# Djibouti

### EZ Version (this is complete, don’t need to add the cards under)

#### Us China tensions are coming to a head in the small authoritarian country of Djibouti which houses the only US base in Africa and acts as an access point for the entire region. If the US loses any presence China is able to take over Africa.

Josh Rogin, Columnist for the Global Opinions section of the Washington Post and a political analyst with CNN. Can the Trump administration stop China from taking over a key African port?, pub March 7 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/03/07/can-the-trump-administration-stop-china-from-taking-over-a-key-african-port/?utm_term=.2c2bfe94869a> ///AHS PB

Ever since the Djiboutian government seized control of the Doraleh Container Terminal from Dubai-based DP World last month, reports are it intends to strike a deal with a Chinese-state-controlled firm to run the facility. On Tuesday, Djibouti signed an agreement to expand the port with a Singaporean company that works with China Merchants Port Holdings Co., which already owns a large stake in the facility. The port is significant not only because it sits next to China’s only overseas military base but also because it is the main access point for American, French, Italian and Japanese bases in Djibouti and is used — because of its strategic location — by parts of the U.S. military that operate in Africa, the Middle East and beyond. The U.S. military is now openly warning that if China gains control of the port, U.S. national security interests will be put at risk. Meanwhile, officials said, Djibouti has been growing closer to, and is increasingly indebted to, the Chinese government. “When we talk about influence and access, this is a classic example with regards to China, of how we’ve got to proceed and how we’ve got to be careful as we move forward,” said Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, commander of U.S. Africa Command, in testimony Tuesday before the House Armed Services Committee. The Djiboutian leadership told the U.S. ambassador there that Djiboutian authorities have no intention of handing over the port to Chinese control, Waldhauser said, but will operate the port themselves for 60 days and then sign a deal with a company to manage and operate the massive facility. “We’ll have to wait and see” whether the Chinese are actually given that contract, he said, but if that happens, it could be a big problem. The U.S. military is already taking significant steps to counter the intelligence threat that Chinese military presence in Djibouti poses, but that challenge will multiply if China can control access to the port. Chinese expansion in Djibouti is only one part of China’s overall Africa strategy, which mixes military, economic and diplomatic incentives to lure African countries away from the West and bolster China’s One Belt, One Road initiative. Djibouti now owes China at least $1.2 billion and the debt is piling up, Waldhauser said. In a speech at George Mason University on Tuesday, Tillerson argued that the United States is a better choice than China for African countries seeking strategic partnership. China’s approach in Africa “encourages dependency using opaque contracts, predatory loan practices, and corrupt deals that mire nations in debt and undercut their sovereignty, denying them their long-term, self-sustaining growth,” Tillerson said. But Waldhauser testified that the United States hasn’t developed a real strategy for competing with China in Africa and has failed to convince most Africans that a partnership based on American values such as rule of law and open markets is in their best interest. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy correctly defines the threat of China’s global efforts, but there’s no follow-through. “We are in the initial stages of trying to at least get ‘Africa’ and ‘China’ in the same sentence,” Waldhauser said. Part of the problem in Djibouti is that the government, led by longtime president Ismail Omar Guelleh, is widely suspected of gross corruption and stands accused of horrendous human rights violations. Guelleh simply might not be interested in cooperation based on Western values. That has led some to argue that the United States would be better off moving its Africa base to another location, such as the relatively stable and democratic autonomous region of Somaliland. Waldhauser says the Djibouti location is so strategic, we can’t afford to lose it. If that’s so, the United States must come up with a plan to bring Djibouti back into the fold through real incentives for increased cooperation and real consequences if Guelleh does sell out to Beijing.

#### And the aff cuts US presence in Djibouti:

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**Sun**, Degang / Zoubir, Yahia H. (**2016**), The Eagle’s Nest in the Horn of Africa: US Military Strategic Deployment in Djibouti, in: A fric a S p e c tr u m , 51, 1, 111–124. URN: <http://nbn-resolving.org/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-9254> ///AHS PB

In the past two decades, US assistance to Djibouti has been second only to that of France, the main contributor to Djibouti’s state revenues. Before 9/11, total US aid to Djibouti was a mere USD 12.4 million. However, since 9/11, this number has risen dramatically: in 2003 US economic and military aid rose to USD 26.37 million, and in 2004 to USD 37.37 million (InsideGov 2016). The terms of the new agreement on the military base and facility services that the two sides signed in 2012 grant the United States the military base for 99 years, guaranteeing Djibouti a steady rent throughout this century. Prior to 2014, the rental of the base, including the use of Ouaramous Island, amounted to USD 38 million annually (The Washington Post 2013; Lostumbo et al. 2013: 156). France’s base, located outside the city, costs EUR 30 million a year; the amounts the United States and France pay are second only to the USD 700 million in transit fees paid by landlocked Ethiopia to export its products through the Djibouti seaport (Reuters 2012). In May 2014, President Obama and President Guelleh met and agreed to nearly double the annual rent of the base to USD 70 million, of which 7 million is allocated to development assistance. Apart from the lease, since 2010 the United States has spent between USD 300 million and 500 million annually on the base (Ploch 2011), providing employment, allowing for procurement (such as construction material and food supplies), and facilitating other social services (health and dental care for the population). Approximately 1,200 local employees and foreign labourers work on the base. The unemployment rate in Djibouti has been between 50 and 60 per cent since 2007 (CIA 2016), and from 1991 to 1997 Djibouti’s GDP growth rate remained negative but became steadily positive from 2001 on, attaining 5.8 per cent in 2008 and standing at 5.5 per cent in 2014 (Trading Economics 2016). The rent from the US base and its spillover effects, combined with rents from other foreign powers, accounts for much of the steady economic growth.

#### Second, the Base itself is a form of aid, insofar as it exports military resources to the an authoritarian regime.

#### Third, cutting aid signals the US doesn’t want cooperation and hurts ties with the cash hungry government. There is always a risk of offense the AC hurts our relationship with Djibouti which is sufficient to negate absent aff offense that they help it.

#### Chinese takeover of Africa enables massive structural violence and props up authoritarian regimes – turns case

Dr. George B.N. Ayittey, Ph.D - President of the Free Africa Foundation based in Washngton, DC., The Rape of Africa by China, No Date, <https://www.africanpost.com/opinion/55-individual/1148-the-rape-of-africa-by-china.html> ///AHS PB BRACKETED FOR CLARITY AND GENDERED LANGAGUE

China deals with just about any rogue and unsavory regime in Africa that has some natural resource to exploit. It supplies jet fighters, military vehicles and guns to Zimbabwe, Sudan, Ethiopia and other repressive governments. At the U.N., China has used its veto power to block sanctions against tyrannical regimes in Sudan and Zimbabwe. Four aspects of China's dealings in Africa are particularly obnoxious and objectionable. First, many of the deals are brokered by a Chinese outfit called the Queensway syndicate, of a shady corporate structure and a multiplicity of shell companies. Based in Hong Kong, it operates largely in secret and negotiates deals with African governments in barter terms that are stacked in China's favor. Oversight of the Queensway syndicate's operations is almost non-existent and it does not publish even routine data. Here are some examples of its deals: · China will spend $5 billion to fix Nigeria’s dilapidated railway system in exchange for four oil blocks. China will supply all the equipment and technical personnel at prices determined by itself. Such aid “must be used to buy goods or services from companies, many of them state-controlled, that Chinese officials select themselves. Competitive bidding by the borrowing nation is discouraged, and China pulls a veil over vital data like project costs, loan terms and repayment conditions. Even the dollar amount of loans offered as foreign aid is treated as a state secret” (The New York Times, Sept 21, 2009; p.A12). · Guinea has the world’s largest reserves of bauxite and its largest untapped reserves of high-grade iron ore. Under a contract signed with Queensway, “the syndicate got an 85% share in a venture called the African Development Corporation. The government received the other 15%. The venture won exclusive rights to new mineral concessions in Guinea, including the right to negotiate oil-production contracts in the Gulf of Guinea. In return, the syndicate promised to invest “up to $7 billion” in housing, transport and public utilities, according to the government of Guinea (GDP $4.5 billion)” (The Economist, Aug 13, 2011; p.26). To secure the deal, the Queensway syndicate gave Guinea’s ex-military ruler, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, a helicopter as a present. · In Zimbabwe, Queensway set up a new company, called Sino-Zimbabwe Development Limited, which received rights to extract oil and gas, and to mine gold, platinum and chromium. In return, the company publicly promised to build railways, airports and public housing. These pledges were valued at $8 billion by Mugabe’s government. · In Angola, the syndicate set up China Sonangol to buy oil from Angola but the terms have never been made public. The syndicate gets the oil from the Angolan state at a low price that was fixed in 2005 and sells it on to China at today’s market prices. The price at which the contract was fixed is confidential, but Brent crude stood at just under $55 a barrel in 2005; today it is trading above $100” (The Economist, Aug 13, 2011; p.26). The difference could substantial profits in tens of billions of dollars and the terms have not been negotiated since 2005. In return for Angolan oil, the syndicate promised to build infrastructure, including low-cost housing, public water-mains, hydroelectric plants, cross-country roads and railways. According to the IMF and the World Bank, billions of dollars have disappeared from Sonangol’s accounts (The Economist, Aug 13, 2011; p.26). In other words, the syndicate’s mark up could be substantial. Over the years, considering the volume of oil that is being sold to China, its profit could amount to tens of billions of dollars. No public statement suggests the terms have been renegotiated since 2005. In return for Angolan oil, the syndicate promised to build infrastructure, including low-cost housing, public water-mains, hydroelectric plants, cross-country roads and railways, Second, the nature of the deals being signed are not transparent and are secured through secrecy, outright bribery, kickbacks (Namibia), and building presidential palaces (Sudan, Zimbabwe) and sports stadiums (Congo DR, Guinea), etc. In Angola, the price the country gets for its oil is a "state secret." The New York Times (Sept 21, 2009) cites the case of a Chinese company, Nuctech, which won $55.3 million contract to supply scanner for airport security systems was indicted by Namibian officials for kickbacks (p.A12). Third, cash from the Queensway syndicate props up brutal tyrants and thereby fuels violent conflicts. For instance, in Guinea when the military junta went on the rampage in Sept 2009, raping wom[x]n by the score and massacring more than 150 protesters in a sports stadium, it triggered EU and African Union sanctions. "A month later, the syndicate [Chinese shell companies] signed its minerals deal, transferring $100m to the cash-strapped junta" (The Economist, Aug 13, 2011; p.26). In Zimbabwe, the syndicate has made large cash payments to the Central Intelligence Office (CIO), whose job it is to terrorize and crack heads to keep Mugabe in power. Fourth, the impact on local economies has been deleterious. Textile industries in Kano, Lesotho, and South Africa have been destroyed by cheap Chinese textile imports. Hundreds of thousands of Africans have lost their jobs in northern Nigeria, Lesotho, and South Africa. Africans have derived little benefit from these trade deals with China. They offer scant employment opportunities, as China brings its own workers into Africa. Take the case of Angola, for example. The terms under which China Sonangol buys oil from Angola have been a secret and funds earmarked for infrastructure development have been plundered. "In 2006 the head of the external intelligence service, General Fernando Miala, alleged that $2 billion of Chinese money intended for infrastructure projects had disappeared. He claimed that the funds had been transferred to private accounts in Hong Kong by senior officials" (The Economist, Aug 13, 2011; p.26). Sonangol was deemed so corrupt in 2003 that Citibank closed all its accounts. ccording to the IMF and the World Bank, billions of dollars have disappeared from Sonangol's accounts. Needless to say, the Queensway syndicate has failed to meet many of the obligations it took on to win mining contracts. Zimbabwe is still awaiting even a fraction of its promised infrastructure. Guinea never received the 100 public buses that were meant to arrive within 45 days of the 2009 deal. In Angola, all work on the Benguela railway stopped and the syndicate extorted $3.5 billion from the government in order to continue. Six years after the syndicate arrived more than 90% of the residents of the capital, Luanda, remain without running water. The Chinese are also invading sectors traditionally reserved for locals. In Aug 2010, Ghana began arresting foreign nationals, mostly Chinese, illegally engaged in artisanal mining. Further, the Chinese deals enrich the corrupt ruling vampire elites. Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe are examples where the trade and oil deals with China have not benefited the poor. Chinese aid, disingenuously described as with no strings attached, is propping up hideously repressive regimes in Ethiopia, Guinea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. This aid is also impeding both political and economic reform, as recipient governments have little incentive to reform their abominable systems. The ulterior motivations of China and its real intentions in Africa seem to be: to muscle out Western companies and gain access to Africa's resources (Washington Times, April 28, 2006). In Ghana, China National Offshore Oil Corp. tried to challenge Exxon Mobil Corp.'s $4 billion offer for a stake in a giant oil discovery off of West Africa (The Wall Street Journal, Oct 13, 2009). The other motives are to canvass for African votes for geo-political reasons, seek new markets for Chinese manufactures, and dump surplus Chinese population in Africa. China "has also succeeded in getting African states to accept large numbers of Chinese experts and workers as part of their investment packages: 28 "Baoding villages" have been established, each housing up to 2,000 Chinese workers, in various parts of Africa. (The Sunday Times, July 16, 2006). In fact, China has a secret plan called Chongqing Experiment, in which over 12 million of its farmers will be moved off their lands and encouraged to seek out new pastures in Africa.

### Uniqueness/internal link

#### Us China tensions are coming to a head in the small authoritarian country of Djibouti which houses the only US base in Africa and acts as an access point for the entire region. If the US loses any presence achieves a full takeover.

Bradley Byrne, Congressman writing letter to James Mattis, March 2018, <https://byrne.house.gov/sites/byrne.house.gov/files/Byrne%20Djibouti%20Letter.pdf> ///AHS PB

Last week, the Republic of Djibouti illegally seized control of the Doraleh port terminal by presidential decree. According to reports, Djibouti [and] plans to gift the facility to the Chinese government. While Beijing's aggressive expansion into Africa is not new, I am concerned our military and intelligence assets and ability to operate in this strategic choke point are increasingly under threat due to China's growing influence with President Guelleh's government. As you well know, Djibouti is a key location for U.S. power projection and operations. According to the Department of Defense, Camp Lemonnier is the only U.S. permanent base on the entire African continent and is “essential to U.S. efforts in East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.” The base hosts 4,000 military and intelligence personnel and serves as a key outpost for counterterrorism operations targeting AQIP, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Lord's Resistance Army and ISIS. Home to Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), Djibouti hosts Special Forces, UAVs, helicopters, planes, and a 150-member rapid response force. Established in the wake of the fatal attack on our mission in Benghazi, this unit is tasked to support and protect U.S. diplomatic personnel working in austere environments across the region. With these sensitive operations based out of Djibouti, I am troubled by President Guelleh's decision to allow the Chinese to obtain land to build a massive base just miles from Camp Lemonnier. Roughly the size of New Jersey, Djibouti is the only country in the world to host both a U.S. and Chinese naval base. With the completion of Beijing's first foreign military base, Djibouti is primed to host up to 10,000 troops from China - more than double the U.S. presence. As confirmed by AFRICOM commander General Thomas Waldhauser, this is the closest to a U.S. installation that a rival has been able to build a base, raising significant “security concerns.” President Guellah's willingness to accommodate China is further illustrated in recent reports requesting U.S. forces leave the port town to make way for the Chinese. Many in Congress, the intelligence community, and military have warned of the impact this growing foothold will have in the region. During testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on February 27th, CENTCOM commander General Votel confirmed "the new military base and port allow China to project forces more permanently within the region and influence strategically valuable trade waterways.” President Guellah's willingness to accommodate China is further illustrated in recent reports requesting U.S. forces leave the port town to make way for the Chinese. 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Beijing has financed two international airports, a rail line linking Djibouti and Ethiopia, and a new presidential palace for Mr. Guelleh - rumored to be “free of charge.” Improper bilateral business dealings in the region represent such a challenge, AFRICOM addressed them in its 2017 posture statement: “Whether with trade, natural resource exploitation, or weapons sales, we continue to see international competitors engage with African partners in a manner contrary to the international norms of transparency and good governance. These competitors weaken our African partners' ability to govern and will ultimately hinder Africa's long-term stability and economic growth, and they will also undermine and diminish U.S. influence.” It is becoming clear what Chinese influence has bought today. The concern is what will it buy tomorrow. If Djibouti is willing to confiscate a port terminal operating under a legal 30-year agreement, what is to stop President Guelleh from reneging on the twenty-year lease the U.S. signed in 2014 for Camp Lemonnier? The growing correlation between the billions spent by Beijing and actions taken by Djibouti harmful to the interests of the U.S. and our allies raises serious questions. In his 2015 Foreign Affairs piece “China Comes to Djibouti: Why Washington Should be Worried”, China scholar Dr. John Lee provides a prescient answer: "Money talks, especially in small and underdeveloped states run by authoritarian governments such as Djibouti—and soon Beijing, not Washington, may have the strongest voice.” Your April 2017 visit to Djibouti sent a strong signal about the strategic significance and need for a robust U.S. presence. I appreciate your statements highlighting the need for longestablished international norms to be followed in and around the increasingly congested country. As you engage your Djiboutian counterparts, I respectfully request you continue to ensure our presence and ability to operate unimpeded are respected.

#### OR [PICK AND CHOOSE] Second card is prob better

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Josh Rogin, Columnist for the Global Opinions section of the Washington Post and a political analyst with CNN. Can the Trump administration stop China from taking over a key African port?, pub March 7 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/03/07/can-the-trump-administration-stop-china-from-taking-over-a-key-african-port/?utm_term=.2c2bfe94869a> ///AHS PB

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### Link

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### Impact

#### Chinese takeover of Africa enables massive structural violence and props up authoritarian regimes – turns case

Dr. George B.N. Ayittey, Ph.D - President of the Free Africa Foundation based in Washngton, DC., The Rape of Africa by China, No Date, <https://www.africanpost.com/opinion/55-individual/1148-the-rape-of-africa-by-china.html> ///AHS PB BRACKETED FOR CLARITY AND GENDERED LANGAGUE

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China will supply all the equipment and technical personnel at prices determined by itself. Such aid “must be used to buy goods or services from companies, many of them state-controlled, that Chinese officials select themselves. Competitive bidding by the borrowing nation is discouraged, and China pulls a veil over vital data like project costs, loan terms and repayment conditions. Even the dollar amount of loans offered as foreign aid is treated as a state secret” (The New York Times, Sept 21, 2009; p.A12). · Guinea has the world’s largest reserves of bauxite and its largest untapped reserves of high-grade iron ore. Under a contract signed with Queensway, “the syndicate got an 85% share in a venture called the African Development Corporation. The government received the other 15%. The venture won exclusive rights to new mineral concessions in Guinea, including the right to negotiate oil-production contracts in the Gulf of Guinea. In return, the syndicate promised to invest “up to $7 billion” in housing, transport and public utilities, according to the government of Guinea (GDP $4.5 billion)” (The Economist, Aug 13, 2011; p.26). To secure the deal, the Queensway syndicate gave Guinea’s ex-military ruler, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, a helicopter as a present. · In Zimbabwe, Queensway set up a new company, called Sino-Zimbabwe Development Limited, which received rights to extract oil and gas, and to mine gold, platinum and chromium. In return, the company publicly promised to build railways, airports and public housing. These pledges were valued at $8 billion by Mugabe’s government. · In Angola, the syndicate set up China Sonangol to buy oil from Angola but the terms have never been made public. The syndicate gets the oil from the Angolan state at a low price that was fixed in 2005 and sells it on to China at today’s market prices. The price at which the contract was fixed is confidential, but Brent crude stood at just under $55 a barrel in 2005; today it is trading above $100” (The Economist, Aug 13, 2011; p.26). The difference could substantial profits in tens of billions of dollars and the terms have not been negotiated since 2005. In return for Angolan oil, the syndicate promised to build infrastructure, including low-cost housing, public water-mains, hydroelectric plants, cross-country roads and railways. According to the IMF and the World Bank, billions of dollars have disappeared from Sonangol’s accounts (The Economist, Aug 13, 2011; p.26). In other words, the syndicate’s mark up could be substantial. Over the years, considering the volume of oil that is being sold to China, its profit could amount to tens of billions of dollars. No public statement suggests the terms have been renegotiated since 2005. In return for Angolan oil, the syndicate promised to build infrastructure, including low-cost housing, public water-mains, hydroelectric plants, cross-country roads and railways, Second, the nature of the deals being signed are not transparent and are secured through secrecy, outright bribery, kickbacks (Namibia), and building presidential palaces (Sudan, Zimbabwe) and sports stadiums (Congo DR, Guinea), etc. In Angola, the price the country gets for its oil is a "state secret." The New York Times (Sept 21, 2009) cites the case of a Chinese company, Nuctech, which won $55.3 million contract to supply scanner for airport security systems was indicted by Namibian officials for kickbacks (p.A12). Third, cash from the Queensway syndicate props up brutal tyrants and thereby fuels violent conflicts. For instance, in Guinea when the military junta went on the rampage in Sept 2009, raping wom[x]n by the score and massacring more than 150 protesters in a sports stadium, it triggered EU and African Union sanctions. "A month later, the syndicate [Chinese shell companies] signed its minerals deal, transferring $100m to the cash-strapped junta" (The Economist, Aug 13, 2011; p.26). In Zimbabwe, the syndicate has made large cash payments to the Central Intelligence Office (CIO), whose job it is to terrorize and crack heads to keep Mugabe in power. Fourth, the impact on local economies has been deleterious. Textile industries in Kano, Lesotho, and South Africa have been destroyed by cheap Chinese textile imports. Hundreds of thousands of Africans have lost their jobs in northern Nigeria, Lesotho, and South Africa. Africans have derived little benefit from these trade deals with China. They offer scant employment opportunities, as China brings its own workers into Africa. Take the case of Angola, for example. The terms under which China Sonangol buys oil from Angola have been a secret and funds earmarked for infrastructure development have been plundered. "In 2006 the head of the external intelligence service, General Fernando Miala, alleged that $2 billion of Chinese money intended for infrastructure projects had disappeared. He claimed that the funds had been transferred to private accounts in Hong Kong by senior officials" (The Economist, Aug 13, 2011; p.26). Sonangol was deemed so corrupt in 2003 that Citibank closed all its accounts. ccording to the IMF and the World Bank, billions of dollars have disappeared from Sonangol's accounts. Needless to say, the Queensway syndicate has failed to meet many of the obligations it took on to win mining contracts. Zimbabwe is still awaiting even a fraction of its promised infrastructure. Guinea never received the 100 public buses that were meant to arrive within 45 days of the 2009 deal. In Angola, all work on the Benguela railway stopped and the syndicate extorted $3.5 billion from the government in order to continue. Six years after the syndicate arrived more than 90% of the residents of the capital, Luanda, remain without running water. The Chinese are also invading sectors traditionally reserved for locals. In Aug 2010, Ghana began arresting foreign nationals, mostly Chinese, illegally engaged in artisanal mining. Further, the Chinese deals enrich the corrupt ruling vampire elites. Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe are examples where the trade and oil deals with China have not benefited the poor. Chinese aid, disingenuously described as with no strings attached, is propping up hideously repressive regimes in Ethiopia, Guinea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. This aid is also impeding both political and economic reform, as recipient governments have little incentive to reform their abominable systems. The ulterior motivations of China and its real intentions in Africa seem to be: to muscle out Western companies and gain access to Africa's resources (Washington Times, April 28, 2006). In Ghana, China National Offshore Oil Corp. tried to challenge Exxon Mobil Corp.'s $4 billion offer for a stake in a giant oil discovery off of West Africa (The Wall Street Journal, Oct 13, 2009). The other motives are to canvass for African votes for geo-political reasons, seek new markets for Chinese manufactures, and dump surplus Chinese population in Africa. China "has also succeeded in getting African states to accept large numbers of Chinese experts and workers as part of their investment packages: 28 "Baoding villages" have been established, each housing up to 2,000 Chinese workers, in various parts of Africa. (The Sunday Times, July 16, 2006). In fact, China has a secret plan called Chongqing Experiment, in which over 12 million of its farmers will be moved off their lands and encouraged to seek out new pastures in Africa.

# Random cards

#### Impacts: A) turns case China leads to more fascism

https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/chinas-influence-africa-implications-the-united-states

**The** People's Republic of China **(PRC) aids and abets oppressive and destitute African dictatorships by legitimizing their misguided policies and praising their development models as suited to individual national conditions. Beijing holds out China's** unique development model-significant economic growth overseen by a disciplined, **one-party totalitarian state with full authority, if not control, over all aspects of economic activity-as an example for others to emulate**. Moreover**, China rewards its African friends with diplomatic attention and financial and military assistance, exacerbating existing forced dislocations of populations and abetting massive human rights abuses** in troubled countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. As a consequence, **Chinese support for political and economic repression in Africa counters the liberalizing influences of Africa's traditional European and American partners**. China's vigorous campaign to develop close ties with individual African nations also reflects Beijing's global quest to isolate Taiwan diplomatically (seven of the 26 countries that have full diplomatic relations with Taiwan are African).[1] The most pernicious effect of the renewed Chinese interest in Africa is that **China is legitimizing and encouraging Africa's most repressive regimes, thereby increasing the likelihood of weak and failed states**. The United States must also be alert to the potential long-term disruption of American access to important raw materials and energy sources as these resources are "locked up" by Chinese firms for the PRC's domestic market to maintain China's economic growth. **U.S. national interests lie in effectively countering these developments in Africa by deftly encouraging democratic processes, economic freedom, and respect for human rights across the African continent.**

https://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-plans-in-africa-arent-just-economic-satellite-images-show-theyre-military-too-2018-7

Yet right now, Djibouti is of great importance to China. Xi Jinping is treating Djibouti — hotspot for smugglers and pirates and the same country where misery and famine still determine the everyday lives of many — as a podium on which it can showcase its military strength, for all the world to see. Xi Jinping may be carrying out plans to expand power in Djibouti Djibouti is the first overseas military base China has built, allegedly for humanitarian purposes only. Yet the country has been positioning soldiers there over the past year — in reality, it appears as though Head of State Xi Jinping has other much bigger plans. Despite insistence that the base was not for military purposes, reports from Die Welt, based on analysis of satellite images examined by British journal Jane's Defense Weekly, confirmed that deep berths — which have been in construction since May — appeared to be for warships. Alarmingly, this fits comfortably into the theory that China is looking to dominate the region. It seems Beijing's movers and shakers really are pushing ahead with their gigantic silk road project. The Horn of Africa is the gateway to the whole continent so, strategically, it would be significantly valuable to China if the country were looking to outstrip the USA and take over world trade in the future. The only catch is that it's so unstable, it can only be controlled with a massive military presence — which it seems Beijing has already begun working towards.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/03/07/can-the-trump-administration-stop-china-from-taking-over-a-key-african-port/?utm\_term=.2c2bfe94869a

Ever since the Djiboutian government seized control of the Doraleh Container Terminal from Dubai-based DP World last month, reports are it intends to strike a deal with a Chinese-state-controlled firm to run the facility. On Tuesday, Djibouti signed an agreement to expand the port with a Singaporean company that works with China Merchants Port Holdings Co., which already owns a large stake in the facility. The port is significant not only because it sits next to China’s only overseas military base but also because it is the main access point for American, French, Italian and Japanese bases in Djibouti and is used — because of its strategic location — by parts of the U.S. military that operate in Africa, the Middle East and beyond. The U.S. military is now openly warning that if China gains control of the port, U.S. national security interests will be put at risk. Meanwhile, officials said, Djibouti has been growing closer to, and is increasingly indebted to, the Chinese government. “When we talk about influence and access, this is a classic example with regards to China, of how we’ve got to proceed and how we’ve got to be careful as we move forward,” said Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, commander of U.S. Africa Command, in testimony Tuesday before the House Armed Services Committee. The Djiboutian leadership told the U.S. ambassador there that Djiboutian authorities have no intention of handing over the port to Chinese control, Waldhauser said, but will operate the port themselves for 60 days and then sign a deal with a company to manage and operate the massive facility. “We’ll have to wait and see” whether the Chinese are actually given that contract, he said, but if that happens, it could be a big problem. The U.S. military is already taking significant steps to counter the intelligence threat that Chinese military presence in Djibouti poses, but that challenge will multiply if China can control access to the port. Chinese expansion in Djibouti is only one part of China’s overall Africa strategy, which mixes military, economic and diplomatic incentives to lure African countries away from the West and bolster China’s One Belt, One Road initiative. Djibouti now owes China at least $1.2 billion and the debt is piling up, Waldhauser said. In a speech at George Mason University on Tuesday, Tillerson argued that the United States is a better choice than China for African countries seeking strategic partnership. China’s approach in Africa “encourages dependency using opaque contracts, predatory loan practices, and corrupt deals that mire nations in debt and undercut their sovereignty, denying them their long-term, self-sustaining growth,” Tillerson said. But Waldhauser testified that the United States hasn’t developed a real strategy for competing with China in Africa and has failed to convince most Africans that a partnership based on American values such as rule of law and open markets is in their best interest. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy correctly defines the threat of China’s global efforts, but there’s no follow-through. “We are in the initial stages of trying to at least get ‘Africa’ and ‘China’ in the same sentence,” Waldhauser said. Part of the problem in Djibouti is that the government, led by longtime president Ismail Omar Guelleh, is widely suspected of gross corruption and stands accused of horrendous human rights violations. Guelleh simply might not be interested in cooperation based on Western values. That has led some to argue that the United States would be better off moving its Africa base to another location, such as the relatively stable and democratic autonomous region of Somaliland. Waldhauser says the Djibouti location is so strategic, we can’t afford to lose it. If that’s so, the United States must come up with a plan to bring Djibouti back into the fold through real incentives for increased cooperation and real consequences if Guelleh does sell out to Beijing.

#### Good Uniqueness and T card

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/djibouti-is-becoming-gateway-to-africa-for-china-a-1191441.html

But **Djibouti does have** one major commodity. In the real estate industry, they have a mantra for it, too: **location**, location, location. One of the most trafficked shipping lanes in the world is located right off the country's coast. Dozens of oil tankers and container ships head to the Red Sea every day, bound for the Suez Canal and the ports of Europe. **This strategic location is one of the reasons the Chinese are here with their project managers, bankers and engineers and, most recently, with their army**. And although they may only be the latest in a long line of foreign powers to set up quarters in Djibouti, they do think in bigger terms than the others. **The tiny country serves as their gateway to Africa**. Those who were here before the Chinese came have also stayed, mostly with their militaries. Countries from three continents have bases south of the capital, including the United States, Japan, Italy and, of course, Djibouti's former colonial rulers, the French. Spanish and German forces are also stationed at the French military's Base Aérienne 188. French still happens to be the most important language in Djibouti. Almost a million people live here, in a country a little larger in size than the German state of Hesse. They come from different cultures, speak Arabic or the languages of the neighboring countries of Somalia and Ethiopia. Two large population groups were long embroiled in conflict **with one another, the Afar from the north and the Issa from the south, but things have been relatively peaceful since the civil war ended in 1994. Authoritarian President Ismail Omar Guelleh has proven successfully in keeping the country at peace. Guelleh finds the notion of political freedom for all too risky, and he has instead emphasized strictness and stability**. In a conflict-filled region, stability is the other resource that Djibouti has to offer. The third is a certain amount of openness to the world. Islam may be the state's official religion, but faith is generally a private matter in Djibouti. Services regularly take place in its Christian churches, and if a woman wants to walk through the streets in jeans and without wearing a headscarf, nobody takes offense to it. President Guelleh can also afford to distance himself from the **Western powers. Although they pay a lot of money for the right to station soldiers, aircraft and drones on Djiboutian soil, they are dependent on Guelleh because of their desire to stay**. In an interview last spring with the newsmagazine Jeune Afrique, he said that "the Americans constantly tell us that the Chinese presence is hindering their operations, and the Japanese are even more worried." But he says those concerns are unnecessary. His dealings with the Chinese tend to be a lot more pleasant. Chinese President Xi Jinping gave Guelleh the highest honor in November, welcoming him to Beijing with all of the pomp of a state visit. Both presidents agreed to a "strategic partnership," although this sounds a little bit odd given that one of the men governs 1,400 times as many people as the other. Economic Aid or Exploitation? Still, the use of the term "partnership" sends a political message. When a much bigger state treats a smaller one as a peer, it can be interpreted as a bow -- a bow toward Africa. The Chinese have faced a lot of criticism since they began securing access to the continent's mineral resources and financing ports, train lines and dams with billions in loans. In Africa, they are often viewed as neo-colonialists, as ruthless business fanatics who think only of themselves. Alternately, could one instead view these Chinese investments as a particularly efficient form of development aid? The conflict over this question -- carried out between China and the West, but also within Africa itself -- is a heated one. **Critics are riled over the conditions under which Chinese loans are often provided -- with little or no interest early on, followed by high interest for many years -- a financial model they argue creates dependency**. Ge Hua is familiar with the accusations. Ge is the Chinese counsellor on trade in Djibouti, an important representative of her country. All civil projects that China is involved in cross her desk. She is there when the contracts are negotiated, she explains Djiboutian positions to officials in Beijing and oversees the implementation of the finalized plans in the country. Like most foreigners here, she struggles with the heat. The windows of her office are totally darkened. But there's a sincerity when she talks about her fondness for Djibouti. "I told my friends that they need to come here this year," she says. "It is a very beautiful and unique country. Tourism is going to become very important." Even more important, of course, are the construction projects. In addition to the free trade zone and the port of Doraleh, three cross-border facilities backed by lots of money are also in the works. They will bring **Djibouti** and Ethiopia, which carries out its international trade almost entirely via the ports of its seaside neighbor, even closer together. The Chinese are handling the development of that infrastructure. The New Silk Road The electrified train line connecting the two capitals has been finished for a some time now, though there isn't enough electricity for regular operation over the entire line. The water pipeline from Ethiopia is already functioning, with its final completion approaching, and a gas pipeline is also in the planning stages. From the Chinese perspective, this **is all meant to fit into a larger whole: the new Silk Road. Beijing has been investing in the construction of port facilities, roads, train lines and trade centers in Asia, Africa and Europe under the cumbersome English name, "One Belt, One Road." The goal is to create a tightly interwoven economic zone under Chinese control**. One Belt, One Road is, above all else, a geopolitical project. Djibouti also happens to be located along this new Silk Road. Nicholas Li's headquarters are situated right next to the building of the Silk Road International Bank, founded in 2016. Ge Hua works nearby. The economic expert emphasizes that "**the Chinese government has many financing projects** in Djibouti, mainly concessional loan projects." She adds that her country is also making sure that all people involved profit. "It is important that the Djiboutians make good income from the projects so that they will have a better life and are able to repay their debts," she says. And -- and this absolutely must be mentioned, she says -- there is also **a long list of aid projects**, including schools, hospitals and sports facilities, that **have been financed by China**, without any loans. A few days later, an opportunity arises to view the biggest project: Sixty Chinese and 150 Djiboutian workers are building a national archive that will include a public library. A red-and-white sign points out that the construction site has been free of accidents for 355 days. In July 2019, the building is to be handed over to the Djibouti state, including furniture and stacks. You can talk with Ge about any of these things, just not the military. "That's not part of my job," she says. Protecting Strategic Interests **Chinese soldiers are very present in the country, despite having holed themselves up behind cement walls. West of the port, the army opened a naval base last summer. It has been the subject of many rumors. It's the first Chinese military facility to be located outside of Asia, and that alone makes it interesting**. Officially, it's a logistical support base for the Chinese fleet. Western military people like to call the imposing facility "Jabba the Hutt's palace," a reference to "Star Wars." The building reportedly has three underground floors and can accommodate up to 10,000 soldiers. Chinese media regularly report about the new military base. In November, the soldiers marched out for weapon practice, which they held on a drill ground in the middle of the country. Afterward, Beijing's state-run Global Times newspaper reported on the strategic purpose of those drills. "It's natural," the paper stated, "that **the Chinese troops stationed in Djibouti must be always prepared for combat." It pointed out that the country had already invested over $100 billion in Africa and that, for this reason, the military was dutybound to "safeguard China's interests in the continent." With military displays like the ones in Djibouti, China wants to send a double message: One of strength and one of peace. The army is showing what it is capable of**. At the same time, the Chinese politicians emphasize at every opportunity that this is merely a question of defense. Despite these efforts to placate the situation, the **Americans are suspicious. They worry that China will soon be an equal not only on an economic, but also on a military level. One of the noteworthy qualities of Djibouti is that the old and the new superpower are closer to one another here than anywhere else on the planet. Camp Lemonnier, the only permanent U.S. military base on African soil, is located only a few kilometers away from the Chinese fortress.** From here, special forces head out on their secretive commando missions, and drones take off to chase terrorists in Somalia or Yemen. The approximately 4,000 American soldiers live in their camp in ways reminiscent of life on an aircraft carrier, viewing the land around them as an ocean filled with perils. They are only allowed to leave their base with special permission. And ,even then, the capital is mostly classified as a "no-go area." A 'Key Region' Originally a French base, the U.S. military took over Camp Lemonnier in 2002, following the 9/11 attacks, after Paris determined it no longer needed the facility. The current French base north of the airport is still expansive. It's a place where you can see soldiers in shorts cycling to stay fit and children on their way to school. The engines of the Mirage fighter jets can regularly be heard as they control the airspace above the capital. Thierry Duquenoÿ, the head of the French armed forces in the country, explains why **Djibouti is so important. "For Asia, Africa and Europe, this is a key region,**" he says. "The Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea don't separate the Arab and Africa sphere so much as they connect them like a zipper."

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Sun, Degang / Zoubir, Yahia H. (2016), The Eagle’s Nest in the Horn of Africa: US Military Strategic Deployment in Djibouti, in: A fric a S p e c tr u m , 51, 1, 111–124. URN: http://nbn-resolving.org/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-9254

In the past two decades, US assistance to Djibouti has been second only to that of France, the main contributor to Djibouti’s state revenues. Before 9/11, total US aid to Djibouti was a mere USD 12.4 million. However, since 9/11, this number has risen dramatically: in 2003 US economic and military aid rose to USD 26.37 million, and in 2004 to USD 37.37 million (InsideGov 2016). The terms of the new agreement on the military base and facility services that the two sides signed in 2012 grant the United States the military base for 99 years, guaranteeing Djibouti a steady rent throughout this century. Prior to 2014, the rental of the base, including the use of Ouaramous Island, amounted to USD 38 million annually (The Washington Post 2013; Lostumbo et al. 2013: 156). France’s base, located outside the city, costs EUR 30 million a year; the amounts the United States and France pay are second only to the USD 700 million in transit fees paid by landlocked Ethiopia to export its products through the Djibouti seaport (Reuters 2012). In May 2014, President Obama and President Guelleh met and agreed to nearly double the annual rent of the base to USD 70 million, of which 7 million is allocated to development assistance. Apart from the lease, since 2010 the United States has spent between USD 300 million and 500 million annually on the base (Ploch 2011), providing employment, allowing for procurement (such as construction material and food supplies), and facilitating other social services (health and dental care for the population). Approximately 1,200 local employees and foreign labourers work on the base. The unemployment rate in Djibouti has been between 50 and 60 per cent since 2007 (CIA 2016), and from 1991 to 1997 Djibouti’s GDP growth rate remained negative but became steadily positive from 2001 on, attaining 5.8 per cent in 2008 and standing at 5.5 per cent in 2014 (Trading Economics 2016). The rent from the US base and its spillover effects, combined with rents from other foreign powers, accounts for much of the steady economic growth.