and qualified to the NDT. His students have earned 98 career bids, reached TOC finals, and won many championships.); <http://premierdebatetoday.com/2015/09/10/in-defense-of-inclusion-by-john-scoggin-and-bob-overing/>

In establishing affirmative and negative truth burdens, truth-testing forecloses important discussions even of the resolution itself. Consider the fact that in 1925-1926, there were two college policy topics, one for men and one for women. Men got to debate child labor laws, and women had to debate divorce law. On the truth-testing view, the women debating the women’s topic would be barred from discussing the inherent sexism of the topic choice and the division of topics to begin with. Or consider the retracted 2010 November Public Forum topic, “Resolved: An Islamic cultural center should be built near Ground Zero.” Many debaters would feel uncomfortable arguing that resolution, just like they did on the 2012 January/February LD topic about domestic violence. We both know individuals who felt the domestic violence topic was so triggering that they did not want to compete at all. We can draw two conclusions from examples like these. First, there are good reasons to not debate a particular topic. These reasons have been spelled out over decades of debate scholarship ranging from Broda-Bahm and Murphy (1994) to Varda and Cook (2007) to Vincent (2013). Second, truth-testing prevents either team from making the argument that the topic is offensive or harmful. A hypothetical case, such as a resolution including an offensive racial epithet, makes the problem more obvious. Maybe the idea behind the resolution is good, but there’s something left out by analysis that stops there and ignores the use of a derogatory slur. Truth-testing makes irrelevant the words in the topic and the words used by the debaters. Thus, it fails to capture the reasons that any good person would “negate” or even refuse to debate an offensive topic. Clearly, there are elements of a topical advocacy beyond its truth that are worthy of questioning. Nebel (2015) acknowledges that some past resolutions were potentially harmful to debate (1.2, para. 5). Rather than exclude affected students as ‘not following the rules’ of semantics or truth-testing, we conclude that they should not be required to debate the topic. Nebel grapples with harmful topics in the following passage: I don’t think there is a magic-bullet response to critiques of the topic…I think they must be answered on a case-by-case basis, in their own terms…The question boils down to whether or not the topic is harmful for students to debate, and whether those harms justify breaking, or making an exception to, the topicality rule (1.2, para. 5) This statement is hard to square with Nebel’s thesis that semantic interpretations of the resolution come “lexically prior” (in other words, they always come first). He wants to allow exceptions, but doing so proves that harmfulness concerns can and do trump the topicality rule. As Nebel’s struggle with the critique of topicality illustrates, every article that claims to espouse a comprehensive view of debate must allow some exceptions to comply with our intuitions. The exceptions do not prove the rule. They prove there is a high level of concern in debate for affording dignity and respect to different kinds of arguments and modes of argumentation. There is no one principle of proper debate. Once the door is open for external factors like harmfulness, the inference to the priority of pragmatics is an easy one to make. If we care about the effects of debating the resolution on the students debating it, then other values like exclusion, education, and fairness start to creep in. If we can justify avoiding discussion of a bad topic on pragmatic grounds, we can also justify promoting discussion of a good topic. Any advantage to allowing discursive kritiks, performances, and roles of the ballot further justifies this pragmatic view against truth-testing. NDT champion Elijah Smith (2013) warns that without these argument forms, we “distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day”. Christopher Vincent (2013) built on that idea, arguing that universal moral theory “drowns out the perspectives of students of color that are historically excluded from the conversation” (para. 3). While we don’t agree wholesale with these authors, their work unequivocally demonstrates the value of departures from pure truth-testing. While we may not convince our opposition that they should presume value in kritik-based strategies, they should remain open to them. In a recent article for the Rostrum, Pittsburgh debate coach Paul Johnson (2015) extolled the ‘hands-off’ approach. Let the debaters test whether the arguments have merit, rather than deciding beforehand: In a debate round, one may argue the impertinence of theses about structural racism with regards to a particular case…But when we explicitly or implicitly suggest such theses have little to no value by deciding in advance that they are inaccurate, we are forswearing the hard, argumentative work of subjecting our own beliefs to rigorous testing and interrogation (p. 90) Suggesting that non-topical, race-based approaches are “vigilantist” and “self-serving” “adventure[s]” is to demean the worth of these arguments before the debate round even starts (Nebel 2015, 1.1, para. 2). The claim that they ‘break the rules’ or exist ‘outside the law’ otherizes the debaters, coaches, and squads that pursue non-traditional styles. Especially given that many of these students are students of color, we should reject the image of them as lawless, self-interested vigilantes. Students work hard on their positions, often incorporating personal elements such as narrative or performance. To defend a view of debate that excludes their arguments from consideration devalues their scholarship and the way they make debate “home.” That’s unacceptable. Branse notes “the motivation for joining the activity substantially varies from person to person” yet excludes some debaters’ motivations while promoting others (5, para. 4). We agree with Smith on the very tangible effects of such exclusion: “If black students do not feel comfortable participating in LD they will lose out on the ability to judge, coach, or to force debate to deal with the truth of their perspectives” (para. 5). Of course, we do not believe that Nebel or Branse intend their views to have these effects, but they are a concern we need to take seriously. III. Changing the Rules In Round One thought is that rejecting truth-testing is the wrong solution. Instead, we should create a better topic-selection process or an NSDA-approved topic change when the resolution is particularly bad. These solutions, however, are not exclusive of a rejection of truth-testing. An offensive topic might be reason to reform the selection process and to stop debating it immediately. Good role of the ballot arguments are the best solution because they pinpoint exactly why a debater finds the resolution inadequate. They highlight the problems of the proposed topic of discussion, and outline reasons why a different approach is preferable. While Branse believes these examples of in-round rule-making are problematic, we think debate rounds are an excellent location for discussing what debate should be. The first reason is the failure of consensus. Because there are a wide variety of supported methods to go about debating, we should be cautious about paradigmatic exclusion. While we don’t defend the relativist conclusion that all styles of debate are equally valuable, there is significant disagreement that our theories must account for. Truth-testing denies a number of ways to debate that many find valuable. The second reason is the internalization of valuable principles. Even people who do not think kritiks are the right way to debate have taken important steps like removing gendered language from their positions. NDT champion Elijah Smith (2013) identified hateful arguments and comments “you expect to hear at a Klan rally” as commonplace in LD rounds and the community (para. 2). We’d like to think those instances are at least reduced by the argumentation he’s encouraged. For instance, the much-maligned “you must prove why oppression is bad” argument now sees little play in high-level circuit rounds. Truth-testing forecloses this kind of learning from the opposition. Roles of the ballot and theory interpretations are examples of how in-round argumentation creates new rules of engagement. We welcome these strategies, and debaters should be prepared to justify their proposed rules against procedural challenges. The arguments we have made thus far are objections to truth-testing as a top-down worldview used to exclude from the get-go, not in-round means of redress against certain practices. There is a major difference between a topicality argument in a high school debate round and a prominent debate coach and camp director’s glib dismissal of non-topical argument as follows: [Y]ou can talk about whatever you want, but if it doesn’t support or deny the resolution, then the judge shouldn’t vote on it (Nebel 2015, 1.2, para. 4) Branse is equally ideological: Within the debate, the judge is bound by the established rules. If the rules are failing their function, that can be a reason to change the rules outside of the round. However, in round acts are out of the judge’s jurisdiction (2, para. 12) We take issue with debate theorists’ attempts to define away arguments that they don’t like. At one point, Jason Baldwin (2009) actually defended truth-testing for its openness, praising the values of the free market of ideas: That’s how the marketplace of ideas is supposed to work. But it is supposed to be a free marketplace where buyers (judges) examine whatever sellers (debaters) offer them with an open mind, not an exclusive marketplace where only the sellers of some officially approved theories are welcome (p. 26) Unfortunately for the truth-tester, debate has changed, and it will change again. What was once a model that allowed all the arguments debaters wanted to make – a prioris, frameworks, and meta-ethics – is now outdated in the context of discursive kritiks, performance, and alternative roles of the ballot. IV. Constitutivism, Authority, and the Nature of Debate Branse’s goal is to derive substantive rules for debate from the ‘constitutive features’ of debate itself and the roles of competitors and judges. We’ll quote him at length here to get a full view of the argument: [P]ragmatic benefits are constrained by the rules of the activity….education should not be promoted at the expense of the rules since the rules are what define the activity. LD is only LD because of the rules governing it – if we changed the activity to promoting practical values, then it would cease to be what it is (2, para. 7) Internal rules of an activity are absolute. From the perspective of the players, the authority of the rules are non-optional. (2, para. 12) The resolution, in fact, offers one of the only constitutive guidelines for debate. Most tournament invitations put a sentence in the rules along the lines of, “we will be using [X Resolution].” Thus, discussion confined to the resolution is non-optional (3, para. 5) [T]he delineation of an “affirmative” and a “negative” establishes a compelling case for a truth testing model…two debaters constrained by the rules of their assignment – to uphold or deny the truth of the resolution…[J]udging the quality of the debaters requires a reference to their roles. The better aff is the debater who is better at proving the resolution true. The better neg is the debater who is better at denying the truth of the resolution. The ballot requests an answer to “who did a comparatively better job fulfilling their role”, and since debaters’ roles dictate a truth-testing model, the judge ought to adjudicate the round under a truth testing model of debate. The judge does not have the jurisdiction to vote on education rather than truth testing (3, para. 7-8) Once a judge commits to a round in accordance with a set of rules…the rules are absolute and non-optional (4, para. 4) Similarly, Nebel uses contractual logic – appealing to the tournament invitation as binding agreement – to justify truth-testing: “The “social contract” argument holds that accepting a tournament invitation constitutes implicit consent to debate the specified topic….given that some proposition must be debated in each round and that the tournament has specified a resolution, no one can reasonably reject a principle that requires everyone to debate the announced resolution as worded. This appeals to Scanlon’s contractualism (1.1, para. 2) This approach is attractive because it seeks to start from principles we all seem to agree on and some very simple definitions. The primary problem is that the starting point is very thin, but the end point includes very robust conclusions. The terms “affirmative” and “negative” are insufficient to produce universal rules for debate, and certainly do not imply truth-testing (Section I, paragraph 3.) Branse does some legwork in footnoting several definitions of “affirm” and “negate,” but does little in the way of linguistic analysis. We won’t defend a particular definition but point out that there are many definitions that vary and do not all lend themselves to truth-testing. On a ballot the words “speaker points” are as prominently displayed as the words “affirmative” or “negative,” but neither Branse nor Nebel attempt to make any constitutive inference from their existence. Further, to find the constitutive role of a thing, one needs to look at what the thing actually is, rather than a few specific words on a ballot. Looking at debates now, we see that they rarely conform to the truth-testing model. It is simply absurd to observe an activity full of plans, counterplans, kritiks, non-topical performances, theory arguments, etc. and claim that its ‘constitutive nature’ is to exclude these arguments. Not only that, but the truth-testing family has been heavily criticized in both the policy and LD communities (Hynes Jr., 1979; Lichtman & Rohrer, 1982; Mangus, 2008; Nelson, 2008; O’Donnell, 2003; O’Krent, 2014; Palmer, 2008; Rowland, 1981; Simon, 1984; Snider, 1994; Ulrich, 1983). The empirical evidence also points toward argumentative inclusion in three important ways. The first is argument trends. The popularity of kritiks, a prioris, meta-ethics, etc. confirm that at different times the community at large has very different views of what constitutes not only a good argument but also a good mode of affirming or negating. The second is argument cycles. An alternate view would suggest that debate evolves and leaves bad arguments by the wayside. Nevertheless, we see lots of arguments pop in and out of the meta-game, suggesting that we have not made a definitive verdict on the best way to debate. The third is judge deference. While people’s views on proper modes of debate shift, we retain a strong deference to a judge’s decision. Judges have different views of debate; if there were some overarching principle that all judges should follow, we would expect tournament directors to enforce such a rule. In sum, there is no way to view debate as a whole and see truth-testing as the general principle underlying our practices. The existence of a judge and a ballot are also insufficient to produce universal rules for debate. Branse thinks “[t]he ballot requests an answer to ‘who did a comparatively better job fulfilling their role.’” While that may be a valid concern, it is dependent on what the judge views the roles of debaters to be. The absence of any sort of instruction other than determining the ‘better debating’ or the ‘winner’ most naturally lends itself to a presumption of openness. In fact, many practices very explicitly deviate from the constitutive roles Branse lays out. Some counterplans (PICs, PCCs, topical CPs and the like) may do more to prove the resolution than disprove it, yet are generally accepted negative arguments. Another type of objection to Branse’s view is an application of David Enoch’s “agency shmagency” argument. Enoch (2011) summarizes in his paper “Shmagency revisited”: [E]ven if you find yourself engaging in a kind of an activity…inescapably…and even if that activity is constitutively governed by some norm or…aim, this does not suffice for you to have a reason to obey that norm or aim at that aim. Rather, what is also needed is that you have a reason to engage in that activity…Even if you somehow find yourself playing chess, and even if checkmating your opponent is a constitutive aim of playing chess, still you may not have a reason to (try to) checkmate your opponent. You may lack such a reason if you lack a reason to play chess. The analogy is clear enough: Even if you find yourself playing the agency game, and even if agency has a constitutive aim, still you may not have a reason to be an agent (for instance, rather than a shmagent) (p. 5-6) The application to chess helps us see the application to debate. Truth-testing may be the constitutive aim of doing debate, but it does not follow that our best reasons tell us to test the truth of the resolution. In fact, you may have no reasons to be a truth-testing debater in the first place. If “affirmative” means “the one who proves the resolution true,” we’ve demonstrated times when it’s better to be “shmaffirmative” than “affirmative.” Finally, we think one of the most important (perhaps constitutive) features of debate is its unique capacity to change the rules while playing within the rules. Education-based arguments and non-topical arguments are just arguments – they’re pieces on the chess board to be manipulated by the players. Branse concedes that in APDA debate, the resolution is “contestable through a formal, in-round mechanism (3, para. 9). LD and policy debate also have this mechanism through theory arguments, kritiks, and alternative roles of the ballot. Branse is right that in soccer and chess, there is no way to kick a ball or move a chess piece that would legitimately change the rules of the game. Debate is different. While soccer and chess have incontrovertible empirical conditions for victory (checkmates, more goals at fulltime), debate does not. In fact, discussing the win conditions is debating! Whenever a debater reads a case, they assume or justify certain win conditions and not others. This deals with Branse’s “self-defeatingness” objection because debate about the rules does not create a “free-for-all” — it creates a debate (6, para. 1). The truth-testing judge does not get to pick and choose what makes a good debate; to do so is necessarily interventionist. This demonstrates truth-testing is more arbitrary and subjective [2] than the education position Branse criticizes (4, para. 4; 5, para. 2, 5). To be truly non-interventionist, we should accept them as permissible arguments until proven otherwise in round. Of course, not all rules are up for debate. There is a distinction between rules like speech times (call these procedural rules) and rules like truth-testing (call these substantive rules). The former are not up for the debate in the sense that the tournament director could intervene if a debater refused to stop talking. The latter are debate-able and have been for some time. No tournament director enforces their pet paradigm. Because the tournament director, not the judge, has ultimate authority, we liken her to the referee in soccer. On this view, the judge is not the referee tasked with enforcing “the rules”; she should decide only on the basis of arguments presented in the debate. Tournaments are not subject to any form of higher authority and are not obligated to follow NSDA rules, TOC guidelines, or anything else to determine a winner. Something is only a procedural rule if it is enforced by the tournament, and truth-testing has not and shouldn’t be enforced in this manner. To our knowledge, no bid tournament director has ever imposed a truth-testing burden on all competitors. If anything is a binding contract, it is the judge paradigm. Judge philosophies or paradigms are explicitly agreed to in writing because each judge establishes their own, and there is no coercion at play. Most tournaments mandate or strongly encourage written paradigms, have time to review them, and accept judge services instead of payment for hiring a judge. These norms establish a clearer contractual agreement in favor of judge deferral than universal truth-testing. We have tested the constitutive and contractual arguments by considering how truth-testing is not a procedural rule like speech times. As such, it cannot accrue the benefits of bindingness, authority, and non-arbitrariness. We can also test the argument in the opposite direction. There are some rules that seem even more “constitutive” of debate than the resolution but are not examples of procedural rules. For instance, every judge and debate theorist would likely reject completely new arguments in the 2AR, but there is nothing within Branse’s constitutive rules (speech times, the resolution, the aff and neg) to justify the norm. The no-new-arguments rule does not need to be written in a rulebook to have a lot of force. V. Pragmatic Justifications for Truth-testing With the priority of pragmatics established and constitutive arguments well addressed, we turn to some hybrid arguments that attempt to justify truth-testing by appealing to pragmatics. Nebel argues that the advantages stemming from truth-testing must be weighed against all exceptions to it and that the advantages of debating the ‘true meaning’ of the topic nearly always outweigh: It would be better if everyone debated the resolution as worded, whatever it is, than if everyone debated whatever subtle variation on the resolution they favored. Affirmatives would unfairly abuse (and have already abused) the entitlement to choose their own unpredictable adventure, and negatives would respond (and have already responded) with strategies that are designed to avoid clash…people are more likely to act on mistaken utility calculations and engage in self-serving violations of useful rules (1.1, para. 2) However, the advantages of topicality for the semantic/truth-testing view hold on the pragmatic view as well. We agree that the reasons to debate the meaning of the topic are strong. The only difference is that the pragmatic theory can explain the possibility of exceptions to the rule without interpretive contortion. It makes much more sense to understand that strict topicality is just a very good practice than to tout it as an absolute, lexically prior, constitutively- and contractually-binding rule. Ultimately, all benefits to topicality and debating something other than the resolution are weighed on the same scale, so we should adopt the theory that explicitly allows that scale. We are unconvinced that direct appeals to pragmatic considerations would be worse on pragmatic grounds than an external and absolute rule like ‘always be topical.’ If topicality is as important and beneficial as Nebel says it is, then it should be easy to defend within a particular debate, avoiding the worst slippery slope scenarios. Nebel also argues that the pragmatic view “justifies debating propositions that are completely irrelevant to the resolution but are much better to debate” (1.1, para. 5). Branse makes the same claim about education: “Education as a voting issue legitimizes reading positions and debating topics that have no association with the resolution” (5, para. 3). This alarmism we’ve answered with our discussion of harmful resolutions. There is no empirical indication of a slippery slope to a world where no one discusses the topic. The disadvantages to one debate round departing from topical debate are quite small, and we have no problem biting the bullet here. Sometimes (and it may be very rare), it’s better not to debate the resolution. There may also be reasons to debate something else even when the resolution is very good. Black students should not have to wait for a reparations topic to talk about race in America. As conversations about racial oppression and police brutality grow louder and louder, it becomes increasingly unreasonable to defend a view of debate that ignores their relevance to the everyday lives of our students. It should be clear that the pragmatic view takes no absolute stance on topicality or burdens. A debate practice may be pragmatic in one context but not another. For that reason, we reject the narrowness of truth-testing.

#### Intent-based frameworks ignore material oppression

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In addition, the deconstructive bent of discursive approaches limits their capacity to challenge the structure of modern industrialism. Just as science has been reluctant to recognize the holistic qualities of nature, so we have been slow to appreciate that the power of industrialism and its resultant near-hegemony in the modern world is largely the result of its ability to integrate science, politics, and everyday social life within a structure that appears complete and self-sufficient. This structure cannot be challenged without reference to alternative structures. To celebrate choice and free play without also celebrating the frames of meaning within which they take place is simply to guarantee our assimilation to and absorption within industrialism, and so represents a philosophy of surrender. For example, “freedom” has little meaning in the absence of a framework of democratic laws which protect the vulnerable against the “freedom” of the powerful to exploit, intimidate, and mislead. Similarly, my freedom to explore an area of wilderness is negated if energy companies and off-road vehicle clubs also have the freedom to use the area as they see fit. Freedom is all to often interpreted as the absence of structure; and structure gives meaning and implies responsibilities and limitations. One of the most insidious aspects of the colonization of the world is industrialism's silent but lethal elimination of structures that could challenge it. The widespread lack of appreciation within academia of the way in which postmodern approaches involving deconstruction promote this insidious *conceptual* assimilation to industrialism is an index of the urgent need to develop a psychocultural dimension to our environmental understanding. Finally, we should not ignore the possibility that an emphasis on language serves particular defensive functions for the social scientist. Noam Chomsky has noted that it”it's too hard to deal with real problems,” some academics tend to “go off on wild goose chases that don't matter . . . [or] get involved in academic cults that are very divorced from any reality and that provide a defense against dealing with the world as it actually is.”71 An emphasis on language can serve this sort of defensive function; for the study of discourse enables one to stand aside from issues and avoid any commitment to a cause or idea, simply presenting all sides of a debate and pointing out the discursive strategies involved. As the physical world appears to fade into mere discourse, so it comes to seem less real than the language used to describe it; and environmental issues lose the dimensions of urgency and tragedy and become instead the proving grounds for ideas and attitudes. Rather than walking in what Aldo Leopold described as a “world of wounds,” the discursive theorist can study this world dispassionately, safely insulated from the emotional and ecological havoc that is taking place elsewhere. Like experimentalism, this is a schizoid stance that exemplifies rather than challenges the characteristic social pathology of out time; and it is one that supports Melanie Klein's thesis that the internal object world can serve as a psychotic substitute for an external “real” world that is either absent or unsatisfying.72 Ian Craib's description of social construction as a “social psychosis”73 therefore seems entirely apt. But what object relations theorists such as Klein fail to point out is the other side of this dialectic: that withdrawing from the external world and substituting an internal world of words or fantasies, because of the actions that follow from this state of affairs, makes the former even less satisfying and more psychologically distant, so contributing to the vicious spiral that severs the “human from the “natural” and abandons nature to industrialism.

### Kritiks

#### This card is amazing and if you read a kritik you will lose

**Taylor 17** Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, assistant professor of African American studies at Princeton University [“Home Is the Crucible of Struggle,” American Quarterly, Vol. 69, No. 2, June 2017, p. 229-233, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

Creating home, or what may also be described as a struggle to belong, has always been political in the United States. In a country founded on the extermination of its indigenous population, whose wealth was derived from the forced labor of the enslaved, and for whom that wealth was multiplied a trillion times over through the violent expropriation of waves upon waves of immigrant labor—to stay or belong has been brutally contested and valiantly fought to achieve. In other words, we share a history of repression and resistance in the elemental, human struggle to belong, to be home. Those various battles over land rights and citizenship; the right to work and housing; the right to vote, speak, and organize have all been in an effort to reshape or reform the injustice and oppression that shapes the daily lives of most people in this country. In this persistent quest, we now enter into a period of both certainty and uncertainty. We can be certain that the administration of Donald Trump will pursue policies that will make the lives of ordinary people substantially harder. We can be certain that his administration will attack immigrants. He has promised to restore law and order, which appears to be an invitation for the police to continue their assaults on Black and Brown communities. Trump has bragged about sexually assaulting women while decrying their rights to reproductive freedom. Trump and his cohort have all but declared war on Muslims in the United States and beyond. We have seen a revival of the white supremacist Right and an unleashing of open racial animus. In the month after the election of Trump, over one thousand hate crimes across the country were reported. Since he has taken office, Jewish cemeteries have been desecrated; mosques have been burned; and swastikas have been brandished in acts of vandalism and intimidation. What is uncertain is the extent to which Trump will be able to follow through on his threats against a variety of communities. This uncertainty is not with Trump's intention to inflict as much pain and harm on the most vulnerable people in the United States; rather, it is based on a calculation that our ability to organize and build movements will complicate, blunt, and, in some cases, thwart the Trump agenda. [End Page 229] The challenge is in using the spaces we occupy in the academy to approach this task. There will be many different kinds of organizing spaces developed in the coming years, but there is a particular role we can play in this moment. This organizing possibility exists only when we recognize the academy, itself, as a site of politics and struggle. Those who ignore that reality do so because they have the luxury to or because they are so constrained by compartmentalization that they ignore the very world they are living in. In the last two years we have seen the flowering of campus struggles against racism, rape, and sexual violence, amid campaigns for union recognition and the right of faculty to control the atmosphere of their classrooms. Whether or not we on campus see them as political spaces, the right wing certainly does. They have raged against "safe spaces" and what they refer to as "political correctness." While reasonable people may debate the merits and meaning of concepts like safe spaces, we should not confuse those discussions with an attack from the right that is intended to create "unsafe spaces" where racial antagonism, sexual predation, and homophobia are considered rites of passage or, as the new president describes as it, "locker room" behavior. These, unfortunately, are only smaller battles happening within the larger transformation of colleges and universities into the leading edge of various neoliberal practices**, from** the growing use of "contingent labor" to the proliferation of online education, to certificate and master's programs that are only intended to increase the coffers while adding little to nothing to the intellect or critical thinking capacities of its participants. Robin Kelley reminds us that universities will "never be engines for social transformation," but they are places that often reflect, and in some situations magnify, the tensions that exist in society more generally. There is a relationship between the two. The struggles for academic units in Black and Chicano studies in the 1960s were born of the political insurgencies that captivated those communities while shaking the entire country to its core. Robert Warrior reminds us that in Native studies there is a commitment to crash through the firewall that is often intended to silo scholarship from the communities it is often derived from. He writes that a "clear predominance exists in Native studies of scholarship that obligates itself in clear ways to being connected to the real lives of real peoples living in real time. More than just connected, a hallmark of Native studies scholarship is a preoccupation with how the work of scholars and scholarship translates itself into the process of making the Indigenous world a better, more just, and more equitable place to live, thrive, and provide for future generations." Scholarship alone is not politics, but the study of history, theory, and politics can imbue our political practice with depth and confidence. Today there is a [End Page 230] need to connect the legacy of resistance, struggle, and transformation with a new generation of students and activists who are desperately looking for hope that their world is not coming to an end. To be sure, there is deep malaise and fear about the meaning of a Trump presidency. It is not to be underestimated. Anyone who is so open about his antipathy and disgust with entire populations of people should be believed when he promises to amplify the suffering in this society. And we should not underestimate the obstacles that confront a political Left that is deeply fractured and politically divided. But we should also remember that the future is not already written. It has yet to be cast in stone. The stories of our demise have been predicted over and over again. The marches that erupted in the immediate aftermath of the Trump victory give a sense of the resistance to come. Who could have predicted that the day after Trump's inauguration between three and four million people in the United States would take to the streets to defiantly resist and oppose the new president? In fact, we have already seen in the last decade the eruption of mass struggle embodied in the Occupy movement and most recently the rise of Black Lives Matter. The challenge to Trump, however, will demand more than moral outrage. It requires a strategy, and strategy can be developed only when we have political clarity on the nature of Trumpism. The queer theorist Lisa Duggan made an important observation at the association's annual meeting last November in Denver. In an emergency session assessing the US presidential election, there was a sense of urgency that we have talked enough and now is the time to act. But Duggan made the important observation that while action is always necessary, we must also create the political and intellectual spaces necessary for debate, argument, and discussion. We cannot act in intelligent ways without understanding why we are acting and what we are acting against. In other words, politics and ideas matter as much as the action necessary to transform conditions we abhor. This may seem like a minor or even self-evident point, but there is a constant critique that we are often "preaching to the choir" or a question about the usefulness of sitting in yet "another" meeting. But this most recent electoral season has also shown that the choir has different pitches and cadences. The choir can be off-key. This is not to suggest that we should all agree or mute the areas of disagreement and tension, but we should be clear about those differences. Just as we should be clear on what is agreed on and what are the bases on which we can overcome differences and unite. These various position s cannot be intuited; they are discovered through patient debate. Beyond the culture of respectful internal debate and discussion, academics also have something to contribute. The confidence necessary to effectively [End Page 231] engage in struggle is not easily attained in an atmosphere of defeat and defensiveness. Those are the moments to draw on the history of resistance in the movements of the oppressed. Often the political establishment better understands the power of this history than those who are its rightful inheritors. There is a reason that the federal government invested so heavily in the repression of the Black liberation movement of the 1960s. The point was not only to defeat the struggle; it was intended to snuff out its legacy. In significant ways the repression has carried on until this very day. There is a reason sixty-nine-year-old Assata Shakur remains a political exile in Cuba and our government continues to keep a $2 million bounty on her head while shamefully including her on the misnamed terrorist watch list. It is the same reason that the Angola Three—Robert King, Albert Woodfox, and Herman Wallace, Black Panther members held in the infamous prison in Louisiana—collectively spent 113 years in solitary confinement as political punishment for their ideas. It is the same reason 45 years after the Attica Prison Rebellion in 1971, federal and state officials continue to hide the truth of its brutal repression. The most important, and thus damning, archives that the historian Heather Ann Thompson used to write her book on Attica have, once again, disappeared from public scrutiny. Not only does the political establishment want to punish and demonize the voices for Black liberation, but more important, they want to bury the legacy, the history, and politics of the movement itself. It is clear to understand why. It is not irrational hatred of African Americans; it is quite simply because when Black people go into struggle, it unravels the dominant narrative, or the fabrications at the heart of American mythology—that we are a democratic and just society. Only a cursory knowledge of Black history—and the history of indigenous people in this land—shatters the United States' obsession with its own self-idealization as an "exceptional" society. In doing so, Black struggles are examples of how the "margins" can upend and destabilize the supposed center. And perhaps even more important is how those struggles within the various iterations of the Black Freedom movement become a platform for other liberation struggles to emerge. This was the legacy of the Black insurgency of the 1960s. As a result, the political establishment distorts this history and distorts its radical content, its radical leaders, and their voices. This is not just a lesson of who gets to tell history; this legacy of repression affects the movements of today. The attempt to distort and bury the struggles from a previous period of Black rebellion deprives the current generation of the politics, strategy, and tactics of our movement historically. It diminishes the analyses and the political tools necessary to help forge a way forward in [End Page 232] this political moment. But perhaps, most perniciously, the efforts to disconnect people, especially young people, moving into struggle from their radical roots and history, are to dramatically limit our political imaginations so that we believe that the best we can hope for in this life is a Black president or a more responsive and less inept Democratic Party: the establishment wants us to believe that life as it currently is, is the best we can hope for. This is why, for example, the scholar and activist Angela Davis is so important because she is a connection to our radical history. She is the living legacy of a political movement that put liberation at its center. And you can see her political and intellectual fingerprints all over our movement today—from the politics of Black feminism and the concept of intersectionality to the demand of abolition and the rejection of the very normative idea that humans should be surveilled, caged, or killed by the state. It is no wonder that her politics and activism have deeply influenced many of the Black queer women at the heart of the Black Lives Matter movement. She compels us to think more deeply, to get to the root of the matter, to be radical in our analysis, and to struggle harder—not just in the world as it is but for the world as we want it to be. Davis is but a single example. There are many other examples where those from a previous era of struggle whom we respect and honor connect our searching present with a previous moment of insurgency and struggle. In our lifetimes, we have never been more in need of the inspiration, the lessons, and the strength of those who have bequeathed to us the certainties and uncertainties of home today. The challenge continues to lie in our abilities to transcend, through argument, debate, and struggle, the many paths that crisscross and potentially divide our resistance to hatred, bigotry, and oppression. This is a call for solidarity, but not on the basis of papering over the different experiences that create different levels of consciousness within our society. Solidarity is most palpable when there is recognition that our fates are connected and that an injury to one is an injury to all. Another world is truly possible, but only if we are willing to struggle for it.

#### Saying the case “doesn’t solve enough” is unethical – before saying “reform is impossible” consider what the affirmative does

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The CLS critique of piecemeal reform Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale reformation that must occur to create a decent society. Even worse, an unfair social system survives by using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize oppression. Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair and just. In fact, Crits believe that teaching the common law or using the case method in law school is a disguised means of preaching incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure.“ To avoid this, CLS scholars urge law professors to abandon the case method, give up the effort to ﬁnd rationality and order in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political fashion. The CLS critique of piecemeal reform is familiar, imperialistic and wrong. Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the Promised Land is at hand. The critique is imperialistic in that it tells minorities and other oppressed peoples how they should interpret events affecting them. A court order directing a housing authority to disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing may postpone the revolution, or it may not. In the meantime, the order keeps a number of poor families warm. This may mean more to them than it does to a comfortable academic working in a warm office. It smacks of paternalism to assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty of heat now, unless there is evidence for that possibility. The Crits do not offer such evidence. Indeed, some incremental changes may bring revolutionary changes closer, not push them further away. Not all small reforms induce complacency; some may whet the appetite for further combat. The welfare family may hold a tenants’ union meeting in their heated living room. CLS scholars’ critique of piecemeal reform often misses these possibilities, and neglects the question of whether total change, when it comes, will be what we want.

#### Methodological pluralism is good

Bleiker 14 [Roland, professor of international relations at the university of Queensland. “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2. June 17, 2014]

This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement. For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

#### Debating about tangible, real world solutions are good – we’ll crush them on the uniqueness debate

Gurney 18, Kyra Gurney [Columbia University M.S., Journalism] 2-23-2018, “Last fall, they debated gun control in class. Now, they debate lawmakers on TV,” Tampa Bay Times, <http://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/02/23/they-debated-gun-control-in-class-last-fall-now-they-debate-lawmakers-on-tv/> / MM

When students at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High debated gun control in class last November, they never imagined they were preparing to lead a national discussion on how to prevent school shootings. As the debate team filled Google docs with research on state laws, brainstormed arguments for and against universal background checks and wrote speeches, they were amassing information that would later help them formulate arguments on national TV, in face-to-face meetings with Florida legislators and at vigils for their murdered classmates. And it’s not just the students at Stoneman Douglas. Since a gunman opened fire at the high school last Wednesday, killing 17 people, teenagers from across Broward County have joined the call for stricter gun control policies. They have been praised for their composure and well-articulated arguments, which often appear so polished they have fueled conspiracy theories that the students are “crisis actors.” But what really explains the students’ poise, said Broward Schools Superintendent Robert Runcie, is the school district’s system-wide debate program that teaches extemporaneous speaking from an early age. Every public high school and middle school in the county has a debate program, along with more than two dozen elementary schools. It’s one of the largest debate programs in the country — and, amid the heartbreak, it has helped Broward students position themselves on the front lines of the #NeverAgain movement. “I’m like a parent that is just beaming with pride in terms of how they have been able to express themselves, how they’ve exhibited a kind of courage that everybody needs to have and how they’re working to reclaim their future and do what they know is right,” Runcie said. “In some ways it seems like we’ve been preparing our kids for this moment without realizing it.” The debate program has certainly helped prepare David Hogg, a senior at Stoneman Douglas who has appeared on nearly every major network and cable news program over the past week. “It’s been immensely helpful because I’ve been able to speak articulately about these current events,” Hogg said Wednesday evening on his way to a CNN town hall at the BBandT Center in Sunrise. With no time to prepare any new arguments in recent days, Hogg said he’s relied on the research he conducted in debate class last fall. “Exhausted is an understatement, but I like it,” he added, referring to the frequent media appearances. “The fast pace of the media cycle is what keeps me going.” Hogg said he joined Stoneman Douglas’ debate program on a whim in ninth grade. At the high school, debate is both a class and an after-school activity. Roughly 80 percent of the 150 students who take the class also participate in competitions, which means they spend time preparing for debates in the afternoons and on weekends. Although Hogg said he’s not a star on the team, he enjoys arguing about current events. “I’ve never won a single debate tournament, even come in 10th place,” he said. “I guess it shows you don’t have to be great at something to make an impact.” Sophomore Sari Kaufman has also used her debate training to advocate for stricter gun control policies. On Sunday, the 15-year-old Stoneman Douglas student wrote a letter to lawmakers, which was grounded in her debate class research, that has been shared hundreds of times on social media. Kaufman also brought her debate notes on a trip to Tallahassee earlier this week to meet with lawmakers. “I don’t think we made a huge change, but we definitely moved the needle a little more than it was before,” she said. Gun control isn’t the only lesson from debate class that’s come in handy this past week. Students recently studied special interest groups and lobbying, said debate teacher and program director Jesus Caro. They talked about political action committees, the groups that raise money for candidates, and about groups like the National Rifle Association. “Just to see that these kids aren’t bound by any of these rules ... it’s really moving,” Caro said. “It does make me proud.” Katherine Guerra, a sophomore at Stoneman Douglas and a debate team captain, has stayed out of the limelight. But she said the debate program has helped her classmates respond to the shooting. “We know what we want, and we have the research,” she said. “We know how things work and that gives us more liberty to speak out because we’re not unsure of things.” “The thing is in debate you have to argue both sides, which is also beneficial because as much as we want to change things we also need to see the different views,” she added. In recent years, some of the students on the team, which Caro described as “up and coming,” have traveled around the country to attend tournaments. This year, the national tournament will be held in Fort Lauderdale in June. The location was decided before the shooting, but Runcie said he plans to ask the National Speech and Debate Association to make gun control one of the topics at the competition. The Stoneman Douglas team has a long road ahead before the national competition. A beloved member, 14-year-old Alyssa Alhadeff, was killed during the shooting and the team is grieving the loss of other classmates and staff as well. Caro said he hopes the open environment in debate class, where students have space to discuss controversial issues, will give them the opportunity to share what they’re feeling. “I just know I’m going to try to give everybody a chance to speak, try to create some sense of normalcy and definitely give them opportunities to develop solutions,” he said.

#### Death and suffering come first

Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### Critique is useless without a concrete policy option that solves for your harms.

Bryant 12 Levi Bryant (Professor of Philosophy at Collin College) “A Critique of the Academic Left” 2012 <https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/> / MM

Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignor[es]ing how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park: The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this: Phase 1: Collect Underpants Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Profit! They even have a catchy song to go with their work: Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows: Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation! Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express [critiques] them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing? But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done! But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.

#### No root cause claims

Levy & Thompson 13 (Jack S. Levy is Board of Governors' Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, and Affiliate at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and William R. Thompson is Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly, "The Decline of War? Multiple Trajectories and Diverging Trends", International Studies Review, 2013, 15, pp. 396-419)

If true, we would have a unified theory of violence. Pinker subsequently steps back from this expansive claim. He notes that some other forms of violence— including homicides, lynchings, domestic violence, and rapes—do not fit a power law model, suggesting that the mechanisms driving these practices differ from those driving international war. Still, there are others who have insisted on a unified theory of violence. Examples might include Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of aggressive instincts as a root cause of war (Einstein and Freud 1933), frustration-aggression theory (Durbin and Bowlby 1939), and contemporary rational choice theories. We are highly skeptical. We fear that any theory broad enough to explain violence at the levels of the individual, family, neighborhood, communal group, state, and international system would be too general and too indiscriminating to capture variations in violence within each level, which is a prerequisite for any satisfactory theoretical explanation. It is difficult to imagine an explanation for great power war, or interstate war more generally, that does not include system-level structures of power and wealth, dyadic-level rivalries, and domestic institutions and processes. All but the latter contribute little if anything to an explanation of homicides and domestic violence. It is not even clear whether **different kinds of organized warfare**—hegemonic wars, interstate wars, colonial wars, and civil wars—can be explained with a single theory. In fact, the theoretical literature on interstate war and civil war remains for the most part two distinct literatures, with little overlap in their respective analyses of the causes of war.9 Exceptions include the concept of the security dilemma (Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999) and the increasingly influential bargaining model of war (Fearon 1995), which cut across both literatures. International relations scholars are even divided on the question of whether **different kinds of interstate wars** can be subsumed under a single theory. A 1990 symposium addressed the questions of whether big wars and small wars had similar causes and whether a single theory could account for both.10 Whereas Bueno de Mesquita (1990) argued that an expected utility framework can explain all kinds of wars, Thompson (1990) argued that system-level structures of power and wealth differentiate big wars from small wars.11 The closely related question of whether the outbreak and spread (expansion) of war are driven by the same or different variables and processes was the subject of another recent symposium (Vasquez, Diehl, Flint, and Scheffran 2011). Our skepticism about the utility of a unified theory of violence or war is reinforced by the systematic and rigorous evidence Pinker provides about the trends in different forms of violence over time

#### The state is inevitable - learning to speak the language of power creates the only possibility of social change debate can offer and opens up options for resistance

Coverstone 05 Alan Coverstone (masters in communication from Wake Forest, longtime debate coach) “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference November 17th 2005 / MM

An important concern emerges when Mitchell describes reflexive fiat as a contest strategy capable of “eschewing the power to directly control external actors” (1998b, p. 20). Describing debates about what our government should do as attempts to control outside actors is debilitating and disempowering. Control of the US government is exactly what an active, participatory citizenry is supposed to be all about. After all, if democracy means anything, it means that citizens not only have the right, they also bear the obligation to discuss and debate what the government should be doing. Absent that discussion and debate, much of the motivation for personal political activism is also lost. Those who have co-opted Mitchell’s argument for individual advocacy often quickly respond that nothing we do in a debate round can actually change government policy, and unfortunately, an entire generation of debaters has now swallowed this assertion as an article of faith. The best most will muster is, “Of course not, but you don’t either!” The assertion that nothing we do in debate has any impact on government policy is one that carries the potential to undermine Mitchell’s entire project. If there is nothing we can do in a debate round to change government policy, then we are left with precious little in the way of pro-social options for addressing problems we face. At best, we can pursue some Pilot-like hand washing that can purify us as individuals through quixotic activism but offer little to society as a whole. It is very important to note that Mitchell (1998b) tries carefully to limit and bound his notion of reflexive fiat by maintaining that because it “views fiat as a concrete course of action, it is bounded by the limits of pragmatism” (p. 20). Pursued properly, the debates that Mitchell would like to see are those in which the relative efficacy of concrete political strategies for pro-social change is debated. In a few noteworthy examples, this approach has been employed successfully, and I must say that I have thoroughly enjoyed judging and coaching those debates. The students in my program have learned to stretch their understanding of their role in the political process because of the experience. Therefore, those who say I am opposed to Mitchell’s goals here should take care at such a blanket assertion. However, contest debate teaches students to combine personal experience with the language of political power. Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill

#### The right fills in and makes shit so much worse

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1. In the early days of the crisis there was widespread anticipation of change. From the collapse of large banks and public anger at acquisitive capitalists, to the collapse in faith in neoliberal 2 ideologues and political elites, this was a watershed moment for the radical Left. However, given its failure to provide a coherent response to the crisis, many radicals have begun to explore what it means to be of the ‘radical Left’ today (Chandler, 2009a; Smith, 2008; Cox, 2009; Harvey, 2009; Castree, 2009; contributors to Pugh, 2009). Importantly, we are still therefore at a time of opportunity for the Left. 2. The crisis has highlighted the salience of the state, representational and party politics. It has done so because while of course the ‘masses’ have not emerged as a political force, making strong demands of the state, the state nevertheless became, by default, the main institution that the general population left to resolve the crisis. 3. Seizing this opportunity, governments (in Britain, the USA, and across much of the West) have used trillions of dollars of taxpayer money to continue to intervene in the interests of capital and the neo-liberal model. Across Europe, as elsewhere, the Right and neo-liberals get this point, using the economic power of government in recent months to support their causes. 4. Some (clearly not all) on the radical Left have therefore misread the public mood when it comes to the role of the nation state. Despite predictions and aspirations from those civil society organisations that want to withdraw and deterritorialise from the state, most other people, if reluctantly, have moved in the opposite direction. 5. Some radicals had reduced radical politics to living more ethical lifestyles. Their aim is to produce ethical individuals, to raise awareness, not a collective and instrumental political project for the state. This is not providing an effective challenge to the Right and neo-liberals, who as just noted post-crisis are capturing the powerful institutions of politics. 6. Articulate and intelligent, the ‘philosophical militant’ has done much to shift and change our understanding of the world in recent decades. However, the crisis shows that there is a difference between doing philosophy and doing politics. Philosophy does not provide the detailed, tangible, instrumental mechanisms needed today. Some radicals have therefore attached too much importance to their philosophical interventions and critique, making them political acts, in and of themselves. I do not claim to be able to make intricate connections between these various points in this brief, largely rhetorical paper. They are simply a list to provide food for thought to those engaged with that disparate label that we call ‘the radical Left’. And for those who have perhaps, like me, been shocked at our impotence. Most People Looked to the State, Not Away From It As noted, my first point is directed toward those who seek to avoid the salience of the state, representational, and party politics post-crisis. Before the crisis Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) produced what was widely heralded at radical conferences as the Communist Manifesto for the twenty-first century. Sadly for many, the crisis proved it to be incorrect. For while Hardt and Negri (2000, p. 48) were seeking ‘lines of flight’ from territorial government, through the deterritorialised multitude, post crisis most people have, by default, allowed a strong state to address the specificities of the crisis

#### Anti-humanism is worse than humanism – focusing on differences is the basis for genocidal exclusions and strategic humanism solves their offense.

Lester 12 – (January 2012, Alan, Director of Interdisciplinary Research, Professor of Historical Geography, and Co-Director of the Colonial and Postcolonial Studies Network, University of Sussex, “Humanism, race and the colonial frontier,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Volume 37, Issue 1, pages 132–148)

Anderson argues that it is not an issue of extending humanity to … negatively racialised people, but of putting into question that from which such people have been excluded – that which, for liberal discourse, remains unproblematised. (2007, 199) I fear, however, that if we direct attention away from histories of humanism’s failure to deal with difference and to render that difference compatible with its fundamental universalism, and if we overlook its proponents’ failed attempts to combat dispossession, murder and oppression; if our history of race is instead understood through a critique of humanity’s conceptual separation from nature, we dilute the political potency of universalism. Historically, it was not humanism that gave rise to racial innatism, it was the specifically anti-humanist politics of settlers forging new social assemblages through relations of violence on colonial frontiers. Settler communities became established social assemblages in their own right specifically through the rejection of humanist interventions. Perhaps, as Edward Said suggested, we can learn from the implementation of humanist universalism in practice, and insist on its potential to combat racism, and perhaps we can insist on the contemporary conceptual hybridisation of human–non-human entities too, without necessarily abandoning all the precepts of humanism (Said 2004; Todorov 2002). We do not necessarily need to accord a specific value to the human, separate from and above nature, in order to make a moral and political case for a fundamental human universalism that can be wielded strategically against racial violence. Nineteenth century humanitarians’ universalism was fundamentally conditioned by their belief that British culture stood at the apex of a hierarchical order of civilisations. From the mid-nineteenth century through to the mid-twentieth century, this ethnocentrism produced what Lyotard describes as ‘the flattening of differences, or the demand for a norm (“human nature”)’, that ‘carries with it its own forms of terror’ (cited Braun 2004, 1352). The intervention of Aboriginal Protection demonstrates that humanist universalism has the potential to inflict such terror (it was the Protectorate of Aborigines Office reincarnated that was responsible, later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for Aboriginal Australia’s Stolen Generation, and it was the assimilationist vision of the Protectors’ equivalents in Canada that led to the abuses of the Residential Schools system). But we must not forget that humanism’s alternatives, founded upon principles of difference rather than commonality, have the potential to do the same and even worse. In the nineteenth century, Caribbean planters and then emigrant British settlers emphasised the multiplicity of the human species, the absence of any universal ‘human nature’, the incorrigibility of difference, in their upholding of biological determinism. Their assault on any notion of a fundamental commonality among human beings has disconcerting points of intersection with the radical critique of humanism today. The scientific argument of the nineteenth century that came closest to post-humanism’s insistence on the hybridity of humanity, promising to ‘close the ontological gap between human and non-human animals’ (Day 2008, 49), was the evolutionary theory of biological descent associated with Darwin, and yet this theory was adopted in Aotearoa New Zealand and other colonial sites precisely to legitimate the potential extinction of other, ‘weaker’ races in the face of British colonisation on the grounds of the natural law of a struggle for survival (Stenhouse 1999). Both the upholding and the rejection of human–nature binaries can thus result in racially oppressive actions, depending on the contingent politics of specific social assemblages. Nineteenth century colonial humanitarians, inspired as they were by an irredeemably ethnocentric and religiously exclusive form of universalism, at least combatted exterminatory settler discourses and practices at multiple sites of empire, and provided spaces on mission and protectorate stations in which indigenous peoples could be shielded to a very limited extent from dispossession and murder. They also, unintentionally, reproduced discourses of a civilising mission and of a universal humanity that could be deployed by anticolonial nationalists in other sites of empire that were never invaded to the same extent by settlers, in independence struggles from the mid-twentieth century. Finally, as Whatmore’s (2002) analysis of the Select Committee on Aborigines reveals, they provided juridical narratives that are part of the arsenal of weapons that indigenous peoples can wield in attempts to claim redress and recompense in a postcolonial world. The politics of humanism in practice, then, was riddled with contradiction, fraught with particularity and latent with varying possibilities. It could be relatively progressive and liberatory; it could be dispossessive and culturally genocidal. Within its repertoire lay potential to combat environmental and biological determinism and innatism, however, and this should not be forgotten in a rush to condemn humanism’s universalism as well as its anthropocentrism. It is in the tensions within universalism that the ongoing potential of an always provisional, self-conscious, flexible and strategic humanism – one that now recognises the continuity between the human and the non-human as well as the power-laden particularities of the male, middle class, Western human subject – resides.

### Theory Underview

#### Aff gets 1AR theory and it’s drop the debater

#### The round is inevitably skewed from substance abuse and time spent on theory

#### Reciprocity – encourages 1NCs to be infinitely abusive with no check

#### Allow 2ar responses to blippy 1nc tricks

#### Key to protect time-crunched 1ars and disincentivize blip-storms that aren’t complete arguments

#### Topic ed- encourages substantive debate on real world issues instead of recycled garbage

#### Aff gets RVIs

1. Skew – there’s no 2AC to develop carded offense and the 1AR has to over-cover since the 6-minute 2NR is devastating which encourages them to under-develop T in the NC and over-develop in the NR – need the RVI to develop good, in-depth T offense
2. Reciprocity – T is a unique avenue to the ballot that the aff can’t access –they should be ready to defend it, without RVIs it becomes a
3. Whole res sucks
   1. No real-world instance where there would be universal removal of military aid – outweighs on scope - they get access to more ground than us while we’re pigeonholed to the one aff they can easily predict.
   2. Stale education – the negative really only has to answer one position because there’s only one possible advocacy – on the TOC topic, people should a. be able to use the fullest extent of strategy and b. explore all portions of the topic literature
4. Reasonable aff interps with a brightline of turn ground and disclosure
   1. Khashoggi and the wiki prove there is a ton of lit – encourages substantive debate this late in the season when research is expected and T and non-T has been determined
   2. Don’t vote on theory unless you believe that we made this debate impossible for them – they can read any argument with a topic link or a link to Saudi or UAE
5. Semantics doesn’t matter
   1. The aff still affirms the resolution – view the plan text in a vacuum
   2. Jurisdiction is empirically denied – judges vote on non-T affs all the time
   3. Jake Nebel or some random author don’t determine the topic – the lit base does.

### Memes

#### No neg fiat

Plants 89 [COUNTERPLANS RE-VISITED: THE LAST SACRED COW? J. Daniel Plants, Baylor University 1989 - Punishment Paradigms : Pros and Cons; <http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Plants1989Punishment.htm>

The notion of "as compared to the way things are done now" is nothing novel. Such a comparison is implicit any time the term "should" is invoked. Examples will make this clear. Imagine a congressperson proposing a mandatory seat belt law. The floor is opened to debate over the merits of mandating safety belts. All of a sudden, another member of Congress interrupts with the brilliant idea of banning all automobiles. Such a suggestion would be immediately discarded as irrelevant (if not also as absurd). Obviously, when the first member of congress proposed the seat belt law, he or she presupposed the existence of cars in the first place. The bill was suggested in a world where automobiles (and automobile accidents) were the quid pro quo. Similarly, take the example of a group of friends discussing where to dine. After a list of several restaurants, someone suggests that the group play tiddly-winks instead. While that might make for great group fun, playing tiddly-winks has absolutely nothing to do with the process of selecting WHERE to have dinner. The tiddly-winks suggestion should have been offered in the "What should we do tonight?" or the "Should we even have dinner?" conversations. **Once the topic under discussion is clearly not whether to eat but where to do it, the "counterplan" offered by the tiddly-wink enthusiast begs the question being asked**. These analogies highlight the fundamental flaw in the optimality perspective. **Counterplans are not responsive to the question posed by the resolution. The resolution suggests an action, and asks if it should be done. It explicitly limits the range of discussion to that action and no more: should we affirm this resolution? Yes or no**? The area under discussion is the resolution and its beneficial and detrimental effects, nothing more. When the negative counterplans, it begs the question of the topic. Resolutions do not make claims such as, "Resolved: the United States should enact \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ as compared to all other competing priorities." Such wording might legitimize counterplans, implicitly, by requiring the affirmative to be superior to all other options, although even then it is arguable that the affirmative need only be superior to extant alternatives. It is not a coincidence that the resolution is worded in its present fashion. It proposes a course of action. It is up to both sides to clash over that particular action, not distract the question at hand with unrelated policies. An example of a popular generic counterplan will further illustrate my point. Recent college and high school topics have dealt with uniform, minimum educational standards imposed by the Federal government. The thrust of this topic, and the reason that Federal intrusion into the area of education was ever suggested, is that for the past 200+ years, the states' performance in education has been unsatisfactory. Time and again, the states have been unwilling to force the schools under their control to meet minimum standards. The affirmative's rationale for Federal action is largely buttressed by the demonstrated recalcitrance of the states to take the initiative. Without fail, the negative would counterplan by doing exactly what the affirmative did, but enacting the proposal simultaneously in the 50 states. Such a strategy begs the question posed by the topic. The topic demands that the desirability of federal action be debated; the negative proposal to go through the states relegates the central question of the resolution to secondary importance. Indeed, at the start of the debate, the affirmative, in arguing for change advances its best possible indictment of the status quo as it exists at the start of the first affirmative constructive. In arguing for change, what other system could the affirmative claim to be superior to? **The status quo is all that exists when the debate commences. The affirmative cannot forsee all possible systems** that the negative could offer; and even if such premonition were possible, the negative could always change its strategy, since the affirmative must speak first. In short, when the affirmative argues that we should change, they mean that change is beneficial as compared to the present system; there exists no other standard of comparison to which they could conceivably be appealing, The origin of the idea that the affirmative must compare favorably to any and all negative proposals, is beyond me. Surely the affirmative has done their job if they can prove change is warranted at the margin. Negative Fiat As most students of debate know, debate has adopted a curious deus ex machina to make debate more practical. The concept of fiat (from Latin, literally meaning, "Let it be") is the assumption, for the purpose of discussion, that the resolution can be implemented. Obviously, four debaters in a classroom aren't really able to affect the nation's policies. But debate would be inane if the affirmative offered the plan in the 1AC, and then the 1NC rose and cavalierly argued, "Since the affirmative team members are not congresspersons, they cannot put their plan into effect. Therefore, the negative wins." Thus, to avoid questions of whether or not the present system would adopt the affirmative, we assume that it would, for the purpose of discussion. This makes it possible to debate the merits of proposals, rather than the likelihood of their adoption. So far, so good. We have made only one assumption: that the action specified in the topic is put into effect, so that its desirability can be evaluated. Notice that the rationale for allowing this is, once again, to focus more clearly on whether we "should" affirm the topic. This brings us to an important question: **Where does "negative fiat", if such a thing is possible, come from? Why does the negative have the right to offer and implement proposals? Observe that fiat, as developed above, is not known as "affirmative" fiat; it is neutral with respect to side. It is a device that assists BOTH teams in analyzing whether we should take action**. Fiat merely directs the debate more clearly to relevant discussion. **Fiat is not a reciprocal privilege that the negative deserves on grounds of equity, because it doesn't give either side an advantage over the other. Fiat inheres in the way both teams debate the merits of the resolution. In essence, the negative already has "benefited" from fiating the resolution into existence as much as the affirmative did; both sides now can avoid debating what WOULD be done and debate instead what SHOULD be done. Consequently, the conclusion that the negative deserves "negative fiat" to counter the "affirmative fiat" is groundless**. Thus, the prior question, posed again: why and how can the negative assume into existence alternative policies? There is only one action asked to be debated: the resolution (or its designated representative, the plan) . We can assume into existence the resolution and nothing more. From our standpoint, that is literally all that we have control over; we have, by agreeing to limit discussion to a single proposal, proscribed our ability to deal with or effectuate any other policies. Succinctly stated, there is no theoretical basis for the existence of counterplans as an argument against the affirmative. Whither the negative? At the outset of this section, let me make clear my conviction that this part of the essay is not indispensable to my argument in any way. The preceding paragraphs are reasons why counterplans have no legitimacy as debate arguments. If that is indeed true, then arguments about what debate will come to after the passing of counterplans, is secondary. Remember, at one time there was no such thing as a counterplan. Debate persevered. There is absolutely nothing wrong with innovation in debate; however, those who innovate must be able to justify the appropriateness of their creations. If counterplans are proven inappropriate for debate, they should be discarded. The fact that they have been around for so long should afford them no special protection. For the sake of argument (no pun intended), though, what would the post-counterplan world look like? Not that different, really. The negative would defend the status quo. The affirmative, to win, would have to be on balance superior to the way things are done in the present system. It is beyond me why so many people are unwilling to force the negative to defend the present system. A typical claim is, "It's unfair to leave the negative nothing but the messed-up, defunct status quo. Why should the negative get stuck with it?" What a facile assertion! The status quo is not some random, irrational system that is inherently deficient. There are reaons why things are done the way they currently are. True, they may be bad or flimsy reasons, but in those instances, then change would seem to indeed be warranted. And should we not have equal, if not greater, sympathy for the affirmative? They are asked to prove that the longstanding traditions of the status quo be abandoned in favor of an untried alternative. my point is that there is nothing untenable about the negative arguing that we should not change the status quo. Argumentative Benefits Another equally unpersuasive claim is that "valuable" issues will be eliminated if counterplans perish. This is, of course, untrue. rentw. "**Valuable" arguments, then, wouldn't be sacrificed; only those that were not truly reasons to reject the affirmative** (i.e., non-unique disadvantages). The elimination of counterplans would improve, not harm, the quality of argumentation by placing a higher burden of proof on the issues in the debate. The successful negative would be the one who argued extremely well researched disadvantages, had a copious quantity of specific case evidence, and who was competent at extending intelligent topicality violations. Few debate purists would object to such strategies

### Trivialism

#### I contend that trivialism is true and everything is true—3 warrants

#### 1) Curry’s paradox proves all statements as true.

#### Carrara and Martino

Massimiliano Carrara, Department of Philosophy University of Padua (Italy), Enrico Martino, Department of Philosoph yUniversity of Padua (Italy),  2011, "Curry’S Paradox . A New Argument For  Trivialism," Logic And Philosophy Of Science, <http://www.academia.edu/4926008/Curry_s_Paradox_._A_new_Argument_for_Trivialism_Logic_and_Philosophy_of_Science_> //BW

Curry’s paradox belongs to the family of so-called paradoxes of self-reference (or paradoxes of circularity). Shortly, the paradox is derived in natural language from sentences like (a): **(a) If sentence (a) is true, then Santa Claus exists.** **Suppose that the antecedent of the conditional in (a) is true**, i.e. that sentence (a) is true. **Then**, by MPPSanta Claus exists. **In this way the consequent of (a) is proved under the assumption of its antecedent. In other words, we have proved (a). Finally**, by MPP, **Santa Claus exists.** Of course, **we could substitute any arbitrary sentence for “Santa Claus exists”: that means that every sentence can be proved and trivialism follows.** In Priest (1979, IV.5) Priest observes that, in a semantically closed theory, using (MPP) and absorption, a version of Curry’s paradox is derivable. We reconstruct his argument in the language of first order arithmetic with a truth predicate.

#### 2) A trivial entity necessarily exists, which proves trivialism.

#### Kabay 2 bracketed for grammar

[Paul Douglas Kabay, (PhD thesis, School of Philosophy, Anthropology, and Social Inquiry) "A Defense Of Trivialism" The University Of Melbourne, 2008, https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/handle/11343/35203, DOA:10-25-2017 // WWBW]

**Let us define a trivial entity a[i]s an entity** that instantiates every predicate, i.e. an entity **of which everything is true. One** of the **thing**s **true of a trivial entity is that it exists in a reality in which trivialism is true. Hence, if a trivial entity exists, then trivialism is true.** But is it true that there exists a trivial entity? Here is an argument for thinking that it is true: **1) Every being (or entity or object) is either trivial or nontrivial 2) It is not the case that every being is nontrivial 3) Hence, there exists a trivial being**107 By a nontrivial being I mean a being which instantiates some but not all predicates. **Premise 1) exhausts the logical possibilities.** But why think that premise 2) is true? The reason why **premise 2)** is true **follows directly from the** truth of the PSR (the **Principle of Sufficient Reason**). According to the PSR “… nothing is, without sufficient reason why it is, rather than not; and why it is thus, rather than otherwise.”108 Or, to put it another way “… no fact can be true or existing and no statement truthful without a sufficient reason for its being so and not different …”109 Alternatively, it has been articulated as “**Everything that is the case must have a reason why it is the case. Necessarily, every true proposition** or at least every contingent true proposition **has an explanation.**”110Now, **if every object were nontrivial**, then **there would be a fact that would be unexplained, specifically the fact of nontriviality.** That is to say, **the nontriviality of nontrivial beings would be inexplicable**. What I mean here is that **one would need to explain why only some predicates are instantiated and not all predicates are instantiated. One could not cite the existence of another nontrivial being as the explanation for the nontriviality of other nontrivial beings, as this would be viciously circular.** Likewise, one could not explain the nontriviality of a given being, B1, by citing the existence of another nontrivial being, B2, whose nontriviality is in turn explained by the existence of another nontrivial being, B3, and so on in an infinite series of nontrivial beings.Now either the infinite series (of nontrivial entities) as a whole is trivial or it is nontrivial. If it is trivial, then there exists a trivial entity. If it is nontrivial, then the nontriviality of the series as a whole has not been explained. But this cannot be so because **nontriviality requires an explanation given the truth of the PSR. It follows then that the series as a whole is trivial. Therefore, there exists a trivial entity (the series as a whole) and trivialism is true.** Of course, the only thing that will explain all this nontriviality is a trivial being. Any explanatory regress will cease in a satisfactory manner at the postulating of a trivial being. Such a being is not one way as opposed to another, that is to say there is no need to explain why only some predicates are true of it as opposed to others – all predicates are true of it. So, for example, it is not trivial as opposed to nontrivial, as its triviality also entails its nontriviality. Moreover, its existence really does explain the existence of nontrivial beings. After all, one of the predicates true of a trivial being is that it exists in a world in which there are nontrivial beings.

#### 3) The formulation of an alternative to trivialism is definitionally impossible.

#### Kabay 3

[Paul Douglas Kabay, (PhD thesis, School of Philosophy, Anthropology, and Social Inquiry, ) "A Defense Of Trivialism" The University Of Melbourne, 2008, https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/handle/11343/35203, DOA:10-25-2017 // WWBW]

But given that **it is a necessary condition for an assertion to be a denial of some conjunction that it is not a conjunct of the relevant conjunction, it follows that there are no assertions that can constitute a denial of trivialism.** This is because each and **every proposition is a conjunct in the conjunction that expresses trivialism. And so there is no proposition that can stand in for** altriv – **the alternative of trivialism**. For example, **one does not successfully deny trivialism by asserting ‘it is not the case that trivialism is true**’ i.e. by asserting ¬∀pTp.132 Nor can one express a denial of it by claiming ‘trivialism is incoherent’. Nor can one express a denial of it by pointing out that trivialism is incompatible with our perceptual experiences.133 **All such claims are conjuncts in the conjunction that expresses trivialism,** and so are not suitable candidates for playing the role of altriv. Each of these is identical to part of the content of trivialism or one of the assertions of the trivialist. **One could only assert a disagreement with trivialism by asserting a proposition that is not part of the content of trivialism. But there are no such propositions, as the assertion of trivialism is the assertion of all possible propositions.**

## Advantages

### Democracy

#### Democracy is declining – that destabilizes the Middle East

Darrag 18 [Amr is the founder of the Egyptian Institute of Studies, an independent think tank located in Istanbul] “AN EARTHQUAKE IS COMING IN THE MIDDLE EAST—AND IT'LL BE BIGGER THAN THE ARAB SPRING.” Newsweek. November 1, 2018. <https://www.newsweek.com/earthquake-coming-middle-east-bigger-arab-spring-1197444>

Democracy itself is now under threat. The Middle East, the cradle of civilisation, is where it is most at risk. And witness to the tyranny taking place or taking hold in the Middle East, the West has failed to take proper action. President Donald Trump, in fact, lent vocal support to autocrats like Egypt’s General Sisi and continues to insist on strategic ties with Saudi Arabia and its de-facto leader, Mohammad bin Salman. But this tolerance for autocracy will not secure regional stability or advance American interests. Indeed, Trump has only weakened the moral authority of the U.S. and its allies at a critical time for them and for the Middle East, and condemned millions to the suffocating oppression of capricious tyrants. He has only showed contempt for democracy, and in so doing encouraged a wider belief—one peddled by the strongmen of the Arab world—that democracy is not always morally good or even desirable. It is this support, as well as the unpredictability and sheer incoherence of the Trump administration, that have allowed Sisi and others to pursue increasingly repressive policies. Tyrants have taken control in Arab states enfeebled by revolution and exploited a world in turmoil and a West mired in populism to hound and put to death those who defy them. Sisi has enjoyed complete impunity already under the Obama administration, even after massacring over 1,000 Egyptians in Rabaa square in August 2013. Now, he punishes dissidents and activists daily; illegal arrests, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings have become routine, and his hidden war in the Sinai Peninsula threatens a humanitarian crisis. This unravelling in the Middle East joins the increasing recklessness of North Korea, the rise of China and anger in Europe over immigration and low economic growth to amount to a world in turmoil—one that requires strong moral leadership and the upholding of absolute moral values such as democracy, freedom of expression and the principles underpinning international standards and law.

#### The plan boosts democracy and human rights cred

Kramer and Stack 18 David J. Kramer and John F. Stack Jr., 12-3-2018, [David J. Kramer is senior fellow of the Vaclav Havel Program on Human Rights and Diplomacy at Florida International University’s Steven J. Green School of International & Public Affairs and a former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. John F. Stack, Jr. is the founding dean of FIU’s Green School and professor of politics, international relations, and law.] "Human Rights Suffers a Major Blow," American Interest, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/12/03/human-rights-suffers-a-major-blow/>

Fast forward to the current Administration. President Trump’s clear affinity for strongmen leaders, his failure to fill the position at the State Department responsible for democracy, human rights, and labor two years into his term, his undemocratic rhetoric, and his efforts to cut aid in this field have done enormous harm to the leadership role played by the United States over the years. Despite the problems associated with Bush’s Freedom Agenda and Obama’s seeming lack of interest in the issue, human rights activists and dissidents still turned to the United States for moral, financial, and political support. These days, they are not sure where to turn. Under the current Administration, human rights simply are not a priority, a position made crystal clear by Trump’s recent comments concerning Saudi Arabia, despite the Kingdom’s abominable treatment of human beings and the murder of Khashoggi. Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson warned that prioritizing American values (human rights) could harm other American interests, a position for which he was roundly criticized. Trump’s admiration for leaders like Egypt’s Sisi, the Philippines’ Duterte, Russia’s Putin, and North Korea’s Kim is demoralizing to human rights advocates everywhere. Despite Kim’s unparalleled brutality in North Korea, Trump at a campaign rally said that he and Kim “fell in love” through their various exchanges; one can only imagine if Obama had said such a thing. There are two positive exceptions to this record: 1) the current Administration has maintained sanctions under the Magnitsky Act on Russian officials and imposed additional sanctions under the global version of it, albeit under Congressional pressure, and 2) the Administration has spoken out on the abuses committed by the Maduro, Castro and Ortega regimes in Latin America. What Is to Be Done? Supporting human rights and democratic governance around the world does not and should not mean imposing American values on others or staging military interventions. Each country, if given the opportunity, will develop in its own unique way. But our support does involve peacefully aiding local activists who look to the United States for moral, political, diplomatic, and sometimes material support. These activists often risk prison, torture, and death struggling for a more democratic society; helping them reflects our own highest principles. It is the least we can do. Today, with the current wave of nationalism and populism, human rights are facing new challenges from some unexpected places, including the United States—but don’t expect advocates to quit. NATO and the European Union, along with the OSCE have played a key role on the European continent in supporting the cause of human rights and freedom; while not a member of the European Union, the United States is a key member of NATO and the OSCE. In the Western Hemisphere, despite a long history of authoritarian rule, sometimes aided and abetted by the United States, individuals have challenged human rights abuses. With the support of the Organization of American States (OAS), the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in 1948 established a vehicle for the investigation of human rights abuses throughout the hemisphere with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which was followed 20 years later by the establishment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Here, too, the United States has played an important role. Safeguarding the institutionalization of human rights within these organizations is absolutely critical to guarantee that defenders and advocates have a strong voice. As long as they keep on taking the risks to do so, they deserve to have the United States standing with them. But this requires speaking out consistently when abuses occur. It mandates placing human rights and advancing the cause of freedom high on the foreign policy priorities list. It means distancing ourselves from authoritarian regimes, recognizing that the way they treat their own people is often indicative of how they will behave in foreign policy and toward other countries. It means not whitewashing gross human rights abuses. In his address before the UN General Assembly this past September, President Trump underscored the idea of sovereignty, declaring: “We will never surrender America’s sovereignty to an unelected, unaccountable global bureaucracy. America is governed by Americans. We reject the ideology of globalism. And we embrace the doctrine of patriotism.” Trump went on to inform his fellow leaders that “the United States will not tell you how to live or work or worship. We only ask that you honor our sovereignty in return.” Such a declaration both misrepresents what the United States had sought to do over the past seven-plus decades in maintaining and nurturing the international order—which has largely been a huge net gain for human rights and democracy, albeit with significant exceptions—and telegraphed to authoritarian leaders that they could get away with bloody murder without worrying about repercussions from the United States, either bilaterally or through multilateral organizations. That became even more explicit with the murder of Khashoggi. “Democracy has spread and endured,” writes Robert Kagan in his most recent book, The Jungle Grows Back, “because it has been nurtured and supported: by the norms of the liberal order, by the membership requirements of liberal institutions like the European Union and NATO, by the fact that the liberal order has been the wealthiest part of the world, and by the security provided by the world’s strongest power, which happens to be a democracy.” And yet, in 2018, as Patricia O’Toole writes in her book, The Moralist: Woodrow Wilson and the World He Made, “as Woodrow Wilson’s 100 years came to an end, the peaceful world order of his dreams was nowhere in sight. Nationalism and autocracy were on the rise and democracy was under attack in some of the most democratic countries on earth, including the United States.” President Trump’s latest dismissal of human rights as a matter of interest will be welcomed not only by the Saudi Kingdom but by authoritarian regimes around the world. Buy enough arms and pledge to invest enough in the United States and the Trump Administration will turn a blind eye to gross human rights abuses. Human rights defenders, by contrast, will feel abandoned. They need and deserve the support of the United States and that of other democracies. American leadership, hard to envision right now, must be restored to carry on this indispensable mission.

#### Cutting aid to Saudi is a referendum on fundamental values

Fuchs 18 [Michael H. Fuchs is a senior fellow at American Progress, where his work focuses on U.S. foreign policy priorities, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs, helped US prepare its response to the Arab Spring] “Khashoggi’s fate is proof the US-Saudi relationship is over.” Guardian. October 19, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/19/khashoggi-fate-us-saudi-relationship>

Saudi Arabia is a monarchy that rules through repression. Freedom House ranked Saudi Arabia as “[not free](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/saudi-arabia)” in 2018, while the 2017 US Human Rights report on Saudi Arabia detailed abuses by government including, “unlawful killings, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, violence and official gender discrimination against women”. And yet, specious arguments for a robust US-Saudi partnership have dominated policy circles and government. We need Saudi Arabia to combat terrorism, we are told. Mere whispers of the words “but, terrorism cooperation” have long won debates in Washington over the need to work with the Saudis. But is Saudi Arabia a real partner? Fifteen of the 19 men who attacked America on 9/11 were Saudis. And according to a leaked US government [memo](https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/09/25/saudi-arabia-accused-of-turning-a-blind-eye-to-international-terrorism-financing-by-global-watchdog/#56bd2fb46763) from 2009, “donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide”. Another argument claims the United States needs Saudi Arabia for regional stability. But the facts tell a different story. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia has been waging a war – with US support – for more than three years, causing one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters. With thousands of Yemenis dead and millions displaced, the United Nations is now [warning](https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/15/yemen-on-brink-worst-famine-100-years-un) that up to 13 million Yemenis are at risk of starvation. And while Iran is also to blame for backing violence in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has escalated significantly. Ah, yes, Iran! Combatting Iran’s malign influence is another magic end that supposedly justifies the means of the United States working with Saudi Arabia. But what has the relationship achieved for the United States? Saudi Arabia tried to prevent the United States from negotiating a deal that verifiably stopped Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon, and then encouraged the [Trump administration](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/trump-administration) to withdraw despite the fact that the deal was working. Iran is no doubt a destabilizing actor, funding terrorism and threatening Israel. But Saudi Arabia is also a destabilizing actor, and by taking Saudi Arabia’s side against Iran it is entirely possible that the United States helps fuel the deadly regional rivalry. One more recent justification for the US-Saudi relationship has been Israel. With the quietly growing ties between Israel and Gulf states, Saudi Arabia no longer plays a lead role in condemning Israel. And while lower tensions between Israel and its neighbors is a good thing, their improving relationship is not about the United States – it’s about increasingly shared anti-Iran views. The United States can continue to support Israel’s security without supporting Saudi Arabia. But don’t we need Saudi Arabia for oil? Not as much as we once [did](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/16/world/middleeast/saudi-khashoggi-us.html). And Saudi Arabia has its own interest in continuing to pump oil, which is the country’s sole stream of revenue. Furthermore, the world must rapidly transition to clean energy to avert the most cataclysmic effects of climate change, so this can help provide a kickstart. Which brings us back to Khashoggi. The fate of one man illustrates how destructive the US-Saudi relationship has become. It is now widely believed that Saudi Arabia felt emboldened enough to kill a US resident with impunity in another country. And Trump’s response? [Help](https://edition.cnn.com/2018/10/15/politics/trump-saudi-king-tweet/index.html) the Saudis cover up the reported murder. Trump has given Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) a blank check in the Middle East. The result has been an emboldened Saudi Arabia, which under MBS’s leadership reportedly kidnapped the prime minister of Lebanon and [downgraded](https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-us-sidesteps-getting-involved-in-escalating-saudi-canada-dispute/) the Canada-Saudi Arabia relationship over Canadian criticism of Saudi Arabia’s human rights abuses. Trump has supported MBS’s dangerous policies, from the blockade of Qatar to the devastating war in Yemen. Trump even refused to back America’s ally Canada in its dispute with Saudi Arabia. The reported murder of Khashoggi is a byproduct of this morally bankrupt relationship. Khashoggi’s blood is also on Trump’s hands. Why would Trump assist Saudi Arabia in policies so damaging to US interests? Perhaps it is because of Trump’s blatant disregard for human rights at home and abroad. Or perhaps it is because of longstanding personal financial [ties](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2017/06/14/433956/trumps-conflicts-interest-saudi-arabia/) between Trump and Saudi Arabia, including a massive [jump](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/i-like-them-very-much-trump-has-long-standing-business-ties-with-saudis-who-have-boosted-his-hotels-since-he-took-office/2018/10/11/0870df24-cd67-11e8-a360-85875bac0b1f_story.html?utm_term=.dd661580490c) in Saudi patronage of Trump hotels since Trump became president. With [reports](https://www.justsecurity.org/61001/united-states-fail-duty-warn-jamal-khashoggi-intelligence-directive-191-applies/) that the Trump administration may have known in advance of an alleged Saudi plot against Khashoggi and did nothing to warn him, we need answers as to what the Trump administration knew and when they knew it. The US-Saudi relationship as we know it is over, and Khashoggi’s apparent murder is helping wake everyone up to a relationship that soured long ago. It’s time to finally ground any engagement with Saudi Arabia solely on genuine US interests in regional peace and human rights. That means no more arms sales. No more taking sides in a regional war between fundamentalist, repressive regimes. No more support for the war in Yemen. US officials should trigger the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act to impose sanctions on MBS and Saudi leadership for human rights violations. And when we need cooperation on counter-terrorism, be transactional – and sanction Saudi officials if they don’t target terrorist funding coming from within their country. At the end of the day, this is about more than the US-Saudi relationship. It’s about whether or not America will stand up for democratic values and human rights, including against the growing brazenness of autocracies like Russia and China to reach beyond their borders to murder and abduct critics. The United States must take a stand.

#### That sends a signal that these harms will not go silent

Green 17 Shannon N. Green, 3-8-2017, [director and senior fellow of the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.] "When the U.S. Gives Up on Human Rights, Everyone Suffers," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/04/when-the-u-s-gives-up-on-human-rights-everyone-suffers/>

This capitulation would have major security and economic consequences for the United States and its closest allies. In addition to the moral imperative, America has strong interests in supporting democracy and human rights abroad. First, democratic countries make the best, most stable partners. Democracies are more likely to form alliances and cooperate with other democracies and less likely to get embroiled in conflict. The U.S. military understands the value of having partners that respect human rights and the rule of law, and thus invests billions a year in enhancing the professionalism of security forces overseas. Recent research has deepened our understanding of the benefits for American security of having broad and deep ties to other countries. In a statistical analysis of Muslim-majority countries’ cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism, Peter S. Henne found states that received more foreign assistance were more collaborative than those that did not. Conversely, emboldened dictators tend to pursue foreign policy agendas that are erratic and destructive for the United States and its allies. North Korean ruler Kim Jong Un’s spate of nuclear tests and missile launches and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea and incursions into eastern Ukraine are emblematic of the kind of aggressive behavior the international community has come to expect from autocratic leaders. Second, contrary to the president’s assertions, the United States has benefitted immensely from the liberal world order that it helped create. From the ashes of World War II, America invested in interlocking political and economic institutions, alliances, and norms — based on universal human rights, shared values, and the rule of law — that would prevent large-scale conflict and displacement in the future and fuel Europe’s recovery from the war. The United States has been both the primary engine and beneficiary of this liberal international order. To be clear, inequality has been a terrible byproduct of this system — and too many have been left behind. But, far from being victimized by globalization, the United States has enjoyed nearly 70 years of unparalleled influence because of its investment in the promotion of democracy and human rights. Finally, U.S. support for democracy and human rights matters in people’s lives. It is true that the United States has been far from perfect in championing human rights, especially where America has short-term security interests. Yet there is no other country that can substitute for the United States when it comes to fighting for universal freedoms.

### Yemen

#### Saudi military aid is fueled under a guise of “national security” - that encourages endless intervention in Yemen and unethical violence

Khanna 10/20 Ro Khanna, 10-20-2018, "Congress must end U.S. military aid to Saudi war in Yemen," [https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/Congress-must-end-U-S-military-aid-to-Saudi-war-13319536.php /](https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/Congress-must-end-U-S-military-aid-to-Saudi-war-13319536.php%20/) MM

Every ghastly new detail we learn about the disappearance of journalist Jamal Khashoggi suggests that this was a premeditated murder, carried out at the direction of the highest level of the Saudi dictatorship. The cascading revelations rival the gore of horror films, from the 15 Saudis who flew into Turkey, lying in wait for Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, to the bone-saw-equipped forensics specialist who reportedly dismembered Khashoggi’s body wearing headphones and recommending that others listen to music as well. Just weeks before, Khashoggi had publicly pleaded with the de facto ruler of the Saudi regime, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to curb his propensity for violence. Khashoggi’s September column for the Washington Post was headlined “Saudi Arabia’s crown prince must restore dignity to his country — by ending Yemen’s cruel war.” “Cruel” is, if anything, an understatement. Since 2015, the Saudis have launched an estimated 18,000 air strikes on Yemen, attacking hospitals, schools, water treatment plants, funerals, markets and even farms. The Saudis also imposed a blockade on food, fuel and medicine from freely entering the country in what can only be described as a deliberate effort to starve the civilian population into submission. Buried by the news of Khashoggi’s slaying was a grim new warning by Lise Grande, the U.N.’s humanitarian coordinator for Yemen: The nation could experience the world’s worst famine in 100 years, with 12 million to 13 million innocent civilians at risk of dying from the lack of food within months. Related Stories US & WorldKey battle in Yemen’s war risks tipping country into famine OpinionEditorial: Is Trump selling out to the Saudis? As early as 2015, Foreign Policy magazine reported the Saudi coalition’s “daily bombing campaign would not be possible without the constant presence of U.S. Air Force tanker planes refueling coalition jets.” Yet there was never a debate or vote by the people’s elected congressional representatives, as required by the Constitution, as to whether the U.S. military should participate in the Saudi government’s genocidal war. As the architect of this hideous military strategy, Mohammed bin Salman reacted to Khashoggi’s criticisms the way he knew best. MbS, as he’s known, probably ordered the assassination of Khashoggi and then — just as the Saudi regime did after bombing a school bus filled with Yemeni children last month — issued ever-shifting and contradictory lies, relying on the Trump administration’s full backing and clumsy assistance in the cover-up. Unlimited Digital Access for 99¢ Read more articles like this by subscribing to the San Francisco Chronicle SUBSCRIBE MbS’ campaign of killing Yemenis and Saudis alike must come to an end. Congressional Progressive Caucus co-chair Mark Pocan, D-Wis., and I are leading dozens of our colleagues, including top House Democrats, in demanding answers from the Trump administration about its possible complicity in Khashoggi’s killing. We also are working to force a vote in Congress to decisively shut down unconstitutional U.S. participation in the Saudi regime’s gruesome war in Yemen within weeks. Partnering with Sen. Bernie Sanders, independent-Vermont, we aim to secure majorities in both chambers of Congress as soon as we return to Washington to direct the president to remove U.S. forces from unauthorized hostilities in Yemen. We are invoking the War Powers Resolution with the aim of passing House Congressional Resolution 138 and Senate Joint Resolution 54. These resolutions have priority over other foreign policy considerations in the chambers, and the votes on them cannot be blocked by Republican leadership. Never before has such a feat been attempted in both houses of Congress at once — but the War Power Resolution allows members of Congress to force votes to end illegal U.S. military participation in this war. When we succeed, the Saudi campaign will inevitably collapse. If our moral compass is to guide our country after the butchering of Jamal Khashoggi, the incineration of thousands of Yemenis in U.S.-Saudi air strikes, and the quiet deaths of more than 100,000 Yemeni children who succumbed to war-triggered hunger and disease over the past two years, Congress must pass these resolutions. America’s founders deliberately broke with the unchecked power enjoyed by Europe’s monarchs by vesting Congress with the sole authority over the question of war and peace. By forcing long-overdue sunlight and public participation into the now-secret realm of war, these resolutions will help restore our republic and end America’s complicity in such incomprehensibly immense human suffering. Today’s leaders owe it to all those who have sacrificed for a fairer world to bring an end to the worst humanitarian crisis on Earth.

#### US-Saudi intervention has resulted in human rights violations and regional destabilization

Morris 17 Brett Morris 12-1-2017, "How the United States Is Helping Saudi Arabia Destabilize the Middle East," [https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3 /](https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3%20/) MM

At around two in the morning on August 25, 2017, a five-year-old girl named Buthaina lost her entire family. Saudi Arabia had dropped a bomb on her home and several others in Sana’a, the capital of Yemen, as part of its ongoing campaign against Houthi rebels. The attack killed 16 people, including Buthaina’s parents and four siblings, and injured 17 others. Now under the care of her aunt and uncle, Buthaina herself was one of the injured. Images of Buthaina trying to open her bruised eyes went viral after the attack. Where does Saudi Arabia get the bombs it uses to kill all these people? For the most part, they come from the United States, with the United Kingdom and France also supplying substantial amounts. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, from 1950 to 2016, the United States provided Saudi Arabia with more than $34 billion worth of arms, while the United Kingdom provided more than $10 billion, and France provided more than $7 billion. The United States is the world’s leading arms exporter, and Saudi Arabia is its top client. The bomb that injured Buthaina and killed her family originated in the United States, as an Amnesty International investigation found. Buthaina and her family are just a few of the victims of the long-standing U.S.-Saudi alliance—an alliance that has allowed Saudi Arabia to remain one of the worst human rights abusers in the world, export its odious Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, and inspire jihadist movements throughout the world, at the cost of thousands of lives. Oil, Money, and the “Threat” of Iran. The basis for the U.S.-Saudi alliance is the fact that Saudi Arabia sits on top of a lot of oil, as well as its opposition to actors and movements in the region that run counter to U.S. hegemonic ambitions. Nowadays, the United States gets most of its oil through domestic production or from Canada. (The United States is now the world’s leading oil producer, with Saudi Arabia a close second.) Just 11 percent of the oil that the United States imports comes from Saudi Arabia. Despite this, the United States — under both Republican and Democratic administrations — has backed Saudi Arabia and will likely continue to do so in the future. Although the United States is currently enjoying its own oil boom, it’s likely to be short-lived. Domestic oil production will probably begin to decline around 2020, as the United States has proven reserves of just 10 billion barrels. The Saudis and their OPEC partners, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, have proven reserves of 460 billion barrels. In 1945, the State Department identified Saudi Arabia’s oil resources as “a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.” That hasn’t changed — and there’s no reason Washington won’t want Saudi Arabia to remain firmly inside its camp. In addition, if all those massive arms deals between Washington and Riyadh were suddenly to stop, defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and General Dynamics would stand to lose lots of money. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s extremist variant of Islam has been very useful for the United States. Despite the rhetoric about a “clash of civilizations” supposedly happening between the West and Islam, the United States has, for the most part, traditionally sided with extremist sects of Islam against their more secular enemies for the simple reason that those secular enemies would rather remain independent of U.S. domination. The U.S.-Saudi relationship began in the 1930s but strengthened after Gamal Abdel Nasser became president of Egypt in 1956. Nasser, a neutralist and secularist during the Cold War, nationalized many of Egypt’s industries and instituted social welfare measures. For these crimes, he was considered “an extremely dangerous fanatic” with a “Hitler-ite personality” by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Since Nasser had widespread prestige throughout the Arab world for his anti-imperialism and independence, the United States needed a counterweight in the region. “The people are on Nasser’s side,” as Eisenhower complained. That counterweight was Saudi Arabia, an absolute monarchy and the only country in the world named after a ruling family (the Al Saud family). The U.S.-Saudi relationship took on new urgency in 1979, when Iran overthrew its U.S.-installed dictator. The United States and United Kingdom had overthrown Iran’s democratically elected government in 1953, because its secular leader, Mohammed Mossadegh, had nationalized Iran’s oil industry. With the loss of its ally in Iran, U.S. support for Saudi Arabia would now be based not only on the kingdom’s opposition to secular nationalist movements and governments, but also against the Shia theocracy in Iran. U.S. opposition to Iran has nothing to do with Iran’s human rights record or its authoritarian government. If it were, the United States would not be supporting Saudi Arabia, which has a much worse human rights record and a more authoritarian government. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran has actual elections, women have some kind of rights, and there is a liberal opposition. Nor is U.S. opposition to Iran based on Iran’s support for “extremist” groups abroad — because, again, Saudi Arabia supports and inspires much worse extremist groups abroad. Watch this dumbfounded State Department official trying to explain the contradiction between U.S. support for Saudi Arabia while opposing Iran: The truth is, Iran just isn’t a threat to the United States. Its military budget is $13 billion, equivalent to about 2 percent of the U.S. military budget of $611 billion, the highest in the world. (Saudi Arabia’s military budget is $64 billion, the fourth highest in the world.) Iran does not have nuclear weapons, nor does it have a nuclear weapons program. As the Defense Department has pointed out, “Iran’s military doctrine is primarily defensive.” Why, then, does the United States take such an antagonistic attitude toward Iran? The answer is simple: Iran refuses to subordinate itself to U.S. hegemony. Anybody who doesn’t follow orders is an enemy.

#### Reject US support – it allows for state-sanctioned violence on innocent populations

Morris 17 Brett Morris 12-1-2017, "How the United States Is Helping Saudi Arabia Destabilize the Middle East," [https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3 /](https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/how-the-united-states-is-helping-saudi-arabia-destabilize-the-middle-east-b408863289b3%20/) MM

Today, Saudi Arabia is creating a humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen, with U.S. support. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has been bombing Yemen to defeat the Houthis, a group that Saudi Arabia accuses of being proxies for Iran — an exaggerated claim. In addition to bombing civilian targets such as homes, schools, hospitals, mosques, and markets, Saudi Arabia has instituted a blockade on Yemen, “making an already catastrophic situation far worse,” according to the World Health Organization, the World Food Programme, and UNICEF. At least 10,000 people have died in the conflict, with another 3 million people displaced. Saudi Arabia’s bombing campaign and blockade have helped cause a cholera epidemic in Yemen that “has become the largest and fastest-spreading outbreak of the disease in modern history, with a million cases expected by the end of the year and at least 600,000 children likely to be affected,” as the Guardian reports. As Zeeshan Aleem writes for Vox, Saudi Arabia’s campaign has “contributed to a malnutrition crisis of colossal proportions: Close to 80 percent of Yemen’s population lacks reliable access to food, and the United Nations estimates that 7 million of the country’s population of 28 million people are facing famine.” None of this would be possible without U.S. support. As Alex Emmons writes for the Intercept: The U.S. has had the power to pull the plug on the intervention since the beginning. Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a 30-year veteran of the CIA, explained last year that “if the United States and the United Kingdom, tonight, told King Salman [of Saudi Arabia], ‘This war has to end,’ it would end tomorrow. The Royal Saudi Air Force cannot operate without American and British support.” In his final days in office, Obama halted some arms sales to Saudi Arabia (when everyone knew Trump could simply reauthorize them when taking office, which he did), but other than this, both the Obama and Trump administrations have strongly backed Saudi Arabia and its campaign in Yemen, with massive arms deals, intelligence sharing, and refueling Saudi planes as they continue to bomb Yemeni civilians. Even putting all moral questions aside — which we shouldn’t — it’s clear that what the United States is doing with Saudi Arabia is undermining its own national security. Policies such as arming and supporting the Saudi tyranny to kill thousands of innocent Muslims in Yemen have a tendency to drive recruitment for terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. Thankfully, there is growing congressional opposition toward U.S. support for Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s tyrannical government and despicable actions — and U.S. support for them — are immoral and destabilizing.

# ---1AR---

# Overviews

## 1AR Shortest

#### US military aid to the Yemen-coalition leads to the worst humanitarian crisis in modern history. The plan grounds the RSAF and stops bombings.

## 1AR Super Short

#### US military aid to the Yemen-coalition has created the worst humanitarian crisis in modern history. 18 thousand strikes on Yemen have led to long term suffering, famine, and disease outbreaks.

#### Pulling aid is the only ethical option, it collapses the coalition and forces Saudi to reconcile their abuses.

## 1AR Overview

#### US military aid to Yemen-coalition leads to unethical violence and justifies bombing innocent populations in Yemen and regional destabilization, the impacts are long term suffering, famine, and massive disease outbreaks that cause thousands of deaths and lifelong suffering. US arms deals, refueling, and intelligence have made Saudi’s intervention in Yemen possible and the US should take responsibility for the horrific violence that happens as a result of it.

## 2AR Overview

#### The question that your ballot should rest on is whether 18,000 bombings on innocent populations is ethical or not. Saudi-UAE bombings on Yemen are unethical and can NEVER be justified, it leads to long term suffering, famine, and disease outbreaks.

## Ethical Framing O/V

### Normal

#### Only models of debate that focus on material violence are productive – status quo debates shut down discussions of violence by taking extra steps to get to that discussion. Centralizing discussion on anything that isn’t the VIOLENCE ITSELF glosses it over and prevents action from preventing it in the real world.

### NDCA

#### Our framing turns all their offense – framing the war in Yemen as a “necessary evil” allows the harms to continue – risk of link defense or impact defense on the disad should be sufficient to vote aff on our offense because probability determines whether they access their framing args in the first place – hold the threshold for probability at 100%

## ROTB Framing O/V

### Ext – Taylor 17

#### Institutional engagement towards material reform is pedagogically valuable and necessary – whether or not we see politics as a site of struggle is irrelevant when the alt-right does. Pure scholarship can’t connect its way to Capitol Hill and accompanying it with political movements is necessary to create well-crafted resistance strategies – anything else cedes politics to the right and recreates their impacts.

### Ext – Bleiker 14

#### Coupling their theorization with real, material political movements is essential to ensuring it doesn’t get coopted. Scholars don’t ever take one stable position, they look between different methods to craft the best one. That justifies permutation do both and solves all of their offense.

# 1AR Theory

## Condo

### 1AR Condo (0:20)

## Condo PICs

## PICs

## Conditions CPs

## Actor CPs

## Floating PIKs

## NIBs

## Spec Status

## Graphs/Images

# 1AR Kritiks

## Fuck Kant

### 1AR – Fuck Kant

#### Their philosophy requires rationality that constructs a “perfect subject” – this “perfect subject” is inaccessible to everyone, which rectifies ableism

Ryan 11 "[Group 2] Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice (Deontology-Ryan) « Introduction to Ethics," No Publication, <http://parenethical.com/phil140win11/2011/01/17/group-3-cognitive-disability-misfortune-and-justice-deontology-ryan/> MM

In Kant's deontological ethics, one has a duty to treat humanity not as a means, but as an end. However, Kant's criterion for being part of humanity and moral agency is not biological. In order to be considered fully human, and a moral agent, one must be autonomous and rational. If one lacks rationality and autonomy they cannot escape the chain of causality to act freely from moral principles, and hence are not moral agent's. Kant's moral program fails to account for those who are cognitively impaired because they lack autonomy and rationality. Since Kant's requirement for moral agency is so cut-and-dry and leaves no room for ambiguity, there is no clear moral distinction made between the cognitively impaired and other non-human animals. In the case of Kant, there could be no universal moral law from the categorical imperative that would apply to the cognitively impaired and not non-human animals as well. McMahan reaches the same conclusion as Kant, namely that, there is no meaningful moral distinction to be made between the cognitively impaired and other non-human animals. McMahan takes it to be the case that certain psychological attributes and capacities constitute a minimum for us to value a person as a moral agent. The cognitively impaired fall below the threshold for moral agency because they do not have certain psychological attributes and capacities that McMahan takes to be constitutive of moral agency. Therefore, as morality dictates we be impartial, we cannot give favor to the cognitively impaired over animals with similar psychological endowments. According to McMahan we have no non-arbitrary basis to do so. While McMahan agrees that many accept that we have reasons to give priority to those most proximal to us (which would give the family of someone cognitively impaired reason to favor them over a similarly endowed non-human animal) it does not give a reason for society as a whole to give this preference. Kant and McMahan are similar, in that their standards for moral agency exclude the cognitively impaired (rationality/autonomy and psychological capacities respectively). In Kant's morality, those who are rational and autonomous are to be treated as ends in themselves.

#### Independent reason to drop them – ableism permeates all form of violence and is a representation of human inferiority and oppression

Siebers 9: Siebers, Tobin ~Professor of Literary and Cultural Criticism @ University of Michigan~, "The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification". October 2009. / MM

*Oppression* is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves “groups,” and not “individuals,” means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferiority—what some call “in-built” or “biological” inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel. This is why the study of oppression requires an understanding of aesthetics—not only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed. One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification, it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems. In disability oppression, the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. “Racism” disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors, bloodlines, and physical features. “Sexism” disqualifies on the basis of sex/gender as a direct representation of mental and physical inferiority. “Classism” disqualifies on the basis of family lineage and socioeconomic power as proof of inferior genealogical status. “Ableism” disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature. As racism, sexism, and classism fall away slowly as justifications for human inferiority—and the critiques of these prejudices prove powerful examples of how to fight oppression—the prejudice against disability remains in full force, providing seemingly credible reasons for the belief in human inferiority and the oppressive systems built upon it. This usage will continue, I expect, until we reach a historical moment when we know as much about the social construction of disability as we now know about the social construction of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Disability represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority.

## Spikes

### 1AR – Fuck Spikes

#### Their use of spikes fuels ableism in the debate space, spikes create an unwinnable battle for debaters with disabilities

**Thompson 15** ,(Marshall, former circuit debater and current judge.), “Musings on Debate.” NSD, PDT, VBI., April 21, 2015 / MM

First, I think that evaluating who is the better debater via who dropped spikes excludes lots of specific individuals, especially those with learning disabilities. I have both moderate dyslexia and extreme dysgraphia.  Despite debating for four years with a lot of success I was never able to deal with spikes. I could not ‘mind-sweep’ because my flow was not clear enough to find the arguments I needed, and I was simply too slow a reader to be able to reread through the relevant parts of a case during prep-time. I was very lucky, my junior year (which was the first year I really competed on the national circuit) spikes were remarkably uncommon. Looking back it was in many ways the low-point for spike. They started to be used some my senior year but not anything like the extent they are used today. I am entirely confident, however, in saying that if spikes had had anywhere near the same prevalence when I started doing ‘circuit’ debate as they do now, I—with the specific ways that dyslexia/dysgraphia has affected me—would never have bothered to try to debate national circuit LD (I don’t intend to imply this is the same for anyone who has dyslexia or dysgraphia, the particular ways that learning disabilities manifest is often difficult to track).

#### The ballot must be used as a tool of accountability, debater’s arguments and styles don’t exist in a vacuum and neither do judge’s decisions.

**Vincent 13**, (Vincent, Christopher. Debate Coach), “Re-Conceptualizing Our Performances: Accountability In Lincoln Douglas Debate” Victory Briefs, 2013. / MM

Debaters must be held accountable for the words they say in the round. We should no longer evaluate the speech. Instead we must begin to evaluate the speech act itself. Debaters must be held accountable for more than winning the debate. They must be held accountable for the implications of that speech. As educators and adjudicators in the debate space we also have an ethical obligation to foster an atmosphere of education. It is not enough for judges to offer predispositions suggesting that they do not endorse racist, sexist, homophobic discourse, or justify why they do not hold that belief, and still offer a rational reason why they voted for it.  Judges have become complacent in voting on the discourse, if the other debater does not provide a clear enough role of the ballot framing, or does not articulate well enough why the racist discourse should be rejected. Judges must be willing to foster a learning atmosphere by holding debaters accountable for what they say in the round. They must be willing to vote against a debater if they endorse racist discourse. They must be willing to disrupt the process of the flow for the purpose of embracing that teachable moment. The speech must be connected to the speech act. We must view the entire debate as a performance of the body, instead of the argument solely on the flow. Likewise, judges must be held accountable for what they vote for in the debate space. If a judge is comfortable enough to vote for discourse that is racist, sexist, or homophobic, they must also be prepared to defend their actions. We as a community do not live in a vacuum and do not live isolated from the larger society. That means that judges must defend their actions to the debaters, their coaches, and to the other judges in the room if it is a panel. Students of color should not have the burden of articulating why racist discourse must be rejected, but should have the assurance that the educator with the ballot will protect them in those moments. Until we re-conceptualize the speech and the speech act, and until judges are comfortable enough to vote down debaters for a performance that perpetuates violence in the debate space, debaters and coaches alike will remain complacent in their privilege. As educators we must begin to shift the paradigm and be comfortable doing this. As a community we should stop looking at ourselves as isolated in a vacuum and recognize that the discourse and knowledge we produce in debate has real implications for how we think when we leave this space. Our performances must be viewed as of the body instead of just by it. As long as we continue to operate in a world where our performances are merely by bodies, we will continue to foster a climate of hostility and violence towards students of color, and in turn destroy the transformative potential this community could have.

# A2: Case Objections

## Dumb Inherency Shit

#### Their evidence is all clickbait – that’s not how Congress works

Davis and Schmitt 12/13 Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Eric Schmitt, 12-13-2018, "Senate Votes to End Aid for Yemen Fight Over Khashoggi Killing and Saudis’ War Aims," No Publication, [https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/politics/yemen-saudi-war-pompeo-mattis.html /](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/politics/yemen-saudi-war-pompeo-mattis.html%20/) MM

The 56-to-41 vote was a rare move by the Senate to limit presidential war powers and sent a potent message of disapproval for a nearly four-year conflict that has killed thousands of civilians and brought famine to Yemen. Moments later, senators unanimously approved a separate resolution to hold Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia personally responsible for the death of the journalist, Jamal Khashoggi. Together, the votes were an extraordinary break with Mr. Trump, who has refused to condemn the prince and dismissed United States intelligence agencies’ conclusions that the heir to the Saudi throne directed the grisly killing. While the House will not take up the measure by the end of the year, the day’s votes signal that Congress will take on Mr. Trump’s support of Saudi Arabia when Democrats take control of the House next month.

#### Although a resolution was passed through the House to limit US support to Saudi Arabia – it doesn’t pull away ALL military aid, it didn’t get two-thirds congressional support, the measure will expire, AND Trump will veto it if it reaches his desk – regardless – this debate should still be a question about whether military support is ethical

Davis and Schmitt write Davis, Julie Hirschfeld. Schmitt, Eric. “Senate Votes to Limit War Powers in Yemen, Angered by Saudi Killing of Journalist.” The New York Times. December 13, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/politics/yemen-saudi-war-pompeo-mattis.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur> / MM

Senate voted resoundingly on Thursday to withdraw American military assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, issuing the latest in a series of stinging bipartisan rebukes of President Trump for his defense of the kingdom amid outrage in both parties over Riyadh’s role in the killing of a dissident journalist. The 56-to-41 vote was a rare move by the Senate to limit presidential war powers and send a potent message of official disapproval for a nearly four-year conflict that has killed thousands of civilians and brought famine to Yemen. Its immediate effect was largely symbolic, after the House earlier this week moved to scuttle it, all but assuring that the measure will expire this year without making it to Mr. Trump’s desk.

## Advantage

### AT: PMCs

#### Fiat solves circumvention – the aff says that we should never give military aid

#### Draw a brightline on their link ev saying NOTHING about the Saudi conflict – all of it was about Vietnam and Iraq-era policies

#### PMCs don’t have Tornados and F15’s – DoD funded missions give high quality arms and support that PMCs can’t

#### Media coverage solves your offense – people are getting pissed at Trump for staying in Saudi and people would get even more pissed if he ignored promises

### AT: UK alt cause

#### UK arms are a fraction of the US’ – the arms aren’t as high quality which is why they want to stick with the US, pulling out significantly reduces violence because other arms aren’t as high quality and there aren’t as many

#### UK is pulling out – increased US support comes as a result of pull out

Dewan 18 (Angela, Senior Producer, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/22/middleeast/arms-exports-saudi-arabia->intl/index.html)

A number of countries have restricted arms sales to Saudi Arabia since the kingdom began airstrikes on Yemen in 2015, in a war that the UN describes as the world's worst man-made humanitarian disaster. Calls for more restrictions on arms exports have been growing, particularly in Europe, since the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Turkey last month. US President Donald Trump, however, has repeatedly pointed to the US' lucrative arms deals with the Saudis as a reason to stand by the kingdom. Denmark and Finland on Thursday became the latest countries to suspend new arms deals with Saudi Arabia. Denmark's Foreign Ministry said it was freezing new deals over both Khashoggi and Yemen, while the Finnish Foreign Ministry mentioned only Yemen. Finland also banned new arms sales to the United Arab Emirates, which is part of the Saudi-led coalition in the conflict. Their announcements came just two days after Germany said it was stopping all arms transfers to the kingdom. Denmark and Finland are not major suppliers of weapons to Saudi Arabia, but Germany certainly is. It had already suspended new arms deals to Saudi Arabia, but on Monday it widened that ban to include the transfers of weapons on existing orders as well. So where is Saudi Arabia getting its weapons from? Arms deals are often done in secret or with little publicity. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) tries to track deals involving major weapons, and a database of Saudi imports from the last decade shows the United States as the biggest supplier, followed by the United Kingdom, France, Spain and then Germany. But a lot of exporters still selling to the Saudis have dramatically decreased their supply in recent years. The United Kingdom, for example, transferred arms worth an estimated $843 million in 2016 but almost halved that value to $436 million last year, according to SIPRI. (The database uses values constant with 1990 prices to eliminate currency fluctuations and inflation.) French exports of major weapons to Saudi Arabia were worth $174 million in 2015 but dropped to $91 million in 2016 and $27 million last year. The value of Spanish exports also dramatically decreased in that time period, but the Spanish government confirmed this year it would go ahead with arms deals it had previously suggested it would freeze, bowing to pressure from Spanish manufacturers, according to reports. US dwarfs other exporters Despite these decreases, the overall value of Saudi weapons imports actually increased by 38% between 2016 and 2017. That was almost entirely because of a huge uptick in transfers from the United States, which almost doubled its exports in terms of value from $1.8 billion to $3.4 billion in that time. Germany also multiplied its exports from $14 million to $105 million, although it is expected to be much lower this year following its suspension. Overall, no country comes close to the United States in major weapons supply. Over the past five years, for example, the US accounted for 61% of major arms sales to the Saudis. The UK was a distant second, with a 23% share, while France, in third place, was a mere 4%. In a statement on Tuesday, Trump said that canceling major arms contracts with the Saudis would be foolish, and that "Russia and China would be the enormous beneficiaries" if the US halted its sales. China supplies a negligible amount of major weaponry to Saudi Arabia, SIPRI data shows, but it is on the increase. Russia supplies so little it is not included in the organization's database. "Russia has tried hard in the past 10 to 15 years to get into the large Saudi arms market, but it has not been very successful. Saudi Arabia has acquired Russian rifles and may have bought some other items, but such deals have been very small," said Pieter Wezeman, a senior researcher with SIPRI's arms transfers and military expenditure program. "China has made some more substantial inroads into the Saudi arms market, in particular selling armed drones," Wezeman said. "The details are shady and we may very well have underestimated China's role as an arms exporter to Saudi Arabia. But China doesn't come anywhere near the USA, UK or even France as arms suppliers. Still, the important point here is that Saudi Arabia has explored the possibility of diversifying its supplier base."

### AT: UAE Alt Cause

#### No reason to punish the UAE

Rubin 19 Michael Rubin, 1-2-2019, "Don’t punish the UAE and Bahrain for Saudi misdeeds," Washington Examiner, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/dont-punish-the-uae-and-bahrain-for-saudi-misdeeds IB recut MM

Don’t punish the UAE and Bahrain for Saudi misdeeds DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — The alleged murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi is a disaster for U.S.-Saudi relations. Whereas Saudi authorities could dismiss Saudi involvement in the Sept. 11 terror attacks by arguing that the hijackers were al Qaeda and hence a mutual enemy, there is no shirking responsibility for what happened in the Saudi consulate: If the Turkish information is true, it was a Saudi death squad acting on the commands of the Saudi crown prince who ordered the hit. Already in Congress and the White House, talk has turned to retaliation. Senators now talk not only about scaling back U.S. aid to Saudi Arabia’s disastrous campaign in Yemen, but also about cutting off all military aid to Saudi Arabia. President Trump, for his part, promises “severe punishment” if Saudi Arabia was responsible. Overnight, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has gone from A-list to pariah; he could not be less popular in Washington if he had Ebola. Authorities in Riyadh may believe they can wait for the storm to blow over. Washington, after all, will soon be consumed by midterm elections. Yet the stink associated with Crown Prince Mohammed may linger. Even seasoned American officials and longtime friends of Saudi Arabia question his judgment. Frankly, the only hope for any quick repair in bilateral ties may come only with the crown prince pushed aside and replaced by a man not only ambitious but wise. It’s important, however, not to punish allies of Saudi Arabia for the misdeeds of Crown Prince Mohammed, or to throw the strategic baby out with the bathwater. Consider Yemen: The imprecision of Saudi bombing is a huge problem, but Yemen is far more complicated than the bellicose Saudi vs. peaceful Yemen narrative would hold. The Iranian-backed Houthis seized the government. They too impede the free flow of food and aid to a needy civilian population. Their acquisition of ballistic missiles and their use against Saudi targets such as the international airport in Riyadh cannot be excused. Should anyone launch missiles at an American airport, the response would be far more devastating than Saudi Arabia’s. Would it be best if the Saudis stopped their bombardment, and the Houthis ceased their ties to Iran, withdrew from the capital, and laid down their arms? Yes. But Houthi ambition and overreach is not Saudi Arabia’s fault; it is the fault of the Houthis and their Iranian backers.

### AT: Exec Not Normal Means

#### Exec action is normal means –

#### Syria –

Crawford ’18 [Jamie Crawford, 5-19-2018, "US withdrawing aid from northwest Syria," CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/19/politics/donald-trump-syria-aid/index.html] / MM

The United States is withdrawing assistance from northwest Syria as the Trump administration reviews hundreds of millions of dollars in stabilization aid to Syria, a State Department official has told CNN.

#### Pakistan –

Sullivan ’18 [Emily Sullivan, 9-2-2018, "U.S. Cuts $300 Million In Aid To Pakistan; Says It's Failing To Fight Militants," NPR.org, https://www.npr.org/2018/09/02/644117490/u-s-cuts-300-million-in-aid-to-pakistan-says-its-failing-to-fight-militants] / MM

In the latest blow to already fragile ties between the United States and Pakistan, the Defense Department said on Saturday it has suspended $300 million in funding to Islamabad over what it calls the government's failure to take action against terrorists. The suspension is part of a broader pullback in military aid for Pakistan announced by the Trump administration in January. The administration says Pakistan is not taking strong enough steps to combat the Taliban and other groups. Pakistan, which serves as a key route for transporting supplies to U.S. forces in Afghanistan, has repeatedly denied harboring terrorists.

### AT: Ceasefire

#### Cease-fire failed

MacMilan and Aldroubi 2/7 [Arthur, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent for The National, Mina, journalist for The National, “Talks on Yemen ceasefire break off without final agreement,” published 02/07/19, accessible online at <https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/talks-on-yemen-ceasefire-break-off-without-final-agreement-1.823064>] / MM

One part of a twin-pronged UN effort to push forward peace in Yemen failed to break the deadlock on Thursday as talks in Hodeidah broke off **without any final agreement** on how to redeploy rival forces as part of a stumbling ceasefire. The head of the UN monitoring mission in Hodeidah, Major General Michael Lollesgaard, this week chaired discussions between government and Houthi representatives to try and preserve the limited **truce**, which has been **undermined by** numerous and persistent breaches by the **rebels** during the six weeks it has been in force. A spokesman for UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres said plans were being made for more talks between the two sides as although “challenges remain, not least because of the complex nature of the current frontlines” in Hodeidah, a compromise had been agreed in principle. The details, which were not disclosed, would now go to government and Houthi leaders for approval. The talks about the withdrawal of all forces from the city and its three Red Sea ports started on Monday on a ship docked in the inner harbour of Hodeidah port, reflecting the high level of distrust between the two sides, who agreed to the ceasefire at UN-brokered talks in Sweden in December. Major General Lollesgaard chairs the joint Redeployment Coordination Committee which was later established to ensure the ceasefire is fully implemented. Repeated promises to do so **have not materialised**, **raising fears of** an **escalation** in the conflict. The agreed ceasefire **applies only to Hodeidah**. “To help overcome these issues, the RCC chair tabled a proposal that proved acceptable, in principle, to both parties to move forward on the implementation of the Hodeidah agreement,” the UN spokesman told reporters in New York on Thursday, confirming that this week's talks had ended. “A preliminary compromise was agreed, pending further consultation by the parties with their respective leaders. The RCC chair expects to reconvene the RCC within the next week, with the aim of finalising details for redeployments.” There is, however, **deep skepticism** about whether the ceasefire will come into full effect. On Thursday the UN's humanitarian aid chief, Mark Lowcock, said the Houthis were still refusing to grant access to the Red Sea Mills in Hodeidah, which hold tens of thousands of tonnes of grain which is urgently needed to feed millions of starving people. “Access to the mills grows ever more urgent as time passes and the risk of spoilage to the remaining grain increases,” Mr Lowcock said in a statement. Last week, the Arab-led coalition that backs Yemen's government sent a letter to the UN Security Council that outlined hundreds of incidents where the rebels had breached the ceasefire. The plan for talks on the ship to save the ceasefire was announced hours later. “The negotiations came to an end because the Houthis are **refusing to withdraw** their forces from Hodeidah and the ports,” a Yemeni government official told The National on Thursday.

#### Ceasefire useless and will collapse

ABC News 1-10-19 [https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-01-11/rebel-drone-bombs-yemen-military-parade-kills-at-least-six/10706830 /](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-01-11/rebel-drone-bombs-yemen-military-parade-kills-at-least-six/10706830%20/) MM

**A bomb-laden drone flown by Yemen's Houthi rebels has hit a military parade** outside Aden, **killing at least six troops** from a Saudi-led coalition and their allies. It struck the Al Anad Air Base, where American special forces once led their fight against Yemen's Al Qaeda branch, targeting high-ranking military officials in Yemen's internationally recognised government. Two senior military officials were wounded. **Thursday's brazen attack** has threatened UN-brokered peace efforts **to end the years-long war** in the Arab world's poorest nation. It has also raised new questions about Iran's alleged role in arming the Houthis with drone and ballistic missile technology, something long denied by Tehran despite researchers and UN experts linking the weapons to the country. "Once again **this proves that the Houthi criminal militias are not ready for peace** and that they are exploiting truces in order for deployment and reinforcements," **Yemen's Information Minister** Moammar Al **Eryani said**. "This is time for the international community to stand by the legitimate government and force the militias to give up their weapons and pull out of the cities." The Houthis immediately claimed the attack through their Al Masirah satellite news channel, saying they had targeted "invaders and mercenaries" at the base in the Southern province of Lahj, leaving "dozens of dead and wounded". Yemeni officials said that among the wounded were Mohammad Saleh Tamah, head of Yemen's Intelligence Service, senior military commander Mohammad Jawas, and Lahj governor Ahmed Al Turki. Authorities were still searching for wounded among the rubble hours after the attack. Yemen has been in the grip of an increasingly complex civil war since 2011, as several competing factions fight for control of the Middle East's poorest country. Local reporter Nabil Al Qaiti was attending the ceremony and standing in front of the stage when he saw a drone approach and hover nearby, about 25 metres high in the air, minutes after the parade started. Army spokesman Mohammed Al Naqib was delivering a speech from a podium when the drone exploded. "It was a very strong explosion and we could feel the pressure," he said, adding that two of the people standing next to him — a soldier and a journalist — were wounded. Mr Al Qaiti saw many wounded but no dead. "The drone was packed with explosives," he said. Some 8,000 soldiers had been taking part in the parade, as well as two governors and a large number of top military commanders including the chief of staff. Yemen plunged into civil war in 2014 when the rebels captured Sanaa, and the Saudi-led coalition intervened a year later when they pushed further south. The coalition, which is fighting alongside government troops, has since been trying to restore Yemen's internationally recognised government to power. **Hopes were raised last month** **that the country was moving toward peace** after the two sides agreed to a prisoner swap and cease-fire in the port city of Hodeida. **Rival forces were to withdraw to allow humanitarian aid flows to return** and hopefully relieve a country pushed to the brink of famine by war. Fighting has largely abated in Hodeida but **progress on the withdrawal has been slow**. Yemen's health system has collapsed amid a tightened blockade imposed by the Saudi-led coalition. **The UN humanitarian aid chief on Wednesday accused the rebels of blocking humanitarian supplies** travelling from areas under their control to government-held areas.

### AT: Other Countries Give Aid

#### They say other countries give aid -

#### The aff isn’t responsible for that – cross apply our Burke evidence, the aff is an ethical evaluation. We don’t make a claim to solve the entire war in Yemen, but just that the US is giving a ton of aid to a country that is using that aid in a bad way and the US not giving that aid would be good

#### Even if other countries give aid, it’s not enough to make a significant effect – our first piece of Morris evidence says that the US has given close to $26 billion in aid and almost every bomb that they drop originated in the US, other aid isn’t significant enough to make a difference on Saudi

### AT: Fill In

#### They say fill in –

#### It’s illogical – the only two countries that want to fill in are Russia and China BUT they can’t because they’re supporting the Hounthi’s which is WHO SAUDI IS FIGHTING AGAINST

#### Their weapons don’t fit in Saudi planes and aren’t as high quality – our Caverley evidence says it would take decades and Saudi wouldn’t want to because it would interrupt fighting

### AT: Fill In – Debate Drills

#### Fill in is illogical – China and Russia are both supporting Iran, if they decided to support Saudi it would just piss Iran off even more

#### Both pieces of Goldberg ev is trash – it doesn’t even give a warrant, countries can’t fill in, it takes too long and is too costly – their “visibility” warrant IS the status quo and the aff proves it doesn’t work

#### Their Saab ev – the only examples of when they used other countries weapons is 1987 and 2014 BEFORE the Saudi coalition – transition would be costly and prohibitive – that was the Caverley evidence

#### Their UAE fill in ev – Russia can’t provide the bombs they need; they don’t fit in their planes – the unhighlighted part has a list of what they give and it doesn’t include weapons

# A2: T/Theory

## Generic Responses

### Extra-T

#### Aff doesn’t violate – the aff just defends military aid in a vacuum and nothing more. Use the advocacy as a brightline for abuse violations.

### Reasonability

#### Prefer reasonability with a brightline of disclosure and turn ground

#### Don’t vote on theory if you don’t believe that we made this debate IMPOSSIBLE for them. They can read any argument with a generic topic link, Saudi link, or a link to our method. US-Saudi relations are also ALL over the news so there is no excuse for limits or ground.

### Reasonability on T

#### Use reasonability – no universal consensus

Kanaan and Ghazzal 18 (Salah Ziyad Ghazzal- DISEC Chair, Fadi Kanaan- Secretary General, DISEC BACKGROUND GUIDE, 2018, BEYMUN, JKS)

Definition of Foreign Military Aid The definition of the term ‘military’ is significant to understanding the concept of FMA as it signifies acts executed by an armed force i.e. with weaponry, on behalf of the government—or a rebel force in cases of unregulated or faulty military aid—to fight an opposition. While there is no universal definition for the term FMA, it is acknowledged as any transfer aiming to strengthen the military capability of a nation and contribute in maintaining national security. Military aid is, therefore, a type of foreign aid but in the military context. In fact, foreign military aid is often documented as a percentage of a country’s foreign aid budget. Usually, the country providing the aid is referred to as a ‘donor country’ and the one receiving the aid is referred to as a ‘recipient country’. Accordingly, military aid can be monetary (i.e. in the form of transferring money to a recipient country so it can purchase weapons or other military equipment) or materialistic, such as through the temporary transfer of army to logistically assist the recipient country.

### RVI’s Good

#### **Aff gets RVIs**

#### **Skew – there’s no 2AC to develop carded offense and the 1AR has to over-cover since the 6 minute 2NR is devastating which encourages them to under-develop T in the NC and over-develop in the NR – need the RVI to develop good, in-depth T offense**

#### **Reciprocity – T is a unique avenue to the ballot that the aff can’t access –they should be ready to defend it, without RVIs it becomes a no risk option**

### RVI’s Good on Multiple Shells

#### Aff gets RVIs on multiple shells

#### **Skew – there’s no 2AC to develop carded offense and the 1AR has to over-cover since the 6-minute 2NR is devastating which encourages them to under-develop T in the NC and over-develop in the NR – need the RVI to develop good, in-depth T offense**

#### Reciprocity – encourages debaters to throw out as many T shells as possible and sit on one for 6 minutes – outweighs 1AR sitting on RVIs - you get 6 minutes to respond to them and can still extend offense for 2 minutes or more

## Definitions

### Military Aid

#### Includes arms

CIA 78 (National Foreign Assessment Center, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Developing Countries 1978, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:EjrjgnKfVAkJ:https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08S01350R000100150002-9.pdf+&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)

The term military aid as used throughout this paper includes commercial sales of military equipment and services as well as sales on concessionary terms. (iii)

#### Use reasonability – no universal consensus

Kanaan and Ghazzal 18 (Salah Ziyad Ghazzal- DISEC Chair, Fadi Kanaan- Secretary General, DISEC BACKGROUND GUIDE, 2018, BEYMUN, JKS)

Definition of Foreign Military Aid The definition of the term ‘military’ is significant to understanding the concept of FMA as it signifies acts executed by an armed force i.e. with weaponry, on behalf of the government—or a rebel force in cases of unregulated or faulty military aid—to fight an opposition. While there is no universal definition for the term FMA, it is acknowledged as any transfer aiming to strengthen the military capability of a nation and contribute in maintaining national security. Military aid is, therefore, a type of foreign aid but in the military context. In fact, foreign military aid is often documented as a percentage of a country’s foreign aid budget. Usually, the country providing the aid is referred to as a ‘donor country’ and the one receiving the aid is referred to as a ‘recipient country’. Accordingly, military aid can be monetary (i.e. in the form of transferring money to a recipient country so it can purchase weapons or other military equipment) or materialistic, such as through the temporary transfer of army to logistically assist the recipient country.

#### Prefer a broad definition of the topic – there’s no consensus on what “military aid” is.

Toomey 14(James, Ret. Lt. Colonel, Associate Professor at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) U.S. Security Cooperation in Foreign Policy: Looking Past Human Rights Paradigms DISAM Annual, Vol3 )

While scholars have linked state human rights practices to military aid allocation, **there are** three **significant gaps in the current literature.** First, **most of the research does not** focus on nor **capture the entire scope of U.S. military assistance**. Moreover, **the** Department of Defense **(DOD) and** the Department of **State do not recognize** **the term “military aid**” or “military assistance.” **Security assistance and security cooperation are the terminologies used when referring to foreign aid that focuses on defense** and security partnerships, **and may include activities not normally considered as military assistance, but which serves as complimentary supports** or multipliers **to other forms of military aid in the execution of our foreign policy**. In other words, **scholars and researchers have not generally considered DOD’s more comprehensive collection** of foreign engagement activities, **defined as security cooperation**. DOD describes security cooperation (SC) as: ...Department of Defense (DOD) **interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation** (Joint Pub 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 2010). Security cooperation comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DOD-administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build defense and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. It is DOD policy that SC is an important tool of national security and foreign policy and is an integral element of the DOD mission. SC activities shall be planned, programmed, budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and efficiency as other integral DOD activities. SC requirements shall be combined with other DOD requirements and implemented through standard DOD systems, facilities, and procedures (Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2008). Additionally, **when operationalizing a measure of U.S. military interaction** and influence on foreign policy, **scholars tend to define it as an aggregate or coded variable that only entails bilateral military grants, loans, troop presence, and arms sales** (Poe 1991, Poe and Meernik 1995, Sullivan, Tessman and Li 2011, Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985). **These are only four limited dimensions of persuasive** (versus coercive) **military interaction that, in actuality, consists of over 100 programs; the more comprehensive conceptualization of military interaction becomes especially important in research** on Africa and AFRICOM. For fiscal year 2013, the total aggregate loans or foreign military financing (FMF) for African nations within AFRICOM’s area of responsibility amounted to only about $40 million, while the total value of our military engagement with Africa was arguably well over $500 million based on the size of AFRICOM’s operations and maintenance budget, other DOD security cooperation funding provided under Title 10 programs and authorities, and Department of State Title 22 funding. Researching the factors that motivate America to provide foreign military aid to African states demands a more comprehensive analysis of security cooperation programs not previously applied. (44)

#### Military aid is aid direct towards benefiting armed forces, prefer our definition, it’s from a federal agency and has intent to define

USAID writes <https://explorer.usaid.gov/about.html#tab-methodology> / MM

Military assistance is defined as foreign aid for programs primarily for the benefit of recipient government armed forces, or aid which subsidizes or substantially enhances military capability. Military assistance excludes humanitarian and non-military development programs funded by the U.S. Department of Defense; these programs are categorized as 'Economic Assistance'.

### Can Include Arms

#### Military aid includes arms sales

**CIA publication 78** (National Foreign Assessment Center, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Developing Countries 1978, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:EjrjgnKfVAkJ:https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08S01350R000100150002-9.pdf+&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)

**The term military aid** as used throughout this paper **includes commercial sales of military equipment and services as well as sales on concessionary terms**. (iii)

## Weighing Args

### Fairness > education

**Fairness comes before education – (1) If debate wasn’t fair people would quit debate, meaning no education is the first place (2) we can get education out of round – just spend all your time researching arguments and never compete. Debate is a competitive activity, not purely educational, meaning fairness comes first. Otherwise you could just concede the round and spend the rest of the time explaining the details of your args to us (3) the judge can’t evaluate the round in the first place if it’s not fair, and every round needs a winner / loser (4) winning rounds is what motivates people to do prep and research – there’s no incentive to prep for an activity where the round is skewed against you.**

### Education > fairness

**Education comes before fairness – (1) Debate is a unique activity where we can clash arguments and gain knowledge of how certain arguments interact – just doing research on our own doesn’t give us that type of education (2) education is why schools fund debate – if debate wasn’t educational it wouldn’t be funded, meaning the activity wouldn’t exist in the first place (3) fairness has no out-of-round impact – the only thing that we come out of debate with is the knowledge and experience we gained.**

### Drop the debater

**Drop the debater – (1) Best deterrent against future abuse (2) drop the arg wouldn’t make up for the lost time of me reading theory in the first place (3) the round is already skewed, so drop the arg wouldn’t rectify the abuse that has already occurred.**

### Use competing interps

**Use competing interps – (1) Leads to a race to the top to get the best interps for debate (2) reasonability leads to a race to the bottom to be as abusive as possible as long as you meet a certain brightline of abuse that’s allowed (3) reasonability is arbitrary and it’s very vague when determining whether a brightline has been met or not.**

### Use reasonability

**Use reasonability – (1) Competing interps allows for infinite frivolous shells as a legitimate strategy since you can win on any minor abuse (2) ensures the entire debate isn’t focused on the line-by-line of the theory flow and we can actually debate about substance – key since non-theory education is more applicable outside of debate (3) insofar as I win that my brightline is a good test of abuse and I meet my brightline, I shouldn’t be punished (4) all rounds are inherently unfair in some way whether it be side bias, judge bias, the pairing, etc. – reasonability acknowledges this fact and recognizes that a certain small level of abuse should not be grounds for a theory argument.**

### RVIs on topicality good

**I should get RVIs on T – (a) otherwise it’s a NIB – I can lose the round on it but they can’t, making it irreciprocal and thus unfair (b) time skew – I have to answer each one of their args for longer than it takes them to read it since they can win on any one of their standards (c) checks frivolous T – forces them to read substantive args rather than just filling the 1NC with a generic T position which is better for substance education. They should be forced to defend their position. Outweighs because actually has out of round benefits compared to T debate.**

## AT: T – Nebel/Can’t Spec

### Counter-Interp Short

#### Counter-interp – the affirmative can specify Saudi Arabia and the UAE if the aff is disclosed and willing to specify in CX

#### Prefer:

#### Clash – they force the topic to one aff which justifies PICs or disads for particular regimes or whole res nonsense – PICs are worse because they steal aff ground and can PIC out of infinite things - specing Saudi draws a line on research and ground, you get power vaccuum, terror, oil, or iran disad

1. Education – no world where there would be universal removal – our method is best for understanding particular instances

### Counter-Interp

#### Counter-interp – the affirmative can specify Saudi Arabia and the UAE if the aff is disclosed and willing to specify in CX

#### Countries and governments can be singular

Kefer 92 Michel Kefer and Johan Van Der Auwera [Department Member at the Universitat zu Koln in Philosophy, Education, and Political Science], "Meaning and Grammar: Cross-Linguistic Perspectives," Walter de Gruyter, January 1, 1992, GHS//MM

Words such as family, government, etc., which can occur in sentences as either "singular" or "plural": the family/government is/are coming today, can be explained in the same way. The nature of "families" and "governments" is such that they may be alternatively viewed as discrete individuals (perceived in discontinuous space) or as forming a larger unit composed of these individual members (perceived in continuous space). Therefore, the choice of the "singular" or "plural" forms with regard to verb agreement will directly depend upon the speaker's perception of these entities in space in accordance to the particular message being conveyed.

#### Prefer:

#### Clash – they force the topic to one aff which justifies PICs or disads for particular regimes or whole res nonsense – PICs are worse because they steal aff ground and can PIC out of infinite things - specing Saudi draws a line on research and ground, you get power vaccuum, terror, oil, or iran disad

1. Education – no world where there would be universal removal – our method is best for understanding particular instances

#### Prefer reasonability with a brightline of turn ground

#### Don’t vote on theory if you don’t believe that we made this debate IMPOSSIBLE for them. They can read any argument with a topic link or a link to Saudi or UAE. The war in Yemen is ALL over the news and it’s the biggest aff on the topic.

### AT: Interp

#### Overview –

#### Their interp results in spec one speech later due to disad and counterplan links – 1ac clarification is key to stable links

#### Small affs get rolled on particular disads and Ks – they also get generics like fill in and terror

#### We meet – the aff defends two countries

#### Semantics -

#### No impact, semantics is a floor not a ceiling– Jake Nebel doesn’t determine fairness, the lit base does

#### Jurisdiction isn’t a voter – judges vote on non-t affs

#### Predictability – disclosure and lit checks solve – this interp isn’t questioning if there is military aid it’s questioning whether we can spec regimes

#### Strat skew -

#### Non-unique – the aff was disclosed and you already prewrote the shell beforehand – you would’ve read this anyways

#### Ground -

#### Not my fault - they pick the ground against the aff, if we prove the aff is reasonable then it’s terminal defense to their standard

#### The aff is easier to predict because it’s on the wiki and you’re neg

#### Limits -

#### Limits is arbitrary – the neg can always complain that they don’t have enough ground regardless of how much they really have – just cut better links

#### Stable advocacy -

#### Non-unique - people always no link from everything – we also have advocacy text and whole res with specific advantages makes the 1ar even more shifty

#### TVA –

#### Links back to their offense – they still have to answer it and our interp is better because it avoids dumb stuff like PICs

### 2AR – Topic Lit and Clash O/W

#### Our topic lit and clash impact outweighs:

#### 1] lexically prior: limits are only valuable because they facilitate valuable clash over a relevant proposition—if their interp doesn’t do that then there’s no impact to limits

#### 2] controls the internal link—predictable limits and ground are determined by the literature, not Jake Nebel—the literature is the litmus for determining what the bounds of the topic of should be

### 2AR – AT: Limits

#### Their limits claim is massively exaggerated – winning functional limits is terminal defense since they’ve conceded PICs weighing – things like inherency, adv areas, and it having to be military aid all check the number of affs

#### A] there’s a structural disincentive to reading tiny affs without an impact because they’d lose to a risk of politics or risk of a link to ks with large impacts like set col or afropess

#### B] generics like the fill-in da and conditions cp checks—only a few affs will have hyper-specific responses but most of the examples in their caselist don’t have a strategic angle vs. those args

#### C] err aff—it’s the TOC topic—we have 5 months which means a high number of affs is definitely manageable for the neg but pigeonholing us to 1 aff at TOC makes being aff impossible

## AT: T – Can’t Be Plural

### Counter-Interp

#### CI – The affirmative can defend not providing military aid to Saudi Arabia and the UAE if the aff is disclosed and willing to specify in CX

#### Prefer it

#### Common Usage – plural means more than one, no one thinks that “regimes” is a singular regime – outweighs, common usage controls our interpretation of the the topic and what args we read.

#### Limits – two regimes draws the line on predictable ground and clash – we get specific offense and they get specifics and generics for both countries, there are UAE specific links for things like terror and cyber

#### Prefer reasonability with a brightline of turn ground and disclosure

#### Don’t vote on theory if you don’t believe that we made this debate IMPOSSIBLE for them. They can read any argument with a generic topic link or a link to our method. Saudi relations are also ALL over the news and it’s the biggest aff on the topic.

### AT: Interp

#### Overview – make them name specific arguments they lost because we defended two countries involved in the same coalition. They get at least double the ground and defending anything else makes it infinitely worse.

## AT: T – Must be Plural

### Counter-Interp

#### CI – the aff can specify one authoritarian regime

#### Prefer –

#### Limits - No distinction between prepping for one and two – you have to generate links to both countries which splits disad ground in half – outweighs because it has in-round effects on strategy

#### Logic – there are certain circumstances where two countries can’t go together – slapping extra words onto a plan text creates illogical combinations

#### Prefer reasonability with a brightline of turn ground and disclosure

#### Don’t vote on theory if you don’t believe that we made this debate IMPOSSIBLE for them. They can read any argument with a generic topic link or a link to our method.

### AT: Interp

#### We meet – the plan text spills over and effects other countries

#### Overview– their offense has no impact other than jurisdiction, which isn’t an impact –

#### Judges vote on non-t affs all the time

#### Doesn’t determine in-round abuse – the lit base, disclosure, and solvency advocate determines ground, not David Branse

#### The aff is disclosed, the resolution isn’t the only thing we know before the round

#### If they win competing interps it means the judge has to evaluate different models which disproves jurisdiction

## AT: T – Authoritarian

### Counter-Interp

#### Counter-interp: Authoritarian regimes are those that are listed as authoritarian under the EIU index

EIU 18 Alexandra Ma, 2-4-2018, "The 30 most authoritarian regimes in the world," Business Insider, <https://www.businessinsider.com/economist-intelligence-unit-2017-democracy-index-worst-countries-2018-1#30-belarus-31310-1> / MM 1 North Korea 2 Syria 3 Chad 4 CAR 5 Congo 6 Turkmenistan 7 Equatorial Guinea 8 Tajikistan 9 Saudi Arabia 10 Uzbekistan 11 Guinea-Bissau 12 Yemen 13 Sudan 14 Libyra 15 Burundi 16 Loas 17 Eritrea 18 Iran 19 Afghenistan 20 Azerbajijan 21 UAE 22 Bahrain 23 Djibouti 24 Swaziland 25 Oman 26 Togo 27 Kazakhstan 28 Vietnam 29 China 30 Belarus / MM

The Economist Intelligence Unit has released its latest Democracy Index this week, which ranks 167 countries according to political and civic freedom. Countries are given a score out of 10 based on five criteria. Above eight is a "full democracy," while below four is an "authoritarian regime."

...9. Saudi Arabia

#### Prefer –

#### **Limits – they overlimit - there are only a certain number of regimes that the US gives military aid to – their interp makes clearly topical affs like Saudi, Chad, or Egypt non-t and allows them to draw arbitrary lines based on what their interp claims is totalitarian. Our list establishes a hard cap – theirs is super vague and self serving**

#### Prefer reasonability with a brightline of link and impact turn ground

#### Don’t vote on theory if you don’t believe that we made this debate IMPOSSIBLE for them. They can read any argument with a generic topic link or a link to our method. Their evidence even says that “authoritarian” encompasses totalitarian.

#### Evaluate it through in round abuse – allows the neg to complain and get away with claiming we’re abusive when their wiki has Saudi specific disads

### AT: Interp

#### Be skeptical when their interp is from Wikipedia – it’s sketch and there’s a reason why you can’t cite it in school so why should you be able to cite it in a debate round?

#### We meet – the Steinmetz evidence says authoritarian encompasses totalitarian

#### No violation – your interp says it has to be all aspects of social life and your violations never cite things like economy, art, or science

#### Limits -

#### Their limits standard is arbitrary– the neg can always complain that they don’t have enough ground regardless of how much they really have – just cut better links

#### Limits isn’t determined by the Distributed Wikipedia, it’s determined by the lit base – look at the news once and tell me we “underlimit”

#### Evaluate through in round abuse – allows the neg to complain and get away with claiming we’re abusive when their wiki has Saudi specific disads

#### Extra T –

#### No violation – nothing in the aff specifies anything that’s not providing military aid to an authoritarian regime

## AT: T – Military Aid

### Counter-Interp Short

#### Counter-interp: US Legal Statute defines Military Aid

Burma Act 07 S.2257 - Burma Democracy Promotion Act of 2007 (110th Congress (2007-2008), https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/senate-bill/2257/text)

SEC. 11. REPORT ON MILITARY AID TO BURMA. (a) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that— (1) contains a list of countries that provide military aid to Burma; and (2) describes the military aid provided by each of the countries described in paragraph (1). (b) Military Aid Defined.—In this section, the term “military aid” includes— (1) the provision of weapons, military vehicles, and military aircraft; (2) the provision of military training; and (3) conducting joint military exercises. (c) Form.—The report required

#### Prefer it:

#### Context outweighs – this is the biggest and most common aff on the topic, excluding it DESTROYS affirmative predictability which outweighs - the neg can react with generics like PICs or conditions, the aff can’t start over mid tournament

#### Real world- congress has ONLY mentioned military aid twice since September- both were about Saudi Arms sales

### Counter-Interp

#### Counter-interp: US Legal Statute defines Military Aid

Burma Act 07 S.2257 - Burma Democracy Promotion Act of 2007 (110th Congress (2007-2008), https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/senate-bill/2257/text)

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#### Prefer it:

#### Context outweighs – this is the biggest and most common aff on the topic, excluding it DESTROYS affirmative predictability which outweighs - the neg can react with generics like PICs or conditions, the aff can’t start over mid tournament

#### Real world- congress has ONLY mentioned military aid twice since September- both were about Saudi Arms sales- if congress considers this aid it’s not real world to exclude it

#### Use reasonability with a brightline of link and impact turn ground –

#### Don’t vote on theory if you don’t believe that we made this debate IMPOSSIBLE for them. They can read any argument with a generic topic link or Saudi specific link.

#### Drop the argument and re-evaluate the aff under the interp –

#### Key to substantive education, they can generate links to things that aren’t just arms sales because the aff defends “military aid” in general

### AT: Interp

#### We meet - the aff is NOT contingent on arms sales – our Ward evidence cites numerous other forms of aid like logistics, training, advising, and refueling.

#### Not a voter - the plan says “military aid” in a vacuum – if the neg wins that the plan doesn’t end arm sales, that’s just a solvency takeout and not a voting issue

#### No ground loss - make them explain which disads apply to “military aid” but not “arms sales”- if they are correct than aid is incredibly small and the neg will have no ground - adding arms sales affects 450 billion vs. 11 thousand – the former is obviously easier to negate.

#### No limits explosion—they don’t have a caselist and a new 2nr one skews aff strategy—including arms sales doesn’t substantially increase the research burden

## AT: T – Must Spec Aid

### Counter-Interp

#### CI – The aff doesn’t need to specify a type of military aid if the aff specifies Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the aff is disclosed, and willing to specify in CX

#### Prefer it –

#### Predictable Limits – specifying Saudi draws a line on country specific disads, PICs, and generics that allow for the best aff and neg ground – their interp overlimits and makes neg prep ridiculous with no literature basis

### AT: Interp

#### Overview – You need to look me in the eyes and tell me that somehow specifying a kind of military aid makes it easier for them to be negative. Defending all military aid while specing a country gets them better strength of link to their disads while still preserving generic neg ground

#### We meet – the aid our Ward evidence describes is training, advising, coordination, and arms deals.

#### Conditionality –

#### The aff defends military aid in a vaccuum – just read a better link, it’s not the affs responsibility that you need to win the link debate

#### Specificity –

#### CI proves that we specified enough to make neg and aff ground goldilocks

## AT: T – Can’t Be Executive

### Counter-Interp

#### CI – the aff can specify the Executive Branch if there is a solvency advocate that proves its normal means and the aff is disclosed

#### Prefer –

#### Policy Education – learning about intricate processes of policies procedures helps us learn how stuff like this works in the real world – battles between the Executive and Congress happen all the time and this is our argument that the Executive has control

#### Ground – defending normal means opens up the neg to reading actor counterplans and doing the same thing – actor CPs are worse, they steal aff ground and limit the debate down to a miminal net benefit instead of the topic. The aff specifying is better because we still debate about the topic and you get exec disads.

### AT: Interp

#### We meet - your interp doesn’t say that the Exec can’t do it – it just says that the President doesn’t have as much authority as Congress. Our ev says the Exec is what controls the DoD which distributes aid.

#### Predictability – they need a list of ground lost – agenda PTX disads are stale and rely on bad assumptions – debating about the consequences of policy actions instead of generic debates about fights in Congress are better to resolve issues

#### Topic lit – PMCs and ICBMs are not reliant on Congress – just because the Executive does something doesn’t mean it can’t be circumvented – cross apply our Ground offense

#### Semantics – they’re stupid and don’t determine the lit basis – also contradicts your solvency advocate arg under topic lit – jurisdiction doesn’t matter because judges vote on non-t affs all the time

## AT: T – Provide

### AT: Interp

#### We meet – they never asked what the plan text does, the affirmative defends military aid in a vacuum, the plan text says “end” which doesn’t violate, we defend prevention of future military aid

#### Overview– their offense has no impact other than jurisdiction, which isn’t an impact –

#### Judges vote on non-t affs all the time

#### Doesn’t determine in-round abuse – the lit base determines ground, not Jake Nebel

#### The aff is disclosed, the resolution isn’t the only thing we know before the round

### Counter-Interp

#### CI – the aff can defend “ending” military aid to Saudi Arabia and the UAE

#### Prefer it

#### Logic – No brightline to abuse, they allow for ZERO aff ground because we have no idea what won’t be provided in the future, we can only prevent what is being provided now

## AT: T – Regime

#### CI – regimes are defined by Macmillan Dictionary as “a government that controls a country, especially in a strict or unfair way” <https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/regime>

#### Prefer it –

#### Limits – they overlimit the topic – they cause way too many affs that aren’t defined in relationship to countries which allows for infinite affs. Under their interp – the Trump regime aff, MbS aff, and obviously non-T affs like 5 person groups in random countries would be topical which explodes negative prep and makes engagement impossible.

#### Stable Link Ground – no stable definition on how big a “group of people” is makes getting clear links impossible – they can no link if our link is too big and say not substancial enough if our link is too strong.

## AT: Spikes on Top

### Counter-Interp

CI – the aff can put spikes in the bottom of the doc if the underview is just defensive spikes

1. Topic Education – discussing the topic is good – none of the spikes affect your strategy, but instead just encourage substantive education, just don’t read theory on a topical aff

2. Aff flex – the time-crunched 1ar means that minor abuse by the aff is good – even if they win that a few seconds of CX is lost, I’m just equalizing the inherent neg skew in the round.

### AT: Interp

I meet – flip computer upside down

Rearrange the doc – solves all your offense

Separate header of doc solves – clearly delineated – just offense

No abuse – I didn’t mean to read it, I just had extra time

Turn – you incentivize more theory debate, theory debate is bad because it doesn’t spill over, topic ed encourages valuable real world skills, that was the 1ac method page

## AT: Solvency Advocate

### Counter-Interp

#### CI – the aff can have more than one card as solvency advocates if the extra cards describe the implementation of the aff and the aff is disclosed on the wiki

#### Prefer –

#### Real World – not everything magically fits together in one fun document – no policy has been instituted yet so compiling a document together like a policy is best for mimicking policy procedures

#### Ground – more than one solvency advocate increases the probability that there are flaws in the aff

### AT: Interp

#### We meet – the aff has evidence that we should stop giving aid to Saudi Arabia – implementation of the plan is a secondary question that doesn’t disprove there being a lit base

#### Overview – none of their ground arguments are offense, just cut better evidence, just because I cut a good aff doesn’t mean that you have no prep

#### Topic lit – just because we have a piece of evidence about enforcement dosen’t mean that there isn’t lit – empirically disproven by things like Oil, Iran, and Fill In DAs, no warrant as to why actor spec is uniquely bad

#### Resolvability – again, no warrant as to why actor spec is uniquely bad – we still have plenty of evidence that says that the US fueled war in Yemen should be stopped

#### Fiat Abuse – what about fiating an actor is abuse? There is no warrant as to why having a separate card explaining the implementation is bad – nothing about this is stretching the truth, it’s the exact opposite of that

## AT: Open Source Disclosure

### Counter-Interp

#### Counter interp – the aff doesn’t need to open source with highlighting if the aff is full text without highlighting in the downloadable document and first three and last three in the cite box

#### Prefer it –

#### Research – stealing cards is a terrible norm, it teaches students to steal instead of at least recutting them and knowing what the article says – outweighs all your offense, teaching debaters to read from stolen files discourages learning the background of arguments

### AT: Interp

#### Overview – all of their offense is resolved via full text and first three last three, it doesn’t let me hide anything blippy, encourages novices to recut evidence instead of stealing it, and still lets you call me out if my ev is mis-cut because you can see the full text

#### Prefer reasonability with a brightline of link and impact turn ground

#### Don’t vote on theory if you don’t believe that we made this debate IMPOSSIBLE for them, my disclosure practices are fine AND EVEN PEOPLE ON YOUR PREP SQUAD DO THE SAME AND WROTE AN ARTICLE ABOUT IT.

# A2: Disads

## Generic Responses

### Extinction Risk Bad

#### Reject high magnitude framing

#### Any action could cause it—as magnitude reaches the upper ends, even probabilities with minimal risks would be relevant--- that ensures glossing over of systemic violence which naturalizes violence against innocent Yemeni’s

#### Magnitude is systemically overprioritized--- the media actively primes individuals to over assign risk because of the availability heuristic--- you should actively resist the urge to cave to “extinction first” and be willing to overdetermine for probability.

### Thumpers

#### Thumpers!

#### Congress cutting IMET – that happened in early 2019 and nothing happened

#### The House passed the resolution to withdrawal military aid and attempted to in late 2018 – it’s still on the table though because the senate and Trump haven’t done anything

#### We ended refueling which is a part of our tech integration

## Impact Turns

### High Oil Prices Good

#### No negative impact on high prices

Rapier 18 Robert Rapier [Chemical engineer in the energy industry, contributor to Forbes], "Mr. President, High Oil Prices Are Actually Not That Bad For U.S. Anymore," Forbes, 4-20-2018 https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2018/04/20/mr-president-high-oil-prices-are-no-longer-that-bad-for-u-s/

Earlier today, President Trump tweeted: "Looks like OPEC is at it again. With record amounts of Oil all over the place, including the fully loaded ships at sea, Oil prices are artificially Very High! No good and will not be accepted!" The President might need reminding that the top three oil-producing states in the country -- Texas, North Dakota, and Alaska -- all voted for him. Of the Top 25 oil-producing states, only California, New Mexico, Colorado, and Illinois (at No. 16) voted against him. Oil country is Trump country, and I would imagine he will hear from some constituents that they like high oil prices. Rising oil prices have enabled U.S. shale oil production to rebound from the decline it suffered in 2016. Further, it isn't true that there is still record amounts of oil "all over the place." A couple of years ago, global inventories were indeed at record highs. There was also a tremendous amount of oil in floating storage -- the "fully loaded ships at sea." That's no longer the case. The production cuts from OPEC have reduced crude oil inventories back into a normal range. This can be seen in the most recent Oil Market Report from the International Energy Agency: Once upon a time, when the U.S. imported 10 million barrels per day of crude oil, high oil prices were a serious drag on the U.S. economy. But with U.S. net exports plummeting toward zero, this situation is changing. If the U.S. ultimately becomes a net exporter of crude oil and petroleum products, then higher crude oil prices will bring more revenue into the U.S. This is a very different situation from the days when the U.S. was sending record amounts of cash overseas to purchase foreign oil. Yes, there are certain sectors that will be harmed by higher oil prices, but the net impact on the economy should start to improve as U.S. net exports increase. As a result, the notion that high oil prices are necessarily bad for the U.S. should be re-evaluated.

#### Shocks cause a shift to renewables without damaging the world economy

Warner 18 (Warner, Jeremy, award-winning economics expert. “We are heading for a new oil shock – but it will be the last hurrah”. The Telegraph. May 24, 2018. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2018/05/24/price-oil-soaring-rise-renewables-may-last-hurrah/>) BW

**Yet the possibility of Middle Eastern war is already very much in the mix,** and in the event of outright hostilities the price would sky-rocket to $100 and beyond. **Saudi Arabia could theoretically compensate for the loss of Iranian production by boosting its own supply. Yet if the effect of war is to disrupt shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, then it may be in no position to do so.** Besides, Saudi is by no means averse to the current upward trajectory; it needs an $80 plus oil price just to break even fiscally on current expenditures. On the other side of the fence, an economically struggling Russia would also very much welcome a much higher oil price. **Fortunately, the world economy is no longer as sensitive to oil price shocks as it used to be. Oil intensity in the global economy** - the amount of oil needed to produce a single unit of output - **has long been in steep decline,** having fallen by more than a half in advanced economies since the 1960s. What is more, **all those warnings of “peak oil” - the idea that the oil would run out before alternatives are found - have turned out to be so much poppycock. The shale revolution has created an abundance of supply,** such that peak world demand for oil will be reached - probably around fifteen years from now - long before the reserves begin to dwindle. **The rapid advance of renewables makes it highly likely that a large part of these reserves will never be used at all.** Happily, the shale revolution has in any case transformed the world’s largest economy, the US, into a net beneficiary of a high oil price, a complete reversal of the position it has found itself in during previous oil price spikes. **The world over, economies are weaning themselves off oil.** Even so, **oil still has the power to shock.** The macro-economic impact of a rising oil price is both inflationary and deflationary at the same time. It raises general price inflation, and by taking money out of consumers' pockets, depresses wider economic demand. As a general rule of thumb, a 10 percent rise in the oil price knocks around 0.1 percent off global output. It doesn’t sound much, and certainly the price would need to rise a lot to in itself derail the current global recovery. Nonetheless, combined with the knock to confidence from an all embracing Middle East conflict, the effect would be quite bad enough, especially on oil poor regions such as China. **Yet there is also a longer term bonus to be had from higher oil prices, the effect of which is to incentivise the development of alternative sources of energy. These are coming on in leaps and bounds, such that some of them are already cheaper than traditional hydrocarbons. We are at a tipping point, where the march of renewables starts to render older forms of energy production obsolete. Oil producers should enjoy the price spike while it lasts.** They’ve got a few decades left in them yet, but this may be their last hurrah.

#### Renewables prevent extinction

Wood 10, PhD, (Duncan, PoliticalStudies@Queens, https://www.csgwest.org/programs/documents/USMexico\_Cooperation\_Renewable\_Energies.pdf)

It is by now common knowledge that **the world is facing a climate change crisis caused by the effects of fossil fuel driven industrializatio**n. **A significant rise in global temperatures, combined with more severe weather conditions, more frequent floods and droughts**, are bringing a paradigm shift to the way we think about our relationship with the planet. For the first time in over 150 years policy makers are thinking seriously about decreasing dependency on fossil fuels and looking for alternatives that may be more expensive in the short and medium terms, but ultimately more sustainable. 7 All of this has happened at the same time as two other, related phenomena. The first is that the global population is reaching new highs and by 2040‐50 will total over 9 billion people. Experts predict that 85% of the world’s population will be located in the developing world, which will mean a rapidly growing demand for goods and for energy. Both of these factors will result in a **need to increase energy efficiency as well as find new sources of energy**. What’s more, this massive jump in population will coincide not only with climate change but also with increasingly difficult conditions for hydrocarbons exploration and production. **As most of the world’s “easy” oil has already been discovered, oil companies and nation states are turning to alternatives such a non‐conventional oil reserves (tar sands, complex fields) and reserves that in the past would have been considered unrecoverable, such as in very deep ocean waters.** Furthermore, **political conditions in many of the world’s oil rich regions are uncertain, unstable and often unfriendly to private oil companies and to the countries of the West.** Climate change and natural disasters The **urgency of finding alternatives to fossil fuels has been confirmed in recent years by mounting scientific evidence that we are undergoing a noticeable anthropogenic shift in the world’s weather and temperature**. Not only are a **range of indicators showing that the planet is warming, but the retreat of the polar ice caps, the melting of glaciers, and most importantly in the short term extreme weather conditions and increased incidence of natural disasters** have highlighted the consequences of maintaining the status quo in our patterns of energy consumption and industrial development. It is estimated that **we have experienced a 1 degree Celsius rise in global temperatures over the past 100 years and that by the end of the current century global temperatures may have risen by as much 7 or 8 degrees.** Even with the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions that is contemplated by the most ambitious mitigation strategies, **global temperatures may rise by as much as 6%.** This would have a **dramatic and disastrous impact on both developed and developing nations and will threaten the existence of both humans and animal and plant species**. **Though the connection between man‐made greenhouse gases and global warming was denied for many years by industry and governments alike, it has now been accepted that something must be done to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere.** Given that 86% of all global energy comes from fossil fuels, and that these fossil fuels produce 27,000,000,000 tons of CO2 emissions annually**, finding alternative sources of energy is a crucial component of climate change mitigation strategies**

### CO2 Ag

#### Agricultural crises are creating global food shortages – that kills a billion people – increased CO2 is key to solve

Idso’s 11 [Sherwood PhD and former research physicist for the Department of Agriculture, Keith PhD Botany, Craig PhD Geography, 6/6/2011, “Meeting the Food Needs of a Growing World Population”, http://www.co2science.org/articles/V14/N27/EDIT.php] / MM

Parry and Hawkesford (2010) introduce their study of the global problem by noting that "food production needs to increase 50% by 2030 and double by 2050 to meet projected demands," and they note that at the same time the demand for food is increasing, production is progressively being limited by "non-food uses of crops and cropland," such as the production of biofuels, stating that in their homeland of the UK, "by 2015 more than a quarter of wheat grain may be destined for bioenergy production," which surely must strike one as both sad and strange, when they also note that "currently, at least one billion people are chronically malnourished and the situation is deteriorating," with more people "hungrier now than at the start of the millennium." So what to do about it: that is the question the two researchers broach in their review of the sad situation. They begin by describing the all-important process of photosynthesis, by which the earth's plants "convert light energy into chemical energy, which is used in the assimilation of atmospheric CO2 and the formation of sugars that fuel growth and yield," which phenomena make this natural and life-sustaining process, in their words, "a major target for improving crop productivity both via conventional breeding and biotechnology." Next to a plant's need for carbon dioxide comes its need for water, the availability of which, in the words of Parry and Hawkesford, "is the major constraint on world crop productivity." And they state that "since more than 80% of the [world's] available water is used for agricultural production, there is little opportunity to use additional water for crop production, especially because as populations increase, the demand to use water for other activities also increases." Hence, they rightly conclude that "a real and immediate challenge for agriculture is to increase crop production with less available water." Enlarging upon this challenge, they give an example of a *success story*: the Australian wheat variety 'Drysdale', which gained its fame "because it uses water more efficiently." This valued characteristic is achieved "by slightly restricting stomatal aperture and thereby the loss of water from the leaves." They note, however, that this ability "reduces photosynthetic performance slightly under ideal conditions," but they say it enables plants to "have access to water later in the growing season thereby increasing total photosynthesis over the life of the crop." Of course, Drysdale is but one variety of one crop; and the ideal goal would be to get nearly all varieties of all crops to use water more efficiently. And that goal can actually be reached by doing nothing, by merely halting the efforts of radical environmentalists to deny earth's carbon-based life forms -- that's all of us and the rest of the earth's plants and animals -- the extra carbon we and they need to live our lives to the fullest. This is because allowing the air's CO2content to rise in response to the burning of fossil fuels naturally causes the vast majority of earth's plants to progressively reduce the apertures of their stomata and thereby lower the rate at which water escapes through them to the air. And the result is even better than that produced by the breeding of Drysdale, because the extra CO2 in the airmore than overcomes the photosynthetic reduction that results from the partial closure of plant stomatal apertures, allowing even more yield to be produced per unit of water transpired in the process. Yet man can make the situation better still, by breeding and selecting crop varieties that perform better under higher atmospheric CO2 concentrations than the varieties we currently rely upon, or he can employ various technological means of altering them to do so. Truly, we can succeed, even where "the United Nations Millennium Development Goal of substantially reducing the world's hungry by 2015 will not be met," as Parry and Hawkesford accurately inform us. And this truly seems to us the moral thing to do, when "at least one billion people are chronically malnourished and the situation is deteriorating," with more people "hungrier now than at the start of the millennium."

#### Food crises escalate into food wars and regional conflicts **Smith 98** [Paul J., Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Report_Food_Security_98.html>] / MM

Food security and political stability are often inextricably linked in many countries. Historically, significant malnutrition and famine have been caused by the disruption of food supplies through wars and civil strife.[53](http://www.apcss.org/Publications/food-ftnt-46-64.htm)  Yet, the concepts of food security and political stability are often mutually dependent and reinforcing. Food security, for example, can influence the political stability of countries. Simultaneously, political instability (such as wars or other forms of civil strife) can influence food security, as can be seen recently in the case of Indonesia. One seminar participant noted that the greatest risk for regime stability is the risk of urban riots—riots that are sometimes sparked by food shortages or sudden price increases among food products. Generally, starvation in the countryside does not result in political instability. This is because those who experience the brunt of food shortages tend to be rural and have little political voice. A recent example of this phenomenon occurred in India where rising food prices led to urban riots directed at India’s ruling political party—the Bharatiya Janata Party. Similarly, when the price of rice soared in Indonesia, thereby making it prohibitively expensive for a large segment of the population, food riots erupted in eastern Java. The government deployed military forces around markets to prevent looting. Moreover, China’s sharp rejection of the Lester Brown thesis that China needs to import massive amounts of grain from the world market in the coming century was partially rooted in a persistent fear within the Chinese government that food insecurity could potentially provoke widespread anger against the Communist Party and perhaps lead to civil unrest. Thus, the sensitivity that many Asian governments have about food security may be linked to fears of social instability and perhaps even political revolution. Food security thus becomes an issue of regime survival. Another security concern prominent in many Asian capitals is the prospect for increased economic migration as a result of food shortages. Internal migration is the first concern for many governments, especially as internal migration is often a natural "coping response" in times of famine. When North Korea experienced severe floods in September 1995, South Korea responded by creating refugee camps to deal with the possible flood of people who might have fled toward the south. Similarly, Indonesia’s food crisis in 1997 was partly responsible for the outflow of thousands of Indonesian migrants to Malaysia. As the crisis in Indonesia intensified in early 1998, many neighboring countries feared that many more "hungry Indonesians [would] take to boats in search of a better life."[54](http://www.apcss.org/Publications/food-ftnt-46-64.htm)Many countries in East Asia are extremely sensitive and wary about immigration—especially mass migration or illegal migration. The recent surge in labor and economic migration throughout the region has catapulted the immigration issue to the highest levels of government. Immigration disputes, moreover, have broken out between nations—such as the in case of Singapore and the Philippines in 1995—regarding illegal immigration and repatriation policies. Few governments in the region officially desire more immigration. To the extent that food insecurity might spur greater migration, then it may be viewed by many governments in the region as a security concern.

#### Elevated CO2 lets cotton thrive

Kakani et al, 4 – Department of Plant and Soil Sciences, Mississippi State University, Department of Plant and Soil Sciences, Mississippi State University, Department of Plant and Soil Sciences, Mississippi State University, and USDA UV-B Monitoring and Research Program, Natural Resource Ecology Laboratory, Colorado State University, Fort Collins (Vijaya Gopal Kakani, Kambham Raja Reddy, Duli Zhao and Wei Gao, 2004, “Senescence and hyperspectral reflectance of cotton leaves exposed to ultraviolet-B radiation and carbon dioxide”, PHYSIOLOGIA PLANTARUM 121: 250–257. 2004, pubmed.gov | JJ)

Considerable growth and developmental variations occur in plants exposed to UV-B radiation and atmospheric [CO2 ]. Selection of leaves from a plant at different node positions provided us with leaves that differed in age, and the leaves at same node in different treatments enabled us to study the effect of different intensities of UV-B radiation and [CO2 ] on leaves of the same age. In cotton (Gossypium hirsutum L. cv. DES119), Sassenrath-Cole et al. (1996) found that changes in leaf photosynthetic responses to light environment during leaf ageing were solely as a result of physiological changes within the senescing leaf and not the result of photon flux density environment or shading. Decline in photosynthesis and chlorophyll are early symptoms of senescence, with chloroplasts as one of the primary targets for degradation (Thomas and Stoddart 1980, Grove and Mohanty 1992). In cotton, remobilization of leaf N to reproductive organs appears to be the principle component leading to photosynthetic decline (Pettigrew et al. 2000) and the data also suggest that environmental factors can play a role in causing the photosynthetic decline. In our study, atmospheric [CO2 ] did not alter the senescence as indicated by Pn and chlorophyll pigments. Elevated [CO2 ], however, increased Pn by 35% similar to that recorded in earlier studies in well-watered and well fertilized conditions (Reddy et al. 1997, 2000). In this study, at 0 kJ of UV-B and with increase in leafage, a decrease in Pn was recorded with no change in chlorophyll pigments indicating that decline in Pn is a stimulant for leaf senescence in cotton. The photosynthesis activity below a certain threshold level is known to induce leaf senescence (Smart 1994, Dai et al. 1999). Hensel et al. (1993) postulated that a decrease in photosynthesis efficiency reduces sugar levels that may be an early signal for induction of senescence. In the current study, near ambient UV-B radiation (7.7 kJ) reduced the Pn of30day-old leaves by 50% compared with that at 0 kJ UV-B radiation. In detached maize leaves, senescence induced loss of chlorophyll and photosynthesis was significantly enhanced by UV-B radiation (Biswal et al. 1997). Under high UV-B of15.1 kJ, the 12-day-old leaves had Pn on par with the 30-day-old leaves in the control treatment. The 21-day-old leaves exposed to high UV-B were on par with the 30-day-old leaves exposed to ambient and high UV-B, suggesting that these leaves were in a similar senescence phase as a result of their exposure to UV-B radiation. Thus, the UV-B radiation resulted in accelerated leaf ageing.

#### Cotton’s key to the Pakistani economy

Nadeem et al, 10 - Department o f Agronomy, University o f Agriculture, Faisalabad , Pakistan, 1 = University College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences , Islamia University, Bahawalpur , Pakistan (Muhammad Ather Nadeem, Asghar Ali, Muhammad Tahir , Muhammad Naeem 1 , Asim Raza Chadhar and Sagheer Ahmad, 2010, “Effect of Nitrogen Levels and Plant Spacing on Growth and Yield of Cotton”, Pakistan Journal of Life and Social Sciences, Vol. 8 No. 2, <http://www.pjlss.edu.pk/sites/default/files/121-124%20(dr.%20Athar%202).pdf> | JJ)

Cotton (Gossypium hirsutum L.) is considered as mainstay of Pakistan’s economy. It is an important cash crop, major source of foreign exchange and plays an important role in agriculture, industry and economic development of the country. In Pakistan cotton is grown on an area is 3.22 million hectares with total production of 12417 thousand bales and average seed cotton yield of 732 kg ha -1 (Anonymous, 2007). Despite of concerted efforts of breeders and agronomists, yield per unit area is still far below from many other cotton producing countries of the world. Low yield of cotton in Pakistan is attributed to some production as well as economic constraints. Poor quality seed, low seed rate, low plant population, poor management or agronomic practices, conventional sowing methods, imbalanced fertilizer application, weed infestation and insect attack are main causes of its low yield. In cotton plant, spacing has effects on the growth and yield characteristics of the plant. Plant population (density) is very important for attaining optimum crop growth and yield under irrigated conditions. Mostly, farmers maintain plant spacing and density according to their traditional methods of planting rather than variety requirement and hence do not obtain the high crop yield. Hussain et al. (2000) reported that 30 cm spacing between cotton plants increased plant height, number of bolls per plant and boll weight as compared to 10 cm and 20 cm. However, plant spacing did not affect ginning out turn or fiber quality. On the other hand Muhammad et al. (2002) found that boll weight decreased by increasing plant population. The field conditions that produce short stature plants can generally tolerate higher plant density without incurring significant yield reduction (Hake et al., 1991). Adequate plant population facilitates the efficient use of applied fertilizers and irrigation (Abbas, 2000). When density is low, fruiting branches are longer and a greater percentage of bolls are produced on outer position of fruiting branches but first position bolls produced by high density are the biggest and best resulting in high yield. Fruit initiation was influenced by plant density in upland cotton (Buxton et al., 1977).

#### Nuclear War

Guthrie, 2K (Grant, J.D. candidate, 2000, University of California, Hastings College of the Law., Hastings International and Comparative Law Review “Nuclear Testing Rocks the Sub-Continent: Can International Law Halt the Impending Nuclear Conflict Between India and Pakistan?” Spring/Summer 2000, pg lexis wyo-ef)

Nuclear testing creates political instability because it requires a substantial economic investment. One, small fission device typically costs five million U.S. dollars to manufacture. 84 Pakistan's economy is fragile already. 85 Pakistan's total budget for 1996-1997 was $ 12.5 [\*503] billion, out of which 45 percent was spent on debt service and 24 percent on defense. 86 If Pakistan begins increasing its defense budget there will be nothing left for its people. 87 The spending effects of continued nuclear tests might bankrupt the Pakistani economy. One day, the Pakistani government might be forced to sell nuclear fuel, nuclear weapons or nuclear technology to generate capital. Uncontrollable nuclear proliferation could ensue and the world political regime might become destabilized. There are strong political forces contending for control of Pakistan. 88 Pakistan has been ruled on and off by the military for half of its history. 89 In October of 1999, Pakistan's democratically elected government was overthrown and traded for a military regime. 90 If Pakistan's political climate does not eventually stabilize, Pakistan may become divided and compartmentalized, like a warlord-ridden, nuclear Somalia. Each faction would control nuclear weapons and a nuclear civil war could ensue. The world could be at the mercy of a rogue nuclear state. The effect on the world could be incredibly destabilizing.

### Dedev

**Even massive economic decline has zero chance of war**

Robert **Jervis 11**, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, **it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough** to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that **even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited**, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen **such a sharp economic down-turn** without **anyone** suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that **even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict**, **it will not make war thinkable**.

#### Growth causes war

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If this limits-to-growth analysis is at all valid, the implications for the problem of global peace and conflict and security are clear and savage. If we all remain determined to increase our living standards, our level of production and consumption, in a world where resources are already scarce, where only a few have affluent living standards but another 8 billion will be wanting them too, and which we, the rich, are determined to get richer without any limit, then nothing is more guaranteed than that there will be increasing levels of conflict and violence. To put it another way, if we insist on remaining affluent we will need to remain heavily armed. Increased conflict in at least the following categories can be expected. First, the present conflict over resources between the rich elites and the poor majority in the Third World must increase, for example, as ‘development’ under globalisation takes more land, water and forests into export markets. Second, there are conflicts between the Third World and the rich world, the major recent examples being the war between the US and Iraq over control of oil. Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US intervened, accompanied by much high-sounding rhetoric (having found nothing unacceptable about Israel’s invasions of Lebanon or the Indonesian invasion of East Timor). As has often been noted, had Kuwait been one of the world’s leading exporters of broccoli, rather than oil, it is doubtful whether the US would have been so eager to come to its defence. At the time of writing, the US is at war in Central Asia over ‘terrorism’. Few would doubt that a ‘collateral’ outcome will be the establishment of regimes that will give the West access to the oil wealth of Central Asia. Following are some references to the connection many have recognised between rich world affluence and conflict. General M.D. Taylor, US Army retired argued ‘... US military priorities just be shifted towards insuring a steady flow of resources from the Third World’. Taylor referred to ‘… fierce competition among industrial powers for the same raw materials markets sought by the United States’ and ‘… growing hostility displayed by have-not nations towards their affluent counterparts’.62 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product; within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets’.63 ‘That more than half of the people on this planet are poorly nourished while a small percentage live in historically unparalleled luxury is a sure recipe for continued and even escalating international conflict.’64 The oil embargo placed on the US by OPEC in the early 1970s prompted the US to make it clear that it was prepared to go to war in order to secure supplies. ‘President Carter last week issued a clear warning that any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf would lead to war.’ It would ‘… be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States’.65 ‘The US is ready to take military action if Russia threatens vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, the US Secretary of Defence, Mr Brown, said yesterday.’66 Klare’s recent book Resource Wars discusses this theme in detail, stressing the coming significance of water as a source of international conflict. ‘Global demand for many key materials is growing at an unsustainable rate. … the incidence of conflict over vital materials is sure to grow. … The wars of the future will largely be fought over the possession and control of vital economic goods. … resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the global security environment.’67 Much of the rich world’s participation in the conflicts taking place throughout the world is driven by the determination to back a faction that will then look favourably on Western interests. In a report entitled, ‘The rich prize that is Shaba’, Breeze begins, ‘Increasing rivalry over a share-out between France and Belgium of the mineral riches of Shaba Province lies behind the joint Franco– Belgian paratroop airlift to Zaire. … These mineral riches make the province a valuable prize and help explain the West’s extended diplomatic courtship …’68 Then there is potential conflict between the rich nations who are after all the ones most dependent on securing large quantities of resources. ‘The resource and energy intensive modes of production employed in nearly all industries necessitate continuing armed coercion and competition to secure raw materials.’69 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product, within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets …’70 Growth, competition, expansion … and war Finally, at the most abstract level, the struggle for greater wealth and power is central in the literature on the causes of war. ‘… warfare appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the capitalist world economy. … world wars regularly occur during a period of economic expansion. ’71 ‘War is an inevitable result of the struggle between economies for expansion.’72 Choucri and North say their most important finding is that domestic growth is a strong determinant of national expansion and that this results in competition between nations and war.73 The First and Second World Wars can be seen as being largely about imperial grabbing. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. Britain already held much of the world within its empire … which it had previously fought 72 wars to take! ‘Finite resources in a world of expanding populations and increasing per capita demands create a situation ripe for international violence.’74 Ashley focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. ‘War is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources … expansion is a prime source of conflict. So long as the dynamics of differential growth remain unmanaged, it is probable that these long term processes will sooner or later carry major powers into war.’75 Security The point being made can be put in terms of security. One way to seek security is to develop greater capacity to repel attack. In the case of nations this means large expenditure of money, resources and effort on military preparedness. However there is a much better strategy; i.e. to live in ways that do not oblige you to take more than your fair share and therefore that do not give anyone any motive to attack you. Tut! This is not possible unless there is global economic justice. If a few insist on levels of affluence, industrialisation and economic growth that are totally impossible for all to achieve, and which could not be possible if they were taking only their fair share of global resources, then they must remain heavily armed and their security will require readiness to use their arms to defend their unjust privileges. In other words, if we want affluence we must prepare for war. If we insist on continuing to take most of the oil and other resources while many suffer intense deprivation because they cannot get access to them then we must be prepared to maintain the aircraft carriers and rapid deployment forces, and the despotic regimes, without which we cannot secure the oil fields and plantations. Global peace is not possible without global justice, and that is not possible unless rich countries move to ‘The Simpler Way’.

#### Extinction

**Chase-Dunn 96** Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems at the University of (Christopher, Conflict Among Core States: World-System Cycles and Trends, 23 January 1996, http://wsarch.ucr.edu/archive/papers/c-d&hall/warprop.htm)

Note-figure omitted

Late in the K-wave upswing (i.e. in the 2020s), the world-system schema predicts a window of vulnerability to another round of world war. This is when world wars have occurred in the past. Intensified rivalry and competition for raw materials and markets will coincide with a multipolar distribution of military power among core states. The world-system model does not predict who the next hegemon will be. Rather it designates that there will be structural forces in motion that will favor the construction of a new hierarchy. Historical particularities and the unique features of the era will shape the outcome and select the winners and losers. If it were possible for the current system to survive the holocaust of another war among core states, the outcome of the war would be the main arbiter of hegemonic succession. While the hegemonic sequence has been a messy method of selecting global "leadership" in the past, the settlement of hegemonic rivalry by force in the future will be a disaster that our species may not survive. It is my concern about this possible disaster that motivates this effort to understand how the hegemonic sequence has occurred in the past and the factors affecting hegemonic rivalry in the next decades. What are the cyclical processes and secular trends that may affect the probability of future world wars? The world-system model is presented in Figure 1. This model depicts the variables that I contend will be the main influences on the probability of war among core states. The four variables that raise the probability of core war are the Kondratieff cycle, hegemonic decline, population pressure (and resource scarcity) and global inequality. The four variables that reduce the probability of core war are the destructiveness of weaponry, international economic interdependency, international political integration and disarmament. The probability of war may be high without a war occurring, of course. Joshua Goldstein's (1988) study of war severity (battle deaths per year) in wars among the "great powers" demonstrated the existence of a fifty-year cycle of core wars. Goldstein's study shows how this "war wave" tracks rather closely with the Kondratieff long economic cycle over the past 500 years of world-system history. It is the future of this war cycle that I am trying to predict. Factors that Increase the Likelihood of War Among Core States The proposed model divides variables into those that are alleged to increase the probability of war among core states and those that decrease that probability. There are four of each. Kondratieff waves The first variable that has a positive effect on the probability of war among core powers is the Kondratieff wave -- a forty to sixty year cycle of economic growth and stagnation. Goldstein (1988) provides evidence that the most destructive core wars tend to occur late in a Kondratieff A-phase (upswing). Earlier research by Thompson and Zuk (1982) also supports the conclusion that core wars are more likely to begin near the end of an upswing. Boswell and Sweat's (1991) analysis also supports the Goldstein thesis. But several other world-system theorists have argued that core wars occur primarily during K-wave B-phases. This disagreement over timing is related to a disagreement over causation. According to Goldstein states are war machines that always have a desire to utilize military force, but wars are costly and so statesmen tend to refrain from going to war when state revenues are low. On the other hand, statesmen are more likely to engage in warfare when state revenues are high (because the states can then afford the high costs of war). Boswell and Sweat call this the "resource theory of war."

### US Modeling

#### US leadership is dead now --- trying to go back to unipolarity triggers violent conflict, especially under Trump.

Adams 18 Gordon Adams, Gordon Adams is emeritus faculty from American University and a Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center. He oversaw national security budgets in the Clinton White House from 1993-97. “Beyond Hegemony And A Liberal International Order.” May 17, 2018. https://lobelog.com/beyond-hegemony-and-a-liberal-international-order/

America’s place in the world is experiencing an historic turning point. All the mumbo-jumbo about being the “exceptional” and “indispensable” nation, the natural “leader” of something called the “West,” the guarantor of some kind of international system of “rules” is finally being cast into the dustbin of history. This moment is not just about leaving the Iran nuclear agreement, or even the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris climate agreement. It is not simply attributable to the unpredictable, childish impulses of the current president. Nor is it the result of Obama’s failure to enforce a red line in Syria, or “leading from behind” in Libya. It is not even about Bush’s invasion of Iraq with the goal of regime change, setting in motion the destruction of what little political stability existed in the Middle East. Of course, it is about all these decisions. But in every case, those decisions, and even the critics of those decisions, have failed to realize how they have played into, helped cause, and now accelerate a fundamental shift in global realities—the centrifugal redistribution of power and influence in the international system that has brought to an end the “American century.” The United States has become just another power in a system for which it no longer sets or enforces the rules, if it ever really did. Both political parties fail to cope with this reality. Democrats and liberals insist that Trump’s foreign-policy decisions threaten the “rules-based” international order America built and dominated. A simple change in leadership, they believe, can restore order and America’s primacy. Republicans [demand](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/03/24/john-bolton-wants-regime-change-in-iran-and-so-does-the-cult-that-paid-him/?utm_term=.68aa7b4e3cce) bellicose American assertiveness, believing that force and military strength guarantee that the world will behave. Columnists bewail America’s declining status, [arguing](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trump-has-put-america-in-the-worst-of-all-possible-worlds/2018/05/11/ff68940c-5553-11e8-9c91-7dab596e8252_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.76f57dea9018) that greater iinvestment in allies and diplomacy, combined with military engagement might reverse the tide. Think tanks scurry to [define](https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/credibility-matters-strengthening-american-deterrence-in-an-age-of-geopolit) new national security and military policies that can put America back on top. This debate is a circular firing squad. Both liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans are struggling to recreate a myth: that the US dominates the world by dint of power, values, wisdom, even God’s decisions. America, and only America, can bring order and security to the world. Any other option spells chaos. Power Shifts The latest foreign policy whim—withdrawing from the nuclear agreement with Iran—is the most recent nail in the coffin lid in which the myth is buried. Rather than restore leadership, withdrawing from the agreement simply accelerates the global rebalancing already underway, a tectonic shift that began with the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The signs are everywhere. In the Middle East, the power shift is palpable. The United States has treated Iran as a pariah since 1979, trying to stuff the ayatollahs back into some imaginary bottle, hoping that they will go away or be overthrown. This approach has failed, and the withdrawal from the nuclear deal will only make that failure more evident. Iran is a regional power, defending its interests, engaging other powers and movements inside and outside the region, such as Russia. US regime change in Iraq not only destabilized the region but helped usher the Iranians into this active regional role. The other influential countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel, will have to deal with this reality. In addition to these three countries, Russia is also key to regional stability and instability. There’s no way of pushing the Russians out, short of direct conflict. Nor can Turkey be forced to comply with American policy. It is clearly asserting its own interests and influence in three directions at the same time: Central Asia and Russia, Europe, and the Middle East. The invasion of Iraq may have helped open this Pandora’s box. The US is rapidly becoming a marginal player in the chaotic security environment of the Middle East. In Asia, decades of US condemnation and containment of China have failed. How dare China rise? How dare China steal intellectual property, stifle democracy, arm its artificial islands in the South China Sea, develop a powerful military, mess in Africa (complete with a military base in Djibouti), and intrude into Latin America? And yet, to paraphrase Galileo, “they move.” There is a new, global, competitive player in the system, a reality the United States can not contain or reverse. That player is disrupting that lovely system of rules, acting without U.S. permission or approval. It is even creating new international institutions—an infrastructure development bank and a global trading infrastructure programs (the Belt and Road initiative) to which the US is not even a party. The balance has changed, permanently, and the rules are being rewritten, whether the United States likes it or not. At the end of the Cold War, American power surrounded Russia, coopting its former satellites, provoking a Russian reaction. Today, the Russian government is, poisoning its citizens overseas, arming Assad, intruding on elections globally, stifling dissent and killing dissenters, and rebuilding its military. Confront Russia, condemn Putin, pretend that they are isolated, treat them with contempt and moral judgment, but Putin does not go away. He is asserting his view of Russia’s interests and Russia’s role in the world, like any great power is likely to do. No amount of US pressure, sanctions, or policy is likely to change that reality. Russia is consciously and actively rebalancing the United States, with some success. American bullying and presidential rhetoric may have played a role in the apparent, but uncertain, willingness of the North Korean regime to put its nuclear program on the table. But if that program disappears, the putative Nobel Peace Prize may actually belong to President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and even Kim Jong Un, for seizing an opportunity. Even that regional balance and the key players are shifting. Reckoning with the Shift America has not been able to use its dominant military to prevent this evolution or restore order. Where it has been deployed in large numbers—Iraq and Afghanistan—U.S. military force has failed. War grinds on in Afghanistan with no light suddenly appearing at the end of the tunnel, despite the promises of generations of officers. Rousting the Islamic State from Iraq has not solved the internal problems of that unhappy country, which is still recovering from a US occupation. Special Operations forces in dozens of countries whack at terrorist moles only to find others arising in their place, stimulated by the confrontation. Order is not restored; the American rules are not being obeyed. If the US fails to read global rebalancing accurately and tries either to bully the rest of the world or to “restore” the liberal international order, the entire world will find itself at an even more dangerous moment. Bullying will only accelerate the centrifugal trend. Asserting the superiority of an American “order” and American “rules” will no longer persuade other rising powers. The rules will change with the rebalancing. Eliminating the Trump presidency will not restore the previous order. His actions are not an aberration, but an accelerant, spreading the fires that were already under way. The challenge is to completely redesign US foreign and national security policy to fit with a world where America is just another power, competing and cooperating for influence. The United States must learn to play well with others in the global sandbox.

#### Liberal constitutionalism has been a weapon of imperial war for nearly a century. The aff is a failed attempt to reassert a lost ideal of neoliberal internationalism that is fundamentally unsustainable and results in unethical violence.

Bâli & Rana ’18 (Asli, Prof. of Law @ UCLA, Faculty Director, Promise Institute for Human Rights, Director, UCLA Center for Near Eastern Studies, and Aziz, Prof. of Law @ Cornell U., “Constitutionalism and the American Imperial Imagination,” 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 257)

President Donald **Trump's ascendance** to the White House **has been understood as signaling a breakdown in American global leadership.** For some, the last year reflects the end of the American century; for others, the combination of the Trump ad- ministration and Brexit suggests the demise of over two centuries of Anglo-American global leadership. In short, disorienting developments across the Atlantic in the last year have triggered questions about the stability and sustainability of an international order premised on a particular brand of American imperium. We argue that **while the Trump administration has certainly broken with** the **decorum** and diplomacy of past American presidential policies, the unraveling of the international order put in place under American leadership in the postwar period has been more than a quarter century in the making. The postwar order that replaced the age of empires was one that reflected the American constitutional imagination and marked a break from the earlier era of formal colonial dependencies. By contrast with its predecessor, the American-led order, grounded in constitutional principles, had two international components. The first was a commitment to spreading market-based capitalist democracy and its correlate, liberal constitutionalism, through American bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.2 The second was support for a rule-based international order that was understood as an extension of the American constitutional imagination to the challenges of global governance. Indeed, the post-war liberal international regime represented a clear expression of American constitutionalism from the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (tied eventually to an "International Bill of Rights") and the UN Charter (a "constitution" for world order), to the creation of a tight web of interlocking institutions governing everything from international monetary policy and global trade to health, education, and scientific cooperation. As a consequence, the United States served as a global hegemon in a multilateral framework whose legitimacy depended on legality and a kind of international social contract that would command consensual participation from the international community, albeit in a system **that still preserved asymmetric benefits for its author.**3 And during the Cold War, as the self-styled leader of the "free world," America and its commitments to legality and capitalist democracy were contrasted with the authoritarian control economies of the Soviet sphere. In this Essay, we explore the degree to which the version of American empire that characterized the postwar project has given way to competing commitments and preferences that have ultimately eroded basic faith at home and abroad in constitutionalism itself. **The Cold War period was no doubt filled with gross violations of international legality, antidemocratic overthrows, and support for American-aligned dictatorships.** Indeed, in many ways the defining feature of American Cold War power was the degree to which the promotion of liberal constitutionalism in actuality produced coercion and widespread violence on the ground. And as we suggest below, **America's** departures **from its own presumptive constitutional values** were in truth not defections at all. They were instead hard baked into the very structure of how American policymakers attempted to marry universal claims with efforts to project power, often on highly racialized terms. **This means that the vision of American imperium** that marked the Cold War **was always an unstable one, cyclically breaking down under the internal weight of its own inherent contradictions.** But crucially, even in the context of these tensions – such as during the Vietnam War – **the persistent tendency of policymakers was to revive and defend the ideology of American imperium.** **The destructive consequences of US power were justified, time and again, either as aberrations necessitated by the imperatives of anticommunism or** unfortunate transitional developments on the way to full-fledged **liberal democracy.** Perhaps most critically, despite these real and damaging consequences, the requirements of offering a credible alternative to the Soviet example pressed American officials to invest in developmental and reconstructive efforts as well as multilateral institutions that highlighted the compatibility of the American model with foreign prosperity and mutual constraint. In this way, the default American postwar order not only remained wedded to constitutional liberal democracy in its self-presentation. Especially during the heady postwar years of American economic largesse, it also embodied a plausible account both at home and abroad of shared economic and political security.4 These characteristics of the postwar order were further manifest in what Professor Samuel Huntington memorably framed as the "waves of democratization" that spread through the international system.5 The end of World War II was marked by American assistance to help postfascist Western European states resurrect market democracies. Postcolonial independence brought a wave of new states that embraced constitutions-along with flags and anthems-as markers of self-determination.6 Joining international human-rights treaties became a rite of passage as states gained sovereignty and entered the United Nations. In later waves, countries emerging from military rule in Latin America and postcommunist reforms in Eastern Europe appeared to confirm the transnational spread of constitutional democracy as an incident of American-led international order. This meant that for all the profound violence and real democracy demotion of the Cold War years, liberal constitutionalism as a "default design choice"7 did diffuse broadly in the decades following World War II. While this earlier era of democratization depended on many factors, this diffusion was facilitated, on our account, by the background conditions of multilateral order and the presentation of constitutional democracy as the legitimate domestic political order for countries maintaining good standing in the American-led "free world." Although it was viewed as a system without ideological competitors by the end of the Cold War, this seemingly "default" framework nonetheless depended on American commitments that underwrote the postwar international order. While the decline of liberal constitutionalism may be tied to numerous factors, the gradual American retreat from its own international and domestic model has surely played a role. During the Cold War, American leaders commonly regarded the constraints of international institutions as conducive to entrenching the nation's hegemony. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fact of unipolarity seemed to remove many of the external pressures that had previously connected national self-interest to international legal restraint.8 Moreover, in the absence of an alternative model as a foil against which the United States proclaimed its democratic commitments, other strategic priorities gained salience. In particular, counterterrorism and the national security state became increasingly central to American governance imperatives. In the very regions where American analysts awaited the arrival of a "fourth wave" of democracy – notably the Muslim world – these new imperatives not only displaced constitutional priorities but were in many cases in direct tension with them.9 Certainly, during the Cold War there had always been a tension between democratization and anticommunism, leading to the support of pliable dictatorships.o But in the post-World War II years, such support was presented as transitional or as still bound to a narrative of shared economic growth that would in time generate liberal democratic regimes. However, **with the Muslim world styled as an incubator of terrorist threat and a general American retreat from the domestic and international welfarist policies** that marked the early Cold War, **the United States increasingly moved simply to consolidate executive power abroad.**11 This consolidation persisted without any plausible account of political transition or collective economic improvement- and despite half-hearted invocations of "democracy promotion." In essence, the Cold War's coercive security means became increasingly disconnected from any credible aspirational ends. In some ways, **the Trump administration represents the apotheosis of these broad** international and transnational **trends.** **The Cold War era had been marked by a persistent cycle in which American policymakers elaborated a framework of constitutional values and norms only to see those norms break down in political practice.** But the post-Cold War era culminating in Trump has now seemingly ended the cycle. It has produced a final collapse of commitment to the values themselves and, thus, of the basic justifications for American imperium.12 At the domestic level, **the president shows little deference to constitutional norms** at home-decrying judicial independence when it undermines executive fiat's and setting aside long-standing practices in areas ranging from conflict-of-interest rules to the treatment of the White House press corps.14 On the international front, Trump entered office announcing a determination to withdraw from key American commitments in multilateral agreements from NAFTA to the Paris Climate Agreement, proposed to slash funding to the State Department and other domestic agencies with foreign policy or foreign aid responsibilities, called into question the country's commitment to NATO, and evinced a pronounced hostility to the United Nations.15 Trump has also expressed disdain for projects of nation building and promised to cut support for American foreign policy programs designed to advance democracy abroad.16 While Trump's intemperate behavior is clearly unusual, his boastful unilateralism is not. The post-Cold War period, from the Clinton administration through the Obama administration, has more often been characterized by departures from the rule-based order of twentieth-century international institutions than support for them.1 In this sense, events of the last year reflect an accumulating momentum decades in the making rather than the eccentricities of an accidental president. A slow trickle of defections from earlier multilateral commitments by the United States has gathered into a tidal shift, reducing the coherence and stability of liberal constitutional design as a default internationally and transnationally. Thus, to understand the continuities between Trump and earlier administrations requires an appreciation for the complex role liberal constitutionalism and American exceptionalism have played in both creating and undermining an inter- national social contract premised on US hegemony. Over the following pages, we lay out this argument in greater detail, emphasizing how as the domestic creedal commitment tying constitutionalism back to America's founding narrative came under pressure domestically in the post-Cold War era, its imperial correlates-capitalist democratization and a rule- based international ordering principle-began to lose support. We view this as an explanation for the decline in the spread of liberal constitutionalism that is consistent with and indeed underlies other hypotheses in the literature, but one that remains underappreciated. We begin with an analysis of the commitment to con- stitutionalism at the heart of the American century and its rela- tionship to racial and economic policies pursued by American elites. We then trace how the international dimensions of the constitutional project receded with the end of the Cold War by tracking key changes to strategies of democracy promotion and multilateral governance under the Clinton, Bush, and Obama presidencies. **Understanding the diffusion of constitutionalism and rule-based international governance as a means of projecting American power transnationally** (**as a domestic prescription**) **and globally** (**as an ordering principle**) **exposes the degree to which** empire and constitutionalism have been deeply imbricated. By extension, we contend that the decline in constitutionalism represents a crisis in the articulation of American global power in the post-Cold War era in which international order has been reframed around a Global War on Terror.

#### Rebels use terrorism---democracy enables passive support for funding and arms trafficking

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Conclusion

The empirical analysis reveals that democracy influences terrorism through a channel that is yet to be explored. Democracies often find themselves to be ‘‘passive supporters’’ of rebel groups committing acts of terrorism because the liberties and freedoms inherent in democracies create a convenient environment for opportunistic actors to exploit. The empirical findings provide further support for the facilitating effect of democracy on terrorism, yet in a different context and through a previously unexplored causal mechanism. Terrorism is just one of the many tactics employed by rebels that try to achieve concessions from a government; it is most definitely not a tool reserved for only the use of broad transnational networks, such as Al-Qaeda. Examining the interaction between states that are potential supporters and those that are targeted by terrorism improves our understanding of the role of interstate relations in terrorism. The preceding findings reveal the conditions under which potential supporters transform into actual supporters for terrorism and suggest the following:

Democracies are less likely to create direct channels of support for terrorism. This has implications for promoting democracy as a means to fight terrorism in the long run and compliments the work of Abrahms (2007) and Piazza (2007).

Democratic states cannot avoid exploitation by rebel groups because of inherent freedoms and liberties existing in democracies. This holds true even after we control for various other significant factors, such as press freedom, whether a rebel group fights an external adversary and shares some ethnic and religious ties with the majority group in the potential supporter state that may motivate states to support a rebel group.

#### Successful attacks cause retaliation and collapse the economy

Roth and Bunn, 17 - Roth, research associate at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University and research fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland; Bunn, professor of practice at the Harvard Kennedy School (Nickolas Roth and Matthew Bunn, "The effects of a single terrorist nuclear bomb," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 9-28-2017, http://thebulletin.org/effects-single-terrorist-nuclear-bomb11150)

The escalating threats between North Korea and the United States make it easy to forget the “nuclear nightmare,” as former US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry put it, that could result even from the use of just a single terrorist nuclear bomb in the heart of a major city.

At the risk of repeating the vast literature on the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and the substantial literature surrounding nuclear tests and simulations since then—we attempt to spell out here the likely consequences of the explosion of a single terrorist nuclear bomb on a major city, and its subsequent ripple effects on the rest of the planet. Depending on where and when it was detonated, the blast, fire, initial radiation, and long-term radioactive fallout from such a bomb could leave the heart of a major city a smoldering radioactive ruin, killing tens or hundreds of thousands of people and wounding hundreds of thousands more. Vast areas would have to be evacuated and might be uninhabitable for years. Economic, political, and social aftershocks would ripple throughout the world. A single terrorist nuclear bomb would change history. The country attacked—and the world—would never be the same. The idea of terrorists accomplishing such a thing is, unfortunately, not out of the question; it is far easier to make a crude, unsafe, unreliable nuclear explosive that might fit in the back of a truck than it is to make a safe, reliable weapon of known yield that can be delivered by missile or combat aircraft. Numerous government studies have concluded that it is plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude bomb if they got the needed nuclear material. And in the last quarter century, there have been some 20 seizures of stolen, weapons-usable nuclear material, and at least two terrorist groups have made significant efforts to acquire nuclear bombs. Terrorist use of an actual nuclear bomb is a low-probability event—but the immensity of the consequences means that even a small chance is enough to justify an intensive effort to reduce the risk. Fortunately, since the early 1990s, countries around the world have significantly reduced the danger—but it remains very real, and there is more to do to ensure this nightmare never becomes reality. Brighter than a thousand suns. Imagine a crude terrorist nuclear bomb—containing a chunk of highly enriched uranium just under the size of a regulation bowling ball, or a much smaller chunk of plutonium—suddenly detonating inside a delivery van parked in the heart of a major city. Such a terrorist bomb would release as much as 10 kilotons of explosive energy, or the equivalent of 10,000 tons of conventional explosives, a volume of explosives large enough to fill all the cars of a mile-long train. In a millionth of a second, all of that energy would be released inside that small ball of nuclear material, creating temperatures and pressures as high as those at the center of the sun. That furious energy would explode outward, releasing its energy in three main ways: a powerful blast wave; intense heat; and deadly radiation. The ball would expand almost instantly into a fireball the width of four football fields, incinerating essentially everything and everyone within. The heated fireball would rise, sucking in air from below and expanding above, creating the mushroom cloud that has become the symbol of the terror of the nuclear age. The ionized plasma in the fireball would create a localized electromagnetic pulse more powerful than lightning, shorting out communications and electronics nearby—though most would be destroyed by the bomb’s other effects in any case. (Estimates of heat, blast, and radiation effects in this article are drawn primarily from Alex Wellerstein’s “Nukemap,” which itself comes from declassified US government data, such as the 660-page government textbook The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.) At the instant of its detonation, the bomb would also release an intense burst of gamma and neutron radiation which would be lethal for nearly everyone directly exposed within about two-thirds of a mile from the center of the blast. (Those who happened to be shielded by being inside, or having buildings between them and the bomb, would be partly protected—in some cases, reducing their doses by ten times or more.) The nuclear flash from the heat of the fireball would radiate in both visible light and the infrared; it would be “brighter than a thousand suns,” in the words of the title of a book describing the development of nuclear weapons—adapting a phrase from the Hindu epic the Bhagavad-Gita. Anyone who looked directly at the blast would be blinded. The heat from the fireball would ignite fires and horribly burn everyone exposed outside at distances of nearly a mile away. (In the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, visitors gaze in horror at the bones of a human hand embedded in glass melted by the bomb.) No one has burned a city on that scale in the decades since World War II, so it is difficult to predict the full extent of the fire damage that would occur from the explosion of a nuclear bomb in one of today’s cities. Modern glass, steel, and concrete buildings would presumably be less flammable than the wood-and-rice-paper housing of Hiroshima or Nagasaki in the 1940s—but many questions remain, including exactly how thousands of broken gas lines might contribute to fire damage (as they did in Dresden during World War II). On 9/11, the buildings of the World Trade Center proved to be much more vulnerable to fire damage than had been expected. Ultimately, even a crude terrorist nuclear bomb would carry the possibility that the countless fires touched off by the explosion would coalesce into a devastating firestorm, as occurred at Hiroshima. In a firestorm, the rising column of hot air from the massive fire sucks in the air from all around, creating hurricane-force winds; everything flammable and everything alive within the firestorm would be consumed. The fires and the dust from the blast would make it extremely difficult for either rescuers or survivors to see. The explosion would create a powerful blast wave rushing out in every direction. For more than a quarter-mile all around the blast, the pulse of pressure would be over 20 pounds per square inch above atmospheric pressure (known as “overpressure”), destroying or severely damaging even sturdy buildings. The combination of blast, heat, and radiation would kill virtually everyone in this zone. The blast would be accompanied by winds of many hundreds of miles per hour. The damage from the explosion would extend far beyond this inner zone of almost total death. Out to more than half a mile, the blast would be strong enough to collapse most residential buildings and create a serious danger that office buildings would topple over, killing those inside and those in the path of the rubble. (On the other hand, the office towers of a modern city would tend to block the blast wave in some areas, providing partial protection from the blast, as well as from the heat and radiation.) In that zone, almost anything made of wood would be destroyed: Roofs would cave in, windows would shatter, gas lines would rupture. Telephone poles, street lamps, and utility lines would be severely damaged. Many roads would be blocked by mountains of wreckage. In this zone, many people would be killed or injured in building collapses, or trapped under the rubble; many more would be burned, blinded, or injured by flying debris. In many cases, their charred skin would become ragged and fall off in sheets. The effects of the detonation would act in deadly synergy. The smashed materials of buildings broken by the blast would be far easier for the fires to ignite than intact structures. The effects of radiation would make it far more difficult for burned and injured people to recover. The combination of burns, radiation, and physical injuries would cause far more death and suffering than any one of them would alone. The silent killer. The bomb’s immediate effects would be followed by a slow, lingering killer: radioactive fallout. A bomb detonated at ground level would dig a huge crater, hurling tons of earth and debris thousands of feet into the sky. Sucked into the rising fireball, these particles would mix with the radioactive remainders of the bomb, and over the next few hours or days, the debris would rain down for miles downwind. Depending on weather and wind patterns, the fallout could actually be deadlier and make a far larger area unusable than the blast itself. Acute radiation sickness from the initial radiation pulse and the fallout would likely affect tens of thousands of people. Depending on the dose, they might suffer from vomiting, watery diarrhea, fever, sores, loss of hair, and bone marrow depletion. Some would survive; some would die within days; some would take months to die. Cancer rates among the survivors would rise. Women would be more vulnerable than men—children and infants especially so. Much of the radiation from a nuclear blast is short-lived; radiation levels even a few days after the blast would be far below those in the first hours. For those not killed or terribly wounded by the initial explosion, the best advice would be to take shelter in a basement for at least several days. But many would be too terrified to stay. Thousands of panic-stricken people might receive deadly doses of radiation as they fled from their homes. Some of the radiation will be longer-lived; areas most severely affected would have to be abandoned for many years after the attack. The combination of radioactive fallout and the devastation of nearly all life-sustaining infrastructure over a vast area would mean that hundreds of thousands of people would have to evacuate. Ambulances to nowhere. The explosion would also destroy much of the city’s ability to respond. Hospitals would be leveled, doctors and nurses killed and wounded, ambulances destroyed. (In Hiroshima, 42 of 45 hospitals were destroyed or severely damaged, and 270 of 300 doctors were killed.) Resources that survived outside the zone of destruction would be utterly overwhelmed. Hospitals have no ability to cope with tens or hundreds of thousands of terribly burned and injured people all at once; the United States, for example, has 1,760 burn beds in hospitals nationwide, of which a third are available on any given day. And the problem would not be limited to hospitals; firefighters, for example, would have little ability to cope with thousands of fires raging out of control at once. Fire stations and equipment would be destroyed in the affected area, and firemen killed, along with police and other emergency responders. Some of the first responders may become casualties themselves, from radioactive fallout, fire, and collapsing buildings. Over much of the affected area, communications would be destroyed, by both the physical effects and the electromagnetic pulse from the explosion. Better preparation for such a disaster could save thousands of lives—but ultimately, there is no way any city can genuinely be prepared for a catastrophe on such a historic scale, occurring in a flash, with zero warning. Rescue and recovery attempts would be impeded by the destruction of most of the needed personnel and equipment, and by fire, debris, radiation, fear, lack of communications, and the immense scale of the disaster. The US military and the national guard could provide critically important capabilities—but federal plans assume that “no significant federal response” would be available for 24-to-72 hours. Many of those burned and injured would wait in vain for help, food, or water, perhaps for days. The scale of death and suffering. How many would die in such an event, and how many would be terribly wounded, would depend on where and when the bomb was detonated, what the weather conditions were at the time, how successful the response was in helping the wounded survivors, and more. Many estimates of casualties are based on census data, which reflect where people sleep at night; if the attack occurred in the middle of a workday, the numbers of people crowded into the office towers at the heart of many modern cities would be far higher. The daytime population of Manhattan, for example, is roughly twice its nighttime population; in Midtown on a typical workday, there are an estimated 980,000 people per square mile. A 10-kiloton weapon detonated there might well kill half a million people—not counting those who might die of radiation sickness from the fallout. (These effects were analyzed in great detail in the Rand Corporation’s Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack and the British Medical Journal’s “Nuclear terrorism.”) On a typical day, the wind would blow the fallout north, seriously contaminating virtually all of Manhattan above Gramercy Park; people living as far away as Stamford, Connecticut would likely have to evacuate. Seriously injured survivors would greatly outnumber the dead, their suffering magnified by the complete inadequacy of available help. The psychological and social effects—overwhelming sadness, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, myriad forms of anxiety—would be profound and long-lasting. The scenario we have been describing is a groundburst. An airburst—such as might occur, for example, if terrorists put their bomb in a small aircraft they had purchased or rented—would extend the blast and fire effects over a wider area, killing and injuring even larger numbers of people immediately. But an airburst would not have the same lingering effects from fallout as a groundburst, because the rock and dirt would not be sucked up into the fireball and contaminated. The 10-kiloton blast we have been discussing is likely toward the high end of what terrorists could plausibly achieve with a crude, improvised bomb, but even a 1-kiloton blast would be a catastrophic event, having a deadly radius between one-third and one-half that of a 10-kiloton blast. These hundreds of thousands of people would not be mere statistics, but countless individual stories of loss—parents, children, entire families; all religions; rich and poor alike—killed or horribly mutilated. Human suffering and tragedy on this scale does not have to be imagined; it can be remembered through the stories of the survivors of the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only times in history when nuclear weapons have been used intentionally against human beings. The pain and suffering caused by those bombings are almost beyond human comprehension; the eloquent testimony of the Hibakusha—the survivors who passed through the atomic fire—should stand as an eternal reminder of the need to prevent nuclear weapons from ever being used in anger again. Global economic disaster. The economic impact of such an attack would be enormous. The effects would reverberate for so far and so long that they are difficult to estimate in all their complexity. Hundreds of thousands of people would be too injured or sick to work for weeks or months. Hundreds of thousands more would evacuate to locations far from their jobs. Many places of employment would have to be abandoned because of the radioactive fallout. Insurance companies would reel under the losses; but at the same time, many insurance policies exclude the effects of nuclear attacks—an item insurers considered beyond their ability to cover—so the owners of thousands of buildings would not have the insurance payments needed to cover the cost of fixing them, thousands of companies would go bankrupt, and banks would be left holding an immense number of mortgages that would never be repaid. Consumer and investor confidence would likely be dramatically affected, as worried people slowed their spending. Enormous new homeland security and military investments would be very likely. If the bomb had come in a shipping container, the targeted country—and possibly others—might stop all containers from entering until it could devise a system for ensuring they could never again be used for such a purpose, throwing a wrench into the gears of global trade for an extended period. (And this might well occur even if a shipping container had not been the means of delivery.) Even the far smaller 9/11 attacks are estimated to have caused economic aftershocks costing almost $1 trillion even excluding the multi-trillion-dollar costs of the wars that ensued. The cost of a terrorist nuclear attack in a major city would likely be many times higher. The most severe effects would be local, but the effects of trade disruptions, reduced economic activity, and more would reverberate around the world. Consequently, while some countries may feel that nuclear terrorism is only a concern for the countries most likely to be targeted—such as the United States—in reality it is a threat to everyone, everywhere. In 2005, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that these global effects would push “tens of millions of people into dire poverty,” creating “a second death toll throughout the developing world.” One recent estimate suggested that a nuclear attack in an urban area would cause a global recession, cutting global Gross Domestic Product by some two percent, and pushing an additional 30 million people in the developing world into extreme poverty. Desperate dilemmas. In short, an act of nuclear terrorism could rip the heart out of a major city, and cause ripple effects throughout the world. The government of the country attacked would face desperate decisions: How to help the city attacked? How to prevent further attacks? How to respond or retaliate? Terrorists—either those who committed the attack or others—would probably claim they had more bombs already hidden in other cities (whether they did or not), and threaten to detonate them unless their demands were met. The fear that this might be true could lead people to flee major cities in a large-scale, uncontrolled evacuation. There is very little ability to support the population of major cities in the surrounding countryside. The potential for widespread havoc and economic chaos is very real. If the detonation took place in the capital of the nation attacked, much of the government might be destroyed. A bomb in Washington, D.C., for example, might kill the President, the Vice President, and many of the members of Congress and the Supreme Court. (Having some plausible national leader survive is a key reason why one cabinet member is always elsewhere on the night of the State of the Union address.) Elaborate, classified plans for “continuity of government” have already been drawn up in a number of countries, but the potential for chaos and confusion—if almost all of a country’s top leaders were killed—would still be enormous. Who, for example, could address the public on what the government would do, and what the public should do, to respond? Could anyone honestly assure the public there would be no further attacks? If they did, who would believe them? In the United States, given the practical impossibility of passing major legislation with Congress in ruins and most of its members dead or seriously injured, some have argued for passing legislation in advance giving the government emergency powers to act—and creating procedures, for example, for legitimately replacing most of the House of Representatives. But to date, no such legislative preparations have been made. In what would inevitably be a desperate effort to prevent further attacks, traditional standards of civil liberties might be jettisoned, at least for a time—particularly when people realized that the fuel for the bomb that had done such damage would easily have fit in a suitcase. Old rules limiting search and surveillance could be among the first to go. The government might well impose martial law as it sought to control the situation, hunt for the perpetrators, and find any additional weapons or nuclear materials they might have. Even the far smaller attacks of 9/11 saw the US government authorizing torture of prisoners and mass electronic surveillance. And what standards of international order and law would still hold sway? The country attacked might well lash out militarily at whatever countries it thought might bear a portion of responsibility. (A terrifying description of the kinds of discussions that might occur appeared in Brian Jenkins’ book, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?) With the nuclear threshold already crossed in this scenario—at least by terrorists—it is conceivable that some of the resulting conflicts might escalate to nuclear use. International politics could become more brutish and violent, with powerful states taking unilateral action, by force if necessary, in an effort to ensure their security. After 9/11, the United States led the invasions of two sovereign nations, in wars that have since cost hundreds of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars, while plunging a region into chaos. Would the reaction after a far more devastating nuclear attack be any less?

#### American-grown democracies in the Middle East fuel terrorism

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Will promoting democracy in the Middle East reduce terrorism, both within Middle-Eastern countries and among countries that are potential targets of Middle Eastern–based terrorist groups? The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania have led to a dramatic re-orientation of United States foreign policy toward the Middle East. Predicated on the hypothesis—now the dominant foreign policy paradigm within the Bush administration—that terrorism is a product of nondemocratic governance, a new idealistic interventionism has replaced the legacy of Cold War realism, culminating in the 2003 invasion of Iraq for the purposes of “draining the swamp”; that is to say removing the conditions that foster terrorism, namely dictatorship. How might promotion of democracy and civil freedoms in the Middle East reduce terrorism? Proponents of democracy promotion view the climate of “unfreedom” that pervades most Middle-Eastern countries as a dangerous precipitant to extremist thought and behavior that results in terrorist activity.1 The repression, violence, and systematic humiliation used by Middle Eastern regimes like Iraq or Syria as tools of popular control foster public rage and increase the appeal of fanaticism. In the absence of a free press or freedom of public expression, proponents of democracy promotion argued, an “epistemological retardation” pervades political discourse fostering a mood of paranoia and giving credence to conspiracy stories in which the United States and its allies, namely Israel, are perpetual villains. Also, in these nondemocracies, public grievances are not addressed and are allowed to fester, providing extremist groups with material for propaganda, facilitating their recruiting efforts and legitimizing their acts of political violence. Finally, the nature of nondemocratic regimes retards the public virtues of political moderation and compromise, which are necessary ingredients of nonviolent political expression (Muravchik 2001). Jennifer L. Windsor, executive director of the Washington, D.C.–based nonprofit Freedom House, articulates a similar vision of the relationship between democratic governance and the reduction of terrorism in the Middle East: The underlying logic is that democratic institutions and procedures, by enabling the peaceful reconciliation of grievances and providing channels of participation in policymaking, can help to address those underlying conditions that have fueled the rise of Islamist Extremism. ... More specifically, promoting democratization in the closed societies of the Middle East can provide a set of values and ideas that offer a powerful alternative to the kind of extremism that today has found expression in terrorist activity, often against U.S. interests. (Windsor 2003, 43) Democracy, Civil Liberties, and Terrorism: Political Access versus Strategic Targeting By and large, scholarly research on the relationship between terrorism, dictatorship, and democracy does not lend empirical support to the argument that there is a linear relationship between democratic governance or protection of civil liberties and the incidence of terrorism. Traditionally, scholars have proposed the opposite: that democracies are more conducive to terrorist activity than are dictatorships (Schmid 1992; Charters 1994; Eubank and Weinerg 1994, 1998 and 2001). Other research indicates that the relationship between democracy and terrorism is either mixed and qualified (Li 2005) or nonlinear (Eyerman 1998). Recent research by Li (2005) finds that although “democratic participation” is a negative predictor of the incidence of international terrorism within a country, “government constraints” in the form of institutional limitations to executive power found in most democracies increases terrorism in countries. Li further illustrates that various electoral institutions within democracies—for example, proportional verses “first-past-the-post” systems—are also positive and negative predictors of the incidence of terrorism. In his seminal study Eyerman (1998), using the assumption that terrorist groups, like all political groups, seek to maximize their rational utility and weigh the costs against the benefits associated with each terrorist act, observes that there are two theoretical schools of thought regarding the relationship between democracy and terrorism. The first, termed the “political access” school, holds that by providing multiple avenues by which actors can advance their political agendas, democracies increase the utility of legal political activity for all political actors, including terrorists. Within democracies there is more political space available than in dictatorships, so there is room “within the system” for actors who subscribe to anti-status quo or non-mainstream opinions. It is important to note that the access school is a “political actor-focused” conceptual framework, meaning that it argues that democracy provides greater opportunities for terrorists to join mainstream politics. This is in contrast to “consumer-focused” conceptions that argue that democracy makes extremists who may engage in terrorism less appealing to the public. One would therefore expect democracies to have fewer terrorist attacks, as would-be terrorists merely pursue legitimate political activities to achieve their goals (Crenshaw 1990; Denardo 1985). The second, termed the “strategic school,” maintains that democracies are more tempting targets for terrorism than are dictatorships because their respect for civil liberties constrain them from more effective antiterrorism efforts such as surveillance, control over movement and personal ownership of weapons, associational life, and media. These same restrictions of executive and police power that are features of democracy also make democratic countries good hosts for terrorist groups. Moreover, the legitimacy of democratic government rests ultimately on the public’s perception of how well it can protect it citizens, and in a democracy citizens can punish elected officials at the ballot box for failure to protect the public. This quality of public responsiveness makes democracies more willing to negotiate with terrorists, thus increasing the potential benefits reaped for extremist groups by terrorist action (Charters 1994; Schmid 1993; Eubank and Weinberg 1992). Eyerman (1998) and a new generation of scholars find empirical support for both the access and strategic schools. In his own study, Eyerman found that although democracies overall did exhibit fewer terrorist acts, “new” democracies were more prone to terrorism. New democracies possess all of the liabilities inherent in democracies in general, making them tempting targets for terrorists as expected by the strategic school, but they are not as able as established democracies to provide to terrorists benefits that consistently outweigh the costs of engaging in political violence as opposed to legal political action because they lack strong and durable political institutions. Similar results are found by Abadie (2004) and Iqbal and Zorn (2003), that nonconsolidated democracies are more likely to exhibit terrorism and political violence, and are consistent with earlier empirical work by Gurr (2000, 1993), which finds that democratization itself can promote political violence because powerful actors may seek to preserve their authority in the midst of uncertainty fostered by the democratic process. The findings produced in these studies linking new democracies to terrorism, however, are limited by several design and theoretical qualities. First, with the exception of Li (2005), they employ rather limited time-frames—most are confined to one or two decades of events or less—and therefore might be distorted by medium-term episodic rises or falls in general levels of political violence. This is a limitation given that some scholarship has indicated terrorism occurs in waves that coincide with longer-term changes in global political and economic trends (Bergensen and Lizardo 2004). The exception is Iqbal and Zorn (2003), but their study is limited only to examination of predictors of assassinations of heads of state from 1946 to 2000 rather than general incidents of terrorism. Second, all but one of the studies (Abadie 2004) considers only international terrorist acts, where the perpetrators and the victims or targets are of different nationalities, rather than both domestic and international incidents, and all of the studies code their dependent variable (terrorism) based on the country where the incident took place. These design features not only eliminate a rather large number of events from the studies, but also severely impair any examination of both the access school and the neoconservative hypothesis on the causes of terrorism. In the post-911 context, in which policymakers speculate that political conditions, namely the lack of democracy, in the “home” countries of the terrorist perpetrators themselves (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates) are important causes for attacks, it seems particularly important to be able to consider the regime typology of the country from which the perpetrators are based and to consider all manifestations of terrorism, including the most common manifestation: domestic terrorism. Finally, with the exception of Iqbal and Zorn (2003) who include a variable for civil wars, none of the studies control for domestic political instability. The shift in Washington toward democratic state-building as a means to reduce terrorism has been accompanied by a much less pronounced discussion among foreign policymakers about the appropriate timeframe for the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq. Within this discussion lies the question of whether or not Iraq is becoming a “failed state:” a society experiencing severe political instability in which the state is unable to provide basic “political goods” to its citizens such as personal security. This raises a second foreign policy conventional wisdom, though one that is much less vociferously articulated by the Bush administration, that failed states like Colombia, Somalia, or Indonesia (or potentially Iraq) are incubators for terrorist groups and terrorist activity (Campbell and Flourney 2001). U.S. Republican U.S. Senator Chuck Hagel explains that these types of states pose the most severe threat to U.S. security at home and abroad because, “Terrorism finds sanctuary in failed or failing states...” (Hagel 2004, 65), Terrorism and State Failure There is a small body of literature on the relationship between failed states and terrorism, but it is theoretical or qualitative case study–oriented rather than empirical (Rotberg 2002, 2003; Kahler 2002; Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002). The relationship has two mutually reinforcing features: (1) state failure helps to create the conditions that create terrorists and (2) failed states provide crucial opportunities for already existing terrorist groups. First, by failing to provide for basic human needs and lacking functioning governing institutions, failed states cannot adequately manage conflicts in society or provide citizens with essential public goods such as security, education, or economic opportunity. This damages the legitimacy of the state and of mainstream, legal political behavior, thus propelling individuals into extralegal action such as terrorism. Failed states are also characterized by predatory political elites that prey on citizens and damage the government’s ability to manage social strife. The result is that significant proportions of the population reject the authority of the central government, providing a wider recruiting pool for terrorist groups and a citizenry that will tolerate, if not aid, them. Second, state failure erodes the ability of national governments to project power internally, creating a political space for non-state actors like terrorist groups, and creates the conditions under which state agents may provide organizational and financial assets to terrorists. Terrorists can rely on large amounts of territory to base operations such as training, communications, arms storage, and revenue generating activities that go beyond the much more limited network of safe houses they are limited to constructing in countries with stronger states. Frequently, political elites within failed states are willing to tolerate the presence of large-scale terrorist operations within national borders in exchange for material compensation, political support or terrorist services during times of political turmoil. Failed states lack adequate or consistent law-enforcement capabilities, thus permitting terrorist organizations to develop extra-legal fundraising activities such as smuggling or drug trafficking. However, failed states are recognized nation-states within the world community and therefore retain “the outward signs of sovereignty” (Tadekh and Gvosdev 2002, 100), thus providing terrorist groups with the necessary legal documentation, such as passports or end user certificates for arms acquisition, and protection from external policing efforts. The Middle East Although the Middle East is the primary laboratory for testing the utility of democracy promotion as anti-terrorism policy—exemplified by the 2003 war and occupation in Iraq and ruminations of the use of military force against Syria and Iran—the states of the Middle East provide a useful universe to empirically test the relationship between (lack of) democracy, civil liberties, state failure, and terrorism. Table 1 illustrates that the states of the Middle East afford researchers with a large number of illiberal political regimes as well as significant numbers of states that have experienced state failures, making the region central to the discussion of regime type and political stability as determinants of terrorism. The Middle East is arguably the least democratic region of the world. Freedom House notes that in 2003, only 5.6 percent of Middle Eastern and North African states could be considered “free” in terms of political rights or civil liberties, placing it behind every other developing world area including Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the Middle East is “bucking the trend” of democratization in the world. The “Freedom in the World 2004” report issued by Freedom House notes that while every other region has increased the number of states considered to be free—the so-called Third Wave of democratization—the Middle East has actually seen a reduction in the number of free states since the mid-1990s. Only two democracies exist in the Middle East: Israel and Turkey. While the former, Israel, guarantees democratic freedoms only for Israeli citizens, who are roughly 65 percent of the population of the total territory Israel administers, the latter, Turkey, is an incomplete and unconsolidated democracy where elected civilian government is regularly punctuated by military rule. A second strata of states—Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, and Kuwait—are all nondemocracies, but have at times experimented with limited political and civil liberalization. The remaining states are solid dictatorships, one group of which—Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen—are bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes characterized by one-party rule and personalistic dictators and another group—Bahrain, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—are autocratic monarchies. Next to Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East is the region exhibiting the largest percentage of states that suffer from state failures from 1998 to 2003, although all of the regions of the world dominated by developing or transitional states besides Latin America have relatively high levels of state failure. What makes the Middle East unique, and what is not captured by the figures in Table 1, is the intense and chronic nature of state failure exhibited in some states in the region. Several states—Lebanon from 1975 to 1991; Israel from 1987 to 2004; Iraq from 1980 to 1998; and Turkey from 1984 to 2000—have experienced prolonged periods of armed ethnic conflict, civil war, and widespread political insurgency. Others suffer from prolonged but low-grade insurgencies such as the Saharawi insurrection in Morocco 1975 to 1989 or the Dhofar tribal insurgency in Oman from 1970 to 1976, or from short but intense bouts of large-scale conflict such as the Syrian confrontation with Islamist guerrillas in 1982 or the suppression of a separatist insurgency by Yemen in 1993. Like many African states, Middle Eastern states suffer from what Kahler (2002) refers to as “stateless areas,” a condition linked to the incubation of terrorism where the central government is unable to project its power in substantial regions of the country controlled by insurgents or regional actors. A report on terrorism in Yemen by the International Crisis Group faults the weakness of Yemeni political institutions, poverty and the inability of the state to extend its authority to more remote tribal regions as precipitants of domestic terrorism (International Crisis Group 2003). Kahler does allow for a non-spatial variant of the stateless area condition in the case of Saudi Arabia, arguing that the Saudi government was not able to penetrate powerful civil society and parastatal institutions, namely Muslim charities, that provide material sustenance to groups like Al Qaeda. Lebanon from 1975 to 1982 (and possibly later) also fits the bill as failed state suffering from stateless areas, which permitted the Palestine Liberation Organization to base its operations in Beirut and Southern Lebanon. Analysis This study seeks to add to the discussion of dictatorship and state failures as root causes of terrorism by conducting a cross-national, pooled, time-series statistical regression analysis on the incidence of terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern states from 1972 to 2003. The analysis is limited to the Middle East, specifically the cases of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel–Palestine, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, in order test the contention that democracy is a panacea for terrorism in the region of the world that U.S. foreign policymakers have chosen as their laboratory for their counterterrorism policy model and to also provide an empirical base to the largely descriptive and theoretical body of scholarship on terrorism produced by Middle Easternists2 (see, for example, Zunes 2003; Khashan 1997; Lewis 1987; Martin 1987; Amos 1985). There are three hypotheses tested in the analysis, using 16 negative binomial regression models on a total of 493 observations: Hypothesis 1: Democratic governance and state protection of civil liberties in the Middle East are negatively related to the incidence of terrorism. Hypothesis 2: Democratic governance and state protection of civil liberties in the Middle East are positively related to the incidence of terrorism. Hypothesis 1 captures the expectations of the political access school of thought regarding terrorism where one would expect more politically liberal states to be equipped to integrate the political expectations of would-be terrorists into a legal rather than extra-legal framework. The result would be fewer terrorist attacks both at home and abroad. Hypothesis 2 captures the expectations of the strategic school of thought, which argues that democracies are both particularly vulnerable to attack from domestic and or international terrorists and may find themselves hosts to terrorist groups because their antiterrorism policies are constricted by the rights protections inherent in all democratic societies. The states of the Middle East also provide a wide range of state failures to examine as predictors of terrorist activity. Controlling for democratic governance and other socioeconomic variables, a third hypothesis is also studied: Hypothesis 3: State failures, measured in the aggregate, are positively related to the incidence of domestic and international terrorism in the cases examined. Because of the nature of the dependent variable in the study, a Poisson distribution is more appropriate that an ordinary least squares (OLS) statistical regression model to analyze the data. The study seeks to explain change or variation in the incidence (frequency) of terrorist incidents, sorted by country targeted by the attacks and the country that is the “host” of the group launching the attacks. Terrorist attacks are sporadic and concentrated in certain countries or at certain time periods, and therefore from a quantitative perspective cannot be expected to be conform to a normal distribution. Also, an event count of terrorist incidents cannot produce negative count data for any given observation; the lowest value of any observation is a zero, indicating that no terrorist attacks have occurred in that country in that year. Both of these qualities violate basic assumptions of OLS regression analysis and recommend a Poisson distribution instead. Furthermore, given that the individual event counts used in the study are not theoretically independent of each other—a country may very well experience a rash of attacks spread out across multiple years by the same terrorist group—a negative binomial Poisson distribution is most appropriate. It produces the same mean as a basic Poisson distribution, but is better suited to data exhibiting a wider variance, thus reducing standard errors and netting less biased estimators (Brandt et al. 2000; Cameron and Trivedi 1998; King 1989). In the study the state of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories are operationalized as one aggregated case, though this may be a controversial methodological decision. There are two justifications for aggregating these two entities into one case: First and foremost, the two entities are highly interconnected in terms of political, economic, and social life. The political conflict that produces terrorism within both of the entities was produced by the political conflict originating in the 1967 occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem by Israeli forces that continues to this day. Moreover, nationals of both political entities reside throughout Israel proper and the occupied territories, and until recently, Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank regularly commuted into Israel for employment. Second, the state of Israel has effectively controlled public policy within the occupied territories since 1967, and this has meant that the Israeli government has helped to determine the shape of political and economic development both for Jewish residents of Israeli proper and Palestinians living in the territories. This poses a simple methodological problem: there is no independent government, or economy, on which to base measurements of variables for the Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank. Although a semi-independent Palestinian National Authority was created in 1994, it still lacks sovereignty, the quintessential quality of all nation-states. To remedy this, all variables for the case Israel–Palestine are operationalized as indexes of population-weighted averages that include the State of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, producing aggregate measures of the regime type, economy, and demographic structure of the populations of both entities. However, this methodological decision could potentially bias the study and is vulnerable to charges of subjectivity on the part of the researcher. Therefore, a separate set of statistical models are run that exclude Israel–Palestine as a case to determine the dependence of models on the total 19 cases on inclusion of Israel–Palestine. The source for yearly terrorist incidents by case—the unit of analysis for the study—is the data collected by the Rand Corporation and collated by the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, which operationally defines terrorism as: ...violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be violation of the rules of war if a state of war existed. This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists often claim credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage of the cause, having long-term psychological repercussions on a particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists may be intended to cause people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the importance of the cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance with their demands.3 To fully test the two hypotheses, especially in order to examine both the access and strategic schools, and to make appropriate use of the MIPT data, terrorism is operationalized as four dependent variables which are run in separate models: (1) international terrorist incidents sorted by the country targeted from 1972 to 1997; (2) international and domestic terrorist incidents sorted by the country targeted from 1998 to 2003; (3) terrorist incidents sorted by country or countries that serve as the base for terrorist attacks abroad from 1972 to 1997; (4) terrorist incidents sorted by country or countries that serve as the base for terrorist attacks both domestically and abroad from 1998 to 2003. The first distinction, between international and international and domestic incidents, is one driven by the data available from MIPT. Although it is methodological desirable to consider both domestic and international attacks combined—incidents committed where the perpetrator and the target or victim may or may not be nationals of the same country—for the entire time-series, aggregation of incidents in this way is only available post 1998.4 Prior to 1998, data is only available for international incidents. Terrorists incidents are also sorted both by “target,” the country and year within the time-series in which the terrorist act occurred, and by “source,” the country or countries per year that serve as bases of operation for terrorist groups that engage in operations, as defined by the MIPT database of terrorist organizations. Targeted countries and source countries are analyzed in separate dependent variables. Examining both states targeted by terrorism and states that are sources for terrorist groups facilitates a more confident evaluation of both the access and strategic schools as well as the role played by state failures because it paints a complete picture of the domestic vulnerability of the state to terrorist attacks and the domestic political conditions that may breed terrorists. The analysis contains no incidents that occurred across two different countries, thereby yielding two target countries. However, as is often the case, terrorist groups base their operations in more than one state. For the analysis, each state that is the host of the terrorist group perpetrating the act in question is allocated an equal count of the event. As an example, because the Black September Organization, a Palestinian militant group active in the 1970s and 1980s, is listed by MIPT as having bases of operation in Jordan, Lebanon, and in the Palestinian Occupied Territories during its active period, a terrorist act committed by Black September in a given year will be recorded as one incident for Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel–Palestine. This is an imperfect methodology because it equally weights three states as sources for terrorism though in reality the “stateless area” afforded Black September by civil-war wracked Lebanon in the 1980s or the lack of political freedom that plagues Palestinians living in Jordan or the limitations to counterterrorism efforts placed on the Israeli state by its democratic process and legal institutions might play a disproportionate role in fueling terrorist incidents. However, data do not permit fine-tuning of this nature and this is the least-subjective method of distribution of acts by source country. Table 2 lists all variables used in the models as well as their operationalization. To test the hypotheses, three independent variables are used: one that measures the degree of democratic governance in each case per year, “Democracy (Polity IV)”; another that measures the degree of civil liberties protections in each case per year, “FH Civil Liberties”; and the other measures the presence and intensity of state failures in each case per year, “State Failures.” The first independent variable is operationalized as the yearly “POLITY” measurement from the Polity IV database. This measurement is an index ranging from -10, signifying a complete autocracy, to 10, signifying a complete democracy. The expectation, given the two-tailed nature of the first hypothesis, is that Democracy (Polity IV) will either be a positive or negative predictor of the incidents in terrorism, measured all four ways in the statistical models. The second independent variable is operationalized as annual index of civil liberties protections coded by the independent nongovernmental agency Freedom House in its annual publication “Freedom in the World.” The Freedom House civil liberties index is an ordinal measure between “1,” which would indicate a status of the highest protection of civil liberties such as freedom of speech, conscience or association, and “7,” which would indicate a status of the lowest protection of aforementioned rights. As with Democracy (Polity IV), the expectation given the two-tailed nature of the first hypothesis is that FH Civil Liberties will either be a positive or negative predictor of the incidents in terrorism, measured all four ways in the statistical models. The third independent variable is operationalized as a measure of aggregate state failures suffered by a given case in a given year. All data for state failures is taken from the State Failure Task Force database, collected by researchers associated with the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland. The CIDCM State Failure Task Force defines state failures as episodes of extreme political instability that test the ability of the state to preserve order and identifies four major types of state failure: ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, genocides and politicides, and adverse regime changes. The variable “State Failures” in this analysis is an additive index ranging from 0 to 16 of the intensity levels of all four types of state failure, which themselves are coded by the State Failure Task Force as measures of intensity where 0 indicates no state failures and 4 indicates highly intense manifestations of state failures. The expectation is that State Failures will be a positive predictor of the incidence of terrorism across all of the models. The models control for several socioeconomic features. The first is “Area,” or the total surface area contained within the recognized boundaries of each state, and the second is “Population,” or the yearly total population count in millions. Eyerman (1998) notes that geographically large countries have higher policing costs and are therefore more susceptible to terrorist attacks. Likewise, populous countries also raise the costs associated with counterterrorism efforts as terrorist groups can more easily obscure their activities and escape detection. Gross domestic product (“GDP”), measured yearly in millions of $U.S., is a control used by Abadie (2004) and Eyerman (1998) in their respective studies and measures the total resources available to enhance state policing and or repressive measures. It is something of a conventional wisdom that poverty and poor economic development are root causes of terrorism, although this has not been validated by a slate of recent empirical studies (Piazza 2006; Abadie 2004; Krueger and Maleckova 2003), though Li and Schaub (2004) in their statistical study of 112 countries from 1975 to 1997 did find that a country’s GDP was a negative predictor of terrorism, positioning level of economic development as an interaction variable linking international economic openness to lower levels of terrorism. It is nonetheless considered as a control and is expected to be a negative predictor of terrorism across the models, if significant at all. Finally, a variable measuring the total years that the current political regime has been in place in each observation, labeled “Regime Durability,” is also included in the analysis. Regime Durability is operationalized by inserting the value for “Durable” coded in the Polity IV dataset. It is expected that more durable regimes are less likely to experience terrorism. (Li 2005) Sixteen statistical models are run in all. The nucleus of the analysis is contained in models 1 through 8 to accommodate four dependent variables—the two measures of terrorist incidents, international and international and domestic attacks, each of which is sorted into attacks by target and attacks by source—and to accommodate two independent variables—both Democracy (Polity IV) and FH Civil Liberties—which are run in separate models. Furthermore, models 1 through 8 are run yet again omitting Israel–Palestine as a case as models 9 through 16 to control for the outlier effect that those observations may contain. Finally, two features are added to the models to correct for autocorrelation and multicollinearity errors. A 1-year lagged dependent variable [B1Incidents(t-1)j] is inserted after the intercept, as is appropriate in time-series multiple regression analysis, and a collinearity test is run on all of the independent variables. Results Table 3 presents the results of the first four models, which examine the effects of the independent variables on the incidence of terrorism by target country in the Middle East The results of models 1 through 4 lend partial support to the strategic school, rather than the political access school, as it applies to Middle Eastern states. In Models 1 and 3, which examine international terrorist attacks only, specifically where the perpetrator and the target or victim are of different national origins, Democracy (Polity IV) is a positive predictor of terrorism whereas FH Civil Liberties is a negative predictor. This suggests that terrorism is more likely to occur in Middle-Eastern states that are political democracies and that protect civil liberties. (Note that the operationalization of FH Civil Liberties is inverted—regimes that protect civil liberties are scored low on the scale—so results are interpreted using the opposite sign of results for Democracy [Polity IV]). However, when terrorism is measured as both domestic and international attacks by target, neither Democracy (Polity IV) nor FH Civil Liberties are signfiicant. This is an interesting result because the two measurements of terrorism are logically and quantitatively—there are more total attacks coded per year when using the international and domestic aggregation—different. However, it is also possible that the different results found in models 1 and 3 and models 2 and 4 are due to the very different time-series used: the 26-year series (1972 to 1997) for international only verses the six year series (1998 to 2003) for the international combined with domestic. A more comparable span of data would be desirable, although presently unobtainable. However, across three of the first four models, State Failures is a strong, significant, and positive predictor of terrorism, regardless of how terrorism is measured. This suggests that Middle-Eastern states that suffer from state failures are more likely to both host groups that will commit terrorist acts at home and abroad and are also more likely to be the target of terrorist groups from other states. Moreover, in three of the four models, the coefficient for State Failures is the largest in the model, and the coefficients are significant at the highest (.000) level. Few of the control variables are significant across models 1–4, and there are two surprising results. Population is a significant predictor in models 1 and 3, as expected, but GDP is a significant positive predictor of terrorism in models 2 and 4 whereas Regime Durability is a significant negative predictor in model 2. The results for GDP and Regime Durability run counter to expectations, but it is telling that these counterintuitive results occur in the models with the shorter time series, as previously found. Table 4 presents the results of models 5 through 8, in which the dependent variable, terrorism, is sorted by source country among Middle-Eastern states. As in models 1 through 4, models 5 through 8 provide partial vindication for the strategic school at the expense of the political access school but leave some nagging questions. In Table 4, Democracy (Polity IV) is a consistent, significant positive predictor of terrorist attacks; however, FH Civil Liberties is not. That is to say that more politically liberal regimes in the Middle East, as measured by Polity IV, are more prone to harbor terrorist groups that commit terrorist acts either at home or abroad than are politically illiberal regimes. However, Middle-Eastern states that respect civil liberties—the very same freedoms that pose barriers to state actors who may seek to apprehend terrorists or quash terrorist networks—are no more likely than Middle-Eastern states with poor civil liberties protections to host terrorist groups. This is difficult to reconcile within the confines of the strategic school and either prompts a consideration of Middle-Eastern exceptionalism or a re-conceptualization of the relationship between the self-imposed limitations within democracies fighting terrorism. It may be possible that within the Middle East, mass political participation serves to inhibit governmental efforts to arrest terrorists and disrupt terrorist networks because the significant segments of the public regards them as having a legitimate political agenda. A cases in point would be Yemen, where Al Qaeda militants might enjoy some sympathy from a public that is permitted to participate in albeit incomplete elections. Or, a second possibility is that in countries where public outrage against terrorists has prompted an over-zealous antiterrorism policy from the government that itself fuels terrorist activity and recruitment. The case here would be Turkey, where public outrage against Kurdish Worker Party (PKK) attacks in the 1980s and 1990s facilitated a harsh antiterrorism policy that included torture, arbitrary arrest, detention, and sentencing, and direct military reprisal against Kurdish civilians. These measures on the part of Turkish government security forces enhanced Kurdish support for the PKK’s objectives, thus assisting PKK recruitment, organization of safe houses, and procurement of supplies. Again, in models 5 through 8 state failures is a significant, at times highly significant, positive predictor of the incidence of terrorism. This illustrates that regardless of whether or not the Middle-Eastern state in question is considered to be a target of terrorist attacks or a source of terrorist attacks, terrorists thrive in countries beset with state failures. A few control variables are significant, and again yield results that counter expectations. GDP is a negative predictor of international terrorism in model 5, but is a positive predictor of terrorism in model 8, as is regime durability. Again, it is possible that sample size is responsible for these differences. Finally, all models are re-run omitting the potentially problematic case of Israel–Palestine, producing the results shown in Table 5: Roughly the same results are obtained in the modified data set analyzed in models 9 through 16. Democratic governance seems to be a somewhat consistent positive predictor of terrorism, while in at least one model (model 11), civil liberties protections are a positive predictor of international terrorism by source—given the negative relationship between FH Civil Liberties, an indicator where states exhibiting poor protections of civil rights are scored higher. Some support for the strategic school is found, although no support is evident for the political access school. And State Failures is a nearly perfectly consistent positive predictor of terrorism, regardless of how terrorism is measured or how terrorist attacks are sorted. Population, as a control variable, is significant in two of the models (9 and 11) and is a positive predictor, as expected. However, GDP and Regime Durability continue to exhibit inconsistent and counterintuitive results. Overall, models 9 through 16 dispel the possibility that the results found in Tables 1 and 2—that state failure is the most significant predictor of the incidence of terrorism, while democracy and civil liberties are more weakly associated with terrorist incidents—are a mere product of the inclusion of a set of observations from an outlier case: a combined Israel and Palestine. Conclusion The results of this study are preliminary, but they do not lend support to the hypothesis that fostering democracy in the Middle East will provide a bulwark against terrorism. Rather, the results suggest the opposite: that more liberal Middle-Eastern political systems are actually more susceptible to the threat of terrorism than are the more dictatorial regimes, as predicted by the strategic school approach to the relationship between democracy and terrorism. Furthermore, the result of the study do lend empirical support to the descriptive literature linking failed states to terrorism: those Middle-Eastern states with significant episodes of state failures are more likely to be the target of and the host for terrorists. Because the study examines multiple measurements of terrorism, by target and by source, multiple measures of political liberalization, democratic processes and civil liberties, and includes what is strangely overlooked by other studies of democracy and terrorism, the role played by state failures, it contributes to scholarly understanding of the relationship between terrorism, democracy, and political stability while assessing the potential effectiveness of current antiterrorism policy. These findings have significant policy implications. The results suggests that a foreign policy toward the Middle East constructed around democracy promotion, or around widening of civil liberties, will not reap a significant security dividend in terms of terrorism. Rather, it may exacerbate the problems of terrorism, both within Middle-Eastern states and for other countries targeted by terrorist groups based in Middle-East states. These findings potentially dampen the enthusiasm of some scholars of the Middle East who have hoped that stalled (or nonexistent) efforts at democratization or the widening of rights through the creation of “civil society” in the Middle East would be revived as the beneficiaries of a new U.S. foreign policy imperative toward the region. For much of the past ten years, the Middle East has lagged far behind every other world region in terms of democratization, as noted previously, and the field of Middle East Studies has vainly searched for signs of nascent democratization among civil society actors in Middle-Eastern countries. This study is the first to lend empirical support to a criticism of democracy-promotion already present within the field of foreign policy research. In his December 2003 article in Foreign Affairs (2003), director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Thomas Carothers critiques the Bush administration emphasis on democracy-building in the Middle East as a means to preventing terrorism. Although lionizing the principle of promoting democracy in a region so characterized by dictatorial rule—but seriously questioning whether or not the new policy really will really prove to be a departure from the Cold War policy of supporting pro-U.S. dictatorships in the region out of self-interest in the final analysis—Carothers warns that democracy might not prove to be the solid bulwark against terrorism that it is fashioned to be. He notes that democracy-promotion policy in the Middle East relies too heavily on what is essentially a fairly simplistic modernization theory conception of Islamic radicalism, that it is a manifestation of traditional society that can be eradicated through more modern and Western political and social engineering. The roots of radical Islamist movements, on the contrary, are complex, varied and “multifaceted” Carothers argues, and democracy is not likely to be the cure-all. Moreover, borrowing a page from the strategic school, Carothers warns that democratization might widen the political space for radicals in the Middle East and he regards the histories of newly democratized states as a cautionary tale to those who see rapid democratization as a stabilizing force in Islamic societies. Finally, Carothers observes that democracy, itself is not always a simple panacea for terrorism outside of the Middle East. He specifically notes Spain as a case study: it is a consolidated, though newer, Western democracy that is the target of regular and violent terrorist attacks from the Basque separatist movement, ETA. One could add a host of other established democracies to the list of countries that are either sources for or targets of terrorism: Great Britain, India, Italy, Greece, and the United States.

#### Democratization causes civil war

Savun 9 (Barcu, Political Science Professor at Pittsburg, “Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?”, 2011, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 233-246)

As Cederman, Hug and Krebs (2007) note, most theoretical and empirical treatments of the democratization-conflict link have occurred with a focus on interstate wars. In From Voting to Violence, Snyder (2000) provides one of the first exclusive systematic studies of the link between democratization and civil conflict, particularly ethnic conflicts. Snyder (2000) proposes that during the early phases of the democratization process, two conditions favorable to the initiation of civil conflict emerge: (a) political elites exploit rising nationalism for their own ends to create divisions in the society and (b) the central government is too weak to prevent elites’ polarizing tactics. According to Snyder, before democratization, the public is not politically active and hence its sense of belonging to a nation is relatively weak (35).3 Democratization increases the feeling of nationalism, especially with the provocation of the elites who feel threatened by the arrival of democracy. To maintain or increase their grab on political power, the elites may depict the political opponents and the ethnic minorities as traitors by invoking nationalist sentiments in the public (37).4 These polarizing tactics, in turn, create tensions among ethnic groups and hence increase the risk of violent clashes in the society.5 For example, during 1987 Milosevic skillfully used the Serbian state TV to convince the Serbian minority that Serbs in the Kosovo were suffering discrimination and repression at the hands of the Albanian majority. These kinds of inciting polarizing tactics by Milosevic and the Serbian nationalist elites were pivotal in contributing to violence in Kosovo. Violent struggles in post-communist regimes such as Croatia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia during the 1990s are other examples of nationalist upheavals incited by the domestic political elites during democratization process. Snyder (2000) argues that the elites’ use of exclusionary nationalism is particularly strong and damaging if the democratizing state has weak political institutions. If state institutions are strong, the institutions may be able to deter the elites’ opportunistic behavior and curb its potentially damaging impacts. However, during early phases of democratization, the institutions are usually new and fragile and the central authority is weak. The weakening of central authority gives the elites the opportunity to monopolize the media, create divisions in the society, and control the political discourse. Without the constraints of strong institutions and state authority, the political elites have more leeway to pull the society to any direction their interests dictate. Rustow’s (1970) seminal work on regime transition divides democratization into three phases. In the preparatory phase, a prolonged political struggle representing different interests takes place.6 Polarization of the elites usually ensues in this phase. In such an environment, a weakening of the central authority is inevitable. As the balance of power shifts from the old authority to the new actors in political life, a power vacuum emerges. The transition of power also weakens the state’s monopoly on the use of force as the military usually plays a key (and often independent) role in the democratization process, as was the case in most democratization episodes in Latin America. In addition, the early phase of a regime change usually renders the policing capacity of the state inefficient and thereby increases its vulnerability to attacks by domestic groups. The extant literature on civil war shows that organizationally and politically weak central governments make civil conflicts feasible due to weak local policing and inept counterinsurgency practices (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75). The weaker the central government, the less likely it is to deter domestic groups from using violence. Weak states also provide the opportunity for rebellion because the rebels’ chances of scoring a victory increase. As the state capacity weakens and questions arise about its legitimacy, the rebels find it easier to recruit and thereby strengthen their base. During democratization, uncertainty also looms large (e.g., Gill 2000; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Teixeira 2008). As Rustow (1970) puts it, “a new political regime is a novel prescription for taking joint chances on the unknown” (358). Uncertainty of the regime change creates several credible commitment problems. First, the political elites have difficulty in trusting each other’s intentions and promises. As Karl (1990) suggests, during regime transitions political actors “find it difficult to know what their interests are, who their supporters will be, and which groups will be their allies or opponents” (6). The new political elites and the old regime are wary of each other’s intentions and hence are unlikely to believe that any promises made or concessions given during the transition period will be honored once the central authority and institutions are consolidated. The key problem is that the elites perceive each other as “conditional in their support for democracy and equivocal in their commitment to democratic rules of the game” (Burton, Gunther, and Higley 1992, 31). The “equivocal commitment to democratic rules” increases the level of distrust and suspicion among the elites and thereby increases the risk of collapse of the political rule. Another credibility problem arises between the elites and ethnic groups in the state. The weakening of the state authority, combined with the uncertainty in the environment, increases the sense of insecurity that comes with the transition (Pridham 2000). This insecurity is particularly acute among minority groups who feel unprotected in an environment of nascent institutions, opportunistic elites, a weak state authority, and rising nationalism. Weingast (1997, 1998) formally demonstrates that during fundamental political changes in a society, institutions are typically weak and everything is at stake. This implies two things. First, the mechanisms limiting one ethnic group from using the state apparatus to take advantage of another are not effective. That is, institutions cannot credibly commit to protect the state apparatus from being captured by any group to exploit the other (Weingast 1998). The literature on democratization similarly contends that the new regimes are not usually successful in honoring their commitments and showing self-restraint (e.g., Huntington 1991). Second, since the stakes are high during regime change, the critical threshold probability that breeds violence based on fears of victimization is particularly low (Weingast 1998, 191). That is, it does not take much for the minority group to resort to violence out of its fear. The extant literature on civil wars shows that minority groups are more likely to resort to violence if they fear that there is a risk of annihilation in the future and the commitments made by the state are not credible (e.g., Fearon 1998; Walter 1997, 2002).

#### Democracy is net-worse for peace

Ghatak 17 (Sam, Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Tennessee Knoxville; Aaron Gold, PhD Student in Political Science at UT Knoxville; Brandon C. Prins, Professor and Director of Graduate Studies of Political Science at UT Knoxville; “External threat and the limits of democratic pacifism,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 141-159)

It has become a stylized fact that dyadic democracy lowers the hazard of armed conflict. While the Democratic Peace has faced many challenges, we believe the most significant challenge has come from the argument that the pacifying effect of democracy is epiphenomenal to territorial issues, specifically the external threats that they pose. This argument sees the lower hazards of armed conflict among democracies not as a product of shared norms or institutional structures, but as a result of settled borders. Territory, though, remains only one geo-political context generating threat, insecurity, and a higher likelihood of armed conflict. Strategic rivalry also serves as an environment associated with fear, a lack of trust, and an expectation of future conflict. Efforts to assess democratic pacifism have largely ignored rivalry as a context conditioning the behavior of democratic leaders. To be sure, research demonstrates rivals to have higher probabilities of armed conflict and democracies rarely to be rivals. But fundamental to the Democratic Peace is the notion that even in the face of difficult security challenges and salient issues, dyadic democracy will associate with a lower likelihood of militarized aggression. But the presence of an external threat, be that threat disputed territory or strategic rivalry, may be the key mechanism by which democratic leaders, owing to audience costs, resolve and electoral pressures, fail to resolve problems nonviolently.

This study has sought a ‘‘hard test’’ of the Democratic Peace by testing the conditional effects of joint democracy on armed conflict when external threat is present. We test three measures of threat: territorial contention, strategic rivalry, and a threat index that sums the first two measures. For robustness checks, we use two additional measures of our dependent variable: fatal MID onset, and event data from the Armed Conflict Database, which can be found in our Online Appendix. As most studies report, democratic dyads are associated with less armed conflict than mixed-regime and autocratic dyads. In every one of our models, when we control for each measure of external threat, joint democracy is strongly negative and significant and each measure of threat is strongly positive and significant. Here, liberal institutions maintain their pacific ability and external threats clearly increase conflict propensities. However, when we test the interactive relationship between democracy and our measures of external threat, the pacifying effect of democracy is less visible. Park and James (2015) find some evidence that when faced with an external threat in the form of territorial contention, the pacifying effect of joint democracy holds up. This study does not fully support the claims of Park and James (2015). Using a longer timeframe, we find more consistent evidence that when faced with an external threat, be it territorial contention, strategic rivalry, or a combination, democratic pacifism does not survive. What are the implications of our study? First, while it is clear that we do not observe a large amount of armed conflict among democratic states, if we organize interstate relationships along a continuum from highly hostile to highly friendly, we are probably observing what Goertz et al. (2016) and Owsiak et al. (2016) refer to as ‘‘lesser rivalries’’ in which ‘‘both the frequency and severity of violent interaction decline. Yet, the sentiments of threat, enmity, and competition that remain—along with the persistence of unresolved issues—mean that lesser rivalries still experience isolated violent episodes (e.g., militarized interstate disputes), diplomatic hostility, and non-violent crises’’ (Owsiak et al., 2016). Second, our findings show that the pacific benefits of liberal institutions or externalized norms are not always able to lower the likelihood of armed conflict when faced with external threats, whether those hazards are disputed territory, strategic rivalry, or a combination of the two. The structural environment clearly influences democratic leaders in their foreign policy actions more than has heretofore been appreciated. Audience costs, resolve, and electoral pressures, produced from external threats, are powerful forces that are present even in jointly democratic relationships. These forces make it difficult for leaders to trust one another, which inhibits conflict resolution and facilitates persistent hostility. It does appear, then, that there is a limit to the Democratic Peace.

## AT: Assurance

### Top Level – Debate Drills

#### This entire disad is just outdated – all their evidence is from 2016 or before and can’t explain relations under the current crown prince or the coalition – aid may have been key 2 years ago to fight ISIS like your evidence says, but in the status quo when it’s killing innocent people it’s important to draw a line

#### The aff doesn’t end aid to the entire GCC – your Anthony ev cites numerous countries that the plan doesn’t end aid to

#### No impact – nowhere in your internal link evidence warrants why they would want nuclear weapons OR why they would want to use them, it’s from 2011 and Saudi has had reasons to proliferate and hasn’t

#### Our Harris evidence and the Senate resolution proves that the US has already done stuff to show Saudi it’s backing away, and they’ve done NOTHING which thumps the disad

### Cards

#### No prolif— intervening actors and it’s too hard

Fitzpatrick 15, Director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, ‘15 (Mark, "Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Nuclear Rumour Mill," May, www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2015-932e/may-7114/saudi-arabia-pakistan-and-the-nuclear-rumour-mill-1419

Wanting enrichment is a far cry from possessing it, however. How would the Saudis acquire enrichment technology? Their nascent nuclear industry is at a rudimentary stage. They have no facilities relating to enrichment and no known research programme or specialists in this field. Developing uranium enrichment on their own would take 15 years or more. If they really want to match Iran’s enrichment programme, they naturally would want to buy the technology, but who would sell it? The 49 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have agreed not to transfer any nuclear technology that would contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is no standard interpretation of this clause, but clearly it would apply to a Saudi enrichment programme that was initiated to contribute to a weapons option. Although the NSG guidelines are voluntary, the ‘non-proliferation principle’, as it is called, has become an entrenched norm. Any inclination to violate it would put the would-be exporter under intense international pressure. Five nations that possess enrichment technology are outside the NSG: India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. Iran obviously would not empower its Gulf rival in this way, and neither would Israel. India, which seeks NSG membership, prides itself on not allowing proliferation-sensitive exports and has strong reasons to keep its export record clean. North Korea may have no compunction against selling nuclear technology to any would-be buyer, but it has no connections with Saudi Arabia and every major intelligence agency is watching to ensure that none develop. Pakistan is the usual suspect. It has close ties with Saudi Arabia and benefitted from Saudi munificence when its nuclear weapons programme was getting off the ground. Every couple of years a media scoop alleges that Pakistan is on the verge of transferring nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia. A thinly sourced article in the Sunday Times on 15 May was the latest in this line, claiming that Saudi Arabia has taken a ‘strategic decision’ to acquire ‘off-the-shelf’ nuclear weapons from Pakistan. Whatever the Saudis may have decided, however, a transfer requires a willing supplier. As I argued last year in my Adelphi book, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers, Pakistan has strong strategic, political and economic incentives to keep its nuclear weapons to itself. Just as the Pakistanis resolutely refused Saudi Arabia’s request for aircraft and ground forces to support the Yemen intervention, so too they would refuse a nuclear weapons transfer.Very little in the Sunday Times article is credible. Take this line, purportedly from a US intelligence official: ‘We know this stuff is available to them off the shelf’. The US intelligence community includes 17 separate agencies and over 800,000 US officials hold top-secret clearances. No doubt reporters can find at least one of them whom they can quote repeating what has been in previous press reports. But responsible intelligence officials do not speak that way. Those who know something about Pakistan’s nuclear programme know that it has no nuclear weapons ‘on the shelf’ waiting for delivery to Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is focused entirely on India. Opening up a second front on its west by becoming involved in the Saudi–Iran dispute would be a strategic blunder.

#### No prolif- their evidence is based on flawed predictions

**Gavin 10** (Francis, Tom Slick Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law @ the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs @ the University of Texas at Austin, “Sam As It Ever Was; Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War,” Lexis)

**Fears of a tipping point** were especially acute in the aftermath of China's 1964 detonation of an atomic bomb: it was predicted that India, Indonesia, and Japan might follow, with consequences worldwide, as "Israel, Sweden, Germany, and other potential nuclear countries far from China and India would be affected by proliferation in Asia." 40 A U.S. government document identified "at least eleven nations (India, Japan, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Canada, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania, and Yugoslavia)" with the capacity to go nuclear, a number that would soon "grow substantially" to include "South Africa, the United Arab Republic, Spain, Brazil and Mexico." 41 A top-secret, blue-ribbon committee established to craft the U.S. response contended that "the [1964] Chinese nuclear explosion has increased the urgency and complexity of this problem by creating strong pressures to develop independent nuclear forces, which, in turn, could strongly influence the plans of other potential nuclear powers." 42 These predictions **were largely wrong**. In 1985 the National Intelligence Council noted that for "almost thirty years the Intelligence Community has been writing about which nations might next get the bomb." All of these estimates based their largely pessimistic and ultimately incorrect estimates on factors such as the increased "access to fissile materials," improved technical capabilities in countries, the likelihood of "chain reactions," or a "scramble" to proliferation when "even one additional state demonstrates a nuclear capability." The 1985 report goes on, "The most striking characteristic of the present-day nuclear proliferation scene is that, despite the alarms rung by past Estimates, no additional overt proliferation of nuclear weapons has actually occurred since China tested its bomb in 1964." Although "some proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities and other major proliferation-related developments have taken place in the past two decades," they **did not have "the damaging, systemwide impacts that the** Intelligence **community** generally **anticipated** they would." 43 **In his analysis of more than sixty years of failed efforts to accurately predict nuclear prolif**eration, analyst Moeed **Yusuf concludes** that "the pace of proliferation has been much slower than anticipated by most." The majority of **countries suspected** of trying to obtain a nuclear weapons capability **"never even came close to crossing the threshold**. In fact, **most did not even initiate a weapons program."** If all the countries that were considered prime suspects over the past sixty years had developed nuclear weapons, "the world would have at least 19 nuclear powers today." 44 As Potter and Mukhatzhanova argue, **government and academic experts frequently "exaggerated the scope and pace of** nuclear weapons proliferation." 45 Nor is there compelling evidence that a nuclear proliferation chain reaction will ever occur. Rather, **the pool of potential proliferators has been shrinking.** Proliferation pressures were far greater during the Cold War. In the 1960s, at least twenty-one countries either had or were considering nuclear weapons research programs. Today only nine countries are known to have nuclear weapons. Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, Sweden, and Ukraine have dismantled their weapons programs. Even rogue states that are/were a great concern to U.S. policymakers--Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea--began their nuclear weapons programs before the Cold War had ended. 46 As far as is known, **no nation has started a** new nuclear weapons **program since** the demise of the Soviet Union in 19**91**. 47 Ironically, by focusing on the threat of rogue states, policymakers may have underestimated the potentially far more destabilizing effect of proliferation in "respectable" states such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

## AT: Agenda PTX

#### Withdraw appeals to domestic war weariness – plan is a campaign issue and a win

Stratfor 17 – institutionally recognized geopolitics think tank Forbes, 1/31/2017, ["The United States: Between Isolation And Empire", http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2017/01/31/the-united-states-between-isolation-and-empire/#5b15a30d5f84] bcr 2-21-2017

Now we have reached another inflection point. Trump's policies are not causes but merely symptoms of it, no less than the Brexit, China's construction of artificial islands, or Russia's annexation of Crimea were. His election reflects a deep popular resistance to the current international system, and the United States' role in it. Whether justified or not, many Americans believe the United States subordinates its national interests to other countries', spends its money on other populations, and overlooks actions that challenge its power or cheat it of economic opportunity. Now America is questioning whether it really needs to play the world's policeman, whether peace really is always beneficial, and whether far-off conflicts really are worth wading into. At the end of World War I, Halford Mackinder -- one of the fathers of modern geopolitics -- pointed out that, "In ordinary society, it is notoriously difficult for people of very unequal fortune to be friends in the true sense; that beautiful relationship is not compatible with patronage and dependence." As has been made clear since Trump's election, that sentiment is just as true within the United States as it is among nations. Persistent inequality among countries will continue to drive competition worldwide, and if Washington is either more inward-looking or spurred to support mercantilism, it cannot be counted on to resolve it. Instead, conflict, collaboration and co-management at the regional and subregional levels will become the new norm.

#### Entrenched partisanship makes speculation useless

Nethercutt 17 Former Congressman George Nethercutt, author, consultant, columnist and commentator. Nethercutt is the founder and chairman of The George Nethercutt Foundation. He was a Republican member of the United States House of Representatives from 1995 to 2005, representing Washington's 5th congressional district. Inlander, 4/13/2017, ["Pushing Past Partisanship", http://www.inlander.com/spokane/pushing-past-partisanship/Content?oid=3712704] bcr 4-14-2017

I can only imagine the political pressure that House Democrats felt when it came time to vote on Obamacare in March 2010. I'm sure they heard, "If you don't vote 'Yes' on Obamacare, you'll destroy the president." Obamacare passed with no Republican votes. If passed, its replacement would have only had Republican votes. Many Republicans and Democrats left Congress when congressional leaders became overbearing, not letting the process and judgment of elected officials unfold naturally, as intended by the Founders. They didn't intend that party leaders or the president's plans would usurp the collective judgment of elected officials in the legislative process. The Constitution is silent about such matters. Americans have gotten used to the domination of party politics in the legislative arena, thus perpetuating polarization. Instead of doing what's right for America, Congress adopts policies that are good for the party in control, or the president who shares their party label. Congress, the president and the press then dissect the dysfunction, instead of working on behalf of all Americans to make the United States better. It's increasingly disturbing that members spend too many hours each week raising money for re-election efforts instead of toiling to make America better.

## AT: Base

### Top Level – Debate Drills

#### No lash out

Bershidsky 17– Bloomberg view columnist (Leonid, “Trump a master of diversionary tactics,” *Frederick News Post*, <http://www.fredericknewspost.com/opinion/trump-a-master-of-diversionary-tactics/article_19f13378-2e36-5d9b-bec2-6a15b056ee0c.html)> / MM

President Donald Trump’s executive activity has been frantic in the first days of his term. He has moved to keep a number of the scary promises that were easier to dismiss as unfeasible during the campaign than to accept as actual policies in the real world. But the big stories he has generated have had nothing to do with these actions. According to data collected by BuzzSumo.com, the most widely shared CNN news story about Donald Trump since Jan. 21 was one about his press secretary, Sean Spicer, attacking the media for their reporting on inauguration attendance. It was shared 169,700 times on Facebook. A story on Trump’s executive order to start rolling back Obamacare clocked just 71,100 shares. On The New York Times’ website, the most widely shared story debunked Spicer’s “alternative facts.” It showed up on Facebook 170,900 times. The New York Times piece about Trump’s executive order abandoning the Trans-Pacific Partnership got 44,600 shares. This is the result of a manipulation strategy described long ago by Noam Chomsky: “Keep the adult public attention diverted away from the real social issues, and captivated by matters of no real importance.” Leftists such as Chomsky argue that this is what capitalist elites do, but I know it as a common tactic of kleptocratic regimes such as Vladimir Putin’s in Russia. There’s even a term for the tactic: “diversionary conflict.” Faced with economic difficulties or other problems potentially threatening to its survival, the regime starts a war somewhere or sharpens domestic ethnic divisions. Since the oil price plummeted in late 2014, the Putin regime has kept Russians on a steady diet of war news from eastern Ukraine and Syria (Russia and its allies have been winning). With the Syrian operation, Putin sharply raised his international standing, but a big reduction in protests against worsening economic conditions has probably been more important to him. In neighboring Ukraine, every time a government finds itself in trouble and particularly unpopular, the matter of the country’s linguistic division surfaces, with various groups trying to promote or ban the Russian language. Former President Viktor Yanukovych used the language matter as cover for passing other unpopular legislation. Now, with President Petro Poroshenko’s popularity at a nadir, reforms stalled and the cost of living rising sharply, Ukrainians are distracted by the discussion of a new language law that would make Ukrainian obligatory in public life, under threat of fines. Trump doesn’t need to start wars: He and his team know how emotional many Americans are about him. He can choose what he wants to be hated for -- preferably for something silly and unrelated to his actual priorities at the moment. He used this to his advantage during the campaign: His alleged sexual misconduct took up so much media time and public attention than issues like his business history, his tax returns and his proposals. As the inauguration attendance argument played, Trump has been busy. Apart from starting the Obamacare rollback and withdrawing from the TPP, he has frozen a reduction of mortgage insurance premiums, allowed the Keystone Pipeline to go ahead and prepared to sign an executive order to begin construction of a border wall. Well aware that some of these important actions might cause indignation and targeted protest, Trump has tossed out another meaningless football for the media and the public to fixate on. “I will be asking for a major investigation into VOTER FRAUD, including those registered to vote in two states, those who are illegal and even those registered to vote who are dead,” he tweeted. Sure enough, at the time of this writing, the CNN story about this was the most shared in the last 24 hours, with news about the border wall order coming a distant second. Just as it was unimportant how many people attended the inauguration, it doesn’t matter at all at this point whether undocumented immigrants actually voted last November and whether any votes were cast for dead people. No one is challenging the results of the election. The wall and the Keystone Pipeline matter, yet are much smaller stories in terms of readership. Trump and his team are already showing a flair for diversion. Is it enough to discourage the kinds of mass protests that such aggressive moves on lightning-rod issues might spark? We’ll know in the coming days and weeks, though protesters’ energy was certainly sapped by the massive women’s march, which took place before Trump actually did anything damaging to women’s rights. Trump’s and his team’s communications look awkward, inept, gallingly primitive. It’s time to wise up: These people know what they’re doing. They want their political opponents to be confused, to flail at windmills, to expend emotions on meaningless scandals to distract them from any targeted, coordinated action against specific threats. There are going to be many of these: Trump appears intent on keeping his promises. Calm concentration is needed to counteract dangerous policies.

#### IMET cuts, Syria, delay on the wall, and government shutdown all thump – so many dissatisfied Trump voters proves that he doesn’t have the capability to start a war

#### The link differential is terrible – no reason why Saudi/UAE is uniquely key

#### Plan popular

Luce 18 (Dan De Luce, Robbie Gramer is a diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/26/saudi-arabia-faces-strong-headwinds-in-congress-over-yemen/> 3-26)

A concerted White House lobbying effort last week helped defeat a resolution in Congress that would have halted U.S. military support for the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen, but Riyadh’s troubles on Capitol Hill are far from over. A top secret briefing from the U.S. Defense Department, direct appeals from Defense Secretary James Mattis, and phone calls from the White House were enough to avert an embarrassing political outcome in the congressional vote. Still, 44 senators voted for the resolution, sponsored by Bernie Sanders, an independent from Vermont; Chris Murphy, a Democrat from Connecticut; and Mike Lee, a Republican from Utah. Even lawmakers who opposed the bill blasted Saudi Arabia for failing to do more to end the war and open access to humanitarian aid. While Saudi Arabia may have dodged a bullet, the political climate in Congress is moving in a hostile direction for the kingdom — and another, more moderate bill aimed at curbing carte blanche U.S. support for the war in Yemen remains on the table. Four separate congressional votes over the past three years, including last week’s measure, point to deep and growing dissatisfaction with Saudi Arabia. Two U.S. arms sales narrowly won approval, and a proposal allowing families of 9/11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia for damages passed with enough votes to overcome a veto from former President Barack Obama in 2016. “The temperature is rising,” says Scott Paul, a senior humanitarian policy advisor for Oxfam America. “This is now on a trajectory that’s been in place for three years.”

### Top Level

#### Government shutdown thumps

Montanero 1/17 (Domenico, “Poll: Trump Approval Down, Slips With Base,” NPR, 1/17/19, <https://www.npr.org/2019/01/17/685539207/poll-trump-approval-down-slips-with-base>) KED

While the longest government shutdown in U.S. history continues, President Trump's approval rating is down, and there are cracks showing with his base. A new NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist poll finds Trump's approval rating down and his disapproval rating up from a month ago. He currently stands at 39 percent approve, 53 percent disapprove — a 7-point net change from December when his rating was 42 percent approve, 49 percent disapprove. And the movement has come from within key portions of his base. He is: Down significantly among suburban men, a net-positive approval rating of 51-to-39 percent to a net-negative of 42 percent approve, 48 percent disapprove. That's a net change of down 18 percentage points. Down a net of 13 points among white evangelicals, from 73-to-17 percent approve to 66-to-23 percent approve. Down a net of 10 points among Republicans, from 90-to-7 percent approve to 83-to-10 percent. Down marginally among white men without a college degree, from 56-to-34 percent approve to 50-to-35 percent approve, a net change downward of 7 points. "For the first time, we saw a fairly consistent pattern of having his base showing evidence of a cracking," said Lee Miringoff, director of the Marist Institute for Public Opinion, which conducted the poll. "Don't know if that's temporary — tied to the government shutdown — or a broader problem the president is having." The percentage of people now saying they strongly disapprove of the job the president is doing is up to 45 percent, the highest for Trump since December 2017.

#### Syria thumps

Monton and Gift 1/7, PhD, 1-7-19 (Jonathan Monten – University College London Jonathan Monten is Lecturer in Political Science and Director of the International Public Policy Program at the School of Public Policy at UCL. His research and teaching interests are in the areas of international relations, international security, and US foreign policy. He is also currently a Visiting Fellow at the LSE US Centre. Thomas Gift – University College London Thomas Gift is a Lecturer of Political Science at UCL, where he teaches on Public Policy Economics and Analysis and is the Director of the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE) Programme. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2019/01/07/trumps-base-does-not-support-withdrawing-us-troops-from-syria-americans-continue-to-favour-international-engagement/)

But does Trump’s base really favor the decision? Recent survey data offer reason for doubt. Even more, they reveal that Trump may be damaging himself politically by adhering to the conventional wisdom that many Americans are reluctant to engage the broader world. According to a survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in 2018, a majority of Americans (57 percent) support the use of US troops “to fight violent Islamic extremist groups in Iraq and Syria.” That number jumps to 70 percent among Republicans who support Trump. We aren’t the first to observe that Trump’s decision to withdraw troops from Syria marks a departure from what his base wants. But if Trump’s playing politics on Syria, why would he defy poll numbers? The answer is because this isn’t the narrative that’s typically depicted. Research by Harvard’s Theda Skocpol and Columbia’s Alexander Hertel-Fernandez shows that conservative activists – including deep pocketed donors – have been especially effective in recent years at pushing forward a specific right-of-center message. According to Stanford’s David Broockman and Northwestern’s Christopher Skovron, when the views of a small group of conservatives get disproportionately pushed, it misleads politicians, especially Republicans, into overestimating how conservative their electorate really is. To the degree that disengaging America from activity abroad reflects a new brand of conservatism, activists pushing this agenda may project a skewed image of what “middle America” actually desires.

#### Plan popular

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### AT: Diversionary War

#### Trump will divert through Twitter

Bershidsky 1-29-2017 – Bloomberg view columnist (Leonid, “Trump a master of diversionary tactics,” *Frederick News Post*, <http://www.fredericknewspost.com/opinion/trump-a-master-of-diversionary-tactics/article_19f13378-2e36-5d9b-bec2-6a15b056ee0c.html)> / MM

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## AT: Countries That Have Worked

### AT: Taiwan

#### Military aid had no impact on Taiwan. The US only recognized them in 2002 and gave then gave them literally NOTHING because they were afraid of China

### AT: Egypt

#### Egypt has literally done nothing positive with the aid the US has provided them. Egypt still jails journalists, fuels terrorist groups, and causes oppression on mass scales.

### AT: Japan

#### Obviously aid to Japan didn’t work because it was all post-WW2 when they were democratic. Most of the aid we needed to give them was economic and infrastructure to make up for nuking them in World War 2.

#### Japan was never authoritarian to begin with AND aid that we gave to them when they were authoritarian just encouraged them to fuel violence – World War 2 proves this.

### AT: South Korea

#### **The US’ aid to South Korea just encouraged even more oppression, they established a military government in South Korea which lead to innocent deaths and mass repression.**

#### **The main movement that make South Korea democratize wasn’t even a US led movement, it was a domestic student-led movement.**

### AT: Pakistan

#### Military aid has had no effect to Pakistan policies, they’re still oppressive. It’s also non-unique, Trump just pulled all aid from Pakistan because they were using it to fuel resources to the top.

## AT: Disaster Relief

#### Framing issue – if military aid effectively worked as a deterrence factor for violence, then innocent children in Yemen would not be getting bombed. They have not proven that the thesis level of the aff is a bad idea which should frame the rest of the debate.

#### Every single one of their links to the aff describe disaster relief as “humanitarian aid” which you should be incredible skeptical about. Just because the US uses the Navy doesn’t mean that it’s military aid. Military aid is different from military activity

USAID writes <https://explorer.usaid.gov/about.html#tab-methodology> / MM

Military assistance is defined as foreign aid for programs primarily for the benefit of recipient government armed forces, or aid which subsidizes or substantially enhances military capability. Military assistance excludes humanitarian and non-military development programs funded by the U.S. Department of Defense; these programs are categorized as 'Economic Assistance'.

#### No link - Foreign disaster relief efforts are coordinated by the USAID

Labrador writes (Rocio Cara Labrador is a very good dog, covers Latin American politics and security. Before joining CFR, she was a Fulbright scholar in Bogota, Colombia, where she interviewed former guerrilla fighters. She holds a bachelor’s degree in government and classical studies from Dartmouth College., “U.S. Disaster Relief at Home and Abroad,” Council on Foreign Relations, 8/15/18, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-disaster-relief-home-and-abroad>, KS)

Overseas, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) coordinates most federal disaster relief efforts [PDF], while the U.S. Department of State takes the lead in assisting refugees affected by disasters. Both agencies work in close partnership with the Department of Defense and other federal agencies, as well as UN agencies, local and donor governments, and NGOs.

## AT: Defense Base

### Top Level

#### Thumpers!

#### Congress cutting IMET – that happened in early 2019 and nothing happened

#### The House passed the resolution to withdrawal military aid and attempted to in late 2018 – it’s still on the table though because the senate and Trump haven’t done anything

#### We ended refueling which is a part of our tech integration

## AT: Democracy

### Top Level

#### If military aid encourages democratization, then Saudi Arabia should’ve stopped bombing Yemen and started using their weapons to prevent terror groups and Iran. All of their evidence is terminally non-unique and has zero impact because aid is being given in the status quo and NOTHING HAS CHANGED.

#### The whole thesis of this argument is empirically disproven by countries like Israel, Egypt, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, any advantage to the aff should be weighed as a reason why this argument is false. Military aid obviously doesn’t work because it leads to unnecessary bombings that kill too many innocent people.

#### Democratic transition causes all of their impacts

Taner ‘2 (Taner—PhD Poli Sci at Syracuse—2002 (Binnur Ozkececi, Fall, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 45, http://www.alternativesjournal.com/binnur.pdf)

More seriously, however, “democratic peace” theorists cannot adequately account for the tendency towards was in democratizing countries, especially after the end of the Cold War. As it has been demonstrated many times since the late 1980s, democratizing states are most often very volatile and dangerous and, thus more inclined to fight wars “than are mature democracies or stable autocracies.”32 The “rocky transitional period” to democratization may make countries more aggressive and war-prone due to not only domestic competition but also utilization of nationalistic feelings by political leadership and mass public support for aggression. If the “democratic peace” theorists would want to make their cases more persuasive, then, those authors should be more attentive to what is going on in newly democratizing countries and modify, not necessarily change, some of their propositions.

### AT: Middle East

#### Democratic Peace Theory is empirically denied in the Middle East

Neuberger ’11 (professor of political science, Benny Neuberger, 11/2/2011, “Between Democracy and Peace”, Haaretz)

The claim that democracies are less inclined to war than other types of government is **invalid in the Middle East**. The Egyptian masses calling for the establishment of a democratic regime have brought the link between peace and democracy into the public debate. While opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei sounds a reassuring note by saying the peace with Israel is not in jeopardy because democracies don't go to war against democracies, the Muslim Brotherhood speaks of a "democratic" referendum to decide the fate of the peace agreement and could lead to its annulment. Indeed, some predict that democratization would return Egypt to the cycle of war. The argument over the connection between democracy and peace has been going on for 20 years. Hundreds of articles have been written about the two versions of the democratic peace theory. The first holds that democracies do not go to war against democracies. The second goes even further, to claim that democratic regimes are less likely than others to engage in war even against dictatorships. The theories assume that the devolution of political power characteristic of democracies leaves time for negotiations and compromise between the hawks, and that democratic rulers are by nature less aggressive than others. Above all, the democratic peace theory, also called the theory of democratic pacifism, is based on Immanuel Kant's "perpetual peace." The 19th-century philosopher argued that nations seek peace and do not want to pay the price of war and that as a result democratic rulers, who are responsible to their peoples, are disinclined to initiate war. In the Middle East there have never been democracies on both sides of the barricades. Nevertheless there are many signs that in its most literal form the theory doesn't work here. **There is** no historical evidencefor the idea (which is congruent with the democratic peace theory and which was popular in pre-state Israel and after independence ) that the source of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the absence of democracy on the Arab side. There is no evidence that the Arab nations wanted peace and it was only the kings and generals who wanted war. Furthermore, **the peace agreements with Egypt and with Jordan were not the result of democratic public opinion;** rather, **they came from leaders who were** not democratic but who chose the road of peace. The Kantian theory of warmongering elites and peace-loving masses has not proved itself in Israel either. **The important decisions in favor of peace** did not stem from popular pressure**.** This is true in regard to the withdrawal from Sinai, as part of the peace treaty with Egypt, and the 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip. The decisions to recognize the Palestinian people and the Palestine Liberation Organization, as part of the Oslo Accords; the proposal to divide Jerusalem, at the 2000 Camp David summit; and the acceptance of the "two states for two peoples" solution, were all taken at the leadership level and were not the result of "democratic" popular pressure. We have seen courageous decisions toward peace on the Arab side (Anwar Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, King Hussein, Mahmoud Abbas ) and the Israeli (Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Rabin, Ariel Sharon ). But we have also had leaders (Shimon Peres, Ehud Barak, Benjamin Netanyahu ) who did not go all the way for peace out of fear of nationalistic public opinion. This "democratic fear" of making peace is an example of the failure of the argument that the people always want peace. Israel's wars of choice - the 1956 Sinai Campaign and the 1982 and 2006 Lebanon wars - also undermine the claim that democracies do not tend to initiate war, as do the wars fought by the United States in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, Granada, Iraq and Afghanistan. A key term that is absent from the theory of democratic pacifism, but extremely relevant to Egypt's current situation, is "democratization" - the transition period from dictatorship to democracy. Whereas in entrenched democracies, such as in Scandinavia, the leadership and the public are indeed generally moderate, in partial democracies (and in regimes undergoing democratization ) there is sometimes unbridled nationalistic competition among the elites, who believe this is the way to win democratic elections. Party and government institutions are too weak to avoid **the temptation of nationalistic incitement**. It is no accident that **it was precisely during the era of democratization that bloody wars broke out in the former Soviet Union** and the former Yugoslavia. Israel's right wing has no reason to rejoice in its clairvoyance if the peace with Egypt stumbles as a result of democratization in that country. It was the right, with Netanyahu leading the way, who argued over and over that peace had no chance as long as the Arab states were not democratic. This was a convenient excuse not to pay the price for peace. It is possible that had the Netanyahu government done more to advance peace with the Palestinians and the Syrians it would have significantly decreased the threats posed by a more democratic Egypt. The theory of democratic peace does not hold water in the Middle East in an era of democratization. Peace and democracy are the basic values of any humane society but the link between them is tangled and complex, exactly like the link between freedom and equality.

## AT: Discourse/Reps

#### Framing issue – Saudi Arabia is authoritarian and saying it’s anything else is wrong and justifies the violence

#### Critiques of reps produce reactionary politics in which change is focused on language directly trading off with efforts to change material problems

Brown ‘01Wendy Brown, Professor Political Science UC Berkeley, Politics Out of History, pg. 35-37

**“**Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech.14 Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usurp **the** discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive ***politi­cal*** response to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institu­tions. But turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain questions and man­dates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility to­ward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legis­lated and enforced truth**.** And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspi­rations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rational­ization and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction**.** Here [is] we greet a persistent political para­dox:the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, **“**Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique**.”** And, we might add,contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conserva­tive as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of histori­cally specific social powers**. But** moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argumentkill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban **(formally or informally)** certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels**.** As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, [and] how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, vio­lence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed.We are lost as how to ad­dress those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorienta­tion [or] rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. **D**on’t mourn, moralize.

## AT: Econ

### Top Level

#### You should not prioritize monetary gains over thousands of innocent lives and long term suffering – there is no warrant as to why military aid is key when the affirmative still allows for economic partnerships, we should not allow Saudi Arabia to be receiving arms that allow millions of people to suffer and then justify it by saying “it allows us to make money”

#### Massive economic decline has zero impact

Robert **Jervis 11**, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, **it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough** to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that **even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited**, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen **such a sharp economic down-turn** without **anyone** suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that **even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict**, **it will not make war thinkable**.

### Top Level – Immac Heart

#### No impact – all that happens when oil prices rise is people get pissed off, oil isn’t significant enough of a sector to determine growth on all fronts – empirically proven by crisis in 73’ and the mid 2000’s

#### No impact

Dichristopher 1/2 Tom Dichristopher, 01-02-2019, “Oil rises 2.5% as Saudi oil exports are seen falling,” CNBC, [https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/02/oil-markets-us-crude-production-global-economy-in-focus.html /](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/02/oil-markets-us-crude-production-global-economy-in-focus.html%20/) MM

Oil prices were higher on the first trading day of 2019, bolstered by signs of tighter supplies from Saudi Arabia that offset record output in the United States and Russia and weak economic data. Crude futures jumped as much as 5 percent earlier in the session but gave up some of those gains in afternoon trading. U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude ended Wednesday’s session at a two-week high, up $1.13, or 2.5 percent, to $46.54. Brent crude rose $1.13, or 2.1 percent, to $54.93 a barrel at 2:28 p.m. ET, after trading as low as $52.51 earlier. Traders pointed to signs that Saudi Arabia is beginning to make good on vows to cut output after a swift fourth-quarter collapse in oil prices. Saudi exports in December fell by about half a million barrels per day to stand at 7.253 million bpd, according to tanker-tracking data from Bloomberg.

#### Zero impact to oil shocks – reserves are full

Weiss ’12 Senior Fellow and Director of Climate Strategy at the Center for American Progress (Weiss, Daniel J.. “Preparing for the Next Oil Price Shock” May 18, 2012. <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/05/spr_g8.html>) / MM

Some argue there should be no sale of reserve oil unless there is actually a severe supply disruption, rather than selling in response to high oil prices driven up by Wall Street speculators in anticipation that there might be a Persian Gulf supply interruption. But the United States and its allies have ample oil reserves that could be used in the event of another huge price spike or a supply disruption so as to pop the speculative bubble and provide economic relief. The United States has significant oil reserves. The Strategic Petroleum **Reserve is 96 percent full** with nearly 700 million barrels of oil. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development nations had more than 800 million barrels of oil reserves at the end of 2011. Selling 30 million barrels from each reserve would reduce total reserves by less than 4 percent. In addition, U.S. reserve oil has been sold **under every president** beginning **with** George **H.W. Bush**. He sold 17.2 million barrels of reserve oil in advance of the 1991 Gulf War in anticipation of supply disruption that did not occur. In 1996 the Republican Congress led by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA) sold 23 million barrels of oil to reduce the federal budget deficit at a time when it was less than 80 percent full. In other words, the oil in the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve is not **some sacred oil supply** only to be used during an oil embargo or pipeline destruction.

### Cards

#### No link and case outweighs

Hartung 18 William D. [director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy. He has also served as a Senior Research Fellow in the New America Foundation's American Strategy Program and is former director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute] “Congress Can Help End the Suffering in Yemen” September 19, 2018. WJ

Even if it were acceptable to favor jobs over human rights in this case, the economic benefits are in fact marginal. Trump strongly implies that if the United States were to cut off arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the $110 billion arms “deal” he has made with Riyadh would be in jeopardy. But as the fact checker for The Washington Post has pointed out, the idea that there ever was a $110 billion arms deal is “fake news.” It is a public relations figure cooked up by the Trump administration that combines offers made under the Obama administration, a few new deals, and a long wish list of sales that may never materialize. In reality, since Trump took office, Saudi Arabia has signed commitments for about $14.5 billion in U.S. weaponry, only slightly more than 10% of the $110 billion figure Trump boasts about at every opportunity. To cite one pertinent example, the precision-guided bomb sale to Saudi Arabia that the Trump administration green-lighted last year will support at most a few thousand jobs in an economy that employs over 125 million people. Military procurement generates fewer jobs than virtually any other form of economic activity, and many of the jobs associated with U.S. arms sales are created overseas in the purchasing nation as a condition of the sale. For example, as part of Mohammed bin Salman’s much-touted economic plan, the goal is to have a full 50% of the work generated by Saudi arms imports done in the kingdom by 2030. U.S. firms are already jumping to comply with this mandate by setting up subsidiaries in Saudi Arabia and signing off on the assembly of U.S.-supplied weapons there.

### Dedev

#### Even massive economic decline has zero chance of war

Robert **Jervis 11**, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, **it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough** to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that **even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited**, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen **such a sharp economic down-turn** without **anyone** suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that **even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict**, **it will not make war thinkable**.

#### Growth causes war

**Trainer 2** Senior Lecturer of School of Social Work @ University of New South Wales (Ted, If You Want Affluence, Prepare for War, Democracy & Nature, Vol. 8, No. 2, EBSCO)

If this limits-to-growth analysis is at all valid, the implications for the problem of global peace and conflict and security are clear and savage. If we all remain determined to increase our living standards, our level of production and consumption, in a world where resources are already scarce, where only a few have affluent living standards but another 8 billion will be wanting them too, and which we, the rich, are determined to get richer without any limit, then nothing is more guaranteed than that there will be increasing levels of conflict and violence. To put it another way, if we insist on remaining affluent we will need to remain heavily armed. Increased conflict in at least the following categories can be expected. First, the present conflict over resources between the rich elites and the poor majority in the Third World must increase, for example, as ‘development’ under globalisation takes more land, water and forests into export markets. Second, there are conflicts between the Third World and the rich world, the major recent examples being the war between the US and Iraq over control of oil. Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US intervened, accompanied by much high-sounding rhetoric (having found nothing unacceptable about Israel’s invasions of Lebanon or the Indonesian invasion of East Timor). As has often been noted, had Kuwait been one of the world’s leading exporters of broccoli, rather than oil, it is doubtful whether the US would have been so eager to come to its defence. At the time of writing, the US is at war in Central Asia over ‘terrorism’. Few would doubt that a ‘collateral’ outcome will be the establishment of regimes that will give the West access to the oil wealth of Central Asia. Following are some references to the connection many have recognised between rich world affluence and conflict. General M.D. Taylor, US Army retired argued ‘... US military priorities just be shifted towards insuring a steady flow of resources from the Third World’. Taylor referred to ‘… fierce competition among industrial powers for the same raw materials markets sought by the United States’ and ‘… growing hostility displayed by have-not nations towards their affluent counterparts’.62 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product; within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets’.63 ‘That more than half of the people on this planet are poorly nourished while a small percentage live in historically unparalleled luxury is a sure recipe for continued and even escalating international conflict.’64 The oil embargo placed on the US by OPEC in the early 1970s prompted the US to make it clear that it was prepared to go to war in order to secure supplies. ‘President Carter last week issued a clear warning that any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf would lead to war.’ It would ‘… be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States’.65 ‘The US is ready to take military action if Russia threatens vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, the US Secretary of Defence, Mr Brown, said yesterday.’66 Klare’s recent book Resource Wars discusses this theme in detail, stressing the coming significance of water as a source of international conflict. ‘Global demand for many key materials is growing at an unsustainable rate. … the incidence of conflict over vital materials is sure to grow. … The wars of the future will largely be fought over the possession and control of vital economic goods. … resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the global security environment.’67 Much of the rich world’s participation in the conflicts taking place throughout the world is driven by the determination to back a faction that will then look favourably on Western interests. In a report entitled, ‘The rich prize that is Shaba’, Breeze begins, ‘Increasing rivalry over a share-out between France and Belgium of the mineral riches of Shaba Province lies behind the joint Franco– Belgian paratroop airlift to Zaire. … These mineral riches make the province a valuable prize and help explain the West’s extended diplomatic courtship …’68 Then there is potential conflict between the rich nations who are after all the ones most dependent on securing large quantities of resources. ‘The resource and energy intensive modes of production employed in nearly all industries necessitate continuing armed coercion and competition to secure raw materials.’69 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product, within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets …’70 Growth, competition, expansion … and war Finally, at the most abstract level, the struggle for greater wealth and power is central in the literature on the causes of war. ‘… warfare appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the capitalist world economy. … world wars regularly occur during a period of economic expansion. ’71 ‘War is an inevitable result of the struggle between economies for expansion.’72 Choucri and North say their most important finding is that domestic growth is a strong determinant of national expansion and that this results in competition between nations and war.73 The First and Second World Wars can be seen as being largely about imperial grabbing. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. Britain already held much of the world within its empire … which it had previously fought 72 wars to take! ‘Finite resources in a world of expanding populations and increasing per capita demands create a situation ripe for international violence.’74 Ashley focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. ‘War is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources … expansion is a prime source of conflict. So long as the dynamics of differential growth remain unmanaged, it is probable that these long term processes will sooner or later carry major powers into war.’75 Security The point being made can be put in terms of security. One way to seek security is to develop greater capacity to repel attack. In the case of nations this means large expenditure of money, resources and effort on military preparedness. However there is a much better strategy; i.e. to live in ways that do not oblige you to take more than your fair share and therefore that do not give anyone any motive to attack you. Tut! This is not possible unless there is global economic justice. If a few insist on levels of affluence, industrialisation and economic growth that are totally impossible for all to achieve, and which could not be possible if they were taking only their fair share of global resources, then they must remain heavily armed and their security will require readiness to use their arms to defend their unjust privileges. In other words, if we want affluence we must prepare for war. If we insist on continuing to take most of the oil and other resources while many suffer intense deprivation because they cannot get access to them then we must be prepared to maintain the aircraft carriers and rapid deployment forces, and the despotic regimes, without which we cannot secure the oil fields and plantations. Global peace is not possible without global justice, and that is not possible unless rich countries move to ‘The Simpler Way’.

## AT: Fill In

### 1AR

#### Our Caverley evidence from the 1AC proves that US arms are superior – transitions are costly for the Saudi government, their weapons don’t fit in their planes, and it takes over a decade which they can’t risk in the middle of a war

#### China and Russia filling in simply doesn’t match their geopolitics. Both countries are allied with Iran who are supporting the Houthi rebels who Saudi Arabia is CURRENTLY FIGHTING AGAINST in the region. Them giving aid to Saudi Arabia would just get Iran even more mad and further conflict – it’s illogical

### Arjun 1AR

#### Overview: Draw a brightline on ZERO of their evidence even MENTIONING Saudi Arabia. They should not win this debate unless they prove that IN THE STATUS QUO it is okay to bomb innocent people in Yemen. Saudi military aid is NOT successful and all of our evidence out of the 1AC proves that it has led to the largest humanitarian crisis in modern history and we are WINNING this debate on empirics.

#### On China Fill In:

#### China filling in is illogical – it’s uniquely different than current US arms and goes against aid that they are giving on the OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE WAR. China is funding Iran which are the ones fueling the fight in Yemen against Saudi Arabia. Regardless, every arms system is different, transferring arms would take YEARS and be prohibitive.

Kessler 18 (Glenn, quoting Bruce Reidel [Expert on US Security, senior fellow on Middle East policy at the Brookings Institution and a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, a former CIA analyst who served in the Agency for 29 years who has advised four presidents on Middle East Policy in the White House on the staff of the National Security Council], “Trump’s $110 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia: still fake,” The Washington Post, 10/11/18, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/11/trumps-billion-arms-sales-saudi-arabia-still-fake/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.501b04831bce>, accessed 1/20/19) KED

Trump raised the possibility that the Saudis might turn to Russia or China for its hardware. The Saudis are still considering purchasing a Russian S-400 air-defense system, but Reidel said the kingdom is too invested in U.S. equipment – which means the U.S. has significant leverage if it wanted to punish the Saudis over the Khashoggi matter. “It would take decades to transition from U.S. and U.K. aircraft, for example, to Russian or Chinese aircraft,” Reidel said. “Same is true for tanks, communications equipment and other hi-tech equipment. And the Saudis don’t have time given they are bogged down in Yemen.”

#### EVERY SINGLE PIECE of fill in evidence says that China has ECONOMIC MEANS, not for means of power. Their Wong evidence just says that China has THREATENED to use military power, but not that they will fulfill it. If anything, it proves the thesis of their argument is wrong because China is scaring off anyone from wanting military coordination.

#### The aff doesn’t preclude any of the aid that their evidence talks about, the aff just removes military aid. Both their Iran and Pakistan examples talk about infrastructure projects which are NOT military aid, here’s a definition from a federal agency

USAID writes <https://explorer.usaid.gov/about.html#tab-methodology> / MM

Military assistance is defined as foreign aid for programs primarily for the benefit of recipient government armed forces, or aid which subsidizes or substantially enhances military capability. Military assistance excludes humanitarian and non-military development programs funded by the U.S. Department of Defense; these programs are categorized as 'Economic Assistance'.

### Saudi Fill In Wrong

#### Every part of this DA is wrong – Russia and China can’t provide the same support

Sokolsky 16 Richard Sokolsky, 10-26-2016, "What a Real Review of U.S. Military Assistance to Saudi Arabia Would Say," War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/what-a-real-review-of-u-s-military-assistance-to-saudi-arabia-would-say/> / MM

It is, of course, possible that the Saudis would turn to Russia or China for arms if U.S. restrictions become too burdensome. But the Saudi military strongly prefers U.S. weapons for both political and military reasons. Integrating Russian and Chinese weapons into their force structure would create serious logistical and operational problems. Further, Saudi dependence on the U.S. military logistics system will ensure a continued long-term service and support contracts with the U.S. defense industry. It would also be imprudent for the United States to continue selling certain weapons systems to the Saudis solely out of fear of losing business. The United States does not need to pander to Saudi views to have an effective security relationship with the Kingdom.

**Any transition would take decades**

Kessler 18 “the” fact checker, 10-11-18 (Glen, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/11/trumps-billion-arms-sales-saudi-arabia-still-fake/?utm\_term=.5935b70dc2da)

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### All Aid is Different

#### US =/= China =/= Russia

**Kessler 18** (Glenn, quoting Bruce Reidel [Expert on US Security, senior fellow on Middle East policy at the Brookings Institution and a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, a former CIA analyst who served in the Agency for 29 years who has advised four presidents on Middle East Policy in the White House on the staff of the National Security Council], “Trump’s $110 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia: still fake,” The Washington Post, 10/11/18, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/11/trumps-billion-arms-sales-saudi-arabia-still-fake/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.501b04831bce>, accessed 1/20/19) KED

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### AT: Indo-China War

#### Indo-China war is extremely unlikely. They are both top trading partners for each other and historically one side has always backed off of war. Recently China and India both declared war on terror-based groups on India. The relationship is growing, and it has been proven to be resilient through conflicts historically.

#### Mutual interests check war – they would never go past some minor trash talk

**Shihai writes** (Sun, 2005, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, CASS, China-Indian Relations in the 21st Century, 9-7)

Firstly, **The development of** the **Sino-Indian relations basically decided by their national interests and** their respect **strategic preferences. For the foreseeable future, the utmost national interests and the primary objective of** the strategy of **both China and India are to develop their economy and to safeguard a favorable security environment**. **Both** of them **want to maintain peace along their borders,** stability and access to resources in Central Asia and a stable Asian order. **It is natural that a healthy and friendly Sino-Indian relations are necessary and in the interest of both the countries**. There is no doubt that development and security concerns of both sides outweigh their aspirations for influence and power status. **In the foreseeable future the possibility of direct conflict does not exist**.

### Impact Turn – China Good

#### Letting China run the world stage is the best option to prevent NoKo takeover – that’s the worst impact

Diamond 17 Larry Diamond, Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University. “There Is a Peaceful Way Out of the North Korea Crisis.” The Atlantic. April 26, 2017. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea-trump-china/524349/> / MM

The drama that is playing out now over North Korea’s nuclear and missile program—accentuated Tuesday by that regime’s large-scale artillery drill—represents one of the most dangerous challenges for U.S. national security since the end of the Cold War. It is a crisis that has been building for a long time, as North Korea has broken through the nuclear barrier and possesses fissile material sufficient for 20 to 25 nuclear weapons, by one estimate. After many failed attempts, through pressure and negotiations, to bring an end to North Korea’s nuclear program, three new elements have heightened the urgency of the situation. First, North Korea is racing to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting the continental United States. In his annual New Years address in January, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un [declared](http://www.ncnk.org/resources/news-items/kim-jong-uns-speeches-and-public-statements-1/kim-jong-uns-2017-new-years-address) his country to be “in the final stage of preparation for the test launch” of such a missile. Moreover, experts warn, North Korea could at some point in the next few year years make the terrifying technological leap to a hydrogen bomb, which could be up to 1,000 times more destructive than the nuclear weapons that now comprise the North Korean arsenal. Currently there are only two adversarial powers capable of hitting the U.S. with such awesome destructive power, Russia and China. That a regime so murderous, megalomaniacal, and unpredictable as North Korea’s—the last truly totalitarian regime on earth, holding more than 100,000 of its own people in political concentration camps—could have the potential to inflict such destruction on the United States should be considered unacceptable. The second relatively new element is North Korea’s young leader, Kim Jong Un. Although he has been North Korea’s absolute and “supreme” leader for more than five years, the world is still learning the full measure of his ambition, paranoia, and recklessness. This is a man who has not hesitated to murder even family members, including allegedly his half-brother, to consolidate absolute control. In pushing an ambitious program of nuclear testing and missile development, he also appears more inclined to take risks to expand his power and eliminate imagined threats than his father, Kim Jong Il. Even the faint glimmers of a possible loosening of absolute political control by North Korea’s communist party, the Worker’s Party of Korea, have been suffocated under Kim Jong Un. The third element is the tough-talking new American president, Donald Trump. While the new American administration has declared the end of “[strategic patience](http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/rex-tillerson-declares-end-to-strategic-patience-with-iran-slams-nuclear-deal/article/2620719)” and vowed that the North Korean missile threat “[will be taken care of,](http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/04/donald-trump-north-korea-strike)” Trump is pursuing a more “transactional” approach to engaging China in pursuit of a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. Thus, North Korea is reported to have figured prominently in the first head-to-head meeting between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the president’s Mar-a-Lago estate recently. It is difficult to exaggerate the stakes here. A preemptive strike on North Korea’s military facilities would have nothing like the limited scope of containment or punishment conveyed by the recent American cruise missile strike on Syria. To accomplish anything meaningful, an American strike on North Korea would have to be on a scale many, many times larger. Even then, it would likely fail to eliminate all of Kim’s short-range missiles (many of which are mobile) or his nuclear weapons (which are surely hidden). And so it could bring on the [worst of all scenarios](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea/523080/), a furious military response from North Korea with its nuclear arsenal still intact, putting millions of lives in South Korea and potentially Japan as well at imminent risk. It is no wonder, then, that the Trump administration has rather quickly discovered the virtues of a diplomatic track. Yet the six-party talks, launched in 2003 among Japan, South Korea, Russia, China, the U.S., and North Korea to find a diplomatic formula to halt North Korea’s nuclear program, have been suspended since 2009. While efforts to resume those talks have been surrounded by mutual threats and false starts, North Korea has raced ahead to build an ever more menacing nuclear weapons program, which is now bringing the region to a crisis potentially more serious than anything since the end of the Korean War. As the old saying goes, however, in crisis there is both danger and opportunity. In his summit with the Chinese leader, President Trump clearly became aware of the complexity of the situation as seen by the Chinese regime: North Korea is not a mere client state of China, and a Chinese attempt to use its economic leverage (such as cutting off essential food and oil supplies) to pressure the Kim dictatorship could bring unpredictable consequences, including, the Chinese fear, a collapse of the North Korean regime that would send millions of North Korean refugees streaming across the border into China. Yet the Chinese leadership is clearly deeply frustrated with North Korea’s erratic and menacing behavior, which increasingly endangers China’s vital interests in regional peace and stability. It is this incipient shift in China’s thinking that presents the most promising opportunity for a breakthrough on the long-stalled diplomatic front. Whether through a resumption of the six-party talks or initiation of direct three-party negotiations involving China, the U.S., and North Korea (with the U.S. closely coordinating with Japan and South Korea), a diplomatic breakthrough must be pursued. It is probably not realistic at this point to think that North Korea will give up its current stockpile of nuclear weapons. But at a minimum, resolution of the current crisis requires a version of what my Stanford colleague Siegfried Hecker first proposed—that the Kim regime [commit to “four no’s”](http://thebulletin.org/hecker-assesses-north-korean-hydrogen-bomb-claims9046): no more bombs that would enlarge its current stockpile; no better bombs, and hence an end to nuclear weapons testing; no missile testing or production that would enhance their current range; and no export of bombs or other nuclear weapons or missile technology. These will be hugely difficult goals to achieve through diplomacy. But there are some inducements the United States and its allies could offer the North that might help bring it (reluctantly) to agree. There is also significant leverage that the U.S. and China could jointly bring to bear on Kim Jong Un to raise the costs of his continuing on the current immensely dangerous path. And there are some things that the U.S. could offer China that might help persuade it to assume the risks of pressuring an unstable and unpredictable “ally.” North Korea has depicted its relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons as a defensive maneuver to deter an attack on it by the United States, Japan, and South Korea. But the problem is that any new weapon changes the balance of power among adversaries. The greater North Korea’s nuclear weapons capacity, the more emboldened it may be to engage in reckless, bullying behavior in the region. We are now at an existential moment, where North Korea must be confronted with a fundamental choice: Either it will face crippling global economic sanctions (including a Chinese oil embargo) that could trigger the collapse of the regime, or it will negotiate a verifiable end to its nuclear weapons development program. The North’s willingness to give up its weapons program would serve as a prerequisite for talks about new ways to defuse tensions on the Korean peninsula—including a peace treaty that recognizes the North Korean regime, normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea, and flows of investment and trade that would help to modernize the North’s economy. Toward the end of Bill Clinton’s presidency, when he was pursuing a diplomatic approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear threat, former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry [found](http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/north-korea-nuclear-deal-donald-trump-china-215034) the North Koreans to be seriously interested in the prospect of normalizing relations with the U.S. With respect to economic incentives, more would be possible for North Korea in terms of investment and trade from the U.S., Japan, and South Korea to the extent that North Korea takes the reform path that China did in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping. This would mean not only greatly accelerating market-oriented reforms in the North but also closing down the country’s concentration camps and allowing a modicum of political openness as well. America’s goal in this process would not be to bring an end to the North Korean regime, but to bring an end to its failed policies, which propel it toward militarism and aggression to cover up for its manifest developmental failures. What could induce China to take risks for peace? One irony of having elected a U.S. president who repeatedly threatened a trade war with China is that a retreat from those ill-considered warnings now appears as a conciliatory gesture. But there is something more the U.S. can offer. China’s fear of a sudden collapse of the Kim regime is not just about massive refugee flows. It also dreads a “German-style” reunification, in which South Korea would politically absorb the north and China would then confront a newly powerful American ally—hosting nearly 30,000 American troops—right on its border. Because the North Korean regime is not irrational, it will probably opt for the above deal under Chinese pressure and American inducements. But should Kim Jong Un balk and his regime then unravel, leading to reunification under a democratic constitution, American troops would no longer be needed to stabilize the Korean peninsula, and they could be withdrawn. Neither should there be a need for the missile defense system (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD) that is now being deployed in South Korea, over real but misplaced Chinese concerns that the system is aimed partly at them. Agreement to withdraw THAAD and American troops following Korean reunification would be huge elements of strategic reassurance for China. On the flip side, however, the U.S. retains coercive inducements to get China on its side, [namely](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/one-powerful-weapon-to-use-against-north-korea/2017/04/21/ddbb9702-26c2-11e7-bb9d-8cd6118e1409_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.4d24efb00424) the option of imposing secondary sanctions on Chinese banks that do business with North Korean front companies.

## AT: GCC

### Top Level – HW

#### CALL FOR THE RAMANI EVIDENCE – it says LITERALLY NOTHING – there is no warrant as to why the CP causes the GCC to lean in the UAE’s favor, no internal link between the UAE and growth of the GCC, AND no reason why the GCC collapses

#### There is ZERO internal link between UAE leverage and GCC growth – their evidence ONLY says that it could pose risks but NOTHING about growth or collapse

#### No specific scenario for war – disproven by countries like Venezuela who got their economy tanked and didn’t lash out with nukes – it also doesn’t go global, the evidence just says it causes interstate conflict

## AT: Heg

### Impact Turn – Heg Bad

#### Framing issue – this is just repugnant – the entire war in Yemen is disgusting and a result of 100 years of trying to “keep power on the world stage”, I’m literally just going to impact turn the shit out of it

#### Trump is an idiot

**Larison 4/23** (Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and was a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and resides in Dallas, “There Is No ‘Trump Doctrine’,” 4/23/19, The American Conservative, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/there-is-no-trump-doctrine-2/>, accessed 4/25/19) KED

Anton imagines Trump as a sort of hard-nosed nationalist who doesn’t put up with nonsense from other states, but that isn’t how Trump has governed for the last two years. If the “core” of Trump’s foreign policy is not to be a chump, that can’t account for why he has repeatedly given U.S. clients in the Middle East whatever they want in exchange for nothing. It doesn’t explain why he walked away from a nonproliferation agreement that was working exactly as intended and proceeded to wage economic war on the country that was faithfully adhering to the agreement. It definitely doesn’t explain why he has gone out of his way to insert the U.S. into a neighbor’s internal political crisis in a push for regime change that has nothing to do with American interests. The list could go on, but the point is that Trump has opted for policies that impose costs on the U.S. without having anything to show for it. For all of his complaints about how often previous presidents let other countries rip off the U.S., he has put on a master class in getting taken to the cleaners. The simple explanation for this is that Trump believes himself to be much cleverer than his predecessors but actually understands things much more poorly than a poorly-informed average citizen, and so it is relatively easy for more skilled and knowledgeable operators to run rings around him. That goes for foreign leaders, and it also goes for the people that ostensibly work for him. He makes decisions that his predecessors chose not to make because they understood the implications and costs better than he does, and then he prides himself on having done something “nobody ever did before.” There is no “Trump Doctrine” as such. There is a hodgepodge of competing influences and factions in the Trump administration, and depending on which ones happen to be ascendant on certain issues the capricious president will go this way or that without any pretense of consistency or overall strategy. The policy either ends up as a complete giveaway to the ideologues that obsess over a particular issue (e.g., almost anything related to Israel or Iran), or it becomes a confusing back-and-forth between opposing positions. So-called “principled realism” is as unprincipled as the president and as divorced from reality as the reality television character. The bigger flaw with Anton’s description of a “Trump Doctrine” is that his own definition doesn’t really tell us anything. He writes: It can be stated like this: Let’s all put our own countries first, and be candid about it, and recognize that it’s nothing to be ashamed of. Putting our interests first will make us all safer and more prosperous. If there is a Trump Doctrine, that’s it. That isn’t a doctrine. It is a banality. Saying that Trump’s foreign policy is the pursuit of his idea of unvarnished national self-interest doesn’t give us any useful information. This would be like saying that the “Obama Doctrine” is a belief in the importance of mutually beneficial cooperation. Obama may very well believe in this, but that doesn’t explain why he made the foreign policy decisions he made, nor does it even tell us anything particularly interesting about his worldview. Despite his erstwhile “insider” status, Anton doesn’t have any inside insight to offer. He is trying to create a coherent “doctrine” out of a mish-mash of ill-informed and impulsive actions that appear to be linked only by a desire to appear “tough” and to assert dominance over weaker pariah states, but he has no more success at this than anyone else could because there is no doctrine that can be identified and described.

#### Heg causes war – 190 years of military intervention, entanglement, and infringement of civil liberties

Glaser 18 (John Glaser, director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, (2018) Status, Prestige, Activism and the Illusion of American Decline, The Washington Quarterly, 41:1, 173-197, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2018.1445903, JKS)

Yet, despite this era of peerlessness and peace, the United States has maintained, and in some ways expanded, its grand strategy of primacy. Primacy holds that a peaceful world order and our own national security depend on maintaining a preponderance of U.S. power—a “benevolent hegemony”—over the inter- national system. This approach calls for a large military, a globe-straddling forward-deployed military presence, extensive security commitments to allies, and the frequent threat and use of force in pursuit of a wide range of national inter- ests, not merely to ensure America’s physical security. Indeed, the United States guarantees the defense of almost 60 nations in Europe, Asia, and the Americas in formal treaty arrangements, along with many more tacit agreements with non- treaty allies in the Middle East and Asia. It also maintains forward bases all over the world, with over 250,000 troops stationed at 800 military bases and installa- tions in some 70 countries.4 The costs of this expansive grand strategy are enormous. The United States has been at war for two out of every three years since the end of the Cold War, despite being a peerless power in an era of historically low levels of interstate violence.5 In fact, since 1989, the United States has engaged in more military interventions than it had in the preceding 190 years.6 America has spent almost $15 trillion on its military in this period, extracting resources from more productive sectors of the private economy and diverting taxpayer money away from useful domestic investments.8 It has also contributed to America’s growing debt problem: in 2012, the U.S. debt surpassed its total GDP for the first time since World War II.9 The strategic costs are also tremendous. By elevating peripheral interests to the level of vital ones, and assuming responsibility for the defense of a multitude of allies, primacy increases the risks of entanglement and entrapment. Primacy also tends to undermine liberal values at home by eroding constitutional checks and balances on war powers, incentivizing government secrecy, and infringing on civil liberties in the name of security.10 Yet, these costs and sacrifices are not necessary. Indeed, securing U.S. defense and stabilizing the inter- national system have been accomplished in spite of U.S. primacy, not because of it.11 Why does America engage in such an expensive, expansive, and risky foreign policy despite its safety? Some scholarship emphasizes structural realist expla- nations for this puzzle, arguing that the unipole pursues an activist foreign policy because it lacks external constraints on its power.12 Strictly structural accounts, however, sometimes fail to account for state behavior in a way that is consistent with the historical record. It is a challenge, in the first place, to achieve consensus about what structure prevails at any given point in history.13 Even when there is general agreement, structure can yield divergent outcomes: a multipolar structure resulted in very different foreign policies by the European great powers in 1815 than it did in 1914, for example. Security-oriented expla- nations argue that U.S. activism has contributed to global peace and stability and is therefore pursued on its own merits,14 though this argument underestimates the costs of primacy while discounting well-founded alternative theories for the lack of great power conflict in the postwar era.15 Other analysis points to the role that private and bureaucratic domestic interests play in driving foreign policy activism.16 Bureaucratic and special interest explanations, however, fail to sufficiently account for the deeply ideological roots of primacy. This article explores the role that status and prestige concerns play in incentivizing costly and unwise foreign policy activism. It argues further that such concerns are a poor basis for sound foreign policymaking.

#### Trump thumps the fuck out of institutional legitimacy – he’s tearing down government and has a zero-sum approach to policy

Salmon 16 Journalist Felix Salmon, MA @ U Glasgow, is a financial journalist, formerly of Portfolio Magazine and Euromoney and a former finance blogger for Reuters, where he analyzed economic and occasionally social issues in addition to financial commentary. In April 2014, Salmon left Reuters for a digital role at Fusion Fusion, 12-6-2016, ["A corrupt oligarchy is the best that America can hope for now", http://fusion.net/a-corrupt-oligarchy-is-the-best-that-america-can-hope-f-1793864109] bcr 4-13-2017

The result is that among voters–who are the people who really matter, in a democracy–almost no one respects the presidency anymore. Half of them loathe the 45th president; the other half voted him in with the express intention of seeing him throw bombs and tear down the very institutions of governance that created whatever level of peace and prosperity America currently enjoys. In this context of debased institutions, Trump is going to have enormous power but much less legitimacy. So the question then arises: What is he going to do with all that power? And remember, this is a man who can unilaterally obliterate life as we know it. A hawkish bully with zero foreign-policy expertise has his finger on the nuclear trigger; on top of that, a bombastic billionaire with zero economic expertise is now in charge of the U.S. economy, which in turn will set the macroeconomic tone for the entire planet. Trump, it’s important to remember, does not have allies. In politics, he was supported by almost no traditional power brokers until the very end; in business he has a long history of doing badly by his contractors, lenders, and the like. For Trump, life is a zero-sum game with winners and losers, and unless someone else is losing, he can’t be winning. This doesn’t bode well for anybody, inside or outside the USA, whose name isn’t Trump.

#### Trump’s ascendance is a textbook power coup – history proves rule of law is now lost and the reign of the alt-right’s here

Gowder 17 Paul Gowder, Niskanen Center, 2/3/17, is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Iowa, where he also holds courtesy appointments in the Departments of Political Science and Philosophy. He is author of The Rule Law in the Real World. ["The Trump Threat to the Rule of Law and the Constitution", https://niskanencenter.org/blog/trump-threat-rule-law-constitution/] bcr 9-17-2017

The election of Donald Trump raises serious worries about the future of the rule of law in the United States. Many an authoritarian has taken power from a democratic state under the banner of populist nationalism, and Trump’s association with illiberal and antidemocratic individuals and groups (from Vladimir Putin to Steve Bannon and the “alt-right”) has raised the worry that Trump does not respect the basic norms of our Constitutional order. How Legal Orders Collapse Some reflections on the rise of authoritarians of the recent—as well as distant—past can give us a clue about how worried we should be. The destruction of legal checks on political power tends to follow a well-established playbook dictated by the strategic constraints on powerful executives.

#### Trump is a magnifier – at worst he’s even more dangerous and ineffective at best

Walt 18 (Stephen M Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. His books include The Origins of Alliances, which received the 1988 Edgar S. Furniss National Security Book Award, and Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, which was a finalist for the Lionel Gelber International Affairs Book Award and the Arthur Ross Book Prize. His most recent book, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (co-authored with John J. Mearsheimer) was a New York Times bestseller and has been translated into more than 20 foreign languages., US grand strategy after the Cold War: Can realism explain it? Should realism guide it?, International Relations 2018, Vol. 32(1) 3–22, JKS)

To sum up, the realist perspective explains a great deal about recent US foreign policy (but not everything); it can help us understand why US policy has mostly failed; and it points the way toward a better solution. But is a major strategic adjustment likely, especially under the erratic leadership of Donald Trump? At first glance, one might have expected Trump to move in this direction given the positions he took during 2016. He called US foreign policy a ‘complete and total disas- ter’, promised to ‘get out of the nation-building business’, accused longstanding US allies of free-riding on American protection, and said his foreign policy would be guided first and foremost by what was in America’s self-interest.50 These positions sound like a crude caricature of realism, and a few observers ini- tially saw him in this light.51 Over time, however, it has become clear that Trump is neither a realist nor a skilled and knowledgeable statesman. Far from steering the ship of state onto a new course, his handling of foreign policy appears to offer the worst of both worlds. For starters, a realist would not have torn up the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an ambi- tious multilateral trade agreement that was central to the Obama administration’s ‘pivot’ to Asia. Nor would a realist have taken sides in the escalating tensions between Sunnis and Shi’ites in the Persian Gulf or attacked the multilateral agreement that has success- fully capped Iran’s nuclear program. A realist would not have quarreled with US allies in Europe and Asia to no good purpose or acted so erratically that they began to doubt US competence and leadership. On that score, a true realist would understand the importance of diplomacy, would not have left dozens of top foreign policy posts unfilled, and would not be gutting the Department of State. Most realists would not have agreed to send additional US troops to Afghanistan in another fruitless attempt to prolong an unwinnable war. In short, there is no reason to believe Trump has a sophisticated understanding of foreign affairs, let alone a ‘realistic’ one. Instead, his foreign policy is essentially a chaotic, confusing, and inept version of his predecessors’ approach. The United States is still engaged all over the world, still spending far more than any other state on its mili- tary, and still conducting combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other coun- tries. Its global burdens have not decreased, but the ship of state is now being steered by an impulsive captain lacking accurate charts or even a clear destination. It is therefore unsurprising that the percentage of foreign populations with ‘confidence in US leader- ship’ has declined from an average of 64 percent at the end of Obama’s second term to only 22 percent today.52 The good news (such as it is) is that the United States is still very powerful and remarkably secure. Trump can say and do a lot of foolish things and the country will not be at immediate risk. If the United States can survive 9/11, the 2008 financial crisis, and the long and costly Iraq and Afghan Wars, it can probably survive Donald Trump too. But not without paying a stiff price. As realism reminds us, international politics is a deadly serious business and states whose leaders conduct foreign policy in an incompetent or cavalier way eventually suffer for it. As confidence in the United States wanes, it will open new avenues of influence for China and encourage other major powers to hedge their bets and make arrangements that exclude the United States. Trump may have promised ‘America First’, but he seems more likely to achieve ‘America Alone’. The tragic irony is that the American people would almost certainly support a more realistic and prudent grand strategy.53 Getting out of the nation-building business, reduc- ing our military footprint in Europe and the Middle East, seeking a realistic rapproche- ment with Russia, and focusing more attention on our partnerships in Asia would all make sense and would free up additional resources that could be spent at home. Had Donald Trump implemented this approach in a systematic and disciplined and explained the logic behind it in clear and simple language, his foreign policy would be more suc- cessful today and his popularity would be higher than it is. Unfortunately, it is increasingly clear that Trump lacks the temperament or wisdom to pursue this sensible course. Barring a complete change of personality, he will continue to pick fights to no purpose, encourage instability in areas that the United States should prefer to be tranquil, fuel anti-Americanism in many places – even Great Britain – and act so erratically that longtime US friends lose confidence in our steadiness. None of these developments are in America’s national interest.

## AT: Houthis

#### Statistically the coalition is worse

**BBC 3/21** (“Yemen crisis: Why is there a war?,” BBC, 3/21/19, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423>, accessed 4/28/19) KED

In short, Yemen is experiencing the world's worst [hu]man-made humanitarian disaster.

The UN says at least 7,025 civilians have been killed and 11,140 injured in the fighting since March 2015, with 65% of the deaths attributed to Saudi-led coalition air strikes.

## AT: Intelligence Gathering

### Top Level - State

#### Their argument is wrong for two reasons, a. their examples are outdated and don’t take into account the newest crown Prince and b. the Khashoggi killing proves that intelligence relationships with the new crown price are unreliable

Manson writes Katrina Manson, 10-24-2018, "Khashoggi case underlines fears over Saudi’s ‘reckless’ crown prince," Financial Times, <https://www.ft.com/content/7726a68a-d77e-11e8-a854-33d6f82e62f8?fbclid=IwAR0w-OREigiivAOd68R-NXwQ69T65lAsoFRTD3_HgCsUXPCykaQPM08SOzI> / MM

When Mohammed bin Salman was promoted to crown prince last year, he did not just become heir to the Saudi throne. He also displaced a darling of western intelligence. His ousted cousin, Mohammed bin Nayef, had worked closely with western security officials for nearly two decades and many were wary of his young, ambitious and headstrong replacement, say former and serving intelligence officials. Now, in the aftermath of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi’s death at the hands of Saudi officials three weeks ago, Prince Mohammed is facing the glare of a US intelligence investigation and growing doubts among some of his kingdom’s closest allies about how to continue working with him. “It will be harder under MBS to have the same degree of confidence [that] we can work with Saudi Arabia in light of the brutal murder of Khashoggi,” said a former senior western intelligence official. Having been briefed by their Turkish counterparts, US intelligence officials including Gina Haspel, CIA director, were on Wednesday due to give Donald Trump their assessment of what happened to Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on October 2. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey president, said this week that Khashoggi was murdered in a brutal and pre-planned attack. Saudi crown prince says 'justice will be seen' in Khashoggi killing Donald Trump’s own faith in Prince Mohammed has ebbed as Saudi explanations for Khashoggi’s death have shifted. On Tuesday, the US president branded their reaction “the worst cover up ever” and began to cast doubt on the crown prince’s denial to him of any personal involvement. “He’s running things and so if anybody were going to be [involved in a plot to kill Khashoggi], it would be him,” Mr Trump told the Wall Street Journal on Tuesday, adding he wanted to believe him. The slow collapse in trust, played out in public, represents a dramatic departure from the close and covert relationship that the CIA and MI6 developed with his ousted cousin and rival for power, Mohammed bin Nayef.

#### Intelligence gathering isn’t military aid - military aid is aid direct towards benefiting the receiving countries armed forces, intelligence gathering benefits the US, not the receiving country, prefer our definition, it’s from a federal agency and has intent to define

USAID writes <https://explorer.usaid.gov/about.html#tab-methodology> / MM

Military assistance is defined as foreign aid for programs primarily for the benefit of recipient government armed forces, or aid which subsidizes or substantially enhances military capability. Military assistance excludes humanitarian and non-military development programs funded by the U.S. Department of Defense; these programs are categorized as 'Economic Assistance'.

#### Their evidence does not give examples of when the US gave aid – the example they give is when Saudi Arabia provided THE US and various European nations intelligence to intercept an al-Qaeda bomb plot. This example a. isn’t about the US providing aid and b. is outdated and can’t take into account why STATUS QUO aid to Saudi Arabia is bad

#### US aid fuels terrorist organizations – if counterterror was working, it wouldn’t be killing innocent people

Byman writes Daniel L. Byman, 5-24-2016, "The U.S.-Saudi Arabia counterterrorism relationship," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-u-s-saudi-arabia-counterterrorism-relationship/?fbclid=IwAR2mIY8fb4FPWfD1Jt7mWAZ68385C8PFlvUdhtohT784wSZsNd1CQEFtABY> / MM and SM

Perhaps most important, Saudi Arabia is home to many preachers and religious organizations that embrace sectarianism and oppose a U.S. role in the Middle East. A number of prominent Saudi preachers regularly condemn Shi’a Muslims, thus validating the Islamic State’s sectarian campaign and otherwise increasing its legitimacy. Some also blame the United States for a host of ills, embracing conspiracy theories such as the Bush administration being behind the 9/11 attacks. There is relative progress, however, in that many senior religious leaders do urge Saudis not to be foreign fighters or otherwise participate in conflicts abroad, arguing instead that local Muslims or state authorities should be the ones to respond.[[26]](https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-u-s-saudi-arabia-counterterrorism-relationship/?fbclid=IwAR2mIY8fb4FPWfD1Jt7mWAZ68385C8PFlvUdhtohT784wSZsNd1CQEFtABY#twentysix) Saudi Arabia considers Al Qaeda to be [an] mortal enemy, yet its military campaign in Yemen has indirectly assisted the group. By targeting and pushing back the Houthis in Yemen, which Riyadh considers (largely erroneously) to be a pawn of Tehran, Saudi Arabia has given breathing space to AQAP, which also is fighting the Houthis. Understanding Saudi Arabia’s relationship with terrorists, however, is far more difficult than assessing Iran’s backing of terrorism, which is open, extensive, and state-sponsored.[28] Much of Saudi support is done by non-state actors. Yet being ‘non-state’ does not absolve the Saudi government of responsibility. These non-state actors enjoy a range of relationships to the Saudi regime. Some receive or did receive official patronage. Others, particularly those tied to leading clerics in the Kingdom, are embraced indirectly by the regime’s self-proclaimed role as Defender of the Faithful. And still others are truly private, acting independently of the government and in times in opposition to it. In addition, the Saudi royal family itself occupies an unusual role. In one sense the royal family, with its tens of thousands of princes, is not the government. However, the family’s and the government’s finances are interwoven, and if a prince supports a group it has an unofficial imprimatur of approval. King Salman himself, for example, helped raise money for the mujahedin in Afghanistan and the Balkans.[29] Many of these voices are responsible for indoctrination rather than direct violence. That is to say that might propagate views on the Satanic nature of Jews, the apostasy of Shia or the heretical nature of the Ahmadiyyas, and the legitimacy of using violence to fight foreign occupiers of Muslim lands, be it Indian forces in Kashmir, U.S. forces in Iraq, or Israeli forces in historic Palestine.[30] Such support, in the United States, would often be considered distasteful but part of protected free speech. For terrorists, however, it can prove invaluable as it provides theological legitimacy for their actions, enabling them to attract recruits and funds.

#### There is zero chance of terrorists using nuclear weapons – in order for them to win this impact, they need to win that a. terrorists have access to nuclear weapons and b. that terrorists would use it - just because they have bad intentions doesn’t mean that they launch a nuke

Kapur writes [S. Paul, associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. pg. 32]

Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes to engage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter 2004; U.S. Government 2002). However, **it is not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear devices**. Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity (Laqeuer 1999: 4-5), **extensive empirical evidence indicates** that **terrorist groups** in fact **behave rationally**, adopting strategies designed **to achieve particular ends** (Crenshaw 1995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on whether doing so is likely to further their goals. Under what circumstances could nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? **For** certain types of terrorist **objectives, nuclear weapons could be too destructive**. Large-scale **devastation could negatively influence audiences** important to the terrorist groups. Terrorists often rely on populations sympathetic to their cause for political, financial, and military support. The horrific destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienate segments of this audience. People who otherwise would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that in using a nuclear device terrorists had gone too far and were no longer deserving of support. The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, if a terrorist orga- nization were struggling with another group for control of their common home- land, the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy group would devastate the terrorists' own home territory**. Using nuclear weapons would be extremely counter- productive** for the terrorists in this scenario. It is thus not obvious that all terrorist groups would use nuclear weapons. Some groups would probably not. The propensity for nuclear acquisition and use by ter- rorist groups must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

### Cards

#### Saudi intel sucks

Wilkinson 18— Tracy Wilkinson, [Covered wars, crises and daily life on three continents. Her career began with United Press International, where she covered the Contra war in Nicaragua. She moved to The Times in 1987, first as a writer on the Metro staff, then as a foreign correspondent based in San Salvador. In 1995, she moved to Vienna, where she covered the war in the Balkans, winning the George Polk Award in 1999, and then to Jerusalem. From there, she went to Rome, where she covered two popes and did several stints in Iraq. In 2008, she became Mexico bureau chief, where her coverage was part of a team Overseas Press Club Award and a Robert F. Kennedy Journalism Award. Wilkinson was also the 2014 winner of the Maria Moors Cabot Award for coverage of Latin America. She earned her bachelor’s degree from Vanderbilt University. Her book “The Vatican's Exorcists: Driving Out the Devil in the 21st Century” has been translated into a dozen languages. She joined The Times' Washington, D.C., bureau in 2015 to cover foreign affairs] 10-23-2018, "Is Saudi Arabia really a crucial strategic ally for the U.S.?" LA Times, https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pol-us-saudi-ally-20181023-story.html

Saudi Arabia’s complex relationship with terrorism and Iran. The administration frequently credits Saudi Arabia with valuable assistance in the gathering and accumulation of counter-terrorism intelligence. Undoubtedly, Saudi agents have cooperated extensively with American counterparts, especially as a bulwark against Iran. Yet former U.S. officials say even the definition of terrorism can be complicated with Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia. Washington typically defines terrorists as militants committing violent deeds, while the Saudis often brand as terrorists people whose views they don’t like, such as members of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, Shiite clerics or dissidents. For more than a generation, the Saudis also have exported a fundamentalist view of Islam, and won its acceptance in many parts of the world with the money accompanying its imams. Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, where Islam long existed in a steadfastly secular environment, saw an explosion of Saudi-financed mosques and an influx of Muslims practicing a puritanical Wahhabi faith in the 1990s, as civil war there wound down. That ideological strain contributed to the creation of Al Qaeda under Osama bin Laden, a Saudi. Most of the men who participated in the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, were Saudi.

## AT: Iran

### Top Level – HW

#### Iran is super weak – they have weak ass weapon systems, rely on a military that is going against countries that are 5x stronger than them, and only have draftees and outdated weaponry – that was Wald

#### US aid encourages and emboldens Iran because Saudi breaks arms deals and sells weapons to local Militia in Yemen that Iran steals from – there are literally pictures of Iranian soldiers using US manufactured AK47’s

#### Case outweighs – they rely on the deaths of Yemeni’s to scare away Iran, fearing a country because they literally kill civilians is morally repugnant.

#### A number of alt causes to Iranian expansionism – the unhighlighted part of the Gordon evidence says

Evelyn Gordon 1-30-19 [Israeli journalist and commentator, former reporter for the Jerusalem Post, BA Princeton], "Backing the Saudis in Yemen is right, strategically and morally," JNS.org, https://www.jns.org/opinion/backing-the-saudis-in-yemen-is-right-strategically-and-morally/

Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets in Syria obviously further this effort, since Iran must keep replacing what Israel destroys. But the Saudi coalition in Yemen is similarly forcing Iran is keep expending resources on a war it thought would be easily won. Thus if Washington is serious about countering Tehran and doesn’t want to risk American troops in the process, supporting regional allies who are bleeding Iran is the only alternative.

#### No impact – all that happens when oil prices rise is people get pissed off, oil isn’t significant enough of a sector to determine growth on all fronts – empirically proven by crisis in 73’ and the mid 2000’s

#### Double bind – either the end of sanctions waivers thump or Iran closing the strait is just hot air

**Meredith 4/23** (Sam, Sam Meredith is a Digital Reporter for CNBC in London. Having joined in October 2016, Sam writes regular news stories covering politics and macroeconomics across Europe. Previously, he worked as a Broadcast Journalist in Geneva and Riga. Sam graduated from the University of Portsmouth with a BA in Journalism, 4/23/19, “Could Iran close the Strait of Hormuz? Energy analysts skeptical of Tehran’s latest threat,” CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/23/iran-oil-sanctions-strait-of-hormuz-in-focus-as-oil-prices-rise.html>, accessed 4/27/19) KED

Iran has reportedly renewed its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s busiest transit lane for seaborne oil shipments, prompting fears about the potential ramifications for oil prices and broader financial markets. President Donald Trump’s administration announced Monday that buyers of Iranian oil must stop purchases by May 1 or face sanctions. The move, which took many market participants by surprise, ends six months of waivers which had allowed Iran’s eight biggest buyers of crude to continue to import limited volumes. In response, Iran’s semi-official Fars News Agency quoted Revolutionary Guards General Alireza Tengseiri as saying that if Tehran was barred from using the Strait of Hormuz, they would “shut it down.” Trump squeezing Iran is ‘the ultimate high-wire act for oil prices,’ says commodity expert Analysts at Barclays said in a research note published Monday that approximately 20% of all the sea-borne crude and condensates passes through the Strait of Hormuz. “The short-term upside risk to prices is based on a) our view that Saudi Arabia’s response will likely be lower and slower compared to late last year and b) heightened risks of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz as a result of this action,” analysts at Barclays said. The bank added that the Trump administration’s decision not to reissue waivers in May did not materially impact its view on longer-term prices. International benchmark Brent crude traded at $74.17 Tuesday afternoon, up around 0.2%, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) stood at $65.90, almost 0.6% higher. Reflexive response “This is the sort of stuff which does make me wonder if stock markets are being a bit too calm,” Trevor Greetham, head of multi-asset at Royal London Asset Management, told CNBC’s “Squawk Box Europe” on Tuesday. “We are late in the business cycle, we are at a stage where U.S. interest rate rises are starting to take effect, the data is not necessarily strengthening everywhere you look, and this sort of geopolitical risk is just sort of adding an extra dimension,” Greetham said. Stock markets could be too calm right now, strategist says Iran has frequently claimed it would be prepared to close the Strait of Hormuz in recent years, prompting some energy analysts to dismiss the latest threat as nothing more than incendiary rhetoric. “Iran’s threat to close the Strait of Hormuz was a reflexive response that we do not take at face value,” analysts at Eurasia Group said in a research note published Monday.

### Top Level

#### Top Level – US support encourages Iran because they steal and buy weapons from local Militia that Saudi makes deals with and fill into Yemen because airstrikes aren’t used accurately and instead just kill civilians instead of Iran

#### Hawks will ensure war with Iran if they want one – they’re pushing to remove sanctions waivers for NONPROLIFERATION PROJECTS with Iran

**Larison 4/23** (Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and was a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and resides in Dallas, “The Nuclear Deal Saboteurs Aren’t Finished Yet,” 4/23/19, The American Conservative, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-nuclear-deal-saboteurs-arent-finished-yet/>, accessed 4/25/19) KED

CNN reports that Trump may decide to cancel more sanctions waivers, and this time they affect ongoing work to implement provisions of the nuclear deal: President Donald Trump and his advisers are considering revoking sanctions waivers that have allowed several countries to collaborate with Iran on civil nuclear projects, including those intended to restrict Iran’s nuclear production capabilities, two sources familiar with the matter said. Trump administration officials have held several meetings in recent weeks to discuss eliminating some or all of the nuclear sanctions waivers, but a decision has not yet been reached, an administration official and source familiar with the discussions told CNN. National security adviser John Bolton, a longtime Iran hawk, has been among those pushing for the US to take this next step and eliminate the waivers, the sources said. The most hard-line opponents of the nuclear deal have been agitating for Trump to do this for months, and they have a natural ally in Bolton, who has never seen an arms control or nonproliferation deal that he didn’t want to destroy. The Trump administration had previously been willing to grant these sanctions waivers that allow some nonproliferation work to go ahead at Fordow and Arak: The Trump administration granted waivers allowing “nonproliferation projects at Arak, Bushehr, and Fordow,” three Iranian nuclear sites, to continue in November 2018 at the same time it announced it would reinstate all sanctions waived as part of the 2015 nuclear deal. The State Department made clear it was issuing the waiver to allow “certain ongoing projects that impede Iran’s ability to reconstitute its weapons program and that lock in the nuclear status quo” to move forward. The waivers currently allow modifications that ensure Iran’s Arak reactor produces less plutonium and the conversion of the Fordow nuclear site into a research facility. This has been a case of the administration wanting to have its cake and eat it, since it takes for granted that Iran is complying with the agreement and tacitly acknowledges that the agreement is worth having. Iran hawks in the Senate, including Ted Cruz, Tom Cotton, and Marco Rubio, have been leading the charge to cancel these waivers because they object to Iran’s nuclear program itself no matter what it is being used for. They don’t distinguish between legitimate civilian nuclear projects and illicit military ones, and they deliberately try to confuse them to mislead the public about what Iran is doing. The hawkish extremists have always wanted Iran’s nuclear program to be abolished, and if they can’t have that they want to create a pretext for conflict that allows for military action against Iran. Canceling these waivers would be the next step on the path to forcing Iran to abandon the nuclear deal and provide them with that pretext. European governments warned earlier this month that refusing to extend these waivers could prompt Iran to leave the deal. There is a very real danger that Iran may finally decide that enough is enough. Revoking the waivers certainly makes no sense for U.S. interests, as any credible arms control expert would tell you: Kelsey Davenport, the director of nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, argued it would be a “dangerous and irresponsible decision not to renew the waivers.” “Failing to renew the waivers would be a huge own goal for the United States. It’s in US national security interests to ensure that Iranian nuclear facilities cannot be quickly reconverted for nuclear weapons purposes,” Davenport said. “If the United States stops the remaining states party to the agreement from fulfilling those projects, it puts them in violation for the deal which just gives Iran future justification for abandoning the agreement.” Bloomberg also reported on this earlier this month: “It’s [ridiculous] from a nonproliferation perspective,” said Jarrett Blanc, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former State Department coordinator for Iran nuclear implementation. “Deciding to throw that away because you need the next drumbeat of antagonism toward Iran is nuts.” That isn’t going to discourage Bolton, since driving Iran out of the deal before next year’s presidential election is exactly what he has been working towards for the last year: But National Security Advisor John Bolton opposes an extension, claiming it would lend legitimacy to continued Iranian nuclear activity and to an agreement dismissed as fatally flawed by the president, two sources familiar with the deliberations said. Bolton has won every internal debate over Iran policy thus far, and there is no reason to think that Trump won’t follow his advice this time. Iran’s government may not play into Bolton’s hands, but they are understandably losing patience with an arrangement in which they do everything they are obliged to do and have virtually nothing to show for it. Ariane Tabatabai and Eric Brewer warned last year against revoking these waivers: Similarly, some critics have called on the administration to pressure remaining parties to the nuclear deal into stopping the redesign of the Arak heavy-water research reactor—a project aimed at significantly reducing the amount of plutonium produced by the reactor—and the underground Fordow complex, which was once used for uranium enrichment but is being repurposed to pose less of a proliferation concern. Goldberg and Nagle have similarly argued for the necessity for the Trump administration of using “all its legal authorities to cut off international support to Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastructure.” But it is precisely the international support that is key to making these facilities less useful for nuclear weapons. If global partners withdraw from these projects and leave them incomplete, Iran would have more of an incentive, not less, to convert the facilities back to their pre-agreement designs, increasing the proliferation risk [bold mine-DL]. A [stable] administration interested in supporting nonproliferation efforts would never even consider revoking these waivers, but then a [stable] administration wouldn’t have reneged on the deal and reimposed sanctions in the first place. The Trump administration violated a successful nonproliferation agreement because they wanted it to fail. It would be all too predictable for Trump to take another destructive step in that effort to blow up the the nuclear deal.

#### Alt cause - ending sanctions waivers proves the Iran hawks have won – if they want war – they’ll get it

**Larison 4/21** (Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and was a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and resides in Dallas, “Our Iran Policy Is Run By Fanatics,” 4/21/19, The American Conservative, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/our-iran-policy-is-run-by-fanatics/>, accessed 4/25/19) KED

The Trump administration won’t be issuing any more waivers to importers of Iranian oil: The Trump administration is poised to tell five nations, including allies Japan, South Korea and Turkey, that they will no longer be exempt from U.S. sanctions if they continue to import oil from Iran. U.S. officials say Secretary of State Mike Pompeo plans to announce on Monday that the administration will not renew sanctions waivers for the five countries when they expire on May 2. Refusing to offer new sanctions waivers is the latest sign that Trump is once again giving in to the most extreme Iran hawks. When sanctions on Iran’s oil sector went into effect last November, the administration initially granted waivers to the top importers of Iranian oil to avoid a spike in the price of oil, but that is now coming to an end. The economic war that the U.S. has been waging against Iran over the last year is about to expand to include some of the world’s biggest economies and some of America’s leading trading partners. It is certain to inflict more hardship on the Iranian people, and it will damage relations between the U.S. and other major economic powers, including China and India, but it will have no discernible effect on the Iranian government’s behavior and policies. India, China, and Turkey are practically guaranteed to ignore U.S. demands that they eliminate all Iranian oil imports. Josh Rogin reported on the same story: The decision to end waivers has implications for world oil markets, which have been eagerly anticipating President Trump’s decision on whether to extend waivers. The officials said market disruption should be minimal for two reasons: supply is now greater than demand and Pompeo is also set to announce offsets through commitments from other suppliers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Trump spoke about the issue Thursday with the UAE’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan. Between the administration’s Venezuela and Iran oil sanctions and increased instability in Libya (also supported by the Trump administration), oil prices are nonetheless likely to rise. Even if they don’t, Trump’s Iran obsession is causing significant economic dislocation for no good reason as part of a regime change policy that can’t and won’t succeed. It cannot be emphasized enough that the reimposition of sanctions on Iran is completely unwarranted and represents a betrayal of previous U.S. commitments to Iran and our allies under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The decision to refuse any new sanctions waivers is a clear sign that the most fanatical members of the Trump administration have prevailed in internal debates and U.S. Iran policy is held hostage to their whims.

#### US arms end up in the hands of AQAP and Iran

Smith et al 19 [Nima Elbagir, Salma Abdelaziz, Mohamed Abo El Gheit, and Laura Smith-Spark, CNN, 2-3,19, "US arms sold to Saudi Arabia and UAE end up in wrong hands," <https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/02/middleeast/yemen-lost-us-arms/?utm_term=link&utm_source=fbCNN&utm_content=2019-02-05T00%3A00%3A24&utm_medium=social&fbclid=IwAR3DoAaY3YBd808ACfxdaS9C562EAaX-nhF5QaDipwBgVW0RbTOsgG3VzoM>] / MM

Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners have transferred American-made weapons to al Qaeda-linked fighters, hardline Salafi militias, and other factions waging war in Yemen, in violation of their agreements with the United States, a CNN investigation has found. The weapons have also made their way into the hands of Iranian-backed rebels battling the coalition for control of the country, exposing some of America's sensitive military technology to Tehran and potentially endangering the lives of US troops in other conflict zones. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, its main partner in the war, have used the US-manufactured weapons as a form of currency to buy the loyalties of militias or tribes, bolster chosen armed actors, and influence the complex political landscape, according to local commanders on the ground and analysts who spoke to CNN. By handing off this military equipment to third parties, the Saudi-led coalition is breaking the terms of its arms sales with the US, according to the Department of Defense. After CNN presented its findings, a US defense official confirmed there was an ongoing investigation into the issue. The revelations raise fresh questions about whether the US has lost control over a key ally presiding over one of the most horrific wars of the past decade, and whether Saudi Arabia is responsible enough to be allowed to continue buying the sophisticated arms and fighting hardware. Previous CNN investigations established that US-made weapons were used in a series of deadly Saudi coalition attacks that killed dozens of civilians, many of them children. The developments also come as Congress, outraged with Riyadh over the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi last year, considers whether to force an end to the Trump administration's support for the Saudi coalition, which relies on American weapons to conduct its war. In 2015, Riyadh launched a coalition to oust Iranian-supported Houthi rebels from the country's capital and reinstate the internationally recognized government of President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi. The war split the country in two, and with it came the weapons -- not just guns, but anti-tank missiles, armored vehicles, heat-seeking lasers and artillery -- all flooding into an unruly and complex state. Since then, some of America's "beautiful military equipment," as US President Donald Trump once called it, has been passed on, sold, stolen or abandoned in Yemen's state of chaos, where murky alliances and fractured politics mean little hope for any system of accountability or tracking. Some terror groups have gained from the influx of US arms, with the barrier of entry to advanced weaponry now lowered by the laws of supply and demand. Militia leaders have had ample opportunity to obtain military hardware in exchange for the [power] to fight the Houthi militias. Arms dealers have flourished, with traders offering to buy or sell anything, from a US-manufactured rifle to a tank, to the highest bidder. And Iran's proxies have captured American weapons they can exploit for vulnerabilities or reverse-engineer for native production. 'Do you have American guns here?' In the narrow, ramshackle streets of Taiz's historic district, weapons shops lie tucked between women's clothing stores. Arms markets are illegal in Yemen, but that doesn't stop them operating openly in this large, mountainous city in the country's southwest. To one side hang veils, abayas and colorful dresses for sale; to the other are pistols, hand grenades, and US assault rifles available on special order. In one arms market, sweets were displayed among the ammunition. "Do you have American guns here?" CNN asked. "The American guns are expensive and sought after," the weapons trader replied, in an exchange captured by undercover CNN cameras. In another of the city's markets, a very young-looking boy handled weapons like an expert. Men joked and chewed khat, a commonly used drug, and the atmosphere was casual. But these shops don't just take individual orders, they can supply militias -- and it's this not-so-hidden black market that in part is driving the demand for hi-tech American weapons and perpetuating the cycle of violence in Yemen. Once the intellectual heart of the country, Taiz is now a tinder box that set off a war within a war last year, when the various militias backed by the Saudi-led coalition turned their guns on each other. Amid the chaos of the broader war, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) made its way to the frontlines in Taiz in 2015, forging advantageous alliances with the pro-Saudi militias they fought alongside. One of those militias linked to AQAP, the Abu Abbas brigade, now possesses US-made Oshkosh armored vehicles, paraded in a 2015 show of force through the city. Abu Abbas, the founder, was declared a terrorist by the US in 2017, but the group still enjoys support from the Saudi coalition and was absorbed into the coalition-supported 35th Brigade of the Yemeni army. “Oshkosh Defense strictly follows all US laws and regulations relating to export control," the firm told CNN. And there are deadlier forms of weaponry that have made their way into the city. In October 2015, military forces loyal to the government boasted on Saudi- and UAE-backed media that the Saudis had airdropped American-made TOW anti-tank missiles on the same frontline where AQAP had been known to operate at the time.

#### Iran is weak

Bandow 18 Doug Bandow, 12-18-2018, [senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Times. Bandow speaks frequently at academic conferences, on college campuses, and to business groups. Bandow has been a regular commentator on ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox News Channel, and MSNBC. He holds a JD from Stanford University.] "It's Time to End U.S. Support for the Saudi War on Yemen," Cato Institute, <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/its-time-end-us-support-saudi-war-yemen> RE  
Contrary to Trump administration claims, memorialized in an atrocious op-ed under Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s name, not everything in the world is about Iran. The conflict in Yemen continues decades of internal strife. Saudi Arabia’s invasion internationalized a decade-long domestic fight. Riyadh’s hubris gave Tehran an opportunity to bleed the Saudis militarily. The greatest challenge to U.S. policy in the region is royal stupidity in Saudi Arabia rather than Islamist hostility in Iran. The latter is outgunned, overmatched and badly stretched. Its influence in divided Lebanon and wrecked Syria is of limited value. An active opposition presses for change at home.

#### US military aid encourages Iranian violence

Pillar 18 Paul R. Pillar 9-5-2018, [is a contributing editor at the National Interest and the author of Why America Misunderstands the World], "Why Does the U.S. Support War Crimes in Yemen?," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/why-does-us-support-war-crimes-yemen-30572>

Obsessions are never a sound basis for policy. The U.S. obsession with Iran drives the current U.S. policy on Yemen. Iran has given aid to the Houthis, and the U.S. urge—which the Trump administration exhibits to an extreme—is to oppose anyone and anything with a connection to Iran, and to support anyone opposing Iran. This obsession, like others, muddies perceptions and thinking about where threats really lie. Although the Houthis commonly are described as Iranian proxies, they aren’t, notwithstanding how glad they may be to accept Iranian aid. The most significant thing the Houthis have done during this war—their capture of the capital city of Sana—they did against Iran’s advice . Therefore, American policy with such unfortunate roots also may be counterproductive. Yemen is not a critical theater for the Iranians, but their modest aid to the Houthi movement has been a low-cost way of making their Saudi rivals bleed. The more that the regime of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman seems distracted and flummoxed by its misadventure in Yemen, the more incentive Iran has to keep encouraging the bleeding. This U.S. administration is a part of this mess because it is waging economic warfare against Iran and aiming to destabilize its regime. America also shares in the Saudis' international infamy that is documented in the U.N. report—and gives Iran even more incentive to encourage the conflict.

#### No link – framing the war as Saudi vs. Iran is just more alternative facts from The Donald.

Rajan Menon 18, [Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of International Relations at the Powell School, City College of New York, and Senior Research Fellow at Columbia University’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. He is the author, most recently, of The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention.] 9-18-2018, "The War From Hell—Supported by the United States," Nation, <https://www.thenation.com/article/the-war-from-hell-supported-by-the-united-states/> RE

The commonplace rendition of the war in Yemen pits a US-backed Saudi coalition against the Houthis, cast as agents of Iran and evidence of its increasing influence in the Middle East. Combating terrorism and countering Iran became the basis for Washington’s support of the Saudi-led war. Predictably, as this cartoonish portrayal of a complicated civil war gained ground in the mainstream American media and among Beltway pundits (as well, of course, as in the Pentagon and White House), inconvenient facts were shunted aside. Still, all these years and all those dead later, it’s worth considering some of those facts. There are, for instance, significant differences between the Houthis’ Zaydi variant of Shia Islam and the Twelver Shiism dominant in Iran—and some similarities between Zaydis and Sunnis—which makes the ubiquitous claims about a Iran-Houthi faith-based pact shaky. Moreover, Iran did not jump into the fray during the violent 2004-2010 clashes between Saleh and the Houthis and did not have longstanding ties to them either. In addition, contrary to the prevailing view in Washington, Iran is unlikely to be their main source of weaponry and support. Sheer distance and the Saudi coalition’s naval blockade have made it next to impossible for Iran to supply arms to the Houthis in the volume alleged. Besides, having pillaged various military bases during their march toward Aden, the Houthis do not lack for weaponry. Iran’s influence in Yemen has undoubtedly increased since 2015, but reducing the intricacies of that country’s internal crisis to Iranian meddling and a Tehran-led Shiite bloc expanding from Syria to the Arabian Peninsula amounts to, at best, a massive oversimplification. The obsession of Trump and his key advisers with Iran (a remarkable number of them are Iranophobes) and The Donald’s obsession with plugging American arms makers and hawking their wares helps explain their embrace of the House of Saud and continuing support for its never-ending assault on Yemen. (Jared Kushner’s bromance with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman undoubtedly played a part as well.) None of that, however, explains the full-scale American backing for the Saudi-led intervention there in the Obama years. Even as his administration denounced Bashar al-Assad’s slaughter of Syrian civilians, his officials seemed unmoved by the suffering war was inflicting on Yemenis. In fact, the Obama administration offered $115 billion worth of weaponry to Riyadh, including a $1.15 billion package finalized in August 2016, when the scale of Yemen’s catastrophe was already all too obvious. In recent years, opposition to the war in Congress has been on the rise, with Senator Bernie Sanders and Representative Ro Khanna playing prominent roles in mobilizing it. But such congressional critics had no effect on Obama’s war policy and are unlikely to sway Trump’s. They face formidable barriers. The mainstream narrative on the war remains powerful, while the Gulf monarchies continue to buy vast quantities of American weaponry. And don’t forget the impressive, money-is-no-object Saudi-Emirati lobbying operation in Washington. That, then, is the context for the Pentagon’s gentle warning about the limits of US support for the bombing campaign in Yemen and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s subsequent certification, as required by Congress, that the Saudis and Emiratis were taking perfectly credible action to lower civilian casualties—without which the US military could not continue refueling their planes. (Mattis “endorsed and fully supported” Pompeo’s statement.) As the fifth anniversary of this appalling war approaches, American-made arms and logistical aid remain essential to it. Consider President Trump’s much-ballyhooed arms sales to the Saudis, even if they don’t total $100 billion (as he claimed): Why then would the Saudi and Emirati monarchs worry that the White House might actually do something like cutting off those lucrative sales or terminating the back-end support for their bombing campaign?

#### Israel military cooperation guarantees no Iran conflict

**MEMO 18** (Middle East Monitor, “Saudi Arabia buys Iron Dome defense system from Israel,” 9/13/18, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180913-saudi-arabia-buys-iron-dome-defence-system-from-israel/>) KED

Saudi Arabia is reported to have purchased the Iron Dome missile defense system from Israel signaling a rapprochement between the two countries, according to several diplomatic sources quoted in Al-Khaleej Online. Saudi Arabia not only wants political convergence with Israel, said the sources, but also seeks to reach a level where it publically purchases heavy and developed weapons from Tel Aviv like the UAE does. Read: Saudi rejects undermining of Jerusalem’s historic status Israeli-Saudi relations are the best they have ever been. Chief of staff of the Israeli army, General Gadi Eisenkot, recently said in an interview with the British-based Saudi Elaph newspaper that Israel was prepared to share intelligence with the Saudi side in order to counter Iran’s influence. Moreover, a former senior official in the Israeli army revealed that he had recently had two meetings with two prominent Saudi emirs, who confirmed that Israel was no longer an enemy of Saudi Arabia. The sources confirmed that Saudi Arabia has recently convinced Israel through very strong mediation by the United States during secret tripartite meetings in Washington to sell it its advanced Iron Dome system.

#### Iran is trash – this card is a slam dunk

**Walt 18** (Stephen, Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “The Islamic Republic of Hysteria,” Foreign Policy, 1/16/18, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/the-islamic-republic-of-hysteria-iran-middle-east-trump/>, accessed 1/20/19) KED

Yet this ongoing full-court press against Iran makes little sense because it is nowhere close to being a regional hegemon. If anything, the willingness of pundits and politicians to embrace this alarmist fantasy says more about the cavalier nature of U.S. strategic discourse than it does about the actual challenge Iran may pose. Iran presently lacks the hard power a state would need to dominate the Middle East’s vast and deeply divided set of countries. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran has a population of about 83 million; as of 2016, its GDP was more than $400 billion; and its annual defense budget is almost $16 billion. Its total military manpower (including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC) consists of about 520,000 troops, of of them poorly trained draftees. Many of its tanks, aircraft, and other major weapons systems date from the era of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and are in poor repair. As veteran defense analyst Anthony Cordesman concluded in 2010, “Iran’s conventional military is severely limited, relying heavily on obsolescent and low quality weaponry.… Its forces are not organized or trained to project significant power across the Gulf.” By contrast, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates have a combined population of well over 100 million and a combined GDP of more than $1 trillion — about quadruple that of Iran. Their combined defense spending is at least five times greater than Iran’s. These states possess some of the most sophisticated weapons money can buy, including Abrams battle tanks and F-15 aircraft, and Israel has nuclear weapons. In the unlikely event Iran ever attacked them, they could also count on support from the mighty United States. Given the far more powerful forces arrayed against Iran, to claim it is on the brink of regional hegemony defies reason. When confronted with these realities, Iran’s foes typically warn that it is using local proxies to spread its influence and take over the region. There is no question that Iran has backed a number of local actors in recent years, including the Lebanese Hezbollah, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, various militias in Iraq, and, to a lesser extent, the Houthis in Yemen. These moves have marginally enhanced Iran’s power — but mostly because it has been able to take advantage of its opponents’ blunders, such as the George W. Bush administration’s decision to topple Saddam Hussein. But these advances still leave Tehran far short of regional domination. For one thing, Iran does not control these groups any more than the United States controls its own Middle East clients. Each of these actors has its own interests, and Tehran’s present allies will not blindly follow its orders if doing so would jeopardize their own positions. To see these collaborations as a new Persian empire, as Henry Kissinger and Max Boot apparently do, is risible. Furthermore, many of Iran’s principal partners have all suffered significant setbacks in recent years, forcing the country to expend additional resources to prop them up. Support from the IRGC helped keep Assad in power, for example, but Syria is now a shattered state and thus not much of an ally. Far from creating an ever-expanding, increasingly powerful Iranian empire, Tehran’s support for these various groups has drained its coffers and brought Israel and the Gulf Arabs into tacit alignment, thereby undermining its overall position.

### AT: US Strikes

#### Saudi isn’t the internal link to the US striking Iran– the NSC is filled with hawks

Ward 19 Alex Ward, Staff writer covering international security and defense issues, as well as a co-host of Vox's "Worldly" podcast. Before joining Vox, Alex was an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and US foreign policy. 1-14-2019, "Bolton asked the Pentagon for plans to attack Iran," Vox, <https://www.vox.com/world/2019/1/14/18181962/iran-news-bolton-strike-pentagon-trump-mattis?fbclid=IwAR2HLXnSWZAfQQov_KQ5kVlA7m6A8j7cjgxdOdtUlmMErznni6cMky25KRA> / MM

National Security Adviser John Bolton had his team request options from the Pentagon to strike Iran late last year — a move that worried top defense officials that a possible new war in the Middle East was imminent. On September 6, Iranian-backed militants in Iraq shot three mortars into Baghdad’s massive diplomatic compound, which is home to the US Embassy. Two days later, rockets shot by unknown attackers streaked toward the US consulate in Basra during anti-Iran protests in the city. Those strikes, which injured no one, led Bolton to have the National Security Council (NSC) ask the Defense Department for military plans to attack Iran, according to US officials and people familiar with the request — although it’s unclear how close the US came to bombing the country. The sequence of events, which the Wall Street Journal first reported over the weekend, shows how seriously the Trump administration has considered escalating its policy toward Iran. Yet multiple US officials, including NSC spokesperson Garrett Marquis, told me Bolton’s request was merely meant to ensure the president had all options presented to him — a key part of his job. “The NSC coordinates policy and provides the President with options to anticipate and respond to a variety of threats,” Marquis said in an email. Still, the request caused some controversy in the Pentagon. Then-Defense Secretary James Mattis didn’t even want to respond to the attacks with a strongly worded statement (let alone a military strike), alarming US officials across the government, a senior administration official told me. The White House eventually did issue a statement on September 11 declaring that “the United States will hold the regime in Tehran accountable for any attack that results in injury to our personnel or damage to United States Government facilities.” And Mattis had “deep concerns” about Bolton’s strike request, one US official told Axios on Sunday. The Pentagon eventually provided some military options to the White House — such as a strike on an Iranian military facility — but Mattis and other officials rejected the idea of a large-scale retaliatory attack. Mattis declined to comment for this article. Some US officials say Bolton’s request is another example of his long-held animus toward Tehran. Both in and out of government, the top Trump aide has made clear his desire to see the current Iranian regime fall. But one person familiar with how the NSC operates told me that Bolton is using the council to bend US foreign policy to his will — and especially toward a much harder stance against Iran — all under President Trump’s nose. “They do what they want,” this person, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters, said. “In any other administration they would be fired.” That’s troubling. While Bolton in this case may have just been doing his job, it still brings up the question about just how much he’s using his power to pursue one his long-term objectives — regime change in Iran. How the Iran request came about The group Bolton leads — the National Security Council — coordinates national security policy across the sprawling US government. It collects input on major topics from the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Pentagon, and other agencies to provide the president with the best options at his disposal. On the Sunday after the attack on the Baghdad compound, the NSC’s deputies committee, comprised mainly of No. 2s from the various bureaucracies, met to discuss those options. Mira Ricardel, then Bolton’s deputy before a spat with first lady Melania Trump led to her ouster, at one point reportedly called the attacks “an act of war.” What’s unclear, though, is if the idea to strike Iran with force came from those meetings or if Bolton singlehandedly wanted the Pentagon to draw up some military options. Either way, one Pentagon official I spoke to didn’t seem bothered by the ask. “We always have and discuss military options based on new circumstances,” the official said. “The question of how close we were to striking — that no one knows.” The White House, of course, agrees. “This incident showed the NSC process led by Bolton works,” a senior administration official told me. Top Trump advisers — especially Bolton — are avid Iran hawks There are concerns that the NSC works in just the way Bolton wants it to — pursuing his own policy objectives, mainly an aggressive anti-Iran stance. Bolton has staffed up the NSC with people who share his views. Last week, he hired Richard Goldberg, a noted Iran hawk, to run the administration’s pressure campaign against the country. He also added Charles Kupperman, a former Boeing executive and long-time confidante, to serve as his deputy. Together, they will help Bolton run America’s foreign policy with little input from the president, some say. Kupperman “is the logical choice for someone who is fiercely loyal to Ambassador Bolton,” Mark Groombridge, formerly a top Bolton adviser at the State Department and United Nations, told me. “They are completely simpatico in terms of their views on foreign policy. The problem, of course, is their views are not simpatico with the person they are advising, President Trump.” It’s not so surprising Bolton may be using his power to pursue his anti-Iran objectives. In March 2015, he wrote an article suggesting the US and/or Israel should bomb Iran to keep it from obtaining a nuclear weapon. “Time is terribly short, but a strike can still succeed,” he wrote. “Such action should be combined with vigorous American support for Iran’s opposition, aimed at regime change in Tehran.” And two years later, Bolton gave a speech in which he hoped Iran’s regime would fall before the end of 2018.

### AT: Iran Deal

#### Iran deal doesn’t do shit

**Crook et. al 4/24** (Bloomberg Editorial Board members: Clive, Mary Duenwald, Bobby Ghosh, James Gibney, Nisid Hajari, Tobin Harshaw, Timothy Lavin, Therese Raphael, David Shipley, Tracy Walsh, Mark Whitehouse, Francis Wilkinson, “The Iran Deal Is Dead. Democrats Should Move On,” 4/24/19, Bloomberg, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-24/the-iran-deal-is-dead-democrats-should-move-on>, accessed 4/26/19) KED

Although Trump’s decision was rash, it wasn’t wrong. The deal was fatally flawed. Even as it was being negotiated, critics in the Middle East and beyond complained that the Obama administration was ignoring Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. They feared the regime would use the political cover provided by the JCPOA to step up its threatening behavior. They were right. Since the deal, Iran has only grown more belligerent. In Syria, it has helped President Bashar al-Assad slaughter his own citizens. In Lebanon and Palestine, Iraq and Yemen, it has continued to arm brutal proxy fighters. It has only intensified its pursuit of ballistic-missile technology and its cyberattacks against the U.S. If an agreement limited to nuclear weapons was too narrow in 2015, Iran’s actions since have made such a deal entirely insufficient.

### 1AR Arjun

#### Overview: They have conceded our WP Editorial evidence – all of their evidence has to be presumably false because Saudi spent 27 million dollars on US lobbyists. A journalist was ousted as someone under the Saudi payroll after he wrote a pro-Saudi article WHICH PROVES NO ONE IS TRUSTWORTHY.

#### On their Iran heg evidence – it’s a joke

**Walt 18** (Stephen, Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “The Islamic Republic of Hysteria,” Foreign Policy, 1/16/18, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/the-islamic-republic-of-hysteria-iran-middle-east-trump/>, accessed 1/20/19) KED

Yet this ongoing full-court press against Iran makes little sense because it is nowhere close to being a regional hegemon. If anything, the willingness of pundits and politicians to embrace this alarmist fantasy says more about the cavalier nature of U.S. strategic discourse than it does about the actual challenge Iran may pose. Iran presently lacks the hard power a state would need to dominate the Middle East’s vast and deeply divided set of countries. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran has a population of about 83 million; as of 2016, its GDP was more than $400 billion; and its annual defense budget is almost $16 billion. Its total military manpower (including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC) consists of about 520,000 troops, of of them poorly trained draftees. Many of its tanks, aircraft, and other major weapons systems date from the era of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and are in poor repair. As veteran defense analyst Anthony Cordesman concluded in 2010, “Iran’s conventional military is severely limited, relying heavily on obsolescent and low quality weaponry.… Its forces are not organized or trained to project significant power across the Gulf.” By contrast, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates have a combined population of well over 100 million and a combined GDP of more than $1 trillion — about quadruple that of Iran. Their combined defense spending is at least five times greater than Iran’s. These states possess some of the most sophisticated weapons money can buy, including Abrams battle tanks and F-15 aircraft, and Israel has nuclear weapons. In the unlikely event Iran ever attacked them, they could also count on support from the mighty United States. Given the far more powerful forces arrayed against Iran, to claim it is on the brink of regional hegemony defies reason. When confronted with these realities, Iran’s foes typically warn that it is using local proxies to spread its influence and take over the region. There is no question that Iran has backed a number of local actors in recent years, including the Lebanese Hezbollah, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, various militias in Iraq, and, to a lesser extent, the Houthis in Yemen. These moves have marginally enhanced Iran’s power — but mostly because it has been able to take advantage of its opponents’ blunders, such as the George W. Bush administration’s decision to topple Saddam Hussein. But these advances still leave Tehran far short of regional domination. For one thing, Iran does not control these groups any more than the United States controls its own Middle East clients. Each of these actors has its own interests, and Tehran’s present allies will not blindly follow its orders if doing so would jeopardize their own positions. To see these collaborations as a new Persian empire, as Henry Kissinger and Max Boot apparently do, is risible. Furthermore, many of Iran’s principal partners have all suffered significant setbacks in recent years, forcing the country to expend additional resources to prop them up. Support from the IRGC helped keep Assad in power, for example, but Syria is now a shattered state and thus not much of an ally. Far from creating an ever-expanding, increasingly powerful Iranian empire, Tehran’s support for these various groups has drained its coffers and brought Israel and the Gulf Arabs into tacit alignment, thereby undermining its overall position.

#### On their Saudi prolif evidence – the entirety of the aff is a takeout to this – Saudi has literally ZERO effective arms that could be used to start a war, if they did then they would’ve have called on the US for support, this evidence just says that Saudi has weapons but NOTHING about them wanting to use them or even THINK about using them.

#### On their regime collapse evidence – empirically disproven by the war in Yemen – they obviously don’t isolate themselves when Saudi has dropped 18,000 strikes on Yemen and created the worst humanitarian crisis in modern history.

### Cards

#### Iran is trash – this card is a slam dunk

**Walt 18** (Stephen, Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “The Islamic Republic of Hysteria,” Foreign Policy, 1/16/18, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/the-islamic-republic-of-hysteria-iran-middle-east-trump/>, accessed 1/20/19) KED

Yet this ongoing full-court press against Iran makes little sense because it is nowhere close to being a regional hegemon. If anything, the willingness of pundits and politicians to embrace this alarmist fantasy says more about the cavalier nature of U.S. strategic discourse than it does about the actual challenge Iran may pose. Iran presently lacks the hard power a state would need to dominate the Middle East’s vast and deeply divided set of countries. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran has a population of about 83 million; as of 2016, its GDP was more than $400 billion; and its annual defense budget is almost $16 billion. Its total military manpower (including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC) consists of about 520,000 troops, of of them poorly trained draftees. Many of its tanks, aircraft, and other major weapons systems date from the era of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and are in poor repair. As veteran defense analyst Anthony Cordesman concluded in 2010, “Iran’s conventional military is severely limited, relying heavily on obsolescent and low quality weaponry.… Its forces are not organized or trained to project significant power across the Gulf.” By contrast, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates have a combined population of well over 100 million and a combined GDP of more than $1 trillion — about quadruple that of Iran. Their combined defense spending is at least five times greater than Iran’s. These states possess some of the most sophisticated weapons money can buy, including Abrams battle tanks and F-15 aircraft, and Israel has nuclear weapons. In the unlikely event Iran ever attacked them, they could also count on support from the mighty United States. Given the far more powerful forces arrayed against Iran, to claim it is on the brink of regional hegemony defies reason. When confronted with these realities, Iran’s foes typically warn that it is using local proxies to spread its influence and take over the region. There is no question that Iran has backed a number of local actors in recent years, including the Lebanese Hezbollah, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, various militias in Iraq, and, to a lesser extent, the Houthis in Yemen. These moves have marginally enhanced Iran’s power — but mostly because it has been able to take advantage of its opponents’ blunders, such as the George W. Bush administration’s decision to topple Saddam Hussein. But these advances still leave Tehran far short of regional domination. For one thing, Iran does not control these groups any more than the United States controls its own Middle East clients. Each of these actors has its own interests, and Tehran’s present allies will not blindly follow its orders if doing so would jeopardize their own positions. To see these collaborations as a new Persian empire, as Henry Kissinger and Max Boot apparently do, is risible. Furthermore, many of Iran’s principal partners have all suffered significant setbacks in recent years, forcing the country to expend additional resources to prop them up. Support from the IRGC helped keep Assad in power, for example, but Syria is now a shattered state and thus not much of an ally. Far from creating an ever-expanding, increasingly powerful Iranian empire, Tehran’s support for these various groups has drained its coffers and brought Israel and the Gulf Arabs into tacit alignment, thereby undermining its overall position.

#### This Uniqueness card is straight dumpster juice. It says that sanctions solve conflict with Iran and Israel also solves conflict with Iran – empirics prove.

Hiltermann 12/12, [Joost R. Hiltermann is the Program Director, MENA for International Crisis Group. He was previously its Chief Operating Officer. Went to UC Santa Cruz] International Crisis Group Organization 12 DECEMBER 2018 “The Iran Nuclear Deal and the U.S.-Iran Standoff” <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/iran-nuclear-deal-and-us-iran-standoff> SLHS-RR

Dismayed by the loss of its regional satrap, and incensed in particular over the hostage affair, the U.S. took incremental measures to fence in the revolution, if not to snuff it out. Its weapons were economic sanctions – imposed on a number of grounds – and military support for the Iraqi war effort (which it then undermined by providing arms to Iran in the 1986 Iran-Contra affair). During the 1990s, having soured on an Iraqi leader who had threatened Western interests by invading Kuwait, the U.S. embarked on a “dual-containment” policy in the Gulf, strengthening its alliance with Saudi Arabia as a buffer against a hostile Iran and an unreliable Iraq. These measures proved effective in isolating Iran from international institutions and alliances but did little to threaten its leadership or undermine its society. To the contrary, Iran learned to be resourceful. Outgunned by U.S. allies in the region and with limited access to the international arms market since the revolution, Iran sought to compensate for its sense of encirclement and relative conventional military weakness by building toward self-sufficiency in asymmetric military capabilities and increasing its strategic depth. Iran heavily invested in its ballistic missile program, a legacy of having been a victim of these weapons during the war with Iraq and something it sees as a reliable deterrent against Israel. It also built a network of partners and proxies to protect against external threats. Tehran dubs this its “forward-defence” policy: an effort to exploit weak states, such as Lebanon and post-2003 Iraq, where it can meet its enemies on the battlefield through proxies without direct harm to Iran and its people.

#### Uh-oh. Them reading that trash uniqueness card is gonna come to bite them again. The type of military aid that we give to Saudi Arabia isn’t key to beat back an aggressive Iran.

Hitlermann 12/12, [Joost R. Hiltermann is the Program Director, MENA for International Crisis Group. He was previously its Chief Operating Officer. Went to UC Santa Cruz] International Crisis Group Organization 12 DECEMBER 2018 “The Iran Nuclear Deal and the U.S.-Iran Standoff” <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/iran-nuclear-deal-and-us-iran-standoff> SLHS-RR

The U.S. is banking on active Saudi and Israeli support for a more aggressive approach toward Iran (even though the Israeli security establishment, as opposed to its political leadership, sees benefit in the JCPOA’s survival). But the Saudi leadership is scoring own goal after own goal, while a U.S.-backed strategic alliance between Israel and Saudi Arabia remains elusive, without substantial progress in Israel-Palestine peace-making. Moreover, neither Israel nor Saudi Arabia is prepared to start an all-out war with Iran without the guarantee of U.S. military support – an unlikely prospect under an isolationist Trump, who is all bluster but seems unwilling to sacrifice blood and treasure through new military adventures abroad. The most to which this administration would likely commit are air and missile strikes, but air and missile strikes alone do not win a war. The U.S. also appears to be encouraging, and possibly financing, Iranian opposition and insurgent groups. These groups could cause damage but are unlikely to pose a serious threat to the Iranian system; their attacks could even spark a nationalist circling-of-the-wagons response among ordinary Iranians. Yet a response by the Iranian security apparatus against such groups in Europe, such as alleged attacks in the Netherlands and France, and an allegedly planned one in Denmark, in the past year, could push European states into a more critical stance toward Iran, and therefore more in line with U.S. strategy.

#### Wow! Their internal link card is bad too. It says that Israel would come to the defense of Saudi Arabia because they also have an interest in power projection in the region.

Marcus 17, [Jonathan Marcus Defense and diplomatic correspondent] “Why Saudi Arabia and Iran are bitter rivals” 18 November 2017 BBC News <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42008809> SLHS-RR

Saudi Arabia and Iran - two powerful neighbours - are locked in a fierce struggle for regional dominance. The decades-old feud between them is exacerbated by religious differences. They each follow one of the two main sects in Islam - Iran is largely Shia Muslim, while Saudi Arabia sees itself as the leading Sunni Muslim power. This religious schism is reflected in the wider map of the Middle East, where other countries have Sunni or Shia majorities, some of whom look towards Iran or Saudi Arabia for support or guidance. Historically Saudi Arabia, a monarchy and home to the birthplace of Islam, saw itself as the leader of the Muslim world. However this was challenged in 1979 by the Islamic revolution in Iran which created a new type of state in the region - a kind of theocracy - that had an explicit goal of exporting this model beyond its own borders. In the past 15 years in particular, the differences between Saudi Arabia and Iran have been sharpened by a series of events. The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq overthrew Saddam Hussein, a Sunni Arab who had been a major Iranian adversary. This removed a crucial military counter-weight to Iranian influence in Iraq, which has been rising since then. Fast-forward to 2011 and uprisings across the Arab world caused political instability throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia exploited these upheavals to expand their influence, notably in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, further heightening mutual suspicions. Iran's critics say it is intent on establishing itself or its proxies across the region, and achieve control of a land corridor stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean. Saudi Arabia country profile Iran country profile How have things suddenly got worse? The strategic rivalry is heating up because Iran is in many ways winning the regional struggle. In Syria, Iranian (and Russian) support for President Bashar al-Assad has largely routed rebel group groups backed by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is trying desperately to contain rising Iranian influence and the militaristic adventurism of the kingdom's young and impulsive Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman - the country's de facto ruler - is exacerbating regional tensions. He is waging a war against rebels in Saudi Arabia's southern neighbour, Yemen, in part to stem perceived Iranian influence there, but after nearly three years this is proving a costly gamble. Meanwhile in Lebanon, many observers believe the Saudis put pressure on the prime minister to resign in order to destabilise a country where Iran's ally, Shia militia group Hezbollah, leads a politically powerful bloc and controls a huge, heavily armed fighting force. Lebanon in the crosshairs Who are Hezbollah? There are also external forces at play. Saudi Arabia has been emboldened by support from the Trump administration while Israel, which sees Iran as a mortal threat, is in a sense "backing" the Saudi effort to contain Iran. The Jewish state is fearful of the encroachment of pro-Iranian fighters in Syria ever closer to its border. Israel and Saudi Arabia were the two countries most resolutely opposed to the 2015 international agreement limiting Iran's nuclear programme, insisting that it did not go far enough to roll back any chance of Iran obtaining the bomb. The power behind the throne Crown prince's ruthless streak Who are their regional allies? Broadly speaking the strategic map of the Middle East reflects the Shia-Sunni divide. In the pro-Saudi camp are the other major Sunni actors in the Gulf - the UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain, as well as Egypt and Jordan. In the Iranian camp is Syria's government, which has been strongly backed by Iran, and where pro-Iranian Shia militia groups, including the Lebanon-based Hezbollah, have played a prominent role in fighting predominantly Sunni rebel groups. The Shia-dominated Iraqi government is also a close ally of Iran, though paradoxically it also retains a close relationship with Washington on whom it has depended for help in the struggle against so-called Islamic State. Iran and Saudi Arabia: Their friends and foes How is the Saudi-Iranian rivalry being played out? This is in many ways a regional equivalent of the Cold War, which pitted the US against the Soviet Union in a tense military standoff for many years. Iran and Saudi Arabia are not directly fighting but they are engaged in a variety of proxy wars around the region. Syria is an obvious example while in Yemen Saudi Arabia has accused Iran of supplying ballistic missiles fired at Saudi territory by the Shia Houthi rebel movement - an incident which heightened the war of words between the two countries. But having become bogged down in Yemen and essentially defeated in Syria, Saudi Arabia seems to have its eye on Lebanon as the next proxy battlefield. Lebanon risks being tipped into Syria-like chaos but few analysts see Saudi interests prevailing there. Conflict in Lebanon could so easily draw in Israel in opposition to Hezbollah and this could lead to a third Israel-Lebanon war far more devastating than any of the previous encounters. Some cynics wonder if the Saudi crown prince's game plan is to trigger a war between Israel and Hezbollah and deliver a heavy blow to the group this way! A night of long knives and missiles Are we heading towards a direct war between Saudi Arabia and Iran? So far Tehran and Riyadh have fought via proxies. Neither is really geared up for a direct war with the other but one successful rocket attack on the Saudi capital from Yemen could upset the apple cart. One obvious area where they could come into direct conflict is in the waters of the Gulf, where they face each other across a maritime border. But here too fighting could risk a much broader conflict. For the US and other Western powers, freedom of navigation in the Gulf is essential and any conflict that sought to block the waterway - vital for international shipping and oil transportation - could easily draw in US naval and air forces. For a long time the US and its allies have seen Iran as a destabilising force in the Middle East. The Saudi leadership increasingly sees Iran as an existential threat and the crown prince seems willing to take whatever action he sees necessary, wherever he deems it necessary, to confront Tehran's rising influence. The danger is that Saudi Arabia's new activism is fast making it a further source of volatility in the region.

#### Israel is way more powerful than Iran and nuclear weapons deter any sort of proactive attack in the region by Iran - Syria proves. (This is the same author that had wrote their internal link)

Marcus 18 ([Jonathan Marcus Defense and diplomatic correspondent], “Israel strikes Iranian targets in Syria in response to rocket fire” 5/10/18, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44063022)

The strikes came after 20 rockets were fired at Israeli military positions in the occupied Golan Heights overnight. Syria's military said the Israeli "aggression" had killed three people. There was no immediate comment from Iran, whose deployment of troops to Syria to help President Bashar al-Assad has alarmed Israel. Iran has repeatedly called for an end to the existence of the Jewish state. Russia, Germany and France called on both countries to exercise restraint, but the US said Iran bore "full responsibility for the consequences of its reckless actions" and that Israel had a right to defend itself. The Golan Heights is a rocky plateau in south-western Syria, about 50km (30 miles) from the capital Damascus. Israel occupied most of the area in the 1967 Middle East war and later annexed it in a move not recognised internationally. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) said that early on Thursday morning 20 rockets had been launched at its forward posts there by the Quds Force, the overseas operations arm of Iran's Islamic Revolution Guards Corps. IDF spokesman Lt Col Jonathan Conricus said four rockets were intercepted by the Israeli Iron Dome aerial defence system, while 16 others fell short of their targets. No injuries or damage were reported. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a UK-based monitoring group, confirmed that rockets were fired towards the occupied Golan. But it said the attack came after Israeli forces bombarded Baath, a town in the demilitarised zone. A senior source in an Iranian-led military alliance that supports Syria's government also told AFP news agency that Israeli forces had fired first. Col Conricus said fighter jets had struck 70 military targets belonging to Iran inside Syria, causing significant damage. The targets included: Intelligence sites associated with Iran and its proxies A logistics headquarters belonging to the Quds Force A military logistics compound in Kiswah, a town south of Damascus An Iranian military compound north of Damascus Quds Force munition storage warehouses at Damascus International Airport Intelligence systems and posts associated with the Quds Force Observation and military posts and munitions in the Golan demilitarised zone The IDF said it had also targeted Syrian military air defence systems after they fired at the fighter jets despite an Israeli "warning". Israeli Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman later told a conference in the town of Herzliya that the IDF had "hit almost all of the Iranian infrastructure in Syria". "They must remember that if it rains here [in Israel], it will pour there," he said. "I hope that we have finished this chapter and that everyone got the message." However, Syria's military declared it had "thwarted a new Israeli act of aggression" and that its air defences "destroyed a large part" of the missile barrage. Three people were killed by the missiles, a spokesman said. A radar station and an ammunition depot were also destroyed, and several air defence bases sustained damage, he added. [Why is there a war in Syria?](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229) [The Golan Heights explained](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14724842) The Syrian Observatory reported that at least 23 people were killed, including five Syrian soldiers and 18 other allied fighters. Russia, which is also supporting the Syrian military, said Israel fired 60 air-to-surface and 10 surface-to-surface missiles and that more than half were shot down.

## AT: MbS/Vision 2030

### Top Level – Debate Drills

#### Uq overwhelms the link – their Wright evidence says that he’s widely popular among Saudi’s, but not because of the war

#### The internal link is laughable, MbS doesn’t singlehandedly solve climate change – even if they cut off oil like their ev says, there are other oil producers that will just step up. They don’t get access to this “saudi stability” link turn because nowhere in this ev says “stability”

#### Plan doesn’t trigger the impact, things like GCC still exist post-plan – independently their link says that we should just shake hands with an autocrat to keep him in office which is MESSED UP and the case link turns

#### Case impacts outweigh on probability and magnitude – one global leader can’t control all of climate change, but the US can shift a war that causes millions to suffer, prefer impacts that start at 100%

### Impact Turn – Co2 Good

#### CO2 key to solve Bio-D loss and helps fight global hunger

Goklany 15-- Indur M. Goklany is a science and technology policy analyst for the United States Department of the Interior, where he holds the position of Assistant Director of Programs, Science and Technology Policy. “CARBON DIOXIDE The good news” <http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2015/10/benefits.pdf>

3 Ancillary benefits of increased biospheric productivity Improved human wellbeing Higher agricultural yields reduce food prices in general. This provides a double dividend for humanity. Firstly, it reduces chronic hunger, but secondly a reduction in chronic hunger is the first step toward improvements in public health.61,62 Reduced habitat loss and pressure on biodiversity No less important, higher yields also provide a double dividend for the rest of nature. Firstly, they free up habitat for the rest of nature, which reduces the pressure on ecosystems. Had it not been for the increase in yields of 9–15%, global cropland would have had to be increased by a similar amount to produce the same amount of food, all else being equal. That figure means that an area equivalent to the combined area of Myanmar, Thailand and Malaysia has been saved from the plough. Secondly, land that has not been appropriated by humans also produces more food for other species. Consequently, this increases the aggregate biomass – that is, the product of number of species and representatives of each species – that the planet can sustain. How much would the food available for other species have decreased in the absence of anthropogenic increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide? To calculate this figure, assume that: • the productivity of unmanaged ecosystems also increased by 9–15% because of higher carbon dioxide concentrations (as estimated for crops) • human beings currently ‘appropriate’ 25% of the earth’s NPP.63 Therefore, had there been no anthropogenic increase in carbon dioxide, satisfying current human demand for food, timber, feed for domesticated animals and other plant-derived product would have required the share of NPP available for the rest of nature to decline by 11–17%. Alternatively, if one assumes that human beings currently use 40% of global NPP64 and retain the other assumptions intact then the present share of NPP available for the rest of nature would have had to decline by 14–22%. In either case, in the absence of any carbon dioxide fertilisation there would have been **a significant increase in the number of species at risk of extinction**. Notably, one of the factors invoked to explain the latitudinal gradient in biodiversity –the greater abundance of species as one moves from the poles to the tropics – is greater ecological productivity.65 It has also been suggested that an even more importantfactor might be that metabolic and other processes speed up as temperatures increase, consistent with the Arrhenius rate equation.66,67 Whatever the explanation, it reminds us that in a world with higher temperatures, at the very least the higher latitudes would support more biomass, other things being equal. The increasing amplitude of the seasonal variation in atmospheric carbon dioxide in these areas is one manifestation of this.68

#### Food loss ensures nuclear war

Cribb 14 [Julian, “Human extinction: it is possible?” Sydney Morning Herald, Published: April 2, 2014, p. <http://www.smh.com.au/comment/human-extinction-it-is-possible-20140402-zqpln.html>]

However our own behaviour is liable to be a far more immediate determinant of human survival or extinction. Above two degrees – which we have already locked in – the world’s food harvest is going to become increasingly unreliable, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warned this week. That means **mid-century famines** in places like **India**, **China**, the **Middle East** and **Africa**. But what scientists cannot predict is how humans living in the tropics and subtropics will respond to this form of stress. So let us turn to the strategic and military think tanks, who like to explore such scenarios, instead. The Age of Consequences study by the US Centre for Strategic and International Studies says that under a 2.6 degree rise “nations around the world will be overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress…as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world… has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities. Armed conflict between nations over resources… is likely and **nuclear war is possible**. The social consequences range from increased religious fervour to outright chaos.” Of five degrees – which the world is on course for by 2100 if present carbon emissions continue – it simply says the consequences are "inconceivable". Eighteen nations currently have nuclear weapons technology or access to it, **raising the stakes on nuclear conflict to the highest level** since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, with more than 4 billion people living in the world’s most vulnerable regions, scope for refugee tsunamis and pandemic disease is also large. It is on the basis of scenarios such as these that scientists like Peter Schellnhuber – science advisor to German President Angela Merkel – and Canadian author Gwynne Dyer have warned of the potential **loss of most of the human population** in the conflicts, famines and pandemics spinning out of climate impacts. Whether that adds up to extinction or not rather depends on how many of the world’s 20,000 nukes are let off in the process. These issues all involve assumptions about human, national and religious behaviour and are thus beyond the remit of scientific bodies like the IPCC, which can only hint at what they truly think will happen. So you are not getting the full picture from them.

### Link D – MbS Not Leaving

#### MbS is NOT leaving the Throne – their evidence is all from anonymous Western sources that can’t be verified, this card will END the debate

Joplin 4/9 Ty Joplin, Ty Joplin is a researcher focused on geopolitical developments and humanitarian crises in the Middle East. He lives in Amman, Jordan, 4-9-2019, "Why You Should Be Skeptical of Mohammed bin Salman’s Disappearing Act," Al Bawaba, <https://www.albawaba.com/news/why-you-should-be-skeptical-mohammed-bin-salman%E2%80%99s-disappearing-act-1278066?fbclid=IwAR1UHQhYb6xnIwTBSx58vaLZAIcEIsIQzIrnig-k7leUEWf2dElaU8i78x0> / MM

The Bitter truth: Bin Salman is here to stay Mohammed bin Salman still has hands on Saudi’s levers of power, and his absence from certain meetings may simply be to continue with a strategy of PR damage control. “The reality of the matter is that MbS is solidified in his position as the al-Saud [regime] has rallied around MbS,” Theodore Karasik, a Gulf expert who is now a Senior Adviser at Gulf State Analytics, told Al Bawaba. Mohammed bin Salman is still the head of Saudi’s Ministry of Defense, which gives him control of the state’s military apparatus and aspects of its foreign policy, while also effectively leading the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), which is an internal military force dedicated solely to protecting the royal family from coup attempts. Karasik also noted that MbS still has strong support from the country’s technocrats, who back MbS’ reform efforts. These positions, and not his presence at diplomatic meetings, are likely to be more accurate measurements of MbS’ political power inside Saudi Arabia. “MbS doesn't disappear if you keep track of the Arabic press. Ever since MBS became Deputy Crown Prince there has been a steady stream of Western reporting on major internal problems and Disappearing Acts as a sign of problems at the top of the Saudi hierarchy,” Karasik added. Domestically, according to Karasik, MbS still appears to be a popular figure among those who support his plan to open the country up to foreign investment while leashing the country’s notorious religious police. For his lack of high-profile public appearances, Saudi may simply be making a strategic calculation to limit his exposure. “I don't think anyone can say anything with certainty but it may be that Mohammed bin Salman is keeping a lower public profile as he continues to consolidate power domestically and attempts to contain the fallout from the murder of Jamal Khashoggi,” explained Kristian Ulrichsen, a Middle East fellow at the Baker Institute based out of Rice University. On a supposed internal rift between the king and MbS, Ulrichsen points out several occasions where MbS and the king have been seen together: “I think it is safe to assume that Mohammed bin Salman retains the support of King Salman,” he said. When it comes to anonymous sources with purported insider knowledge claiming MbS is on his way out or that the royal court is scheduling is replacement, there is reason to be skeptical. “If anyone is leaking information about the Crown Prince's position I would imagine it might be coming from members of Western intelligence communities who are alarmed at the volatility and unpredictability in aspects of Saudi regional and foreign policymaking,” Ulrichsen argued, though Al Bawaba could not independently verify this claim. Karasik further explained that the anonymous leaks may be politically driven attempts to try and influence who becomes the next king. The country’s current ruler, King Salman, has suffered from dementia for years and is likely to pass the reigns of the country on soon. “Some sources want MbS out so bad that they will manipulate the press and leak articles almost to the minute in order to keep fake narratives alive,” Karasik added. A protester wears a mask depicting MbS’ face while demonstrating outside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey (AFP/FILE) Understanding how Mohammed bin Salman is able to hold onto power in spite of global backlash is just as important to knowing how he abuses that power in the first place. That he ordered the hit on a famous American journalist speaks to one level of power he commands: to know how he can order such hits with impunity is similarly vital information, which speaks to another type of power he has captured. There is a real risk this information could get lost under the stampede of recurrent speculations by some media outlets regarding his supposedly ailing grasp on Saudi. Thinking he is vulnerable from the negative media coverage betrays the amount of power he actually has. As it appears now, he is withstanding the negative media coverage of his rule while he continues the Saudi’s war in Yemen that he ordered in 2015 and tortures more dissidents and women’s activists. The rumors that the royal court is grooming a replacement have so far not panned out. The underlying reason why he is able to persist as the country’s de facto leader is because he has centralized power more effectively than any other Saudi leader: he has personalized the state’s institutions around him while becoming the face of a fast-changing kingdom, all the while brutalizing those who stand in his way and exacerbating the world’s worst humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The Saudi state is not quietly holding him to account, because he is the Saudi state.

### Impact D – China Alt Cause

#### China is a greater cause of warming- destroys all solvency

**Wortzel ‘8** (Former Director of Asian Studies at the Heritage Foundation (Larry et al, Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Nov, p. google)

China argues that developed countries are the primary cause of climate change and therefore places primary responsibility for re ducing emissions on those countries rather than on China and other developing countries, a concept identified as ‘‘common but differentiated responsibilities.’’ 190 The United States *is* the largest historical greenhouse gas emitter and far exceeds China in emissions per capita.191 However, in the past two years China has overtaken the United States in total production of greenhouse gas emissions. **All projections** indicate that, in the absence of major energy consumption changes in China, both China’s aggregate emissions and its share of global emissions will continue to **increase dramatically for the foreseeable future**. The consequent reality is that it will be **impossible** for the international community to resolve the climate change problem by sufficiently reducing emissions **unless China contributes to the effort.** The solution also is unachievable unless the United States—as currently the world’s second largest emitter and the largest historical emitter of greenhouse gases— makes a substantial contribution. Any efforts to address this problem will require global participation by developed and developing nations.

### Impact D – Inevitable

#### More evidence- there’s too much CO2 in the air even if we stop

**Hansen ‘8** (Hansen, head of NASA Goddard Institute and professor of Environmental Sciences, Columbia University, 2008 (James E. Hanson. Head of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies in New York City and adjunct professor in the Department of Earth and Environmental Science at Columbia University. Al Gore’s science advisor. Introductory chapter for the book State of the Wild. “Tipping point: Perspective of a Scientist.” April. http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/2008/StateOfWild\_20080428.pdf)

**The upshot of the combination of inertia and feedbacks is that additional climate change is already “in the pipeline”: even if we** stopincreasing **greenhouse gases today, more warming will occur.** This is sobering when one considers the present status of Earth’s climate. Human civilization developed during the Holocene (the past 12,000 years). It has been warm enough to keep ice sheets off North America and Europe, but cool enough for ice sheets to remain on Greenland and Antarctica. With rapid warming of 0.6°C in the past 30 years, **global temperature is at its warmest level** in the Holocene.3 **The warming that has already occurred, the positive feedbacks** that have been **set in motion, and the** additional warming in the pipeline **together have brought us to the precipice of a planetary tipping point. We are at the tipping point because the climate state includes large,** ready **positive feedbacks** provided by the Arctic sea ice, the West Antarctic ice sheet, and much of Greenland’s ice. Little additional forcing **is needed to trigger these feedbacks and magnify global warming. If we go over the edge, we will transition to an environment far outside the range that has been experienced by humanity, and there will be no return** within any foreseeable future generation. Casualties would include more than the loss of indigenous ways of life in the Arctic and swamping of coastal cities. An intensified hydrologic cycle will produce both greater floods and greater droughts. In the US, the semiarid states from central Texas through Oklahoma and both Dakotas would become more drought-prone and ill suited for agriculture, people, and current wildlife. Africa would see a great expansion of dry areas, particularly southern Africa. Large populations in Asia and South America would lose their primary dry season freshwater source as glaciers disappear. A major casualty in all this will be wildlife.

## AT: New Iran Deal

#### Iran says no – bad faith negotiations collapse the current deal and give Iran hawks in the administration pretext for going to war – turns the net benefit

**Larison 4/24** (Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and was a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and resides in Dallas, “There Is No ‘Better’ Deal Than the JCPOA,” 4/24/19, The American Conservative, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/there-is-no-better-deal-than-the-jcpoa/>, accessed 4/25/19) KED

Bloomberg’s editors keep declaring the JCPOA dead, but in spite of the administration’s efforts to kill it the other parties to the agreement refuse to let it die. They have urged European governments to abandon the deal, but Germany, France, and Britain pressed ahead and established the INSTEX workaround. As they have done once again, they have repeatedly called for a “better” or “new” deal that Iran would never agree to. Like other opponents of the nuclear deal, they seem to think that all that is required to obtain even more extensive concessions from Iran is sufficient pressure and the will to demand more. The deal’s opponents pretend that Iran can be forced into accepting things that their government believes to be contrary to their interests, but of course that isn’t possible. It isn’t credible to feign interest in negotiations with Iran while actively seeking the demise of the most significant diplomatic agreement with Iran. Iran hawks have often pretended that they were not opposed to diplomacy with Iran itself, but their actions and bad faith arguments prove that they are. Hawks recoil from the compromise that diplomatic agreements require. They are almost never satisfied with the concessions our diplomats manage to secure, and they usually assume that the other government has outmaneuvered ours. Hawks never want to settle for the available agreement, but insist that there is always some “better,” “tougher” one waiting just over the horizon. In almost every case, this means that they think the other side should surrender and cede all of its rights and claims while demanding nothing from us. It is never realistic, it is never acceptable to the other government, and unsurprisingly the “better” deal never materializes because the other side has no reason to negotiate with unreasonable maximalists. We have seen this with every arms control and nonproliferation agreement over the decades. Thirty years ago, hard-liners denounced Reagan for appeasing the Soviets with the INF Treaty, which also happened to be the most lopsidedly pro-American arms control treaty ever negotiated. The content of these agreements doesn’t matter to them, and the “flaws” and “defects” that hawks say they want to fix are usually necessary to ensure that the agreement is acceptable to all parties. When hawks say they want to “fix” the “defects” in the JCPOA, they mean they want to destroy the agreement and replace it with nothing.

#### Asking to renegotiate pushes Iran out of the current deal altogether – turns the net benefit

**Larison 2/12** (Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and was a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and resides in Dallas, “The U.S. Should Rejoin the Nuclear Deal Without New Demands,” The American Conservative, 2/12/19, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-u-s-should-rejoin-the-nuclear-deal-without-new-demands/>, accessed 4/25/19) KED

The authors want to punish Iran for honoring the agreement despite U.S. violations by expecting Iran to give up even more than it already has. Whatever else one wants to say about this, it will be a non-starter in Tehran, and it should be. If the positions were reversed, our government would never consider offering even more to the party that reneged on its commitments, and we shouldn’t expect other governments to behave any differently. Instead of simply rejoining the deal, the authors propose that a future administration “should use the leverage gained from Trump’s exit—however much they might disagree with that decision—to come to some preliminary understandings with Iran on the many issues of contention that remain in the relationship and on the future of Iran’s nuclear program.” In other words, they want the next administration to make our government’s reentry into an agreement that it should never have left conditional on the Iranian government’s willingness to negotiate on other issues that they have already said they won’t talk about. More to the point, Iranian officials have made U.S. reentry the precondition for any future negotiations, so they aren’t going to participate in haggling with the U.S. over the price of rejoining the agreement. Goldenberg and Brewer have taken a straightforward, sensible position–urging the U.S. rejoin the JCPOA–and warped it almost beyond recognition. They add that the U.S. “should also be realistic and not ask for too much, since it is in the United States’ interest to go back into the agreement,” but that raises the obvious question: why make additional demands to get us to do something that already serves U.S. interests? The attempt to overreach and profit from Trump’s previous deal-breaking is foolish and greedy, and Iran isn’t going to play along. This sort of unnecessary foot-dragging on the part of a future administration would be just the thing to convince Iran’s leaders to give up on the JCPOA all together. If Iran’s government has been hoping to wait out Trump, they will not respond favorably to more pressure tactics after Trump is out of office. The authors have just provided an outline of what the next administration definitely shouldn’t do when rejoining the JCPOA. I hope none of the 2020 candidates adopts their recommendations

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#### Iran says no

**Smeltz and Cookson 3/27** (Dina Smeltz is a senior fellow of public opinion and foreign policy at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and John R. Cookson is a digital content officer at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “Would Iranians welcome a new nuclear deal? Think again.” 3/27/19, The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/27/how-iranians-attitudes-toward-nuclear-deal-are-changing/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.210077cc1e06>, accessed 4/25/19) KED

The drop in Iranian public support for the Iran nuclear agreement is even more dramatic. A December IranPoll found that Iranian public support for the JCPOA plunged from 76 percent in August 2015 to 51 percent in December 2018. Iranians have soured on the whole negotiation experience. Seven in 10 Iranians say the JCPOA experience demonstrated it was not worthwhile for Iran to make concessions because Iran cannot have confidence other world powers will honor their side of an agreement (72 percent in December, up from 67 percent in January 2018). Why the change? Explaining this recent dive in support for the deal requires understanding why Iranians initially supported it. Critically, it was never out of a desire to see Tehran’s nuclear program or military diminished. Since 2014, Iranian public backing for their country’s nuclear program has stayed fixed around 90 percent. On top of that, virtually all Iranians believe it is important for the country to develop missiles (76 percent very important, 20 percent somewhat important, in 2018). Instead, Iranians expected economic dividends after the nuclear deal. They wanted the West to show them the money. In fact, Iranian expectations of a windfall seem to have outpaced the exact terms of the agreement, with many Iranians believing all sanctions — not just nuclear-related ones — would be lifted. Instead, following the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA, Washington reinstated all the sanctions that had been in place before the agreement was signed. Targeting not just Iran but also the countries that trade with it, the sanctions apply to oil, banking and shipping sectors, critical areas of the Iranian economy. Even more recently, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has suggested the U.S. government designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard as an official terrorist organization. If it comes to pass, this would be the first time a military unit of another government would fall into this category. The result is many Iranians do not feel the West has followed through on their side of the bargain. By January 2018, six in 10 Iranians said the United States had not lifted all of the sanctions it agreed to lift in the JCPOA, nearly double the number that said the same in 2016. Confidence in the United States to live up to its perceived agreement obligations fell from 45 percent in 2015 to just 12 percent in 2018. These impressions allow the Iranian regime to divert the blame of economic hardship. While most Iranians blame the country’s economic situation on their own leaders’ mismanagement, the portion that blames western sanctions is increasing (from 26 percent in May 2015 to 36 percent in December 2018). Despite the reimposed U.S. sanctions, the European signatories to the Iran deal are laboring to keep trade with Iran alive by setting up INSTEX, a special purpose payment vehicle. But both Zarif and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini criticized this payment channel, saying the European Union is not fulfilling its JCPOA obligations. These messages have been reaching the Iranian public. For the first time since 2016, less than half of Iranians are convinced European countries will fulfill their obligations under the deal (44 percent compared with 61 percent in June 2018). Rouhani, whose elevation to the presidency in 2013 was an impetus for starting talks with the United States, seems to have tapped the current sentiment in Iran during a speech broadcast live on state television earlier this month in which he declared “there is no possibility of entering negotiations with America.” Zarif recently resigned, then quickly returned, in a move that seems to have done little to reverse power moving toward the hard-liners in Tehran. How much does this matter? We can expect the Iran agreement will be a 2020 campaign issue. No fewer than five presidential hopefuls on the Democratic side — including Sens. Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren and Kamala D. Harris — say they would rejoin the JCPOA as long as Iran continued to comply with the requirements in the 2015 agreement. But just because an American president may want to return to negotiations does not mean Iranian leaders will jump at the invitation. Nor do Iranian leaders distinguish between Democrats and Republicans in their public criticism of the United States. As things stand, neither a sudden reversal in policy by the Trump administration nor Democratic campaign vows to reenter the deal if elected looks likely to lead Iran back to talks any time soon. And there certainly is no pressure from the Iranians to do so.

## AT: NonProlif Ptx

#### Gold standard not key – the deal would have a ton of congressional checks without it AND insisting on it would cause the Saudis to turn to other actors not worried about them proliferating – turns the internal link

**Tubb ’18** (Katie Tubb is a senior policy analyst for energy and environmental issues in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, “U.S. Shouldn’t Hold to Strict "Gold Standard" on Saudi Nuclear Deal,” 5/20/18, The Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/us-shouldnt-hold-strict-gold-standard-saudi-nuclear-deal>, accessed 4/26/19) KED

\*Bracketed numbers added for quick rebuttal & c/x reference

By all appearances, Saudi Arabia is pursuing a legitimate, robust, and peaceful nuclear power industry that is matched by its continued participation in international non-proliferation treaties. Saudi Arabia signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1988 and concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement in 2009, giving the International Atomic Energy Agency access to its nuclear program and facilities. The agency is further involved in Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy program through a country program framework spanning from 2017 to 2021, which provides technical guidance as the Saudis develop their nuclear energy program. Additionally, Saudi Arabia is party to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative, agreements focused on monitoring the transportation of radioactive material, information sharing between countries, and detection and prevention of trafficking nuclear weapons. The ‘Gold Standard’ Controversy Some have argued that an essential piece to a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia is the so-called “gold standard,” which would require a ban on enrichment and reprocessing technologies as a condition of trading with the U.S. They argue this is critical to preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and acceleration of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. There are a number of problems with the so-called “gold standard.” To take just one, a “gold standard” misleadingly implies that any other standard is deficient or ineffectual. Congress already requires strong commitments from partner nations in 123 agreements, which are codified in nine non-proliferation terms. Briefly summarized, a partnering country must: [1] Must indefinitely maintain safeguards on all nuclear material and equipment transferred or produced through trade under the 123 agreement; [2] Must be under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; [3] Must not use nuclear material, equipment, or technology for research, development, or deployment in an explosive or other military application; [4] Must not transfer material, technology, or information outside of its jurisdiction without prior U.S. consent; [5] Must guarantee the physical security of nuclear material and facilities; [6] Must not enrich or reprocess any U.S. originating material or any material produced from U.S.-based technology without prior approval from the U.S. government; [7] Must not store plutonium or highly enriched uranium originating from U.S. material or technology without prior approval from the U.S. government; And further, that: [8] The U.S. retains the right to retract all nuclear material and equipment transferred through trade under the 123 agreement if the partnering nation rebuffs International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or detonates a bomb; [9] The 123 agreement covers all material, technology, and facilities transferred. In fixating on this misleadingly-named “gold standard,” advocates are missing the major gains that could be made by engaging with Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program through a 123 agreement. In fact, the “gold standard” itself may be a detriment to advancing America’s non-proliferation goals if it causes potential partnering nations to minimize or reject trade with the U.S. The U.S. has a unique opportunity to engage with Saudi Arabia and help guide its peaceful introduction of commercial nuclear power, to which a 123 agreement is the doorway.

## AT: Prolif

### Top Level - HW

### Cards

#### No prolif— intervening actors and it’s too hard

Fitzpatrick 15, Director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, ‘15 (Mark, "Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Nuclear Rumour Mill," May, www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2015-932e/may-7114/saudi-arabia-pakistan-and-the-nuclear-rumour-mill-1419

Wanting enrichment is a far cry from possessing it, however. How would the Saudis acquire enrichment technology? Their nascent nuclear industry is at a rudimentary stage. They have no facilities relating to enrichment and no known research programme or specialists in this field. Developing uranium enrichment on their own would take 15 years or more. If they really want to match Iran’s enrichment programme, they naturally would want to buy the technology, but who would sell it? The 49 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have agreed not to transfer any nuclear technology that would contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is no standard interpretation of this clause, but clearly it would apply to a Saudi enrichment programme that was initiated to contribute to a weapons option. Although the NSG guidelines are voluntary, the ‘non-proliferation principle’, as it is called, has become an entrenched norm. Any inclination to violate it would put the would-be exporter under intense international pressure. Five nations that possess enrichment technology are outside the NSG: India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. Iran obviously would not empower its Gulf rival in this way, and neither would Israel. India, which seeks NSG membership, prides itself on not allowing proliferation-sensitive exports and has strong reasons to keep its export record clean. North Korea may have no compunction against selling nuclear technology to any would-be buyer, but it has no connections with Saudi Arabia and every major intelligence agency is watching to ensure that none develop. Pakistan is the usual suspect. It has close ties with Saudi Arabia and benefitted from Saudi munificence when its nuclear weapons programme was getting off the ground. Every couple of years a media scoop alleges that Pakistan is on the verge of transferring nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia. A thinly sourced article in the Sunday Times on 15 May was the latest in this line, claiming that Saudi Arabia has taken a ‘strategic decision’ to acquire ‘off-the-shelf’ nuclear weapons from Pakistan. Whatever the Saudis may have decided, however, a transfer requires a willing supplier. As I argued last year in my Adelphi book, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers, Pakistan has strong strategic, political and economic incentives to keep its nuclear weapons to itself. Just as the Pakistanis resolutely refused Saudi Arabia’s request for aircraft and ground forces to support the Yemen intervention, so too they would refuse a nuclear weapons transfer.Very little in the Sunday Times article is credible. Take this line, purportedly from a US intelligence official: ‘We know this stuff is available to them off the shelf’. The US intelligence community includes 17 separate agencies and over 800,000 US officials hold top-secret clearances. No doubt reporters can find at least one of them whom they can quote repeating what has been in previous press reports. But responsible intelligence officials do not speak that way. Those who know something about Pakistan’s nuclear programme know that it has no nuclear weapons ‘on the shelf’ waiting for delivery to Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is focused entirely on India. Opening up a second front on its west by becoming involved in the Saudi–Iran dispute would be a strategic blunder.

## AT: PQD

### Top Level - DD

TOP LEVEL FRAMING – BE VERY SKEPTICAL OF THIS DISAD – THEIR EV AND LINK CHAIN IS HORRIBLE

A. their link evidence for why military aid legislation always causes judicial resolution is from the REAGAN era

B. the entire PQD doctrine is super vague because it’s completely up to the courts to decide – the actual probability of the courts deciding is super low, unpredictable, and takes too long

C. No brink – numerous examples of judicial resolution on foreign affairs that have already happened – War Powers Act and Court takedown of Trump immigration ban prove

D. Missing internal link – no reason why countries would suddenly change and remove their PQD after the US violates its own

#### Pressure from Republicans forces Trump to comply with congressional action

Lederman 18 (Josh, Lederman covered foreign affairs, national security and U.S. diplomacy for The Associated Press (AP), based in Washington. NBC News. “Trump administration to hit Russia with new sanctions for Skripal poisoning” 8/8/18. <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-administration-hit-russia-new-sanctions-skripal-poisoning-n898856>) / MM

The Trump administration is hitting Russia with [new sanctions](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/new-russia-sanctions-will-likely-target-oligarchs-close-putin-n862996) punishing President Vladimir Putin's government for [using a chemical weapon against an ex-spy in Britain](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/former-russian-spy-sergei-skripal-critical-condition-england-n853931), U.S. officials told NBC News Wednesday. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo signed off on a determination that Russia violated international law by poisoning the former spy, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter in March, officials said, a decision that was announced Wednesday afternoon by State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert. Although the United States joined European countries in publicly blaming Moscow within days of the attack, the Trump administration had never issued the formal determination that triggers automatic sanctions under a decades-old U.S. law on chemical weapons. The decision could bolster [President Donald Trump](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/foreign-affairs-chair-says-trump-ignoring-sanctions-russia-former-spy-n894961)'s claim that — despite the noise of special counsel Robert Mueller's investigation into alleged Russian election meddling, which Trump has called a "witch hunt" — his administration has been tough on Moscow in practice and has hit hard when needed. But Trump had to be nudged by Congress into unleashing the penalties after blowing more than a month past a statutory deadline. The government had two months after a formal congressional request in March for Trump to determine whether Russia had violated international law. After the deadline came and went with no response, Trump [was called out in late July](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/foreign-affairs-chair-says-trump-ignoring-sanctions-russia-former-spy-n894961') by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce, R-Calif., NBC News first reported.:16 It was a rare instance of friendly fire from a fellow Republican, as members of Trump's party grew increasingly frustrated with his handling of Russia after his Helsinki summit with Putin in June. Royce, who faulted Trump for failing to make use of existing sanctions authorities on Russia, had urged Trump to comply by midday Wednesday. Senior U.S. officials said making the formal determination is a complicated and technical process that can take more time than the deadline allows, particularly to ensure that sanctions don't have unintended consequences for U.S. businesses. Previous administrations also frequently missed the deadline. Royce responded to the move Wednesday by saying Trump's administration was "rightly acting to uphold international bans" on chemical weapons and to put more pressure on Moscow. He said in a statement that Putin "must know that we will not tolerate his deadly acts, or his ongoing attacks on our democratic process." The sanctions are structured in two tranches, laid out in a 1991 law, the Chemical and Biological Weapons and Warfare Elimination Act. An initial, immediate round limits exports and financing but may have limited impact, because it largely overlaps with other restrictions already in place, such as on selling arms to Russia. The biggest impact from the initial sanctions is expected to come from a ban on granting licenses to export sensitive national security goods to Russia, which in the past have included items like electronic devices and components, along with test and calibration equipment for avionics. Before the sanctions, such exports were allowed on a case-by-case basis. The new prohibition could cut off hundreds of millions of dollars in future exports to Russia, a senior State Department official said. A second, more painful round kicks in three months later unless Russia provides "reliable assurances" that it won't use chemical weapons in the future and agrees to "on-site inspections" by the United Nations — conditions unlikely to be met. The second round of sanctions could include downgrading diplomatic relations, suspending the state airline Aeroflot's ability to fly to the United States and cutting off nearly all exports and imports. The chemical weapons law was most recently used in March when the Trump administration determined that North Korea had used the chemical agent VX to kill leader Kim Jong Un's half-brother in a Malaysian airport. The sanctions on Russia will take effect in 15 days, when they will be published in the Federal Register.

#### Trump thumps PQD international modelling.

Salmon ’16 Journalist Felix Salmon, MA @ U Glasgow, is a financial journalist, formerly of Portfolio Magazine and Euromoney and a former finance blogger for Reuters, where he analyzed economic and occasionally social issues in addition to financial commentary. In April 2014, Salmon left Reuters for a digital role at Fusion Fusion, 12-6-2016, ["A corrupt oligarchy is the best that America can hope for now", http://fusion.net/a-corrupt-oligarchy-is-the-best-that-america-can-hope-f-1793864109] bcr 4-13-2017

The result is that among voters–who are the people who really matter, in a democracy–almost no one respects the presidency anymore. Half of them loathe the 45th president; the other half voted him in with the express intention of seeing him throw bombs and tear down the very institutions of governance that created whatever level of peace and prosperity America currently enjoys. In this context of debased institutions, Trump is going to have enormous power but much less legitimacy. So the question then arises: What is he going to do with all that power? And remember, this is a man who can unilaterally obliterate life as we know it. A hawkish bully with zero foreign-policy expertise has his finger on the nuclear trigger; on top of that, a bombastic billionaire with zero economic expertise is now in charge of the U.S. economy, which in turn will set the macroeconomic tone for the entire planet. Trump, it’s important to remember, does not have allies. In politics, he was supported by almost no traditional power brokers until the very end; in business he has a long history of doing badly by his contractors, lenders, and the like. For Trump, life is a zero-sum game with winners and losers, and unless someone else is losing, he can’t be winning. This doesn’t bode well for anybody, inside or outside the USA, whose name isn’t Trump.

## AT: Pelosi

### Top Level – HW

#### No internal link between shifting war powers back to Congress and us first striking North Korea – Congress still has checks over the executive and Trump can’t just click a big red button to strike them.

## AT: Rider

#### Fiat solves your link – the plan passes so no debate in congress and nothing attached to the plan

#### Rider DA’s are a voting issue for ground - there’s an infinite number of things that could be attached that are not based in the topic lit – they steal aff ground and lack of link evidence proves they’re just asserting vague claims

## AT: Syria

### Top Level – Debate Drills

#### Saudi doesn’t have the power to go into Syria – their military is trash without US support and don’t have the support to try and overthrow the government – they lose the RSAF and 61% of their arms

#### No impact – their ev is about Middle Eastern countries in general so Saudi isn’t necessary to trigger the link

#### Case outweighs – justifying the war by saying “oh they might do something else” creates infinite spans of unpredictable actions that collapses the war to nothing more than “necessary violence”

## AT: Syria Power Vacuum

### Top Level - State

#### There is no link to the aff – we’re giving aid to the REBELS THAT ARE TRYING TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT, we aren’t giving aid to the authoritarian regimes itself – the world of the aff would not remove that military aid

#### The status quo should’ve triggered the impact – they say that the US pulls out of Syria and it creates a power vacuum, but the US already declared that we were going to pull out of Syria and nothing has happened.

#### This doesn’t disprove that the aff is a good idea – US military aid does horrible, terrible things that shouldn’t be glossed over, it has sparked the largest humanitarian crisis in modern history and tens of thousands of deaths that THE UNITED STATES IS RESPONSIBLE FOR. Acting like other countries can be worse is ridiculous and ignores status quo injustices.

## AT: Sanctions

### Impact Turn – Sanctions Good

#### Sanctions good – they’re an effective form of international deterrence which solves all their terminal impacts.

Lumen 18 [Christine, Tallinn University of Technology, “The Power of Sanctions as a Tool of International Relations: Factors that Determine its Success, published 2018] // BBM

As stated by Lorber et al. 2015 “sanctions allow ... to take non-military actions in cases where military force, where the cost of using force is too high, but a strong response is required”. Thus, the international community resorts to the application of economic pressure against the target state as a tool of deterrence and punishment for their deviant behaviour. The sender country’s objective is to penalize the target-country and to discourage other states from future wrongdoing. In other words, economic sanctions, as a punitive measure, contribute to the formulation of **internationally agreed** basic standards of **legitimate** conduct (Leyton-Brown 1987). More precisely, deterrence refers to the ability to prevent or at least discourage future unpleasant policy, by demonstrating capability and readiness to suppress unacceptable behaviour. Moreover, this punishment approach decreases the risk of repeated undesirable action by the targeted country. For example, sanctions imposed against China in response to the Quemoy-Matsu crisis in 1954-1955, could be considered as a deterrence success. At that time, Vice President Nixon declared: “[We have to adopt] an area of action between war and appeasement ... [otherwise it would lead to a] chain reaction of aggression by Chinese Communists” (Komine 2008). There are times when sanctions are imposed in order to deter other states from unwanted behaviour, by demonstrating the probable consequences or cost of misbehaviour. The classic example is the U.S.-Cuba case, where trade bans and a complete embargo against financial institutions were imposed by the U.S. on

## AT: Saudi Oil

### Top Level

#### No impact – all that happens when oil prices rise is people get pissed off, oil isn’t significant enough of a sector to determine growth on all fronts – empirically proven by crisis in 73’ and the mid 2000’s

#### No impact

Dichristopher 1/2 Tom Dichristopher, 01-02-2019, “Oil rises 2.5% as Saudi oil exports are seen falling,” CNBC, [https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/02/oil-markets-us-crude-production-global-economy-in-focus.html /](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/02/oil-markets-us-crude-production-global-economy-in-focus.html%20/) MM

Oil prices were higher on the first trading day of 2019, bolstered by signs of tighter supplies from Saudi Arabia that offset record output in the United States and Russia and weak economic data. Crude futures jumped as much as 5 percent earlier in the session but gave up some of those gains in afternoon trading. U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude ended Wednesday’s session at a two-week high, up $1.13, or 2.5 percent, to $46.54. Brent crude rose $1.13, or 2.1 percent, to $54.93 a barrel at 2:28 p.m. ET, after trading as low as $52.51 earlier. Traders pointed to signs that Saudi Arabia is beginning to make good on vows to cut output after a swift fourth-quarter collapse in oil prices. Saudi exports in December fell by about half a million barrels per day to stand at 7.253 million bpd, according to tanker-tracking data from Bloomberg.

#### Zero impact to oil shocks – reserves are full

Weiss ’12 Senior Fellow and Director of Climate Strategy at the Center for American Progress (Weiss, Daniel J.. “Preparing for the Next Oil Price Shock” May 18, 2012. <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/05/spr_g8.html>) / MM

Some argue there should be no sale of reserve oil unless there is actually a severe supply disruption, rather than selling in response to high oil prices driven up by Wall Street speculators in anticipation that there might be a Persian Gulf supply interruption. But the United States and its allies have ample oil reserves that could be used in the event of another huge price spike or a supply disruption so as to pop the speculative bubble and provide economic relief. The United States has significant oil reserves. The Strategic Petroleum **Reserve is 96 percent full** with nearly 700 million barrels of oil. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development nations had more than 800 million barrels of oil reserves at the end of 2011. Selling 30 million barrels from each reserve would reduce total reserves by less than 4 percent. In addition, U.S. reserve oil has been sold **under every president** beginning **with** George **H.W. Bush**. He sold 17.2 million barrels of reserve oil in advance of the 1991 Gulf War in anticipation of supply disruption that did not occur. In 1996 the Republican Congress led by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA) sold 23 million barrels of oil to reduce the federal budget deficit at a time when it was less than 80 percent full. In other words, the oil in the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve is not **some sacred oil supply** only to be used during an oil embargo or pipeline destruction.

#### Iran sanctions thump– this ev assumes your oversupply responses

**Larison 4/21** (Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and was a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and resides in Dallas, “Our Iran Policy Is Run By Fanatics,” 4/21/19, The American Conservative, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/our-iran-policy-is-run-by-fanatics/>, accessed 4/25/19) KED

The Trump administration won’t be issuing any more waivers to importers of Iranian oil: The Trump administration is poised to tell five nations, including allies Japan, South Korea and Turkey, that they will no longer be exempt from U.S. sanctions if they continue to import oil from Iran. U.S. officials say Secretary of State Mike Pompeo plans to announce on Monday that the administration will not renew sanctions waivers for the five countries when they expire on May 2. Refusing to offer new sanctions waivers is the latest sign that Trump is once again giving in to the most extreme Iran hawks. When sanctions on Iran’s oil sector went into effect last November, the administration initially granted waivers to the top importers of Iranian oil to avoid a spike in the price of oil, but that is now coming to an end. The economic war that the U.S. has been waging against Iran over the last year is about to expand to include some of the world’s biggest economies and some of America’s leading trading partners. It is certain to inflict more hardship on the Iranian people, and it will damage relations between the U.S. and other major economic powers, including China and India, but it will have no discernible effect on the Iranian government’s behavior and policies. India, China, and Turkey are practically guaranteed to ignore U.S. demands that they eliminate all Iranian oil imports. Josh Rogin reported on the same story: The decision to end waivers has implications for world oil markets, which have been eagerly anticipating President Trump’s decision on whether to extend waivers. The officials said market disruption should be minimal for two reasons: supply is now greater than demand and Pompeo is also set to announce offsets through commitments from other suppliers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Trump spoke about the issue Thursday with the UAE’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan. Between the administration’s Venezuela and Iran oil sanctions and increased instability in Libya (also supported by the Trump administration), oil prices are nonetheless likely to rise. Even if they don’t, Trump’s Iran obsession is causing significant economic dislocation for no good reason as part of a regime change policy that can’t and won’t succeed. It cannot be emphasized enough that the reimposition of sanctions on Iran is completely unwarranted and represents a betrayal of previous U.S. commitments to Iran and our allies under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The decision to refuse any new sanctions waivers is a clear sign that the most fanatical members of the Trump administration have prevailed in internal debates and U.S. Iran policy is held hostage to their whims.

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### AT: Shocks

#### Nah

**Rogin 4/21** (Josh Rogin is a columnist covering foreign policy and national security Education: George Washington University, BA in International Affairs 2001; Sophia University, Tokyo Josh Rogin is a columnist for the Global Opinions section of the Washington Post and a political analyst with CNN. Previously, he has covered foreign policy and national security for Bloomberg View, Newsweek, the Daily Beast, Foreign Policy magazine, Congressional Quarterly, Federal Computer Week magazine and Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper. He was a 2011 finalist for the Livingston Award for Young Journalists and the 2011 recipient of the Interaction Award for Excellence in International Reporting. Rogin holds a BA in international affairs from George Washington University and studied at Sophia University in Tokyo, “No more waivers: The United States will try to force Iranian oil exports to zero,” The Washingto Post, 4/21/19, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/04/21/no-more-waivers-united-states-will-try-force-iranian-oil-exports-zero/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6fb94e067777>, accessed 4/25/19) KED

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### AT: Oil Prices

**Saudi’s trying and FAILING to raise prices now**

**ABC News 1-13**-19 https://abcnews.go.com/beta-story-container/International/wireStory/saudi-energy-minister-concerned-oil-price-volatility-60343159

**Saudi Arabia's energy minister said** Sunday **that major oil producers need to do better to narrow swings in prices** that dip below $60 a barrel and rise above $86. "I think what we need to do is narrow the range ... of volatility," Khalid al-Falih said. "We need to do better and the more producers that work with us, the better we're able" to do so, he told the Atlantic Council's Global Energy Forum in Abu Dhabi. Cautious not to set a price target or range, he explained there are consequences when oil prices dip too low or rise too high. **Last month, OPEC countries, including Saudi Arabia**, and other major oil producers **agreed to cut production** by 1.2 million barrels a day **to reduce oversupply and boost prices** for the first six months of 2019. Oil producers are under pressure to reduce production following a sharp fall in oil prices in recent months **because major producers — including the U**nited **S**tates — **are pumping oil at high rates**.

### AT: Unique Crisis

#### Crises are episodic and inevitable

Gause 13F. Gregory III F. Gregory Gause, III is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Doha Center. He specializes in the domestic politics and international relations of the Gulf countries, with a particular focus on Saudi Arabia. professor of political science at the University of Vermont. | October 14, 2013 2:12pm¶ “Will Nuclear Talks With Iran Provoke A Crisis In U.S.-Saudi Ties?” http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/iran-at-saban/posts/2013/10/14-saudi-iran-rivalry-nuclear-deal2

The hints, and they are no more than hints, of an improved Iranian-American relationship have led to some interesting (to put it mildly) reactions from Saudi Arabia. For the first time, the Saudi government gave up its yearly opportunity to present its view of the world in an address to the United Nations General Assembly. The Saudis let it be known that their unhappiness with American foreign policy in the region — on Iran, on Syria, on the Palestinian issue — led to this demurral. Saudi **commentators and media have raised the specter of the U.S. selling out Riyadh** in a grand geopolitical bargain with Tehran. **Are we headed for another "crisis" in** Saudi-American relations?¶ In a word, **no**. **There is nothing new here. The United States and Saudi Arabia have faced much more serious differences in the past, without the bilateral relationship being fundamentally altered — the 1973-74 oil embargo**, the differences over the **Camp David Accords** and the **Iranian Revolution in the late 1970’s**, the profound crisis of **9/11 and the Iraq War**. The **episodic** **crises**, **both real and imagined,** between Riyadh and Washington **are**, in fact, **baked in the cake.** **They are the result of two enduring elements of the relationship:** 1) **the structural fact** **that the Saudis are the much weaker party** in the partnership, **and** 2) **the mistaken belief** of many, more in the U.S. than in Saudi Arabia, **that the** de facto **alliance is built on a complete complementarity of interests.**

### Impact Turn – Dedev

#### Even massive economic decline has zero chance of war

Robert **Jervis 11**, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, **it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough** to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that **even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited**, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen **such a sharp economic down-turn** without **anyone** suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that **even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict**, **it will not make war thinkable**.

#### Growth causes war

**Trainer 2** Senior Lecturer of School of Social Work @ University of New South Wales (Ted, If You Want Affluence, Prepare for War, Democracy & Nature, Vol. 8, No. 2, EBSCO)

If this limits-to-growth analysis is at all valid, the implications for the problem of global peace and conflict and security are clear and savage. If we all remain determined to increase our living standards, our level of production and consumption, in a world where resources are already scarce, where only a few have affluent living standards but another 8 billion will be wanting them too, and which we, the rich, are determined to get richer without any limit, then nothing is more guaranteed than that there will be increasing levels of conflict and violence. To put it another way, if we insist on remaining affluent we will need to remain heavily armed. Increased conflict in at least the following categories can be expected. First, the present conflict over resources between the rich elites and the poor majority in the Third World must increase, for example, as ‘development’ under globalisation takes more land, water and forests into export markets. Second, there are conflicts between the Third World and the rich world, the major recent examples being the war between the US and Iraq over control of oil. Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US intervened, accompanied by much high-sounding rhetoric (having found nothing unacceptable about Israel’s invasions of Lebanon or the Indonesian invasion of East Timor). As has often been noted, had Kuwait been one of the world’s leading exporters of broccoli, rather than oil, it is doubtful whether the US would have been so eager to come to its defence. At the time of writing, the US is at war in Central Asia over ‘terrorism’. Few would doubt that a ‘collateral’ outcome will be the establishment of regimes that will give the West access to the oil wealth of Central Asia. Following are some references to the connection many have recognised between rich world affluence and conflict. General M.D. Taylor, US Army retired argued ‘... US military priorities just be shifted towards insuring a steady flow of resources from the Third World’. Taylor referred to ‘… fierce competition among industrial powers for the same raw materials markets sought by the United States’ and ‘… growing hostility displayed by have-not nations towards their affluent counterparts’.62 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product; within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets’.63 ‘That more than half of the people on this planet are poorly nourished while a small percentage live in historically unparalleled luxury is a sure recipe for continued and even escalating international conflict.’64 The oil embargo placed on the US by OPEC in the early 1970s prompted the US to make it clear that it was prepared to go to war in order to secure supplies. ‘President Carter last week issued a clear warning that any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf would lead to war.’ It would ‘… be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States’.65 ‘The US is ready to take military action if Russia threatens vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, the US Secretary of Defence, Mr Brown, said yesterday.’66 Klare’s recent book Resource Wars discusses this theme in detail, stressing the coming significance of water as a source of international conflict. ‘Global demand for many key materials is growing at an unsustainable rate. … the incidence of conflict over vital materials is sure to grow. … The wars of the future will largely be fought over the possession and control of vital economic goods. … resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the global security environment.’67 Much of the rich world’s participation in the conflicts taking place throughout the world is driven by the determination to back a faction that will then look favourably on Western interests. In a report entitled, ‘The rich prize that is Shaba’, Breeze begins, ‘Increasing rivalry over a share-out between France and Belgium of the mineral riches of Shaba Province lies behind the joint Franco– Belgian paratroop airlift to Zaire. … These mineral riches make the province a valuable prize and help explain the West’s extended diplomatic courtship …’68 Then there is potential conflict between the rich nations who are after all the ones most dependent on securing large quantities of resources. ‘The resource and energy intensive modes of production employed in nearly all industries necessitate continuing armed coercion and competition to secure raw materials.’69 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product, within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets …’70 Growth, competition, expansion … and war Finally, at the most abstract level, the struggle for greater wealth and power is central in the literature on the causes of war. ‘… warfare appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the capitalist world economy. … world wars regularly occur during a period of economic expansion. ’71 ‘War is an inevitable result of the struggle between economies for expansion.’72 Choucri and North say their most important finding is that domestic growth is a strong determinant of national expansion and that this results in competition between nations and war.73 The First and Second World Wars can be seen as being largely about imperial grabbing. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. Britain already held much of the world within its empire … which it had previously fought 72 wars to take! ‘Finite resources in a world of expanding populations and increasing per capita demands create a situation ripe for international violence.’74 Ashley focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. ‘War is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources … expansion is a prime source of conflict. So long as the dynamics of differential growth remain unmanaged, it is probable that these long term processes will sooner or later carry major powers into war.’75 Security The point being made can be put in terms of security. One way to seek security is to develop greater capacity to repel attack. In the case of nations this means large expenditure of money, resources and effort on military preparedness. However there is a much better strategy; i.e. to live in ways that do not oblige you to take more than your fair share and therefore that do not give anyone any motive to attack you. Tut! This is not possible unless there is global economic justice. If a few insist on levels of affluence, industrialisation and economic growth that are totally impossible for all to achieve, and which could not be possible if they were taking only their fair share of global resources, then they must remain heavily armed and their security will require readiness to use their arms to defend their unjust privileges. In other words, if we want affluence we must prepare for war. If we insist on continuing to take most of the oil and other resources while many suffer intense deprivation because they cannot get access to them then we must be prepared to maintain the aircraft carriers and rapid deployment forces, and the despotic regimes, without which we cannot secure the oil fields and plantations. Global peace is not possible without global justice, and that is not possible unless rich countries move to ‘The Simpler Way’.

## AT: Saudi PTX

### Top Level – the Benjamin

#### The senate’s failed resolution thumps

Harb 18 Ali Harb, Middle East Eye, 12-28-2018, ["A most tumultuous year: How support for MBS pushed Trump into a corner", https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/most-tumultuous-year-how-support-mbs-pushed-trump-corner-807998367] AL 1-2-2019

In his last Washington Post [column](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/09/11/saudi-arabias-crown-prince-must-restore-dignity-to-his-country-by-ending-yemens-cruel-war/?utm_term=.ed5a32b301b3) published while he was still alive, Khashoggi urged MBS to end the war in Yemen. Ironically, his death brought unprecedented scrutiny to Riyadh's war efforts in the impoverished country, as well as to Washington's role in the conflict. Saudi Arabia launched a wide-scale military operation in Yemen in 2015 - during the tenure of then-US President Barack Obama - to root out the country's Houthi rebels, who had taken over the capital Sanaa and ousted Saudi-backed President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi. Washington, which views the Houthis as a proxy force for Iran, was on board from the get-go. But as casualties mounted to the [tens of thousands](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-60000-dead-armed-violence-2016-research-group-says-2073459223) by some estimates, and Yemen became the world's [worst humanitarian crisis](https://www.rescue.org/article/why-yemen-worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis), backing the Saudis began losing its status as the default position for the power centres in Washington. In a stunning rejection of Trump's relations with Riyadh, **the US Senate voted in December to end US military assistance to the Saudi-led coalition** in Yemen. The senators invoked the War Powers Resolution of 1973 for the first time ever, which gives Congress the power to stop US involvement in military interventions authorised solely by the White House. A similar measure stalled in the House of Representative, as lawmakers from Trump's Republican Party, who still controlled the chamber, managed to prevent it from being debated and presented for a full vote. However, the growing awareness of the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen and the newly found scepticism towards Riyadh has raised troubling questions for the White House over its logistical and political support for the war. In September, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo [said](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/world/middleeast/saudi-yemen-pompeo-certify.html) Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were making an adequate effort to minimise civilian casualties, an assertion that was backed by then Pentagon chief James Mattis. The announcement came about a month after a Saudi air strike on a school bus killed dozens in northern Yemen in an attack that [Human Rights Watch](https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/02/yemen-coalition-bus-bombing-apparent-war-crime) said was an "apparent war crime". Still, by October, even the Trump administration was calling for an end to the war. "It is time to end this conflict, replace conflict with compromise, and allow the Yemeni people to heal through peace and reconstruction," [Pompeo said](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/washington-calls-end-war-yemen-901326305) in a statement late in October, as pro-coalition forces closed in on the port city of Hodeidah, threatening to choke the lifeline for humanitarian aid into Yemen. The secretary of state's comments were followed by a decision from the White House to [stop](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-to-end-refueling-for-saudi-coalition-aircraft-in-yemen/2018/11/09/d08ff6c3-babd-4958-bcca-cdb1caa9d5b4_story.html?utm_term=.c686699ced6f)mid-air refueling for Saudi jets headed for missions in Yemen. Those steps towards resolving the conflict, however, had little effect as lawmakers tried to force Trump's hand. In December, Mattis and Pompeo asked members of the House of Representatives in a briefing "to continue the military advising, logistics support and intelligence that have for years been shared with Saudi Arabia", the New York Times reported. But with **an anti-war bill that has cleared the Senate**, in the new year a **Democratic**-controlled **House** of Representatives **is expected to pass the measure to force Trump to end US assistance for Saudi Arabia's war, setting up another showdown over relations with Riyadh.**

## AT: Saudi Reps

### Top Level - LHP

#### Framing – the negative needs to prove the consequences of the plan are a bad idea, anything else moots 6 minutes of 1ac offense, is impact self-serving, and kills topic education

#### Top Level - Saudi Arabia is an authoritarian human rights abuser and saying it’s anything different legitimizes their actions. Cross out 2nr extrapolations because they are literally just pulling for straws.

#### We aren’t “critiquing Muslim dialogue” – we’re saying that Saudi Arabia shouldn’t bomb innocent fucking people. There’s a difference between saying that “Islamic countries cause all the harm in the middle east” and saying that US is causing a non-justifiable war

#### The aff doesn’t even say Saudi is the problem – the aff says that Saudi FUELED BY the US is the problem. The whole reason why some people are Islamophobic in their rhetoric is because the US has fueled a war that those people are using that rhetoric towards.

#### You should hold such a high bar on the link debate in the 2NR – the aff was literally just “stop giving bombs to a country that uses them to kill innocent people”, they have to literally be pulling words out of my mouth to get a link

## AT: Terror

### Top Level – HW

#### UAE and Saudi counterterror are trash and draw a line on ALL of the examples they are going to give in the 2NR because they are NOT backed by their ev - our ev postdates theirs and straight turns it, all of their ev doesn’t take into account how it’s changed under the coalition – Fenton-Harvey and Smith et al prove that Saudi and the UAE fuel the terror conflict because they break arms agreements and give them money and arms

#### The “aggressive policies” that the US and Saudi pursue is striking EVERY PERSON in their path to stop one terrorist – turns the disad

#### If Al-Qaeda or IS have wanted to use weapons they would’ve done it already – they’ve had access to them for years and takeover of Syria and Yemen should’ve triggered the impact

#### Normal means includes weapons – in order for Saudi to effectively strike them they need to use US weapons. At worst, the US strikes and the strikes are still just as bad

#### Case impacts outweigh on probability and magnitude – starts at 100% at causes millions to suffer – reject impact scenarios with no empirical backing

#### Jadoon is about Pakistan – not Saudi and the UAE

### Top Level – Debate Drills

#### UAE and Saudi counterterror are trash and draw a line on ALL of the examples they are going to give in the 2NR because they are NOT backed by their ev, all of their ev is about drone basing which the aff doesn’t end – our ev postdates theirs and link turns it, all of their ev doesn’t take into account how it’s changed under the coalition – Fenton-Harvey and Smith et al prove that Saudi and the UAE fuel the terror conflict because they break arms agreements and give them money and arms

#### Their BPMA ev - ignore all these claims that Saudi is “aiming to improve targeting” – all of this should thump the internal link – Saudi consistently lies about things getting better so they can keep getting arms – our ev is also newer than yours and says that those “efforts” are bullshit.

#### Normal means includes weapons – in order for Saudi to effectively strike them they need to use US weapons. At worst, the US strikes and the strikes are still just as bad

#### Case impacts outweigh on probability and magnitude – starts at 100% at causes millions to suffer

### Cards

#### US arms end up in the hands of AQAP and Iran – most recent ev

Smith et al 19 [Nima Elbagir, Salma Abdelaziz, Mohamed Abo El Gheit, and Laura Smith-Spark, CNN, 2-3,19, "US arms sold to Saudi Arabia and UAE end up in wrong hands," <https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/02/middleeast/yemen-lost-us-arms/?utm_term=link&utm_source=fbCNN&utm_content=2019-02-05T00%3A00%3A24&utm_medium=social&fbclid=IwAR3DoAaY3YBd808ACfxdaS9C562EAaX-nhF5QaDipwBgVW0RbTOsgG3VzoM>] / MM

Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners have transferred American-made weapons to al Qaeda-linked fighters, hardline Salafi militias, and other factions waging war in Yemen, in violation of their agreements with the United States, a CNN investigation has found. The weapons have also made their way into the hands of Iranian-backed rebels battling the coalition for control of the country, exposing some of America's sensitive military technology to Tehran and potentially endangering the lives of US troops in other conflict zones. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, its main partner in the war, have used the US-manufactured weapons as a form of currency to buy the loyalties of militias or tribes, bolster chosen armed actors, and influence the complex political landscape, according to local commanders on the ground and analysts who spoke to CNN. By handing off this military equipment to third parties, the Saudi-led coalition is breaking the terms of its arms sales with the US, according to the Department of Defense. After CNN presented its findings, a US defense official confirmed there was an ongoing investigation into the issue. The revelations raise fresh questions about whether the US has lost control over a key ally presiding over one of the most horrific wars of the past decade, and whether Saudi Arabia is responsible enough to be allowed to continue buying the sophisticated arms and fighting hardware. Previous CNN investigations established that US-made weapons were used in a series of deadly Saudi coalition attacks that killed dozens of civilians, many of them children. The developments also come as Congress, outraged with Riyadh over the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi last year, considers whether to force an end to the Trump administration's support for the Saudi coalition, which relies on American weapons to conduct its war. In 2015, Riyadh launched a coalition to oust Iranian-supported Houthi rebels from the country's capital and reinstate the internationally recognized government of President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi. The war split the country in two, and with it came the weapons -- not just guns, but anti-tank missiles, armored vehicles, heat-seeking lasers and artillery -- all flooding into an unruly and complex state. Since then, some of America's "beautiful military equipment," as US President Donald Trump once called it, has been passed on, sold, stolen or abandoned in Yemen's state of chaos, where murky alliances and fractured politics mean little hope for any system of accountability or tracking. Some terror groups have gained from the influx of US arms, with the barrier of entry to advanced weaponry now lowered by the laws of supply and demand. Militia leaders have had ample opportunity to obtain military hardware in exchange for the [power] to fight the Houthi militias. Arms dealers have flourished, with traders offering to buy or sell anything, from a US-manufactured rifle to a tank, to the highest bidder. And Iran's proxies have captured American weapons they can exploit for vulnerabilities or reverse-engineer for native production. 'Do you have American guns here?' In the narrow, ramshackle streets of Taiz's historic district, weapons shops lie tucked between women's clothing stores. Arms markets are illegal in Yemen, but that doesn't stop them operating openly in this large, mountainous city in the country's southwest. To one side hang veils, abayas and colorful dresses for sale; to the other are pistols, hand grenades, and US assault rifles available on special order. In one arms market, sweets were displayed among the ammunition. "Do you have American guns here?" CNN asked. "The American guns are expensive and sought after," the weapons trader replied, in an exchange captured by undercover CNN cameras. In another of the city's markets, a very young-looking boy handled weapons like an expert. Men joked and chewed khat, a commonly used drug, and the atmosphere was casual. But these shops don't just take individual orders, they can supply militias -- and it's this not-so-hidden black market that in part is driving the demand for hi-tech American weapons and perpetuating the cycle of violence in Yemen. Once the intellectual heart of the country, Taiz is now a tinder box that set off a war within a war last year, when the various militias backed by the Saudi-led coalition turned their guns on each other. Amid the chaos of the broader war, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) made its way to the frontlines in Taiz in 2015, forging advantageous alliances with the pro-Saudi militias they fought alongside. One of those militias linked to AQAP, the Abu Abbas brigade, now possesses US-made Oshkosh armored vehicles, paraded in a 2015 show of force through the city. Abu Abbas, the founder, was declared a terrorist by the US in 2017, but the group still enjoys support from the Saudi coalition and was absorbed into the coalition-supported 35th Brigade of the Yemeni army. “Oshkosh Defense strictly follows all US laws and regulations relating to export control," the firm told CNN. And there are deadlier forms of weaponry that have made their way into the city. In October 2015, military forces loyal to the government boasted on Saudi- and UAE-backed media that the Saudis had airdropped American-made TOW anti-tank missiles on the same frontline where AQAP had been known to operate at the time.

#### UAE counterterror doesn’t work – they support AQAP

Fenton-Harvey 18 Jonathan Fenton-Harvey, 7-28-2018, "How the UAE is destroying Yemen," Middle East Eye, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/how-uae-destroying-yemen?fbclid=IwAR1sopjCTLscI59idzBBYLVXyDPWXTeXYVzSvbN3vy4uaHahvx1_EZfR6Co> / MM

The UAE's "stabilising" policies have also significantly increased Yemen's internal divide. Abu Dhabi's backing of southern secessionists and other military proxies has inflamed tensions in an already fragmented country. In January, the southern militias it backs clashed with Hadi government forces in Aden. The UAE's support for southern independence has failed to create any kind of unity, as Abu Dhabi has backed different groups, such as the Hadrami Elite Forces, which want an independent Hadramaut rather than a unified southern Yemen and have committed abuses such as arbitrary detentions. The UAE's rift with Saudi Arabia has also been problematic. Riyadh has supported Islah, Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood branch, as a stable ally on the ground. But the UAE opposes the Brotherhood, instead backing militants who maintain non-hostile relations with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) - which it is supposed to be fighting - to counteract Islah, researcher Helen Lackner notes in her book Yemen in Crisis. As such, the UAE is in a proxy war with Saudi Arabia in Yemen.

#### Terrorists won’t use nukes

Kapur ‘8 [S. Paul, associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. pg. 32]

Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes to engage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter 2004; U.S. Government 2002). However, **it is not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear devices**. Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity (Laqeuer 1999: 4-5), **extensive empirical evidence indicates** that **terrorist groups** in fact **behave rationally**, adopting strategies designed **to achieve particular ends** (Crenshaw 1995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on whether doing so is likely to further their goals. Under what circumstances could nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? **For** certain types of terrorist **objectives, nuclear weapons could be too destructive**. Large-scale **devastation could negatively influence audiences** important to the terrorist groups. Terrorists often rely on populations sympathetic to their cause for political, financial, and military support. The horrific destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienate segments of this audience. People who otherwise would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that in using a nuclear device terrorists had gone too far and were no longer deserving of support. The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, if a terrorist orga- nization were struggling with another group for control of their common home- land, the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy group would devastate the terrorists' own home territory**. Using nuclear weapons would be extremely counter- productive** for the terrorists in this scenario. It is thus not obvious that all terrorist groups would use nuclear weapons. Some groups would probably not. The propensity for nuclear acquisition and use by ter- rorist groups must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

#### Globalization means war won’t happen

Sokolosky 16 (Johnny; Jan/Feb 2016; B.A. in Political Science and Russia Studies from East Carolina University, General Staff College, US army major and author of multiple articles and books on globalization and trade; Military Review, “The Future of War: How Globalization is Changing the Security Paradigm,” [http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview\_20160228\_art006.pdf; RP)](http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art006.pdf))

Decline of Interstate Conflict The world has entered the era of **permanent great power peace**. 1 —Christopher J. Fettweis Since 1945, the number of interstate conflicts has **declined precipitously** despite the number of states in the international community tripling.2 In comparison to intrastate conflict, interstate conflicts are quite infrequent. In most years, **less than three** conflicts are ongoing at any time, and from 2004 to 2010, **zero** interstate conflicts existed.3 This declining trend in interstate conflict is remarkable, and yet the trend is mostly unacknowledged in the U.S. military. Undoubtedly, many variables contribute to this trend, such as the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons or the advance of democracy across the globe. But, **a number of studies** attribute the decline of interstate conflicts to globalization.4 Kristian Gleditsch and Steve Pickering best describe the pacification effect of globalization: “States with more trade and more extensive economic relations are likely to have higher opportunity costs from escalation to war and may have more opportunities to signal intent and reach resolution by means other than force.”5 The **interconnectedness** of states is, in effect, limiting the benefits of conventional war and **promoting other means** to achieve political ends. While the decline of interstate conflict is a positive trend, it is important to note two things. First, although the incidence of interstate conflict remains low, the risk of conflict between states still exists, particularly among neighboring nations with increasing populations competing for declining resources. Second, states are increasingly inclined to support **proxy wars** rather than engage in direct conflict themselves in an effort to achieve political or strategic gains. Russia’s material support to the separatists in Crimea and eastern Ukraine highlights such a strategy. While an all-out conventional invasion would be unacceptable to the international community, Russia’s strategy of plausible deniability enables it to violate Ukraine’s sovereign borders, instigate instability, and seize strategic territory. To further illustrate the reluctance of the international community to resort to conventional war, consider the following example. On 17 July 2014, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down over Ukraine, killing 298 people.6 Shooting down an airliner flying at 32,000 feet is clearly beyond the normal capacity of a guerrilla fighter, and **evidence** points to Russian-backed separatists.7 Yet, despite Russia’s indirect involvement in an attack that killed citizens from several different countries, the international community chose to respond with an investigation and economic sanctions. These are **powerful examples** of how states are inclined to behave in the era of globalization—and they raise the question: What would be the threshold for the United States to commit to a large

## AT: Trump Lash Out

### Top Level – HW

#### We don’t defend the executive signing the war powers resolution – nothing in the aff restricts power – we just say that the executive signs an XO defending aid

#### Their internal link literally says that Trump would “probably not lash out” and the only way he would lash out is if he is getting killed in the Russia Investigation – which also non-unqiues their impact

#### Impact is non-unique – the war in Yemen should prove that Iran has ZERO power because Saudi keeps bombing them in Yemen and they do nothing

#### Iran is a joke

**Walt 18** (Stephen, Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “The Islamic Republic of Hysteria,” Foreign Policy, 1/16/18, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/the-islamic-republic-of-hysteria-iran-middle-east-trump/>, accessed 1/20/19) KED

Yet this ongoing full-court press against Iran makes little sense because it is nowhere close to being a regional hegemon. If anything, the willingness of pundits and politicians to embrace this alarmist fantasy says more about the cavalier nature of U.S. strategic discourse than it does about the actual challenge Iran may pose. Iran presently lacks the hard power a state would need to dominate the Middle East’s vast and deeply divided set of countries. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran has a population of about 83 million; as of 2016, its GDP was more than $400 billion; and its annual defense budget is almost $16 billion. Its total military manpower (including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC) consists of about 520,000 troops, of of them poorly trained draftees. Many of its tanks, aircraft, and other major weapons systems date from the era of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and are in poor repair. As veteran defense analyst Anthony Cordesman concluded in 2010, “Iran’s conventional military is severely limited, relying heavily on obsolescent and low quality weaponry.… Its forces are not organized or trained to project significant power across the Gulf.” By contrast, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates have a combined population of well over 100 million and a combined GDP of more than $1 trillion — about quadruple that of Iran. Their combined defense spending is at least five times greater than Iran’s. These states possess some of the most sophisticated weapons money can buy, including Abrams battle tanks and F-15 aircraft, and Israel has nuclear weapons. In the unlikely event Iran ever attacked them, they could also count on support from the mighty United States. Given the far more powerful forces arrayed against Iran, to claim it is on the brink of regional hegemony defies reason. When confronted with these realities, Iran’s foes typically warn that it is using local proxies to spread its influence and take over the region. There is no question that Iran has backed a number of local actors in recent years, including the Lebanese Hezbollah, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, various militias in Iraq, and, to a lesser extent, the Houthis in Yemen. These moves have marginally enhanced Iran’s power — but mostly because it has been able to take advantage of its opponents’ blunders, such as the George W. Bush administration’s decision to topple Saddam Hussein. But these advances still leave Tehran far short of regional domination. For one thing, Iran does not control these groups any more than the United States controls its own Middle East clients. Each of these actors has its own interests, and Tehran’s present allies will not blindly follow its orders if doing so would jeopardize their own positions. To see these collaborations as a new Persian empire, as Henry Kissinger and Max Boot apparently do, is risible. Furthermore, many of Iran’s principal partners have all suffered significant setbacks in recent years, forcing the country to expend additional resources to prop them up. Support from the IRGC helped keep Assad in power, for example, but Syria is now a shattered state and thus not much of an ally. Far from creating an ever-expanding, increasingly powerful Iranian empire, Tehran’s support for these various groups has drained its coffers and brought Israel and the Gulf Arabs into tacit alignment, thereby undermining its overall position.

## AT: Veto

#### Aff isn’t a legislative veto – congressional war declatory powers make it distinct and THAT’S KEY to Separation of Powers

**French 4/17** (David French is a senior writer for National Review, a senior fellow at the National Review Institute, and a contributor to Time. David is a New York Times bestselling author, and his next book, The Great American Divorce, will be published by St. Martin’s Press later this year. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School, the past president of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, and a former lecturer at Cornell Law School, “America’s War in Yemen Is Plainly Unconstitutional,” 4/17/19, The National Review, <https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/04/americas-war-in-yemen-is-plainly-unconstitutional/>, accessed 4/25/19) KED

I understand and support the core holding of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, which ended the practice of so-called legislative vetoes — instances where the legislature invalidated executive acts by mere majority vote — but Constitution gives war-making powers explicitly to Congress. When it is construed as allowing the president to launch war on his own and then to continue that war in the absence of congressional supermajorities, the constitutional structure is fatally undermined. Debates about different American wars are debates for a different time. There is no longer any constitutional justification for continuing American participation in Saudi Arabia’s indiscriminate bombing campaign in Yemen. Congress has spoken. Trump doesn’t have the choice of vetoing the resolution. It’s now his obligation to order American forces to stand down. His refusal to do so further degrades America’s already-shaky constitutional structure.

## AT: War Powers

#### No shift in powers – the war is blatantly unconstitutional in already entrenched constitutional framework – the aff turns your SOP scenario

**French 4/17** (David French is a senior writer for National Review, a senior fellow at the National Review Institute, and a contributor to Time. David is a New York Times bestselling author, and his next book, The Great American Divorce, will be published by St. Martin’s Press later this year. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School, the past president of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, and a former lecturer at Cornell Law School, “America’s War in Yemen Is Plainly Unconstitutional,” 4/17/19, The National Review, <https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/04/americas-war-in-yemen-is-plainly-unconstitutional/>, accessed 4/25/19) KED

The president’s veto of a bipartisan resolution demanding the end of American involvement in the conflict further degrades our constitutional architecture. Yesterday, Donald Trump vetoed a bipartisan congressional resolution demanding an end to U.S. involvement in Yemen’s civil war. It’s now official: The president who ran for office pledging to reduce military entanglements abroad is involving American forces in a foreign war in direct defiance of the plain language of the Constitution. First, some background. Beginning in 2015, the Obama administration recklessly inserted itself into Saudi Arabia’s proxy war with Iran, backing Saudi military action against Yemen’s Houthi rebels. America has long been an important source of arms for Saudi Arabia, but Obama’s support went well beyond merely providing planes and bombs. His administration also authorized other active, indispensable support, including aerial refueling and targeting assistance. This direct involvement represented an act of war by any reasonable measure, and there is no meaningful argument that it was enabled by any existing congressional war authorization. The Authorization for the Use of Military Force enacted after the 9/11 attacks plainly doesn’t apply to Iran-backed Shiite rebels fighting in Yemen (though it does apply to al-Qaeda cells active in the country), nor does the subsequent Iraq War authorization. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution grants Congress the exclusive authority to declare war. Yes, Article II declares that the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but reading the two clauses together, their meaning is plain: The president commands American forces when Congress declares war. Yes, the president has inherent authority to order immediate military actions in times of crisis, but he should also promptly seek congressional approval for such actions. No one should pretend that there aren’t constitutional gray areas in this structure, of course: How long can a president respond to an emergency before Congress must ratify or reject the conflict? Once Congress has authorized any given action, how far can a president extend or expand a conflict? Does the authorization of force against al-Qaeda extend to, say, al-Qaeda progeny such as ISIS? Does the authorization of war in Iraq extend to actions deemed militarily necessary to stabilize the country, like the use of force in Syria? These are all good constitutional questions, but they’re beside the point because none of them apply to the conflict in Yemen. President Obama wasn’t responding to a true national emergency in backing the Saudis against the Houthis, and President Trump isn’t responding to a true national emergency in continuing to back the Saudis. They were (and are) waging a new conflict against a new enemy. Late last year, in the resolution Trump just vetoed, Congress rejected military action in Yemen under the provisions of the War Powers Act, a controversial 1973 statue passed over Richard Nixon’s veto. The Act attempted to answer the thorny constitutional issues outlined above by requiring a president to consult with Congress within 48 hours of the introduction of American forces into foreign hostilities. Congress can then, by resolution, terminate American involvement. 50 U.S.C. Section 1544(c) states that “at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.” (Emphasis added.) Presidents have opposed the War Powers Act ever since its passage, even as they’ve frequently complied with its terms. They have historically taken such a broad view of their commander-in-chief powers as to functionally write Congress’s war-making power out of the Constitution. If a president can fight when he wants, where he wants, and for as long as he wants, then Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 is meaningless. Moreover, even Trump’s veto is an unconstitutional act. A declaration of war requires an affirmative act of Congress. A bipartisan majority’s rejection of American participation in the Yemeni conflict is anything but an affirmation. And when the Constitution requires congressional affirmation, then congressional rejection can’t be vetoed by the president. I understand and support the core holding of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, which ended the practice of so-called legislative vetoes — instances where the legislature invalidated executive acts by mere majority vote — but Constitution gives war-making powers explicitly to Congress. When it is construed as allowing the president to launch war on his own and then to continue that war in the absence of congressional supermajorities, the constitutional structure is fatally undermined. Debates about different American wars are debates for a different time. There is no longer any constitutional justification for continuing American participation in Saudi Arabia’s indiscriminate bombing campaign in Yemen. Congress has spoken. Trump doesn’t have the choice of vetoing the resolution. It’s now his obligation to order American forces to stand down. His refusal to do so further degrades America’s already-shaky constitutional structure.

#### Non-unique – Dem house seeks to control foreign affairs anyways.

Zengerle 18 Patricia Zengerle, U.S., 11-7-2018, ["How a Democratic U.S. House could alter foreign policy", https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-foreignpolicy-explainer/how-a-democratic-u-s-house-could-alter-foreign-policy-idUSKCN1NC0I7] AL 12-27-2018

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - **Democrats will use their new majority in the** U.S. **House** of Representatives **to reverse** what they see as a hands-off approach by Republicans toward President Donald **Trump’s foreign policy, and push for tougher dealings with Russia, Saudi Arabia and North Korea**. A rainbow forms over the U.S. Capitol as evening sets on midterm Election Day in Washington, U.S. November 6, 2018. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst Representative Eliot Engel, the Democrat in line to head the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said they may also seek congressional authorization for the use of military force in places like Iraq and Syria. But on some hot-button areas, like China and Iran, he acknowledged there was little they could do to change the status quo. As the majority party, **Democrats will decide what legislation is considered in the House and have a bigger role in setting spending policy and writing legislation.** “I don’t think we should challenge something just because it’s put forth by the administration, but I do think we have an obligation to review policies and do oversight,” Engel told Reuters in a telephone interview. Since they must still work with a Republican-controlled Senate to pass any bills, **the Democratic majority’s greatest influence will be oversight, the ability to call hearings and, if necessary, subpoena witnesses, as they lead committees like Foreign Affairs as well as Armed Services and Intelligence.**

# A2: Counterplans

## AT: Prolif CP

### Top Level – HW

#### Bruh – this evidence is about the Cold War – the US is active in a war in Yemen and based on Saudi and the UAE’s past they would just nuke Yemen

#### No solvency – not a single card that says possession by Saudi is good – just that everyone should have nukes

#### Conceded no prolif from the case – they don’t have the facilities and it would take years, no one will give them anything more than facilities, but not weapons

## AT: Counterterror PIC

### Top Level – Debate Drills

#### UAE and Saudi counterterror are trash and draw a line on ALL of the examples they are going to give in the 2NR because they are NOT backed by their ev – our ev postdates the FUCK out of theirs and all of their ev doesn’t take into account how it’s changed under the coalition –Fenton-Harvey and Smith et al prove that Saudi and the UAE fuel the terror conflict because they break arms agreements and give them money

#### NO NET BENEFIT – the text doesn’t include the UAE, so they don’t get the UAE link on the terror disad AND they don’t get the Saudi link because the Saudi link says WAY MORE than just intel sharing.

#### Normal means would mean arms sales are included in counterterror, your BPMA evidence agrees because the aid it talks about is arms sales – the way that they strike them is via US arms, that is why they need military aid and why normal means on the PIC would keep arms

#### Intel sucks

Wilkinson 18— Tracy Wilkinson, [Covered wars, crises and daily life on three continents. Her career began with United Press International, where she covered the Contra war in Nicaragua. She moved to The Times in 1987, first as a writer on the Metro staff, then as a foreign correspondent based in San Salvador. In 1995, she moved to Vienna, where she covered the war in the Balkans, winning the George Polk Award in 1999, and then to Jerusalem. From there, she went to Rome, where she covered two popes and did several stints in Iraq. In 2008, she became Mexico bureau chief, where her coverage was part of a team Overseas Press Club Award and a Robert F. Kennedy Journalism Award. Wilkinson was also the 2014 winner of the Maria Moors Cabot Award for coverage of Latin America. She earned her bachelor’s degree from Vanderbilt University. Her book “The Vatican's Exorcists: Driving Out the Devil in the 21st Century” has been translated into a dozen languages. She joined The Times' Washington, D.C., bureau in 2015 to cover foreign affairs] 10-23-2018, "Is Saudi Arabia really a crucial strategic ally for the U.S.?" LA Times, https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pol-us-saudi-ally-20181023-story.html CCDE

Saudi Arabia’s complex relationship with terrorism and Iran. The administration frequently credits Saudi Arabia with valuable assistance in the gathering and accumulation of counter-terrorism intelligence. Undoubtedly, Saudi agents have cooperated extensively with American counterparts, especially as a bulwark against Iran. Yet former U.S. officials say even the definition of terrorism can be complicated with Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia. Washington typically defines terrorists as militants committing violent deeds, while the Saudis often brand as terrorists people whose views they don’t like, such as members of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, Shiite clerics or dissidents. For more than a generation, the Saudis also have exported a fundamentalist view of Islam, and won its acceptance in many parts of the world with the money accompanying its imams. Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, where Islam long existed in a steadfastly secular environment, saw an explosion of Saudi-financed mosques and an influx of Muslims practicing a puritanical Wahhabi faith in the 1990s, as civil war there wound down. That ideological strain contributed to the creation of Al Qaeda under Osama bin Laden, a Saudi. Most of the men who participated in the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, were Saudi.

### Cards

#### Counterterror fails

Hartig 18 Luke Hartig, a fellow in New America’s International Security program. He is also executive director of National Journal’s Network Science Initiative, a research effort that maps policy influencers and the connections among them, 12-7-2018, "Full Accounting Needed of US-UAE Counterterrorism Partnership in Yemen," Just Security, <https://www.justsecurity.org/61761/full-accounting-needed-us-uae-counterterrorism-partnership-yemen/> / MM

President Donald Trump’s first significant action on counterterrorism once in office was to dial up the pressure in Yemen by leaning into the partnership with the UAE. During his first week in the White House, he authorized a joint U.S.-Emirati raid in Yemen that went awry, leaving Navy SEAL Ryan Owens and. several Yemeni civilians dead The raid and its outcome raised serious questions about how the new administration was going to manage counterterrorism deployments. (Subsequent deaths of U.S. special operators in Somalia and the Sahel reinforced these concerns.) Yet while commentators, myself included, focused on the president’s mismanagement of high-risk operations, the administration was, for the most part, continuing and intensifying the counterterrorism playbook the Obama administration had established in Yemen over the previous year.

## AT: Conditions CP

### Top Level – Harvard Westlake

#### The CP is the squo – the US already has an adviser in the Saudi war room and has the ability to veto strikes BUT THEY DON’T which proves that Saudi doesn’t meet conditions

#### No solvency claims for the civilian target plank – they don’t outline the process which means you should default to our ev which says that Saudi ignored calls to not kill innocent people

#### No fill it – they conceded that Russian weapons don’t fit in our planes and transitions take a decade

#### Their “says yes” ev doesn’t say the coalition is breaking up – it also flows aff because it literally says “significantly diminish support” which the CP doesn’t do because it doesn’t cut any sales or aid

#### No quotes from Saudi means they won’t say yes – this is all theorizing

### Top Level – NDCA Quarters

#### Their solvency advocate says Saudi says no and advocates for the aff

**Goldenberg and Thomas, 12-5**  
(2018, Ilan is the Director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security where Kaleigh is the Research Assistant for the program. [https://nationalinterest.org/feature/give-saudi-arabia-take-it-or-leave-it-deal-37902](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/give-saudi-arabia-take-it-or-leave-it-deal-37902)), accessed 4/14/19) KED

Americans should also have realistic expectations. The Saudis are likely not to take Washington up on this offer, in which case the United States should suspend military aid and distance itself from the war in Yemen until the Saudis change their minds or take clear steps to end the war. But given the scrutiny they are under, the likelihood of a more flexible approach from the Crown Prince is much higher than it was two months ago.

### Top Level

#### Conditions CAN’T WORK TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS IN YEMEN – Saudi Arabia is one of the richest countries in the world and the only thing they are using aid to do is kill innocent people – placing conditions on anything still justifies the conflict in Yemen or makes it even worse because it justifies Saudi’s actions

#### Perm do the plan on the CP conditions. Intrinsic perms key to protecting the aff from abusive CPs. Otherwise negs can attach arbitrary conditions that don’t test competition or the aff

#### Saudi meets conditions, but then ignores them and continues the war anyways

Meyers 18 [Joshua Meyers (Joshua Myers is an Advocacy Intern at ADHRB)Saudi Arabia Dishes Out Aid to Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen as PR Stunt November 27, 2018]

On 30 October 2018, documents concerning an agreement made between the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) and Saudi Arabia regarding humanitarian aid were leaked. The Guardian [reported](https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/30/saudis-demanded-good-publicity-over-yemen-aid-leaked-un-document-shows) that foreign aid from Saudi Arabia came with so many strings attached that it could be considered ‘paid publicity’. While all states plan to enjoy some positive recognition for donating to humanitarian efforts, states mainly provide aid because they believe it is their moral obligation. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, required specific concessions in exchange for the $930 million dollars of humanitarian aid, in the form of favorable news in equal measure to their donation. Thus, the kingdom transformed humanitarian aid into a service transaction, shown in the leaked documentation detailing Saudi Arabia’s requirement for aid to “be tied to the amount of beneficial publicity given to Saudi Arabia.” Though ostensibly the Saudi government intervened in the Yemen conflict in 2015 to aid the government officially recognized by the UN against insurrection, their true reason behind engaging was to ensure Saudi’s sphere of influence was maintained in the region. Three years into the civil war, Saudi Arabia’s intervention is seen as having created a humanitarian catastrophe on a monumental scale. So far over [10,000 civilians](http://yemendataproject.org/data/) have been killed from bombings, famine, and other trappings of war, including a [bus full of children](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/02/saudis-admit-yemen-strike-on-bus-carrying-children-unjustified) who were killed by a Saudi air-strike in August 2018. According to The Guardian, the terms for Saudi Arabia’s 2018 humanitarian budget for Yemen, referred to as the Visibility Plan, showed OCHA was put under extreme pressure to abide by the public relations requirements desired by the kingdom. Saudi Arabia is only concerned with providing aid to Yemen to bolster its own public image, not out of a desire to alleviate the suffering and pain caused by its own role in the conflict The publicity garnered from these donations was not meant to simply be a thank you for a generous contribution. Instead, the intention was to counterbalance the bad press Saudi Arabia was receiving for causing Yemen’s humanitarian crisis in the first place. [Stories](https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/un-receives-nearly-1-billion-saudi-arabia-uae-humanitarian-response-yemen-crisis) praising Saudi Arabia were to be published in newspapers such as the New York Times and the Guardian, the paper that broke this story. The publicity was to be specifically targeted towards countries that hold weight in the international community and also sell arms to the Saudi government, such as the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). Additionally, in the agreement with OCHA, Saudi Arabia adds: “We consider it very important to ensure that our dear fellow Yemenis are all aware of our donations. More emphasis should be placed on strengthening the local visibility plan by engaging local media … so that donors get deserved recognition and not to be overshadowed by the recipient’s agencies’ visibility.” This report comes at a time when US Senators are [pushing](https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/418320-sanders-to-force-vote-this-week-on-us-support-for-saudi-arabia-in-yemen) for a stop to arms sales to Saudi Arabia – centered around the planned assassination of journalist [Jamal Khashoggi](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/22/the-khashoggi-fallout-a-timeline-of-events.html) by the Saudi government. This new information surrounding Saudi Arabia treating humanitarian aid, a necessity for the most vulnerable, as a PR campaign for its own gain should be included in their decision making. As Saudi Arabia is the cause of much of the suffering in Yemen, this is another factor that should add weight to a necessary move in rebuking Saudi Arabia for its role in the Yemen crisis.

#### Defense to the net benefit means that the counterplan is a bad idea – we’ll do that work now [insert specific responses or go to that flow]

## AT: Congress CP

### Top Level – Harvard Westlake

#### Perm do both – no reason why we can’t fix war powers after pulling aid -

#### Gets circumvented – Trump literally vetoed it two weeks ago

#### No link to the net benefit – the aff doesn’t cause him to overstretch to NoKo or China, just pulling aid from Yemen

#### The CP precedent causes further constraint --- undermines overall war powers

Paul 8 Christopher, Senior Social Scientist; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School Pittsburgh Office Education Ph.D., M.A., and B.A. in sociology, University of California, Los Angeles, “US Presidential War Powers: Legacy Chains in Military Intervention Decisionmaking\* ,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 45, No. 5 (Sep., 2008), pp. 665-679

Legacy Chains

Finegold & Skocpol (1995: 222) describe policy legacies: Past and present policies are connected in at least three different ways. First, past policies give rise to analogies that affect how public officials think about contemporary policy issues. Second, past policies suggest lessons that help us to understand the processes by which contemporary policies are formulated and implemented and by which the conse quences of contemporary policies will be determined. Third, past policies impose limitations that reduce the range of policy choices available as responses to contemporary problems. All three of the ways in which they connect past policy to present policy can be viewed as changes in the institutional context in which policy is made. These legacies are institutionalized in two different ways: first, through changes in formal rules or procedures, and second, in the 'taken for granteds', 'schemas', and accepted wisdom of policy makers and ordinary citizens alike (Sewell, 1992: 1-29). While a policy or event can leave multiple legacies, it often leaves a single major legacy. For example, the War Powers Resolution for mally changed the relationship between the president and the congress with regard to war-making and the deployment of troops. Subsequent military interventions were influenced by this change and have, in turn, left their own legacy (legal scholars might call it precedent) as a link in that chain. Legacy chains can be modified, trans formed, or reinforced as they step through each 'link' in the chain. As another example, US involvement in Vietnam left a legacy in the sphere of press/military relations which affected the intervention in Grenada in 1983 (the press was completely excluded for the first 48 hours of the operation). The press legacy chain begun in Vietnam also affected the Panama invasion of 1989 (a press pool was activated, in country, but excluded from the action), but the legacy had been trans formed slightly by the Grenada invasion (the press pool system itself grew out of complaint regarding press exclusion in Grenada) (Paul & Kim, 2004). Because of the different ways in which policy legacies are institutionalized, some legacies have unintended institutional cons quences. The War Powers Resolution was intended to curtail presidential war-making powers and return some authority to the con gress. In practice, the joint resolution failed to force presidents to include congressional participation in their intervention decision making, but it had the unintended conse quence of forcing them to change the way they planned interventions to comply with the letter of the law (see the extended ex ample presented later in the article).1

#### Causes nuclear war and bioterror---exec flex is key to successful fourth-gen warfare

Zheyao Li 9, J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, 2009; B.A., political science and history, Yale University, 2006. This paper is the culmination of work begun in the "Constitutional Interpretation in the Legislative and Executive Branches" seminar, led by Judge Brett Kavanaugh, “War Powers for the Fourth Generation: Constitutional Interpretation in the Age of Asymmetric Warfare,” 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 373 2009 WAR POWERS IN THE FOURTH GENERATION OF WARFARE

A. The Emergence of Non-State Actors

Even as the quantity of nation-states in the world has increased dramatically since the end of World War II, the institution of the nation-state has been in decline over the past few decades. Much of this decline is the direct result of the waning of major interstate war, which primarily resulted from the introduction of nuclear weapons.122 The proliferation of nuclear weapons, and their immense capacity for absolute destruction, has ensured that conventional wars remain limited in scope and duration. Hence, "both the size of the armed forces and the quantity of weapons at their disposal has declined quite sharply" since 1945.123 At the same time, concurrent with the decline of the nation-state in the second half of the twentieth century, non-state actors have increasingly been willing and able to use force to advance their causes. In contrast to nation-states, who adhere to the Clausewitzian distinction between the ends of policy and the means of war to achieve those ends, non-state actors do not necessarily fight as a mere means of advancing any coherent policy. Rather, they see their fight as a life-and-death struggle, wherein the ordinary terminology of war as an instrument of policy breaks down because of this blending of means and ends.124 It is the existential nature of this struggle and the disappearance of the Clausewitzian distinction between war and policy that has given rise to a new generation of warfare. The concept of fourth-generational warfare was first articulated in an influential article in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, which has proven highly prescient. In describing what they saw as the modem trend toward a new phase of warfighting, the authors argued that: In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). 125 It is precisely this blurring of peace and war and the demise of traditionally definable battlefields that provides the impetus for the formulation of a new. theory of war powers. As evidenced by Part M, supra, the constitutional allocation of war powers, and the Framers' commitment of the war power to two co-equal branches, was not designed to cope with the current international system, one that is characterized by the persistent machinations of international terrorist organizations, the rise of multilateral alliances, the emergence of rogue states, and the potentially wide proliferation of easily deployable weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and otherwise. B. The Framers' World vs. Today's World The Framers crafted the Constitution, and the people ratified it, in a time when everyone understood that the state controlled both the raising of armies and their use. Today, however, the threat of terrorism is bringing an end to the era of the nation-state's legal monopoly on violence, and the kind of war that existed before-based on a clear division between government, armed forces, and the people-is on the decline. 126 As states are caught between their decreasing ability to fight each other due to the existence of nuclear weapons and the increasing threat from non-state actors, it is clear that the Westphalian system of nation-states that informed the Framers' allocation of war powers is no longer the order of the day. 127 As seen in Part III, supra, the rise of the modem nation-state occurred as a result of its military effectiveness and ability to defend its citizens. If nation-states such as the United States are unable to adapt to the changing circumstances of fourth-generational warfare-that is, if they are unable to adequately defend against low-intensity conflict conducted by non-state actors-"then clearly [the modem state] does not have a future in front of it.' 128 The challenge in formulating a new theory of war powers for fourthgenerational warfare that remains legally justifiable lies in the difficulty of adapting to changed circumstances while remaining faithful to the constitutional text and the original meaning. 29 To that end, it is crucial to remember that the Framers crafted the Constitution in the context of the Westphalian system of nation-states. The three centuries following the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 witnessed an international system characterized by wars, which, "through the efforts of governments, assumed a more regular, interconnected character."' 130 That period saw the rise of an independent military class and the stabilization of military institutions. Consequently, "warfare became more regular, better organized, and more attuned to the purpose of war-that is, to its political objective."' 1 3' That era is now over. Today, the stability of the long-existing Westphalian international order has been greatly eroded in recent years with the advent of international terrorist organizations, which care nothing for the traditional norms of the laws of war. This new global environment exposes the limitations inherent in the interpretational methods of originalism and textualism and necessitates the adoption of a new method of constitutional interpretation. While one must always be aware of the text of the Constitution and the original understanding of that text, that very awareness identifies the extent to which fourth-generational warfare epitomizes a phenomenon unforeseen by the Framers, a problem the constitutional resolution of which must rely on the good judgment of the present generation. 13 Now, to adapt the constitutional warmarking scheme to the new international order characterized by fourth-generational warfare, one must understand the threat it is being adapted to confront. C. The Jihadist Threat The erosion of the Westphalian and Clausewitzian model of warfare and the blurring of the distinction between the means of warfare and the ends of policy, which is one characteristic of fourth-generational warfare, apply to al-Qaeda and other adherents of jihadist ideology who view the United States as an enemy. An excellent analysis of jihadist ideology and its implications for the rest of the world are presented by Professor Mary Habeck. 133 Professor Habeck identifies the centrality of the Qur'an, specifically a particular reading of the Qur'an and hadith (traditions about the life of Muhammad), to the jihadist terrorists. 134 The jihadis believe that the scope of the Qur'an is universal, and "that their interpretation of Islam is also intended for the entire world, which must be brought to recognize this fact peacefully if possible and through violence if not."' 135 Along these lines, the jihadis view the United States and her allies as among the greatest enemies of Islam: they believe "that every element of modern Western liberalism is flawed, wrong, and evil" because the basis of liberalism is secularism. 136 The jihadis emphasize the superiority of Islam to all other religions, and they believe that "God does not want differing belief systems to coexist."' 37 For this reason, jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda "recognize that the West will not submit without a fight and believe in fact that the Christians, Jews, and liberals have united against Islam in a war that will end in the complete destruction of the unbelievers.' 138 Thus, the adherents of this jihadist ideology, be it al-Qaeda or other groups, will continue to target the United States until she is destroyed. Their ideology demands it. 139 To effectively combat terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, it is necessary to understand not only how they think, but also how they operate. Al-Qaeda is a transnational organization capable of simultaneously managing multiple operations all over the world."14 It is both centralized and decentralized: al-Qaeda is centralized in the sense that Osama bin Laden is the unquestioned leader, but it is decentralized in that its operations are carried out locally, by distinct cells."4 AI-Qaeda benefits immensely from this arrangement because it can exercise direct control over high-probability operations, while maintaining a distance from low-probability attacks, only taking the credit for those that succeed. The local terrorist cells benefit by gaining access to al-Qaeda's "worldwide network of assets, people, and expertise."' 42 Post-September 11 events have highlighted al-Qaeda's resilience. Even as the United States and her allies fought back, inflicting heavy casualties on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and destroying dozens of cells worldwide, "al-Qaeda's networked nature allowed it to absorb the damage and remain a threat." 14 3 This is a far cry from earlier generations of warfare, where the decimation of the enemy's military forces would generally bring an end to the conflict. D. The Need for Rapid Reaction and Expanded Presidential War Power By now it should be clear just how different this conflict against the extremist terrorists is from the type of warfare that occupied the minds of the Framers at the time of the Founding. Rather than maintaining the geographical and political isolation desired by the Framers for the new country, today's United States is an international power targeted by individuals and groups that will not rest until seeing her demise. The Global War on Terrorism is not truly a war within the Framers' eighteenth-century conception of the term, and the normal constitutional provisions regulating the division of war powers between Congress and the President do not apply. Instead, this "war" is a struggle for survival and dominance against forces that threaten to destroy the United States and her allies, and the fourth-generational nature of the conflict, highlighted by an indiscernible distinction between wartime and peacetime, necessitates an evolution of America's traditional constitutional warmaking scheme. As first illustrated by the military strategist Colonel John Boyd, constitutional decision-making in the realm of war powers in the fourth generation should consider the implications of the OODA Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. 44 In the era of fourth-generational warfare, quick reactions, proceeding through the OODA Loop rapidly, and disrupting the enemy's OODA loop are the keys to victory. "In order to win," Colonel Boyd suggested, "we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries." 145 In the words of Professor Creveld, "[b]oth organizationally and in terms of the equipment at their disposal, the armed forces of the world will have to adjust themselves to this situation by changing their doctrine, doing away with much of their heavy equipment and becoming more like police."1 46 Unfortunately, the existing constitutional understanding, which diffuses war power between two branches of government, necessarily (by the Framers' design) slows down decision- making. In circumstances where war is undesirable (which is, admittedly, most of the time, especially against other nation-states), the deliberativeness of the existing decision-making process is a positive attribute. In America's current situation, however, in the midst of the conflict with al-Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations, the existing process of constitutional decision-making in warfare may prove a fatal hindrance to achieving the initiative necessary for victory. As a slow-acting, deliberative body, Congress does not have the ability to adequately deal with fast-emerging situations in fourth-generational warfare. Thus, in order to combat transnational threats such as al-Qaeda, the executive branch must have the ability to operate by taking offensive military action even without congressional authorization, because only the executive branch is capable of the swift decision-making and action necessary to prevail in fourth-generational conflicts against fourthgenerational opponents.

### Links to PTX

#### Links to politics---turf battles over authority are key

James A. Baker 11, was secretary of state from 1989 to 1992. Lee H. Hamilton is a former Democratic representative from Indiana who chaired the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Breaking the war powers stalemate, www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/breaking-the-war-powers-stalemate/2011/06/08/AGX0CrNH\_story.html

Breaking the war powers stalemate¶ With our country engaged in three critical military conflicts, the last thing that Congress and the White House should be doing is squabbling over which branch of government has the final authority to send American troops to war. But that is exactly what has been happening, culminating with the House’s rebuke of the Obama administration last Friday for the way it has gone about the war in Libya.¶ On one hand is a bipartisan group of House members who argue that President Obama overreached because he failed to seek congressional approval for the military action in Libya within 60 days of the time the war started, as required by the War Powers Resolution. The lawmakers are particularly upset because the administration sought, and received, support from the United Nations — but not from them.¶ On the other hand is the White House, which argues that history is on its side. The 1999 NATO-led bombing over Kosovo lasted 18 days longer than the resolution’s 60-day requirement before the Serbian regime relented.¶ Stuck in the middle are the American people, particularly our soldiers in arms. They would be best served if our leaders debated the substantive issues regarding the conflict in Libya — and those of Afghanistan and Iraq — rather than engaging in turf battles about who has ultimate authority concerning the nation’s war powers.¶ There is, unfortunately, no clear legal answer about which side is correct. Some argue for the presidency, saying that the Constitution assigns it the job of “Commander in Chief.” Others argue for Congress, saying that the Constitution gives it the “power to . . . declare war.” But the Supreme Court has been unwilling to resolve the matter, declining to take sides in what many consider a political dispute between the other branches of government.¶ We believe there is a better way than wasting time disputing who is responsible for initiating or continuing war.¶ Almost three years ago, we were members of the Miller Center’s bipartisan National War Powers Commission, which proposed a pragmatic framework for consultation between the president and Congress. Co-chaired by one of us and the late Warren Christopher, the commission could not resolve the legal question of which branch has the ultimate authority. Only the court system can do that. Instead, the commission strove to foster interaction and consultation, and reduce unnecessary political friction. The commission — which represented a broad spectrum of views, from Abner Mikva on the liberal end to Edwin Meese on the conservative end — made a unanimous recommendation to the president and Congress in 2008.¶ The commission’s proposed legislation would repeal and replace the War Powers Resolution. Passed over a presidential veto and in response to the Vietnam War, the 1973 resolution was designed to give Congress the ability to end a conflict and force the president to consult more actively with the legislative branch before engaging in military action. The resolution, a hasty compromise between competing House and Senate plans, stated that the president must terminate a conflict within 90 days if Congress has not authorized it. But no president has ever accepted the statute’s constitutionality, Congress has never enforced it and even the bill’s original sponsors were unhappy with the end product. In reality, the resolution has only further complicated the issue of war powers.

### Courts CP

#### Court interference in national security decks effective executive responses to prolif, terror, and the rise of hostile powers---link threshold is low

Robert Blomquist 10, Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIPRUDENCE, 44 Val. U.L. Rev. 881

Supreme Court Justices--along with legal advocates--need to conceptualize and prioritize big theoretical matters of institutional design and form and function in the American national security tripartite constitutional system. By way of an excellent introduction to these vital issues of legal theory, the Justices should pull down from the library shelf of the sumptuous Supreme Court Library in Washington, D.C. (or more likely have a clerk do this chore) the old chestnut, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law by the late Harvard University law professors Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks. n7 Among the rich insights on institutional design coupled with form and function in the American legal system that are germane to the Court's interpretation of national security law-making and decision-making by the President are several pertinent points. First, "Hart and Sacks' intellectual starting point was the interconnectedness of human beings, and the usefulness of law in helping us coexist peacefully together." n8 By implication, therefore, the Court should be mindful of the unique [\*883] constitutional role played by the POTUS in preserving peace and should prevent imprudent judicial actions that would undermine American national security. Second, Hart and Sacks, continuing their broad insights of social theory, noted that legal communities establish "institutionalized[] procedures for the settlement of questions of group concern" n9 and regularize "different procedures and personnel of different qualifications . . . appropriate for deciding different kinds of questions" n10 because "every modern society differentiates among social questions, accepting one mode of decision for one kind and other modes for others-e.g., courts for 'judicial' decisions and legislatures for 'legislative' decisions" n11 and, extending their conceptualization, an executive for "executive" decisions. n12 Third, Professors Hart and Sacks made seminal theoretical distinctions between rules, standards, principles, and policies. n13 While all four are part of "legal arrangements [\*884] in an organized society," n14 and all four of these arrangements are potentially relevant in judicial review of presidential national security decisions, principles and policies n15 are of special concern because of the sprawling, inchoate, and rapidly changing nature of national security threats and the imperative of hyper-energy in the Executive branch in responding to these threats. n16

The Justices should also consult Professor Robert S. Summers's masterful elaboration and amplification of the Hart and Sacks project on enhancing a flourishing legal system: the 2006 opus, Form and Function in a Legal System: A General Study. n17 The most important points that [\*885] Summers makes that are relevant to judicial review of American national security presiprudence are three key considerations. First, a "conception of the overall form of the whole of a functional [legal] unit is needed to serve the founding purpose of defining, specifying, and organizing the makeup of such a unit so that it can be brought into being and can fulfill its own distinctive role" n18 in synergy with other legal units to serve overarching sovereign purposes for a polity. The American constitutional system of national security law and policy should be appreciated for its genius in making the POTUS the national security sentinel with vast, but not unlimited, powers to protect the Nation from hostile, potentially catastrophic, threats. Second, "a conception of the overall form of the whole is needed for the purpose of organizing the internal unity of relations between various formal features of a functional [legal] unit and between each formal feature and the complementary components of the whole unit." n19 Thus, Supreme Court Justices should have a thick understanding of the form of national security decision-making conceived by the Founders to center in the POTUS; the ways the POTUS and Congress historically organized the processing of national security through institutions like the National Security Council and the House and Senate intelligence committees; and the ways the POTUS has structured national security process through such specific legal forms as Presidential Directives, National Security Decision Directives, National Security Presidential Decision Directives, Presidential Decision Directives, and National Security Policy Directives in classified, secret documents along with typically public Executive Orders. n20 Third, according to Summers, "a conception of the overall form of the whole functional [legal] unit is needed to organize further the mode of operation and the instrumental capacity of the [legal] unit." n21 So, the Supreme Court should be aware that tinkering with national security decisions of the POTUS--unless clearly necessary to counterbalance an indubitable violation of the text of the Constitution--may lead to unforeseen negative second-order consequences in the ability of the POTUS (with or without the help of Congress) to preserve, protect, and defend the Nation. n22

[\*886] B. Geopolitical Strategic Considerations Bearing on Judicial Interpretation

Before the United States Supreme Court Justices form an opinion on the legality of national security decisions by the POTUS, they should immerse themselves in judicially-noticeable facts concerning what national security expert, Bruce Berkowitz, in the subtitle of his recent book, calls the "challengers, competitors, and threats to America's future." n23 Not that the Justices need to become experts in national security affairs, n24 but every Supreme Court Justice should be aware of the following five basic national security facts and conceptions before sitting in judgment on presiprudential national security determinations.

(1) "National security policy . . . is harder today because the issues that are involved are more numerous and varied. The problem of the day can change at a moment's notice." n25 While "[y]esterday, it might have been proliferation; today, terrorism; tomorrow, hostile regional powers" n26, the twenty-first century reality is that "[t]hreats are also more likely to be intertwined--proliferators use the same networks as narco-traffickers, narco-traffickers support terrorists, and terrorists align themselves with regional powers." n27

(2) "Yet, as worrisome as these immediate concerns may be, the long-term challenges are even harder to deal with, and the stakes are higher. Whereas the main Cold War threat--the Soviet Union--was brittle, most of the potential adversaries and challengers America now faces are resilient." n28

(3) "The most important task for U.S. national security today is simply to retain the strategic advantage. This term, from the world of military doctrine, refers to the overall ability of a nation to control, or at least influence, the course of events." n29 Importantly, "[w]hen you hold [\*887] the strategic advantage, situations unfold in your favor, and each round ends so that you are in an advantageous position for the next. When you do not hold the strategic advantage, they do not." n30

(4) While "keeping the strategic advantage may not have the idealistic ring of making the world safe for democracy and does not sound as decisively macho as maintaining American hegemony," n31 maintaining the American "strategic advantage is critical, because it is essential for just about everything else America hopes to achieve--promoting freedom, protecting the homeland, defending its values, preserving peace, and so on." n32

(5) The United States requires national security "agility." n33 It not only needs "to refocus its resources repeatedly; it needs to do this faster than an adversary can focus its own resources." n34

[\*888] As further serious preparation for engaging in the jurisprudence of American national security presiprudence in hotly contested cases and controversies that may end up on their docket, our Supreme Court Justices should understand that, as Walter Russell Mead pointed out in an important essay a few years ago, n35 the average American can be understood as a Jacksonian pragmatist on national security issues. n36 "Americans are determined to keep the world at a distance, while not isolating ourselves from it completely. If we need to take action abroad, we want to do it on our terms." n37 Thus, recent social science survey data paints "a picture of a country whose practical people take a practical approach to knowledge about national security. Americans do not bother with the details most of the time because, for most Americans, the details do not matter most the time." n38 Indeed, since the American people "do know the outlines of the big picture and what we need to worry about [in national security affairs] so we know when we need to pay greater attention and what is at stake. This is the kind of knowledge suited to a Jacksonian." n39

Turning to how the Supreme Court should view and interpret American presidential measures to oversee national security law and policy, our Justices should consider a number of important points. First, given the robust text, tradition, intellectual history, and evolution of the institution of the POTUS as the American national security sentinel, n40 and the unprecedented dangers to the United States national security after 9/11, n41 national security presiprudence should be accorded wide latitude by the Court in the adjustment (and tradeoffs) of trading liberty and security. n42 Second, Justices should be aware that different presidents [\*889] institute changes in national security presiprudence given their unique perspective and knowledge of threats to the Nation. n43 Third, Justices should be restrained in second-guessing the POTUS and his subordinate national security experts concerning both the existence and duration of national security emergencies and necessary measures to rectify them. "During emergencies, the institutional advantages of the executive are enhanced", n44 moreover, "[b]ecause of the importance of secrecy, speed, and flexibility, courts, which are slow, open, and rigid, have less to contribute to the formulation of national policy than they do during normal times." n45 Fourth, Supreme Court Justices, of course, should not give the POTUS a blank check--even during times of claimed national emergency; but, how much deference to be accorded by the Court is "always a hard question" and should be a function of "the scale and type of the emergency." n46 Fifth, the Court should be extraordinarily deferential to the POTUS and his executive subordinates regarding questions of executive determinations of the international laws of war and military tactics. As cogently explained by Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, n47 "the United States should comply with the laws of war in its battle against Al Qaeda"--and I would argue, other lawless terrorist groups like the Taliban--"only to the extent these laws are beneficial to the United States, taking into account the likely response of [\*890] other states and of al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations," n48 as determined by the POTUS and his national security executive subordinates.

## AT: Reform CP

### Top Level – Harvard Westlake

#### Smith et al and Thul both outdate your ev and prove that the war in Yemen increases AQAP presence – they both violate agreements and sell arms or give money to militia groups or AQAP to gain leverage which encourages them to gain more presence in Yemen

#### No reason why Saudi or UAE are key – we’ll do that work on the net benefit <go there>

### Top Level – NDCA Quarters

#### Perm do both – the CP is literally the status quo, AQAP is our top priority and ending the war significantly reduces AQAP presence

#### Unless they can indicate a material difference in their solvency advocate that would happen - not in the impact, but in the process - of making AQAP a "top priority" as in how that would change our military tactics, they get NO offense because allowing the 2NR to say without any justification would justify CP’s that are just like "the United States should defeat the Taliban"

#### UAE and Saudi counterterror are trash– our ev postdate all of theirs and all of their ev doesn’t take into account how it’s changed under the coalition –Fenton-Harvey and Smith et al prove that Saudi and the UAE fuel the terror conflict because they break arms agreements and give them money

## AT: Demining PIC

### Top Level

#### Demining isn’t military aid- it’s humanitarian

DoS no date (U.S. department of state, Overview of U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program, <https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/2002/14867.htm>, JKS)

The U.S. Government has now approved programs to assist 43 landmine-affected countries and northwest Somalia. Through its Humanitarian Demining Program and Emergency Demining Initiative, the list of recipients is expected to expand as the United States approves more applicant countries each year. To Walk the Earth in Safety describes the extensive history of the U.S. commitment to humanitarian demining in these 44 locations. The following table depicts all U.S.-funded humanitarian demining support since FY93, support intended to promote our interests in peace, prosperity, and regional stability.

#### Normal means doesn’t remove demining

Thul 18, Prak Chan Thul, experienced Correspondent with a demonstrated history of working in the media in Cambodia. Skilled in writing, investigative reporting, and strong media and communication professional with a Bachelor of Arts in English.

2-28-2018, "Cambodia 'shocked' by 'disrespectful' U.S. aid cut, says democracy...," U.S., [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-politics-usa/cambodia-shocked-by-disrespectful-u-s-aid-cut-says-democracy-intact-idUSKCN1GC0X0 /](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-politics-usa/cambodia-shocked-by-disrespectful-u-s-aid-cut-says-democracy-intact-idUSKCN1GC0X0%20/) MM

Cambodia said on Wednesday it was saddened and shocked by a “disrespectful” U.S. decision to rein back aid programs because of perceived democratic setbacks and defended its record on democracy. The White House said on Tuesday it was suspending or curtailing several Treasury, USAID and military assistance programs that support Cambodia’s military, taxation department and local authorities - all of which, it said, shared blame for recent instability. A Cambodian court on Tuesday ordered the seizure of the headquarters of the main opposition party, pending the payment of damages to Prime Minister Hun Sen, the latest blow to the dissolved opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party. Hun Sen, who has ruled Cambodia for more than 30 years, has forced the closure of an English-language newspaper and jailed government critics, including opposition leader Kem Sokha, whom he has accused of conspiring with the United States to overthrow him. Rights groups and Western nations have decried the crackdown on the opposition ahead of a general election set for July 29. “Besides being saddened and shocked over the decision by the friendly nation over development assistance, Cambodia is proud to maintain and continue democracy with energy,” government spokesman Phay Siphan told Reuters on Wednesday. Phay Siphan called the aid cut “disrespectful” and “dishonest” as it builds democracy. “Democracy belongs to the people, not to the party that is already dissolved,” he said. “Cambodia had a bitter experience during the interventions of the United States and Western nations, which tried to set up democracy between 1970 and 1975, and they failed,” he said. A defiant Guaido returns home to Venezuela Hun Sen has never forgiven the United States for dropping bombs on Cambodia during the Vietnam War, which ended in 1975. Cambodia ranks among the world’s nations most littered with unexploded ordnance, says the Mines Advisory Group, which helps find and destroy unexploded devices that kill or injure an average of two Cambodians every week. The White House said that Washington had spent more than $1 billion in support for Cambodia and that assistance in health, agriculture and mine-clearing will continue.

#### Case outweighs – their ev is hype because they didn’t even highlight the impact – their ev says it’s killed less than 1000 people but justifying Saudi’s actions via ANY aid encourages them to continue the violence somehow

#### Other actors solve – at worst it fails and kills deminers

AFP 19, 1-20-2019, "Blast kills 5 demining experts in Yemen: security source," France 24, [https://www.france24.com/en/20190120-blast-kills-5-demining-experts-yemen-security-source /](https://www.france24.com/en/20190120-blast-kills-5-demining-experts-yemen-security-source%20/) MM

An explosion killed five demining specialists in war-torn Yemen's central province of Maarib on Sunday, security and medical sources said. A pro-government security official, who spoke to AFP on condition of anonymity, said the the five were foreign experts working on the Saudi-backed Masam landmine clearance project. AFP could not independently confirm which countries they came from. The official said the blast occurred as landmines were being transported to be destroyed. A medic at a Maarib hospital confirmed five bodies were brought to the hospital, adding that a number of other people were injured in the incident.

#### Bangladesh solves- they JUST deployed hundreds of soldiers for demining operations

Chowdhury 18 (Kamran Reza, Reporter, 8-12-2018, "Bangladesh to Send Troops to Saudi Arabia under Defense Pact," BenarNews, <https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/bengali/saudi-deal-02142019164746.html>, JKS)

Bangladesh is to deploy hundreds of soldiers to Saudi Arabia for demining operations along the kingdom’s border with war-torn Yemen under a new bilateral defense deal between Dhaka and Riyadh, the Bangladeshi foreign minister said. Senior military officers from both countries signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in Riyadh on Thursday, sealing the first ever agreement on defense cooperation between the two nations, Bangladeshi officials confirmed. Bangladesh’s government, however, did not release a copy of the MoU. It calls for sending 1,800 troops to Saudi Arabia in a non-combat role, Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul Momen told BenarNews on the eve of the MoU’s signing. “According to the deal, the members of the Bangladesh armed forces will clear the landmines planted on the Saudi border with Yemen,” he said. “Our forces will work to protect the two holy mosques in Mecca and Medina, if attacked. Other than this, they will not take part in any combat activities.”

#### Other actors solve – KSRelief is a non profit org that’s solving their net benefit

Arab News, 12-22-2018, "Saudi project removes 26,609 land mines in Yemen," <http://www.arabnews.com/node/1424536/saudi-arabia>

Saudi project removes 26,609 land mines in Yemen Members of a Yemeni military demining unit prepare to destroy unexploded bombs and mines collected from conflict areas near the southern port city of Aden, Yemen. (REUTERS) Updated 23 December 2018 ARAB NEWS December 22, 2018 23:30 1489 In Yemen, KSRelief distributed 37 tons of food to about 3,000 displaced people in the villages of Al-Jouf governorate JEDDAH: The Saudi Project for Landmines Clearance in Yemen launched by the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center (KSRelief), removed 64 anti-personnel mines, 1,430 anti-vehicle mines, 85 explosive devices and 955 unexploded ordnance during the second week of December. The mines were planted by the Iranian-backed Houthi militia in Yemen. In the last week of November, members of the project managed to dismantle some 1,462 land mines to reach 6,677 mines planted by the Houthi militia in schools and residential areas throughout the month. The militia has attempted to hide the land mines via several methods, which has led to the death or severe injury of children, women and elderly men. Since the beginning of the project, 26,609 mines have been removed.

## AT: Arms Sales CP

### Top Level

#### Doesn’t solve case – refueling, intelligence sharing, and training are all other forms of aid that the plan stops which encourage intervention

#### Aid MUST be unconditional – it’s either all or nothing for the US – it’s not beneficial for the US to remove some aid, but not all

#### No offense if we win defense to the net benefit, we’ll do that work now <go to flow or put defense>

## AT: THAAD PIC

### Top Level

#### No net benefit – they already implemented THAAD - the aff doesn’t take away current systems like missile defense, it suspends future arms and ends programs, we don’t fly there and say “nope, no more defense systems”

#### Even if the aff removes THAAD, they need to prove it has prevented a significant impact – we installed THAAD in South Korea and it failed because shooting a missile out of thin air is like throwing up a golf ball and hitting it with another golf ball

#### Uniqueness overwhelms the link – THAAD hasn’t stopped Iran from progressing or doing bad stuff in Yemen – their uniqueness ev is from 2017 when we actually installed it and the link ev is from 2018, whoopsies.

#### PICs are a voting issue – it makes the aff debate themselves, explodes neg ground because the neg can PIC out of an infinite number of things, this encourages writing vague plans and tiny affs to avoid PICs which explodes limits and turns any of their offense.

## AT: Medical Relief PIC

#### Military aid is aid direct towards benefiting armed forces, NOTHING ABOUT MILITARY AID INCLUDES MEDICAL RELIEF, their counterplan is not competitive because medical relief is not exclusive with military aid, prefer our definition, it’s from a federal agency and has intent to define

USAID no date <https://explorer.usaid.gov/about.html#tab-methodology> / MM

Military assistance is defined as foreign aid for programs primarily for the benefit of recipient government armed forces, or aid which subsidizes or substantially enhances military capability. Military assistance excludes humanitarian and non-military development programs funded by the U.S. Department of Defense; these programs are categorized as 'Economic Assistance'.

## AT: IMET PIC

### Top Level – Debate Drills

#### Congressional budget thumps – they just cut IMET to Saudi because it wasn’t working

Harris 1/23 (Bryant Harris, 1-23-19, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/01/congress-cuts-deal-mideast-aid-package-saudi-arabia-turkey.html)

Although **Congress** has yet to coalesce around a path out of the monthlong government shutdown, it has at least **reached a consensus on a Middle East aid package for 2019. The compromise contains good news for several US allies** — namely Egypt, Morocco and Turkey — as it undoes significant setbacks they faced when the House passed a different spending bill earlier this year. **But it also** contains a significant blow to Saudi Arabia by shutting the kingdom out of a key US military training program. The **provisions were all in the Democratic-held House’s spending** bill, which passed 234-180 today. **The** Republican-controlled Senate **is set to vote on its own version** of the bill on Thursday, **but foreign aid provisions** are identicalto the House bill. The dueling bills differ on immigration and border security, so neither is likely to become law this week as the two chambers remain mired in partisan gridlock. Still, the Middle East aid provisions have already been agreed to in both chambers, **indicating that they’ll likely become law when the shutdown** eventually **ends.** The agreement comes after the House passed a different spending bill on Jan. 3 that would have cut Egyptian military aid, rebuked Morocco over its occupation of the Western Sahara and banned the transfer of F-35 jets to Turkey. Although that bill originated in the Republican-held Senate last year, the upper chamber did not include President Donald Trump’s more recent demand for funding to build a wall along the US-Mexico border. Notably, the House and Senate have agreed to a new provision in **today’s bill** that would cut Saudi Arabia off from the State Department-run International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. While the Saudis only receive a few thousand dollars in **IMET** assistance every year, **participation makes Riyadh eligible for savings on other US training programs** needed to operate its US-made military arsenal.

#### Causes the aff’s terminal impact – IMET is the reason why the Saudi military can do such “precise” bombings on innocent people, proves US modeled democracy fails

#### Be skeptical of the link – no Saudi specific link or proof of democratic transition means the CP can’t solve – the Yemen coalition has been going on for 4 years now and things have just got worse

#### Perm do the CP – not military aid

USAID no date <https://explorer.usaid.gov/about.html#tab-methodology> / MM

Military assistance is defined as foreign aid for programs primarily for the benefit of recipient government armed forces, or aid which subsidizes or substantially enhances military capability. Military assistance excludes humanitarian and non-military development programs funded by the U.S. Department of Defense; these programs are categorized as 'Economic Assistance'.

## AT: UAE PIC

### Top Level – HW

#### Perm do both – Saudi and the UAE are tied, it’s all or nothing, the CP ends up in the UAE not receiving aid because that’s the only way strikes end

#### The CP can’t solve the case – our Turse evidence disproves the theory that Saudi controls the direction of the war – the UAE is just as responsible for the harms in Yemen and the CP glosses over that

#### Their evidence DOES NOT say the war would end – it just says that Saudi’s would comply with a ceasefire but NOT that the UAE would – the UAE isn’t the little guy and they DON’T have a warrant

#### Their UAE wants peace evidence is embarrassing – it’s two sentences long and an opinion with no warrant from Indyk in a conversation with other Western journalists – don’t buy their “UAE wants peace” bullshit until the President of the UAE stops using US weapons to kill innocent people

### Top Level – Debate Drills

#### Turse disproves the link – their ev is all about condemning Saudi for Khashoggi, but not about the actual bombing runs – the UAE has been just as responsible

#### We’ll just put defense on the net benefit – independently though the UAE is just terrible, and we shouldn’t ignore their actions

## AT: Uranium PIC

### Top Level – Debate Drills

#### The US circumvents through energy deals to let Saudi proliferate

**Gardner 3/27** (Timothy, “U.S. approved secret nuclear power work for Saudi Arabia,” Reuters, 3/27/19, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-saudi-nuclear/us-approved-secret-nuclear-power-work-for-saudi-arabia-idUSKCN1R82MG>, accessed 4/28/19) KED

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry has approved six secret authorizations by companies to sell nuclear power technology and assistance to Saudi Arabia, according to a copy of a document seen by Reuters on Wednesday. The Trump administration has quietly pursued a wider deal on sharing U.S. nuclear power technology with Saudi Arabia, which aims to build at least two nuclear power plants. Several countries including the United States, South Korea and Russia are in competition for that deal, and the winners are expected to be announced later this year by Saudi Arabia. Perry’s approvals, known as Part 810 authorizations, allow companies to do preliminary work on nuclear power ahead of any deal but not ship equipment that would go into a plant, a source with knowledge of the agreements said on condition of anonymity. The approvals were first reported by the Daily Beast. The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) said in the document that the companies had requested that the Trump administration keep the approvals secret. “In this case, each of the companies which received a specific authorization for (Saudi Arabia) have provided us written request that their authorization be withheld from public release,” the NNSA said in the document. In the past, the Energy Department made previous Part 810 authorizations available for the public to read at its headquarters. A Department of Energy official said the requests contained proprietary information and that the authorizations went through multi-agency approval process. Many U.S. lawmakers are concerned that sharing nuclear technology with Saudi Arabia could eventually lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman told CBS last year that the kingdom would develop nuclear weapons if its rival Iran did. In addition, the kingdom has occasionally pushed back against agreeing to U.S. standards that would block two paths to potentially making fissile material for nuclear weapons clandestinely: enriching uranium and reprocessing spent fuel.

#### Perm do both –

#### \*\*They are in an OBVIOUS double bind – either Saudi complies and they don’t take away military aid to the Kingdom – OR they don’t comply and there is no net benefit.

#### Bolton pushing to remove sanctions waivers for NONPROLIFERATION PROJECTS with Iran – their Miller ev says Iran prolif is why Saudi proliferates

**Larison 4/23** (Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and was a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and resides in Dallas, “The Nuclear Deal Saboteurs Aren’t Finished Yet,” 4/23/19, The American Conservative, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-nuclear-deal-saboteurs-arent-finished-yet/>, accessed 4/25/19) KED

CNN reports that Trump may decide to cancel more sanctions waivers, and this time they affect ongoing work to implement provisions of the nuclear deal: President Donald Trump and his advisers are considering revoking sanctions waivers that have allowed several countries to collaborate with Iran on civil nuclear projects, including those intended to restrict Iran’s nuclear production capabilities, two sources familiar with the matter said. Trump administration officials have held several meetings in recent weeks to discuss eliminating some or all of the nuclear sanctions waivers, but a decision has not yet been reached, an administration official and source familiar with the discussions told CNN. National security adviser John Bolton, a longtime Iran hawk, has been among those pushing for the US to take this next step and eliminate the waivers, the sources said. The most hard-line opponents of the nuclear deal have been agitating for Trump to do this for months, and they have a natural ally in Bolton, who has never seen an arms control or nonproliferation deal that he didn’t want to destroy. The Trump administration had previously been willing to grant these sanctions waivers that allow some nonproliferation work to go ahead at Fordow and Arak: The Trump administration granted waivers allowing “nonproliferation projects at Arak, Bushehr, and Fordow,” three Iranian nuclear sites, to continue in November 2018 at the same time it announced it would reinstate all sanctions waived as part of the 2015 nuclear deal. The State Department made clear it was issuing the waiver to allow “certain ongoing projects that impede Iran’s ability to reconstitute its weapons program and that lock in the nuclear status quo” to move forward. The waivers currently allow modifications that ensure Iran’s Arak reactor produces less plutonium and the conversion of the Fordow nuclear site into a research facility. This has been a case of the administration wanting to have its cake and eat it, since it takes for granted that Iran is complying with the agreement and tacitly acknowledges that the agreement is worth having. Iran hawks in the Senate, including Ted Cruz, Tom Cotton, and Marco Rubio, have been leading the charge to cancel these waivers because they object to Iran’s nuclear program itself no matter what it is being used for. They don’t distinguish between legitimate civilian nuclear projects and illicit military ones, and they deliberately try to confuse them to mislead the public about what Iran is doing. The hawkish extremists have always wanted Iran’s nuclear program to be abolished, and if they can’t have that they want to create a pretext for conflict that allows for military action against Iran. Canceling these waivers would be the next step on the path to forcing Iran to abandon the nuclear deal and provide them with that pretext. European governments warned earlier this month that refusing to extend these waivers could prompt Iran to leave the deal. There is a very real danger that Iran may finally decide that enough is enough. Revoking the waivers certainly makes no sense for U.S. interests, as any credible arms control expert would tell you: Kelsey Davenport, the director of nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, argued it would be a “dangerous and irresponsible decision not to renew the waivers.” “Failing to renew the waivers would be a huge own goal for the United States. It’s in US national security interests to ensure that Iranian nuclear facilities cannot be quickly reconverted for nuclear weapons purposes,” Davenport said. “If the United States stops the remaining states party to the agreement from fulfilling those projects, it puts them in violation for the deal which just gives Iran future justification for abandoning the agreement.” Bloomberg also reported on this earlier this month: “It’s [irrational] insane from a nonproliferation perspective,” said Jarrett Blanc, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former State Department coordinator for Iran nuclear implementation. “Deciding to throw that away because you need the next drumbeat of antagonism toward Iran is nuts.” That isn’t going to discourage Bolton, since driving Iran out of the deal before next year’s presidential election is exactly what he has been working towards for the last year: But National Security Advisor John Bolton opposes an extension, claiming it would lend legitimacy to continued Iranian nuclear activity and to an agreement dismissed as fatally flawed by the president, two sources familiar with the deliberations said. Bolton has won every internal debate over Iran policy thus far, and there is no reason to think that Trump won’t follow his advice this time. Iran’s government may not play into Bolton’s hands, but they are understandably losing patience with an arrangement in which they do everything they are obliged to do and have virtually nothing to show for it. Ariane Tabatabai and Eric Brewer warned last year against revoking these waivers: Similarly, some critics have called on the administration to pressure remaining parties to the nuclear deal into stopping the redesign of the Arak heavy-water research reactor—a project aimed at significantly reducing the amount of plutonium produced by the reactor—and the underground Fordow complex, which was once used for uranium enrichment but is being repurposed to pose less of a proliferation concern. Goldberg and Nagle have similarly argued for the necessity for the Trump administration of using “all its legal authorities to cut off international support to Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastructure.” But it is precisely the international support that is key to making these facilities less useful for nuclear weapons. If global partners withdraw from these projects and leave them incomplete, Iran would have more of an incentive, not less, to convert the facilities back to their pre-agreement designs, increasing the proliferation risk [bold mine-DL]. A [rational]sane administration interested in supporting nonproliferation efforts would never even consider revoking these waivers, but then a [rational]sane administration wouldn’t have reneged on the deal and reimposed sanctions in the first place. The Trump administration violated a successful nonproliferation agreement because they wanted it to fail. It would be all too predictable for Trump to take another destructive step in that effort to blow up the the nuclear deal.

#### Solvency deficit – Albright ev says “This U.S. policy should happen in parallel with efforts to strengthen and extend, or make permanent, the nuclear limitations of the JCPOA.” Not to mention we left the Iran Deal already which should trigger the net benefit.

#### It DOES NOT work – their ev – THEY EVEN HIGHLIGHT A PART THAT SAYS IT DOESN’T WORK – we read blue

Lin 12 - Yang Bonny Lin (Political Science PhD from Yale, Political Science Researcher @ RAND), 2012, Arms, Alliances, and the Bomb: Using Conventional Arms Transfers to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation, PhD Dissertation, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1038970618 WJ

In-depth case studies of Israel, South Korea, and Pakistan support the statistical findings, but also reveal that arms sales provide the U.S. leverage over all nuclear aspiring countries regardless of the maturity of the arms recipient's nuclear weapons program. U.S. arms transfers to Israel encouraged Tel Aviv to delay production of nuclear weapons until 1967 and to manufacture nuclear weapons at a slow rate until 1973. After the 1973 October War, U.S. arms sales could not prevent Israel from expanding its nuclear arsenal but did encourage Israel to never publicly test, demonstrate, or use its nuclear weapons. Similarly, in the mid-1970s, Washington combined reassurances with the threat of ending the U.S.-ROK. security relationship - including terminating the U.S. arms supply - to pressure South Korea into shelving its nuclear project. After South Korea restarted its nuclear program in the late 1970s, Seoul again canceled the program in exchange for U.S. support and arms. On the other hand, Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons began in 1972, after the country suffered two military defeats and a sustained U.S. arms embargo. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, allowed Pakistan to enjoy a stronger U.S. commitment and substantial U.S. arms sales. In the 1980s, Islamabad continued to seek nuclear weapons but limited its activities: it did not test a nuclear device or delivery vehicle and delayed the assembly of a nuclear bomb.

Though arms transfers may not be able to completely reverse or contain mature nuclear weapons programs, arms sales can delay nuclear proliferation and buy the international community more time to deal with the consequences of nuclear proliferation. Arms embargoes, on the other hand, are more likely to reinforce a country's perceived need for nuclear weapons.

## AT: UK Actor CP

#### Perm do both – the aff doesn’t preclude the UK pulling away aid – it’s not mutually exclusive

#### The UK is already reducing military aid to Saudi Arabia

Dewan 18 (Angela, Senior Producer, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/22/middleeast/arms-exports-saudi-arabia->intl/index.html)

A number of countries have restricted arms sales to Saudi Arabia since the kingdom began airstrikes on Yemen in 2015, in a war that the UN describes as the world's worst man-made humanitarian disaster. Calls for more restrictions on arms exports have been growing, particularly in Europe, since the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Turkey last month. US President Donald Trump, however, has repeatedly pointed to the US' lucrative arms deals with the Saudis as a reason to stand by the kingdom. Denmark and Finland on Thursday became the latest countries to suspend new arms deals with Saudi Arabia. Denmark's Foreign Ministry said it was freezing new deals over both Khashoggi and Yemen, while the Finnish Foreign Ministry mentioned only Yemen. Finland also banned new arms sales to the United Arab Emirates, which is part of the Saudi-led coalition in the conflict. Their announcements came just two days after Germany said it was stopping all arms transfers to the kingdom. Denmark and Finland are not major suppliers of weapons to Saudi Arabia, but Germany certainly is. It had already suspended new arms deals to Saudi Arabia, but on Monday it widened that ban to include the transfers of weapons on existing orders as well. So where is Saudi Arabia getting its weapons from? Arms deals are often done in secret or with little publicity. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) tries to track deals involving major weapons, and a database of Saudi imports from the last decade shows the United States as the biggest supplier, followed by the United Kingdom, France, Spain and then Germany. But a lot of exporters still selling to the Saudis have dramatically decreased their supply in recent years. The United Kingdom, for example, transferred arms worth an estimated $843 million in 2016 but almost halved that value to $436 million last year, according to SIPRI. (The database uses values constant with 1990 prices to eliminate currency fluctuations and inflation.) French exports of major weapons to Saudi Arabia were worth $174 million in 2015 but dropped to $91 million in 2016 and $27 million last year. The value of Spanish exports also dramatically decreased in that time period, but the Spanish government confirmed this year it would go ahead with arms deals it had previously suggested it would freeze, bowing to pressure from Spanish manufacturers, according to reports. US dwarfs other exporters Despite these decreases, the overall value of Saudi weapons imports actually increased by 38% between 2016 and 2017. That was almost entirely because of a huge uptick in transfers from the United States, which almost doubled its exports in terms of value from $1.8 billion to $3.4 billion in that time. Germany also multiplied its exports from $14 million to $105 million, although it is expected to be much lower this year following its suspension. Overall, no country comes close to the United States in major weapons supply. Over the past five years, for example, the US accounted for 61% of major arms sales to the Saudis. The UK was a distant second, with a 23% share, while France, in third place, was a mere 4%. In a statement on Tuesday, Trump said that canceling major arms contracts with the Saudis would be foolish, and that "Russia and China would be the enormous beneficiaries" if the US halted its sales. China supplies a negligible amount of major weaponry to Saudi Arabia, SIPRI data shows, but it is on the increase. Russia supplies so little it is not included in the organization's database. "Russia has tried hard in the past 10 to 15 years to get into the large Saudi arms market, but it has not been very successful. Saudi Arabia has acquired Russian rifles and may have bought some other items, but such deals have been very small," said Pieter Wezeman, a senior researcher with SIPRI's arms transfers and military expenditure program. "China has made some more substantial inroads into the Saudi arms market, in particular selling armed drones," Wezeman said. "The details are shady and we may very well have underestimated China's role as an arms exporter to Saudi Arabia. But China doesn't come anywhere near the USA, UK or even France as arms suppliers. Still, the important point here is that Saudi Arabia has explored the possibility of diversifying its supplier base."

#### CP sparks US fill-in – US will increase military aid if the UK cuts back – empirics proves since the value of Saudi aid increased by 38% even though every other country slashed it – that’s Dewan

#### The only reason the UK is there is to support the US – link magnifier to our 3 point

## AT: NMS Actor CP

#### Perm do the counterplan – their evidence says the DoD does it which is what the aff defends

#### No reason why the aff doesn’t shield the link to the net benefit – if anything they link into it because NMS isn’t normal means, straight up executive order is

**McBride 18** James McBride, Deputy Editor at Council on Foreign Relations, a master’s degree from Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, “How Does the U.S. Spend Its Foreign Aid?” Council on Foreign Relations, October 1, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-spend-its-foreign-aid

The Department of Defense plays a major role as the agency primarily responsible for implementing traditional military aid, though the State Department also funds and influences many security assistance programs. The Department of Health and Human Services implements many health-related programs, including the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The Treasury Department helps manage funding of global financial institutions, as well as programs for debt relief and economic reforms in poor countries. There is also a plethora of other agencies and autonomous organizations, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Peace Corps, and the African Development Foundation, involved in aid work.

## AT: Impeach Trump

### Top Level – HW

#### Perm do both – the executive does the aff and then after the aff is done, Pelosi signs the war powers resolution

#### The CP doesn’t fiat that the senate convicts – just that Congress impeaches. If the senate doesn’t convict – both of them stay president, the senate needs 2/3 majority which they can’t fiat

#### No reason why they would impeach – they need a link to why they CAN impeach Trump

# A2: Kritiks

## Generic Responses

### 1AR O/V

#### Framing – let us weigh the impacts of the case – anything else moot 6 minutes of AC offense, is impact self-serving, and destroy topic education, our framework can take into account material violence and them reading a new framing mechanism just excludes other forms of oppression

#### Case outweighs – The aff prevents Yemeni’s from unnecessary suffering, pulling out Saudi military aid is still a good idea

#### Institutional engagement towards material reform is pedagogically valuable and necessary – whether or not we see politics as a site of struggle is irrelevant when the alt-right does. Pure scholarship can’t connect its way to Capitol Hill and accompanying it with political movements is necessary to create well-crafted resistance strategies – anything else cedes politics and recreates their impacts.

#### Coupling their theorization with real, material politics movements is essential to ensuring it doesn’t get coopted. Scholars don’t ever take one stable position, they look between different methods to craft the best one. That justifies permutation do both and solves all of their offense.

#### Perm do both - pluralism is best

Bleiker 14 [Roland, professor of international relations at the university of Queensland. “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2. June 17, 2014]

This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement. For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

#### Perm do the aff and the alt in all other instances - either the alt is strong enough to overcome the residual links or it’s not strong enough and couldn’t solve in the first place

## AT: Debate Bad

### Top Level – Neenah

## AT: Cap

### Top Level

#### Framing – let us weigh the impacts of the case– anything else moot 6 minutes of AC offense, is impact self-serving, and destroy topic education

#### Floating PIKs are a voting issue – they steal aff ground and encourage un-educational 1nc and 2nr shiftiness, especially with no 2ac to develop in-depth offense and understand the literature

#### Perm do both – politics is key

Gibson and Graham 02 Gibson, human geography @ Australian National University, and Graham, geography @ U of Massachussets, 2 (Katharine, human geography@ Australian National University, Julie, geography @U of Massachusetts, <http://www.communityeconomies.org/papers/rethink/rethinkp3.rtf>, accessed: 30 June 2011, JT)

Finally, **what can we say about an economic politics outside the binary frame? In the face of the programs and plans of anti-globalization theorists and political analysts, our micropolitical experiments can easily be dismissed**. Most analysts, like Hardt and Negri, offer a vision of an appropriate political response to globalization that is very distant from the one we are pursuing: Imperial corruption is already undermined by the productivity of bodies, by cooperation, and by the multitude’s designs on productivity. The only event that we are still awaiting is the construction, or rather the insurgence, of a powerful organization. The genetic chain is formed and established in ontology, the scaffolding is continuously constructed and renewed by the new cooperative productivity, and thus we await only the maturation of the political development of the posse. We do not have any models to offer this event. Only the multitude through its practical experimentation will offer models and determine when and how the possible becomes real. (2000: 411) **We are no longer capable of waiting for the multitude to construct a powerful organization** (Gibson-Graham, 1996). Instead, we continue to be inspired by feminism as a global force, one that started small and personal and largely stayed that way, that worked on cultivating new ways of being, that created new languages, discourses and representations, that built organizations, and that quickly (albeit unevenly) encompassed the globe. **Globalization appears to call for one form of politics—mobilization and resistance on the global scale**. But **we believe there are other ways of practicing transformative politics**—**involving an opening to the local** as a place of political creativity and innovation. **To advocate local enactments is in no way to suggest that other avenues should close down**. **We would hope for the acceptance of multiple powers and forms of politics, with an eye to increasing freedoms and not limiting options.**  Rather than equivocating, with paradoxical certainty, about when and how a challenge to globalization will arise (the Hardt and Negri position), we have engaged in a here and now political experiment—working on ourselves and in our backyards.29 This is not because we think that we have found the only way forward, but because we have become unable to wait for an effective politics to be convened on some future terrain. The form of politics we are pursuing is not transmitted via a mass organization, but through a language and a set of practices. **A language can become universal without being universalist**. **It can share the space of power with other languages, without having to eradicate or “overthrow” them**.30 Academic, NGO, and internet networks can become part of a system of transmission, translation, amplification. **In our** (admittedly hopeful**) vision, the language of** the diverse economy and accompanying practices of **non-capitalist development may have global purchase one day**.

#### Cap solves disease

Norberg 03 [Johan, “In Defense of Global Capitalism, pg. 186, TCT]

One common objection to the market economy is that it causes people and enterprises to produce for profit, not for needs. This means, for example, pharmaceutical companies devoting huge resources to research and medicines to do with obesity, baldness, and depression, things that westerners can afford to worry about and pay for, whereas only a fraction is devoted to attempting to cure tropical diseases afflicting the poorest of the world's inhabitants, such as malaria and tuberculosis. This criticism is understandable. The unfairness exists, but capitalism is not to blame for it. Without capitalism and the lure of profit, we shouldn't imagine that everyone would have obtained cures for their illnesses. In fact, far fewer would do so than is now the case. If wealthy people in the West demand help for their problems, their resources can be used to research and eventually solve those problems, which are not necessarily trivial to the people afflicted with them. Capitalism gives companies economic incentives to help us by developing medicines and vaccines. That westerners spend money this way does not make things worse for anyone. This is not money that would otherwise have gone to researching tropical diseases—the pharmaceutical companies simply would not have had these resources otherwise. And, as free trade and the market economy promote greater prosperity in poorer countries, their needs and desires will play a larger role in dictating the purposes of research and production.

#### Disease is an existential risk – it’s almost done it and it will do it again

Casadevall 12 Dr. Casadevall, Albert Einstein College of Medicine Microbiology and Infectious Diseases professor, 12 [Arturo, MD and Ph.D from New York University, Sep 2012, Microbial Biotechnology, “The Future of Biological Warfare”, 5(5): 584–587, Wiley, accessed 7-10-14, AFB]

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large‐scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes’ recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering

## AT: Afropess

### Top Level – Non-black People

#### Framing – let us weigh the impacts of the case – anything else moot 6 minutes of AC offense, is impact self-serving, and destroy topic education, our framework can take into account material violence and them reading a new ROTB just excludes discussions about other forms of oppression

#### Draw a line on non-black debaters determining the social status of black people – I shouldn’t be able to speak for them and either should they. This isn’t saying that we shouldn’t talk about groups that aren’t our own – but making declarations about how they should view their future and their past is something that uniquely bad and links you back into all your offense and functions as a Whiteness DA to the alt.

#### Case outweighs – the general thesis of ontology doesn’t disprove that material improvements of the world ARE possible, it doesn’t complete overdetermine materiality, progress has been made possible since the 19th century and you should not overlook that. Stating that progress is impossible ignore lived realities and progress that has happened – giving up is significantly worse because it disagrees with the idea that 100 years from now society will still be just as anti-black as it is today.

#### Permutation do both – political movements happen with the alt - links don’t shield the perm if there isn’t a link in the first place

Wilderson 10 (Frank b. Wilderson III, Prof at UC Irvine, speaking on a panel on literary activism at the National Black Writers Conference, March 26, 2010, "Panel on Literary Activism", transcribed from the video available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/222448, begins at roughly 49:10)

Typically what I mean when I ask myself whether or not people will like or accept my reading, what I'm really trying to say to myself whether or not people will like or accept me and this is a difficult thing to overcome especially for a black writer because we are not just black writers, we are black people and as black people we live every day of our lives in an anti-black world. A world that defines itself in a very fundamental ways in constant distinction from us, we live everyday of our lives in a context of daily rejection so its understandable that we as black writers might strive for acceptance and appreciation through our writing, as I said this gets us tangled up in the result. The lessons we have to learn as writers resonate with what I want to say about literature and political struggle. I am a political writer which is to say my writing is self-consciously about radical change but when I have worked as an activist in political movements, my labor has been intentional and goal oriented. For example, I organized, with a purpose to say free Mumia Abu Jamal, to free all political prisoners, or to abolish the prison industrial complex here in the United States or in South Africa, I have worked to abolish apartheid and unsuccessfully set up a socialist state whereas I want my poetry and my fiction, my creative non fiction and my theoretical writing to resonate with and to impact and impacted by those tangible identifiable results, I think that something really debilitating will happen to the writing, that it the writing will be hobbled if and when I become clear in the ways that which I want my writing to have an impact on political struggle what I am trying to say when I say that I want to be unclear is I don't want to clarify, I do not want to clarify the impact that my work will have or should have on political struggle, is that the relationship of literature to struggle is not one of causality but one of accompaniment, when I write I want to hold my political beliefs and my political agenda loosely. I want to look at my political life the way I might look at a solar eclipse which is to say look indirectly, look arie, in this way I might be able to liberate my imagination and go to places in the writing that I and other black people go to all the time the places that are too dangerous to go to and too dangerous to speak about when one is trying to organize people to take risk or when a political organization is presenting a list of demands, I said at the beginning this is an anti-black world. Its anti black in places I hate like apartheid South Africa and apartheid America and it’s anti-black in the places I don't hate such as Cuba, I've been involved with some really radical political movements but none of them have called for an end of the world but if I can get away from the result of my writing, if I can think of my writing as something that accompanies political struggle as opposed to something that will cause political struggle then maybe just maybe I will be able to explore forbidden territory, the unspoken demands that the world come to an end, the thing that I can’t say when I am trying to organize maybe I can harness the energy of the political movement to make breakthroughs in the imagination that the movement can't always accommodate, if its to maintain its organizational capacity.

#### Reject non-black debaters reading afropessimism

Evans 15 Evans, Rashad. "RWEsq." On Flipping Aff & Being Black. RWEsq, 31 July 2015. Web. 12 Nov. 2016.

Such was not the case with Black Nihilism. The debaters actually picked this argument up with some ease. Of course, the argument beneath the Nihilism argument is afro-pessimism. This is a super popular debate argument already so I can see how it might be attractive to young debaters. However, I wonder why there was no similar cognitive dissonance for the debaters before arguing in favor of a radical Black argument which principally focuses on white violence and the necessity of a Black revolution. I listened to the debates just as I have listened to many college debates on the argument and it became clear to me that the kids did not get the argument. The argument had been reduced to: it sucks to be the Black body. I consistently hear debaters saying things like “the Black body can never…” “the Black body always…”"…to the Black body.” The is actually a reprieve from those debaters who would sometimes insert slave instead of Black body. In any event, non-Black debaters tend to use the pessimism argument to reduce Black people to a body or slave or simply an object. This is kinda the argument. But, this is the perversity of the argument in the hands of non-black debaters. One important move of afro-pessimism is to focus on anti-blackness as opposed to or in addition to white supremacy. The idea is that the world is anti-black and that anti-blackness is: (1) bigger than individual acts, (2) about more than white people and (3) foundational to humanity and civil society. In other words, all white people are implicated no matter how good or nice they are and so are non-white, non-Black people and no good can come of this world. However, that focus on anti-blackness and what makes the Black experience unique has also become an excuse for non-Black debaters to only focus on how “the Black body” is positioned by violence without theorizing about who is doing the positioning. In addition, if the world is always already anti-black then it can be difficult to see how any individual debater, judge or coach might be actually participating in anti-blackness, particularly as they engage with each other on the everyday. And, that humanity and civil society is fundamentally anti-black is merely an opportunity to explain why it has always sucked to be Black and not an opportunity to explain that the only way to affirm Blackness is to upend the entire world and at least includes a violent war against white people. Afropessimism is nothing if not an affirmation of blackness. It includes a negation of the world, but it is principally an affirming argument. For Black people. A white afropessimist makes no sense. White afropessimism is just anti-blackness. If you are a white afro-pessimist you should understand that your existence is complicit in violence against Black people and/or that your non-existence is a necessity to Black liberation. Under no circumstances should you understand your role to be to spread the gospel of pessimism further. Your engagement with the argument will always be theoretical (you have no relevant experience), redundant (you can never be additive to this conversation) and objectifying (reducing black people to objects of study). Afropessimism is an argument about why Black people should be the the subjects of the the debate. It is about how Black people are always already the subject of all debates but excluded from them as such. It is not about white people. All of this assumes that we are taking the argument seriously and not speaking in metaphorical terms, something Eve Tuck warns against in the context of settler colonialism. Both the Settler Colonialism and Black Nihilism arguments rely significantly on Fanon. And Fanon’s main point is that the native/colonialist and/or black/white cannot coexist. In practical terms, this meant that Black liberation in Africa required a violent war to the end. It’s an either/or life or death choice for both sides. But, understanding that anti-black violence is foundational is to understand that you have to fight back in literal terms. To end the world is to end the world. I am not certain that debaters fully understand the implications of such. If the students in my lab understood this they would have found the Black Nihilism argument as difficult as the Settler Colonialism argument. But they did not, partially because they were introduced to the argument from the perspective of Gramsci and a theory of civil society and not from Fanon and everyday anti-Black violence, but also because I didn’t take the time to explain the argument fully. Under no circumstances should non-Black debaters be taught to advocate for afro-pessimism from a non-Black person. And under no circumstances should two white boys think they have a better shot flipping negative and running afropessimism than reading their own Aff (something I had to explain before a quarters debate at the camp tournament). When that happens something has gone wrong.

### Top Level

#### Framing – let us weigh the impacts of the case – anything else moot 6 minutes of AC offense, is impact self-serving, and destroy topic education, our framework can take into account material violence and them reading a new ROTB just excludes discussions about other forms of oppression

#### Case outweighs – the aff prevents material harms against innocent people in Yemen. Hold a high bar on the link debate – the aff is still a good idea. Completely overdetermining the thesis of existence and saying we shouldn’t stop support that causes people in Yemen to suffer is morally repugnant

#### Permutation do both – materially improve the lives of people in Yemen while rejecting antiblackness - ontology doesn’t disprove that material improvements of the world ARE possible, it doesn’t complete overdetermine materiality, progress has been made since the Atlantic Slave Trade and you should not overlook that. Stating that progress is impossible ignore lived realities and progress that has happened – giving up is significantly worse because it disagrees with the idea that 100 years from now society will still be just as anti-black as it is today.

#### Permutation do both – political movements happen with the alt

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Typically what I mean when I ask myself whether or not people will like or accept my reading, what I'm really trying to say to myself whether or not people will like or accept me and this is a difficult thing to overcome especially for a black writer because we are not just black writers, we are black people and as black people we live every day of our lives in an anti-black world. A world that defines itself in a very fundamental ways in constant distinction from us, we live everyday of our lives in a context of daily rejection so its understandable that we as black writers might strive for acceptance and appreciation through our writing, as I said this gets us tangled up in the result. The lessons we have to learn as writers resonate with what I want to say about literature and political struggle. I am a political writer which is to say my writing is self-consciously about radical change but when I have worked as an activist in political movements, my labor has been intentional and goal oriented. For example, I organized, with a purpose to say free Mumia Abu Jamal, to free all political prisoners, or to abolish the prison industrial complex here in the United States or in South Africa, I have worked to abolish apartheid and unsuccessfully set up a socialist state whereas I want my poetry and my fiction, my creative non fiction and my theoretical writing to resonate with and to impact and impacted by those tangible identifiable results, I think that something really debilitating will happen to the writing, that it the writing will be hobbled if and when I become clear in the ways that which I want my writing to have an impact on political struggle what I am trying to say when I say that I want to be unclear is I don't want to clarify, I do not want to clarify the impact that my work will have or should have on political struggle, is that the relationship of literature to struggle is not one of causality but one of accompaniment, when I write I want to hold my political beliefs and my political agenda loosely. I want to look at my political life the way I might look at a solar eclipse which is to say look indirectly, look arie, in this way I might be able to liberate my imagination and go to places in the writing that I and other black people go to all the time the places that are too dangerous to go to and too dangerous to speak about when one is trying to organize people to take risk or when a political organization is presenting a list of demands, I said at the beginning this is an anti-black world. Its anti black in places I hate like apartheid South Africa and apartheid America and it’s anti-black in the places I don't hate such as Cuba, I've been involved with some really radical political movements but none of them have called for an end of the world but if I can get away from the result of my writing, if I can think of my writing as something that accompanies political struggle as opposed to something that will cause political struggle then maybe just maybe I will be able to explore forbidden territory, the unspoken demands that the world come to an end, the thing that I can’t say when I am trying to organize maybe I can harness the energy of the political movement to make breakthroughs in the imagination that the movement can't always accommodate, if its to maintain its organizational capacity.

#### Making totalizing claims about blackness link back into your kritik – it positions blackness in a position of absolute negativity which discourages material solutions to violence in the face of systemic oppression which encourages the deaths of innocent people for the sake of smaller movements – the permutation resolves this.

### Cards

#### Libidinal explanations of anti-blackness are wrong

Peter Hudis 15, Professor of English and History @ Queens College, 2015, “Frantz Fanon: Philosopher of the Barricades,” Pg. 35-37

Fanon’s vantage point upon the world is his situated experience. He is trying to understand the inner psychic life of racism, not provide an account of the structure of human existence as a whole. Racism is not, of course, an integral part of the human psyche; it is a Social construct that has a psychic impact. Any effort to comprehend social distress that accompanies racism by reference to some a priori structure- be it the Oedipal Complex or the Collective Unconscious- is doomed to failure. Carl Jung sought to deepen and go beyond Freud's approach by arguing that the subconscious is grounded in a universal layer of the psyche- which he called "the collective unconscious:' This refers to inherited patterns of thought that exist in all human minds, regardless of specific culture or upbringing, and which manifest themselves in dreams, fairy tales, and myths. Jung referred to these universal patterns as "archetypes:' It may seem, on a superficial reading, that 1 Fanon is drawing from Jung, since he discusses how white people tend to unconsciously assimilate views of blacks that are based on negative stereotypes. Even the most "progressive" white tends to think of blacks a certain way (such as "emotional;' "physical," or / "aggressive"), even as they disavow any racist animus on their part. However, Fanon denies that such collective delusions are part of a psychic structure; they are not permanent features of the mind. They are habits acquired from a series of social and cultural impositions. While they constitute a kind a collective unconscious on the part of many white people, they are not grounded in any universal "archetype." The unconscious prejudices of whites do not derive from genes or nature, nor do they derive from some form independent of culture or upbringing. Fanon contends that Jung "confuses habit with instinct." Fanon objects to Jung's "collective unconscious" for the same reason that he rejects the notion of a black ontology. His phenomenological approach brackets out ontological claims on both a social and psychological level insofar as the examination of race and racism is concerned. He writes, "Neither Freud nor Adler nor even the cosmic Jung took the black man into consideration in the course of his research.” This does not mean that Fanon rejects their contributions tout court. He does not deny the existence of the unconscious. He only denies that the inferiority complex of blacks operates on an unconscious level. He does not reject the Oedipal Complex. He only denies that it explains (especially in the West Indies) the proclivity of the black "slave" to mimic the values of the white "master." And as seen from his positive remarks on Lacan's theory of the mirror stage, he does not reject the idea of psychic structure. He only denies that it can substitute for an historical understanding of the origin of neuroses .23 Fanon adopts a socio-genetic approach to a study of the psyche because that is what is adequate for the object of his analysis. For Fanon, it is the relationship between the socio-economic and psychological that is of critical import. He makes it clear, insofar as the subject matter of his study is concerned, that the socio-economic is first of all responsible for affective disorders: "First, economic. Then, internalization or rather epidermalization of this inferiority."24 Fanon never misses an opportunity to remind us that racism owes its origin to specific economic relations of domination- such as slavery, colonialism, and the effort to coopt sections of the working class into serving the needs of capital. It is hard to mistake the Marxist influence here. It does not follow, however, that what comes first in the order of time has conceptual or strategic priority. The inferiority complex is originally born from economic subjugation, but it takes on a life of its own and expresses itself in terms that surpass the economic. Both sides of the problem-the socio-economic and psychological-must be combatted in tandem: "The black man must wage the struggle on two levels; whereas historically these levels are mutually dependent, any unilateral liberation is flawed, and the worst mistake would be to believe their mutual dependence automatic:''5 On these grounds he argues that the problem of racism cannot be solved on a psychological level. It is not an "individual" problem; it is a social one. But neither can it be solved on a social level that ores the psychological. It is small wonder that although his name never appears in the book, Fanon was enamored of the work of Wilhelm Reich. This important Freudian-Marxist would no doubt feel affinity with Fanon's comment, "Genuine disalienation will have been achieved only when things, in the most materialist sense, have resumed their rightful place:'27

#### Psychoanalysis is non-falsifiable

Bunge 10 Bunge, McGill University philosophy professor, 2010 [Mario, “Should Psychoanalysis Be in the Science Museum?” http://stirling-westrup-tt.blogspot.com/2010/11/tt-ns-2780-robert-bud-and-mario-bunge.html]

WE SHOULD congratulate the Science Museum for setting up an¶ exhibition on psychoanalysis. Exposure to pseudoscience greatly¶ helps understand genuine science, just as learning about tyranny¶ helps in understanding democracy.¶ Over the past 30 years, psychoanalysis has quietly been displaced in¶ academia by scientific psychology. But it persists in popular¶ culture as well as being a lucrative profession. It is the¶ psychology of those who have not bothered to learn psychology, and¶ the psychotherapy of choice for those who believe in the power of¶ immaterial mind over body.¶ Psychoanalysis is a bogus science because its practitioners do not¶ do scientific research. When the field turned 100, a group of¶ psychoanalysts admitted this gap and endeavoured to fill it. They¶ claimed to have performed the first experiment showing that patients¶ benefited from their treatment. Regrettably, they did not include a¶ control group and did not entertain the possibility of placebo¶ effects. Hence, their claim remains untested (The International¶ Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol 81, p 513).¶ More recently, a meta-analysis published in American Psychologist¶ (vol 65, p 98) purported to support the claim that a form of¶ psychoanalysis called psychodynamic therapy is effective. However,¶ once again, the original studies did not involve control groups.¶ In 110 years, psychoanalysts have not set up a single lab. They do¶ not participate in scientific congresses, do not submit their papers¶ to scientific journals and are foreign to the scientific community -¶ a marginality typical of pseudoscience.¶ This does not mean their hypotheses have never been put to the test.¶ True, they are so vague that they are hard to test and some of them¶ are, by Freud's own admission, irrefutable. Still, most of the¶ testable ones have been soundly refuted.¶ For example, most dreams have no sexual content. The Oedipus complex¶ is a myth; boys do not hate their fathers because they would like to¶ have sex with their mothers. The list goes on.¶ As for therapeutic efficacy, little is known because psychoanalysts¶ do not perform double-blind clinical trials or follow-up studies.¶ Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. Its concepts are woolly and¶ untestable yet are regarded as unassailable axioms. As a result of¶ such dogmatism, psychoanalysis has remained basically stagnant for¶ more than a century, in contrast with scientific psychology, which is thriving.

#### View the political as contingent instead of as a closed system – the existence of antiblackness doesn’t imply irreversibility, and Black resistance throughout history disproves social death.

Gordon 17 (Lewis R Gordon is a Professor of Philosophy and Africana Studies at the University of Connecticut, “Thoughts on Afropessimism”, December 2017, Contemporary Political Theory, pg: 1-9)

“Afropessimism” came out of “Afro-pessimism.” The elimination of the hyphen is an important development, since it dispels ambiguity and in effect announces a specific mode of thought. Should the hyphen remain, the ambiguity would be between pessimistic people of African descent and theoretical pessimism. The conjoined, theoretical term is what proponents often have in mind in their diagnosis of what I shall call ‘‘the black condition.’’ The appeal to a black condition is peculiarly existential. Existentialists reject notions of human ‘‘nature’’ on the grounds that human beings live in worlds they also construct; they produce their so-called essence. That does not mean, however, human beings lack anchorage. Everyone has to start from somewhere. Existentialists call that somewhere a condition or conditions for these reasons, and the world human beings produce or through which we live is sometimes called ‘‘human reality.’’ Critics of existentialism often reject its human formulation. Heidegger, for instance, in his ‘‘Letter on Humanism,’’ lambasted Sartre for supposedly in effect subordinating Being to a philosophical anthropology with dangers of anthropocentrism (Heidegger, 1971). Yet a philosophical understanding of culture raises the problem of the conditions through which philosophical reflections could emerge as meaningful. Although a human activity, a more radical understanding of culture raises the question of the human being as the producer of an open reality. If the human being is in the making, then ‘‘human reality’’ is never complete and is more the relations in which such thought takes place than a claim about the thought. The etymology of existence already points to these elements. From the Latin ex sistere, ‘‘to stand out,’’ it also means to appear; against invisibility in the stream of effects through which the human world appears, much appears through the creative and at times alchemic force of human thought and deed. Quarrels with and against existential thought are many. In more recent times, they’ve emerged primarily from Marxists, structuralists, and poststructuralists, even though there were, and continue to be, many existential Marxists and even existentialists with structuralist and poststructuralist leanings. I begin with this tale of philosophical abstraction to contextualize Afropessimism. Its main exemplars, such as Jared Sexton and Frank Wilderson III, emerged from academic literary theory, an area dominated by poststructuralism even in many cases that avow ‘‘Marxism.’’ Sexton (2010) and Wilderson (2007) divert from a reductive poststructuralism, however, through examining important existential moves inaugurated, as Daniel McNeil (2011, 2012) observed, by Fanon and his intellectual heirs. The critical question that Afropessimism addresses in this fusion is the viability of posed strategies of Black liberation. (I’m using the capital ‘‘B’’ here to point not only to the racial designation ‘‘black’’ but also to the nationalist one ‘‘Black.’’ Afropessimists often mean both, since blacks and Blacks have a central and centered role in their thought.) The world that produced blacks and in consequence Blacks is, for Afropessimists, a crushing, historical one whose Manichaean divide is sustained contraries best kept segregated. Worse, any effort of mediation leads to confirmed black subordination. Overcoming this requires purging the world of antiblackness. Where cleansing the world is unachievable, an alternative is to disarm the force of antiblack racism. Where whites lack power over blacks, they lose relevance – at least politically and at levels of cultural and racial capital or hegemony. Wilderson (2008), for instance, explores my concept of ‘‘an antiblack world’’ to build similar arguments. Sexton (2011) makes similar moves in his discussions of ‘‘social death.’’ As this forum doesn’t afford space for a long critique, I’ll offer several, non-exhaustive criticisms. The first is that ‘‘an antiblack world’’ is not identical with ‘‘the world is antiblack.’’ My argument is that such a world is an antiblack racist project. It is not the historical achievement. Its limitations emerge from a basic fact: Black people and other opponents of such a project fought, and continue to fight, as we see today in the #BlackLivesMatter movement and many others, against it. The same argument applies to the argument about social death. Such an achievement would have rendered even these reflections stillborn. The basic premises of the Afropessimistic argument are, then, locked in performative contradictions. Yet, they have rhetorical force. This is evident through the continued growth of its proponents and forums (such as this one) devoted to it. In Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism, I argued that there are forms of antiblack racism offered under the guise of love, though I was writing about whites who exoticize blacks while offering themselves as white sources of black value. Analyzed in terms of bad faith, where one lies to oneself in an attempt to flee displeasing truths for pleasing falsehoods, exoticists romanticize blacks while affirming white normativity, and thus themselves, as principals of reality. These ironic, performative contradictions are features of all forms of racism, where one group is elevated to godlike status and another is pushed below that of human despite both claiming to be human. Antiblack racism offers whites self-other relations (necessary for ethics) with each other but not so for groups forced in a ‘‘zone of nonbeing’’ below them. There is asymmetry where whites stand as others who look downward to those who are not their others or their analogues. Antiblack racism is thus not a problem of blacks being ‘‘others.’’ It’s a problem of their not-being-analogical-selves-and-not-even-being-others. Fanon, in Black Skin, White Masks (1952), reminds us that Blacks among each other live in a world of selves and others. It is in attempted relations with whites that these problems occur. Reason in such contexts has a bad habit of walking out when Blacks enter. What are Blacks to do? As reason cannot be forced, because that would be ‘‘violence,’’ they must ironically reason reasonably with forms of unreasonable reason. Contradictions loom. Racism is, given these arguments, a project of imposing non-relations as the model of dealing with people designated ‘‘black.’’ In Les Damne´ de la terre (‘‘Damned of the Earth’’), Fanon goes further and argues that colonialism is an attempt to impose a Manichean structure of contraries instead of a dialectical one of ongoing, human negotiation of contradictions. The former segregates the groups; the latter emerges from interaction. The police, he observes, are the mediator in such a situation, as their role is force/violence instead of the human, discursive one of politics and civility (Fanon, 1991). Such societies draw legitimacy from Black non-existence or invisibility. Black appearance, in other words, would be a violation of those systems. Think of the continued blight of police, extra-judicial killings of Blacks in those countries. An immediate observation of many postcolonies is that antiblack attitudes, practices, and institutions aren’t exclusively white. Black antiblack dispositions make this clear. Black antiblackness entails Black exoticism. Where this exists, Blacks simultaneously receive Black love alongside Black rejection of agency. Many problems follow. The absence of agency bars maturation, which would reinforce the racial logic of Blacks as in effect wards of whites. Without agency, ethics, liberation, maturation, politics, and responsibility could not be possible. Afropessimism faces the problem of a hidden premise of white agency versus Black incapacity. Proponents of Afropessimism would no doubt respond that the theory itself is a form of agency reminiscent of Fanon’s famous remark that though whites created le Ne`gre it was les Ne`gres who created Ne´gritude. Whites clearly did not create Afropessimism, which Black liberationists should celebrate. We should avoid the fallacy, however, of confusing source with outcome. History is not short of bad ideas from good people. If intrinsically good, however, each person of African descent would become ethically and epistemologically a switching of the Manichean contraries, which means only changing players instead of the game. We come, then, to the crux of the matter. If the goal of Afropessimism is Afropessimism, its achievement would be attitudinal and, in the language of old, stoic – in short, a symptom of antiblack society. At this point, there are several observations that follow. The first is a diagnosis of the implications of Afropessimism as symptom. The second examines the epistemological implications of Afropessimism. The third is whether a disposition counts as a political act and, if so, is it sufficient for its avowed aims. There are more, but for the sake of brevity, I’ll simply focus on these. An ironic dimension of pessimism is that it is the other side of optimism. Oddly enough, both are connected to nihilism, which is, as Nietzsche (1968) showed, a decline of values during periods of social decay. It emerges when people no longer want to be responsible for their actions. Optimists expect intervention from beyond. Pessimists declare relief is not forthcoming. Neither takes responsibility for what is valued. The valuing, however, is what leads to the second, epistemic point. The presumption that what is at stake is what can be known to determine what can be done is the problem. If such knowledge were possible, the debate would be about who is reading the evidence correctly. Such judgment would be a priori – that is, prior to events actually unfolding. The future, unlike transcendental conditions such as language, signs, and reality, is, however, ex post facto: It is yet to come. Facing the future, the question isn’t what will be or how do we know what will be but instead the realization that whatever is done will be that on which the future will depend. Rejecting optimism and pessimism, there is a [an] supervening alternative: political commitment. The appeal to political commitment is not only in stream with what French existentialists call l’intellectuel engage´ (committed intellectual) but also reaches back through the history and existential situation of enslaved, racialized ancestors. Many were, in truth, an existential paradox: commitment to action without guarantees. The slave revolts, micro and macro acts of resistance, escapes, and returns help others do the same; the cultivated instability of plantations and other forms of enslavement, and countless other actions, were waged against a gauntlet of forces designed to eliminate any hope of success. The claim of colonialists and enslavers was that the future belonged to them, not to the enslaved and the indigenous. A result of more than 500 years of conquest and 300 years of enslavement was also a (white) rewriting of history in which African and First Nations’ agency was, at least at the level of scholarship, nearly erased. Yet there was resistance even in that realm, as Africana and First Nation intellectual history and scholarship attest. Such actions set the course for different kinds of struggle today. Such reflections occasion meditations on the concept of failure. Afropessimism, the existential critique suggests, suffers from a failure to understand failure. Consider Fanon’s notion of constructive failure, where what doesn’t initially work transforms conditions for something new to emerge. To understand this argument, one must rethink the philosophical anthropology at the heart of a specific line of Euromodern thought on what it means to be human. Atomistic and individual substance-based, this model, articulated by Hobbes, Locke, and many others, is of a non-relational being that thinks, acts, and moves along a course in which continued movement depends on not colliding with others. Under that model, the human being is a thing that enters a system that facilitates or obstructs its movement. An alternative model, shared by many groups across southern Africa, is a relational version of the human being as part of a larger system of meaning. Actions, from that perspective, are not about whether ‘‘I’’ succeed but instead about ‘‘our’’ story across time. As relational, it means that each human being is a constant negotiation of ongoing efforts to build relationships with others, which means no one actually enters a situation without establishing new situations of action and meaning. Instead of entering a game, their participation requires a different kind of project – especially where the ‘‘game’’ was premised on their exclusion. Thus, where the system or game repels initial participation, such repulsion is a shift in the grammar of how the system functions, especially its dependence on obsequious subjects. Shifted energy affords emergence of alternatives. Kinds cannot be known before the actions that birthed them. Abstract as this sounds, it has much historical support. Evelyn Simien (2016), in her insightful political study Historic Firsts, examines the new set of relations established by Shirley Chisholm’s and Jesse Jackson’s presidential campaigns. There could be no Barack Obama without such important predecessors affecting the demographics of voter participation. Simien intentionally focused on the most mainstream example of political life to illustrate this point. Although no exemplar of radicalism, Obama’s ‘‘success’’ emerged from Chisholm and Jackson’s (and many others’) so-called ‘‘failure.’’ Beyond presidential electoral politics, there are numerous examples of how prior, radical so-called ‘‘failures’’ transformed relationships that facilitated other kinds of outcome. The trail goes back to the Haitian Revolution and back to every act of resistance from Nat Turner’s Rebellion in the USA, Sharpe’s in Jamaica, or Tula’s in Curacao and so many other efforts for social transformation to come.

#### A priori orientations towards pessimism ignore lived experience – even if the future looks bad giving up is totalizing and links right back into your criticism

Gordon 15 --- Lewis, Afro-Jewish philosopher, political thinker, educator, and musician, Professor at the University of Connecticut in Philosophy and Africana Studies, European Union Visiting Chair in Philosophy; Nelson Mandela Visiting Professor of Politics and International Studies at Rhodes University, South Africa; and Chairman of the Frantz Fanon awards committees of the Caribbean Philosophical Association, transcribed from <https://youtu.be/UABksVE5BTQ>, presenting and discussing his book “What Fanon Said” \*\*\*Theonaturalism – religion based difference

The first thing to bear in mind you may wonder why in the beginning of the talk I talked about philosophical anthropology. And many people when they are trying to talk about social change they never think about *what a human being is* and this is something Fanon pays attention to. Many people want to have closed conceptions of human beings because then human beings can be predicable. In fact, in fanons writing he gave an example. One of the problems is that when he would walk in reason seems to walk out. One problem we have to bear in mind when we try to look at the question of human beings in terms of rigid closed systems is that we often are trying to get as a model of how we work as theorists on issues of social change that are actually based on what we can call law like generalizations. Now what is a law like generalization? It is when you make sure that whatever you say has no contradiction down the line. So if you are to say this much [gestures with hand] the next stage must be consistent with that, and the next stage until you are maximally consistent. Do you get that? But here is the problem – and I can just put it in a nut shell- nobody, nobody in this room would like to date, be married to, or be a best friend with a maximally consistent person. You know what that is. Its hell. And this tells you something, because if somebody where maximally consistent, you know what you would say that person is not reasonable. And we have a person here who does work on Hegel that can point out this insight, that a human being has the ability to evaluate rationality. Now why is that important? Because you see the mistake many of us make is many of us want to push the human being into that maximized law like generalization model. So when we think about our philosophical anthropology, some people, our question about intersectionality for instance, what some people don’t understand is nowhere is there ever a human being who is one identity. People talk about race – do you ever really see a race walking? You see a racialized man or woman, or transman or transwoman. Do you ever see a class walking? Class is embodied in flesh and blood people. And we can go on and on. So if we enrich our philosophical anthropology we begin to notice certain other things. And one of the other things we begin to realize is that we commit a serious problem when we do political work. And the problem is this. The question about Wilderson for instance. There is this discussion going on (and allot of people build it out of my earlier books). I have a category I call, as a metaphor, an antiblack world. You notice an indefinite article – an anti-black world. The reason I say that is because the world is different from an anti-black world. The project of racism is to create a world that would be completely anti-black or anti-woman. Although that is a project, it is not a fait accompli. People don’t seem to understand how recent this phenomenon we are talking about is. A lot of people talk about race they don’t even know the history of how race is connected into theonaturalism. How, for instance, Andalucia and the pushing out of the Moors. The history of how race connected to Christianity was formed. A lot of people don’t understand – from the standpoint of a species whose history is 220,000 years old, what the hell is 500 years? But the one thing that we don’t understand to is we create a false model for how we study those last 500 years. We study the 500 years as if the people who have been dominated have not been fighting and resisting. Had they not been fighting and resisting we wouldn’t be here. And then we come into this next point because you see the problem in the formulation of pessimism and optimism is they are both based on forecasted knowledge, a prior knowledge. But human beings don’t have prior knowledge. And in fact – what in the world are we if we need to have guarantees for us to act. You know what you call such people? Cowards. The fact of the matter is our ancestors – let’s start with enslaved ancestors. The enslaved ancestors who were burning down those plantations, who were finding clever ways to poison their masters, who were organizing meetings for rebellions, none of them had any clue what the future would be 100 years later. Some had good reason to believe that it may take 1000 years. But you know why they fought? Because they knew it wasn’t for them. One of the problems we have in the way we think about political issues is we commit what Fanon and others in the existential tradition would call a form of political immaturity. Political immaturity is saying it is not worth it unless I, me, individually get the payoff. When you are thinking what it is to relate to other generations – remember Fanon said the problem with people in the transition, the pseudo postcolonial bourgeois – is that they miss the point, you fight for liberation for other generations. And that is why Fanon said other generations they must have their mission. But you see some people fought and said no I want my piece of the pie. And that means the biggest enemy becomes the other generations. And that is why the postcolonial pseudo-bourgeoisie they are not a bourgeoisie proper because they do not link to the infrastructural development of the future, it is about themselves. And that’s why, for instance, as they live higher up the hog, as they get their mediating, service oriented, racial mediated wealth, the rest of the populations are in misery. The very fact that in many African countries there are people whose futures have been mortgaged, the fact that in this country the very example of mortgaging the future of all of you is there. What happens to people when they have no future? It now collapses the concept of maturation and places people into perpetual childhood. So one of the political things – and this is where a psychiatrist philosopher is crucial – is to ask ourselves what does it mean to take on adult responsibility. And that means to understand that in all political action it’s not about you. It is what you are doing for a world you may not even be able to understand. Now that becomes tricky, because how do we know this? People have done it before. There were people, for instance, who fought anti-colonial struggles, there are people (and now I am not talking about like thirty or forty years ago, I am talking about the people from day one 17th 18th century all the way through) and we have no idea what we are doing for the 22nd century. And this is where developing political insight comes in. Because we commit the error of forgetting the systems we are talking about are human systems. They are not systems in the way we talk about the laws of physics. A human system can only exist by human actions maintaining them. Which means every human system is incomplete. Every human being is by definition incomplete. Which means you can go this way or you can go another way. The system isn’t actually closed.

## AT: NDCA R2 Afropess

### 1ar – f/w

#### The role of the judge is to decide whether the plan is a good or bad idea –

#### a – Clash – weighing the 1AC guarantees that our research is relevant and the NEG contradicts it. Their arbitrary frameworks skirt engagement with the 1AC, which hurts argumentative refinement. Which is the only way we leave debate with the ability to debate.

#### b – Fairness – arbitrarily mooting 6 minutes of the 1AC for the sake of the NEG’s theory of the week which is an explicit answer to their role of the ballot – fairness is a prereq to their discussion.

### 1ar – case o/w

#### Case outweighs – the general thesis of ontology doesn’t disprove that material improvements of the world ARE possible, it doesn’t complete overdetermine materiality, progress has been made possible since the 19th century and you should not overlook that. Stating that progress is impossible ignore lived realities and progress that has happened – giving up is significantly worse because it disagrees with the idea that 100 years from now society will still be just as anti-black as it is today.

### 1ar – perm (wilderson)

#### Permutation do both – political movements happen with the alt – decimates the link – their author.

Wilderson 10 (Frank b. Wilderson III, Prof at UC Irvine, speaking on a panel on literary activism at the National Black Writers Conference, March 26, 2010, "Panel on Literary Activism", transcribed from the video available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/222448, begins at roughly 49:10)

Typically what I mean when I ask myself whether or not people will like or accept my reading, what I'm really trying to say to myself whether or not people will like or accept me and this is a difficult thing to overcome especially for a black writer because we are not just black writers, we are black people and as black people we live every day of our lives in an anti-black world. A world that defines itself in a very fundamental ways in constant distinction from us, we live everyday of our lives in a context of daily rejection so its understandable that we as black writers might strive for acceptance and appreciation through our writing, as I said this gets us tangled up in the result. The lessons we have to learn as writers resonate with what I want to say about literature and political struggle. I am a political writer which is to say my writing is self-consciously about radical change but when I have worked as an activist in political movements, my labor has been intentional and goal oriented. For example, I organized, with a purpose to say free Mumia Abu Jamal, to free all political prisoners, or to abolish the prison industrial complex here in the United States or in South Africa, I have worked to abolish apartheid and unsuccessfully set up a socialist state whereas I want my poetry and my fiction, my creative non fiction and my theoretical writing to resonate with and to impact and impacted by those tangible identifiable results, I think that something really debilitating will happen to the writing, that it the writing will be hobbled if and when I become clear in the ways that which I want my writing to have an impact on political struggle what I am trying to say when I say that I want to be unclear is I don't want to clarify, I do not want to clarify the impact that my work will have or should have on political struggle, is that the relationship of literature to struggle is not one of causality but one of accompaniment, when I write I want to hold my political beliefs and my political agenda loosely. I want to look at my political life the way I might look at a solar eclipse which is to say look indirectly, look arie, in this way I might be able to liberate my imagination and go to places in the writing that I and other black people go to all the time the places that are too dangerous to go to and too dangerous to speak about when one is trying to organize people to take risk or when a political organization is presenting a list of demands, I said at the beginning this is an anti-black world. Its anti black in places I hate like apartheid South Africa and apartheid America and it’s anti-black in the places I don't hate such as Cuba, I've been involved with some really radical political movements but none of them have called for an end of the world but if I can get away from the result of my writing, if I can think of my writing as something that accompanies political struggle as opposed to something that will cause political struggle then maybe just maybe I will be able to explore forbidden territory, the unspoken demands that the world come to an end, the thing that I can’t say when I am trying to organize maybe I can harness the energy of the political movement to make breakthroughs in the imagination that the movement can't always accommodate, if its to maintain its organizational capacity.

### 1ar – a2: ontology

#### I’ll do the ontology debate here –

#### Gordon slays their thesis claims – racism is a system of relations – it’s the set of customs and beliefs that empower individuals with racist beliefs – without a structure of racism to ground those beliefs, racists would simply be seen as “obnoxious,” which means that without a broader system to empower them, racists become ultimately inconsequential.

#### Gordon indicates that systems of social relations don’t have to be premised on the attitudes and perspectives of anti-black racists – this relational frame of analysis is necessary to move beyond racism – constraining ourselves to a singular meaning or truth of blackness only serves to empower racist systems.

#### The 1NC’s pessimism is an a-priori assertion on reality that ignores the contingency of human relations – studies of power relations and how they fluctuate can contribute to our understandings of antiblackness, while surface-level ontology claims directly trade off with that analysis – means the scholarship of the 1NC directly trades off with resistance.

#### We don’t need to win that the state is always good, just that it can be good – obviously, racist institutions have been constructed and maintained, but we only need to win that those institutions can be broken down.

### 1ar – a2: dillon

#### I’ll answer Dillon specifically –

#### a – It’s a film analysis – it doesn’t have the intent to create a theory of power which means you should prefer Gordon.

#### b – It’s not even about anti-blackness or pessimism – that means if I win the arguments about contingency I made on the ontology debate, you shouldn’t evaluate this evidence.

#### c – Their argument is that constructing fantasies of futures is bad – if I win the spill-up arguments on framework, this isn’t an argument.

### 1ar – a2: alt (burn it down)

#### The alternative debate – Gordon is offense – it’s a homogenization of political strategies that tells black people there’s only one way to be black and that’s through the alternative’s strategy – it skips necessary steps to create change.

The alternative ignores historical construction of hierarchies which causes error replication and dooms the alt to create a another structure of hierarchies which makes their impacts inevitable – that means you default to contingent reform being

## AT: Baudy

### Top Level

#### Framing - the negative needs to prove the consequences of the plan are a bad idea, anything else moots 6 minutes of 1ac offense, is impact self-serving, and kills topic education

#### Allow new 2ar responses to 2nr extrapolations – high theory bullshit can be framed however they want it to which justifies shifty 1ncs and CX and then new 2nr link stories

#### Drop them for endorsing a racist, sexist, Eurocentric asshole

Dutton ‘90 Dutton, Dennis. "Jean Baudrillard," Johns Hopkins University Philosophy and Literature 14 (1990): 234-38. SK~

Just as frivolous, but at least more amusing, is Baudrillard’s travel adventure though America (Verso, $24.95). I’ve met young people who at their first encounter with Europe will gush that it was “just like a movie.” Naive, yes, though it’s a perfectly natural reaction if you’ve never seen Europe except in movies; eventually the feeling wears off. I do hope Baudrillard will continue to visit the States, as I’m sure he’ll outgrow his sense that in America “cinema is true because it is the whole of space, the whole way of life that are cinematic . . . life is cinema. . . . The American city seems to have stepped right out of the movies.” A week’s visit with relatives — anybody’s relatives — in Des Moines, sleeping on a sofa bed, might have cured such delusions, but he seems to have spent most of his time either on the freeways or in such “paradisiacal” haunts as Santa Barbara. Most European accounts of America adopt an angle, and besides the mandatory clichés about Disneyland and American hyperreality, **Baudrillard’s theme is the untamed primitivism of the place. Old Europe is gray with thought, bent under the weight of history. But there’s a savage animalism about these Americans. Of the Black and Puerto Rican women of New York, he remarks that “black**, the pigmentation of the dark **races, is like a natural make-up that is set off by the artificial kind to produce a beauty which is not sexual, but sublime and animal.”**

#### Stop reading this ivory tower bullshit

Vaupel et al 6 – Lars Vaupel, Olaf Arndt, and Janneke Schönenbach, 8-19-2006, members of BBM, a Berlin-based artists group, “on first cyborgs, aliens and other sides of new technologies,” http://www.balsas.cc/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=151

Valentinas: We all know that Jean Baudrillard did not believe that the Gulf War did take place, as it was over-mediated and over-simulated. In fact, the Gulf War II is still not over, and Iraq became much more than just a Frankenstein laboratory for the new media, technology and “democracy” games. What can we learn from wars that do not take place, even though they cannot be finished? Are they becoming a symptom of our times as a confrontation between multiple time-lines, ideologies and technologies in a single place? Lars: Actually, it has always been the same: new wars have been better test-beds for the state of art technologies and the latest computer-controlled firearms. The World War I already was a fully mechanized war where pre-robots were fighting each other and gassing the troops. And afterwards, the winners shape the new world order. Olaf: Who on hell is Baudrillard? The one who earns money by publishing his prognoses after the things happen? What a fuck**,** **French philosophy deals too much with luxury problems and elegantly ignores the problem itself**. It’s no wonder, **this is the colonizer’s mentality**, you can hear it roaring in their words: **they use phrases made to camouflage genocide.** I went to see that Virilio’s exhibition "Ce qui arrive" at Foundation Cartier in 2003. I was smashed by that banal presentation of the evil of all kinds: again, natural catastrophes and evil done by man were exposed on the same wall, glued together with a piece of "theory". There you find it all, filed up in one row: the pure luxury of the Cartier-funded Jean Nouvel building, an artwork without any blood in its veins, and that late Christian philosophy about the techno-cataclysm being the revenge of God. **Pure shit, turned into gold in the holy cellars of the modern alchemists’ museums.** The artist-made video "documents" of the Manhattan towers opposed to Iraqian war pictures: that’s not Armageddon, that’s man-invented war technology to be used to subdue others. And **there is always somebody who pushes the buttons,** even when the button is a computer mouse some ten thousand kilometers away from the place where **people die**, or even if it is a civil airplanes redirected by Islamists. Everybody knows that. **War technology has always been made to make killing easier**. And to produce martyrs as well. Janneke: Compare Baudrillard with **Henry Dunant,** the founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Dunant was no philosopher, he was just an intelligent rich man in the late 19th century. But his ideas went far more in the direction where **you should hope to find** **philosophers** as well. He experienced war as a "randonneur": he passed by, he saw the suffering and the inhumanity of war. **And he felt obliged to act**. Apart from the maybe 10 days he spent on the battlefield, on the beautiful meadows in the Europeans Alps, helping wounded people to survive, as a complete medical layman he decided to do something more sustainable against these odds. He knew that his efforts couldn’t prevent war in general, but he felt that he could alter the cruelty of reality. **And he succeeded in doing it**. No wonder that in our days we find the most engaged people to support the TROIA projects intention in Geneva, where they are still based. And they are not only doing their necessary surgeon’s work in the field: they are as well **fighting with the same energy on the diplomatic battlefield.**

#### Fuck theory

Fuck Theory 16 Anonymous blogger, writer, and twitter voice commenting on the election based in New York City, @FuckTheory, November 10, 2016, thread archived at: <https://twitter.com/FuckTheory/status/796702038176464896>, accessed November 12, 2016

For at least 20 years, upper-middle class, often tenured academics have been teaching young people that politics is a futile form of irony. I've watched Ivy League professors with tenure explain to graduate students with no health insurance that striking for pay is silly. I've heard smug male assholes with Ph.D.s describe registering voters as the "busywork" of political activity. I've watched Derrideans and Lacanians who own homes sneer at 19-year-olds who raise their hand to ask what forms of activism are useful. I've watched ridiculous theory fakers who don't understand the first thing about Foucault explain to eager kids that society is a prison. I've watched post-Zizek fuckboy Marxists condescendingly tell young socialists that signification, not class, is the REAL locus of struggle. I've watched spirited black kids, spirited LGBT kids, spirited poor kids, show up at college hopeful for action only to be sold nihilism. I've watched Tim Dean tell young men that ethical gay liberation means filling as many anonymous assholes with cum as possible. I've watched Lee Edelman tell students with a shit-eating grin that hope is surrender and that fighting for the future is "heteronormative." Kids who are the first of their family to go to college. Kids who spent their whole life fighting for a scholarship. Kids who worked full time while they studied for their SATs rather than having the family tutor come with to the Hamptons every summer. Kids who - like me - grew up looking with awe at the worn, dog-eared copies of the Communist Manifesto on their grandparents' bookshelves. Kids who - like me - had the shit kicked out of them for being smart, for being queer, for being brave, for being different. Kids who - like me - were told by adults that high school is hell but if I can JUST make it to college I'll find intellectual paradise. The smartest kids. The most determined kids. The most enthusiastic kids. The kids who needed a concept of ethical politics the most. The kids who could and in many cases would have gone back to their communities to teach, to write, to lead, to work. For decades, smug, privileged hypocrites have enjoyed the benefits and social advantages they discouraged students from fighting for. For decades, a small group of overpaid assholes too blind to see how lucky they are have been sapping the vigor of an entire generation. They haven't been pursuing a \*different\* form of activity. No. They have colluded with nihilism to ideologically devalue activity as such. For decades, this country's smartest kids have had their entire concept of political activity reduced to this: This is not the first time I have said these things. I've been saying them for years. This rotting nihilism, this political Soylent, is a big part of why I stopped doing "queer theory" and eventually left academia. This rotting nihilism is behind my commitment to pure positivity, to Spinozan metaphysics, to Nietzsche's joy and Irigaray's wonder. This rotting nihilism is the reason I wept tears of relief the first time I read the Ethics, because here, finally, was pure love of being. This isn't the first time I've said these things. I've been saying them for years. But it has become necessary to say them again. It has become necessary because we are now bluntly, painfully living the consequences of that vile, pseudo-political anti-ethics. Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying the tenured "queer" assholes at NYU and Yale are actually responsible for Trump. No academic has ever had that much power, as much as they love to pretend they could. But they are directly responsible for the nihilism and irony of a specific, crucial segment of the population who SHOULD be a vanguard. Yesterday morning, my little segment of the Twitterverse was troubled by the rancid stench of a dazzlingly dumb and blind Jacobin op-ed. This op-ed announced that the election result was the fault of "elites" and that the solution to it was "politics." "Elites." That op-ed was signed by five people...including not one but TWO white, well-educated, heterosexual married couples. One of those heterosexual men teaches at Princeton. Aaaaand...the other has an MFA in writing from Sarah Lawrence. But yeah. "Elites." What was these bold self-described radicals' proposed solution? "Politics." Not a specific political orientation. Not a specific plan of political action. Not a coherent set of principles. "Do politics." Um. OK. Then, this morning, no less a journalistic thinkfluencer than Hamilton Nolan excitedly announced a new movement. Again, he doesn't have any particular platform or a specific political agenda. He just thinks, you know, all things considered maybe politics is something we should maybe consider starting to do. You'd think at least ONE of these dudes who talk about politics online for a living might have at least HEARD of [@prisonculture](https://twitter.com/prisonculture), right? I don't mention these white writers because they or their writing actually matter. I mention them as excellent, convenient examples. Examples of a specific, crucial segment of the privileged, degree-hoarding elite who have been bitterly failed by their teachers. Examples of a generation of students, with parents either hard-working or rich, trained by the handmaidens of late-capitalist automation. A generation of students who can emit bullshit on command but can't actually write. A generation of students who are impressed by neologisms but have no grasp of concepts. A generation of students who think fully articulating why something can't be done is more profound than actually doing something. A generation of students who value novelty more than history and think the phrase "always-already" absolves them of historicizing. A generation of students who don't care about the coherent of the theory as long as they can feel superior to those kids from high school. A generation of students who think memes are a form of political engagement. A generation of students who think Lacan is a psychoanalyst and Zizek is a philosopher and that's exactly what their ideas look like. Most importantly, though: a generation of students who think "politics" is something you can CHOOSE to do, can choose to opt in or out of. Because that? That's the real privilege. Those are the real blinders. That is the real meaning of "elite": the ability to opt out of doing. The freedom to "do" politics because of an intellectual curiosity and not because your life and the lives of those you love are in danger. The privilege to genuinely live life thinking nobody around IS doing politics, and that, oh hey, maybe politics is something we should do? In 2008 at the huge gender studies conference at Penn, I saw Jose Muñoz and Lisa fucking Duggan give a talk. I've talked about that moment here before. It left a deep, lasting impression on me. Because it was so awful and embarrassing. Muñoz and Duggan get on stage and start talking in a cheery, excited tone about how they were recently having drinks in a West Village bar. And as they were in this West Village bar drinking, they started to think, "Omg, isn't optimism like, SO over? Lol eyerolling emoji." "So then we though, like, omg, what if instead of being hopeful and optimistic all the time, queer people tried being hopeless? Gag! Lol." This, btw, is just a few hours after Jack Halberstam got up to talk about masochism and Mishima's suicide as models for queer politics. So they're giving this talk and I am absolutely horrified, not just at the content, but at the Mean Girls-meets-deconstruction smugness. Then the talk ends and there's a Q&A. A very tall black woman with a single huge braid gets up to the microphone. She looks at them and says "I'm a black lesbian, and I'm here to tell you that there is nothing affirming or positive about hopelessness." (All quotations are approximate but I would wager at least 10-20 of my current followers must have been in that room that day). You guys, I have never seen two people with confused arguments backpedal so fucking fast. SO fucking fast. That was the day I stopped calling myself a queer theorist. And that talk is the best metaphor I have for the blindness I'm talking about. Again, let's not exaggerate the importance of "theory." Trump didn't win the presidency because Lisa Duggan has her head up her own ass. But when I look at how (over)educated white people of my generation talk about politics, I see the indelible smeary residue of that mindset. One of the most painful things about this election - grim echo of 2000 - is how small the gap was in so many states. And yes, that gap could maybe have been closed if Clinton had been shaking hands in Wisconsin instead of making cameos on Broad City. But maybe it could also have been closed if an extra 5000 white people with BAs in English or history had sat their parents down for a talk. Maybe it could have been closed if nobody were actually fucking stupid enough to think that "accelerationism" is a reason to vote for Trump. Maybe that gap could have been closed if we had worried more and rolled our eyes less, if we had remembered more or talked to our elders. There are people alive still who survived the Holocaust. My grandmother is still alive. The one with the scissors. Fascism isn't a fantasy. And I too assumed that Clinton would win. I too thought I didn't have to do much except shrug and roll my eyes. I was wrong. Many of us were wrong. And we're going to live with that fact for a long time. ...or maybe just until the tsunamis devour the cities. The brunt of that fact is the realization that more could and should have been done, somehow, somewhere. And I sympathize with guilt, truly I do. I'm not just Jewish but also a Freudian. But the fact that you or I now awake to a new need or new urgency for action does not mean other have not, ahem, always-already been acting. The work has been happening. People have been fighting. People have been dying. It is only the bourgeois ideology of insular, self-oriented exceptionalism that makes you think you need to or even CAN start something new. You're walking into the middle of a memorial service to tell the people who lost their loved ones that there's a war happening. No. Shit.

### Impact Turn – Information Good

#### Turn – The acceleration of information has not destroyed dissent – human agency has been expanded due to the ability to transfer information about movements quickly – empirics prove.

* Terrains of dissent have not disappeared, but shifted
* Concedes that information has been accelerated to the hyperreal, but counters with the argument that this acceleration is good for dissent
* Multiple revolutions prove information 🡪 change
* Knowledge about the functioning of global politics is key to deal with this new kind of political territory

Bleiker ’00 [Roland Bleiker, Ph.D., Professor of IR @ The University of Queensland, “The Changing Space and Speed of Dissident Politics,” Social Alternatives 19(1), 2000]//JIH

What can an activist learn from the insights that Virilio and Baudrillard have provided? Indeed, is activism still possible at a time when political and social consciousness gushes out of five-second sound-bites and corresponding hyper-real images that flicker over our television screens? Do human actions still matter in a world where the exchange of virtual capital through computerised networks plunges the global economy, at random so its seems, into up and down spirals that sweep across traditional boundaries of identity and sovereignty? Both Virilio and Baudrillard are highly pessimistic about the prospects of direct political action in the late modern world. One of the main themes in Virilio's latest book revolves around the environmental pollution of not only our atmosphere and hydrosphere, but also of our planet's time-space relationship. This "dromospheric pollution;' he claims, eludes all democratic controls and will soon precipitate a yet unknown fatal event,"the accident of all accidents, or, in other words, the [global] circulation of the generalised accident" (Virilio 1995: 35, 47, 83-4, 90, 98-9). Baudrillard's apocalyptic vision looks slightly different. For him, the ability to exert human agency has been annihilated because the link between "realities" and "refer· ents" no longer exist. And since we have no more reality, theory can no longer dissent against it (see 5mart 1993: I22-3;Welsch 1993:208- I I) But things do not necessarily have to look this grim. One can accept the rapidly changing nature of the late modern world and, at the same time, explore new forms of activism that emerge. The most potent of these terrains of dissent are perhaps located in the types of struggles that lead to a slow transformation of societal values. ReadingViriIio (1995:31) may help us recognise the contours of such a position: The question no longer is one that opposes the global in relation to the local, or the transitional in relation to the national. It is, above all, the question of this sudden temporal commutation which blurs not only the inside and the outside, the boundaries of the political territory, but also the before and after of its duration, its history. One can acknowledge the phenomena that Virilio and Baudrillard describe without necessarily accepting the overall conclusion that they have reached from their analyses. Yes, the blurring of distinctions between local and global, national and transnational, reality and virtuality, has altered the interaction between domination and resistance today. If 'real space' has become absorbed into the domains of speed and simulation, as Virilio and Baudrillard claim, then dynamics of dissent do not primarily, or at least not only, take place in their immediate spatial environment. Dissent operates as least as much in the virtuality of speed, the instantaneity of globalised communication. Consider, among many other examples, the socalled people power revolution against Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, the dissident movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma, or the massive street protests that preceded the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In each of these cases an act of popular dissent, successful or not, drew world-wide media attention and led to strong outside pressures being exerted upon the authority against which the protest was directed. Dissent has become an important transnational phenomenon, reflecting and shaping various aspect of late modern life. It is a phenomenon that defies conventional spheres of inquiry and oozes, so to speak, into grey zones of theory and practice. Dissident movements have come to transgress well-established boundaries between domestic and international politics (for a more detailed engagement with these themes see Bleiker 2000). Look at a more specific example. In October 1999 countless street demonstrations took place in several counties: expressions of discontent with the events that followed the overwhelming East Timorese vote for independence from Indonesia. From NewYork to London, from Brisbane to Paris, from Wellington to Hongkong, a variety of public rallies, big or small, brief or sustained, expressed outrage over both the terror created by militia forces opposed to independence and the refusal of the Indonesian army to halt the ensuing killing and mass displacement of EastTimorese. Many of these public protests were broadcasted on global television networks. The ensuing media-event contributed to the rapid emergence of a cross-territorial moral consensus that facilitated immediate action. In an unusually swift manner, the UN Security Council agreed to dispatch immediately an intervention force, whose task consisted of protecting EastTimorese people and securing a return to order. World wide protest actions against the Indonesian involvement in EastTimor thus not only facilitated the -speedy emergence of a near unanimous world-wide public and diplomatic agreement on the desirability of a military intervention, but also influenced the actions of Indonesia, whose permission essential to facilitate the employment of UN troops in East Timor. Indeed, debates in the Indonesian parliament underline the crucial importance that outsider presser played in bringing about a change in policy.A public statement by the armed forces voting bloc, one of the most influential segments of the parliament, admitted that "as part of the international community we have to accept it [the transfer of power to the UN and the ensuing parliamentary decision to revoke the 1978 decree incorporating East Timor into Indonesia]." (Greenless 1999:1) Speed and the Magnification of Dissent The phenomenon of speed has not annihilated dissent. Quite to the contrary. Speed may well have erased space to the benefit of some kind of globalised instantaneity. Yet, hyperreal images racing daily over our television screens nevertheless take part in a struggle over 'real time.' Independently of how instantaneous, distorted and simulated they are, these images influence our perceptions of the world and thus also our responses to important issues of our time. To accept the logic of speed, then, is not to render 'real time' obsolete, but to acknowledge multiple and overlapping spatial and temporal spheres within which political practices are constantly. Speed has increased the potential to interfere with the gradual transformation of societal values over 'real time. But where exactly is this potential for political action in a world of blurring boundaries, images and realities? One must acknowledge that with the advent of speed, the terrain of political struggle has changed fundamentally. Manifestations of dissent, such as street demonstrations or acts of civil disobedience, used to take place in a mostly local context. They engaged the spatial dynamics that were operative in the interactive relationship between ruler and ruler. The contraction of space, however, has altered the very foundations of these socio-political dynamicS. Domination and resistance now interact in a much wider and more complex array of power relations. The boundaries of discursive struggles have widened - and so have, consequently, the possible terrains of dissent where human agency can be exerted. Images of a protest march, for instance, may flicker over television screens world-wide· only hours after people have taken to the street. As a result, a local act of resistance can acquire almost immediately a much larger, cross-territorial dimension. It may generate a variety of outside pressures on the authorities against which the protest was directed. Any protest action that draws sufficient media attention thus has the potential to engender a political process that transcends its immediate spatial environment. Political activism then no longer takes place solely in the streets of Dilli and Belfast, at the gates of factories or around the AboriginalTent Embassy in front of Canberra's Old Parliament House. Political activism, wherever it occurs and whatever form it takes, has become intrinsically linked with the non-spatial logic of speed. Knowledge about this transformed logic of global politics can provide us with the potential for activist engagements and the resulting means to search for a more just world in the new millennium.

## AT: Psycho

#### Thumbs down to psychoanalysis

Gordon 1 Paul Gordon, accomplished psychotherapist, “Psychoanalysis and Racism: The Politics of Defeat,” RACE & CLASS v. 42 n. 4, 2001, pp. 17-34. / MM

But in the thirty years since Kovel wrote, that attempt to relate mind and society has been fractured by the advent of postmodernism, with its subsumption of the material/historical, of notions of cause and effect, to what is transitory, contingent, free-¯oating, evanescent. Psychoanalysis, by stepping into the vacuum left by the abandonment of all metanarrative, has tended to put mind over society. This is particularly noticeable in the work of the Centre for New Ethnicities Research at the University of East London, which purports to straddle the worlds of the academy and action by developing projects for the local community and within education generally.28 But**,** in marrying psychoanalysis and postmodernism, on the basis of claiming to be both scholarly and action oriented, it degrades scholarship and undermines action, and ends in discourse **analysis a language** in which metaphor passes for reality**.** Cohen's work unavoidably raises the question of the status of psycho- analysis as a social or political theory, as distinct from a clinical one. Can psychoanalysis, in other words, apply to the social world of groups, institutions, nations, states and cultures in the way that it does, or at least may do, to individuals? Certainly there is now a considerable body of literature and a plethora of academic courses, and so on, claim- ing that psychoanalysis is a social theory. And, of course, in popular discourse, it is now a commonplace to hear of nations and societies spoken of in personalised ways. Thus `truth commissions' and the like, which have become so common in the past decade in countries which have undergone turbulent change, are seen as forms of national therapy or catharsis, even if this is far from being their purpose. Nevertheless, the question remains: does it make sense, as Michael Ignatieff puts it, to speak of nations having psyches the way that individuals do? `Can a nation's past make people ill as we know repressed memories sometimes make individuals ill? . . . Can we speak of nations ``working through'' a civil war or an atrocity as we speak of individuals working through a traumatic memory or event?' 47 The problem withthe application ofpsychoanalysis to social institutionsis thatthere can be no testing of the claims made. If someone says, for instance, that nationalism is a form of looking for and seeking to replace the body of the mother one has lost, or that the popular appeal of a particular kind of story echoes the pattern of our earliest relationship to the maternal breast, how can this be proved? Thepioneers of psychoanalysis, from Freud onwards, allderived their ideas in the context oftheirwork with individual patients and their ideas can be examined in the everyday laboratory of the therapeutic encounter where the validity of an interpretation, for example, is a matter for dialogue between therapist and patient**.** Outside of the consulting room, there can be no such verification process, and the further one moves from the individual **patient,** the less purchase psychoanalyticideas canhave**.** Outside the therapeutic encounter, anything and everything can be true, psychoanalytically speaking. Butif everything is true, then nothing can be false and therefore nothing can be true. An example of Cohen's method is to be found in his 1993 working paper, `Home rules', subtitled `Some re¯ections on racism and nation- alism in everyday life'. Here Cohen talks about taking a `particular line of thought for a walk'. While there is nothing wrong with taking a line of thought for a walk, such an exercise is not necessarily the same as thinking. One of the problems with Cohen's approach is that a kind of free association, mixed with deconstruction, leads not to analysis, not even to psychoanalysis, but to . . . well, just more free association, an endless, indeed one might say pointless, play on words. This approach may well throw up some interesting associations along the way, connections one had never thought of but it is not to be confused with political analysis. In `Home rules', anything and everything to do with `home' can and does ®nd a place here and, as I indicated above, even the popular ®lm Home Alone is pressed into service as a story about `racial' invasion.

#### Psychoanalysis is nonsense

Bunge 10 Bunge, McGill University philosophy professor, 2010 [Mario, “Should Psychoanalysis Be in the Science Museum?” http://stirling-westrup-tt.blogspot.com/2010/11/tt-ns-2780-robert-bud-and-mario-bunge.html]

WE SHOULD congratulate the Science Museum for setting up an¶ exhibition on psychoanalysis. Exposure to pseudoscience greatly¶ helps understand genuine science, just as learning about tyranny¶ helps in understanding democracy.¶ Over the past 30 years, psychoanalysis has quietly been displaced in¶ academia by scientific psychology. But it persists in popular¶ culture as well as being a lucrative profession. It is the¶ psychology of those who have not bothered to learn psychology, and¶ the psychotherapy of choice for those who believe in the power of¶ immaterial mind over body.¶ Psychoanalysis is a bogus science because its practitioners do not¶ do scientific research. When the field turned 100, a group of¶ psychoanalysts admitted this gap and endeavoured to fill it. They¶ claimed to have performed the first experiment showing that patients¶ benefited from their treatment. Regrettably, they did not include a¶ control group and did not entertain the possibility of placebo¶ effects. Hence, their claim remains untested (The International¶ Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol 81, p 513).¶ More recently, a meta-analysis published in American Psychologist¶ (vol 65, p 98) purported to support the claim that a form of¶ psychoanalysis called psychodynamic therapy is effective. However,¶ once again, the original studies did not involve control groups.¶ In 110 years, psychoanalysts have not set up a single lab. They do¶ not participate in scientific congresses, do not submit their papers¶ to scientific journals and are foreign to the scientific community -¶ a marginality typical of pseudoscience.¶ This does not mean their hypotheses have never been put to the test.¶ True, they are so vague that they are hard to test and some of them¶ are, by Freud's own admission, irrefutable. Still, most of the¶ testable ones have been soundly refuted.¶ For example, most dreams have no sexual content. The Oedipus complex¶ is a myth; boys do not hate their fathers because they would like to¶ have sex with their mothers. The list goes on.¶ As for therapeutic efficacy, little is known because psychoanalysts¶ do not perform double-blind clinical trials or follow-up studies.¶ Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. Its concepts are woolly and¶ untestable yet are regarded as unassailable axioms. As a result of¶ such dogmatism, psychoanalysis has remained basically stagnant for¶ more than a century, in contrast with scientific psychology, which is thriving.

## AT: Weheliye

### Top Level

#### Framing – let us weigh the impacts of the case – anything else moot 6 minutes of AC offense, is impact self-serving, and destroy topic education, our framework can take into account material violence and them reading a new framing mechanism just excludes other forms of oppression

#### Case outweighs – The aff prevents Yemeni’s from unnecessary suffering, pulling out Saudi military aid is still a good idea

#### Permutation do both – end the bombings in Yemen so people can access HV –people in Yemen can’t access the alt because they are literally being killed – bodily security outweighs

#### Reject the alt – would say things like ending slavery are bad because they give rights to people

#### Institutional engagement towards material reform is pedagogically valuable and necessary – whether or not we see politics as a site of struggle is irrelevant when the alt-right does. Pure scholarship can’t connect its way to Capitol Hill and accompanying it with political movements is necessary to create well-crafted resistance strategies – anything else cedes politics and recreates their impacts.

### Cards

#### Anti-humanism is worse than humanism – focusing on differences is the basis for genocidal exclusions and strategic humanism solves their offense.

Lester 12 – (January 2012, Alan, Director of Interdisciplinary Research, Professor of Historical Geography, and Co-Director of the Colonial and Postcolonial Studies Network, University of Sussex, “Humanism, race and the colonial frontier,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Volume 37, Issue 1, pages 132–148)

Anderson argues that it is not an issue of extending humanity to … negatively racialised people, but of putting into question that from which such people have been excluded – that which, for liberal discourse, remains unproblematised. (2007, 199) I fear, however, that if we direct attention away from histories of humanism’s failure to deal with difference and to render that difference compatible with its fundamental universalism, and if we overlook its proponents’ failed attempts to combat dispossession, murder and oppression; if our history of race is instead understood through a critique of humanity’s conceptual separation from nature, we dilute the political potency of universalism. Historically, it was not humanism that gave rise to racial innatism, it was the specifically anti-humanist politics of settlers forging new social assemblages through relations of violence on colonial frontiers. Settler communities became established social assemblages in their own right specifically through the rejection of humanist interventions. Perhaps, as Edward Said suggested, we can learn from the implementation of humanist universalism in practice, and insist on its potential to combat racism, and perhaps we can insist on the contemporary conceptual hybridisation of human–non-human entities too, without necessarily abandoning all the precepts of humanism (Said 2004; Todorov 2002). We do not necessarily need to accord a specific value to the human, separate from and above nature, in order to make a moral and political case for a fundamental human universalism that can be wielded strategically against racial violence. Nineteenth century humanitarians’ universalism was fundamentally conditioned by their belief that British culture stood at the apex of a hierarchical order of civilisations. From the mid-nineteenth century through to the mid-twentieth century, this ethnocentrism produced what Lyotard describes as ‘the flattening of differences, or the demand for a norm (“human nature”)’, that ‘carries with it its own forms of terror’ (cited Braun 2004, 1352). The intervention of Aboriginal Protection demonstrates that humanist universalism has the potential to inflict such terror (it was the Protectorate of Aborigines Office reincarnated that was responsible, later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for Aboriginal Australia’s Stolen Generation, and it was the assimilationist vision of the Protectors’ equivalents in Canada that led to the abuses of the Residential Schools system). But we must not forget that humanism’s alternatives, founded upon principles of difference rather than commonality, have the potential to do the same and even worse. In the nineteenth century, Caribbean planters and then emigrant British settlers emphasised the multiplicity of the human species, the absence of any universal ‘human nature’, the incorrigibility of difference, in their upholding of biological determinism. Their assault on any notion of a fundamental commonality among human beings has disconcerting points of intersection with the radical critique of humanism today. The scientific argument of the nineteenth century that came closest to post-humanism’s insistence on the hybridity of humanity, promising to ‘close the ontological gap between human and non-human animals’ (Day 2008, 49), was the evolutionary theory of biological descent associated with Darwin, and yet this theory was adopted in Aotearoa New Zealand and other colonial sites precisely to legitimate the potential extinction of other, ‘weaker’ races in the face of British colonisation on the grounds of the natural law of a struggle for survival (Stenhouse 1999). Both the upholding and the rejection of human–nature binaries can thus result in racially oppressive actions, depending on the contingent politics of specific social assemblages. Nineteenth century colonial humanitarians, inspired as they were by an irredeemably ethnocentric and religiously exclusive form of universalism, at least combatted exterminatory settler discourses and practices at multiple sites of empire, and provided spaces on mission and protectorate stations in which indigenous peoples could be shielded to a very limited extent from dispossession and murder. They also, unintentionally, reproduced discourses of a civilising mission and of a universal humanity that could be deployed by anticolonial nationalists in other sites of empire that were never invaded to the same extent by settlers, in independence struggles from the mid-twentieth century. Finally, as Whatmore’s (2002) analysis of the Select Committee on Aborigines reveals, they provided juridical narratives that are part of the arsenal of weapons that indigenous peoples can wield in attempts to claim redress and recompense in a postcolonial world. The politics of humanism in practice, then, was riddled with contradiction, fraught with particularity and latent with varying possibilities. It could be relatively progressive and liberatory; it could be dispossessive and culturally genocidal. Within its repertoire lay potential to combat environmental and biological determinism and innatism, however, and this should not be forgotten in a rush to condemn humanism’s universalism as well as its anthropocentrism. It is in the tensions within universalism that the ongoing potential of an always provisional, self-conscious, flexible and strategic humanism – one that now recognises the continuity between the human and the non-human as well as the power-laden particularities of the male, middle class, Western human subject – resides.

## AT: Set Col

### Top Level – HW

#### The role of the ballot is to decide whether the plan is a good or bad idea

#### Clash – weighing the 1AC guarantees that our research is relevant, and the NEG contradicts it. Their arbitrary frameworks skirt engagement with the 1AC, which hurts argumentative refinement. Which is the only way we leave debate with portable skills.

#### Fairness – arbitrarily mooting 6 minutes of the 1AC for the sake of the NEG’s theory which is an explicit answer to their role of the ballot – fairness is a prereq to their discussion.

#### Case outweighs – The aff prevents Yemeni’s from unnecessary suffering, pulling out Saudi military aid is still a good idea, they don’t have a theory of IR so default preventing bombings

#### Permutation do both - Kids are dying in Yemen and the US is supporting it by appearing as the IR savior, the aff is the definition of abandoning settler institutions and anything other than complete abolition from our position in Yemen IS settler colonialist

#### SCT is fatalist – returning land does not return agency – it’s merely a gift from the Settler state that fuels Settler Solidarity – state engagement to prevent foreign colonialism is what the 1AC does and giving back the land is NOT realistic.

### Cards

#### U.S. military aid is the epitome of colonialism.

Windholz 9/17 (Windholz, Annie, International, Intersectional Thought & Travel By an Anxious Activist with an Attempt at Humor. Intersectional Feminist author. “Military Intervention is Modern Day Colonialism.” *Medium.com.* 17 Sept. 2018, <https://medium.com/@anniewindholz/military-intervention-is-modern-day-colonialism-bc178e262fa4>. Accessed 17 Dec. 2018.) LHSLA LH

Yesterday the Senate passed the National Defense Authorization Act which allocates roughly $700 billion in military spending for the year. This accounts for roughly 54% of the annual discretionary spending for the US. That same day I attended a community discussion concerning the military budget, which was frankly pretty depressing. We wrote postcards to senators and even spoke to representatives for Senators who were in the room with us, but the culture of violence in America- propped up by the culture of fear of others- felt like an insurmountable problem that needs immediate change. It’s going to take a lot more than postcards to change Senators minds who are almost all propped up with funding by weapons contractors. In 2015 the U.S. accounted for 37 percent of the total military spending in the world. This means that the U.S. military expenditures are about the size of the next seven largest military budgets in the world, combined. A man from the refugee community sitting next to me at the discussion shook his head in exasperation: “You bomb other countries and create more refugees, and then tell them they can’t come to the US. When really, if you would just spend all that money to help other countries rebuild, you would not have refugees.” Weapons manufacturers depend on constant threat of war to be able to continue providing jobs for all of their workers. It is not in these corporations interests to end wars. Additionally, war is being waged outside of America. Police force and Immigration and Border Patrol also request military grade equipment to “keep America safe” on its own land. When you take into account that it is not just that military manufacturers make weapons for the American war economy, but they also provide weapons for much of the world’s war economy as well (see School of the Americas)- you realize that this is big money, and it is not changing with a few peace and love signs. We need a complete cultural shift, because the current culture is constantly being influenced by hawkish propaganda in our everyday lives. The media has a huge role in this, with basically all mainstream media outlets normalizing war, and helping to propagate[s] the culture of fear and hatred of the “other.” In addition to profiting from other countries’ resources, war itself turns a huge profit for those who make a business of it. Recently Erik Prince (founder of the now-defunct mercenary corporation Blackwater) and Stephen Feinberg (owner of DynCorp military contractor) have developed proposals for Trump to use more private military contractors in Afghanistan rather than US troops. Corporate military contractors make 300–500 billion a year from the Department of Defense. Prince explains the “benefits” of corporate mercenaries, by using an immediate comparison to literal colonialism: “If you look back in history, the way the English operated India for 250 years, they had an army that was largely run by companies — and no English soldiers. So cheap, very low cost.” Western nations used to be open about wanting to exploit the world for their own gain. In recent years though this old form of colonialism has been covered up with ideas of “humanitarian interventionism.” Now, with the Trump administration in office, we are back to a much more blatant colonialism as Trump expresses desire to take Afghanistan’s minerals and Iraq’s oil- instead of just wanting to “help” the countries as previous administrations have claimed. Additionally, with exploitation of other people and the land they live on comes environmental pollution, an important intersection to realize. Not only are we killing people with immediate attacks, we’re killing people slowly with pollution. Also, nuclear weapons stockpiling (see Nuclear Disarmament) and drone warfare are issues for another article, but I wanted to set the stage for future anti-war articles today.

#### This card is fire and has 3 implications 1) They treat unsettling the settler as an end in itself commodifying the ballot meaning the judge can vote aff to endorse that their education is good and not reward them the ballot. Don’t give into their self-interest and 2) Decolonization fails because there are multiple factors precluding solvency and 3) We must engage institutions even in the face of settler colonialism. That means you prefer our aff.

Davis et al 17—Associate Professor, Indigenous Studies, Trent University, \*Associate Professor, Sociology McMaster University, and \*\*Associate Professor, Social Work University of Regina [Lynne Davis, Jeff Denis, and Raven Sinclair, 2017, Pathways of settler decolonization, Settler Colonial Studies, 7:4, 393-397, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1243085]//mba-cwk

The upsurge of intertwining scholarship in this field illuminates the present historical moment where scholars in multiple disciplines are turning to settler colonial studies in search of relevant conceptual tools. The authors in this volume write from different disciplines in exploring topics of decolonization, settler learning and solidarities. What they share in common is their engagement with the analysis of settler colonialism as the coherent logic of the state. This understanding provides a unified theme to scholarship that draws upon other disciplinary lenses. In addition to interdisciplinarity, the papers also share a concern to move from analysis toward action. Scholars such as Macoun and Strakosch,1 and Snelgrove, Dhamoon and Corntassel2 have warned against an abdication of responsibility by settler activists because the structural nature of settler colonialism would seem to defy a transformed future. In assessing the strengths and limitations of settler colonial theory, Macoun and Strakosch challenge those who use settler colonial theory (SCT) to realize its transformative opportunities while acting consciously to counter limitations identified by various critics. They caution against a stance of inevitability of settler colonialism that would risk delegitimizing Indigenous resistance, and they worry about re-inscribing settler academics’ political and intellectual authority to the detriment of Indigenous voices. At the same time, they note the contribution of SCT in providing a theoretical language to understand colonialism as a continuing force in the present, including an analysis of how both conservative and progressive settler movements may detract from Indigenous political challenges to the state, thus problematizing settler efforts at reconciliation and decolonization. They identify as one of its strengths the ability of SCT to provide non-Indigenous people with ‘a better account of ourselves’, 3 and to generate new conversations and alliances between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. Snelgrove, Dhamoon and Corntassel warn that SCT’s rapid ascendancy in the academy could overshadow Indigenous Studies and the voices of Indigenous peoples. They argue that: without centering Indigenous peoples’ articulations, without deploying a relational approach to settler colonial power, and without paying attention to the conditions and contingencies of settler colonialism, studies of settler colonialism and practices of solidarity run the risk of reifying (and possibly replicating) settler colonial as well as other modes of domination.4 In their view, Indigenous resistance and resurgence must remain central in discussions of changing relationships: Theorists of Indigenous resurgence, such as Taiaiake Alfred and Leanne Simpson, among others, also express the possibility for settler society listening, learning, and actings […] in accordance with and for what is being articulated [by Indigenous people]; Indigenous resurgence is ultimately about reframing the conversation around decolonization in order to re-center and reinvigorate Indigenous nationhood. Macoun and Strakosch, and Snelgrove, Dhamoon and Corntassel gesture towards action by settler society to follow the lead of resurgence theorists in transforming settler colonialism, despite the structural, relational and affective challenges of anti-colonial struggle, in order to ‘reinvigorate Indigenous nationhood’. The authors in this volume examine pathways to settler decolonization, analyzing the uneven terrain of settler efforts and experiences through the lenses of SCT, Indigenous scholars and grassroots communities, and specific disciplinary analyses. While SCT has been criticized for its inability to theorize a decolonial future, this volume interrogates what happens when settlers engage with and seek to transform the system. What does such action look like? What challenges, complexities and barriers are faced? What are the stumbling blocks? And what opportunities and possibilities emerge? The articles in this volume all note the need for settlers to transform our/their relations with the land and with Indigenous peoples, while recognizing the structural and psychological challenges of applying these principles in practice. It is one thing to care about the environment, and quite another to reorient one’s lifestyle around sustainable practices and the health of local ecosystems. It is one thing to feel a connection to a place, and another to accept the notion of ‘non-human agency’. 6 Likewise, it is easier for settlers to advocate for the return of land to Indigenous peoples ‘over there’ rather than right where settlers and settler states and corporations (claim to) own property.7 Transforming social relations is not just a matter of befriending Indigenous people; it means developing long-term relations of accountability, engaging in meaningful dialogue, and respecting Indigenous laws and jurisdiction. Learning to transform relationships in these ways – and to transform self-understandings and thinking and feeling patterns or ‘settler common sense’ 8 – is an ongoing process; it is not linear, but rather iterative, occurring in what Hiller in this volume calls ‘upward and downward spirals’. Moreover, settlers’ anti-colonial learning (and unlearning) does not simply precede action; it occurs through action, through meaningful relationships with Indigenous peoples and with other engaged settlers, and through experimentation with activism of various sorts. The Nehiyawak (Cree) refer to this relational and iterative social justice-focused process as kisāhkīwewin: love in action. Several papers in this volume also address the role of emotions in settler decolonization. While critical self-reflection is essential to this process, and while emotions such as guilt, shame and indignation can help motivate settlers to change their ways and support Indigenous resurgence (as Bacon shows in one of the articles collected here), it is equally important not to treat ‘unsettling the settler within’ 9 as an end in itself; rather than dwelling in discomfort, the point of unsettlement is to be a springboard to action that benefits Indigenous peoples. A related point of tension (or contention) is whether decolonization is in the interests of settlers. Boudreau (in this volume) argues that deep decolonizing solidarities must not be based on self-interest; decolonization for settlers entails sacrifice, or giving up power and privilege. This may be true and, therefore, if it is believed that there is nothing in it for settlers, why would they ever pursue it? Although decolonization may not be in settlers’ short-term economic or political interests, it may fulfill a humanistic, ethical and moral commitment. Moreover, decolonization may be in virtually everyone’s long-term interest, particularly if Indigenous resurgence assists in combatting climate change, ever-growing economic inequality, and other political and social problems. As Tuck and Yang make clear, decolonization is not a metaphor for other social justice projects.10 Nevertheless, settler colonialism does intersect with other systems of oppression, and decolonization would be incomplete without also tackling racism, capitalism and heterosexism.11

#### Legal reform is vital to provide meaningful redress for past violence to natives—can’t fix the law outside of the law

William Bradford 2, Chiricahua Apache. LL.M., 2001, Harvard Law School; Ph.D., 1995, Northwestern University, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": 1 Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 Am. Indian L. Rev. 1

[\*17] Nevertheless, even if the non-Indian majority would reject the American Myth in the interest of mending national fences, the path to Indian redress winds through terrain unmapped heretofore. Compensation and apologies, gestures potentially part of an amicable settlement, are not germane to the resolution of Indian claims for injustices that cannot be remedied save by reinvestiture of lands and sovereignty in self-determining Indian tribes. 70 This requires not merely an abstract acknowledgment of the value of pluralism but a comprehensive program of legal reform that dispenses with doctrines and precedents perpetuating the denial of the human rights of Indian tribes and people. 71 As law, more than any other social variable, has reproduced the subordination of Indians in the United States, 72 legal reform occupies a central position in the claim for Indian redress. 73¶ [\*18] In short, proponents of Indian redress must not only displace a flawed version of history: they must articulate a proposal for remediation that transports the American people far beyond the strictures of existing law to enable the peaceful restoration of Indian lands and powers of self-government. 74 Such a transformative mission cannot be accomplished by positing Indians and the non-Indian majority as adversaries, as would reparations; rather, redress of Indian claims and the healing of the American nation -- crucial foci of the drive toward perfection -- necessitate dialogue, reconciliation, and joint authorship of a future history of peace, harmony, and justice. 75¶ Part II of this Article offers a disquieting version of U.S-Indian history that accelerates erosion of the American Myth and acquaints the non-Indian majority with the necessary factual predicate to Indian redress. Parts III and IV contrast the assumptions, procedures, and remedies that distinguish reparations and reconciliation, 76 the dominant contending models of redress available to group victims of human injustice, and demonstrate that, because it offers the best hope for a peaceful American coexistence marked by mutual respect for sovereignty, reconciliation is a more appropriate avenue to Indian redress. Several preliminary proposals, including the introduction of traditional tribal peacemaking as perhaps the most appropriate form of [\*19] reconciliation, will be offered to stimulate thinking.

#### Giving back the land pushes poor POC off homes that have no alternative. i.e. Refugees, Immigrants, Asylum seekers come to settle in land because they’d be killed otherwise.

## AT: Berlant

### Top Level - LHP

#### Framing - the negative needs to prove the consequences of the plan are a bad idea, anything else moots 6 minutes of 1ac offense, is impact self-serving, and kills topic education

#### Permutation do both – recognize our current attachment to Saudi Arabia as cruelly optimistic and kill those attachments

#### Nothing about the aff changes anything – we’ll concede fiat is illusory – that doesn’t deny the process of the 1AC is a valuable one – our Taylor evidence says that learning more about policies that cause innocent deaths encourages participation outside of debate and ceding to political institutions to resolve issues is what CAUSED SHITTY PEOPLE LIKE TRUMP to be in office and institute policies like the ones in Yemen

#### You link into your offense – you are cruelly optimistic that your arguments will do something, whether that be getting the ballot or nothing, even doing nothing is doing something

## AT: Schlag

### Top Level – Debate Drills

#### This is such a stupid time suck – the 1AC is pedagogically valuable because it helps us learn about a war that is under covered and horrific. Their world would justify us never talking about real world issues which is disgusting and kills the value to debate. No alternative means presume aff ethically because anything else would justify never discussing horrible status quo violence.

# A2: NCs

## AT: Truth Testing Shit

### Top Level

#### Truth testing is the epitome of tricks debate and should be rejected. Debate should allow a multitude of models of engagement and shouldn’t be limited to one “constitutive” claim because it ignores discussions about oppression.

#### Proves the NC doesn’t care about oppression or the real world because if the NC talked about it then they wouldn’t read new framing

#### Proves the NC is trying to hide some sketchy shit and trigger presumption or permissibility because ridiculous arguments like that shouldn’t exist under our framing

#### Truth testing makes up rules to constrain relevant discussions and is honestly just stupid

Overing and Scoggin 15 “In Defense of Inclusion”; September 10, 2015; John Scoggin (coach for Loyola in Los Angeles and former debater for the Blake School in Minneapolis. His students have earned 77 bids to the Tournament of Champions in the last 7 years. He’s coached 2 TOC finalists, a TOC quarterfinalist, and champions of many major national tournaments across the country) and Bob Overing (former debater for the USC Trojan Debate Squad, and current student at Yale Law School. As a senior in high school, he was ranked #1, earned 11 bids and took 2nd at TOC. In college, he cleared at CEDA and qualified to the NDT. His students have earned 98 career bids, reached TOC finals, and won many championships.); <http://premierdebatetoday.com/2015/09/10/in-defense-of-inclusion-by-john-scoggin-and-bob-overing/>

In establishing affirmative and negative truth burdens, truth-testing forecloses important discussions even of the resolution itself. Consider the fact that in 1925-1926, there were two college policy topics, one for men and one for women. Men got to debate child labor laws, and women had to debate divorce law. On the truth-testing view, the women debating the women’s topic would be barred from discussing the inherent sexism of the topic choice and the division of topics to begin with. Or consider the retracted 2010 November Public Forum topic, “Resolved: An Islamic cultural center should be built near Ground Zero.” Many debaters would feel uncomfortable arguing that resolution, just like they did on the 2012 January/February LD topic about domestic violence. We both know individuals who felt the domestic violence topic was so triggering that they did not want to compete at all. We can draw two conclusions from examples like these. First, there are good reasons to not debate a particular topic. These reasons have been spelled out over decades of debate scholarship ranging from Broda-Bahm and Murphy (1994) to Varda and Cook (2007) to Vincent (2013). Second, truth-testing prevents either team from making the argument that the topic is offensive or harmful. A hypothetical case, such as a resolution including an offensive racial epithet, makes the problem more obvious. Maybe the idea behind the resolution is good, but there’s something left out by analysis that stops there and ignores the use of a derogatory slur. Truth-testing makes irrelevant the words in the topic and the words used by the debaters. Thus, it fails to capture the reasons that any good person would “negate” or even refuse to debate an offensive topic. Clearly, there are elements of a topical advocacy beyond its truth that are worthy of questioning. Nebel (2015) acknowledges that some past resolutions were potentially harmful to debate (1.2, para. 5). Rather than exclude affected students as ‘not following the rules’ of semantics or truth-testing, we conclude that they should not be required to debate the topic. Nebel grapples with harmful topics in the following passage: I don’t think there is a magic-bullet response to critiques of the topic…I think they must be answered on a case-by-case basis, in their own terms…The question boils down to whether or not the topic is harmful for students to debate, and whether those harms justify breaking, or making an exception to, the topicality rule (1.2, para. 5) This statement is hard to square with Nebel’s thesis that semantic interpretations of the resolution come “lexically prior” (in other words, they always come first). He wants to allow exceptions, but doing so proves that harmfulness concerns can and do trump the topicality rule. As Nebel’s struggle with the critique of topicality illustrates, every article that claims to espouse a comprehensive view of debate must allow some exceptions to comply with our intuitions. The exceptions do not prove the rule. They prove there is a high level of concern in debate for affording dignity and respect to different kinds of arguments and modes of argumentation. There is no one principle of proper debate. Once the door is open for external factors like harmfulness, the inference to the priority of pragmatics is an easy one to make. If we care about the effects of debating the resolution on the students debating it, then other values like exclusion, education, and fairness start to creep in. If we can justify avoiding discussion of a bad topic on pragmatic grounds, we can also justify promoting discussion of a good topic. Any advantage to allowing discursive kritiks, performances, and roles of the ballot further justifies this pragmatic view against truth-testing. NDT champion Elijah Smith (2013) warns that without these argument forms, we “distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day”. Christopher Vincent (2013) built on that idea, arguing that universal moral theory “drowns out the perspectives of students of color that are historically excluded from the conversation” (para. 3). While we don’t agree wholesale with these authors, their work unequivocally demonstrates the value of departures from pure truth-testing. While we may not convince our opposition that they should presume value in kritik-based strategies, they should remain open to them. In a recent article for the Rostrum, Pittsburgh debate coach Paul Johnson (2015) extolled the ‘hands-off’ approach. Let the debaters test whether the arguments have merit, rather than deciding beforehand: In a debate round, one may argue the impertinence of theses about structural racism with regards to a particular case…But when we explicitly or implicitly suggest such theses have little to no value by deciding in advance that they are inaccurate, we are forswearing the hard, argumentative work of subjecting our own beliefs to rigorous testing and interrogation (p. 90) Suggesting that non-topical, race-based approaches are “vigilantist” and “self-serving” “adventure[s]” is to demean the worth of these arguments before the debate round even starts (Nebel 2015, 1.1, para. 2). The claim that they ‘break the rules’ or exist ‘outside the law’ otherizes the debaters, coaches, and squads that pursue non-traditional styles. Especially given that many of these students are students of color, we should reject the image of them as lawless, self-interested vigilantes. Students work hard on their positions, often incorporating personal elements such as narrative or performance. To defend a view of debate that excludes their arguments from consideration devalues their scholarship and the way they make debate “home.” That’s unacceptable. Branse notes “the motivation for joining the activity substantially varies from person to person” yet excludes some debaters’ motivations while promoting others (5, para. 4). We agree with Smith on the very tangible effects of such exclusion: “If black students do not feel comfortable participating in LD they will lose out on the ability to judge, coach, or to force debate to deal with the truth of their perspectives” (para. 5). Of course, we do not believe that Nebel or Branse intend their views to have these effects, but they are a concern we need to take seriously. III. Changing the Rules In Round One thought is that rejecting truth-testing is the wrong solution. Instead, we should create a better topic-selection process or an NSDA-approved topic change when the resolution is particularly bad. These solutions, however, are not exclusive of a rejection of truth-testing. An offensive topic might be reason to reform the selection process and to stop debating it immediately. Good role of the ballot arguments are the best solution because they pinpoint exactly why a debater finds the resolution inadequate. They highlight the problems of the proposed topic of discussion, and outline reasons why a different approach is preferable. While Branse believes these examples of in-round rule-making are problematic, we think debate rounds are an excellent location for discussing what debate should be. The first reason is the failure of consensus. Because there are a wide variety of supported methods to go about debating, we should be cautious about paradigmatic exclusion. While we don’t defend the relativist conclusion that all styles of debate are equally valuable, there is significant disagreement that our theories must account for. Truth-testing denies a number of ways to debate that many find valuable. The second reason is the internalization of valuable principles. Even people who do not think kritiks are the right way to debate have taken important steps like removing gendered language from their positions. NDT champion Elijah Smith (2013) identified hateful arguments and comments “you expect to hear at a Klan rally” as commonplace in LD rounds and the community (para. 2). We’d like to think those instances are at least reduced by the argumentation he’s encouraged. For instance, the much-maligned “you must prove why oppression is bad” argument now sees little play in high-level circuit rounds. Truth-testing forecloses this kind of learning from the opposition. Roles of the ballot and theory interpretations are examples of how in-round argumentation creates new rules of engagement. We welcome these strategies, and debaters should be prepared to justify their proposed rules against procedural challenges. The arguments we have made thus far are objections to truth-testing as a top-down worldview used to exclude from the get-go, not in-round means of redress against certain practices. There is a major difference between a topicality argument in a high school debate round and a prominent debate coach and camp director’s glib dismissal of non-topical argument as follows: [Y]ou can talk about whatever you want, but if it doesn’t support or deny the resolution, then the judge shouldn’t vote on it (Nebel 2015, 1.2, para. 4) Branse is equally ideological: Within the debate, the judge is bound by the established rules. If the rules are failing their function, that can be a reason to change the rules outside of the round. However, in round acts are out of the judge’s jurisdiction (2, para. 12) We take issue with debate theorists’ attempts to define away arguments that they don’t like. At one point, Jason Baldwin (2009) actually defended truth-testing for its openness, praising the values of the free market of ideas: That’s how the marketplace of ideas is supposed to work. But it is supposed to be a free marketplace where buyers (judges) examine whatever sellers (debaters) offer them with an open mind, not an exclusive marketplace where only the sellers of some officially approved theories are welcome (p. 26) Unfortunately for the truth-tester, debate has changed, and it will change again. What was once a model that allowed all the arguments debaters wanted to make – a prioris, frameworks, and meta-ethics – is now outdated in the context of discursive kritiks, performance, and alternative roles of the ballot. IV. Constitutivism, Authority, and the Nature of Debate Branse’s goal is to derive substantive rules for debate from the ‘constitutive features’ of debate itself and the roles of competitors and judges. We’ll quote him at length here to get a full view of the argument: [P]ragmatic benefits are constrained by the rules of the activity….education should not be promoted at the expense of the rules since the rules are what define the activity. LD is only LD because of the rules governing it – if we changed the activity to promoting practical values, then it would cease to be what it is (2, para. 7) Internal rules of an activity are absolute. From the perspective of the players, the authority of the rules are non-optional. (2, para. 12) The resolution, in fact, offers one of the only constitutive guidelines for debate. Most tournament invitations put a sentence in the rules along the lines of, “we will be using [X Resolution].” Thus, discussion confined to the resolution is non-optional (3, para. 5) [T]he delineation of an “affirmative” and a “negative” establishes a compelling case for a truth testing model…two debaters constrained by the rules of their assignment – to uphold or deny the truth of the resolution…[J]udging the quality of the debaters requires a reference to their roles. The better aff is the debater who is better at proving the resolution true. The better neg is the debater who is better at denying the truth of the resolution. The ballot requests an answer to “who did a comparatively better job fulfilling their role”, and since debaters’ roles dictate a truth-testing model, the judge ought to adjudicate the round under a truth testing model of debate. The judge does not have the jurisdiction to vote on education rather than truth testing (3, para. 7-8) Once a judge commits to a round in accordance with a set of rules…the rules are absolute and non-optional (4, para. 4) Similarly, Nebel uses contractual logic – appealing to the tournament invitation as binding agreement – to justify truth-testing: “The “social contract” argument holds that accepting a tournament invitation constitutes implicit consent to debate the specified topic….given that some proposition must be debated in each round and that the tournament has specified a resolution, no one can reasonably reject a principle that requires everyone to debate the announced resolution as worded. This appeals to Scanlon’s contractualism (1.1, para. 2) This approach is attractive because it seeks to start from principles we all seem to agree on and some very simple definitions. The primary problem is that the starting point is very thin, but the end point includes very robust conclusions. The terms “affirmative” and “negative” are insufficient to produce universal rules for debate, and certainly do not imply truth-testing (Section I, paragraph 3.) Branse does some legwork in footnoting several definitions of “affirm” and “negate,” but does little in the way of linguistic analysis. We won’t defend a particular definition but point out that there are many definitions that vary and do not all lend themselves to truth-testing. On a ballot the words “speaker points” are as prominently displayed as the words “affirmative” or “negative,” but neither Branse nor Nebel attempt to make any constitutive inference from their existence. Further, to find the constitutive role of a thing, one needs to look at what the thing actually is, rather than a few specific words on a ballot. Looking at debates now, we see that they rarely conform to the truth-testing model. It is simply absurd to observe an activity full of plans, counterplans, kritiks, non-topical performances, theory arguments, etc. and claim that its ‘constitutive nature’ is to exclude these arguments. Not only that, but the truth-testing family has been heavily criticized in both the policy and LD communities (Hynes Jr., 1979; Lichtman & Rohrer, 1982; Mangus, 2008; Nelson, 2008; O’Donnell, 2003; O’Krent, 2014; Palmer, 2008; Rowland, 1981; Simon, 1984; Snider, 1994; Ulrich, 1983). The empirical evidence also points toward argumentative inclusion in three important ways. The first is argument trends. The popularity of kritiks, a prioris, meta-ethics, etc. confirm that at different times the community at large has very different views of what constitutes not only a good argument but also a good mode of affirming or negating. The second is argument cycles. An alternate view would suggest that debate evolves and leaves bad arguments by the wayside. Nevertheless, we see lots of arguments pop in and out of the meta-game, suggesting that we have not made a definitive verdict on the best way to debate. The third is judge deference. While people’s views on proper modes of debate shift, we retain a strong deference to a judge’s decision. Judges have different views of debate; if there were some overarching principle that all judges should follow, we would expect tournament directors to enforce such a rule. In sum, there is no way to view debate as a whole and see truth-testing as the general principle underlying our practices. The existence of a judge and a ballot are also insufficient to produce universal rules for debate. Branse thinks “[t]he ballot requests an answer to ‘who did a comparatively better job fulfilling their role.’” While that may be a valid concern, it is dependent on what the judge views the roles of debaters to be. The absence of any sort of instruction other than determining the ‘better debating’ or the ‘winner’ most naturally lends itself to a presumption of openness. In fact, many practices very explicitly deviate from the constitutive roles Branse lays out. Some counterplans (PICs, PCCs, topical CPs and the like) may do more to prove the resolution than disprove it, yet are generally accepted negative arguments. Another type of objection to Branse’s view is an application of David Enoch’s “agency shmagency” argument. Enoch (2011) summarizes in his paper “Shmagency revisited”: [E]ven if you find yourself engaging in a kind of an activity…inescapably…and even if that activity is constitutively governed by some norm or…aim, this does not suffice for you to have a reason to obey that norm or aim at that aim. Rather, what is also needed is that you have a reason to engage in that activity…Even if you somehow find yourself playing chess, and even if checkmating your opponent is a constitutive aim of playing chess, still you may not have a reason to (try to) checkmate your opponent. You may lack such a reason if you lack a reason to play chess. The analogy is clear enough: Even if you find yourself playing the agency game, and even if agency has a constitutive aim, still you may not have a reason to be an agent (for instance, rather than a shmagent) (p. 5-6) The application to chess helps us see the application to debate. Truth-testing may be the constitutive aim of doing debate, but it does not follow that our best reasons tell us to test the truth of the resolution. In fact, you may have no reasons to be a truth-testing debater in the first place. If “affirmative” means “the one who proves the resolution true,” we’ve demonstrated times when it’s better to be “shmaffirmative” than “affirmative.” Finally, we think one of the most important (perhaps constitutive) features of debate is its unique capacity to change the rules while playing within the rules. Education-based arguments and non-topical arguments are just arguments – they’re pieces on the chess board to be manipulated by the players. Branse concedes that in APDA debate, the resolution is “contestable through a formal, in-round mechanism (3, para. 9). LD and policy debate also have this mechanism through theory arguments, kritiks, and alternative roles of the ballot. Branse is right that in soccer and chess, there is no way to kick a ball or move a chess piece that would legitimately change the rules of the game. Debate is different. While soccer and chess have incontrovertible empirical conditions for victory (checkmates, more goals at fulltime), debate does not. In fact, discussing the win conditions is debating! Whenever a debater reads a case, they assume or justify certain win conditions and not others. This deals with Branse’s “self-defeatingness” objection because debate about the rules does not create a “free-for-all” — it creates a debate (6, para. 1). The truth-testing judge does not get to pick and choose what makes a good debate; to do so is necessarily interventionist. This demonstrates truth-testing is more arbitrary and subjective [2] than the education position Branse criticizes (4, para. 4; 5, para. 2, 5). To be truly non-interventionist, we should accept them as permissible arguments until proven otherwise in round. Of course, not all rules are up for debate. There is a distinction between rules like speech times (call these procedural rules) and rules like truth-testing (call these substantive rules). The former are not up for the debate in the sense that the tournament director could intervene if a debater refused to stop talking. The latter are debate-able and have been for some time. No tournament director enforces their pet paradigm. Because the tournament director, not the judge, has ultimate authority, we liken her to the referee in soccer. On this view, the judge is not the referee tasked with enforcing “the rules”; she should decide only on the basis of arguments presented in the debate. Tournaments are not subject to any form of higher authority and are not obligated to follow NSDA rules, TOC guidelines, or anything else to determine a winner. Something is only a procedural rule if it is enforced by the tournament, and truth-testing has not and shouldn’t be enforced in this manner. To our knowledge, no bid tournament director has ever imposed a truth-testing burden on all competitors. If anything is a binding contract, it is the judge paradigm. Judge philosophies or paradigms are explicitly agreed to in writing because each judge establishes their own, and there is no coercion at play. Most tournaments mandate or strongly encourage written paradigms, have time to review them, and accept judge services instead of payment for hiring a judge. These norms establish a clearer contractual agreement in favor of judge deferral than universal truth-testing. We have tested the constitutive and contractual arguments by considering how truth-testing is not a procedural rule like speech times. As such, it cannot accrue the benefits of bindingness, authority, and non-arbitrariness. We can also test the argument in the opposite direction. There are some rules that seem even more “constitutive” of debate than the resolution but are not examples of procedural rules. For instance, every judge and debate theorist would likely reject completely new arguments in the 2AR, but there is nothing within Branse’s constitutive rules (speech times, the resolution, the aff and neg) to justify the norm. The no-new-arguments rule does not need to be written in a rulebook to have a lot of force. V. Pragmatic Justifications for Truth-testing With the priority of pragmatics established and constitutive arguments well addressed, we turn to some hybrid arguments that attempt to justify truth-testing by appealing to pragmatics. Nebel argues that the advantages stemming from truth-testing must be weighed against all exceptions to it and that the advantages of debating the ‘true meaning’ of the topic nearly always outweigh: It would be better if everyone debated the resolution as worded, whatever it is, than if everyone debated whatever subtle variation on the resolution they favored. Affirmatives would unfairly abuse (and have already abused) the entitlement to choose their own unpredictable adventure, and negatives would respond (and have already responded) with strategies that are designed to avoid clash…people are more likely to act on mistaken utility calculations and engage in self-serving violations of useful rules (1.1, para. 2) However, the advantages of topicality for the semantic/truth-testing view hold on the pragmatic view as well. We agree that the reasons to debate the meaning of the topic are strong. The only difference is that the pragmatic theory can explain the possibility of exceptions to the rule without interpretive contortion. It makes much more sense to understand that strict topicality is just a very good practice than to tout it as an absolute, lexically prior, constitutively- and contractually-binding rule. Ultimately, all benefits to topicality and debating something other than the resolution are weighed on the same scale, so we should adopt the theory that explicitly allows that scale. We are unconvinced that direct appeals to pragmatic considerations would be worse on pragmatic grounds than an external and absolute rule like ‘always be topical.’ If topicality is as important and beneficial as Nebel says it is, then it should be easy to defend within a particular debate, avoiding the worst slippery slope scenarios. Nebel also argues that the pragmatic view “justifies debating propositions that are completely irrelevant to the resolution but are much better to debate” (1.1, para. 5). Branse makes the same claim about education: “Education as a voting issue legitimizes reading positions and debating topics that have no association with the resolution” (5, para. 3). This alarmism we’ve answered with our discussion of harmful resolutions. There is no empirical indication of a slippery slope to a world where no one discusses the topic. The disadvantages to one debate round departing from topical debate are quite small, and we have no problem biting the bullet here. Sometimes (and it may be very rare), it’s better not to debate the resolution. There may also be reasons to debate something else even when the resolution is very good. Black students should not have to wait for a reparations topic to talk about race in America. As conversations about racial oppression and police brutality grow louder and louder, it becomes increasingly unreasonable to defend a view of debate that ignores their relevance to the everyday lives of our students. It should be clear that the pragmatic view takes no absolute stance on topicality or burdens. A debate practice may be pragmatic in one context but not another. For that reason, we reject the narrowness of truth-testing.

## AT: Logical Consequences

### Top Level (0:40)

#### NIBs are a voting issue - they allow the neg to get away with anything and leave the 1ar a sitting duck, they’re impossible to link turn and the aff can never meet them, just look at the name

#### Merriam Webster defines ought as “used to express obligation”

"Definition of OUGHT," No Publication, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought>

#### That’s key to ground – otherwise people wouldn’t be able to debate

#### Their argument sucks and honestly just doesn’t make sense – aff’s would just be right or wrong, there’s no clash between the process of doing the aff or the status quo – you should draw a line when their argument literally says AFFS CANNOT BE INHERENT

#### The definition also just doesn’t make sense in the context of the resolution – if I were to say it ought to be 5 o’ clock that is a logical consequence, but in the context of the resolution it is a MORAL prohibition

#### Debatability – the aff doesn’t use the word “ought” in the plan text so no link – we can predict things because policymakers aggregate, this card also has zero warrant

#### Real World – we solve – our interpretation allows predictions over real world events – under their interp the neg would always win

#### Neg Definition Choice – this is silly, you can define ought as whatever you want to and I didn’t know you were going to read it – I don’t have a burden to define ought but I DO have a burden to be inherent

## AT: Kant

### Top Level

#### Overview: The affirmative is a good idea and outweighs – Kantianism is an ethical theory, not a political theory, making narrow justifications as to why the war in Yemen is good is outweighed by the fact that it causes 22 million people to starve.

#### On the framework debate -

#### Their framework is morally repugnant in the context of our aff – it justifies Saudi Arabia bombing innocent civilians in Yemen and getting away with it by saying that the consequences don’t matter and it’s only the intention that matters.

#### Cross apply our Kaplan and Curry evidence – Their framework is NOT MEANT TO BE APPLIED TO THE MATERIAL WORLD. Debate needs to deal with material conditions of oppression – papering over status quo conditions with ethical theories is the reason why actions never get taken to minimize those harms.

#### Their framework collapses to evaluating consequences – only our framework can take into degrees of wrongness for an action, deontology holds that everyone should have the ability to set ends, but it’s logical to say that Hitler shouldn’t have to ability to set ends if it causes genocide.

## AT: Hobbes

### Top Level

#### Framing issue - the thesis of Hobbes is that the sovereign needs to be legitimate in order to take legitimate actions, providing aid to authoritarian regimes would fundamentally be bad because it allows illegitimate sovereigns to take legitimate actions. All of your offense flows aff because the aff says that authoritarian regimes should not be able to take actions that harm others.

#### Second framing issue - Hobbes justifies the worst atrocities in history and is so beyond morally repugnant in the context of the aff – saying the sovereign can do whatever they want to prevent the “state of nature” would say that the Holocaust was okay or the Underground Railroad was bad because the state has to “stay all powerful”. The war in Yemen is the modern day example of this – Saudi views Yemen as the state of nature so they bomb hospitals and funerals to show their superiority.

## AT: LHP Agamben Burden

### Top Level

#### The burden of the affirmative is to affirm the resolution and the burden of the negative is to negate the resolution, anything else is self-serving, arbitrary, and kills topic education. Their burden isn’t even topical because “ought” in the resolution means the debate is about whether they should, not have the ability to.

#### Top Level - I cannot believe that they literally just read an argument saying that the state can do whatever it wants – READ THE TAG ON THE FIRST CARD AND DO NOT TELL ME THAT THIS DOESN’T MEAN “hey saudi arabia just bomb people because no one should be able to act on you”. That is SO beyond morally repugnant and is an independent voting issue – it would legitimize Nazi Germany by saying we should never have fought World War 2

#### Providing military aid is infringing on the ability for other states to take actions – it makes the US portray itself as the all mighty Western Savior instead of letting them make their own actions. Turns all of the NC – you say that the state is not obligated to externally take an action BUT THAT’S WHAT MILITARY AID IS. In order for them to win a link, they need to have a card that actually says “military aid is bad” instead of this recycled Agamben NC.

#### The line by line –

#### Their real-world argument – empirically disproven by any IR policy, the sovereign fueled the war in Yemen, and they can stop it

#### Their conceptual necessity argument – no reason why this is pragmatic, words don’t determine action, policies do

#### Their turns case evidence - THIS IS THE ONLY IMPACT AND DON’T LET THEM EXTRAPOLATE MORE, the 1ac is not a promise, but instead just a good idea, what about stopping innocent killings is a “radical reform”?