# 1AR – Case

## 1AR – Overviews

### Offensive Asymmetry

#### Drone swarms cause war – less soldiers dying means less cost to starting wars, swarms can be cheaply mass produced, and can attack from everywhere at once means states want to go first

#### That escalates because AI gets faulted to full states, not accidents

### Cascading Errors

#### Drone swarms cause war – thousand drones means thousand points of error increasing probability of tech failure and susceptibility to jamming – causes accidental targeting of civilians and adversaries in battlefields

#### That escalates because AI gets faulted to full states, not accidents

### Grey-Zone Testing

#### Drone swarms cause war -–ambiguous rules of engagement encourages countries to push the boundaries of deployment and aggression

#### That escalates because AI gets faulted to full states, not accidents

### Use or Lose

#### Drone swarms threaten adversaries’ nuclear weapons causing Use or lose pressures – those cause irrationality and war – [outweighs because rational mutually assured destruction checks their impact]

#### 1 – leaders feel good executing a strike against an adversary that’s shamed them – no greater shame than counterforce capabilities – bio studies

#### 2 – to rebalance deterrence, leaders invoke pre-delegation, launch on warning, and peacetime targeting for nuclear weapons causing accidents

#### 3 – Pressures create a time-crunch crisis that short circuits rational decision making – US war games prove

### Bioweapons

#### Drone swarms make it easier for states to deploy bioweapons – those cause extinction – bioengineering obviates natural barriers which causes global lethal spread

## 1AR – AT: Case Hits

### AT: Circumvention

#### No circumvention –

#### 1 – Being transparent encourages other states to be transparent or else their international cred gets tanked and other nations prolif – Gubrud and Altman

#### 2 – Stigma – Past treaties prove effectiveness in curbing use

#### 3 – Verification – Recording software inputs and other tech prevents cheating

#### 4 – Development requires facilities and outdoor testing which are large and easy to detect

### AT: AI Good

#### AI bad – states will rush and cut corners filling otherwise good programs with holes – causes brittleness, unpredictability, data poisoning, bias

### AT: Semi-autonomous

#### No semi-autonomous – only large numbers of drones have the ability to threaten states – logistically impossible for countries to hire a pilot for each

### AT: Yoo

#### Quoting John Yoo is shameful — he’s a war criminal, not an “expert.” Exclude him *completely* from public discourse.

Hussein 14 — Murtaza Hussain, Journalist and Political Commentator at *The Intercept* focusing on human rights, foreign policy, and cultural affairs, has covered foreign policy and civil liberties for the *New York Times*, The *Guardian*, *Al Jazeera*, The *Globe and Mail*, *Salon*, and *Prism Magazine*, 2014 (“John Yoo’s despicable return: We must stop giving war criminals a platform,” *Salon*, April 16th, Available Online at <http://www.salon.com/2014/04/16/john_yoos_despicable_return_we_must_stop_giving_war_criminals_a_platform/>, Accessed 07-14-2015)

How depraved and incompetent do you have to be before people in America stop asking your opinion about things? Former Bush administration Department of Justice official John Yoo – the man who famously butchered the U.S. Constitution in order to give the CIA the legal authority to conduct medieval torture — this week decided to chime in with his opinion on the Pulitzer Prize being awarded to the publications that reported the Edward Snowden leaks. Unsurprisingly, he was not too thrilled about the decision:∂ “I’m not surprised the Pulitzer committee gave The Washington Post a prize for pursuing a sensationalist story, even when the story is a disaster for its own country….I don’t think we need automatically read the prize as a vindication for Snowden’s crimes. Awarding a prize to a newspaper that covered a hurricane does not somehow vindicate the hurricane, [and] awarding a Pulitzer for a photo of a murder does not somehow vindicate the crime.”∂ His statement is problematic for a few reasons. First, Yoo appears to have brought the same deft reasoning powers with which he argued it was legally justifiable to crush a child’s testicles to his very bizarre analysis of this event. The papers were not – as he apparently failed to grasp before commenting – awarded the Pulitzer for their reporting on Snowden’s “crimes” but rather for their reporting on the NSA’s surveillance programs. That was entirely what the award was for, as anyone who bothered looking at the Pulitzer committee statement could plainly see. It’s true that acts are not made justified simply by being reported in the news, but the only party to which that would be applicable in this situation is the NSA – not Snowden. And so, tragically, Yoo’s elaborate analogies about hurricane vindication are slightly undermined by the fact that they happen to make no fucking sense.∂ But a more important question to ask here is, why are people asking John Yoo’s opinion about things? In what universe does it seem appropriate to seek out a man whose actions resulted in the grievous torture and deaths of innumerable people and ask him to weigh in on the news of the day? John Yoo almost single-handedly shredded the U.S. Constitution – to say nothing of what he helped do to America’s moral standing in the world – and yet major news outlets and even universities continue to regularly seek out his advice as though he isn’t an incompetent reprobate of biblical proportions. Worse than that, he’s the monstrous figure who knowingly enabled the most unconscionable war crimes of the global war on terror. In any sane or just society, Yoo would be rotting in a prison cell instead of wearing tailored suits and sharing his opinions in polite company.∂ But, alas, America as it stands today is somewhat wanting in the departments of both sanity and justice. While powerful ghouls such as Yoo completely escape legal consequences for their actions – no matter how morally despicable and disastrous for the country they were – ordinary Americans somehow continue to regularly land in jail for the slightest transgressions. In fact, Yoo is not only not in jail, he’s still somehow a media figure regularly weighing in on the issues of the day. Legal accountability for his moral failures aside, he hasn’t even really paid a career price for the monumental incompetence he displayed in his work.∂ To be fair, Yoo isn’t the only one in this situation who is taking advantage of the consequence-free world of the rich and politically connected. His fellow Iraq War criminals Karl Rove, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld can all still be seen in the news being regularly solicited for their commentary on various matters. They’re the people who helped kill, wound and displace millions of innocent Iraqis, tens of thousands of American servicemen, and whose collective mismanagement helped turned America into a giant smoldering wreckage by the time they exited government — but somehow they are still apparently shameless enough to offer criticisms of other people’s actions.∂ One can perhaps excuse these people for their lack of self-awareness. After all, they are part of the supremely insular universe of the wealthy and powerful where all criticism from the real world can comfortably be papered over. But why on earth do ostensibly reputable news organizations continue to seek out people like this – individuals who should rightly be awaiting their arraignments at The Hague – for quotations and analysis on current events? Doing so is as inexplicable as asking Ted Kaczynski for his opinion on the 2016 presidential race, or calling up Ratko Mladić to ask what he thinks of the Mets’ chances this year.∂ But perhaps the best example of America’s ironclad career security for the powerful is former Bush speechwriter David Frum. Never mind that the childishly facile “Axis of Evil” quote that became his trademark helped trigger a proxy war with Iran that destroyed America’s imperial projects in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and never mind his own fantastical delusions that the Iraq War would not only be a glorious triumph but would also end up revealing: “the flow of money from Iraq to … French and German corporations [and] senior political figures.”∂ His spectacular moral and professional failures have somehow not harmed Frum one bit. Far from jail or even obscurity, he’s still a voice in our national conversation. Indeed, America’s very own Baghdad Bob has remained on the airwaves consistently no matter how malevolent or criminally incompetent he’s been. Just this past month, on the 11th anniversary of the war he helped start, Frum was named the senior editor of the Atlantic magazine. Yet another example of America’s broken meritocracy; career security for no one except war criminals and Wall Street raiders.∂ It’s time to stop this. The perversity of continuing to refer for “expert” opinion to people who not only have consistent track records of failure but actual blood on their hands cannot continue if America is to have a healthy, sane and productive public discourse. No one should care what John Yoo thinks about the Pulitzer Prize, just like no one would’ve cared what Eichmann thought about the Bay of Pigs invasion or the civil rights movement or “Breakfast at Tiffany’s.” People like Yoo and his coterie of Iraq War perpetrators belong in prison cells, not the pages of major newsmagazines or the lecterns of universities. While we as a society may lack the power to bring these individuals to justice, the least we can do is stop giving their noxious views public airtime.

### 1AR – AT: Fiat Enforcement

#### Yes enforcement –

#### 1--- Ban includes arms control

Sauer 16 [Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer at Bundeswehr University in Munich. He is the author of Atomic Anxiety: Deterrence, Taboo and the Non-Use of U.S. Nuclear Weapons (2015) and a member of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control. October 2016, “Stopping ‘Killer Robots’: Why Now Is the Time to Ban Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-09/features/stopping-%E2%80%98killer-robots%E2%80%99-why-now-time-ban-autonomous-weapons-systems//lhs-ap]

In light of this, four possible outcomes can be predicted for the CCW process. The first would be a legally binding and preventive multilateral arms control agreement derived by consensus in the CCW and thus involving the major stakeholders, the outcome referenced as “a ban.” Considering the growing number of states-parties calling for a ban and the large number of governments calling for meaningful human control and expressing considerable unease with the idea of autonomous weapons systems, combined with the fact that no government is openly promoting their development, this seems possible. It would require mustering considerable political will. Verification and compliance for a ban, as well as for weaker restrictions, would then require creative arms control solutions. After all, with full autonomy in a weapons system eventually coming down to merely flipping a software switch, how can one tell if a specific system at a specific time is not operating autonomously? A few arms control experts are already wrapping their heads around these questions.13

The second outcome would be restrictions short of a ban. The details of such an agreement are impossible to predict, but it is conceivable that governments could agree, for example, to limit the use of autonomous weapons systems, such as permitting their use against materiel only.

The third would be a declaratory, nonbinding agreement on best practices. Such a code of conduct would likely emphasize compliance with existing international humanitarian law and rigorous weapons review processes, in accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.

Finally, there may be no tangible result, perhaps with one of the technologically leading countries setting a precedent by fielding autonomous weapons systems. That would certainly prompt others to follow, fueling an arms race. In light of some of the most advanced standoff weapons, such as the U.S. Long Range Anti-Ship Missile or the UK Brimstone, each capable of autonomous targeting during terminal flight phase, one might argue that the world is already headed for such an autonomy arms race.

#### 2---Ensuring other states comply and refuting allegations incentivize the international community to verify compliance – That’s Gubrud and Altmann – Even if measures are not a part of the plan, they are a consequence

#### 3---Stigma alone solves

Future of Life Institute [Future of Life Institute, xx-xx-xxxx, "Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems," https://futureoflife.org/lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems/, accessed 12-20-2020]LHSBC

Myth: Cheating will make any mandate useless. Fact: Despite cheating, the bio- & chem-weapon bans have created powerful stigma& prevented large-scale use.∂ The chemical weapons ban has robust verification and certifications mechanisms, but other bans, such as biological weapons, do not have any such mechanism. In both cases, to date, there has not been a large scale violation of these bans. Arguably, it is not the legal authority of a weapons ban that has prevented large-scale use and cheating, but the powerful stigma that they have created. Like lethal AWS, chemical and biological weapons can be created at scale and without exotic or expensive materials, but this largely hasn’t happened due to the powerful stigma against these weapons.

### 1AR – AT: Gibbs

#### Yes verification –

#### 1---States are incentivized to comply so other state do so and to disprove allegations

#### 2---Normal means is inspections and monitoring data from engagement – Cheaters will be caught – That’s Gubrud and Altmann

### 1AR – AT: Deo and Mohanty

#### 1---Durable fiat – Debate is a question of should not would otherwise aff would always lose to inherency

#### 2---Yes definitions – Our solvency evidence proves consensus exists and treaty allows future clarifications – That’s Gubrud and Altmann

### 1AR – AT: Khurana

#### 1---Yes destabilizing – Competitive incentives mean states develop swarming drones with first strike capability

#### 2---Inability to empathize or understand context and complexity ensure miscalculation even if it’s not intentional

#### 3---Opacity – No way to verify programming means LAWS destabilize regardless of actual abilities

### 1AR – AT: Assorted Answers to Harker Case Things

#### Noyes—this indicts lack of momentum to ban in the squo but we fiat, and we can verify—Gubrud and Altman say reverse hashing and glass fuses make it possible to trace and punish countries that circumvent.

#### Del Re—we ban and punish their usage—even if we can’t completely eliminate, we can reduce the use down to levels similar to chemical weapons, and this card doesn’t indict our great power scenario—a couple of drones doesn’t compare to swarms that can take out aircraft carriers or automated strike systems.

#### The first Rabkin and Yoo—not specific to LAWs, we can still use software like Stuxnet to take out WMD sites, and this card is about tech progress in general

#### The second one – also not specific to LAWs, innovation in other areas should solve, but LAWs uniquely empower dictators by allowing them to level the playing field against the massive US military through swarm warfare to overwhelm carrier defenses.

#### Sagan—says we need to restructure our nuclear doctrine to solve—they don’t do that

#### Perry—laws of war may apply but machine speed makes retaliation fast and leaders wont understand AI’s solutions, causing escalation.

#### Horowitz—they will deploy risky tech early to try to gain an advantage over the states that don’t—and this doesn’t take out the inevitability of the aff

#### Yes accidents—each side would have the incentive to use LAWs if the other side stopped to gain an advantage, especially true for inferior militaries.

#### Banning isn’t worse for miscalc—leaders might not understand another state’s AI’s calculated decision and retaliate out of fear, even with perfect communication.

#### Human mistakes are less risky than AI mistakes—machine speed and empirical ev show that LAWs are wrong a lot and could misperceive glitches on radar as a nuclear attack, leading to immediate retaliation.

#### Case turns freedom of navigation—underwater drones prevent FON in the south china sea which goes nuclear because they perceive an imminent threat to their fleet

## 1AR – AT: AI Good

### 1AR – AT: AI Good – T/L

#### Overview to AI good – They don’t access any AI good scenarios before they win countries can develop AI without going nuclear – But perception of development alone escalates to nuclear from destabilizing arms racing before deployment even happens – That’s Horowitz

### 1AR – AT: AI Good – Biases

#### reverse goldilocks – still preserves human biases

Johnson, Ph.D., 20 [James Johnson is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). “Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?” 2020 The Elliott School of International Affairs The Washington Quarterly • 43:2 pp. 197–211 https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1770968//lhs-ap]

Bias in machine learning

Despite the speed, diverse data pools, and processing power of algorithms compared to humans, machine-learning systems will still depend on the assumptions encoded into them by human engineers, who risk inadvertently sowing their own biases into the systems they design. Implicit or explicit biases baked into military support systems may cause errors from feedback loops (i.e., action and counterreaction cycles), especially in cluttered and complex battlefield environments. For example, during the Cold War, the Soviets developed a computer program known as VRYAN designed to notify Soviet leaders of a pre-emptive US nuclear strike. However, the data used to feed the system was often biased and thus propelled a feedback loop that heightened the Kremlin’s fear that the United States was pursuing first-strike superiority.10 These feedback loops generated by AI systems could potentially trap human operators into machines’ bias and flawed assumptions.11 Machine learning systems, then, function much like black boxes, making them technically highly unpredictable and potentially unreliable.

Moreover, the added complexity of AI systems will likely amplify existing human uncertainties about the value, scope, availability, credibility, and interpretation of information. For the foreseeable future, narrow AI-infused sensing, selflearning, intelligence gathering and analysis, and decision-making support systems will continue to exhibit a similar penchant for cognitive bias and subjectivity (e.g., attribution error, decision-making heuristics, path-dependency, and dissonance) that has long plagued the human foreign policy and national security decision-making process.12

### 1AR – AT: AI Good – Baltics

#### No Baltic impact – Russia’s weak, NATO fleets checks, and subs are ineffective

Bowers and Kirchberger 20 [Ian Bowers, is associate professor at the Centre for Joint Operations, Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen. Sarah Kirchberger, is the Head of Asia-Pacific Strategy and Security at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) and Vice President of the German Maritime Institute (DMI). (2020): Not so disruptive after all: The 4IR, navies and the search for sea control, Journal of Strategic Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2020.1848819//lhs-ap]

The geography of the region increases the operational complexity of maintaining sea control. An archetypal narrow sea, the Baltic theatre creates operational pressures due to compressed detection and engagement times that could have a substantial impact on decision-making.64 Additionally, the confined operational area ensures that seapower in the Baltic can not only be defined by ships in the water, but the totality of assets that can apply power into the sea and the surrounding littorals. This includes shore-based air and missile capabilities. Variable depths and differing levels of salinity make it a challenging environment for both anti-submarine and submarine operations.65 Water depth, temperature, salinity, seabed conditions, dense ship traffic, and the character and shape of the coast in ‘confined and shallow waters’ such as the Baltic have a detrimental effect on the performance of sensors particularly in the underwater domain. Air temperature, wave height, wind speed, humidity, and other meteorological phenomena such as fog also ‘affect radar, infrared sensors, and radio communications, while haze and other forms of visual distortion affect the performance of optical devices’ in the surface domain.66

Of course, Russia’s naval challenge is to some extent defined by its weaknesses. Of Russia’s four naval fleets, the Baltic Fleet is the smallest, with a modest number of modern vessels when compared with the German, Danish, Swedish and Finnish fleets, all of which possess modern surface capabilities, with two (Germany and Sweden) operating submarines optimised for the variable depths of the Baltic.67 However, Russia maintains substantial military capabilities in Kaliningrad, including advanced shorebased anti-ship and anti-air assets which could theoretically hold any vessel or aircraft operating in that region hostage to Russian intentions or at least deny an enemy the ability to attain sea control.68 Nonetheless, legitimate questions exist about the feasibility of this approach as Russia may struggle to both efficiently enact and sustain a sea-denial strategy in a time of peerconflict.69

## 1AR – AT: Spark

### Nuke War = Extinction

#### Nuclear war does causes extinction – that’s starr 14 – best peer-reviewed studies

#### Destruction of the climate and ozone layer devastate agricultural and kill billions

#### Smoke from firestorms blot out the sun – destroys ag and causes an ice age

#### EMP’s eradicate all electrical devices and cause reactor meltdown – devastating long-lived radioactivity makes earth un-inhabitable

#### Baum was dropped – secondary effects like conflict and disease aren’t studied and survivors vulnerable to subsequent disasters

### Impact – Escalation

#### It won’t be limited

Manzo & Warden 18 (Vince Manzo is a defense and nuclear policy analyst; Warden is a defense policy and strategy analyst based in Washington, @hoochdebate, 05/04/18, “After Nuclear First Use, What?” Survival Global Politics and Strategy Volume 60, 2018 - Issue 3 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2018.1470770)

If an adversary were to cross the nuclear threshold, whatever happened next would have profound near- and long-term consequences. In most circumstances, a nuclear strike would cause substantial, immediate loss of life and potentially long-term humanitarian and economic consequences. In any scenario, it would shatter the more than 70-year-old tradition of nuclear weapons not being used in conflict.2 The potential for further nuclear escalation would place countless lives at risk, and the outcome of the conflict would influence other countries’ perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons, and of the reliability of the United States as an ally and steward of the international system. These epochal stakes demand a serious analysis of how the United States might lead an international effort to minimise the loss of life, secure a just peace and reinforce the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons.

### I/D: Bunkers

#### Survivors inbreed and can’t repopulate

**Bochkov ’84**[Academician. Dir Medical Academy of Sciences at the Institute of Genetics at the USSR Academy of Sciences. The Cold and the Dark: The World After Nuclear War, 1984 Pg 141-2]

Academician Bochkov: When we talk about the ecological and biological consequences of a nuclear war, we are of course focusing on humankind. Thus, in thinking about the possibilities of human survival after a nuclear catastrophe, we should not be afraid to reach the conclusion that the conditions that would prevail would not allow the survival of human beings as a species. We should proceed from the assumption that man has adapted to his environment during a long evolutionary process and has paid the price of natural selection. Only over the past few thousand years has he adapted his environment to his needs and has created, so to speak, an artificial environment to provide food, shelter, and other necessities. Without this, modem [humankind] man cannot survive. Compared to the dramatic improvements made in the technological environment, biological nature has not changed in the recent past. In the statements of Dr. Ehrlich and Academician Bayev, we have heard about the many constraints there would be on the possibility of man's survival after a nuclear catastrophe. Because we also have to look at the more long-range future, I would like to point out that most long-term effects of a nuclear war will be genetic. If islands of humanity—or as Dr. Ehrlich has said, groups of people on islands somewhere in the ocean—should survive, what will they face in terms of genetic consequences? If the population drops sharply, the question then arises of the critical numbers of a population that would be necessary to ensure its reproduction. On the one hand there will be minimum numbers of human beings; on the other hand, because of the small numbers, there will be isolation. There will definitely be inbreeding, and lethal mutations will come to the fore as a result of this, because of fetal and neonatal exposure to radiation and because of exposure to fallout. New mutations will arise and genes and chromosomes will be damaged as a result of the radiation, so there will be an additional genetic load to bear. There will be natural aberrations and death at birth, so that the burden of hereditary illnesses will be only part of a large load. This undoubtedly will be conducive to the elimination of humanity, because humankind will not be able to reproduce itself as a species.

#### Bunkers fail

**Gao 11/19** – studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues. (Charlie, “Can Russia's Bunkers Really Save Moscow from Nuclear War?” National Interest, November 19, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-russias-bunkers-really-save-moscow-nuclear-war-97302)//RP

The “sphere” style of bunker was developed as a way to improve the survivability of shallow bunkers since shallow bunkers are cheaper to build than deeper ones. To attain greater survivability, an outer bunker is made in the form of a sphere. This sphere is placed inside a shallow circular shaft. Shock absorbers are placed around the sphere connecting into an internal bunker. Those absorbers cushion the occupants from the shock waves of a nuclear explosion. Other bunkers that use similar technology in which the central bunker is suspended on shock absorbers in a central structure might also be present, with various variations on the shape of the central bunker. “Cylinder” and “Nut bolt” (hexagonal) types are also rumored to exist. The infamous “metro-2” bunker style is laid out similarly to the older “metro” style but is deeper underground for greater blast resistance and secrecy. It was said to be built in two phases, with the first being in the 1970s and 1980s, called D-6 ,and the second being between 1990–2000 by the TIS (OAO Трансинжстрой) firm, which also builds civilian metro stations. However, most sources reporting on Metro-2 are speculative, with the primary ones being reports of hobbyists who may have stumbled upon some Metro-2 entrances or exits or a 1990s DIA report on the system. Despite the vast number of bunkers, recent advances in fuzing technology for nuclear weapons are threatening to make the minimum civil defense standard obsolete. As fuzing technology improves, such as that used on the American Super Fuze, it’s more likely that pressure levels experienced by the civil defense bunkers will far exceed their design rating.

### I/D: Survivors

#### Survivor populations aren’t stable

NISSANI, 1992 Moti, Professor at Wayne State, Lives in the Balance: The Cold War and American Politics 1945-1991, <http://www.is.wayne.edu/mnissani/pagepub/CH2.html>

*Human Populations*. The direct effects of war on human populations have already been discussed. Here I shall only superimpose the war's indirect effects on projection IV above, a projection which entailed one billion deaths in targeted countries as a result of near-term effects of nuclear bombs: blast, heat, initial radiation, and local fallout (the effects of the other three projections would be correspondingly lighter). The death toll will continue to climb for years after the war, as a consequence of widespread famine in targeted nations, famine in numerous non-targeted Third World countries whose people partly depend for survival on food or food-related imports from targeted nations, general deterioration of the health care and disease prevention system, lingering radioactivity, paucity of shelters, temporary but severe climatic changes, and the likelihood that some grief-stricken survivors will prefer death to a prolonged struggle for sheer physical survival. Several years after the war, the world's population may go down by another billion people. The longer-term impact of total war on human populations depends in part on whether social conditions resembling our own are re-established. If not, human populations could keep declining for decades. But even if such conditions are re-created, further reductions seem likely during the first few decades because young children, infants, and fetuses are more vulnerable to the stresses of a post-nuclear world (radiation, starvation, death of parents, etc.), and so proportionately more individuals in these age brackets will die. In addition, many people may refrain for years after from having children, so the death rate is likely to be higher than the birth rate. (I have confined the discussion here to dry statistics not because they are the most interesting, but because books like this one cannot possibly convey the countless individual tragedies these numbers imply.)

### I/D: Rainout

#### Nuclear black carbon absorbs radiation from the sun, creating a stratospheric lofting effect that circumvents rainout

Mills et al. 14 (Michael Mills - Taine G. McDougal Professor of Engineering, the Chair of the Department of Materials Science and Engineering. Owen Toon - Professor of atmospheric and oceanic sciences and fellow at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics at the University of Colorado Boulder. Julia Lee-Taylor – CIRES Research Associate at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Researcher and project scientist for The National Center for Atmospheric Research. Alan Robock – Climatologist and Distinguished Professor in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University, New Jersey. <MKIM> “Multidecadal global cooling and unprecedented ozone loss following a regional nuclear conflict” 1/4/14. DOA: 7/21/19. https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2013EF000205)

As in previous studies of this scenario [Robock et al., 2007b; Mills et al., 2008], the **BC aerosol absorbs SW radiation, heating the ambient air, inducing a self-lofting that carries most of the BC well above the tropopause**. CESM1(WACCM) has 66 vertical layers and a model top of ∼145 km, compared to 23 layers up to ∼80 km for the GISS ModelE used by Robock et al. [2007b] and 39 layers up to ∼80 km for SOCOL3 used by Stenke et al. [2013]. As Figure 1 shows, we calculate significantly higher lofting than Robock et al. [2007b, compare to their Figure 1b], penetrating significantly into the mesosphere, with peak mass mixing ratios reaching the stratopause (50–60 km) within 1 month and persisting throughout the first year. This higher lofting, in conjunction with effects on the circulation we discuss later, produces significantly longer residence times for the BC than those in previous studies. At the end of 10 years, our calculated visible-band optical depths from the BC persist at 0.02–0.03, as shown in Figure 2. In contrast, Robock et al. [2007b] calculate optical depths near 0.01 only at high latitudes after 10 years, a level that our calculations do not reach for 15 years. 3.2. BC Burden, Rainout, and Lifetime During the first 4 months, 1.2–1.6 of the 5 Tg of BC is lost in our 50 nm experiment ensemble, and 1.6 Tg in our 100 nm experiment, mostly due to rainout in the first few weeks **as the plume initially rises through the troposphere** (Figure 3a). This is larger than the 1.0 Tg initially lost in the study of Mills et al. [2008], which used a previous version of WACCM. This is likely due to the difference in our initial distribution of BC compared to that previous study, which injected 5 Tg into a single column at a resolution four times as coarse as ours. The more concentrated BC in the previous study likely produced **faster heating and rise** into the stratosphere, **mitigating** **rainout**. Our calculated rainout contrasts with the lack of significant rainout calculated by the GISS ModelE [Robock et al., 2007b], which assumes that BC is initially hydrophobic and becomes hydrophilic with a 24 h e-folding time scale. The mass burden reaching the stratosphere and impacts on global climate and chemistry in our calculations would doubtless be greater had we made a similar assumption to the GISS ModelE. Stenke et al. [2013] calculate an initial rainout of ∼2 Tg in their interactive 5 Tg simulations, which assumed BC radii of 50 and 100 nm in two separate runs. After initial rainout, the mass e-folding time for our remaining BC is 8.7 years for the average of our 50 nm experiment ensemble and 8.4 years for our 100 nm experiment, compared to the 6 years reported by Robock et al. [2007b], ∼6.5 years by Mills et al. [2008], 4–4.6 years reported by Stenke et al. [2013], and 1 year for stratospheric sulfate aerosol from typical volcanic eruptions [Oman et al., 2006]. Due to this longer lifetime, after about 4.8 years the global mass burden of BC we calculate in our ensemble is larger than that calculated by the GISS ModelE, **despite the initial 28% rainout loss**. After 10 years, we calculate that 1.1 Tg of BC remains in the atmosphere in our 50 nm experiment ensemble and 0.82 Tg in our 100 nm experiment, compared to 0.54 Tg calculated by the GISS ModelE and 0.07–0.14 Tg calculated by SOCOL3. The long lifetime that we calculate results from both the very **high initial lofting** of BC to altitudes, **where removal from the stratosphere is slow**, and the subsequent slowing down of the stratospheric residual circulation. The Brewer-Dobson circulation is driven waves whose propagation is filtered by zonal winds, which are modulated by temperature gradients [Garcia and Randel, 2008]. As explained by Mills et al. [2008], the BC both heats the stratosphere and cools the surface, reducing the strength of the stratospheric overturning circulation. Figure 4 shows the vertical winds in the lower stratosphere, which bring new air up from the troposphere and drive the poleward circulation, for the control and BC runs. The middle-atmosphere heating and surface cooling reduce the average velocity of tropical updrafts by more than 50%. This effect persists more than twice as long as in Mills et al. [2008], which did not include any ocean cooling effects.

### I/D: Islands

#### War destroys the islands’ food sources

**Mills et al. 14**. Michael J. Mills and Julia Lee-Taylor are with the NCAR Earth System Laboratory; Owen B. Toon is with the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics and the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at the University of Colorado, Boulder; Alan Robock is Distinguished Professor in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University. 04/2014. “Multidecadal Global Cooling and Unprecedented Ozone Loss Following a Regional Nuclear Conflict.” Earth’s Future, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 161–176.

4. Discussion Pierazzo et al. [2010] reviewed literature considering the effects of large and prolonged increases in UV-B radiation, similar to those we calculate, on living organisms, including agriculture and marine [[FIGURE 12 OMITTED]] ecosystems. General effects on terrestrial plants have been found to include reduced height, shoot mass, and foliage area [Caldwell et al., 2007]. Walbot [1999] found the DNA damage to maize crops from 33% ozone depletion to accumulate proportionally to exposure time, being passed to successive generations, and destabilizing genetic lines. Research indicates that UV-B exposure may alter the susceptibility of plants to attack by insects, alter nutrient cycling in soils (including nitrogen fixation by cyanobacteria), and shift competitive balances among species [Caldwell et al., 1998; Solheim et al., 2002; Mpoloka, 2008]. The ozone depletion we calculate could also damage aquatic ecosystems, which supply more than 30% of the animal protein consumed by humans. Häder et al. [1995] estimate that 16% ozone depletion could reduce phytoplankton, the basis of the marine food chain, by 5%, resulting in a loss of 7 million tons of fish harvest per year. They also report that elevated UV levels damage the early developmental stages of fish, shrimp, crab, amphibians, and other animals. The combined effects of elevated UV levels alone on terrestrial agriculture and marine ecosystems could put significant pressures on global food security. The ozone loss would persist for a decade at the same time that growing seasons would be reduced by killing frosts, and regional precipitation patterns would shift. The combination of years of killing frosts, reductions in needed precipitation, and prolonged enhancement of UV radiation, in addition to impacts on fisheries because of temperature and salinity changes, could exert significant pressures on food supplies across many regions of the globe. As the January to May 2008 global rice crisis demonstrated, even relatively small food price pressures can be amplified by political reactions, such as the fearful restrictions on food exports implemented by India and Vietnam, followed by Egypt, Pakistan, and Brazil, which produced severe shortages in the Philippines, Africa, and Latin America [Slayton, 2009]. It is conceivable that the global pressures on food supplies from a regional nuclear conflict could, directly or via ensuing panic, significantly degrade global food security or even produce a global nuclear famine. 5. Summary We present the first simulations of the chemistry-climate effects of smoke produced by a nuclear war using an Earth system model that includes both stratospheric chemistry and feedbacks on sea ice and deep ocean circulation. We calculate impacts on surface climate persisting significantly longer than previous studies, as a result of several feedback mechanisms. First, BC absorbs sunlight, heating ambient air, and self-lofts to the upper stratosphere, a region treated with greater vertical resolution in CESM1(WACCM) than in the model used by Robock et al. [2007b]. Second, the BC spreads globally, absorbing sunlight, which heats the stratosphere and cools the surface. This has the effect of reducing the strength of the stratospheric circulation and increasing the lifetime of BC in the stratosphere. Third, the reduction of surface temperatures cools the upper 100 m of the ocean by >0.5 K for 12 years, and expands ice extent on sea and land. This lends inertia to the surface cooling due to both thermal mass and enhanced albedo, causing recovery in surface temperatures to lag the recovery in BC by a decade or more. As a result, we calculate that surface temperatures remain below the control ensemble range even 26 years after the nuclear war. The global average temperature increase in the stratosphere following the BC injection initially exceeds 70 K, and persists above 30 K for 5 years, with full recovery taking two decades. As in previous studies, this temperature increase produces global ozone loss on a scale never observed, as a result of several chemical mechanisms. The resulting enhancements to UV radiation at the surface would be directly damaging to human health, and would damage agricultural crops, as well as ecosystems on land and in the oceans. These results illustrate some of the severe negative consequences of the use of only 100 of the smallest nuclear weapons in modern megacities. Yet the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France each have stockpiles of much larger nuclear weapons that dwarf the 100 examined here [Robock et al., 2007a; Toon et al., 2007]. Knowing the perils to human society and other forms of life on Earth of even small numbers of nuclear weapons, societies can better understand the urgent need to eliminate this danger worldwide.

### I/D: Reisner

#### Reisner modeling is incorrect and also relies on old, outdated models

Toon PhD 19 [Owen B. Toon, Physics at Cornell; Charles G. Bardeen, Atmospheric Chemistry Observations and Modeling Laboratory, National Center for Atmospheric Research; Alan Robock, Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University, New Brunswick; Lili Xia, Federation of American Scientists; Hans Kristensen, Natural Resources Defense Council; Matthew McKinzie, Department of Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder; R. J. Peterson, School of Earth, Environmental, and Marine Sciences, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley; Cheryl S. Harrison, Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research, University of Colorado, Boulder; Nicole S. Lovenduski , Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research; and Richard P. Turco, Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, University of California, Los Angeles] "Rapidly expanding nuclear arsenals in Pakistan and India portend regional and global catastrophe," Science Advances, https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/5/10/eaay5478 Science Advances 02 Oct 2019: Vol. 5, no. 10 RE

There have been contrary assessments of the possible impacts of nuclear attacks on the global climate and environment. For example, most recently, a high-resolution modeling study (38) purported to demonstrate that a nuclear fire initiated by a 15-kt explosion in India or Pakistan would not loft enough smoke into the upper troposphere to contribute to widespread effects. However, that conclusion was based on a single simulation of such a detonation over a sparsely populated area about 8 km from the city center of Atlanta, Georgia. Significantly, the adopted fuel loading in the affected area (1.07 g/cm2 in the ignition zone) was about one order of magnitude smaller than that in the most sparsely populated urban area considered in the present study, i.e., the 100th city attacked in Pakistan (refer to table S3). Accordingly, the preliminary findings in (38) are not representative of the fires that need to be considered in assessing the potential impacts of a conceivable nuclear conflict having regional or global extent.

### Turn: Nanotech

#### Nanotech is good ---

#### 1 --- immortality by 2040

**Gaudin 9** (Sharon Gaudin is a science writer at Worcester Polytechnic Institute and an experienced technology reporter. Citing Ray Kurzweil, received the 1999 National Medal of Technology and Innovation, the United States' highest honor in technology, inducted into the National Inventors Hall of Fame, established by the U.S. Patent Office, received 21 honorary doctorates, BS in Computer Science from MIT. <KEN>"Nanotech could make humans immortal by 2040, futurist says," Computerworld. October 1, 2019. DOA: 1/1/20. https://www.computerworld.com/article/2528330/nanotech-could-make-humans-immortal-by-2040--futurist-says.html)

In 30 or 40 years, we'll have microscopic machines traveling through our bodies, repairing damaged cells and organs, effectively wiping out diseases. The nanotechnology will also be used to back up our memories and personalities.

In an interview with Computerworld, author and futurist Ray Kurzweil said that anyone alive come 2040 or 2050 could be close to immortal. The quickening advance of nanotechnology means that the human condition will shift into more of a collaboration of man and machine, as nanobots flow through human blood streams and eventually even replace biological blood, he added.

That may sound like something out of a sci-fi movie, but Kurzweil, a member of the Inventor's Hall of Fame and a recipient of the National Medal of Technology, says that research well underway today is leading to a time when a combination of nanotechnology and biotechnology will wipe out cancer, Alzheimer's disease, obesity and diabetes.

It'll also be a time when humans will augment their natural cognitive powers and add years to their lives, Kurzweil said.

"It's radical life extension," Kurzweil said. "The full realization of nanobots will basically eliminate biological disease and aging. I think we'll see widespread use in 20 years of [nanotech] devices that perform certain functions for us. In 30 or 40 years, we will overcome disease and aging. The nanobots will scout out organs and cells that need repairs and simply fix them. It will lead to profound extensions of our health and longevity."

Of course, people will still be struck by lightning or hit by a bus, but much more trauma will be repairable. If nanobots swim in, or even replace, biological blood, then wounds could be healed almost instantly. Limbs could be regrown. Backed up memories and personalities could be accessed after a head trauma.

#### 2 --- solves warming --- extinction

**Aithal & Aithal 18** (Dr. P. S. Aithal – Director, Srinivas Institute of Management Studies, Srinivas University. Dr. Shubhrajyotsna Aithal – Assistant Professor, College of Engineering & Technology, Srinivas University. <KEN> “Nanotechnology based Innovations and Human Life Comfortability –Are we Marching towards Immortality?” International Journal of Applied Engineering and Management Letters (IJAEML), (2018), 2(2), 71-86. DOA: 1/1/20. <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3289262>)

Experts all over the world are in consensus that one of the major factors that will determine the future of human health is the health of our environment and the planet. In the environmental sciences, nanotechnology is a very hot topic, especially when addressing environmental sustainability and reversal of environmental damage caused by the actions of mankind. Nanotechnologists alongside environmental experts have been able to utilize nanomotor degradation and removal of contaminants from water sources. Environmentalists are excited about the use of this technology for water quality monitoring and eventually would like to see “sense and destroy” applications. Future directions in this field even entail immunology influenced chemotactic abilities capable of allowing nanomachines to track contamination back to its source for clearance and reporting to the appropriate authorities. In environmental applications of nanotechnology, a kind of nanorobots called nanomachines can self-replicate under pre-determined, set conditions, can potentially help people to control the changes in the environment. Nanorobots can be programmed to act like a buffer to prevent environmental changes, and help to maintain predetermined temperatures and pressure conditions. Nanomachines also have the ability to act like a chemical factory to process excessive levels of CO2 from the air or produce nontoxic endothermic or exothermic reactions to heat or cool the environment. Thus, nanomachines can be used to cool the oceans to prevent further melting of artic ice. The light reflective properties of nanomaterials added to the oceans can be altered and hence by decreasing or increasing the oceans ability to absorb sunlight could have considerable effects on global warming. Such possibilities for solving various environmental problems and pollutions are truly endless and exciting to for further research. Nanotechnology not only has tremendous implications for the monitoring of human health but also in real time monitoring of the environment and its purification in ways before never thought possible.

#### Regs solve

**Marshall 16** (Patrick Marshall – a freelance policy and technology writer in Seattle, is a technology columnist for The Seattle Times and Government Computer News. He has a bachelor's degree in anthropology from the University of California, Santa Cruz, and a master's degree in international studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. <KEN> "Will the science of atom-size objects reshape the economy?" CQ Researcher. DOA: 1/1/2020. https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2016061000)

Is the federal regulatory framework appropriate for nanotechnologies?

While agencies responsible for regulating nanotechnology products say they are up to the task, and while companies oppose increased regulation, some experts say the regulatory framework needs to be strengthened and better coordinated.

“The basic regulatory mechanisms in the United States — primarily the [Food and Drug Administration] and the [Environmental Protection Agency] — are probably about appropriate right now, and maybe they are on the side of overdone in some cases,” says Papermaster of Nano Global. “It's better to be a little bit more cautious than not cautious enough when you're dealing with human health and the environment.”

Papermaster says any new technology presents regulatory challenges, but that nanotechnology has been around long enough for regulators to figure out what to do. “There's been time, and there have been tremendous resources poured into understanding” nanoparticles and how to test them, he says. “I think it's on par with any other level of testing of biological drugs, genetic engineering and medical devices.”

The private sector widely shares Papermaster's view, according to Harthorn of the Center for Nanotechnology in Society. “We've done surveys that show that industry is very concerned about engineered nanomaterials from a safety standpoint, but they

### ---AT: Toxification :10

#### No global toxification

Hough 14 [Rupert, Environmental Scientist with Expertise in Risk Modelling and Exposure Assessment and PhD from Nottingham University, February, “Biodiversity and human health: evidence for causality?” Biodiversity and Conservation, Vol. 23 No. 2, pg. 272-3/AKG]

Large country-level assessments (e.g. MEA 2005; Huynen et al. 2004; Sieswerda et al. 2001) must be interpreted with some caution. Data measured at country-level are likely to mask regional and local-level effects. Apart from the fact that there are limitations to regression analysis in providing any proof of causality, least squares regression models assume linear relationships between reductions in biodiversity and human health and thus imply a linear relationship between loss of biodiversity and the provision of relevant ecosystem goods and services. A number of authors, however, have suggested that ecosystems can lose a proportion of their biodiversity without adverse consequences to their functioning (e.g. Schwartz et al. 2000). Only when a threshold in the losses of biodiversity is reached does the provision of ecosystem goods and services become compromised. These models also tend to assume a positive relationship between socio-economic development and loss of biodiversity. One problem with this expectation is that the loss in biodiversity in one country is not per definition the result of socio-economic developments in that particular country, but could also be the result of socio-economic developments in other parts of the world (Wackernagel and Rees 1996). Furthermore, the use of existing data means researchers can only make use of available indicators. Unlike for human health and socio-economic development, there are no broadly accepted core-set of indicators for biodiversity (Soberon et al. 2000). The lack of correlation between biodiversity indicators (Huynen et al. 2004) shows that the selected indicators do not measure the same thing, which hinders interpretation of results. Finally, there is likely to be some sort of latency period between ecosystem imbalance and any resulting health consequences. To date, this has not been investigated using regression approaches. Finally, it is thought that provisioning services are more crucial for human health and well-being that other ecosystem services (Raudsepp-Hearne et al. 2010). Trends in measures of human well-being are clearly correlated with food provisioning services, and especially with meat consumption (Smil 2002). While \*60 % of the ecosystem services assessed by the MEA were found to be in decline, most of these were regulating and supporting services, whereas the majority of expanding services were provisioning services such as crops, livestock and aquaculture (MEA 2005). Raudsepp-Hearne et al. (2010) investigated the impacts on human well-being from decreases in non-food ecosystem services using national-scale data in order to reveal human well-being trends at the global scale. At the global scale, forest cover, biodiversity, and fish stocks are all decreasing; while water crowding (a measure of how many people shared the same flow unit of water placing a clear emphasis on the social demands of water rather than physical stress (Falkenmark and Rockstro¨m 2004)), soil degradation, natural disasters, global temperatures, and carbon dioxide levels are all on the rise, and land is becoming increasingly subject to salinization and desertification (Bennett and Balvanera 2007). However, across countries, Raudsepp-Hearne et al. (2010) found no correlation between measures of wellbeing and the available data for non-food ecosystem services, including forest cover and percentage of land under protected-area status (proxies for many cultural and regulating services), organic pollutants (a proxy for air and water quality), and water crowding index (a proxy for drinking water availability, Sieswerda et al. 2001; WRI 2009) This suggests there is no direct causal link between biodiversity decline and health, rather the relationship is a ‘knock-on’ effect. I.e. if biodiversity decline affects mankind’s ability to produce food, fuel and fibre, it will therefore impact on human health and well-being. As discussed in the introduction, the fact that humans need food, water and air to live is an obvious one. All these basic provisions can be produced in a diversity-poor environment. Therefore, to understand whether there is a potential causality relationship between biodiversity in its own right and human health, we need to move beyond the basic provisioning services.

### ---AT: AI :12

#### No AI impact

Michael **Shermer 17**. Publisher of Skeptic magazine, a monthly columnist for Scientific American, and a Presidential Fellow at Chapman University. 04/2017. “Why Artificial Intelligence Is Not an Existential Threat.” Skeptic, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 29–35.

Why AI is not an Existential Threat First, most AI doomsday prophecies are grounded in the false analogy between human nature and computer nature, or natural intelligence and artificial intelligence. We are thinking machines, but natural selection also designed into us emotions to shortcut the thinking process because natural intelligences are limited in speed and capacity by the number of neurons that can be crammed into a skull that has to pass through a pelvic opening at birth, whereas artificial intelligence need not be so restricted. We don't need to compute the caloric value of foods, for example, we just feel hungry. We don't need to calculate the waist-to-hip ratio of women or the shoulder-to-waist ratio of men in our quest for genetically healthy potential mates; we just feel attracted to someone and mate with them. We don't need to work out the genetic cost of raising someone else's offspring if our mate is unfaithful; we just feel jealous. We don't need to figure the damage of an unfair or non-reciprocal exchange with someone else; we just feel injustice and desire revenge. Emotions are proxies for getting us to act in ways that lead to an increase in reproductive success, particularly in response to threats faced by our Paleolithic ancestors. Anger leads us to strike out, fight back, and defend ourselves against danger. Fear causes us to pull back, retreat, and escape from risks. Disgust directs us to push out, eject, and expel that which is bad for us. Computing the odds of danger in any given situation takes too long. We need to react instantly. Emotions shortcut the information processing power needed by brains that would otherwise become bogged down with all the computations necessary for survival. Their purpose, in an ultimate causal sense, is to drive behaviors toward goals selected by evolution to enhance survival and reproduction. AIs -- even AGIs and ASIs -- will have no need of such emotions and so there would be no reason to program them in unless, say, terrorists chose to do so for their own evil purposes. But that's a human nature problem, not a computer nature issue. To believe that an ASI would be "evil" in any emotional sense is to assume a computer cognition that includes such psychological traits as acquisitiveness, competitiveness, vengeance, and bellicosity, which seem to be projections coming from the mostly male writers who concoct such dystopias, not features any programmer would bother including, assuming that it could even be done. What would it mean to program an emotion into a computer? When IBM's Deep Blue defeated chess master Garry Kasparov in 1997, did it feel triumphant, vengeful, or bellicose? Of course not. It wasn't even "aware" -- in the human sense of self-conscious knowledge -- that it was playing chess, much less feeling nervous about possibly losing to the reigning world champion (which it did in the first tournament played in 1996). In fact, toward the end of the first game of the second tournament, on the 44th move, Deep Blue made a legal but incomprehensible move of pushing its rook all the way to the last row of the opposition side. It accomplished nothing offensively or defensively, leading Kasparov to puzzle over it out of concern that he was missing something in the computer's strategy. It turned out to be an error in Deep Blue's programming that led to this fail-safe default move. It was a bug that Kasparov mistook as a feature, and as a result some chess experts contend it led him to be less confident in his strategizing and to second-guess his responses in the subsequent games. It even led him to suspect foul play and human intervention behind Deep Blue, and this paranoia ultimately cost him the tournamentt.[ 13] Computers don't get paranoid, the HAL 9000 computer in 2001 notwithstanding. Or consider Watson, the IBM computer built by David Ferrucci and his team of IBM research scientists tasked with designing an AI that could rival human champions at the game of Jeopardy! This was a far more formidable challenge than Deep Blue faced because of the prerequisite to understand language and the often multiple meanings of words, not to mention needing an encyclopedic knowledge of trivia (Watson had access to Wikipedia for this). After beating the all-time greatest Jeopardy! champions Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter in 2011, did Watson feel flushed with pride after its victory? Did Watson even know that it won Jeopardy!? I put the question to none other than Ferrucci himself at a dinner party in New York in conjunction with the 2011 Singularity Summit. His answer surprised me: "Yes, Watson knows it won Jeopardy!" I was skeptical. How could that be, since such self-awareness is not yet possible in computers? "Because I told it that it won," he replied with a wry smile. Sure, and you could even program Watson or Deep Blue to vocalize a Howard Dean-like victory scream when it wins, but that is still a far cry from a computer feeling triumphant. This brings to mind the "hard problem" of consciousness -- if we don't understand how this happens in humans, how could we program it into computers? As Steven Pinker elucidated in his answer to the 2015 Edge Question on what to think about machines that think, "AI dystopias project a parochial alpha-male psychology onto the concept of intelligence. They assume that superhumanly intelligent robots would develop goals like deposing their masters or taking over the world." It is equally possible, Pinker suggests, that "artificial intelligence will naturally develop along female lines: fully capable of solving problems, but with no desire to annihilate innocents or dominate the civilization."[ 14] So the fear that computers will become emotionally evil are unfounded, because without the suite of these evolved emotions it will never occur to AIs to take such actions against us. What about an ASI inadvertently causing our extinction by turning us into paperclips, or tiling the entire Earth's surface with solar panels? Such scenarios imply yet another emotion -- the feeling of valuing or wanting something. As the science writer Michael Chorost adroitly notes, when humans resist an AI from undertaking any form of global tiling, it "will have to be able to imagine counteractions and want to carry them out." Yet, "until an AI has feelings, it's going to be unable to want to do anything at all, let alone act counter to humanity's interests and fight off human resistance." Further, Chorost notes, "the minute an A.I. wants anything, it will live in a universe with rewards and punishments -- including punishments from us for behaving badly. In order to survive in a world dominated by humans, a nascent A.I. will have to develop a humanlike moral sense that certain things are right and others are wrong. By the time it's in a position to imagine tiling the Earth with solar panels, it'll know that it would be morally wrong to do so."[ 15] From here Chorost builds on an argument made by Peter Singer in The Expanding Circle (and Steven Pinker in The Better Angels of Our Nature[ 16] that I also developed in The Moral Arc[ 17] and Robert Wright explored in Nonzero[ 18]), and that is the propensity for natural intelligence to evolve moral emotions that include reciprocity, cooperativeness, and even altruism. Natural intelligences such as ours also includes the capacity to reason, and once you are on Singer's metaphor of the "escalator of reason" it can carry you upward to genuine morality and concerns about harming others. "Reasoning is inherently expansionist. It seeks universal application," Singer notes.[ 19] Chorost draws the implication: "AIs will have to step on the escalator of reason just like humans have, because they will need to bargain for goods in a human-dominated economy and they will face human resistance to bad behavior."[ 20] Finally, for an AI to get around this problem it would need to evolve emotions on its own, but the only way for this to happen in a world dominated by the natural intelligence called humans would be for us to allow it to happen, which we wouldn't because there's time enough to see it coming. Bostrom's "treacherous turn" will come with road signs ahead warning us that there's a sharp bend in the highway with enough time for us to grab the wheel. Incremental progress is what we see in most technologies, including and especially AI, which will continue to serve us in the manner we desire and need. Instead of Great Leap Forward or Giant Fall Backward, think Small Steps Upward. As I proposed in The Moral Arc, instead of Utopia or dystopia, think protopia, a term coined by the futurist Kevin Kelly, who described it in an Edge conversation this way: "I call myself a protopian, not a Utopian. I believe in progress in an incremental way where every year it's better than the year before but not by very much -- just a micro amount."[ 21] Almost all progress in science and technology, including computers and AI, is of a protopian nature. Rarely, if ever, do technologies lead to either Utopian or dystopian societies. Pinker agrees that there is plenty of time to plan for all conceivable contingencies and build safeguards into our AI systems. "They would not need any ponderous 'rules of robotics' or some newfangled moral philosophy to do this, just the same common sense that went into the design of food processors, table saws, space heaters, and automobiles." Sure, an ASI would be many orders of magnitude smarter than these machines, but Pinker reminds us of the AI hyperbole we've been fed for decades: "The worry that an AI system would be so clever at attaining one of the goals programmed into it (like commandeering energy) that it would run roughshod over the others (like human safety) assumes that AI will descend upon us faster than we can design fail-safe precautions. The reality is that progress in AI is hype-defyingly slow, and there will be plenty of time for feedback from incremental implementations, with humans wielding the screwdriver at every stage."[ 22] Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt agrees, responding to the fears expressed by Hawking and Musk this way: "Don't you think the humans would notice this, and start turning off the computers?" He also noted the irony in the fact that Musk has invested $1 billion into a company called OpenAI that is "promoting precisely AI of the kind we are describing."[ 23] Google's own DeepMind has developed the concept of an AI off-switch, playfully described as a "big red button" to be pushed in the event of an attempted AI takeover. "We have proposed a framework to allow a human operator to repeatedly safely interrupt a reinforcement learning agent while making sure the agent will not learn to prevent or induce these interruptions," write the authors Laurent Orseau from DeepMind and Stuart Armstrong from the Future of Humanity Institute, in a paper titled "Safely Interruptible Agents." They even suggest a precautionary scheduled shutdown every night at 2 AM for an hour so that both humans and AI are accustomed to the idea. "Safe interruptibility can be useful to take control of a robot that is misbehaving and may lead to irreversible consequences, or to take it out of a delicate situation, or even to temporarily use it to achieve a task it did not learn to perform or would not normally receive rewards for this."[ 24] As well, it is good to keep in mind that artificial intelligence is not the same as artificial consciousness. Thinking machines may not be sentient machines. Finally, Andrew Ng of Baidu responded to Elon Musk's ASI concerns by noting (in a jab at the entrepreneur's ambitions for colonizing the red planet) it would be "like worrying about overpopulation on Mars when we have not even set foot on the planet yet."[ 25] Both Utopian and dystopian visions of AI are based on a projection of the future quite unlike anything history has given us. Yet, even Ray Kurzweil's "law of accelerating returns," as remarkable as it has been has nevertheless advanced at a pace that has allowed for considerable ethical deliberation with appropriate checks and balances applied to various technologies along the way. With time, even if an unforeseen motive somehow began to emerge in an AI we would have the time to reprogram it before it got out of control. That is also the judgment of Alan Winfield, an engineering professor and co-author of the Principles of Robotics, a list of rules for regulating robots in the real world that goes far beyond Isaac Asimov's famous three laws of robotics (which were, in any case, designed to fail as plot devices for science fictional narratives).26 Winfield points out that all of these doomsday scenarios depend on a long sequence of big ifs to unroll sequentially: "If we succeed in building human equivalent AI and if that AI acquires a full understanding of how it works, and if it then succeeds in improving itself to produce super-intelligent AI, and if that super-AI, accidentally or maliciously, starts to consume resources, and if we fail to pull the plug, then, yes, we may well have a problem. The risk, while not impossible, is improbable."[ 27]

### ---AT: Simulation :05

#### No simulation

**McDonald ’18** ( GLENN MCDONALD, “We Are Not Living In A Simulation. Probably., https://www.fastcompany.com/40537955/we-are-not-living-in-a-simulation-probably//jc)

New research suggests it’s impossible, but the Simulation Hypothesis is the modern existential debate that just won’t die. Good news, everyone: According to new physics research, reality is probably not a quantum computer simulation designed by a hyper-advanced alien civilization. Takes a load off, doesn’t it? To back up: The Simulation Hypothesis, sometimes called the Simulation Argument, is a concept that’s been bouncing around in scientific circles for several years–and in science fiction stories for several decades before that. The gist, according to proponents, is that all of reality is actually an incredibly complex computer simulation created by an advanced civilization. This controlling civilization may be an existing alien culture, or it may be a future iteration of humanity, one of many spun out into the far-future multiverse of parallel realities. Oh, it’s a trip, man. While the idea itself isn’t particularly new–we’re all familiar with The Matrix movies–what a lot of people don’t know is that Simulation Hypothesis is considered entirely valid, so far as it goes, by a wide range of philosophers, mathematicians, physicists, and metaphysicists. At the 2016 Isaac Asimov Memorial Debate in Washington, D.C., celebrity astrophysicist Neil deGrasse Tyson hosted a two-hour debate on the subject. Elon Musk has suggested that, considered from a certain point of view, it’s pretty much a lock that we’re living inside of some kind of cosmic hard drive. The core of the argument—perhaps made most strenuously by the philosophers David Chalmers and Nick Bostrom—concerns the incredible rate of computer advancement we’ve seen in recent decades, specifically with games and simulations. We’ve gone from the Atari 2600 to high-resolution virtual reality in forty-some years. Projecting that rate of advancement forward, unthinkable amounts of computing power will be available to advanced species, either our own or others in the universe, who might like to create the ultimate cosmic [simulation]. These sims would essentially replicate physical reality down to the subatomic level. Approximated humans within the simulation–that’s us–would be conscious entities. “If you assume any rate of improvement at all, then the [simulations] will become indistinguishable from reality,” Musk says. Some proponents of the idea take it one step further: If future computers can generate limitless simulated universes, then the likelihood of our current reality being the original universe, or the Prime Reality, is actually quite small. In fact, it’s statistically probable that we’re already living inside some kind of cosmic computational construct. In short: We’re in the Matrix. DO THE MATH Clearly, the Simulation Hypothesis depends upon several key assumptions: Will advanced and/or future civilizations survive long enough to develop this technology? Will they run these simulations on 21st-century Earth? Could advanced simulation avatars actually exist as conscious, self-aware entities? These are some of the reasons, technically speaking, that the simulation concept is properly designated as a hypothesis and not a full theory. In October 2017, a team of mathematicians and physicists published a research paper that takes an admirably straightforward and two-fisted approach to the question. They decided to get to the bottom of things by using some very powerful computers to crunch some heavy-duty numbers. The conclusion: Based on everything we now know about physics and computers, it is mathematically impossible for the known universe to be a computer simulation. Theoretical physicists Zohar Ringel and Dmitry L. Kovrizhin–from the University of Oxford and the Hebrew University in Israel–published their findings in the prestigious journal Science Advances. If you speak math, you can read all about it . Since I don’t have a PhD or three, Kovrizhin kindly agreed to break it down for me. Emailing from his lab in Oxford, he writes that to really and truly simulate the universe, our hypothetical future computer would need to replicate phenomena down to the quantum level. “In quantum mechanics, which is the basis for understanding of the nature, a system of particles is described by a Hamiltonian, an object that can be written as a matrix,” Kovrizhin says. “In order to simulate a quantum mechanical system, one would, in general, have to diagonalize this matrix on a computer, which is a computationally difficult task when the size of the matrix becomes large.” According to the research team’s best approximations, it would require a terabyte of RAM to store just 20 spins of a single particle on the quantum level. “If one tries to extrapolate this to few hundreds of spins, then building a computer with such a memory would require more atoms than there are in the universe,” Kovrizhin says. It gets much more complicated than that, as you might imagine. Corresponding with Kovrizhin is a lot of fun if you enjoy discussing the Schrödinger equation and quantum Monte Carlo, which is likely the most efficient possible algorithm for simulating quantum particles, and the one his research focused on. One important detail is that Kovrizhin and his colleagues didn’t actually set out to prove or disprove the Simulation Hypothesis. Their conclusions were a kind of side effect generated by a separate study concerning quantum systems and computational algorithms. Ultimately, the new research just indicates that advanced civilizations could not simulate the known universe using our current understanding of computing technology.

### ---AT: Particle Accelerators – Short :07

#### No accelerators impact

Anders **Sandberg**, Postdoctoral research assistant for the Oxford group of the EU ENHANCE Project at the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and research associate at the Future of Humanity Institute At Oxford University, 20**08** (“Extinction Risks and Particle Physics: When Are They Worth it?,” 3/29, http://www.practicalethicsnews.com/practicalethics/2008/03/extinction-risk.html, Kunal)

The Large Hadron Collider, LHC, is the worlds biggest particle accelerator and due to start investigating the structure of matter later this year. Now a lawsuit has been filed in the US calling on the U.S. Department of Energy, Fermilab, the National Science Foundation and CERN to stop preparations for starting the LHC for a reassessment of the safety of the collider. The reason is fears that the high energy collisions could cause some form of devastating effect threatening the Earth: either the formation of miniature black holes, strangelets that absorb matter to make more strangelets or even a decay of the vacuum state of the universe. Needless to say, physicists are very certain there are no risks. But how certain should we be about safety when there could be a risk to the survival of the human species? The main reason physicists are not worried is that all of the disaster scenarios involve very speculative physics. Current theories do not seem to predict any danger and some disaster cases would require particles that have never been observed despite extensive searches. But this requires our understanding to be accurate, something the experiment itself is about to test. Perhaps the most convincing argument that we are safe is that if particle collisions could collapse planets, why is the moon (or any other heavenly body) still around after billions of years of bombardment that often involve energies far larger than what the LHC ever could produce? The solar system ought to be littered with strange matter and black holes if a measly 14 TeV could cause danger.

### ---AT: Particle Accelerators – Long :16

#### No particle accelerators –

#### 1---Empirics

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#### 2---non-unique

Worrall 18- [Eric Worrall, Staff writer for What’s up With That, 10.02.18, “Forget Climate Change – Large Hadron Collider Set to Destroy the World,” https://wattsupwiththat.com/2018/10/02/forget-climate-change-large-hadron-collider-set-to-destroy-the-world/]

Renowned Cosmologist Professor Martin Rees thinks a particle accelerator experiment gone awry could destroy the world – though there are good reasons to doubt the significance of this risk. Fun though it is to contemplate these outlandish possibilities, there is a good reason to doubt whether any of these possibilities are a significant risk. Every day the Earth is bombarded by untold billions of cosmic ray particles emitted long ago by violent distant cosmic events such as the formation of black holes. Many of the particles which strike the Earth are orders of magnitude more energetic than anything we are ever likely to produce. Some particles like the infamous “Oh-my-god” particle which struck Earth in 1991 with an energy of 3×10^8 TeV, hitting us at 99.99999999999999999999951% of the speed of light defy explanation – we shall likely never find a way to produce particle energies of that magnitude (for comparison the Large Hadron Collider, Earth’s most powerful particle accelerator, produces particles at around the 4TeV range). The point is the Earth has already been struck many times by particles of a very broad range of energies, including the range of energies used by particle physicists. If anything bad was going to happen due to a collision between particles of a specific energy, it should have already happened long ago when a cosmic ray of that energy struck the Earth. On the other hand we have the Fermi Paradox – the mystery of the missing aliens. One possible explanation for why our universe seems so empty of intelligent alien life is that (almost?) all technological civilisations make a common mistake – they reach a level of technology which enables them to commit an act which results in their own destruction. One possible candidate for that act of self destruction is a high energy particle physics experiment which goes horribly wrong. I haven’t read Professor Rees’ book, so for all I know he has an explanation for the cosmic ray flaw in the “particle experiment will destroy the world” theory. But for now I’m not going to be losing any sleep over this alleged risk.

#### 3---Too small

**Bland, 2008** (Eric, Discovery News, September 10, “Particle Smasher's Black Holes Would Be Tiny” http://dsc.discovery.com/news/2008/09/10/black-hole-cern-print.html)

CERN scientists say that a black hole is "virtually impossible." Martin Rees, a U.K. physicist, has put the odds of a CERN black hole at one in 50 million. Cynics have pointed out that those odds are about the same as some state-sponsored lotteries. But when the fate of the world is at stake any risk is too great a risk, contend two groups, one in the United States and one in Europe, who are suing to stop the LHC from operating. Other people have threatened to take matters into their own hands, issuing death threats to CERN scientists and theoretical physicists. [Frank Wilczek](http://web.mit.edu/physics/facultyandstaff/faculty/frank_wilczek.html%20\%20_blank), the 2004 Nobel Prize winner and a professor of theoretical physics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is one of the scientists who has received death threats. He points out there are [massive black holes](http://dsc.discovery.com/news/2008/08/20/black-hole-space.html%20\%20_blank) and then there are smaller, much less destructive black holes. According to Wilzcek, fears of an Earth-gobbling black hole are grounded in the popular idea that all black holes are galactic monsters just waiting for the chance to gobble up any nearby star or planet that gets too close. While supermassive black holes, like the one at the center of our galaxy, do gobble up stars and planets, microscopic black holes, like the ones the LHC could create, would look and act completely differently. "It's like we only had one word for every animal out there," said Wilczek. "It's like they had elephants in mind when they came up with the word 'animal.' But little amoebas are animals too." "The word is the same but the object is very different from the standard image that people think of." If (and that remains a big "if") the LHC creates a black hole it will be extremely tiny, much smaller than a single atom, said Wilzcek. Its mass will be the same as the two protons that created it. Its range will be small -- only a few times the diameter of the two protons. According to Wilczek, that's too small for the baby black hole to eat enough particles to grow to any real size. With no food, the black hole will simply wink out of existence in a fraction of a second. To create a stable black hole, one capable of consuming the Earth, [the black hole](http://dsc.discovery.com/news/2007/07/06/blackhole_spa.html%20\%20_blank) would have to be several hundred tons. A LHC-generated black hole would weigh a tiny fraction of a gram. So what impact would a small, LHC-generated black hole have? Wilczek says the only likely effect is that all of the quarks and other particles [produced in the collisions](http://dsc.discovery.com/space/my-take/lhc-atom-smasher-james-gillies.html%20\%20_blank) will zoom away a fraction of a second slower than they normally would have. The only ones who would even notice that a black hole was there would be the CERN scientists looking at their screens and watching the data. That means even if a black hole were created in Geneva it would have no effect on humanity at large. But, for curiosity's sake, just what would happen to someone if they were dropped into [a supermassive black hole](http://dsc.discovery.com/convergence/amazingspace/reports/holes.html%20\%20_blank), like the one at the center of the galaxy? "At first they might not even notice," said Wilczek. "We could be in a black hole right now and we wouldn't even know it," since information can't escape a black hole. Eventually, however, the person would start to feel the forces. The huge differences in gravity in the black hole would slowly stretch a person out while simultaneously compressing his or her sides. Eventually, a person would stretch out like a strand of spaghetti. That's a fearsome image, but it won't happen at CERN. CERN's internal reports have discredited the possibility, and outside experts agree: CERN is safe. And while Wilczek sees no logic or credence in the alarming rumors surrounding CERN, he does see an upside to all of the attention the experiment is gathering. "People can start to think about black holes, and hopefully that will suck them into thinking about the really exciting science that will happen at CERN,' said Wilczek.

### ---AT: Nanobots – Short :15

#### No nanobots –

#### 1---fuel

Shere 16 (Jeremy Shere, “Grey Goo Attack”, 4/2/2016, http://indianapublicmedia.org/amomentofscience/grey-goo-attack-2/)

Attack of the Killer Robots Nanotechnology scientists dream of some day creating robots the size of molecules, or even turning molecules into machines that could roam the human body and perform all sorts of useful tasks. But some nanotechnology theorists and science fiction aficionados imagine a more ominous possibility. What if one of these tiny robots were given the ability to self-replicate? All it would take is a single malfunction and the robots would consume everything in the galaxy as they multiply out of control until all that was left was a shapeless, robotic mass called “grey goo.” Worst Case Scenario Now, before you go heading for the hills with a year’s supply of water and a survival guide, understand that the death-by-robot scenario is just that—a scenario, and a pretty fanciful one to boot. First, we’re nowhere near the point of being able to create a self-replicating nano-machine. But even if such machines do one day exist, they would have a hard time taking over the universe for one simple reason: fuel. Even microscopic machines need an energy source. Inorganic matter such as rocks and minerals wouldn’t do the trick because they just don’t contain stuff that the machines could break down and use for power. But what if a mad scientist created a robot that fed on organic materials such as sunlight and living things? Not to worry. Natural life forms have had around four billion years of training to compete for resources; the killer robots probably wouldn’t stand much of a chance against such streamlined competitors. Plus, if the robots were made from organic materials, they might be preyed on by bacteria or other predators.

#### 2---too slow

**Easterbrook 3** (Gregg, Senior Fellow – New Republic, “We’re All Gonna Die!”, Wired Magazine, July, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic\_set=)

5. Runaway nanobots! Eric Drexler, the father of nanotechnology, calls it "gray goo": the state of things in the wake of microscopic machines capable of breaking down matter and reassembling it into copies of themselves. Nanobots could swarm over Earth like intelligent locusts, Drexler fears, then buzz out into the cosmos devouring everything they encountered. Michael Crichton's latest novel, Prey, describes a last-ditch attempt by scientists to destroy such contraptions before they take over the world. Set aside the fact that, for all the nanobot speculation you've seen (including in Wired), these creatures do not, technically speaking, exist. Suppose they did. As the visionary scientist Freeman Dyson pointed out in his New York Review of Books critique of Prey, not only wouldn't nanobots be able to swarm after helpless victims as they do in the novel, they'd barely be able to move at all. Laws of physics dictate that the smaller something is, the greater its drag when moving through water or air. "The top speed of a swimmer or flyer is proportional to its length," Dyson notes. "A generous upper limit to the speed of a nanorobot flying through air or swimming through water would be **a tenth of an inch per second**, barely fast enough to chase a snail.

#### 3---Science

oxidization, laws of thermodynamics, no experimental support, hype, at best hudreds of eyars away,

Locklin 10 Physicist specializing in Quantitative Finance, PhD UC Davis, “Nano-nonsense: 25 years of charlatanry” http://scottlocklin.wordpress.com/2010/08/24/nano-nonsense-25-years-of-charlatanry/ [EDymit]

I used to work next to the center for nanotechnology. The first indication I had that there was something wrong with the discipline of “nanotechnology” is I noticed that the people who worked there were the same people who used to do chemistry and material science. It appeared to be a more fashionable label for these subjects. Really “material science” was a sort of fancy label for the chemistry of things we use to build other things. OK, new name for “chemist.” Hopefully it ups the funding. Good for you guys.¶ Later on, I actually read Drexler’s Ph.D. thesis which invented the subject. I can sum it up thusly:¶ Behold, the Schroedinger equation! ¶ With this mighty equation we may go forth and invent an entirely new form of chemistry, with which we may create new and superior forms of life which are mechanical in their form, rather than squishy inefficient biological looking things. We shall use the mighty powers of the computer to do these things! It shall bring forth many great marvels!¶ That’s it. That’s what the whole book is. Oh yes, there are a few collections of intimidating tables and graphs purporting to indicate that such a thing might be possible, and Drexler does sketch out some impressive looking mechanical designs of what he supposes a nanobot might look like, but, without more than a passing justification. He seems to lack the imagination, and of course, the physics to figure out what a real nanosized doodad might look like. Much of his thesis seems to be hand wavey arguments that his “looking rather a lot like a meter scale object” designs would work on a nano or small microscale. I know for a fact that they will not. You can wave your hands around all you want; when you stick an atomic force microscope down on nanosized thingees, you know what forces they produce. They don’t act like macro-objects, at all. Drexler would also occasionally notice that his perfect little robots would probably, you know, oxidize, like most reactive things do, and consign them to Ultra High Vacuum chambers in a fit of embarrassment. Then sometimes he would forget about the chemical properties of oxygen, and enthusiastically stick them everywhere. None of the chemistry you’d need to figure out to even begin to do this was done in his book. Little real thought was given to thermodynamics or where the energy was coming from for all these cool Maxwell-Demon like “perpetual motion” reactions. It was never noticed that computational chemistry (aka figuring out molecular properties from the Schroedinger equation) is basically useless. Experimental results were rarely mentioned, or explained away with the glorious equation of Schroedinger, with which, all things seemed possible. Self assembly was deemed routine, despite the fact that nobody knows how to engineer such thing using macroscopic objects.¶ There is modern and even ancient nano sized tech; lithographic electronic chip features are down to this size now, and of course, materials like asbestos were always nano sized. As far as nano objects for manipulating things on nanoscales; such things don’t exist. Imagining self replicating nanobots or nano machines is ridiculous. We don’t even have micromachines. Mechanical objects on microscales do not exist. On milliscales, everything that I have seen is lithographically etched, or made on a watchmakers lathe. Is it cool? Yep; it’s kind of cool. I have already worked for a “millitech” company which was going to use tiny accelerometers to do sensing stuff in your cell phone. Will it change the universe? Nope. Millitech miniaturization has been available for probably 300 years now (assuming the Greeks didn’t have it); lithography just allows us to mass produce such things out of different materials.¶ This is an honest summary of Drexler’s Ph.D. thesis/book, and with that, a modest act of imagination, accompanied by a tremendous act of chutzpah, and a considerable talent for self promotion, he created what must be the most successful example of “vaporware” of the late 20th and early 21st century. The “molecular foundry” or “center for nanotechnology” or whatever nonsense name they’re calling the new chemistry building at LBL is but the tip of the iceberg. There are government organizations designed to keep up America’s leadership in this imaginary field. There are zillionaire worryworts who are afraid this mighty product of Drexler’s imagination will some day turn us all into grey goo. There are news aggregators for this nonexistent technology. 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Must we work on it for another 25 years before we realize that we can’t even do the “take the Schroedinger equation, figure out how simple molecules stick together” prerequisites which are a fundamental requirement for so called molecular engineering? How many more decades or centuries of research before we can even create a macroscopic object which is capable of the feat of “self replication,” let alone a self replicator which works at length scales which we have only a rudimentary understanding of? How many more cases of nincompoops selling “nanotech sunscreen” or “nanotech water filters” using the “nanotechnology” of activated carbon; must I endure? How many more CIA reports on the dangers of immanent nanoterrorism must my tax dollar pay for, when such technologies are, at best, centuries away? How many more vast coffers of government largesse shall we shower on these clowns before we realize they’re selling snake oil?¶ Drexler’s answer to all this is, since nobody can disprove the necessary things to develop nanotech, they will be developed. Well, that depends what you mean by the words “can” and “disprove.” It also depends on what your time scale is. I’m willing to bet, at some nebulous point in the future, long after Drexler and I are dead, someone may eventually develop a technology sort of vaguely like what he imagines. At least the parts that don’t totally violate the laws of thermodynamics and materials physics (probably, most of the details do). As an argument, “you can’t disprove my crazy idea” doesn’t hold much water with me. Doubtless there are many denizens of the booby hatch who claim to be Jesus, and I can’t really disprove any of them, but I don’t really see why I should be required to. ¶ I have nothing against there being a few people who want to achieve some of the scientific milestones needed to accomplish “nanotech.” I have a great deal against charlatans who claim that we should actually invest significant resources into this crazy idea. If you’re an investor, and somebody’s prospectus talks about “nano” anything, assuming they’re not selling you a semiconductor fab, you can bet that they are selling you snake oil. There is no nanotech. Stop talking about it. Start laughing at it. As Nobel prize winning chemist Richard Smalley put it to Drexler: “No, you don’t get it. You are still in a pretend world where atoms go where you want because your computer program directs them to go there.”

### ---AT: Nanobots – Long :32

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#### 4---Fat and sticky fingers

Science 2k [Robert F. Service, “Is Nanotechnology Dangerous?” Volume 290, Number 5496, November 24, http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/290/5496/1526)

Richard Smalley, a Nobel Prize-winning chemist at Rice University in Houston, Texas, says that there are several good reasons to believe that nanomachines of the sort imagined by Drexler and company can never be made. "To put it bluntly, I think it's impossible," Smalley says. As he sees it, the idea of little machines that grab atoms and assemble them into desired arrangements suffers from three faults. First, he says, it's wrong to think you can just manipulate an individual atom without handling the ones around it as well. "The essence of chemistry is missing here. Chemistry is not just sticking one atom in one place and then going and grabbing another. Chemistry is the concerted motion of at least 10 atoms." That means to move that one atom where you want it, you'll need 10 nanosized appendages to handle it along with all of its neighbors. Which raises the second problem--what Smalley calls the "fat fingers" problem. A nanometer is just the width of eight oxygen atoms. So even if you're trying to build something hundreds of nanometers in size, "there's just not enough room" in that space to fit those 10 fingers along with everything they are trying to manipulate. Finally, there's the "sticky fingers" problem: Even if you could wedge all those little claspers in there with their atomic cargo, you'd have to get them to release those atoms on command. "My advice is, don't worry about self-replicating nanobots," says Smalley. "It's not real now and will never be in the future."

### ---AT: Superintelligence :05

#### No superintelligence

Edward Moore Geist 8-9-2015; MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Is artificial intelligence really an existential threat to humanity? http://thebulletin.org/artificial-intelligence-really-existential-threat-humanity8577

In the 1950s, the founders of the field of artificial intelligence assumed that the discovery of a few fundamental insights would make machines smarter than people within a few decades. By the 1980s, however, they discovered fundamental limitations that show that there will always be diminishing returns to additional processing power and data. Although these technical hurdles pose no barrier to the creation of human-level AI, they will likely forestall the sudden emergence of an unstoppable “superintelligence.” The risks of self-improving intelligent machines are grossly exaggerated and ought not serve as a distraction from the existential risks we already face, especially given that the limited AI technology we already have is poised to make threats like those posed by nuclear weapons even more pressing than they currently are. Disturbingly, little or no technical progress beyond that demonstrated by self-driving cars is necessary for artificial intelligence to have potentially devastating, cascading economic, strategic, and political effects. While policymakers ought not lose sleep over the technically implausible menace of “superintelligence,” they have every reason to be worried about emerging AI applications such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s submarine-hunting drones, which threaten to upend longstanding geostrategic assumptions in the near future. Unfortunately, Superintelligence offers little insight into how to confront these pressing challenges.

### ---AT: Gamma Weapons :05

#### No gamma weapons

Gottfried 03 – Emeritus Professor of Physics at Cornell (Kott, emeritus professor of physics at Cornell University, “Gamma Ray Weapons? A Premature Speculation,” Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/global\_security/nuclear\_weapons/gamma-ray-weapons-a-premature-speculation.html, )

Interest in an "isomer bomb" has been stimulated by a collaboration led by C.B. Collins of the University of Texas at Dallas, who reported that irradiating samples of Hf\* with X-rays produces a several percent enhancement of gamma ray emission by the isomer.3 This experiment therefore suggested that the isomer could be triggered to release its energy by irradiating it with a much lower-energy beam. Such speculations are premature, however, because another collaboration,4 using the very intense and sophisticated X-ray source at Argonne National Laboratory, has announced that it does not reproduce the phenomenon reported by the Texas group; furthermore, the experiment at Argonne sets limits on the effect more than a thousand times below the magnitudes reported in the Texas papers.5 This does not quite settle the matter, however. There are certain differences between the experiments that might have prevented the experiment at Argonne from detecting the effect reported by the Texas group. On the other hand, the results reported by the Argonne experiment are consistent with well-established knowledge about nuclear structure and processes, whears those from the Texas group are in flagrant disagreement with such knowledge. Until this disagreement is resolved, there is neither cause for alarm or celebration, nor for diverting substantial sums from the U.S. Treasury to programs built around what may well not be a real effect. Even if the Texas result were to be confirmed, putting it to use would require overcoming a series of enormous hurdles, the first being the astronomical cost of fabricating significant amounts of the isomer. In fact, the Institute for Defense Analysis has taken "a hard, in-depth technical look at the [Texas] results," reaches a very skeptical verdict regarding their validity, and paints a deeply pessimistic picture of the prospects for putting the effect to use were it to be real.6

### ---AT: Synthetic Pathogens :10

#### No synthetic pathogens

Eckard **Wimmer 18**. Prof @ Stony Brook University. 2018. “Synthetic Biology, Dual Use Research, and Possibilities for Control.” Defence Against Bioterrorism, Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 7–11. link.springer.com, doi:10.1007/978-94-024-1263-5\_2.

Listed below are some constraints that show how in the US the development of dangerous infectious agents, referred to as “select agents”, is controlled – perhaps misuse even prevented – through technical and administrative hurdles: I. Re-creating an already existing dangerous virus for malicious intent is a complex scientific endeavor. (i) It requires considerable scientific knowledge and experience and, more importantly, considerable financial support. That support usually comes from government and private agencies (NIH, NAF, etc.), organizations that carefully screen at multiple levels all applications for funding of ALL biological research. (ii) It requires an environment suitable for experimenting with dangerous infectious agents (containment facilities). Any work in containment facilities is also carefully regulated. II. Genetic engineering to synthesize or modify organisms relies on chemical synthesis of DNA. Synthesizing DNA is automated and carried out with sophisticated, expensive instruments. The major problem of DNA synthesis, however, is that the product is not error-free. Any single mistake in the sequence of small DNA segments (30–60 nucleotides) or large segments (>500 nucleotides) can ruin the experiment. Companies have developed strategies to produce and deliver error free, synthetic DNA, which investigators can order electronically from vendors, such as Integrated DNA Technologies (US), GenScript (US) or GeneArt (Germany). This offers a superb and easy way to control experimental procedures carried out in any laboratory: the companies will automatically scan ordered sequences in extensive data banks to monitor relationship to sequences of a select agent. If so, the order will be stalled until sufficient evidence has been provided by the investigator that she/he is carrying out experiments approved by the authorities. The entire complex issue of protecting society from the misuse of select agents has been discussed in two outstanding studies [11, 12]. III. Engineering a virus such that it will be more harmful (more contagious, more pathogenic) is generally difficult because, in principle, viruses have evolved to proliferating maximally in their natural environment. That is, genetic manipulations of a virus often lead to loss of fitness that, in turn, is unwanted in the bioterrorist agent.

### ---AT: Aliens :10

#### No aliens

Sandberg et al 18 [Andres Sandberg, Future of Humanity Institute researcher, PhD in computational neuroscience from Stockholm University.] “Dissolving the Fermi Paradox” 6 June 2018 (<https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.02404>) – MZhu

Our argument so far is related to a recent argument sketched by Max Tegmark [34]. Like us, he suggests that we should have great uncertainty about f\_l and f\_i, making us very uncertain about the probability of intelligent life arising around a given star. He thus models our uncertainty over the average distance between two independently arising intelligent civilizations as log-uniform. That is, we should be no more surprised if this average distance were at one order of magnitude rather than another. Thus, when we gain some evidence that there is no other civilization within our galaxy, we update this prior by greatly lowering our credence in the average distance being less than this (≈10^21 m). Since there are only six orders of magnitude from the radius of our galaxy to the radius of the observable universe (≈10^27 m) and infinitely many beyond that, he reaches a conclusion that it is unlikely for two civilizations to arise within the same observable universe. Brian Lacki has suggested an improvement to Tegmark’s model, in which the log-uniform prior is replaced with a bounded log-log-uniform prior [35]. Our argument shares the same broad outline. But rather than starting with a very abstract prior representing initial radical uncertainty over more than 10^100 orders of magnitude, we used two different methods to provide a prior that captured the existing scientific uncertainties of tens or hundreds of orders of magnitude. We have seen how this is more than enough make an empty observable universe plausible ex ante (dissolving the Fermi paradox), and quite likely once we account for the Fermi observation. 5 Updating the factors So far we have looked at how the Fermi observation affects our credence in N. We can go further than this and examine how it affects our credence in each of the Drake parameters. Updating on the Fermi observation reduces the expectation of all the parameters. However, parameters with broad distributions (those with the most uncertainty) tend to have their expectation reduced far more than parameters with tight distributions (see Supplement IV). All the observations we consider have a strong effect on our estimates for f\_l , a substantially weaker effect on our estimates for L, and almost no effect on our estimates of the more certain astrophysical factors. As we can see in Table 2, the observations reduce the median for fl by between a factor of 7 and factor of 10^37, while the median for L is only reduced by a factor between 1 and 2. Given the state of scientific uncertainty about the Drake parameters and the Fermi observation, the default guess should hence be that the low-probability term is likely in the past (fl) rather than the future (fc, L). The Fermi observation thus provides only very weak evidence about whether we will soon go extinct or whether interstellar communication or travel is impossible. Instead, the observation mainly just increases our credence that life is rare. This conclusion is quite robust to changing the log-uncertainties of the factors (it remains as long as most uncertainty is in the past factors) or their distribution shape (using log-normals instead of log-uniform distribution has no effect). The conclusion can be changed if we reduce the uncertainty of past terms to less than just 7 orders of magnitude, or if the f\_c factor turns out to be radically uncertain. 6 Conclusion We have seen that a Fermi paradox arises if we combine a high and extremely confident prior for the number of civilizations in our galaxy with the absence of evidence for their existence. The high confidence that causes this clash typically results from applying a Drake-like model using point estimates for the parameters. These estimates, however, make implicit knowledge claims about processes (especially those connected with the origin of life) which are untenable given the current state of scientific knowledge. When we take account of realistic uncertainty, replacing point estimates by probability distributions that reflect current scientific understanding, we find no reason to be highly confident that the galaxy (or observable universe) contains other civilizations, and thus no longer find our observations in conflict with our prior probabilities. We found qualitatively similar results through two different methods: using the authors’ assessments of current scientific knowledge bearing on key parameters, and using the divergent estimates of these parameters in the astrobiology literature as a proxy for current scientific uncertainty. When we update this prior in light of the Fermi observation, we find a substantial probability that we are alone in our galaxy, and perhaps even in our observable universe (53%–99.6% and 39%–85% respectively). ’Where are they?’ — probably extremely far away, and quite possibly beyond the cosmological horizon and forever unreachable.

### ---AT: Alien War :10

#### No alien war

Sedacca 16 [Matthew Sedacca, science writer for Cosmos, citing Janne Korhonen, interstellar military expert. What Military Theory Tells Us About Future Space Warfare. December 2016. cosmos.nautil.us/short/82/what-military-theory-tells-us-about-future-space-warfare]

Janne Korhonen, an author and economics graduate student at Aalto University in Finland, is one of the world’s handful of interstellar military theorists (yes, these people exist). In 2013 he argued that aliens, even if in possession of vastly superior technologically, are very unlikely to attack us. To begin with, why would they bother? War is typically fought over resources. Almost one century ago, historian John Edwin Bakeless found that 14 of the 20 wars from 1878 to 1918 had economic motivations strongly connected to asserting control of natural resources. The number is even larger when you include wars of colonial conquest, which can be counted as no-contest resource-grabs.

But if aliens are looking for resources, an assault on Earth doesn’t make a whole lot of sense, since the gas giant planets and the asteroid belt offer huge repositories of materials for the taking. Sure, Earth does have the most varied minerals in the solar system because of the action of life and water, but just to get to our solar system would require huge amounts of fuel, making the whole venture rather pointless from a cost-benefit view. Only an alien species that requires our specific minerals (or needs to eat sentient carbon-based organisms) would trouble itself with such a voyage.

Nonetheless, if extraterrestrials did want to pick a fight with us, they would be running a huge risk. Korhonen argued that, unless they were 100-percent sure they could destroy us, they could never be assured of final victory. It is often said that advanced aliens would regard us as mere ants—and anyone who has ants in their house or yard knows they are almost impossible to eradicate. Even a few survivors could quickly multiply to repopulate the planet, while learning from the attacker’s technology and preparing a retaliation. Meanwhile, neighboring civilizations might see the act of aggression and join the battle, if only to protect their own interests. In light of this strategic calculus, aliens would be foolish to invade.

## 1AR – AT: Wipeout

### 1AR – AT: Antinatalism/Benatar

#### Every tenet of their argument is wrong—their abstract moralizing is perverse Bush logic

Janning, 14—Ph. D., Copenhagen Business School (Finn, “True Detective: Pessimism, Buddhism or Philosophy?”, Journal of Philosophy of Life Vol.4, No.4 (December 2014):121-141, dml)

Yet, the antinatalist arguments that Benatar unfolds in Better Never To Have Been are based on moral abstractions. The problem is that he wishes to create a universal method of evaluating life, although it only functions to fulfill his claim that reproduction is never morally acceptable, because coming into existence is always harmful. Instead, one could claim that when Cohle experiences nothing but love at the end of the serial, then at that moment (not before) he knows what he has been doing all along. However, one can never know that from the beginning. Cohle’s experiences do not necessarily follow his claim; he remains open. This contrasts with Benatar’s conclusion that follows his claim: Coming into existence is always a harm; therefore, it is better never to have been.

Furthermore, the absence of pain may be good in some circumstances, e.g., serious illnesses, but not in others, e.g., being forced to think (i.e., change). Also, the absence of pain may be good, but never good in the sense that joy is good. For example, it is good that I did not fall off my bike this morning; however, this is an abstract experience that has nothing to do with the joy of experiencing overcoming an actual bike accident.

The antinatalist approach, although it raises relevant issues of whether reproducing is a human right or not, is a variation of former American president George W. Bush’s moral doctrine. Let me quote some of the former President’s ideas:

Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists … We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists; to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country … Nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack ... The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.31

For President Bush, it was morally right to attack a nation before it might strike you, because it presented a possible danger. Similar, Benatar claims that either one knows that coming into existence is a harm, or one is being naïve. This premise is apparently unquestionable, even though people who suffer from severe illnesses or impairment often believe that their life is still worth living. Benatar believes that the human being per se suffers from the “Pollyanna Principle” that says that people tend to assess the quality of their life as more positive than it really is.32 Furthermore, apparently it is our moral duty not to reproduce, because “815,000 people are thought to have committed suicide in 2000.”33 And the rest of the human populations who refrain from committing suicide do so because they were self-seduced?

Still, claiming that coming into existence is always harmful seems impotent. It neglects the fact that life is dynamic. “Sometimes a man undergoes such changes that I should hardly have said he was the same man,” Spinoza writes.34 Changes happen, especially if there is someone who actually cares. This is not to say that the world is not brutal. It is. Torture, rape, murder, severe illnesses, inequalities between gender, etc., exist. Still, Victor Frankl and Imre Kertesz, to mention two prominent writers, have mentioned that even in one of the worst places, a concentration camp during the Second World War, there were moments of happiness – small gestures where people took care of one another and showed levels of strength that some antinatalists cannot imagine.

The approach that I call philosophical is not a matter of being an optimist or pessimist, but of viewing the world as unchangeable or changeable. A philosopher asks the right questions, the kind of questions that are not part of a quiz show where we already know the right answer to begin with. Rather, the questions that invent new problems by acknowledging that our present is a potential constantly being actualized.

Many pessimists suggest that the human being refers to the existence of a higher and idealized being as a security blanket.35 Such a blanket is problematic. A part of the suffering, though, is due to a too rigid belief in unchangeable certainties that decrease our sensitive and perceptive capacity for being aware, whether one claims that a God exists or that being alive is harmful. This basically goes for all kinds of normative ideals, related to spirituality, beauty, weight, job titles, opinions, etc. Today, we live in what Deleuze calls “control societies” where each one manages his or her life according to the norms and ideals that few are incapable of turning their backs to.

The problem of today’s control society is that too few dare to say “no” – to step out of the dominant ideals and norms related to the prestige of having a title, a career, and social identity, and ask “whose ends these serve.”36 The control society is basically our own fault, because only a small number of people leave the scene of rigid performance evaluation. However, both detectives in True Detective get out. Cohle leaves his work as a detective in 2002, and Hart does so some years later. Afterwards, Cohle vanishes. A Buddhist may call it a retreat; a pessimist may call it just another delusion. Nevertheless, he is silent.

Cohle transforms during his absence. He becomes more compassionate. “We left something undone. We gotta fix it,” he tells Hart.37 Thus, Cohle shows compassion, not for a God, but for life. He is concerned. Even after they have caught the killer, Cohle is suffering. “What’s your problem?” asks his partner Hart, whereupon Cohle answers, “Not a care in the world.”

The mystery, therefore, is why there is so little compassion. However, neither the kind of strategic compassion that is controlled by divine laws, nor the pseudo care that basically neglects how the human nature is inventive. It invests in the future by repeating what facilitate future innovations. Rather, the kind of compassion that cares about life and the life to come. It is an action-concept, a power to affirm what is coming into being.

#### Their theory is bunk.

Smuts, 14—Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Temple University (Aaron, “To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice August 2014, Volume 17, Issue 4, pp 711-729, dml)

As a further line of defense, one might object that the asymmetry does indeed suggest that we should zero out the pleasure in quadrant 2 and just compare the boxes in the top row—the pain and the absence of pain. This would indeed get Benatar an anti-natalist result, but the asymmetry does not support such a move. At times Benatar seems to suggest that the asymmetry has this implication. He claims that existence is not a "real advantage."33 Here he seems to be stating the conclusion of his argument in different terms that imply more than he has earned. (Benatar thinks that a "real advantage" is an advantage that it would be bad to lack. But I see no reason to adopt this terminology. There are real advantages that it would just be less good to lack. The problem is that antinatalism does not follow from the asymmetry alone. Benatar also requires this dubious notion of what constitutes an advantage. I will return to this point shortly.) What is important to recognize is that the analogy does not give us reason to think that the goods of existence do not count towards the value of the life for the person. No plausible asymmetry could do that. The asymmetry does not imply that pleasure is not better than no pleasure. Again, no plausible asymmetry could do that.

Here is what the asymmetry does imply: The asymmetry holds that that the absence of good is bad for the existent, but not for the non-existent. This does not imply that goods of life are not good for the living. It would be absurd to suggest otherwise. The asymmetry holds that the absence of the goods of life is not bad for the non-existent in the way that it would be bad for someone who exists to be deprived. But this does not get us what Benatar needs. He needs it to be the case that the goods could never outweigh the bads. However, the asymmetry does not get you this. How could it? If Benatar thinks it does, he is mistaken. The goods of life can outweigh the bads. Accordingly, the goods of life can be greater than the good that is the absence of bad for the non-existent.

Here is another way to think about the problem: The absence of pleasure might not be bad for the non-existent. Sure. This is what the asymmetry says. But this does not mean that the presence of pleasure is not good for the existent. Of course the goods of life are good. Benatar argues that "for the good to be an advantage over non-existence, it would have to have been the case that its absence were bad."34 But this is simply not so. Benatar is wrong. A good can be better than something that is not bad. Lots of a good is better than just a little. And a little good is better than no good at all. This mistake leads Benatar to incorrectly conclude that the asymmetry has larger implications than it actually does. It leads to the misleading talk of "real advantages."

#### Inevitability doesn’t matter.

Smuts, 14—Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Temple University (Aaron, “To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice August 2014, Volume 17, Issue 4, pp 711-729, dml)

Benatar, Taylor, and Russell give us good reason to think that the meaning of life cannot come from enduring accomplishments, since nothing we do will endure for long at all. But this does not give us any reason to think that all projects are of equal worth. Why would it? The argument contains a false premise. There is no reason to think that the value of an activity is entirely determined by its ultimate outcome. Certainly there is value in making someone laugh, even if they do not laugh forever. Surely there is value in providing a hot meal for the hungry, even if they are not satiated for all eternity. And surely it is good to cure cancer, even if humanity does not endure until the end of time. Something need not be permanent in order to be valuable while it exists. As Paul Edwards notes, to think otherwise is to exhibit an irrational, arbitrary preference for the distant future.75 If we recognize that there is value in doing good, certainly we should think that this enhances the meaning of one's life. Hence, I see no reason to accept Benatar's claim that human lives are meaningless from the perspective of the universe.

Moving step back further in the argument, I think that we have good reason to doubt Benatar's claim that the OLT optimist must adopt the perspective of humanity. His example is that of a tragic death at a relatively early age. Perhaps this is best described as a misfortune. It might be that we evaluate some kinds of misfortunes via such comparisons. We do not think it a misfortune that we cannot fly through the air or leap tall buildings in a single bound.76 But this does not show that according to an OLT assessment, a life of only 40 years is not worth living. Isn't that what we are concerned with? If so, we stick to the subject. Would a life of a mere 40 years be worth starting? If such a life is filled with objective goods, it sure seems to be a LWL. Benatar gives no reason to think otherwise.

About our cognitive capacities, he argues that they make our lives richer than those of primates, but "we must concede that it would still be better if we were better equipped cognitively."77 But what is this concession supposed to imply? It does not imply that our lives are bad. It does not give us reason to think that our lives are not worth living. No, it merely tells us what we already know: things could be better. We could be smarter. We could live richer lives. Indeed. But this does not provide any support for pessimism.

Benatar argues that from the perspective of the universe "the quality of human life is [. . .] found wanting." This statement is ambiguous. By "wanting" he might mean "could be better." Alternatively, he might mean "bad," or "not good."78 Surely, compared with the lives of gods, human life could be better.79 There is no denying that. But this does not mean that human life is bad. If happiness is good, it is good. If helping others is good, it is good. If making something of beauty is good, it is good. If falling in love is good, it is good. Who cares if we can conceive of an even greater state of happiness, better forms of care, more fantastically beautiful creations, or richer forms of love? The fact that things could be better does not make them bad. This is not a case of seeing the glass half empty, but of calling a half full glass completely empty. That is wrong, not just pessimistic. To be worth living a life need not be the best conceivable life. No, it merely needs to be better than never to have been.

Once again Benatar fails to see that the opposite of better is not always bad; sometimes it is just less good. This mistake is fatal to his argument against OLT optimism, just as it undermines the asymmetry argument.

### 1AR – AT: Ligotti

#### Pleasure does exist----Life is worth living---the very ability to reflect on consciousness proves.

James TRAFFORD 15. Senior Lecturer in Contextual Studies, School of Communication Design at UCA. “The Philosophy of Thomas Ligotti: True Detective & The Thoughts of an Obscure Literary Master.” *The Critique*. July 15. <http://www.thecritique.com/articles/the-philosophy-of-thomas-ligotti/>.

To discuss Ligotti’s “philosophy” at all, however, is a fractured foundation that gives way under pressure of systematization. Primarily, Ligotti’s work is a form of weird fiction in the lineage of Edgar Allen Poe, H. P. Lovecraft, and Robert W. Chambers. His non-fiction work, The Conspiracy Against the Human Race (2010), is a kind of philosophical tract on the horror of the “real” and the dread that comes, hand-in-hand, with our self-reflection. But this, too, lends itself more to an oneiric, and labyrinthine, treatment than it does academic scrutiny. Ligotti’s work not only gets under the skin, but it infects the entire atmosphere of existence; a challenge to which True Detective attempts to rise. Here, I trace some of the lines of connection between True Detective and Ligotti’s work, with particular attention to the unhinging of “real” from its appearances, and of thought from its grounds in nature.¶ At its best, True Detective follows closely the track well-trodden by H. P. Lovecraft: the universe itself is rendered alien, but in the most familiar of ways. A well-woven detective story, a splash of occultism, a detective with alcohol issues, a dénouement, and, latterly, a transformative experience. This much fits the tropes for a standard HBO output. But, it is precisely this well-worn familiarity that is capable of uprooting our sensibilities as the tentacular weirdness of True Detective takes up residence almost immediately inside the nervous system. Think, for example, of the jarringly quotidian presence of the “Big Hug Mug” that Rust uses as an ashtray.¶ Importantly, for Ligotti, this “alienating” wedge between our ordinary experience and its “reality” is neither a matter of reductionism (that experience is explicable by means of an underlying reality), nor eliminativism of the “real” (that experience should be replaced by concepts drawn from our understanding of an underlying reality). Rather, the relationship between the structure of experience and the “real” is enmeshed in Ligotti’s work. There, what we have is not any kind of replacement of that which is experienced as “real”; ‘but a sort of turning the real world inside out to show that it was unreal all along’ [1]. Primarily, this is achieved by an upturning of the notion of the non-objectivity of subjectivity. In this sense, Ligotti closely follows Thomas Metzinger’s work on the science of consciousness, wherein; ‘the conscious self is an illusion which is no-one’s illusion’ [2]. For Metzinger, humans are not “selves”, rather they are simply organisms that possess “self-models” that are not recognizable as such (internally to the system). That is to say, we are merely information systems where: ‘the phenomenal self is not a thing, but a process – and the subjective experience of being someone emerges if a conscious information processing system operates under a transparent self-model’ [3].¶ This is the “trap” of existence according to Ligotti, which allows for a novel reading of Plato’s cave in which the cave itself is the organism, and the wall the phenomenal projection of the self-model: ‘the cave in which we live our conscious life is formed by our global, phenomenal model of reality’ [4]. The shadows that play on the walls of the cave are low-dimensional renderings of the world, filtered through the specific dynamics of information that is actually presented to the self-model. Consciousness is simply the ‘puppet shadow [that] dances on the wall of the neurophenomenological caveman’s phenomenal state space […] The cave shadow is there. The cave itself is empty’ [5].¶ According to Metzinger, all of this is, practically speaking, incommensurable with the register of human perception. To experience ourselves as self-models, or to experience whatever is “beyond” the self-model (whatever that may mean) is just not the sort of thing that is within the domain of human capacity. Indeed, as may be well exemplified in Rust, even acknowledging that this is the case ‘may be damaging to our mental well-being’ [6]. Yet, as in much of Ligotti’s fiction, Rust seems to hover on the brink of this experience – one foot in and out – at once he is restricted by his “programming”, and yet he is also capable of sensing the “psychosphere”. The latter is akin to Ligotti’s notion of the “fictional diversion”. This is a Borgesian fiction within a fiction, but also one which structures our experience of the world into something that is comforting, homely; something liveable (otherwise, as Rust’s partner, Marty Hart puts it, ‘why get out of bed in the morning?’).¶ Throughout the series, the occult overtones, as well as the stereotypical problematics of transgression (such as Hart’s familial breakdown and resurrection, followed by his problems with his daughter’s pretty conventional teenage “rebellion”), rather than puncture this diversion, serve only to shore it up. It is precisely these graspable forms of contravention of the ordinary state of affairs that render the “normal” normal in a kind of structural reassurance. These, perhaps, are just part and parcel of the warding off of the horror of ungrounding the psychosphere itself. Metzinger, pre-echoing Rust’s monologue in the first episode, and reminiscent of Spinoza has it that: ‘conscious subjectivity is the case in which a single organism has learned to enslave itself’ [7]. As Rust has it: “I have seen the finale of thousands of lives, man. Young, old, each one so sure of their realness. You know that their sensory experience constituted a unique individual with purpose and meaning. So certain that they were more than biological puppet. The truth wills out, and everybody sees. Once the strings are cut, all fall down.”¶ The source of horror, rather, is, in Ligotti’s account, an uprooting of the foundations of the world: ‘But is there really a strange world? Of course. Are there, then, two worlds? Not at all. There is only our own world and it alone is alien to us’ [8]. Neither the universe, nor consciousness, are under theological or natural jurisdiction. According to Rust, consciousness is a kind of natural error, in which nature produces conscious entities as capable of some form of self-understanding. This much seems in accord with Metzinger. Ligotti’s own metaphysics is less naturalistic, and more in accord with Rust’s pessimism. But in both, we are led to a form of fatalism, in which the uncovering of the “natural” order is, nonetheless, an insuperable nexus to which we are forever bound: there is no escape. In many ways, then, Rust is a puppet of Ligotti’s own structured meaninglessness: a meaninglessness that is constituted by the fissure between nature and nature’s own construction of a consciousness that is capable of reflecting upon its own foundations: ‘the horror and nothingness of human existence – the cosy facade behind which was only a spinning abyss’ [9].¶ The realization that the structure of thinking is neither intrinsically meaningful, nor tied down by God, Nature, or whatever else, is precisely the condition of thought’s release from those strictures. Ironically, though, Ligotti ends up accepting the strictures even in the moment that they are made visible, and it is this acceptance that also brings with it a fatalistic anti-natalism in which: ‘[o]ur self-removal from this planet would still be magnificent move, a feat so luminous it would bedim the sun. What do we have to lose?’ [10]. This rears its head in True Detective most obviously in Rust’s eulogizing his daughter’s being “spared” the misery of existence in the ridiculously stereotypical notion of a pain-free, happy, and innocent childhood. In fact, a kind of fatalism runs throughout the series, though, arguably, these woven moments of “pre-destiny” are perhaps the weakest elements of the universe of True Detective. For example, the movement of consciousness’ birth into the pain of “meat”-existence is shot through the eerily microcosmic placement of Marty’s daughter Audrey’s dolls into a supposedly shocking sexual act reflecting that of the cult, and her “aberrant” drawings, both of which are treated as augury of both past and future. Further still, it is not by chance that these moments are typically figured through the women in the show, who (at times) are little more than plot-devices, whose trauma is only ever in service of the structure of the narrative moving, inexorably, to its ends.¶ In this sense, the arena of “meaningfulness”, along with the psychosphere, looks like a kind of immovable feast. This is a kind of totality of the signifying structures of lived experience, the lebenswelt, which is made to seem as though it is rooted in a transparent relation with the world [11]. Alienation, in the vein that we are offered in True Detective, offers an uprooting of experience from the constraints of human phenomenality, which nonetheless, leaves the Urdoxa exactly as they were. For all the attempt to remove religious mysticism, this is where we end up – either you can see it or you can’t – and if you can see it, then all that you once cherished is deemed meaningless and hence eliminable from the status of the “real”. The “real” that lies beneath now replaces that naïve realism in apophatic manoeuvres, and, for all that, we ought simply accelerate our own demise. This is a kind of negation of that which is (or seems to be), to reveal that which is not (which is all there ever really was). For example, in the end, Rust’s rationalisation under socio-evolutionary rubric, serves to shore up exactly the kind of justification of Marty’s affair with Lisa that Maggie, and all too many Hollywood wives, have heard too many times before.¶ Nevertheless, it is a structural principle of True Detective that thought itself is alien: that there is nothing natural about thinking. What is alien about thinking is that it brings with it paradox: ‘In the literature of supernatural horror, a familiar storyline is that of a character who encounters a paradox in the flesh, so to speak, and must face down or collapse in horror before this ontological perversion – something which should not be, yet is’ [12]. Paradox points to the limits of what can be thought such that it is the injunction of thought to precisely think those limits, and also to transcend them in the same movement. As Hegel put it: ‘Great stress is laid on the limitations of thought, of reason, and so on, and it is asserted that the limitation cannot be transcended. To make such an assertion is to be unaware that the very fact that something is determined as a limitation implies that the limitation is already transcended.’¶ It is arguable that our ordinary (and philosophical) reaction to such paradoxes is one of prophylatic recoil at that which is ‘inconceivable’, and yet is also a creation of the system in which it is conceived. The paradoxes that arise at each attempt to totalize thought provide us with content that potentially devastates the notion of a totality of meaningfulness. For example, the antinomies, according to Kant, provide reason to think that that which may be supposed to be an external referent will reside under irresolvable dispute (this is linked to totalities such as the cosmos), and as such, these cannot possibly be legitimate objects of enquiry. In this respect, it is interesting to consider human doxastic conservatism. The experimental psychology of human reasoning suggests that humans have a fundamental bias in ‘the tendency to automatically bring prior knowledge to bear when solving problems’. In the literature around this, it is often suggested that most reasoning revolves around what is called ‘representative heuristics’ judgment, which results in a fundamental ‘belief bias’ across human reasoning. So, it looks like humans have a tendency towards doxastic conservatism, in that we routinely seek to confirm our existent beliefs [13]. We might conjecture that the appearance of the “totality” of meaningfulness is a by-product of both our cognitive machinery and our inherent doxastic conservativeness: we search for what we anticipate, and see what we anticipate even where it does not appear.¶ But, self-consciousness, if that is what we call the reflexive movement of thought’s own self-reflection, may instead be reconsidered in relation to its ability to both buckle and stimulate the materiality of sensation, the structure of doxa, and the unreasonable requirements of rationality. It is precisely this movement that is concomitant with a force of thought that is capable of escaping its own structures. That is to say, this thought of the unthinkable that is made possible in thought’s reflection upon itself is already a process of exteriorization of thinking. Then, it may be possible to conjoin the undermining of transparent meaning, with the renegotiation of those conditions according to the materiality underpinning experience, and the rational processes through which it is understood. This would promise instead a project of transformation and potential emancipation.¶ If we take this seriously, then what Ligotti’s work brings with it is neither an uprooting that institutes a sublime state of nature, nor a ‘mere pathologisation’, a negative result. Rather, there is a catastrophe from the ‘inside’ of a structure, acting upon a limited, contingent, space of meaning, which uproots the structure itself. Ligotti’s work, as well as True Detective, does not see this kind of uprooting, rather it swallows the notion of “limitation” on the totality of meaning, and allows only for its formal negation. Nonetheless, it is also clear that the breach of the unthinkable is made psychologically tractable there, as the dissolution of the contingent totality. It is precisely this ability of thought to reflect upon its own conditions that ensures that it is not merely trapped by programming, but rather is capable of re-programming those conditions beyond mere constraints. This, transformative gesture, is perhaps already to be found in Ligotti’s work: ‘the integrity of material forms is only a prejudice, at most a point of view […] things are not bolted down, so to speak. And no more is that thing which we call the mind’ [14]. This would be to construct the force of thought as that which explores unforeseeable dimensions of life, meaning and truth. But otherwise: “Who told you, you had to understand? Why would you?” (Audrey, Marty’s daughter).

#### Ligotti’s theory of consciousness is scientifically non-verifiable -- even if it’s a delusion you should let individuals make their own value -- he says people should stop procreating, not that everyone should unwillingly be vaporized

Bell 12. Brandon H. Writer of weird fiction and co-editor of The Aether Age, a periodical of liberate literature. “This Inscurtable Light: A Response to Thomas Ligotti’s ‘The Conspiracy Against the Human Race.’” The Lovecraft Zine. <http://tinyurl.com/nk5ugoj>.

Ligotti’s Assertions

-- Consciousness is an existential liability, and the source of all horror and suffering, due to the awareness of sickness, suffering, and death.

-- Life, the Universe, and everything is MALIGNANTLY USELESS. All caps on that one, every time.

-- Through various tactics, we are actors in the biological conspiracy against ourselves, compelling us to believe that life is worth living.

-- We are not real. Consciousness fools us into believing that we are real instead of a puppet of our biology. We are akin to supernaturally animate puppets, who believe themselves real.

-- Life is not worth living.

-- Because existence is composed of suffering (mostly) procreation may rightly be deemed an act of violence against the unborn.

-- And, all this in mind, the human race should stop procreating, at least, or perhaps engage in a species-wide suicide.

These points are paraphrased, but present the essence of Ligotti’s assertions.

Both Ligotti and the author of the foreword, Ray Brassier, make short order of the most obvious objection to Ligotti, that the mere act of writing is a life-affirming action in contradiction to his stated position. Essentially, Ligotti is mired in the same condition and, thus functioning, cannot be faulted for maneuvering that condition with whatever coping mechanisms at his disposal, especially if they shed light on our predicament.

Fair enough, but this is where the crack in his doctrine begins.

Jesus loves me?

“The modern hero, the modern individual who dares to heed the call and seek the mansion of that presence with whom it is our whole destiny to beatoned, cannot, indeed must not, wait for his community to cast off itsslough of pride, fear, rationalized avarice, and sanctified misunderstanding. “Live,” Nietzsche says, “as though the day were here.” It is not society that is to guide and save the creative hero, but preciselythe reverse. And so every one of us shares the supreme ordeal—carriesthe cross of the redeemer—not in the bright moments of his tribe’s greatvictories, but in the silences of his personal despair.” —Joseph Campbell

Ligotti presents the writing of Richard Double, Thomas Metzinger, and other cognitive psychologists, philosophers, and neuroscientists to make the argument that we are acting out “the tragedy of the ego” as mechanistic simulations of personhood.

In an aside of sorts, we are told in TCATHR that no one can really, fully be a determinist and remain sane. It is a constant hedging that grows tiresome.

I don’t have the time, space, or expertise to adequately cover the state of the art in cognitive theory. Peter Watts gives a great treatment of these ideas in his first-contact novel, Blindsight, and mentions Metzinger’s Being No One as the toughest book he’s ever read. In his Blindsight notes, Watts briefly and in lively fashion describes Metzinger’s hypothesis about the subjective sense of self and why ego would emerge in cognitive systems like us homosapiens. Watts suggests it would be easier to list those who haven’t tried to explain consciousness, and mentions theories from diffuse electrical fields, quantum puppet shows, and a range of conjectured physical locations of consciousness in the brain.

The question to Watts is: What good is consciousness? He provides examples where consciousness is effectively kept out of the decision process because it just isn’t as good at it (think of that drive home you can barely remember, and you have an example of this from everyday life.) Aesthetics might be an exception, an area where self-awareness is needed. Interesting, given Ligotti’s own sense that aesthetics represent a valid domain. But the cost of sentience? It may ultimately be that of extinction because aesthetics entails the ability to gain unearned rewards. Negative feedback loop.

It is, to my mind, a reductionist take on our situation as sentient beings, but when posed as a question of evolutionary adaptiveness, over Ligotti’s “Is life worth living?”/EVERYTHING IS MALIGNANTLY USELESS conceptual dyad, it is a more anchored and useful meditation on the subject. This idea of sentience as evolutionary liability is not new to readers of fantastic fiction (the Shaper-Mechanist stories from Bruce Sterling spring to mind, among others) and I suspect we’ll see more populist explorations of these ideas to come.

Ligotti cites valid sources. The function of consciousness is a valid talking point. To be clear: I don’t suggest a denial of the truths Metzinger and others like him discover. That consciousness is an emergent system, as opposed to a pit at the center of our individual avocados, is very likely true. Metzinger suggests a naive realism is our nature, but also says that we “can wake up from our biological history.”

Whatever our nature as sentient beings, cogito ergo sum. Furthermore, Ligotti never suggests the ultimate hell of being, that of solipsism. And he bases his affront at existence on the endless suffering of sentient beings.

The suffering is real. The sufferers are not.

This is meaningless.

Whatever systems give rise to these sufferers, within that system they are functionally real. We are real. Or, we are no more or less real than anything else. I invoke the law of the excluded middle. One could still say: the suffering is not real, and neither are we. I don’t agree, but it would at least be a logical position. It would make meaningless a statement like EVERYTHING IS MALIGNANTLY USELESS. Since we all, including Ligotti, believe in the reality of the suffering, then let us acknowledge this fallacy in the position that we are fake but our suffering is real.

What about warrantability? Most of what we regard as warranted is little more than things that we believe, like ‘Jesus loves me’ or EVERYTHING IS MALIGNANTLY USELESS. We can believe these things, but they are hard to prove, which relates back to our positions on revealed truth. I find a similar failure when talking about correspondence tests for the truth. The faithful Christian will say “Of course Jesus loves me,” and Ligotti will say EVERYTHING IS MALIGNANTLY USELESS. Both speak with equal conviction, and with assurances to their cogency. And both views (and many others besides) would pass a coherence test, even though they are diametrically opposed views and thus they cannot both be true. Warrants, correspondence, and coherence tests don’t help us much in this dialog.

When faced with a truth test based on pragmatism, though, the Ligotti position does not fare well. We could cite various pursuits that a reasonable person would deem worthwhile, and even Ligotti would agree that creative works appealing to a sense of aesthetics have validity and worth, and on this basis we can say that living as though today were the day, as Nietzsche said—as though we have work to do and a purpose to fill—carries with it a pragmatism that Ligotti’s pessimism lacks.

In Search of…

Any of the Truth positions could take a pessimistic, ambivalent, or optimistic mode. Ligotti’s is a pessimistic Position One (no revealed Truth.) For many readers, the conversation ended with the list of his assertions. These ideas are idiotic and wrong at a glance. This stance is particularly bolstered by a Position Two on the Truth question (there is a Revealed Truth.) These folks are often followers of a religious tradition, fundamentalist in their interpretation, though other backgrounds are conceivable. The defining characteristic of this mode is belief that one has access to Truth as revealed by an ultimate Source or Ground of Being. Typically this is God, Allah, Brahma, though nontheists like some of the more strident Nichiren Buddhist and more dualistic eastern traditions could fall under this mode.

These folks have found the Truth. They have the answers to the questions of the universe, provided them via a holy text or texts of divine origin. Perhaps some have living prophets who speak on behalf of the Absolute. Such a position, Ligotti notes, reflects the multifarious nature of Truth despite our tendency to believe Truth a monolithic thing. I don’t believe a revealed Truth exists, or at least it has not yet been revealed. But for the person who does, all this talk adds up to so much belly gazing and liberal pessimism.

And yet, Ligotti’s book was a finalist for the 2010 Bram Stoker awards, signifying that at least some significant portion of the community aware of nonfiction works related to the horror genre, considered this book among the most important of the year. Ligotti’s oeuvre to date suggests his place among writers like Lovecraft, Poe, and Beckett is assured. Ligotti has called us all on our ensnarement in a world of becoming and unbridled desire. Ligotti is, on these points, absolutely correct. If you have a Revealed Truth, then lucky you. You can toss aside this dour read and pursue some other pastime.

Position Three on Truth says there is a Truth, but it has not been revealed. Functionally no different than Position One, but for one odd quirk a human being is capable. Faith. This is the faith of the Gnostic perhaps, the liberal Christian, Jew, or Muslim. It is the faith of the theist who claims no specific religious ties. This person of faith acknowledges the human origin of the given holy book (thus no revelation) but uses it nonetheless as a guide for living. She has faith, while knowing there is no way to know or to prove the object of worship is real or True. Some might say that it is the act of faith that matters.

This is, in my estimation, the most defensible western religious mode, when applied to one’s self and one’s life. When coupled with an evangelical zeal, it morphs into the most grating. Those folks think they’ve found the Truth, and think you should find the same. Because there really is no revealed Truth (unlike Ligotti, I will cry foul on the idea of unending relativism [which I understand is contradictory on the surface as I declare ‘there is no Revealed Truth,’ but bear with me…]) all traditional religious people fall into the type three position. Some of them just don’t know it.

Finally Position Four suggests there is a Truth, but it is revealed through experience. Here is the Buddhist path, where belief is only ever a raft to cross a river or stream, but not the destination. Truth is ephemeral, subjective, and given more to heuristics than commandments. Truth is not easy. But along that path lies the solution to suffering and its causes.

Carl Sagan’s might be a good example of an optimistic Position One. No revealed Truth, and yet his perception of the universe, its beauty, served him.

Ligotti says of Truth:

“Renowned for stating his convictions in the form of a paradox, asabove, Chesterton, along with anyone who has something positive to sayabout the human race, comes out on top in the crusade for truth. (Thereis nothing paradoxical about that.) Therefore, should your truth runcounter to that of individuals who devise or applaud paradoxes that stiffup the status quo, you would be well advised to take your arguments, tearthem up, and throw them in someone else’s garbage.”

Ligotti here refers to the tendency of human optimists, in this case a Christian apologist, to treat logic as secondary, irrelevant, or as a liability, and once Truth is reached via paradox, metaphor, faith, intuition, or a myriad other contrivances, the conversation is at a close. Through inference, Ligotti may also suggest that logic followed without sentimentalism or irrational thought-structures would lead one to a pessimistic conclusion. Ligotti, while claiming a Pessimistic Position One (no Revealed Truth) in fact exposes himself as a Position Four seeker (Truth exists but is not Revealed except through experience) who has lapsed in the face of Revelation into a Position Two believer (Revealed Truth exists.)

I think he said ‘yo mama.’

“The unconscious is always the fly in the ointment, the skeleton on thecupboard of perfection, the painful lie given all idealisticpronouncements, the earthliness that clings to our human nature andsadly clouds the crystal clarity we long for. In the alchemical view, rust,like verdigris, is the metal’s sickness. But at the same time this leprosy isthe vera prima materia, the basis for the preparation of thephilosophical gold.” —Carl Jung, Dreams

We divided up our positions in our conversation with Ligotti based on the question: “Is there a Revealed Truth?” It would have been obvious to readers of TCATHR to instead ask, “Is life worth living?” and to general seekers after Truth (at least in the West), “Does God exist?” and perhaps secondarily, “Does He [sic] love us?”

Critically examined, our four categories have a problem, don’t they?

There is no Revealed Truth. Fair enough.

There is a Revealed Truth. Also fair.

There is a Truth but it is not Revealed. Ligotti won’t be the only one to roll his eyes. Basically here stands Chesterton and his derision of logic. Here is the faith that Christians speak of (the honest ones, at least.) We are prevaricating, our language lacks precision, our thoughts are not cogent. I suggest the stance is different enough from the certainties of the first two positions to warrant consideration. Even though so many who advocate for the position, as they become ‘stronger in their faith’ grow to believe that along with their faith, hope, and charity, they also received the Bat Phone.

Last there is Truth, but it is not Revealed and found only through practice. The objection is: if the Truth exists, at some point it is found. And thus we have our Revealed Truth and no need for a separate category. I suggest a different understanding of what Truth means gives rise to validity. This understanding of truth is purely experiential. The path may be defined but not the experience. The map written, but the journey must be undertaken by each who would have understanding. And that understanding is only ever provisional, incomplete, and never quite the encompassing Truth with a capital T that the first two positions deny or proclaim.

Ligotti never comes right out an states as much, but from his criticism of Chesterton’s flippancy toward logic, it is fair to infer that Ligotti views himself as a champion of logic in the question of ‘Is life worth living?’ Using logical deduction, studying the work of others who seem to see what he also perceives, and applying the true-state experience of the depressed mind, Ligotti has followed a path leading to Revelation. Ligotti holds the Truth of the entire universe. He has dropped anchor, as all believers are wont, and after some consideration as to its merits, chosen to share with the world the Truth that he has found.

Now read that last paragraph over again with this understanding: not sarcastic in tone and written by a man that is no believer in any theological dogma; who is, in fact, an atheist.

I no more agree with Chesterton than I do with Ligotti but I will give Chesterton this much more credit over Ligotti: though he may be the sort that evangelises a doctrine he surmises to be True (something I have nothing but contempt for) on the face of it he at least realizes that logic cannot justify his position. Ligotti contrariwise would have us believe that he exposes the meat grinder Truth. There is no path ahead, there is no uncertainty, and there is no room for disagreement with this John the Baptist of Pessimism. One cannot argue or disagree with Ligotti’s position without essentially proving his premise, that we are unwitting automata working against our own best interest—aka our annihilation.

Because, recall, Ligotti believes himself to be a wooden puppet, come to life: a ‘not real’ thing, realizing itself in the stage of horror that is consciousness. As a Buddhist, I don’t believe in an immortal soul. According to the doctrine of Dependant Origination, which in its most basic form states ‘because of this, that’, we are aggregate things, us sentient beings. From all the non-human components the universe brings to bear, humans are formed, consciousness included. Buddhism allows for a clear understanding of the suffering and its causes that Ligotti perceives and uses as the basis for his doctrine of hopelessness. But Ligotti, like many Christian critics of Buddhism (strange bedfellows, indeed!), stops short of a full and honest account of the picture this philosophy of the mind (that sometimes plays at being a religion) offers.

I don’t want to ‘go all Buddhist on ya’ and in particular I intend this to remain foremost a humanist document. Nonetheless, Ligotti singles out Buddhism, and in this point only will I follow suit. Buddhism is based on suffering and its causes, but does not stop there. The last two of the Four Noble Truths are: The cessation of suffering and the causes of that cessation. In other words, this doctrine does not try to paint a happy face on the disatisfatoriness of the world, but offers a prognosis and a prescription that suggests while life may have no cure, there is a treatment.

With that I’ll return to my humanist-orientation by offering a counter to his living puppet analogy. Instead of the stark uncanny-valley puppet-on-its-strings, lurching about an empty stage, screaming a silent scream, one presumes, I suggest human beings—perhaps any sentience that arises in the universe—are more akin to that other genre trope of emergent intelligence: the AI, born; the life that arises out of software and wires and a billions connections. Such an intelligence might pursue any sort of existence it chooses; it might find the universe a place of wonder or horror. It could posit for itself any role.

And, thus, humanity.

Can you see the real me?

“‘One must go further, one must go further.’ This need to go on is ofancient standing. Heraclitus the ‘obscure’ who reposited his thoughts inhis writings in the Temple of Diana (for his thoughts had been hisarmour in life, which he therefore hung up in the temple of the goddess),the obscure Heraclitus had said ‘one can never walk through the sameriver twice.’ The obscure Heraclitus had a disciple who didn’t remainstanding there but went further and added, ‘One cannot do it even once.’ Poor Heraclitus to have such a disciple! This improvement changed theHeraclitian principle into an Eleatic doctrine denying movement, andyet all that disciple wanted was to be a disciple of Heraclitus who wentfurther, not back to what Heraclitus had abandoned.” —Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling

One must ask of Ligotti, “what does real mean?”

How is it that these imaginary or fake things that we are experience real suffering? Would we be real if there was some pith at our center that did not end? Is it this lack of god-stuff that makes us irreal? Ligotti mourns for a Ground of Being that is not there. A Shore that might stand strong against the tides of time, and in a deficit of such, he cries out in an empty universe, this wooden puppet that has realized itself for what it is, in anger, grief, horror.

If we start from the assumption that there is no god-stuff, nothing more or less eternal than anything else, our perspective shifts. My pain is an affliction of my own attachment to that which I never could hold or own. Why did I ever believe otherwise? Maybe I needed that belief, because I am a small and frail thing and there is so much I do not understand.

“In a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels analien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of thememory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land. This divorcebetween man and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly thefeeling of absurdity.” —Albert Camus, An Absurd Reasoning: Absurdity and Suicide

And there, lost, alone, hopeless, we may remain. Or we could proclaim some revelation of Truth, and hope to convince ourselves of its veracity. Or we could take the next step into an emptiness neither nihilistic nor revelatory. The emptiness of our own nature.

“What did I learn from my teacher? Nothing! He took everything awayfrom me. When I became attached to what he was saying, he took it awayfrom me. By meeting him I had taken everything away from me….. Hecrushed and crushed and completely crushed me…. He never let one hangon to anything. And that was his theory of teaching Buddhism…. After hedied, people called me a heretic, but I am not good enough to have aheresy, because I have nothing. There is no Pure Land or Zen orBuddhism or philosophy. Nothing to hang on to. Nothing controls me. Iwas raised as a real, free man. And I am deeply grateful….” —Haya Akegarasu, Shout of Buddha

Go Further

It would be easy, to get stuck with Ligotti, his book like some modern day surrogate to Heraclitus’ disciple.

The fault of Ligotti’s argument is the fault of every argument that posits to depict the end of all questions, to portray the Truth, of a whole and defined cloth. Because it requires one to stop questioning and accept. And though Ligotti will deny such an interpretation, he has, just like those religious folks who believe you are going to hell if you don’t join them, come up with a bullet-proof rationale for why we might object and by doing so prove our participation in his conspiracy. It’s all a little too neat

In the final analysis, I find myself, despite myself, giving a favorable review to the position of Faith, and have quoted Keirkegaard not once but twice in this treatment. As soon as Faith (aka Truth exists but is not Revealed) morphs into doctrinal or dogmatic certainty (aka Revealed Truth exists), as is the case with most modern religious movements, it becomes a liability to the seeker.

Ascendant over all the positions on the revealed truth question is Position Four: Truth exists but is revealed only through experience, with the caveat being the experiential and subjective nature of that truth. When, as with Ligotti, our search leads us to a Revealed Truth that kills inquiry and offers some final summation of existence, the Truth exposes itself as tarnished, rusted, a forgery.

What Ligotti offers us is a deep look into suffering and its reality. Don’t stop, as Ligotti advocates. Mine is not a suggestion for Buddhism or any particular path, other than endless inquiry and curiosity. Although I did want to note that Science fits the bill as a valid position four (Truth exists but may be revealed only via experience.) How cool is that?

These ideas and considerations are not in the realm of philosophers, scientists, writers, poets, monks, priests, and outside of the realm of the every day person. In the end, only each individual may decide what the ultimate Truth of the universe might be. I choose to believe in a path forward that is rational, and in which I might never cease to find wonder in the present moment, and to find strength to stand against the suffering that will come, and to remember that once I gave you, Dear Reader, a wink and said…

Who ya gonna trust? Me, or the weird wooden dummy beside me?

### 1AR – AT: Animals

#### Extinction turns their impacts

Matheny, 07 [J. G. Matheny, Ph. D. candidate, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, December 6, “Ought we worry about human extinction?,” online: <http://jgmatheny.org/extinctionethics.htm>]

For instance, some moral theories value things like experiences, satisfied preferences, achievements, friendships, or virtuous acts, which take place only in lives. On this view, an early death is bad (at least in part) because it cuts short the number of these valuable things. Similarly, on this view, an early extinction is bad (at least in part) because it cuts short the number of these valuable things. I think this view is plausible and think our best reasons for believing an early death is bad are our best reasons for believing an early extinction is bad. But such a view is controversial and I will not settle the controversy here.

I start from the premise that we ought to increase moral value by increasing both the quality and number of lives throughout history. I also take it, following Singer (2002), this maxim applies to all sentient beings capable of positive subjective feelings.

Life’s prospects

The human population is now 6 billion (6 x 109). There are perhaps another trillion (1012) sentient animals on Earth, maybe a few orders more, depending on where sentience begins and ends in the animal kingdom (Gaston, Blackburn, and Goldewijk, 2003; Gaston and Evans, 2004).

Animal life has existed on Earth for around 500 million years. Barring a dramatic intervention, all animal life on Earth will die in the next several billion years. Earth is located in a field of thousands of asteroids and comets. 65 million years ago, an asteroid 10 kilometers in size hit the Yucatan , creating clouds of dust and smoke that blocked sunlight for months, probably causing the extinction of 90% of animals, including dinosaurs. A 100 km impact, capable of extinguishing all animal life on Earth, is probable within a billion years (Morrison et al., 2002).

If an asteroid does not extinguish all animal life, the Sun will. In one billion years, the Sun will begin its Red Giant stage, increasing in size and temperature. Within six billion years, the Sun will have evaporated all of Earth’s water, and terrestrial temperatures will reach 1000 degrees -- much too hot for amino acid-based life to persist. If, somehow, life were to survive these changes, it will die in 7 billion years when the Sun forms a planetary nebula that irradiates Earth (Sackmann, Boothroyd, Kraemer, 1993; Ward and Brownlee, 2002).

Earth is a dangerous place and animal life here has dim prospects. If there are 1012 sentient animals on Earth, only 1021 life-years remain. The only hope for terrestrial sentience surviving well beyond this limit is that some force will deflect large asteroids before they collide with Earth, giving sentients another billion or more years of life (Gritzner and Kahle, 2004); and/or terrestrial sentients will colonize other solar systems, giving sentients up to another 100 trillion years of life until all stars begin to stop shining (Adams and Laughlin, 1997). Life might survive even longer if it exploits non-stellar energy sources. But it is hard to imagine how life could survive beyond the decay of nuclear matter expected in 1032 to 1041 years (Adams and Laughlin, 1997). This may be the upper limit on the future of sentience.[4]

Deflecting asteroids and colonizing space could delay the extinction of Earth-originating sentience from 109 to 1041 years. Assuming an average population of one trillion sentients is maintained (which is a conservative assumption under colonization[5]), these interventions would create between 1021 and 1053[billion] life-years.

At present on Earth, only a human civilization would be remotely capable of carrying out such projects. If humanity survives the next few centuries, it’s likely we will develop technologies needed for at least one of these projects. We may already possess the technologies needed to deflect asteroids (Gritzner and Kahle, 2004; Urias et al., 1996). And in the next few centuries, we’re likely to develop technologies that allow colonization. We will be strongly motivated by self-interest to colonize space, as asteroids and planets have valuable resources to mine, and as our survival ultimately requires relocating to another solar system (Kargel, 1994; Lewis, 1996).

Extinction risks

Being capable of preserving sentient life for another 1041 years makes human survival important. There may be nothing more important. If the human species is extinguished, all known sentience and certainly all Earth-originating sentience will be extinguished within a few billion years. We ought then pay more attention to what Bostrom (2002) has called “existential risks” -- risks “where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential.”

Such risks include: an asteroid or comet strikes Earth, creating enough debris to shut down photosynthesis for months; a supervolcano erupts, creating enough debris to shut down photosynthesis; a nearby supernova unleashes deadly radiation that reaches Earth; greenhouse gasses cause a radical change in climate; a nuclear holocaust creates enough debris to cause a “nuclear winter,” shutting down photosynthesis; a genetically engineered microbe is unleashed, by accident or design, killing most or all of humanity; or a high-energy physics experiment goes awry, creating a “true” vacuum or strangelets, destroying the Earth (Bostrom 2002; Bostrom and Cirkovic 2006; Leslie 1996, Posner 2004, Rees 2003).

To me, most of these risks seem very unlikely. But dishearteningly, in their catalogs of these risks, Britain ’s Astronomer Royal, Sir Martin Rees (2003), gives humanity 50-50 odds of surviving the next few centuries, and philosophers John Leslie (1996) and Nick Bostrom (2002) put our chances at 70% and 75%, respectively.

Estimating the probabilities of unprecedented events is subjective, so we should treat these numbers skeptically. Still, even if the probabilities are orders lower, because the stakes are high, it could be justified to invest in extinction countermeasures. Matheny (2007) found that, even with traditional social discounting, investing in asteroid detection and mitigation is justified under standard cost-effectiveness analysis.

Ought humanity be saved?

Even accepting that future lives have value and that extinction risks can be cost-effectively reduced, there could still be reasons not to worry about human extinction. For instance, human lives might have negative moral value, in which case human extinction could be a good thing. This might have been Bertrand Russell’s sentiment when he wrote, “Although it is a gloomy view to suppose that life will die out, sometimes when I contemplate the things that people do with their lives I think it is almost a consolation.”[6]

In the 20th century, more people, in absolute numbers, died of war, famine, and pestilence than ever before. But in the same century, more people did not die of war, famine, and pestilence than ever before. So even if we're especially pessimistic about average human welfare during the last century compared to others, it would be hard to argue that total welfare decreased. As long as average welfare was greater than zero – that is, the average life was preferable to suicide – then the century was a success for humanity. We will be capable of even greater moral nightmares in this century than in the last, but we will also be capable of securing greater welfare for a larger fraction of humanity. I suspect in this century, the average life will again be worth living, assuming we survive the century to judge.

We should be more pessimistic when we review how nonhuman animals have fared in the last century. At present around 50 billion animals are raised and killed each year to feed humanity. (Many million animals are used for clothing, product testing, research, and entertainment, but their numbers are insignificant by comparison.) Since World War 2, with the invention of "factory farming," farm animals’ welfare has significantly deteriorated, as they now live in conditions that frustrate their most basic instincts (Singer, 2002, chapter 3).

At the same time, we’re probably the only animal on Earth that routinely demonstrates compassion for other species. Such compassion is nearly universal in developed countries but we usually know too little, too late, for deeply ingrained habits, such as diets, to change. If improvements in other public morals were possible without any significant biological change in human nature, then the same should be true for our treatment of nonhuman animals, though it will take some time.

Even without any change in public morals, it seems unlikely we will continue to use animals for very long – at least, nowhere near 50 billion per year. Our most brutal use of animals results not from sadism but from old appetites now satisfied with inefficient technologies that have not fundamentally changed in 10,000 years. Ours is the first century where newer technologies -- plant or in vitro meats, or meat from brainless animals -- could satisfy human appetites for meat more efficiently and safely (Edelman et al, 2005). As these technologies mature and become cheaper, they will likely replace conventional meat. If the use of sentient animals survives much beyond this century, we should be very surprised.

This thought is a cure for misanthropy. As long as most humans in the future don't use sentient animals, the vast number of good lives we can create would outweigh any sins humanity has committed or is likely to commit. Even if it takes a century for animal farming to be replaced by vegetarianism (or in vitro meats or brainless farm animals), the century of factory farming would represent around 1012 miserable life-years. That is one-billionth of the 1021 animal life-years humanity could save by protecting Earth from asteroids for a billion years.

The century of industrialized animal use would thus be the equivalent of a terrible pain that lasts one second in an otherwise happy 100-year life. To accept human extinction now would be like committing suicide to end an unpleasant itch. If human life is extinguished, all known animal life will be extinguished when the Sun enters its Red Giant phase, if not earlier. Despite its current mistreatment of other animals, humanity is the animal kingdom’s best long-term hope for survival.

### 1AR – AT: Environment

#### No environment impact

Kareiva and Carranza, 18—Institute of the Environment and Sustainability, University of California, Los Angeles (Peter and Valerie, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” Futures, available online January 5, 2018, ScienceDirect, dml)

The interesting question is whether any of the planetary thresholds other than CO2 could also portend existential risks. Here the answer is not clear. One boundary often mentioned as a concern for the fate of global civilization is biodiversity (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2012), with the proposed safety threshold being a loss of greater than 0.001% per year (Rockström et al., 2009). There is little evidence that this particular 0.001% annual loss is a threshold—and it is hard to imagine any data that would allow one to identify where the threshold was (Brook, Ellis, Perring, Mackay, & Blomqvist, 2013; Lenton & Williams, 2013). A better question is whether one can imagine any scenario by which the loss of too many species leads to the collapse of societies and environmental disasters, even though one cannot know the absolute number of extinctions that would be required to create this dystopia. While there are data that relate local reductions in species richness to altered ecosystem function, these results do not point to substantial existential risks. The data are small-scale experiments in which plant productivity, or nutrient retention is reduced as species numbers decline locally (Vellend, 2017), or are local observations of increased variability in fisheries yield when stock diversity is lost (Schindler et al., 2010). Those are not existential risks. To make the link even more tenuous, there is little evidence that biodiversity is even declining at local scales (Vellend et al., 2013, 2017). Total planetary biodiversity may be in decline, but local and regional biodiversity is often staying the same because species from elsewhere replace local losses, albeit homogenizing the world in the process. Although the majority of conservation scientists are likely to flinch at this conclusion, there is growing skepticism regarding the strength of evidence linking trends in biodiversity loss to an existential risk for humans (Maier, 2012; Vellend, 2014). Obviously if all biodiversity disappeared civilization would end—but no one is forecasting the loss of all species. It seems plausible that the loss of 90% of the world’s species could also be apocalyptic, but not one is predicting that degree of biodiversity loss either. Tragic, but plausible is the possibility of our planet suffering a loss of as many as half of its species. If global biodiversity were halved, but at the same time locally the number of species stayed relatively stable, what would be the mechanism for an end-of-civilization or even end of human prosperity scenario? Extinctions and biodiversity loss are ethical and spiritual losses, but perhaps not an existential risk.

### 1AR – AT: Kochi

#### Your author doesn’t actually think we should let a bunch of people die

Tarik Kochi, lecturer in the School of Law, Queen’s University, 2008, Noam Ordan, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity, Borderlands 7.3

It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it **operates as a thought experiment** which may help humans to radically rethink what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not the act of **global** suicide takes place might well be irrelevant. What is more important is the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of thehuman heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm. Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.

## 1AR – AT: First strike

### Generic

#### Perm do both – we can first strike with bombers

#### Breaks the norm of restraint – causes escalation – That’s Mosher 20

#### Small blasts cause extinction

Mills et al. 14 (Michael Mills, NCAR Earth System Laboratory; Owen Toon, Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics and Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences; Julia Lee-Taylor, NCAR Earth System Laboratory, Alan Robock, Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers; 4/1/14, “Multidecadal Global Cooling and Unprecedented Ozone Loss Following a Regional Nuclear Conflict.” Earth’s Future, 2, 161–176)

Pierazzo et al. [2010] reviewed literature considering the effects of large and prolonged increases in UV-B radiation, similar to those we calculate, on living organisms, including agriculture and marine ecosystems. General effects on terrestrial plants have been found to include reduced height, shoot mass, and foliage area [Caldwell et al., 2007]. Walbot [1999] found the DNA damage to maize crops from 33% ozone depletion to accumulate proportionally to exposure time, being passed to successive generations, and destabilizing genetic lines. Research indicates that UV-B exposure may alter the susceptibility of plants to attack by insects, alter nutrient cycling in soils (including nitrogen fixation by cyanobacteria), and shift competitive balances among species [Caldwell et al., 1998; Solheim et al., 2002; Mpoloka, 2008].∂ The ozone depletion we calculate could also damage aquatic ecosystems, which supply more than 30% of the animal protein consumed by humans. Häder et al. [1995] estimate that 16% ozone depletion could reduce phytoplankton, the basis of the marine food chain, by 5%, resulting in a loss of 7 million tons of fish harvest per year. They also report that elevated UV levels damage the early developmental stages of fish, shrimp, crab, amphibians, and other animals. The combined effects of elevated UV levels alone on terrestrial agriculture and marine ecosystems could put significant pressures on global food security. ∂ The ozone loss would persist for a decade at the same time that growing seasons would be reduced by killing frosts, and regional precipitation patterns would shift. The combination of years of killing frosts, reductions in needed precipitation, and prolonged enhancement of UV radiation, in addition to impacts on fisheries because of temperature and salinity changes, could exert significant pressures on food supplies across many regions of the globe. As the January to May 2008 global rice crisis demonstrated, even relatively small food price pressures can be amplified by political reactions, such as the fearful restrictions on food exports implemented by India and Vietnam, followed by Egypt, Pakistan, and Brazil, which produced severe shortages in the Philippines, Africa, and Latin America [Slayton, 2009]. It is conceivable that the global pressures on food supplies from a regional nuclear conflict could, directly or via ensuing panic, significantly degrade global food security or even produce a global nuclear famine.∂ 5. Summary∂ We present the first simulations of the chemistry-climate effects of smoke produced by a nuclear war using an Earth system model that includes both stratospheric chemistry and feedbacks on sea ice and deep ocean circulation. We calculate impacts on surface climate persisting significantly longer than previous studies, as a result of several feedback mechanisms. First, BC absorbs sunlight, heating ambient air, and self-lofts to the upper stratosphere, a region treated with greater vertical resolution in CESM1(WACCM) than in the model used by Robock et al. [2007b]. Second, the BC spreads globally, absorbing sunlight, which heats the stratosphere and cools the surface. This has the effect of reducing the strength of the stratospheric circulation and increasing the lifetime of BC in the stratosphere. Third, the reduction of surface temperatures cools the upper 100 m of the ocean by >0.5 K for 12 years, and expands ice extent on sea and land. This lends inertia to the surface cooling due to both thermal mass and enhanced albedo, causing recovery in surface temperatures to lag the recovery in BC by a decade or more. As a result, we calculate that surface temperatures remain below the control ensemble range even 26 years after the nuclear war.∂ The global average temperature increase in the stratosphere following the BC injection initially exceeds 70 K, and persists above 30 K for 5 years, with full recovery taking two decades. As in previous studies, this temperature increase produces global ozone loss on a scale never observed, as a result of several chemical mechanisms. The resulting enhancements to UV radiation at the surface would be directly damaging to human health, and would damage agricultural crops, as well as ecosystems on land and in the oceans. These results illustrate some of the severe negative consequences of the use of only 100 of the smallest nuclear weapons in modern megacities. Yet the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France each have stockpiles of much larger nuclear weapons that dwarf the 100 examined here [Robock et al., 2007a; Toon et al., 2007]. Knowing the perils to human society and other forms of life on Earth of even small numbers of nuclear weapons, societies can better understand the urgent need to eliminate this danger worldwide.

#### Missile Defense fails and pretending that it works causes war

Grego 18 [Laura Grego, 4-24-2018, "The Faulty and Dangerous Logic of Missile Defense," Scientific American Blog Network, https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-faulty-and-dangerous-logic-of-missile-defense/, accessed 12-27-2019]LHSBC

Reflecting the difficulty of the task, and the haste and lack of rigor of its development, the GMD system today has a very poor test record, even though these tests were “[scripted for success](http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-icbm-missile-interception-20170526-story.html)” according to former Pentagon head testing official Phil Coyle.∂ [The problems are well documented](https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/us-missile-defense/shielded-from-oversight#.Ws_2-S4bPDc). Only about half of the 18 intercept tests since 1999 successfully destroyed their targets, and the test record has not improved with time: only two of the last five tests were successful—and GMD has still has not been tested under operationally realistic conditions. Thus, there is no evidence that the $40 billion GMD system provides a reliable defense, even against a country like North Korea.∂ More fundamentally, even if the reliability is improved, GMD’s prospects for providing an effective defense in the future are poor because it will face [countermeasures](https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/cm_all.pdf) that any country that has developed a long-range missile and a nuclear warhead could readily use to confuse or overwhelm the system.∂ Despite these problems, however, the administration and Congress plan to expand the system; the [current budget includes funding](https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/budgetfy19.pdf) to build 20 additional interceptors.∂ Given North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear-armed long-range missile, it seems reasonable to ask whether something isn’t better than nothing. That sounds plausible, but does not hold up upon closer examination. The unconstrained pursuit of missile defenses can, perhaps counterintuitively, create even greater risks.∂ For example, a belief that missile defense works better than it does can lead political and military leaders to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy and take more risks. U.S. officials [regularly describe the system](https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/07/Shielded-from-Oversight-appendix-9.pdf) as much more capable than it has been demonstrated to be. Even President Trump [stated on television](http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2017/10/11/president-trump-vows-largest-tax-cut-in-history-this-country.html) last October that “We have missiles that can knock out a missile in the air 97 percent of the time.” Yet the [testing data show](https://allthingsnuclear.org/lgrego/missile-defense-will-not-work-97-percent) there is no basis to expect interceptors to work more than 40 to 50 percent of the time even under the most generous and easiest conditions.

#### No Primacy–can’t take out hard and deeply buried targets

Bill Gertz 9/6, senior editor and reporter for Washington Beacon and the Washington Post, 9/6/18, “U.S. Lacks Nuclear Weapon for Hardened Underground Targets,” https://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-s-lacks-nuclear-weapon-hardened-underground-targets/

Trump administration plans to upgrade the military's aging nuclear arsenal do not include a new weapon that experts say is needed to blast deeply buried, hardened targets used by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran to house their leaders and weapons.

The Air Force announced recently that a B-2 bomber at Nellis Air Force Base conducted a simulated test of the modernized B61 nuclear gravity bomb that the Pentagon says will have some earth-penetrating capability.

However, the B61 Mod 12 will not be capable of exploding through hundreds of feet of rock or concrete that protects Russia's Kasvinsky Mountain nuclear command post, or key underground command centers in the 3,000-mile-long Great Underground Wall complex that houses China's nuclear forces and leaders.

North Korea and Iran also have dug deep underground bunkers to hide leaders and protect weapons systems from precision aircraft and missile strikes.

#### Lieber and Press are wrong and old

Carr 18 - Pappalardo Fellow in Physics at MIT (Rachel, Physics and Society Vol 47 No 2 Letter to the Editor, April 2018, <https://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/201804/upload/April18.pdf>, jwg)

In the January issue, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press argue that emerging technologies are creating a “New Era of Nuclear Arsenal Vulnerability.” We share the authors’ interest in how new technologies can influence nuclear security, but we are not convinced that critical shifts have occurred or are inexorably on their way. The longest section of Lieber and Press’s article recounts how missile accuracy has improved since the 1980s, making hardened missile silos more vulnerable to attack. Here the technical point is credible, but the strategic importance is limited. Only the US and Russia keep a significant fraction of their nuclear weapons in silos, and their vulnerability has been recognized for decades. This is one reason why nuclear weapons are deployed on submarines, land-based mobile launchers, and bombers, which maintain a retaliatory capability largely immune to the “accuracy revolution.” The burden of the authors’ argument thus falls to the “sensor revolution,” where the technical discussion is much weaker. This section amounts to a catalog of broad “technological trends,” all on the side of “seekers.” While it is reasonable to predict that sensors and their platforms will improve, so will the tactics and technologies that counter them. Weapons platforms will diversify, potentially to autonomous systems, networked sensors may grow more vulnerable to electronic warfare, and anti-satellite capabilities will advance. Without a comparative analysis between hiders and seekers, we are not persuaded by the authors’ suggestion that seekers will gain the edge. Statements about the growing effectiveness of conventional weapons against nuclear forces (e.g., “conventional weapons can destroy most types of counterforce targets”) are also too broad and unsupported to take at face value. Certainly many types of technology are improving, but it does not follow that a dramatically new era is dawning. Demonstrating that new technologies will “undercut the logic of future nuclear arms reductions” and make arms racing “nearly inevitable” would, in our view, require much stronger evidence than Lieber and Press provide.

### Jupiter

#### 1 - Perm Do both

#### 2 - Put it on an elon musk rocket

#### 3 - Dropped Russian radar inadequacy – they misperceive launch and strike back

#### 4 - RTG thumps – a bigger planet is needed

Brandon 15 [Brandon, 1-30-2015, "Did NASA cover up an accidential nuclear detonation on Jupiter? ," Knowledge Glue, http://knowledgeglue.com/did-nasa-cover-up-an-accidential-nuclear-detonation-on-jupiter/, accessed 1-17-2020]LHSBC

NASA Loves Nukes∂ ∂ Nuclear energy plays a very critical part of interstellar travel. Unlike the pictures we see of Earth-orbiting satellites and space stations, replete with massive solar arrays, probes to the outer planets cannot rely on solar panels to generate significant amounts of energy in which to run the various scientific probes on spacecraft. Therefore, NASA relies on the [Radioisotope thermoelectric generator](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radioisotope_thermoelectric_generator) (“[RTG](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radioisotope_thermoelectric_generator)” for short) to supply power for probes. The usage of RTGs is very prolific among deep-space probes, and has been used since the 1970s for notable probes such as Pioneer and Voyager, up through current spacecraft that are still completing their missions such as Cassini and New Horizons.∂ ∂ The Jovian Connection∂ So how are RTGs connected with Jupiter and a possible nuclear detonation on the planet? The answer may be found almost exactly a month before Mr. Meekers’ picture was taken. On September 21st, NASA decided, in a very odd decision, to send their RTG powered probe named [Galileo](http://solarsystem.nasa.gov/galileo/) hurdling into the planet as its final mission.∂ The reason behind the destruction was mostly sound: NASA worried that a dead probe orbiting Jupiter could eventually contaminate its moons which may harbor life. Scientists believed in 2003, as they do now, that both Europa and Callisto have significant amounts of ice water, and are theorized to have subsurface oceans which may have microbial life.∂ With this in mind, NASA took no chances, and sent a kill order to the probe, directing the spacecraft to a suicidal dive into Jupiter to prevent contamination. Galileo was almost instantly destroyed during its de-orbit, much in the same way it’s [atmospheric probe](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galileo_%28spacecraft%29#Atmospheric_entry_probe) was crushed when it was released in 1995 to conduct experiments during a descent into the hostile planet.∂ But did more result from crashing the probe into the planet? Some experts warned that mixing radioactive material and Jupiter may have catastrophic results. Engineer Jacco van der Worp warned, via a radio show, that the RTGs may reach critical mass due to the intense pressure in the lower atmosphere of the planet, and the elements contained within Jupiter’s deep atmosphere.∂ ∂ How It Could Have Happened∂ ∂ Some of the science behind conversion of the spent RTG canisters into an atomic weapon is difficult to reproduce, which has caused some controversy on the issue of turning a peaceful space probe into a weapon of mass destruction.∂ ∂ Documentation on how nuclear weapons were and are built is well known, but very difficult to reproduce. However, the basic idea on how to build a nuclear weapon is as follows (image from Wikipedia):∂ ∂ The “[Implosion Assembly Method](http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/nucene/bomb3.html)” was used in the first nuclear weapon utilized over the skies of Hiroshima on August 6th, 1945. This method closely mirrors the possible environment of the RTGs during their descent into Jupiter. Nuclear weapons employ powerful explosives to artificially create incredible pressures, forcing the radioactive material to compress, and attain fission, creating the chain of events leading to a nuclear explosion.∂ Jupiter naturally creates the incredible pressures needed to compress a radioactive material to achieve fission. After all, that is how our sun shines – immense pressures force reactions in various types of atoms, creating incredible amounts of energy.∂ One challenge, though, to the argument of plausibility is if the type of material in Galileo’s RTG, U238, could actually create such a weapon. It is absolutely true that U238 can’t create a fissile reaction per se. However, if U238 is enriched, the result is U235, which is considered “Weapons grade” for a nuclear bomb. Could Jupiter provide the needed foundation to enrich U238? We believe so. One of the first discovered methods for creating weapons grade uranium is called “Thermal Diffusion”, which involves the transfer of heat across a thin liquid or gas to accomplish isotope separation, forcing U235 molecules to diffuse towards a hotter surface, while U238 diffuses to a colder surface. We believe that its possible Jupiter created the perfect environment for the transformation of the spent RTG cells into a a nuclear accident waiting to happen.∂ ∂ ∂ Turning a Molehill Into a Mountain∂ One additional criticism of the theory is that if a reaction did indeed occur, causing the radioactive material to explode, it would not create the dark spot seen in the initial picture. This is absolutely true, as the explosive yield would be in the area of 100 kilotons of TNT (or about twice the strength of the bomb used over Hiroshima).∂ So how could the small reaction spark something much greater? The answer lies in what is underneath the clouds of Jupiter. The gas giant contains high amounts of [tritium](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tritium) and [deuterium](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deuterium). Both elements are essential parts of the other type of nuclear weapon which results in a [fusion reaction](https://web.archive.org/web/20130209043454/http:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon#Fusion_weapons). This type of reaction is the basis of what we call a “Hydrogen bomb”, which yields much more energy than a simple fissile bomb.∂ ∂ As per the picture (source: Wikipedia), once the initial reaction is created, the fusion fuel is utilized, creating a much higher yield explosion. The most powerful weapon ever created, the [Tsar Bomba](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsar_Bomba) used the same type of principle. Given the ample fuel that is available deep within Jupiter, it is plausible that the simple fissile reaction became much, much more.∂ In fact, such a reaction was the basis of the sequel to the brilliant space opera, 2001: A Space Odyssey, aptly named [2010](http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0086837/). But this reaction brings up a great question: why didn’t all of the fuel ignite, creating an even bigger explosion? One that would consume the whole planet?∂ The answer for this is simple: Jupiter cannot maintain the pressure needed to create fusion on its own. To create the pressures needed to sustain such a reaction requires a much larger mass, to the tune of 10 times the size of Jupiter. These entities are called [brown dwarfs](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brown_dwarf), and are only recently understood. Therefore, once the initial reaction of U235 had dissipated, there was little to sustain the reaction.

#### 5 - I’m not capping – jupiter needs to be extra thick

Cain 14 [Fraser Cain, 2-20-2014, "Could Jupiter Become A Star?," Universe Today, https://www.universetoday.com/109593/could-jupiter-become-a-star/, accessed 1-17-2020]LHSBC

Hydrogen bombs are ignited by detonating plutonium, and Jupiter’s got a lot of hydrogen.Since we don’t have a second star, you’ll be glad to know this didn’t happen. Could it have happened? Could it ever happen? The answer, of course, is a series of nos. No, it couldn’t have happened. There’s no way it could ever happen… or is there?∂ Jupiter is mostly made of hydrogen, in order to turn it into a giant fireball you’d need oxygen to burn it. Water tells us what the recipe is. There are two atoms of hydrogen to one atom of oxygen. If you can get the two elements together in those quantities, you get water.∂ In other words, if you could surround Jupiter with half again more Jupiter’s worth of oxygen, you’d get a Jupiter plus a half sized fireball. It would turn into water and release energy. But that much oxygen isn’t handy, and even though it’s a giant ball of fire, that’s still not a star anyway. In fact, stars aren’t “burning” at all, at least, not in the combustion sense.∂ Our Sun produces its energy through fusion. The vast gravity compresses hydrogen down to the point that high pressure and temperatures cram hydrogen atoms into helium. This is a fusion reaction. It generates excess energy, and so the Sun is bright. And the only way you can get a reaction like this is when you bring together a massive amount of hydrogen. In fact… you’d need a star’s worth of hydrogen. Jupiter is a thousand times less massive than the Sun. One thousand times less massive. In other words, if you crashed 1000 Jupiters together, then we’d have a second actual Sun in our Solar System.∂ But the Sun isn’t the smallest possible star you can have. In fact, if you have about 7.5% the mass of the Sun’s worth of hydrogen collected together, you’ll get a red dwarf star. So the smallest red dwarf star is still about 80 times the mass of Jupiter. You know the drill, find 79 more Jupiters, crash them into Jupiter, and we’d have a second star in the Solar System.∂ There’s another object that’s less massive than a red dwarf, but it’s still sort of star like: a brown dwarf. This is an object which isn’t massive enough to ignite in true fusion, but it’s still massive enough that deuterium, a variant of hydrogen, will fuse. You can get a brown dwarf with only 13 times the mass of Jupiter. Now that’s not so hard, right? Find 13 more Jupiters, crash them into the planet?∂ As was demonstrated with Galileo, igniting Jupiter or its hydrogen is not a simple matter. We won’t get a second star unless there’s a series of catastrophic collisions in the Solar System. And if that happens… we’ll have other problems on our hands.

#### 6 - Size doesn’t matter – it’s about mass

Shaw 19 [Hillary Shaw, 10-30-2019, "Could Jupiter ever ignite into a star?," New Scientist, https://www.newscientist.com/lastword/mg24432541-100-could-jupiter-ever-ignite-into-a-star/, accessed 1-17-2020]LHSBC

Jupiter’s diameter is in fact larger than that of the [smallest star](https://www.space.com/21420-smallest-star-size-red-dwarf.html), at 140,000 kilometres against 121,000 km for the tiniest star.∂ However it is mass, not size, that counts. This determines the internal pressure that, if sufficiently high, can overcome the mutual repulsion of hydrogen nuclei and convert these to helium through nuclear fusion. This releases the huge amount of energy that makes stars shine.∂ If a large cloud of interstellar gas came Jupiter’s way, maybe the planet could gain enough extra mass to start fusion. Fusion would be short lived if it became a [brown dwarf](https://www.newscientist.com/article/2147636-brown-dwarfs-have-strong-magnetic-fields-just-like-real-stars/), an object midway between star and planet. If it accreted even more mass, just [enough to become a true star](https://www.newscientist.com/article/2131074-stars-can-start-shining-at-a-smaller-mass-than-we-thought/), it would be a dim red dwarf. Its radiation would barely affect us and it wouldn’t look very different to now. A bigger worry would be Jupiter’s increased mass disrupting the solar system, not to mention the raised temperature of the sun, as a result of it capturing most of the gas cloud. ∂ The smallest known stars are red dwarfs. [EBLM J0555-57Ab](https://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/smallest-ever-star-discovered-by-astronomers), which is about 600 light years away, is the current record holder for the star with the least mass. It is slightly smaller than Saturn and has about 6.4 per cent the mass of the sun or about 70 times the mass of Jupiter. ∂ This subject was a theme in Arthur C. Clarke’s novel 2010: Odyssey Two in which Jupiter turns into a star, albeit with help from alien monoliths that increase the planet’s density past a critical point. This is the key factor in going from giant planet to star.∂ Exact figures are uncertain, but calculations suggest Jupiter would need to be 80 times as massive as it is to turn into a small red dwarf star. Another possibility, though, is a [brown dwarf, which is a kind of half-star](https://www.newscientist.com/article/2218948-microbial-life-might-drift-in-the-atmospheres-of-failed-stars/). This isn’t massive enough for ordinary hydrogen to fuse into helium as in most stars. Instead it uses the rarer hydrogen isotope deuterium. First predicted by theory in the 1960s, several brown dwarfs have been found, faint objects emitting mostly infrared radiation. It is estimated a brown dwarf needs to be about 13 times the mass of Jupiter.

### China

#### 1 - Perm do both – we can first strike with bombers

#### 2 - Breaks the norm of restraint – causes global escalation – That’s Mosher 20

#### 3 - Small blasts cause extinction

Mills et al. 14 (Michael Mills, NCAR Earth System Laboratory; Owen Toon, Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics and Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences; Julia Lee-Taylor, NCAR Earth System Laboratory, Alan Robock, Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers; 4/1/14, “Multidecadal Global Cooling and Unprecedented Ozone Loss Following a Regional Nuclear Conflict.” Earth’s Future, 2, 161–176)

Pierazzo et al. [2010] reviewed literature considering the effects of large and prolonged increases in UV-B radiation, similar to those we calculate, on living organisms, including agriculture and marine ecosystems. General effects on terrestrial plants have been found to include reduced height, shoot mass, and foliage area [Caldwell et al., 2007]. Walbot [1999] found the DNA damage to maize crops from 33% ozone depletion to accumulate proportionally to exposure time, being passed to successive generations, and destabilizing genetic lines. Research indicates that UV-B exposure may alter the susceptibility of plants to attack by insects, alter nutrient cycling in soils (including nitrogen fixation by cyanobacteria), and shift competitive balances among species [Caldwell et al., 1998; Solheim et al., 2002; Mpoloka, 2008].∂ The ozone depletion we calculate could also damage aquatic ecosystems, which supply more than 30% of the animal protein consumed by humans. Häder et al. [1995] estimate that 16% ozone depletion could reduce phytoplankton, the basis of the marine food chain, by 5%, resulting in a loss of 7 million tons of fish harvest per year. They also report that elevated UV levels damage the early developmental stages of fish, shrimp, crab, amphibians, and other animals. The combined effects of elevated UV levels alone on terrestrial agriculture and marine ecosystems could put significant pressures on global food security. ∂ The ozone loss would persist for a decade at the same time that growing seasons would be reduced by killing frosts, and regional precipitation patterns would shift. The combination of years of killing frosts, reductions in needed precipitation, and prolonged enhancement of UV radiation, in addition to impacts on fisheries because of temperature and salinity changes, could exert significant pressures on food supplies across many regions of the globe. As the January to May 2008 global rice crisis demonstrated, even relatively small food price pressures can be amplified by political reactions, such as the fearful restrictions on food exports implemented by India and Vietnam, followed by Egypt, Pakistan, and Brazil, which produced severe shortages in the Philippines, Africa, and Latin America [Slayton, 2009]. It is conceivable that the global pressures on food supplies from a regional nuclear conflict could, directly or via ensuing panic, significantly degrade global food security or even produce a global nuclear famine.∂ 5. Summary∂ We present the first simulations of the chemistry-climate effects of smoke produced by a nuclear war using an Earth system model that includes both stratospheric chemistry and feedbacks on sea ice and deep ocean circulation. We calculate impacts on surface climate persisting significantly longer than previous studies, as a result of several feedback mechanisms. First, BC absorbs sunlight, heating ambient air, and self-lofts to the upper stratosphere, a region treated with greater vertical resolution in CESM1(WACCM) than in the model used by Robock et al. [2007b]. Second, the BC spreads globally, absorbing sunlight, which heats the stratosphere and cools the surface. This has the effect of reducing the strength of the stratospheric circulation and increasing the lifetime of BC in the stratosphere. Third, the reduction of surface temperatures cools the upper 100 m of the ocean by >0.5 K for 12 years, and expands ice extent on sea and land. This lends inertia to the surface cooling due to both thermal mass and enhanced albedo, causing recovery in surface temperatures to lag the recovery in BC by a decade or more. As a result, we calculate that surface temperatures remain below the control ensemble range even 26 years after the nuclear war.∂ The global average temperature increase in the stratosphere following the BC injection initially exceeds 70 K, and persists above 30 K for 5 years, with full recovery taking two decades. As in previous studies, this temperature increase produces global ozone loss on a scale never observed, as a result of several chemical mechanisms. The resulting enhancements to UV radiation at the surface would be directly damaging to human health, and would damage agricultural crops, as well as ecosystems on land and in the oceans. These results illustrate some of the severe negative consequences of the use of only 100 of the smallest nuclear weapons in modern megacities. Yet the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France each have stockpiles of much larger nuclear weapons that dwarf the 100 examined here [Robock et al., 2007a; Toon et al., 2007]. Knowing the perils to human society and other forms of life on Earth of even small numbers of nuclear weapons, societies can better understand the urgent need to eliminate this danger worldwide.

#### War is not inevitable – Xi himself proves

Allison ’15, Graham Allison, Political Scientist and Professor of Government at the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?,” September 24th, 2015, The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/

War, however, is not inevitable. Four of the 16 cases in our review did not end in bloodshed. Those successes, as well as the failures, offer pertinent lessons for today’s world leaders. Escaping the Trap requires tremendous effort. As Xi Jinping himself said during a visit to Seattle on Tuesday, “There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides Trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.”

#### It fails

#### Rail-mobile

Gady 16 [Franz-Stefan Gady, The Diplomat, China Tests New Rail-Mobile Missile Capable of Hitting all of US, Jan 5, 2016, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/china-tests-new-rail-mobile-missile-capable-of-hitting-all-of-us/>]

* Bracket in original article

On December 5, China conducted a launcher test of a new rail-mobile version of its newest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-41 (CSS-X-20), IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly [reports](http://www.janes.com/article/56860/china-developing-new-rail-mobile-icbm-say-us-officials). A DF-41 also underwent a flight test on the previous day (December 4) the publication states based on information [obtained](http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-tests-new-icbm-from-railroad-car/) by the Washington Free Beacon. The launch of the DF-41 likely took place at the Wuzhai missile test center in central China’s Shanxi Province. The December 5 test involved a ‘cold launch’ of a DF-41 from a canister with a ggas charge without the engine of the missile being ignited. In a full test, the missile’s engine would ignite microseconds after exiting the launch tube. China’s Defense Ministry confirmed at the end of December that the tests took place without going into details. “Scientific tests within the Chinese territory are conducted according to plan,” Defense Ministry spokesman Colonel Yang Yujun said at a press conference. According to IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, the launch “was likely meant to test the tube launch system’s compatibility with its new rail car.” The Washington Free Beacon notes a 2013 study compiled by the Georgetown University Arms Control Project which argues that the Chinese rail-mobile ICBM system is modeled on the Ukrainian-designed RT-23 (SS-24 ‘Scalpel’) rail-mobile solid-fuel ICBM. The RT-23 is “known as a ‘land nuclear submarine’—an indication the rail launcher uses an ejection tube to boost the missile from the train car shortly before ignition of its engine,” according to the article. The RT-23 was deployed by Moscow from 1987 to 2005. Russia is currently working on another rail-mobile ICBM system slated to enter service by 2020. Chinese missiles aboard trains will be particularly difficult to track for U.S. intelligence agencies. “If that missile train hosts the DF-41 ICBM it means it will also have a MIRV [multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicles] potential,” defense analyst Phillip A. Karber told the Washington Free Beacon. “The combination of high-speed mobility, launch cars disguised as civilian passenger trains, tunnel protection and secure reloading of missiles, coupled with multiple warheads, makes the system extremely hard to regulate or verify the number of systems.”

#### Dual-use

Gomez 17 [Eric Gomez is a policy analyst for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, The Diplomat, August 8, 2017, Meet the DF-31AG and the DF-26: The Big Ballistic Missiles at China’s Military Anniversary Parade, https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/meet-the-df-31ag-and-the-df-26-the-big-ballistic-missiles-at-chinas-military-anniversary-parade/]

China’s nuclear weapons play an important role in these areas of potential conflict. The technical characteristics of the DF-26 and DF-31AG provide valuable insight into the future of China’s nuclear deterrent. According to the latest Department of Defense report to Congress on China’s military, “The DF-26 is an intermediate-range ballistic missile which is capable of conducting conventional and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets.” A dual-capable ballistic missile can bolster deterrence by increasing the risks of strikes against missile bases. In a conflict with China, it would be relatively easy and operationally beneficial for the United States to strike fixed targets that support China’s combat forces. However, the ambiguity surrounding the DF-26 means that a strike intended for China’s conventional ballistic missiles could end up destroying some nuclear-armed missiles instead, which raises the chance of counter-escalation by China. The DF-31AG, meanwhile, is a modified version of the DF-31A road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The primary difference between the DF-31AG and DF-31A is transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicle that transports and fires the missile. While the DF-31A’s TEL could only travel on paved roads, the DF-31AG’s TEL can travel over more rugged terrain. The ability to go off-road improves the survivability of the missile by creating a larger area of potential launching sites. A missile that is not dependent on roads for transport and launch is much more difficult to find and therefore more likely to survive long enough to launch a retaliatory strike. This logic is behind North Korea’s decision to develop tracked TELs for its Pukguksong-2 ballistic missile. Since China is bound to a no first use nuclear doctrine, leaders in Beijing need to be confident that their nuclear forces can survive a nuclear first strike and retaliate in order for deterrent threats to be credible. After China began modernizing its nuclear forces in the 1990s, its land-based ICBM force has focused on building mobile, solid-fueled missiles in a push to maximize survivability while also keeping the force relatively small. The DF-31AG’s new TEL is a major improvement over the DF-31A because it can travel over more terrain, thereby increasing mobility, complicating adversary targeting, and reducing the number of missiles that are likely to be destroyed in a first strike. It is important to understand how improvements in U.S. missile defense capabilities influence the development of China’s nuclear forces. China’s nuclear doctrine assumes that its nuclear forces will be degraded by a first strike. If the United States has a robust missile defense capability that can absorb a ragged retaliation then it would have a decisive strategic advantage over China. The steady increase in the number of missile defense systems deployed in East Asia in recent years, ostensibly in response to the North Korean threat, are of great concern to Beijing. Additionally, North Korea’s ICBM creates political support for improvements to the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, which protects the United States from ICBM attack and reduces the credibility of China’s deterrent. The DF-26 and DF-31 AG indicate that Beijing will pursue a qualitative approach to bolstering its nuclear deterrent in the face of improved U.S. missile defense capabilities. Rather than building up a large number of nuclear weapons that could absorb losses from a first strike and still overwhelm missile defenses, China hopes to keep its deterrent viable through ambiguity and survivability. The ambiguity of whether or not a DF-26 unit has conventional or nuclear warheads makes it risky to target these missiles in a first strike, and the extra mobility of the DF-31AG’s improved TEL increase the numbers of targets that missile defenses have to defeat. While there is nothing inherently bad about increasing survivability, intentionally creating ambiguity as a means of bolstering deterrence creates risks in times of crisis. Chinese strategists hope that ambiguity will create unacceptably high risks for the United States, but this does not guarantee that U.S. decision-makers will restrain themselves and behave as the Chinese hope. If U.S. policymakers continues to place a high value on missile defenses as a way to manage the North Korean problem, they must understand the risks that such an approach creates for U.S.-China stability in the long-run.

#### Draws in Russia

Klare 18 [Michael Klare, Foreign Policy in Focus, The Pentagon Is Planning a Three-Front ‘Long War’ Against China and Russia, Apirl 4, 2018, https://fpif.org/the-pentagon-is-planning-a-three-front-long-war-against-china-and-russia/]

In relatively swift fashion, American military leaders have followed up their claim that the U.S. is in a new long war by sketching the outlines of a containment line that would stretch from the Korean Peninsula around Asia across the Middle East into parts of the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and finally to the Scandinavian countries. Under their plan, American military forces — reinforced by the armies of trusted allies — should garrison every segment of this line, a grandiose scheme to block hypothetical advances of Chinese and Russian influence that, in its global reach, should stagger the imagination. Much of future history could be shaped by such an outsized effort. Questions for the future include whether this is either a sound strategic policy or truly sustainable. Attempting to contain China and Russia in such a manner will undoubtedly provoke countermoves, some undoubtedly difficult to resist, including cyber attacks and various kinds of economic warfare. And if you imagined that a war on terror across huge swaths of the planet represented a significant global overreach for a single power, just wait. Maintaining large and heavily-equipped forces on three extended fronts will also prove exceedingly costly and will certainly conflict with domestic spending priorities and possibly provoke a divisive debate over the reinstatement of the draft. However, the real question — unasked in Washington at the moment — is: Why pursue such a policy in the first place? Are there not other ways to manage the rise of China and Russia’s provocative behavior? What appears particularly worrisome about this three-front strategy is its immense capacity for confrontation, miscalculation, escalation, and finally actual war rather than simply grandiose war planning. At multiple points along this globe-spanning line — the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Syria, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, to name just a few — forces from the U.S. and China or Russia are already in significant contact, often jostling for position in a potentially hostile manner. At any moment, one of these encounters could provoke a firefight leading to unintended escalation and, in the end, possibly all-out combat. From there, almost anything could happen, even the use of nuclear weapons. Clearly, officials in Washington should be thinking hard before committing Americans to a strategy that will make this increasingly likely and could turn what is still long-war planning into an actual long war with deadly consequences.

#### Even small blasts cause extinction

Baum & Barrett 18 (Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, 2018. A Model For The Impacts Of Nuclear War. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute Working Paper 18-2.)

Fire caused by nuclear war can block sunlight by sending smoke into the atmosphere. The effect is strongest in the vicinity of the detonation shortly after the detonation occurs. Some smoke can also enter the stratosphere and block sunlight worldwide for many years. Furthermore, if nuclear war causes a general malfunction of society, this could potentially result in less sunlight being blocked due to the failure of intentional sun blocking known as geoengineering (Baum et al. 2013). Currently, no sunlight-blocking geoengineering is being performed, so any nuclear war would cause a net increase in the amount of sunlight being blocked (i.e., a net decrease in the amount of sunlight reaching the surface). If sunlight-blocking geoengineering is being performed when a future nuclear war occurs, the net effect would depend on the extent of fires caused by the nuclear war and the extent of the geoengineering. One important detail is that the sun- blocking particles in the stratosphere would fall out of the atmosphere in a few years, at which point temperatures would increase to wherever they would have been without the geoengineering (Matthews and Caldeira 2007) or nuclear war.

Figure 11 shows the initial impacts of blocked sunlight. Blockage of sunlight would reduce surface sunlight (i.e., the amount of sunlight reaching the surface), surface temperatures, and precipitation (due to less energy driving the hydrological cycle; see e.g. Mills et al. 2014). It can also shift wind patterns, though the net effect is unclear. Studies of global warming show that temperatures increase the fastest at the poles, which reduces air temperature differentials and in turn reduces wind (Ren 2010). The same logic suggests an increase in wind from blocked sunlight following nuclear war. Indeed, Mills et al. (2014) shows the largest post-nuclear-war temperature declines in high-latitude continental northern hemisphere and in the southern ocean, which would lead to increased temperature differentials. However, to our knowledge, the effect on wind has not been studied.

Reduced surface sunlight, surface temperature, and precipitation could in turn cause major disruptions to agriculture. For example, one recent study found that an India-Pakistan nuclear war could reduce China’s rice crop by 29%, its maize crop by 20%, and its wheat crop by 53% (Xia et al. 2015). Another study found that an India-Pakistan nuclear war could put two billion people at risk of starvation (Helfand 2013). Details are discussed in the agriculture disruption module.

Reduced surface sunlight, surface temperature, and precipitation could also affect energy supplies. Specifically, reduced sunlight would cause a decline in solar power; reduced precipitation would cause a decline in hydroelectric power; and shifted wind would cause a shift in wind power. Figure 12 shows impacts of these effects. One impact is a disruption of energy supplies, details of which are discussed in the energy supply disruption module. Regions with heavy use of solar and hydroelectric power (e.g., Scandinavia) would be hit especially hard.

To make up for the losses of these power supplies, there might be an increase in fossil fuel, geothermal, and nuclear power generation. Most of the increase would probably come from fossil fuel, which can be scaled up relatively quickly. Geothermal power has relatively little potential to expand. Nuclear power expansion generally involves long construction times and could be further hindered if the nuclear war also strengthens the norm against nuclear power (see the shifted norms module). The net result would likely be an increase in greenhouse gas emissions. How this increase in greenhouse gas emissions compares to decreases caused by other nuclear war effects, to our knowledge, has not been studied and likely depends on the specifics of the nuclear war scenario.

**No AI impact**

**Geist 15** – (8/9, Edward, PhD, MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Previously a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the RAND Corporation, “Is artificial intelligence really an existential threat to humanity?,” http://thebulletin.org/artificial-intelligence-really-existential-threat-humanity8577)

Convinced that sufficient “intelligence” can overcome almost any obstacle, Bostrom acknowledges few limits on what artificial intelligences might accomplish. Engineering realities rarely enter into Bostrom’s analysis, and those that do contradict the thrust of his argument. He admits that the theoretically optimal intelligence, a “perfect Bayesian agent that makes probabilistically optimal use of available information,” will forever remain “unattainable because it is too computationally demanding to be implemented in any physical computer.” Yet Bostrom’s postulated “superintelligences” seem uncomfortably close to this ideal. The author offers few hints of how machine superintelligences would circumvent the computational barriers that render the perfect Bayesian agent impossible, other than promises that the advantages of artificial components relative to human brains will somehow save the day. But over the course of 60 years of attempts to create thinking machines, AI researchers have come to the realization that there is far more to intelligence than simply deploying a faster mechanical alternative to neurons. In fact, the history of artificial intelligence suggests that Bostrom’s “superintelligence” is a practical impossibility.

The General Problem Solver: “a particularly stupid program for solving puzzles.” The dream of creating machines that think dates back to ancient times, but the invention of digital computers in the middle of the 20th century suddenly made it look attainable. The 17th century German polymath Gottfried Leibniz sought to create a universal language from symbolic logic along with a calculus of reasoning for manipulating those symbols; in his foundational 1947 work Cybernetics, MIT mathematician Norbert Wiener noted approvingly that “just as the calculus of arithmetic lends itself to a mechanization progressing through the abacus and the desk computing machine to the ultra-rapid computing machines of the present day, so the calculus ratiocinator of Leibniz contains the germs of the machina ratiocinatrix, the reasoning machine.” By the second half of the 1950s, artificial intelligence pioneers claimed to have already created such machines.

In 1957, future Nobel laureate Herbert A. Simon made a speech declaring that the age of intelligent machines had already dawned. “It is not my aim to surprise or shock you—if indeed that were possible in an age of nuclear fission and prospective interplanetary travel,” he intoned. “But the simplest way I can summarize the situation is to say that there are now in the world machines that think, that learn, and that create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until in a visible future the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied.” Given the “speed with which research in this field is progressing,” Simon beseeched that humanity needed to engage in some serious soul-searching: “The revolution in heuristic problem solving will force man to consider his role in a world in which his intellectual power and speed are outstripped by the intelligence of machines.”

Simon’s astonishing pronouncement was more than mere bluster, for in collaboration with RAND researcher Allen Newell, he was hard at work implementing the General Problem Solver—a computer program they hoped would begin making superhuman machine intelligence a reality. Implementing Aristotle’s notion of means-ends analysis algorithmically, the program sought to minimize the distance from an initial state to the desired goal according to rules provided by the user. The discovery of a few powerful inference mechanisms like those embodied by the General Problem Solver, they hoped, would be the breakthrough that enabled the creation of machines boasting greater-than-human intelligence.

Astonishing as the hubris and naïveté of the pioneering artificial intelligence researchers appear in hindsight, the considerable success of their earliest experiments fueled their overconfidence. Starting from literally nothing, every toy example coaxed out of the crude computers of the time looked like, and really was, a triumph. At the beginning of the 1950s, skeptics scoffed at the notion that computers would ever play chess at all, much less well—yet by the time Simon gave his speech, programs had been developed to play chess and checkers, translate sentences from Russian to English, and even, in the case of Simon and Newell’s “Logic Theorist,” prove mathematical theorems. At this astronomical rate of progress, it seemed like what John McCarthy dubbed “artificial intelligence” in 1956 might achieve spectacular results in the not-too-distant future. Simon and Newell certainly thought so, predicting confidently that by 1967 “a digital computer will be the world's chess champion, unless the rules bar it from competition”—a milestone a computer passed only in the late 1990s—and one of its brethren would “discover and prove an important new mathematical theorem.”

Much to their chagrin, Simon and Newell discovered that the General Problem Solver was not the breakthrough they had envisioned—even though it could, as promised, solve any fully specified symbolic problem. With the right inputs and enough computing resources, the General Problem Solver could solve logic puzzles or prove geometric theorems. Simon and Newell even attempted to program it to improve itself—almost certainly the first attempt to create a self-improving reasoning machine. But for all its generality, the General Problem Solver turned out to be quite bad at solving practical problems—as it turned out, most real-world problems were problems precisely because they were not fully specified—and it became an object of mockery for later AI researchers. In 1976 Yale University professor Drew McDermott dismissed Simon and Newell’s creation as “a particularly stupid program for solving puzzles.” Lamenting that it had “caused everybody a lot of needless excitement and distraction,” McDermott suggested that it “should have been called LFGNS—‘Local Feature-Guided Network Searcher.’”

A mistaken conflation of inference with intelligence. The failure of programs like the General Problem Solver forced the field of artificial intelligence to accept that

its early assumptions about the nature of intelligence had been mistaken. Stanford University’s Edward Feigenbaum noted in the 1970s that “[f]or a long time AI focused its attention almost exclusively on the development of clever inference methods,” only to discover that “the power of its systems does not reside in the inference method.” Not only did powerful inference mechanisms offer little advantage, they learned that “almost any inference method will do,” as “the power resides in the knowledge.” This unwanted discovery inspired a massive reorientation of AI research toward “knowledge-based reasoning” during the 1970s. It also poses substantial obstacles to the kind of “intelligence explosion” Bostrom fears, since it implies that machines could not become “superintelligent” by refining their inference algorithms.

Bostrom’s descriptions of how machines might rapidly improve their intelligence make it clear that he does not appreciate that the knowledge possessed by reasoning programs is much more important than how those programs work. Asserting that “even without any designated knowledge base, a sufficiently superior mind might be able to learn much by simply introspecting on the workings of its own psyche,” he muses that “perhaps a superintelligence could even deduce much about the likely properties of the world a priori (combining logical inference with a probability prior biased towards simpler worlds, and a few elementary facts implied by the superintelligence’s existence as a reasoning system).”

Bostrom’s mistaken conflation of inference mechanisms with intelligence is also apparent in his colorful descriptions of how intelligent machines might annihilate humanity. Simply depriving AIs of information about the world is not adequate to render them safe, he claims, as they might be able to accomplish such feats as solving extremely complex problems in physical science without the need to carry out real-world experiments. In a scenario borrowed from Yudkowsky, Bostrom posits that a superintelligence might “crack the protein folding problem” and then manipulate a gullible human into mixing mail-ordered synthesized proteins “in a specified environment” to create “a very primitive ‘wet’ nanosystem, which, ribosome-like, is capable of accepting external instructions; perhaps patterned acoustic vibrations delivered by a speaker attached to the beaker.” It could then employ this system to bootstrap increasingly sophisticated nanotechnologies, and “at a pre-set time, nanofactories producing nerve gas or target-seeking mosquito-like robots might then burgeon forth simultaneously from every square meter of the globe (although more effective ways of killing could probably be devised by a machine with the technology research superpower).” This scenario doesn't just strain a reader’s credulity; it also implies a fanciful understanding of the nature of technological development in which “genius” can somehow substitute for hard work and countless intermediate failures. In the real world, the “lone genius inventor” is a myth; even smarter-than-human AIs could never escape the tedium of an iterative research and development process.

A misguided approach to the control problem. The findings of artificial intelligence researchers bode ill for Bostrom’s recommendations for how to prevent superintelligent machines from determining the fate of mankind. The second half of Superintelligence is devoted to strategies for approaching what Bostrom terms the “control problem.” While creating economic or ecological incentives for artificial intelligences to be friendly toward humanity might seem like obvious ways to keep AI under control, Bostrom has little faith in them; he believes the machines will be powerful enough to subvert these obstacles if they want. Dismissing “capability control” as “at best, a temporary and auxiliary measure,” he focuses the bulk of his analysis on “giving the AI a final goal that makes it easier to control.” Although Bostrom acknowledges that formulating an appropriate goal is likely to be extremely challenging, he is confident that intelligent machines will aggressively protect their “goal content integrity” no matter how powerful they become—an idea he appears to have borrowed from AI theorist Stephen Omohundro. Bostrom devotes several chapters to how to specify goals that can be incorporated into “seed AIs,” so they will protect human interests once they become superintelligent.

### Russia

#### Perm do both – we can first strike with bombers

#### Breaks the norm of restraint – causes escalation – That’s Mosher 20

#### Russian first strike fails

Rodriguez 19 [Luisa Rodriguez, Luisa Rodriguez is a Research Analyst at Rethink Priorities and a Visiting Researcher at the Future of Humanity Institute. Previously, she conducted cost-effectiveness evaluations of nonprofit and government programs at ImpactMatters, Innovations for Poverty Action, and GiveWell. M.A. in Sustainable international development from Brandeis, and B.A. in sociology and anthropology from Carleton college. 6-17-2019, "Would US and Russian nuclear forces survive a first strike?," No Publication, https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/dtQ5hpYjniYKWhmhx/would-us-and-russian-nuclear-forces-survive-a-first-strike#fn-wo7rRbsuRCKEip2HQ-19, accessed 12-30-2019]LHSBC

- Besides picture omitted all brackets were in the original article

- IMO pretty unbiased and draws from everyone

- Internally Cites (important ones):

1. Lieber and Press (u know the quals already lol)

2. Hans Kristensen: Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists; Informs public about nuclear weapons; Frequently consulted to and widely referenced in the media on nuclear weapons.

3. Military Watch is a leading provider in unbiased and unpartisan military news

4. Matthew McKinzie focuses on nuclear power, nonproliferation, and arms-control agreements. PhD in experimental nuclear physics from UPenn and conducted research at Los Alamos National Laboratory and a postdoctoral associate at Cornell University.

5. \*Austin Long, a non-resident FPRI Senior Fellow, is an senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

Previously assistant professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and an Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation; authored reports for the Carnegie Corporation, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Major analyst for NATO and the US; Served as a consultant to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory, Science Applications International Corporation, the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, and the International Crisis Group.

Dr. Long received his B.S. from the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology and his Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

\*\* Brendan Rittenhouse Green is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati and former fellow at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

6. James Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. PhD in [theoretical physics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theoretical_physics) at [Cambridge University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_University)

7. The Missile Threat website brings authoritative and up-to-date open source information and analysis about ballistic and cruise missiles around the globe and the systems designed to defend against them. Missile Threat is a product of the [Missile Defense Project](https://www.csis.org/programs/international-security-program/missile-defense-project) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which looks at a wide range of policy, program, and strategic issues related to missile defense.

Other qual is the US government (it’s a report on missile defense)

The survivability of the Russian nuclear triad∂ Currently, the total number of nuclear warheads in Russia’s nuclear arsenal is estimated at 6,490, with ~1,600 deployed ([Kristensen & Korda, 2019](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891?needAccess=true)). While I’m most interested in understanding the distribution systems of \_ \_deployed warheads as I did in the case of the US arsenal, the breakdown of deployed Russian warheads is more poorly understood; the US releases declassified reports on its arsenal while Russia doesn’t. Given that, I can only assess the distribution of nuclear warheads in the air-based, sea-based, and land-based legs of the triad for the strategic nuclear forces — comprised of high-yield nuclear weapons that can be delivered over long distances.[[10]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/dtQ5hpYjniYKWhmhx/would-us-and-russian-nuclear-forces-survive-a-first-strike#fn-wo7rRbsuRCKEip2HQ-10) I focus on the strategic forces as those are the weapons that would be used to target military facilities, industrial areas, and cities, while shorter-range \_tactical \_nuclear weapons are intended for use in battle ([Kristensen & Korda, 2019](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891?needAccess=true)). Of the approximately 2,670 strategic forces inventory, 1,165 nuclear warheads are land-based — 414 of those are road-mobile — 786 are air-based, and 720 are sea-based ([Kristensen & Korda, 2019](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891?needAccess=true)).∂ [XXXXXXXXX Picture Omitted XXXXXXXXX]∂ Russia’s submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)∂ Again, locating enemy submarines is extremely difficult, making counterforce targeting against Russia’s SSBNs very challenging. However, unlike the US, Russia’s submarine fleet has a history of extremely poor “operational readiness” ([McKinzie, eds. 2001, p.66](https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/us-nuclear-war-plan-report.pdf)).[[11]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/dtQ5hpYjniYKWhmhx/would-us-and-russian-nuclear-forces-survive-a-first-strike#fn-wo7rRbsuRCKEip2HQ-11) [[12]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/dtQ5hpYjniYKWhmhx/would-us-and-russian-nuclear-forces-survive-a-first-strike#fn-wo7rRbsuRCKEip2HQ-12) Moreover, while the Russian navy has drastically improved in the past couple of decades, its submarines could be vulnerable during a first strike if only a few submarines were actually on patrol, or if they were positioned near their own naval bases, which the US would easily be able to target, as they have done in the recent past ([Kristensen, 2013](https://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/05/russianssbns/)).[[13]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/dtQ5hpYjniYKWhmhx/would-us-and-russian-nuclear-forces-survive-a-first-strike#fn-wo7rRbsuRCKEip2HQ-13)∂ As is the case with US SSBNs, new technologies in remote sensing make Russian SSBNs increasingly vulnerable. At the same time, countermeasures are difficult and extremely costly and time-consuming to develop ([Lieber & Press, 2017a, pp. 46-48](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00273)). Given that the US is believed to have a bigger nuclear modernization budget, Russia may be at a considerable disadvantage when it comes to the survivability of their SLBMs ([Lieber & Press, 2017a](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00273); [Tian et al., 2019](https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/fs_1904_milex_2018_0.pdf); [Kofman, 2019](https://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/05/russianssbns/)).[[14]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/dtQ5hpYjniYKWhmhx/would-us-and-russian-nuclear-forces-survive-a-first-strike#fn-wo7rRbsuRCKEip2HQ-14)∂ Given all of this, I have a lot of uncertainty about whether or what proportion of the Russian SLBMs would survive a first strike. I can imagine it could be as few as 10% or as many as 100% of Russia’s SLBMs (between 40 and 430).∂ Russia’s air-based strategic bombers∂ Unlike the US, Russia does not have stealthy strategic bombers (for now). Instead, it has [air-launched cruise missiles](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/#air-launched-cruise-missile-alcm) (ALCMs), shorter-range missiles, and [nuclear gravity bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unguided_bomb) that would be launched from heavy bombers.[[15]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/dtQ5hpYjniYKWhmhx/would-us-and-russian-nuclear-forces-survive-a-first-strike#fn-wo7rRbsuRCKEip2HQ-15) While they lack stealth technology, Russia’s heavy bombers maintain their survivability by being able to launch cruise missiles from really far away (thousands of kilometers), shielding them from US air defense systems and fighter aircraft ([Military Watch, 2018](https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/what-we-know-about-russia-s-upcoming-pak-da-next-generation-heavy-bomber)). So, my sense is that Russia’s heavy bombers have comparable survivability to the US’s stealthy strategic bombers. Like the US air-based nuclear forces, Russia’s is vulnerable at a few ‘choke points’ — before take off, mid-attack, and during refueling and repair — but is overall very survivable. While, as I described above, radar and other technologies are improving, Russia’s heavy bombers will likely remain relatively survivable for the time being.∂ This in mind, I expect some fraction of Russian heavy bombers to be destroyed during a counterforce attack, but I believe many or most would remain unscathed. I guess that somewhere between 60% and 100% (280 and 470) of Russia air-based nuclear warheads would survive a first strike.[[16]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/dtQ5hpYjniYKWhmhx/would-us-and-russian-nuclear-forces-survive-a-first-strike#fn-wo7rRbsuRCKEip2HQ-16)∂ Russia’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)∂ Within the ICBM leg of the triad, deployed ICBMs can be further broken down into: silo-based ICBMs, which both the US and Russia have, and “road-mobile” ICBMs, which only Russia has.∂ Like the US’s land-based nuclear forces, Russia’s silo-based ICBMs would be vulnerable to attack. Also, like the US’s land-based forces, super-hardened silos would make the destruction of 100% of Russia’s silo-based nuclear weapons extremely costly, but improvements in US technology mean the US could get reasonably close ([Lieber & Press, 2017a](https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/isec_a_00273_LieberPress.pdf#page=12); [McKinzie, eds. 2001](https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/us-nuclear-war-plan-report.pdf)). For example, the accuracy of US long-range ballistic missiles has improved dramatically since the end of the Cold War as a result of substantial progress in submarine geolocation and missile guidance systems. Whereas in 1985 US SLBMs had only a 9% change of effectively destroying a hardened silo, today that chance has increased to 90% ([Lieber & Press, 2017b, p. 3](https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Computer%20Nukes%20-%20final.pdf)).∂ Russia’s road-mobile land-based ICBMs have the additional tactical challenge of being ‘relocatable.’ Through bilateral arms control treaties, Russia has shared the coordinates of locations associated with a number of mobile ICBMs (associated garrisons, parking sites, etc.) [(McKinzie, eds. 2001)](https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/us-nuclear-war-plan-report.pdf). The US also has intelligence on the dispersal patterns of road-mobile ICBMs, satellite imaging that’s high-resolution enough to see road-mobile ICBMs (as long as they aren’t in underground tunnels), and the ability to monitor communications between road-mobile missiles ([McKinzie, eds. 2001](https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/us-nuclear-war-plan-report.pdf); [Lieber & Press, 2017a](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00273)).∂ According to [McKinzie et al.](https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/us-nuclear-war-plan-report.pdf), road-mobile missiles are kept stationary at garrisons and parking sites periodically ([2001](https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/us-nuclear-war-plan-report.pdf)). Many of them would only ‘disperse’ after a first strike early warning. Any road-mobile missiles still in the garrisons by the time a first strike arrived would be destroyed with relative ease. One to two 300kt nuclear warheads allocated per garrison known to be sheltering road-mobile ICBMs would yield a high probability of successfully destroying the missile systems positioned there ([McKinzie et al., 2001](https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/us-nuclear-war-plan-report.pdf)).∂ What’s more, the launch sites that would be used by Russia’s mobile missiles are both relatively easy to identify and easy to target, meaning the US would have some success destroying road-mobile missiles even after they’d dispersed ([McKinzie et al., 2001](https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/us-nuclear-war-plan-report.pdf)).∂ But road-mobile missiles that have been mobilized and aren’t positioned at a launch site would be much harder to target, and in fact, used to be considered “inherently survivable” (see a discussion of the general consensus about this in [Long & Green, 2014](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150); [McKinzie, eds. 2001, 54](https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/us-nuclear-war-plan-report.pdf)). According to Long and Green, “In particular, mobile nuclear weapons — ‘relocatable targets’ in the common parlance — are now generally viewed as untargetable in a first strike. A secure second strike has therefore become almost synonymous with a state possessing significant numbers of [SLBMs] and/or mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)” ([2014, p. 40](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150)).∂ Once located, road-mobile missiles are easier to destroy, even while moving, as they have weaker defenses than silo-based missile systems ([Long & Green, 2014](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150); [Acton, 2010](https://carnegieendowment.org/2010/03/01/managing-vulnerability-pub-40264)). In fact, a nuclear bomb wouldn’t have to detonate particularly close a road-mobile target to it to destroy it. For example, a 100kt ICBM detonated in the air would damage a road-mobile missile system anywhere within an area of 26 square kilometers ([McKinzie, eds. 2001](https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/us-nuclear-war-plan-report.pdf)). And if the bomb detonated is big enough, the road-mobile missile system wouldn’t be able to drive outside the radius of the detonation quickly enough to escape the blast, even with early warnings.∂ According to Long and Green ([2014](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150)), improvements in technology, in particular by the US, is getting closer to being able to locate road-mobile ICBMs.[[17]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/dtQ5hpYjniYKWhmhx/would-us-and-russian-nuclear-forces-survive-a-first-strike#fn-wo7rRbsuRCKEip2HQ-17) Modern sensors now take advantage of techniques like spectroscopy and interferometry, among others, allowing them to, for example, detect vapors that leak out of missile silos and trucks from a distance ([Lieber & Press, 2017](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00273)). Similarly, remotely piloted vehicles like drones will be able to monitor the movement of mobile-ICBMs, allowing the US to finally track mobile-ICBMs over time after they’ve been identified ([Lieber & Press, 2017](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00273)).∂ But according to James Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “locating mobile ballistic missiles is exceptionally hard,” and even taking improvements in US technology into account, “it is still fiendishly difficult to locate mobile missiles hidden by a well-prepared enemy” ([Acton, 2010](https://carnegieendowment.org/2010/03/01/managing-vulnerability-pub-40264)). We're just not at the point where we can reliably detect and track road-mobile nuclear forces.∂ Taken together, I expect that — assuming Russia didn’t launch on warning — between 75% and 99% (340–440) of Russia’s silo-based ICBMs and between 10% and 50%, or (30–120) of its road-mobile ICBMs would be destroyed in a US first strike.∂ Russia’s Missile Defense Systems∂ According to CSIS Missile Defense Project, "Russia now possesses some of the most advanced air and missile defense systems in the world” with missile defense systems across the country, and 68 nuclear-armed interceptors are located surrounding Moscow ([2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/russian-air-defense/); [Secretary of Defense, 2019](https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf)). To date, the defense systems have been limited to destroying aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, and short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles, but the arrival of Russia’s newest surface-to-air missile (the S-500) in 2020 may allow it to target US ICBMs ([Ritzen, 2018](https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/countries-buy-controversial-russian-400-181007205808578.html); [CSIS](https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/s-400-triumf/)).[[18]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/dtQ5hpYjniYKWhmhx/would-us-and-russian-nuclear-forces-survive-a-first-strike#fn-wo7rRbsuRCKEip2HQ-18)∂ But my impression is that these systems are intended to protect the capitol — not necessarily to protect Russia’s nuclear arsenal. I therefore don’t expect them to have any meaningful impact on the survivability of its nuclear arsenal.∂ Surviving a US first strike∂ Taken together, I expect that Russia’s nuclear forces would likely fare a bit worse than the US’s during a first strike. If we assume that Russia’s deployed nuclear forces are distributed across the three legs of its triad in proportion to the distribution of its strategic warheads, Russia could be left with up to 1,240 nuclear warheads after a first strike. Realistically though, I expect it would be far fewer — perhaps as few as 450. In either case, Russia would still be able to mount a formidable second strike[[19]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/dtQ5hpYjniYKWhmhx/would-us-and-russian-nuclear-forces-survive-a-first-strike#fn-wo7rRbsuRCKEip2HQ-19).[START FOOTNOTE 19: According to Lieber and Press ([2018](https://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/201801/nuclear-arsenal.cfm)), “even a 90% effective strike against an enemy’s arsenal would be a failure, since the surviving weapons could inflict a devastating counterattack.” END FOOTNOTE 19 ]∂ [XXXXXXXXX Picture Omitted XXXXXXXXX]∂ Like above, my conclusions could be quite different if it turned out either the US or Russia were being deceptive about the size, composition, and capabilities of their nuclear arsenals or missile defense systems. While I think it’s relatively less likely that the US would execute a cyberattack to augment a first strike against Russia, cyberattacks and other unknowns add to my uncertainty.∂ Conclusion∂ For now, it seems like neither the US nor Russia would likely be able to execute a ‘perfect’ counterforce strike, making it unlikely for either to put an immediate end to the nuclear exchange. Uncertainties about deception, cyberattacks, and other unknowns, I expect that [between ~990 and ~1,500 of the US’s deployed nuclear warheads and between ~450 and~1,240 of Russia’s deployed nuclear warheads](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lk-L00RjnZsI_Jwxcpmj_er1pu0PEa2qrAAh2HWoELA/edit?usp=sharing) would survive a first strike. However, improvements in technology could substantially threaten the survivability of deployment systems that have been considered ‘inherently survivable’ for decades.

#### Missile Defense fails

Grego 18 [Laura Grego, 4-24-2018, "The Faulty and Dangerous Logic of Missile Defense," Scientific American Blog Network, https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-faulty-and-dangerous-logic-of-missile-defense/, accessed 12-27-2019]LHSBC

Reflecting the difficulty of the task, and the haste and lack of rigor of its development, the GMD system today has a very poor test record, even though these tests were “[scripted for success](http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-icbm-missile-interception-20170526-story.html)” according to former Pentagon head testing official Phil Coyle.∂ [The problems are well documented](https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/us-missile-defense/shielded-from-oversight#.Ws_2-S4bPDc). Only about half of the 18 intercept tests since 1999 successfully destroyed their targets, and the test record has not improved with time: only two of the last five tests were successful—and GMD has still has not been tested under operationally realistic conditions. Thus, there is no evidence that the $40 billion GMD system provides a reliable defense, even against a country like North Korea.∂ More fundamentally, even if the reliability is improved, GMD’s prospects for providing an effective defense in the future are poor because it will face [countermeasures](https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/cm_all.pdf) that any country that has developed a long-range missile and a nuclear warhead could readily use to confuse or overwhelm the system.∂ Despite these problems, however, the administration and Congress plan to expand the system; the [current budget includes funding](https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/budgetfy19.pdf) to build 20 additional interceptors.∂ Given North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear-armed long-range missile, it seems reasonable to ask whether something isn’t better than nothing. That sounds plausible, but does not hold up upon closer examination. The unconstrained pursuit of missile defenses can, perhaps counterintuitively, create even greater risks.∂ For example, a belief that missile defense works better than it does can lead political and military leaders to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy and take more risks. U.S. officials [regularly describe the system](https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/07/Shielded-from-Oversight-appendix-9.pdf) as much more capable than it has been demonstrated to be. Even President Trump [stated on television](http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2017/10/11/president-trump-vows-largest-tax-cut-in-history-this-country.html) last October that “We have missiles that can knock out a missile in the air 97 percent of the time.” Yet the [testing data show](https://allthingsnuclear.org/lgrego/missile-defense-will-not-work-97-percent) there is no basis to expect interceptors to work more than 40 to 50 percent of the time even under the most generous and easiest conditions.

#### No AI impact –

#### We’ll re-insert their terrible impact ev – can’t control the impact, it’s inevitable in every state, only an if statement about Russia, already in the squo, and extinction is only hype – READ GREEN

Mike Rogers 17, former US Representative from Michigan, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Artificial intelligence — the arms race we may not be able to control", TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/351725-artificial-intelligence-is-the-new-arms-race-we-may-not-be-able-to-control

Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become ruler of the world,” said Vladimir Putin. The sphere the President of Russia is referring to is artificial intelligence (AI) and his comments should give you a moment of pause. Addressing students at the beginning of our Labor Day weekend, Putin remarked “Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind,” adding, “It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict.” For once, I find myself in agreement with the President of Russia, but just this once. Artificial Intelligence offers incredible promise and peril. Nowhere is this clearer than in the realm of national security. Today un-crewed systems are a fact of modern warfare. Nearly every country is adopting systems where personnel are far removed from the conflict and wage war by remote control. AI stands to sever that ground connection. Imagine a fully autonomous Predator or Reaper drone. Managed by an AI system, the drone could identify targets, determine their legitimacy, and conduct a strike all without human intervention. Indeed, the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom issued a press statement in September that the country “does not possess fully autonomous weapon systems and has no intention of developing them,” and that its weapons systems “will always be under control as an absolute guarantee of human oversight and authority and accountability.” Let’s think smaller. Imagine a tiny insect-sized drone loaded with explosive. Guided by a pre-programmed AI, it could hunt down a specific target — a politician, a general, or an opposition figure — determine when to strike, how to strike, and if to strike based on its own learning. Howard Hughes Medical Center recently attached a backpack to a genetically modified dragonfly and flew it remotely. These examples are, however, where humans are involved and largely control the left and right limits of AI. Yet, there are examples of AI purposely and independently going beyond programed parameters. Rogue algorithms led to a flash crash of the British Pound. In 2016, in-game AIs created super AIs weapons and hunted down human players, and AIs have created their own languages that were indecipherable to humans. AIs proved more effective than their human counterparts in producing and catching users in spear phishing programs. Not only did the AIs create more content, they successfully captured more users with their deception. While seemingly simple and low stakes in nature, extrapolate these scenarios into more significant and risky areas and the consequences become much greater. Cybersecurity is no different. Today we are focused on the hackers, trolls, and cyber criminals (officially sanctioned and otherwise) who seek to penetrate our networks, steal our intellectual property, and leave behind malicious code for activation in the event of a conflict. Replace the individual with an AI and imagine how fast hacking takes place; networks against networks, at machine speed all without a human in the loop. Sound far-fetched? It’s not. In 2016, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency held an AI on AI capture the flag contest called the Cyber Grand Challenge at the DEF CON event. AI networks against AI networks. In August of this year the founders of 116 AI and robotics companies signed a letter petitioning the United Nations to ban lethal autonomous systems. Signatories to this letter included Google DeepMind’s co-founder Mustafa Suleyman and Elon Musk who, in response to Putin’s quote tweeted, “Competition for AI superiority at national level most likely cause of WW3 imo (sic)”. AI is not some far off future challenge. It is a challenge today and one with which we must grapple. I am in favor of fielding any system that enhances our national security, but we must have an open and honest conversation about the implications of AI, the consequences of which we do not, and may not, fully understand. This is not a new type of bullet or missile. This is a potentially fully autonomous system that even with human oversight and guidance will make its own decisions on the battlefield and in cyberspace. How can we ensure that the system does not escape our control? How can we prevent such systems from falling into the hands of terrorists or insurgents? Who controls the source code? How and can we build in so-called impenetrable kill switches? AI and AI-like systems are slowly being introduced into our arsenal. Our adversaries, China, Russia, and others are also introducing AI systems into their arsenals as well. Implementation is happening faster than our ability to fully comprehend the consequences. Putin’s new call spells out a new arms race. Rushing to AI weapon systems without guiding principles is a dangerous. It risks an escalation that we do not fully understand and may not be able to control. The cost of limiting AI intelligence being weaponized could vastly exceed all of our nuclear proliferation efforts to date. More troubling, the consequences of failure are equally existential.

#### Small blasts cause extinction

Mills et al. 14 (Michael Mills, NCAR Earth System Laboratory; Owen Toon, Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics and Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences; Julia Lee-Taylor, NCAR Earth System Laboratory, Alan Robock, Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers; 4/1/14, “Multidecadal Global Cooling and Unprecedented Ozone Loss Following a Regional Nuclear Conflict.” Earth’s Future, 2, 161–176)

Pierazzo et al. [2010] reviewed literature considering the effects of large and prolonged increases in UV-B radiation, similar to those we calculate, on living organisms, including agriculture and marine ecosystems. General effects on terrestrial plants have been found to include reduced height, shoot mass, and foliage area [Caldwell et al., 2007]. Walbot [1999] found the DNA damage to maize crops from 33% ozone depletion to accumulate proportionally to exposure time, being passed to successive generations, and destabilizing genetic lines. Research indicates that UV-B exposure may alter the susceptibility of plants to attack by insects, alter nutrient cycling in soils (including nitrogen fixation by cyanobacteria), and shift competitive balances among species [Caldwell et al., 1998; Solheim et al., 2002; Mpoloka, 2008].∂ The ozone depletion we calculate could also damage aquatic ecosystems, which supply more than 30% of the animal protein consumed by humans. Häder et al. [1995] estimate that 16% ozone depletion could reduce phytoplankton, the basis of the marine food chain, by 5%, resulting in a loss of 7 million tons of fish harvest per year. They also report that elevated UV levels damage the early developmental stages of fish, shrimp, crab, amphibians, and other animals. The combined effects of elevated UV levels alone on terrestrial agriculture and marine ecosystems could put significant pressures on global food security. ∂ The ozone loss would persist for a decade at the same time that growing seasons would be reduced by killing frosts, and regional precipitation patterns would shift. The combination of years of killing frosts, reductions in needed precipitation, and prolonged enhancement of UV radiation, in addition to impacts on fisheries because of temperature and salinity changes, could exert significant pressures on food supplies across many regions of the globe. As the January to May 2008 global rice crisis demonstrated, even relatively small food price pressures can be amplified by political reactions, such as the fearful restrictions on food exports implemented by India and Vietnam, followed by Egypt, Pakistan, and Brazil, which produced severe shortages in the Philippines, Africa, and Latin America [Slayton, 2009]. It is conceivable that the global pressures on food supplies from a regional nuclear conflict could, directly or via ensuing panic, significantly degrade global food security or even produce a global nuclear famine.∂ 5. Summary∂ We present the first simulations of the chemistry-climate effects of smoke produced by a nuclear war using an Earth system model that includes both stratospheric chemistry and feedbacks on sea ice and deep ocean circulation. We calculate impacts on surface climate persisting significantly longer than previous studies, as a result of several feedback mechanisms. First, BC absorbs sunlight, heating ambient air, and self-lofts to the upper stratosphere, a region treated with greater vertical resolution in CESM1(WACCM) than in the model used by Robock et al. [2007b]. Second, the BC spreads globally, absorbing sunlight, which heats the stratosphere and cools the surface. This has the effect of reducing the strength of the stratospheric circulation and increasing the lifetime of BC in the stratosphere. Third, the reduction of surface temperatures cools the upper 100 m of the ocean by >0.5 K for 12 years, and expands ice extent on sea and land. This lends inertia to the surface cooling due to both thermal mass and enhanced albedo, causing recovery in surface temperatures to lag the recovery in BC by a decade or more. As a result, we calculate that surface temperatures remain below the control ensemble range even 26 years after the nuclear war.∂ The global average temperature increase in the stratosphere following the BC injection initially exceeds 70 K, and persists above 30 K for 5 years, with full recovery taking two decades. As in previous studies, this temperature increase produces global ozone loss on a scale never observed, as a result of several chemical mechanisms. The resulting enhancements to UV radiation at the surface would be directly damaging to human health, and would damage agricultural crops, as well as ecosystems on land and in the oceans. These results illustrate some of the severe negative consequences of the use of only 100 of the smallest nuclear weapons in modern megacities. Yet the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France each have stockpiles of much larger nuclear weapons that dwarf the 100 examined here [Robock et al., 2007a; Toon et al., 2007]. Knowing the perils to human society and other forms of life on Earth of even small numbers of nuclear weapons, societies can better understand the urgent need to eliminate this danger worldwide.

### North Korea

#### Perm do both – we can first strike with bombers

#### Breaks the norm of restraint – causes escalation – That’s Mosher 20

#### Small blasts cause extinction

Mills et al. 14 (Michael Mills, NCAR Earth System Laboratory; Owen Toon, Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics and Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences; Julia Lee-Taylor, NCAR Earth System Laboratory, Alan Robock, Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers; 4/1/14, “Multidecadal Global Cooling and Unprecedented Ozone Loss Following a Regional Nuclear Conflict.” Earth’s Future, 2, 161–176)

Pierazzo et al. [2010] reviewed literature considering the effects of large and prolonged increases in UV-B radiation, similar to those we calculate, on living organisms, including agriculture and marine ecosystems. General effects on terrestrial plants have been found to include reduced height, shoot mass, and foliage area [Caldwell et al., 2007]. Walbot [1999] found the DNA damage to maize crops from 33% ozone depletion to accumulate proportionally to exposure time, being passed to successive generations, and destabilizing genetic lines. Research indicates that UV-B exposure may alter the susceptibility of plants to attack by insects, alter nutrient cycling in soils (including nitrogen fixation by cyanobacteria), and shift competitive balances among species [Caldwell et al., 1998; Solheim et al., 2002; Mpoloka, 2008].∂ The ozone depletion we calculate could also damage aquatic ecosystems, which supply more than 30% of the animal protein consumed by humans. Häder et al. [1995] estimate that 16% ozone depletion could reduce phytoplankton, the basis of the marine food chain, by 5%, resulting in a loss of 7 million tons of fish harvest per year. They also report that elevated UV levels damage the early developmental stages of fish, shrimp, crab, amphibians, and other animals. The combined effects of elevated UV levels alone on terrestrial agriculture and marine ecosystems could put significant pressures on global food security. ∂ The ozone loss would persist for a decade at the same time that growing seasons would be reduced by killing frosts, and regional precipitation patterns would shift. The combination of years of killing frosts, reductions in needed precipitation, and prolonged enhancement of UV radiation, in addition to impacts on fisheries because of temperature and salinity changes, could exert significant pressures on food supplies across many regions of the globe. As the January to May 2008 global rice crisis demonstrated, even relatively small food price pressures can be amplified by political reactions, such as the fearful restrictions on food exports implemented by India and Vietnam, followed by Egypt, Pakistan, and Brazil, which produced severe shortages in the Philippines, Africa, and Latin America [Slayton, 2009]. It is conceivable that the global pressures on food supplies from a regional nuclear conflict could, directly or via ensuing panic, significantly degrade global food security or even produce a global nuclear famine.∂ 5. Summary∂ We present the first simulations of the chemistry-climate effects of smoke produced by a nuclear war using an Earth system model that includes both stratospheric chemistry and feedbacks on sea ice and deep ocean circulation. We calculate impacts on surface climate persisting significantly longer than previous studies, as a result of several feedback mechanisms. First, BC absorbs sunlight, heating ambient air, and self-lofts to the upper stratosphere, a region treated with greater vertical resolution in CESM1(WACCM) than in the model used by Robock et al. [2007b]. Second, the BC spreads globally, absorbing sunlight, which heats the stratosphere and cools the surface. This has the effect of reducing the strength of the stratospheric circulation and increasing the lifetime of BC in the stratosphere. Third, the reduction of surface temperatures cools the upper 100 m of the ocean by >0.5 K for 12 years, and expands ice extent on sea and land. This lends inertia to the surface cooling due to both thermal mass and enhanced albedo, causing recovery in surface temperatures to lag the recovery in BC by a decade or more. As a result, we calculate that surface temperatures remain below the control ensemble range even 26 years after the nuclear war.∂ The global average temperature increase in the stratosphere following the BC injection initially exceeds 70 K, and persists above 30 K for 5 years, with full recovery taking two decades. As in previous studies, this temperature increase produces global ozone loss on a scale never observed, as a result of several chemical mechanisms. The resulting enhancements to UV radiation at the surface would be directly damaging to human health, and would damage agricultural crops, as well as ecosystems on land and in the oceans. These results illustrate some of the severe negative consequences of the use of only 100 of the smallest nuclear weapons in modern megacities. Yet the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France each have stockpiles of much larger nuclear weapons that dwarf the 100 examined here [Robock et al., 2007a; Toon et al., 2007]. Knowing the perils to human society and other forms of life on Earth of even small numbers of nuclear weapons, societies can better understand the urgent need to eliminate this danger worldwide.

#### Pretty Please, Don’t do it

David Barno & Nora Bensahel 10/10/17 (Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) is a Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, and Dr. Nora Bensahel is a Distinguished Scholar in Residence, at the School of International Service at American University.) “THE GROWING DANGER OF A U.S. NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE ON NORTH KOREA” https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/the-growing-danger-of-a-u-s-nuclear-first-strike-on-north-korea/

A nuclear first strike, then, may seem like an attractive military option to a president who has vowed to end the North Korean nuclear threat once and for all. Yet its political, economic, and moral consequences would be so devastating that it would be hard for any American to imagine, in retrospect, why this ever seemed like a good idea.∂ First and foremost, the human costs would be catastrophic. Millions of North Koreans would either be killed or grievously wounded from the effects of fires, blasts, and radiation. The radioactive fallout from such a strike could spread contamination thousands of miles, directly affecting South Korea, Japan, and China, as well as countries and populations across the region and beyond. Global or regional weather patterns could also be disrupted, affecting agriculture and the environment for years to come.∂ Even if those tragic human costs could somehow be set aside, the cascading range of other consequences would be sufficient to avoid such an attack. China could respond militarily, by moving forces into the parts of North Korea less affected by the strike, for example. This could result in a risky confrontation with U.S. forces seeking to confirm the complete destruction of North Korean nuclear capabilities. Chinese troops could also collide with a potential influx of U.S. and South Korean ground troops trying to establish civil order and provide humanitarian relief to the North Korean populace in the aftermath of the strikes. China might also respond to an attack on its ally more forcefully, by striking U.S. bases in the region or possibly even the U.S. homeland, especially since radiation would inevitably blanket some of its territory.∂ The regional and even global economy would be upended by disrupted trade and the immediate need to provide a massive relief effort for North Korea. Yet the longer-term need to rebuild the country and reconstitute some sort of government would have even more significant economic consequences. The costs of such a colossal effort — including nuclear cleanup and care for the countless numbers of injured and displaced survivors — would be nearly incalculable. Who would pay for all this is less clear still, and would undoubtedly be part of the immediate political jockeying that would result. China, South Korea, Japan, and the United States would all be battling for influence in the devastated territory while seeking to limit the drain on their national economies.∂ The subsequent political backlash would also be immense, with the United States finding itself increasingly isolated. Washington could be rejected by its long-standing allies in Seoul, Tokyo, and beyond, labelled as the aggressor in a massively devastating nuclear war of choice that killed or wounded millions of civilians. U.S. defense and trade relations might be abrogated by shocked friends and allies around the world. Trade boycotts and other economic sanctions could follow. Such a diplomatic blow to the United States would decisively shift the regional and possibly even the global balance of power towards China. There is no way to predict all of the second- and third-order political consequences of a U.S. attack, but it is hard to imagine that they would serve American interests. The U.S. economy would unquestionably be shaken, as U.S. financial markets went into shock, responding to both the strike itself and the negative global reaction.∂ Finally, the United States would immediately forfeit its moral standing in the world. Initiating a nuclear first strike would abruptly and irrevocably terminate any U.S. claims to be the preeminent world leader, one that claims a deep commitment to the rule of law and accepted norms of international behavior. If the first strike occurred without international support — as would almost surely be the case — the United States would rightly be condemned by the global community for its aggression and blatant violations of international law. A unilateral U.S. decision to use nuclear weapons for first time since World War II by launching a first strike against an adversary without compelling evidence of an imminent attack will be judged harshly for generations — perhaps even by current U.S. citizens as well.∂ Is nuclear war on the Korean peninsula inevitable? No, but only if the Trump administration recognizes that a nuclear first strike cannot be a viable alternative, because its consequences are simply unfathomable. Deterrence is the vastly preferable option. The United States faced similar challenges after World War II, when the Soviets and then the Chinese developed nuclear weapons and the ability to strike U.S. targets. In both cases, arguments for American first strikes to remove these threats were soundly rejected in favor of long-term policies of deterrence — which have successfully avoided a nuclear conflagration for many decades. Effective deterrence requires only an adversary who is rational enough to seek his own survival — a threshold that even Kim Jong Un meets. Trump’s most trusted advisors and experienced veteran military men, John Kelly and James Mattis, should repeatedly make this argument to the president while there is still time. There is virtually no likelihood that North Korea can be pressured to give up its nuclear program at this juncture. Given that reality, the best way to advance U.S. national security and protect American lives is to publicly commit to deterring the Korean regime while privately removing threats to its survival. The alternative is a deadly nuclear first strike from which there will be no winners.

#### No capacity, no use and no impact to the grid

Barrett 17— [Brian Barrett, "North Korea's Plenty Scary Without an Overhyped EMP Threat," WIRED, 11-1-17, <https://www.wired.com/story/north-korea-emp-threat/>]

* large numbers from sci-fi, can’t be proven, US military equipment is shielded, very high risk for NoKo, out of character, can’t prevent a counterstrike from US or other areas,

Scary stuff, especially that 90 percent number, which was first offered by representative Roscoe Bartlett in a 2008 Congressional hearing, and backed by a physicist—and leading voice in the EMP issue—named William Graham. But Bartlett himself sourced the figure from a work of science fiction, William R. Fostchen’s One Second After. And while an EMP surge, be it from a hydrogen bomb detonated high above North America or powerful solar storm, would surely impact daily life, the extent of the possible repercussions remains uncertain. At least where North Korea is concerned, that lack of an assured outcome should help ease—if not totally erase—EMP concerns.∂ Blackout or Bust∂ It’s important to note early that the EMP threat has become an unlikely live wire. Its most extreme proponents genuinely fear near-total annihilation; its vocal detractors dismiss the threat as science fiction.∂ In between, though, lie some important subtleties. Crucially, you won’t find much disagreement on the very basic science. In fact, both the US and Russia have proven this out in practice. In 1962, the US conducted a nuclear test known as Starfish Prime, in which it detonated a 1.4 megaton nuclear warhead 240 miles above the Pacific. The resulting EMP knocked out hundreds of street lights, and some telephone communications, 900 miles away in Hawaii. Russian tests at around the same time, over Kazakhstan, reportedly resulted in an EMP that took out a 300-mile communication line, among other assorted impacts. Evidence persists beyond those specific corollaries as well.∂ “You don’t need to do high-altitude nuclear tests to know the EMP threat is real,” says Dr. Peter Pry, who served on the Congressional EMP Commission and has published several books about its potential impacts. Pry points to data gleaned from underground nuclear tests and EMP simulators, all of which, he says, indicate the strong potential for devastation.∂ “I’m sure you’ve had the experience of driving a car down the road, listening to the radio, and then you’ve driven under a high power line, and suddenly your radio doesn’t work. You come out the other side and it works again. What’s happened is you’ve passed through an electromagnetic field that upset your radio,” says Pry. “I don’t think you have to be Albert Einstein to realize that if that electromagnetic field were, say, a billion times more powerful, that your radio would not just be upset but it would be destroyed, the electronics in your car destroyed. Imagine that now not being a localized phenomenon, but extended to the whole North American continent.”∂ The commission Pry served on—tasked with investigating the threat—laid out that case in a 200-plus page 2008 report, and Pry himself speaks passionately on the topic. But EMP skeptics still abound, particularly in the North Korean context. And the EMP Commission shut down on September 30, after the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security didn't seek funds from Congress to continue its operation.∂ “The fact that North Korea has tested a larger yield nuclear weapon than before is of concern because of the yield of the nuclear weapon, not because of EMP,” says Philip Coyle, a senior science fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, who served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense and Director of Operational Test and Evaluation at the Pentagon, and spent decades studying nuclear weapons at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.∂ Coyle acknowledges that EMPs can be a problem—the electromagnetic pulse from an 1859 solar storm, known as the Carrington Event, would have devastating consequences if repeated today—but he and others remain skeptical as to the true impact of the type of nuclear-based attack outlined by the EMP Commission.∂ “I don’t know how the proponents of EMP get such huge results. I just don’t follow their logic,” says Coyle. “There just isn’t a scientific basis to get these huge results, these huge numbers.”∂ “There’s still not proof that it would destroy a wide area of electrical equipment today," says Sharon Burke, who served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy in the Obama administration and is currently a senior adviser at the New America Foundation, a non-partisan think tank. "There’s no actual proof that this would happen.”∂ Pry dismisses those who regard EMP as science fiction as “idiot naysayers.” But Coyle, Burke, and others who have raised doubts don’t deny the underlying scientific principles. “Nuclear weapons do put out electromagnetic pulses of different varieties, and some of them are quite dangerous,” Burke says. “You’ll find that a lot of US military equipment, at least from the Cold War, was shielded against those kinds of EMPs.”∂ For EMP threat skeptics, though, decades-old tests and modern simulations don’t equal a guaranteed result today. Which means the right question to ask isn’t if North Korea could explode a nuclear weapon high over the United States. It’s whether Kim Jong Un would take that risk, uncertain of the ultimate effect, but knowing that his country would receive the full weight of American military response in return.∂ Or, as Burke puts it: “If you’re a country that wants to go to war with the United States, and you want to cause maximum damage, you want to be pretty sure it’s going to work.”∂Risky Business∂ North Korea attacking the US with an EMP would be a fantastically high-risk maneuver, with uncertain gains. And even if it did incapacitate much of the US power grid, it wouldn’t prevent a counterstrike. US military equipment is hardened, and its response could come from plenty of places other than North America.∂In fact, even testing the effects of an EMP attack could provoke US military engagement, says Bruce Bennett, who specializes in asymmetric threats at the Rand Corporation.∂ “The North Korean foreign minister recently threatened to detonate a nuclear weapon over the Pacific to demonstrate their missile capabilities. I think if he even does that, not as EMP, there is a fairly significant chance that the US would respond,” says Bennett.∂ That sort of provocation would be out of character for Kim Jong Un, who despite the public bluster has historically known where the boundaries are, and managed not to cross them. His main objective is the survival of his regime; exploding a nuclear weapon above the United States would almost certainly assure its destruction.∂'If you’re a country that wants to go to war with the United States, and you want to cause maximum damage, you want to be pretty sure it’s going to work.'∂ Given all the uncertainty, the takeaways about the EMP threat are also unclear. Long-term investment in hardening US grid infrastructure makes some sense, but headlines blaring that North Korea could kill 90 percent of the US population with one EMP strike seem counterproductive.∂ “The threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear war with North Korea is a plenty big enough threat as far as I’m concerned,” says Coyle. “Talking about EMP, I think it’s just a distraction. I don’t know why it keeps coming up.”∂ As often happens, the best course to chart might be somewhere down the middle.∂ “The threat is perhaps best characterized as low ​probability but ​potentially ​very high consequence​,” says Frank Cilluffo, director of George Washington University’s Center for Cyber and Homeland Security. “For this reason, the prudent course is to prepare in advance,” through international cooperation to try and contain North Korea, and an increased focus on preventative measures at home and in space.∂ Pry disagrees. In recent Congressional testimony, he offered perhaps the cleanest distillation of the EMP argument, in that it’s equal parts irrefutable and unprovable.

#### Grid attacks aren’t a threat – resiliency and constant updates prevent attack

Spring, ’17, (Tom, Editor-in-Chief, “Squirrels, Not Hackers, Pose Biggest Threat to Electric Grid,” Threat Post, February 17, 2017, https://threatpost.com/squirrels-not-hackers-pose-biggest-threat-to-electric-grid/123788/)

According to Marcus Sachs, CSO with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, doomsday fears of a cyberattack against the U.S. electric grid are overblown.∂ SAN FRANCISCO–The crown jewel of North America’s critical infrastructure is its electric grid. A successful cyberattack on it would be devastating. But according to Marcus Sachs, CSO with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), fears of a cyberattack are overblown.∂ Sachs told RSA Conference attendees on Thursday that squirrels, birds and snakes are currently a bigger threat to the power grid than cyber adversaries. During a session on securing the North American Electric Grid, Sachs said as long as the threat is greater than zero, focus on protecting the grid will always be important. But, he said current priorities are on high impact and high consequence threats that don’t currently include cyberattacks.∂ “Security is extremely important to us. We have to keep the lights on. There are multiple threats. Cyber is one and physical is another,” he said. “Yes, we have a few mouse clicks here and there – but the real threat is Mother Nature and humans doing stupid stuff.” Topping concerns are threats such as natural disasters, physical attacks and theft of equipment such as copper wiring from utility power substations.∂ Concerns over cyber threats to the North American power grid have been a popular topic ever since hackers managed to cut power to 200,000 Ukrainians in 2015. The incident sparked a number of government inquiries from the Department of Homeland Security and FBI into the preparedness for potential cyherattacks.∂ According Sachs, the Ukrainian outage also pushed NERC to take a hard look at what lessons could be learned from the attack. “Ukraine is a lot like the U.S. power grid, sharing many of the same physical and technical attributes,” he said. The saving grace for the North American electric grid, making it exponentially less vulnerable than Ukraine’s, is the hodgepodge of technologies used in the grid’s 55,000 power substations.∂ “What makes Ukraine different from U.S. is their grid is synchronous and lacked the type of diversity and separation of infrastructure that we have in the North America,” Sachs said.∂ In the case of the Ukraine cyberattack hackers sent a phishing email to a power company admin that contained an Excel spreadsheet with a malicious macro, Sachs said. Once the macro was executed hackers were able to steal credentials from the machine. It’s been disputed, but general consensus believes that malware used was developed by the BlackEnergy APT group.∂ Because Ukraine’s system was so homogenized, Sachs said, hackers were able to access three additional substations with stolen credentials. Next, hackers used remote desktop control software to access three admin machines at three separate power company offices and simply turned off a number of electric substations that caused the blackout.∂ “Here in North America, we encourage diversity. No two substations are the same no two companies run their infrastructure the same. It’s all over the place here. In the Ukraine it’s homogenous. If you find a mistake one place, you can probably find the same mistake somewhere else; and that’s a problem,” he said.∂ NERC’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee (CIPC) coordinates NERC’s security initiatives that include assessing ongoing physical and cyber security threats. Another of CIPC’s key functions is developing, reviewing, and revising security guidelines that include cyber.∂ “The fact is we have built resiliency into the grid to counteract physical and cyber threats. If we get into a cyber situation, the same resiliencies and the same countermeasures that exist for physical threats will kick in and protect the grid. If the grid goes down – be it a cyberattack or natural disaster – we can get it back and up running again in minutes,” Sachs said.∂ Not all share Sachs optimism. Just last year at 2016 RSA Conference U.S. Cyber Command’s Adm. Michael Rogers said it’s a matter of when not “if” a nation-state executes a successful cyberattack against the U.S. critical infrastructure impacting the electric grid.∂ Meanwhile, jitters remain high. In December, a false report of a Russian cyberattack on a Vermont power utility was briefly the center of a geopolitical scandal.

### Aliens

#### Perm do both – we can first strike with bombers

#### Breaks the norm of restraint – causes escalation – That’s Mosher 20

#### Aliens aren’t real

Phys.org, 7/21/2016. “The aliens are silent because they're dead.” <https://phys.org/news/2016-01-aliens-silent-theyre-dead.html>.

Life on other planets would likely be brief and become extinct very quickly, say astrobiologists from The Australian National University (ANU).∂ In research aiming to understand how life might develop, the scientists realised new life would commonly die out due to runaway heating or cooling on their fledgling planets.∂ "The universe is probably filled with habitable planets, so many scientists think it should be teeming with aliens," said Dr Aditya Chopra from the ANU Research School of Earth Sciences and lead author on the paper, which is published in Astrobiology.∂ "Early life is fragile, so we believe it rarely evolves quickly enough to survive."∂ "Most early planetary environments are unstable. To produce a habitable planet, life forms need to regulate greenhouse gases such as water and carbon dioxide to keep surface temperatures stable."∂ About four billion years ago Earth, Venus and Mars may have all been habitable. However, a billion years or so after formation, Venus turned into a hothouse and Mars froze into an icebox.∂ Early microbial life on Venus and Mars, if there was any, failed to stabilise the rapidly changing environment, said co-author Associate Professor Charley Lineweaver from the ANU Planetary Science Institute.∂ "Life on Earth probably played a leading role in stabilising the planet's climate," he said.∂ Dr Chopra said their theory solved a puzzle.∂ "The mystery of why we haven't yet found signs of aliens may have less to do with the likelihood of the origin of life or intelligence and have more to do with the rarity of the rapid emergence of biological regulation of feedback cycles on planetary surfaces," he said.∂ Wet, rocky planets, with the ingredients and energy sources required for life seem to be ubiquitous, however, as physicist Enrico Fermi pointed out in 1950, no signs of surviving extra-terrestrial life have been found.∂ A plausible solution to Fermi's paradox, say the researchers, is near universal early extinction, which they have named the Gaian Bottleneck.∂ "One intriguing prediction of the Gaian Bottleneck model is that the vast majority of fossils in the universe will be from extinct microbial life, not from multicellular species such as dinosaurs or humanoids that take billions of years to evolve," said Associate Professor Lineweaver.

#### No alien war

Sedacca 16 [Matthew Sedacca, science writer for Cosmos, citing Janne Korhonen, interstellar military expert. What Military Theory Tells Us About Future Space Warfare. December 2016. cosmos.nautil.us/short/82/what-military-theory-tells-us-about-future-space-warfare]

Janne Korhonen, an author and economics graduate student at Aalto University in Finland, is one of the world’s handful of interstellar military theorists (yes, these people exist). In 2013 he argued that aliens, even if in possession of vastly superior technologically, are very unlikely to attack us. To begin with, why would they bother? War is typically fought over resources. Almost one century ago, historian John Edwin Bakeless found that 14 of the 20 wars from 1878 to 1918 had economic motivations strongly connected to asserting control of natural resources. The number is even larger when you include wars of colonial conquest, which can be counted as no-contest resource-grabs.

But if aliens are looking for resources, an assault on Earth doesn’t make a whole lot of sense, since the gas giant planets and the asteroid belt offer huge repositories of materials for the taking. Sure, Earth does have the most varied minerals in the solar system because of the action of life and water, but just to get to our solar system would require huge amounts of fuel, making the whole venture rather pointless from a cost-benefit view. Only an alien species that requires our specific minerals (or needs to eat sentient carbon-based organisms) would trouble itself with such a voyage.

Nonetheless, if extraterrestrials did want to pick a fight with us, they would be running a huge risk. Korhonen argued that, unless they were 100-percent sure they could destroy us, they could never be assured of final victory. It is often said that advanced aliens would regard us as mere ants—and anyone who has ants in their house or yard knows they are almost impossible to eradicate. Even a few survivors could quickly multiply to repopulate the planet, while learning from the attacker’s technology and preparing a retaliation. Meanwhile, neighboring civilizations might see the act of aggression and join the battle, if only to protect their own interests. In light of this strategic calculus, aliens would be foolish to invade.

#### Burnout and genetic variation check disease

Ian York 14, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch of the Influenza Division at the CDC, PhD in Molecular Virology and Immunology from McMaster University, M.Sc. in Veterinary Microbiology and Immunology from the University of Guelph, former Assistant Prof of Microbiology & Molecular Genetics at Michigan State, “Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species?” 6/4/2014, http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-species

But mostly diseases don't drive species extinct. There are several reasons for that. For one, the most dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly lethal, then the population drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other during the infectious phase. Highly contagious diseases tend to burn themselves out that way.¶ Probably the main reason is variation. Within the host and the pathogen population there will be a wide range of variants. Some hosts may be naturally resistant. Some pathogens will be less virulent. And either alone or in combination, you end up with infected individuals who survive.¶ We see this in HIV, for example. There is a small fraction of humans who are naturally resistant or altogether immune to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. And there are a handful of people who were infected with defective versions of HIV that didn't progress to disease. ¶ We can see indications of this sort of thing happening in the past, because our genomes contain many instances of pathogen resistance genes that have spread through the whole population. Those all started off as rare mutations that conferred a strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were serious threats to the species.

# 1AR – AT: T/Theory

## 1AR – AT: T

### 1AR – AT: T Present – Short

#### Counterinterp –

#### Aff can defend the resolution – PICs solve future advantages

#### Ban is preemptive – 1AC Kumaraguru

#### Also includes future weapons – 1AC Rosert and Gubrud and Altmann

#### Prefer –

#### 1---Ground – LAWS are future since they’re in development – 1AC Klare

#### 2---Topic lit – Contextual solvency advocate proves – Their ev not about LAWS

#### 3---Functional limits check – Nobody writes about Death Stars in the context of LAWS

#### 4---Reasonability to preserve substance

### 1AR – AT: T Present – Long

#### Counterinterp –

#### Aff can defend the resolution

#### Ban is preemptive – 1AC Kumaraguru

#### Also includes future weapons – 1AC Rosert and Gubrud and Altmann

#### Prefer –

#### 1---Ground – LAWS are future since they’re in development – 1AC Klare

#### 2---Topic lit – Contextual solvency advocate proves – Their ev not about LAWS

#### Diplomatic consensus is future

Sauer 16 [Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer at Bundeswehr University in Munich. He is the author of Atomic Anxiety: Deterrence, Taboo and the Non-Use of U.S. Nuclear Weapons (2015) and a member of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control. October 2016, “Stopping ‘Killer Robots’: Why Now Is the Time to Ban Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-09/features/stopping-%E2%80%98killer-robots%E2%80%99-why-now-time-ban-autonomous-weapons-systems//lhs-ap]

The Basics

Some weapons systems used for defensive purposes already can identify and track incoming targets and engage them without a human pushing the metaphorical button. Deemed precursors to autonomous weapons systems, they can react to incoming missiles or mortar shells in cases in which the timing does not allow for human decision-making. The Phalanx Close-In Weapon System on Navy ships is one example for such a weapons system, Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system is another.

Yet, these defensive systems are not the focus of the mainly forward-looking autonomous weapons systems debate. Juxtaposing automatic and autonomous systems is a helpful way to understand why. Defensive systems such as the Phalanx can be categorized as automatic. They are stationary or fixed on ships or trailers and designed to fire at inanimate targets. They just repeatedly perform preprogrammed actions and operate only within tightly set parameters and time frames in comparably structured and controlled environments.

Autonomous weapons are distinguish-able from their precursors. They would be able to operate without human control or supervision in dynamic, unstructured, open environments, attacking a variety of targets. They would operate over an extended period of time after activation and would potentially be able to learn and adapt to their situations. To be fair, this juxtaposition is artificial and glosses over an important gray area by leaving aside the fact that autonomous functionality is a continuum. After all, automatic systems, targeting humans at borders or automatically firing back at the source of incoming munitions, already raise questions relevant to the autonomy debate.

There arguably is a tacit understanding in the expert community and among diplomats in Geneva that the debate’s main focus is on future, mobile weapons platforms equipped with onboard sensors, computers, and decision-making algorithms with the capability to seek, identify, track, and attack targets autonomously. The autonomy debate thus touches on but is not primarily concerned with existing automatic defensive systems. In fact, depending on how the CCW ends up defining autonomous weapons systems, it might be well within reason to exempt those from regulation or a possible preventive ban if their sole purpose is to protect human life by exclusively targeting incoming munitions.

#### 3---Functional limits check – Nobody writes about Death Stars in the context of LAWS

#### 4---Reasonability to preserve substance

### 1AR – AT: Future

#### CI: Affs can immediately ban future tech.

#### Yes preemptive bans

HRW 20 "Stopping Killer Robots," Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and 8-10-2020 RE

At the UN General Assembly in October 2013, Costa Rica warned that “many problems identified with the use of armed drones would be exacerbated by the trend toward increasing autonomy in robotic weapons.”[73] Costa Rica has proposed that critical functions of weapons systems be subject to meaningful human control.[74] It called for a preemptive ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems in April 2016, advocating a preventive approach and citing the precedent provided by the ban on blinding lasers.[75] Costa Rica participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2016-2019.

#### 1 – Overlimiting – 1 aff under their interp – just sgr-a1

#### 2 – Clash – all literature says autonomous weapons are coming and being developed now and why there’s need for a pre-emptive ban

#### 3 – I meet – Being developed for out of the loop

Pasquale 15 [By&nbsp;Frank Pasquale, 11-8-2015, "The Doubtful Ethics of Drone Warfare," CHE, https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-doubtful-ethics-of-drone-warfare/?bc\_nonce=6bml8hbbf36efxe1clt8dt&amp;cid=reg\_wall\_signup, accessed 2-11-2021]LHSBC

As Andrew Bacevich has argued, maturely grappling with the [need for cooperation](http://www.amazon.com/Washington-Rules-Americas-Permanent-American/dp/0805094229) in an unmasterable world is a viable alternative to arms races. At present, though, the military-industrial complex is speeding us toward the development of “human out of the loop” drone swarms, ostensibly because only machines will be fast enough to anticipate the enemy’s counterstrategies.

#### 4 – Reasonability — defense means theory crowded out substance – judges inevitably intervene to adjudicate debates and competing interps causes infinite theory to race to most fair norm

### 1AR – AT: T Autonomous

#### I meet – we ban only lethal autonomous drone swarms – monitoring video feeds, independently targeting, and executing actions of hundreds of drones must be autonomous – kalleborn says it’s the only clear brightline

#### Plan text in a vacuum – aff only says “lethal autonomous drone swarms” – hold us to the plan – only non-arbitrary stasis point and everyone bases links and competition off of wording of the plan – irrelevant affs lose when the neg makes no solvency and fill-in arguments

#### Being developed for out of the loop

Pasquale 15 [By&nbsp;Frank Pasquale, 11-8-2015, "The Doubtful Ethics of Drone Warfare," CHE, https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-doubtful-ethics-of-drone-warfare/?bc\_nonce=6bml8hbbf36efxe1clt8dt&amp;cid=reg\_wall\_signup, accessed 2-11-2021]LHSBC

As Andrew Bacevich has argued, maturely grappling with the [need for cooperation](http://www.amazon.com/Washington-Rules-Americas-Permanent-American/dp/0805094229) in an unmasterable world is a viable alternative to arms races. At present, though, the military-industrial complex is speeding us toward the development of “human out of the loop” drone swarms, ostensibly because only machines will be fast enough to anticipate the enemy’s counterstrategies.

#### Definitions prevent infinite theoretical goalpost shifting which crowds out substance

#### Reasonability — defense means theory crowded out substance – judges inevitably intervene to adjudicate debates and competing interps causes infinite theory to race to most fair norm

### 1AR – AT: T Lethal

#### I meet – we ban only lethal autonomous drone swarms – half the aff says they kill POC

#### Plan text in a vacuum – aff only says “lethal autonomous drone swarms” – hold us to the plan – only non-arbitrary stasis point and everyone bases links and competition off of wording of the plan – irrelevant affs lose when the neg makes no solvency and fill-in arguments

### 1AR – AT: T Ban v2

#### Counter Interpretation: States can ban specific types of lethal autonomous weapons.

#### 1 – Courts

Freeman V. Dal-Tile Corp. 13 [Freeman V. Dal-Tile Corp., 3-14-2013, "Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 930 F. Supp. 2d 611," No Publication, https://casetext.com/case/freeman-v-dal-tile-corp, accessed 1-21-2021]LHSBC

The court notes that the word “ban” simply means “to prohibit.” Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary (Unabridged) 169 (1993) (defining “ban” as “to prohibit, esp[ecially] by legal means or social pressure the performance, activities, dissemination, or use of”); Black's Law Dictionary 164 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “ban” as “[t]o prohibit, esp[ecially] by legal means”). Bans may take on various forms. They may be permanent or temporary, they may prohibit certain forms of communication ( e.g., communication over the telephone), but not others ( e.g., communication by letter or email), or they may encompass any number of different physical, temporal, or geographic restrictions ( e.g., a restraining order which bans contact within a certain number of feet). Here, plaintiff appears to be asking the court to infer that Dal–Tile “promised” (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n Mot. Summ. J., DE # 78, at 9, 12, 24, 27, 31) her an immediate, permanent ban that would keep her from ever having to communicate with or physically encounter Koester again. However, even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the record does not support such a finding. ( See, e.g., Pl.'s Dep., DE # 62–1, at 212:1–12; S. Wrenn Dep., DE # 78–4, at 31:18–32:4.)

#### 2 – Topic

Crootof 15 [Rebecca Crootof is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School of Law, Dr. Crootof earned a B.A. cum laude in English with a minor in Mathematics at Pomona College; a J.D. at Yale Law School; and a PhD at Yale Law School.] 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 1837 (2015). “The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications” <https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2605&context=law-faculty-publications> | ahsBC

Finally, regardless of how autonomous weapon systems are defined, a ban might exclude certain types or uses no one seems to find objectionable, like autonomous weapon systems now employed for purely defensive purposes or “smart” weapons which better distinguish between lawful and unlawful targets.232 While such exclusions will likely increase ratification rates, they would also undermine many ban advocates’ goals, such as limiting military investment in weapon autonomy and preventing the proliferation of autonomous weapon systems.

#### 3 – Negative needs definitions to win – Anything else justifies the neg racing to find and go for the most unpredictable T interp that the aff violates and claim prep was hard – causes infinite T debates which crowds out substantive clash

#### 1 – Either causes 100 rehashes of IHL versus the innovation DA which doesn’t create new clash or 100 illogical SGR-A1 versus Poseidon debates which kills quality clash – that outweighs because it’s the only unique and portable skill

#### 2 – Affs need to answer fill-in because banning SGR-A1 loses to “SGR-A2” fills in which creates a functional limit and makes only broad subset affs viable which link to generics

#### 3 – Infinite Weapon PICs out of whole rez moots affs which is worse than mooting neg ground with a plan because the neg can cope with other offs, 1NC spec is late breaking meaning less clash, and 1ar has less time to cover.

#### 4 – Reasonability — defense means theory crowded out substance – judges inevitably intervene to adjudicate debates and competing interps causes infinite theory to race to most fair norm

#### Jurisdiction wrong – judges vote on non-T affs

#### TVA doesn’t solve – our args are unique to reading speccing a weapon

#### Pics arg is wrong – competition is inevitable meaning people will read the best position to win

### 1AR – AT: T Ban

#### Counter Interpretation: States can ban specific types of lethal autonomous weapons.

#### Can ban certain forms

#### 1 – Courts

Freeman V. Dal-Tile Corp. 13 [Freeman V. Dal-Tile Corp., 3-14-2013, "Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 930 F. Supp. 2d 611," No Publication, https://casetext.com/case/freeman-v-dal-tile-corp, accessed 1-21-2021]LHSBC

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#### 2 – Topic Lit

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Finally, regardless of how autonomous weapon systems are defined, a ban might exclude certain types or uses no one seems to find objectionable, like autonomous weapon systems now employed for purely defensive purposes or “smart” weapons which better distinguish between lawful and unlawful targets.232 While such exclusions will likely increase ratification rates, they would also undermine many ban advocates’ goals, such as limiting military investment in weapon autonomy and preventing the proliferation of autonomous weapon systems.

#### Definitions prevent infinite theoretical goalpost shifting which crowds out substance

#### 1 – Clash – either no innovation or creates illogical and uneducational US drone swarms vs. korean SGR-A1 debates – depth outweighs because multiple rounds solve breadth

#### 2 – PICs flip their standards and make spec inevitable – it’s worse because the neg has other offs, 1NC spec is late breaking, and 1AR restarts are crushing

#### 3 – Reasonability — defense means theory crowded out substance – judges inevitably intervene to adjudicate debates and competing interps causes infinite theory to race to most fair norm

#### 4 – Generics – inevitable Soft Law, politics, ai innovation, and arms control means neg has ground and affs need a substantial unique advantage lest they get clapped – we force innovative research and critical thinking to find links.

#### Jurisdiction wrong – judges vote on non-T affs

#### Pics arg is wrong – competition is inevitable meaning people will read the best position to win

#### TVA doesn’t solve – our args are unique to reading speccing a weapon

### 1AR – AT: Nebel Weapons

#### Counter Interpretation: States can ban specific types of lethal autonomous weapons.

#### Can ban certain forms

#### 1 – Courts

Freeman V. Dal-Tile Corp. 13 [Freeman V. Dal-Tile Corp., 3-14-2013, "Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 930 F. Supp. 2d 611," No Publication, https://casetext.com/case/freeman-v-dal-tile-corp, accessed 1-21-2021]LHSBC

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#### Grammar not predictable – topic literature is IR scholars defining terms of art, not convoluted linguistics

#### Definitions prevent infinite theoretical goalpost shifting which crowds out substance

#### 1 – Clash – either no innovation or creates illogical and uneducational US drone swarms vs. korean SGR-A1 debates – depth outweighs because multiple rounds solve breadth

#### 2 – PICs flip their standards and make spec inevitable – it’s worse because the neg has other offs, 1NC spec is late breaking, and 1AR restarts are crushing

#### 3 – Reasonability — defense means theory crowded out substance – judges inevitably intervene to adjudicate debates and competing interps causes infinite theory to race to most fair norm

#### 4 – Generics – inevitable Soft Law, politics, ai innovation, and arms control means neg has ground and affs need a substantial unique advantage lest they get clapped – we force innovative research and critical thinking to find links.

#### Jurisdiction wrong – judges vote on non-T affs

#### Pics arg is wrong – competition is inevitable meaning people will read the best position to win

#### TVA doesn’t solve – our args are unique to reading speccing a weapon

## 1AR – AT: Theory

### 1AR – AT: State Spec

#### Counter Interpretation: Affirmatives don’t have to spec states

#### 1 – CX checks – would’ve specified if you asked me. 30 seconds at most in CX matters less than their 1-minute shell – independently, neg has generics like politics, innovation, and arms control K’s

#### 2 – No resolutional basis means infinitely regressive – forces us to spend 6 minutes specifying everything nebulous – states? Region? City? – crowds out substantive discussion and offense

#### 3 – It’s potential abuse – just because I “could’ve” done something doesn’t mean I would do it. We shouldn’t vote someone down because they could’ve read 7 NIBs.

### 1AR – AT: Espec

#### Counter Interpretation: Affirmatives don’t have to spec enforcement

#### 1 – CX checks – would’ve specified if you asked me. 30 seconds at most in CX matters less than their 1-minute shell – independently, neg has generics like politics, innovation, and arms control K’s

#### 2 – No resolutional basis means infinitely regressive – forces us to spend 6 minutes specifying everything nebulous – on site inspections? Video controls? Article 36? Etc. – crowds out substantive discussion and offense

#### 3 – It’s potential abuse – just because I “could’ve” done something doesn’t mean I would do it. We shouldn’t vote someone down because they could’ve read 7 NIBs.

### 1AR – AT: Future – New Version

#### 1 – We meet – Plan text in a vacuum – Only objective metric.

#### 2 – Counterinterp – Current ban is preemptive and applies to future weapons – 1AC Kumaraguru and Gubrud and Altmann – Prefer contextual evidence for predictability.

#### 3 – Gut check – Past bans like chemical weapons applied to future weapons

#### 4 – Functional limits – No lit no aff

#### 5 – PICs out of future weapons solve predictability

#### 6 – Turn – LAWS still developing – 1AC Klare – Future weapons key to topic lit

#### 7 – Reasonability to preserve substance

### 1AR – AT: No Future LAWS

#### Counterinterp – Aff can defend CCW – That’s a ban – 1AC Klare.

#### Prefer for topic lit – Academic debates are on future weapons – 1AC Sauer 16 – Key to clash by enabling better research

#### Their interp –

#### 1---Functional limits checks – No literature no affirmative – Nobody writes about Star Wars, and topic lit goes aff – That’s Sauer above

#### 2---No Offense – We defend both current and future LAWS, so you still get links to current systems

#### 3---Turn – LAWS still getting developed, so all ground is about the future – 1AC Klare

#### 4---No resolvability offense – All debates have a decision, and Dasoriya isn’t even about LAWS

#### 5---Induction works – Probability – Past instances like using Tabroom, judge decisions, or not jumping off cliffs prove – At worst, hard ethics aren’t impossible ethics, and risk of offense outweighs.

#### 6---Not extra t – Ban applies to future weapons – 1AC Gubrud and Altmann.

#### 7---Evaluate topicality after the 2ar – Else aff can’t respond, so neg will always win bad interpretations.

### 1AR – AT: Spec – New Version

#### We can spec in cross-x – It solves –

#### 1] CX Checks – A] Bruh this is why we have cx… B] Prevents regress – Questions are limited to 3 minutes C] Judges do pay attention, or you can call attention to arguments even if they don’t flow

#### 2] Arbitrary and infinite regress – Their model justifies spec taking 6 minutes of the AC, which kills aff ground and lack of strong resolutional basis means spec is never predictable and prevents substantive engagement since you can always read more spec

#### 3] Policy education – Normal means debate is better for learning about how policies are actually implemented, and what kind of definitions will be used. Neg reading and debating their own definition is better than the aff arbitrarily choosing their own – Turns neg ground since the aff can choose definition s that don’t link

#### 4] Drop the arg and reasonability on spec – Just grant them a link to the disad if I lose spec, better for substance and key to avoid bad spec like spec pen color.

### 1AR – AT: Spec – Short

#### Forcing us to specify is bad –

#### 1---Arbitrary and nonsensical – No resolutional basis makes their interp unpredictable – Kills clash since we didn’t know to meet it

#### 2---Infinite regress – How much specification is enough? They can add infinite possible conditions so we never meet – Kills clash

#### 3---No offense – Neg can read a definition, ask us in cross x, and we defined ban in solvency – that solves

#### 4---Reasonability to preserve substance

#### CX Checks – A] Bruh this is why we have cx… B] Prevents regress – Questions are limited to 3 minutes C] Judges do pay attention, or you can call attention to arguments even if they don’t flow

#### AT 6 Minutes of 1AC

#### Bruh no you’re supposed to be flowing my aff – MY SPEECH TIME IS NOT FOR YOU TO PREP WTF BRUH

#### AT Preround Prep

#### Disclosure solves – You can read through my ev OR doesn’t solve, and you don’t get any prep since I don’t disclose

#### You can always message me too – Each round is different, so messaging is better because you get specifics of my aff

#### In general aff’s change round to round – Preround prep will always be skewed

Didn’t ask in cx – proves their model is arbitrary and bad for substance because they would rather read dumb theory than engage in substance

### Theory – Spec

#### Counter Interpretation: Affirmatives don’t have to specify past the resolution.

#### CX checks – would’ve specified if you asked me. 30 seconds at most in CX matters less than their 1 minute shell. Terminal defense to the interp – I could’ve met.

#### Default to reasonability – competing interps crowds out substantive clash and over punishes for marginal abuse

#### Infinitely regressive – forces the 1AC to become a 6 minute plan text that loses to substance every time – is the plan local?

#### It’s potential abuse – just because I “could’ve” done something doesn’t mean I would do it. We shouldn’t vote someone down because they could’ve read 7 NIBs.

### Theory – Spec Funding Source

#### Counter Interpretation: Affirmatives don’t have to specify funding source.

#### 1] CX checks – would’ve specified if you asked me. 30 seconds at most in CX matters less than their 1 minute shell. Terminal defense to the interp – I could’ve met.

#### 2] Default to reasonability – competing interps crowds out substantive clash and over punishes for marginal abuse

#### 3] Infinitely regressive – forces the 1AC to spend the entire time speccing – who do you tax, what are the income brackets, is it linear or exponential, what are the exact percentages, are there exemptions, does it apply to corporations

#### 4] It’s potential abuse – just because I “could’ve” done something doesn’t mean I would do it. We shouldn’t vote someone down because they could’ve read 7 NIBs.

#### 5] Extra T – Carbon Taxes, cutting defense spending, cutting police spending, tax on the 1% etc. explode negative prep burdens.

### Theory – Util Spec

#### Counter Interpretation: Affirmatives don’t have to spec their type of util

#### 1 – CX checks – would’ve specified if you asked me. 30 seconds at most in CX matters less than their 1 minute shell. Terminal defense to the interp – I could’ve met.

#### 2 – Default to reasonability – competing interps crowds out substantive clash and over punishes for marginal abuse

#### 3 – Infinitely regressive – forces 1ac to spend entire time speccing and losing to substance and creates norm of infinite spec shells which crowds out substantive clash – i.e. what does util do in X situation, does it account for X people, etc.

#### 4 – It’s potential abuse – just because I “could’ve” done something doesn’t mean I would do it. We shouldn’t vote someone down because they could’ve read 7 NIBs.

### Theory – Don’t need to dislcose New Affs

#### Aff debaters don’t need to disclose new affs

#### Innovation – not disclosing new affs gives debaters an incentive to research because of the competitive advantage – impact turns all teir fairness claims.

#### No limits explosion – unless they prove our aff is non-topical we’re in the predictable realm of preparation which means they should have prep.

#### Generics debate is good – forces us to have in-depth discussions with deep literature bases

### Theory – New Affs Good

#### We get new affs

#### 1 – innovation – only old affs prevents new research which is necessary for more nuanced clash

#### 2 – inevitable – everyone reads a new aff beginning of the topic

#### 3 – reasonability – being topical means they should have prep – winning sufficient defense means they crowdout substantive clash

### 1AR – AT: Cite Trans People

#### Counterinterp – Affs don’t have to defend anything beyond the resolution if not asked before the round

#### 1---Request plank is terminal defense – If you asked, I would have complied

#### 2---Arbitrary and nonsensical – No resolutional basis makes their interp unpredictable – Kills clash since we didn’t know to meet it

#### 2---Infinite regress – How many citations enough? They can add infinite possible conditions so we never meet – Kills clash

#### 3---Your interp doesn’t solve – People will just read one sentence from a trans person, which obviously does not “center trans epistemology” as per 1nc Nicolazzo

#### 4---Aff isn’t epistemic extraction – We haven’t “objectified” trans perspectives – We get new 2ar answers if the 2nr gets new link explanation

#### 5---Your interp makes epistemic extraction worse – It allows cis people to just cite one trans person and pretend they’re super progressive and inclusive when they actually haven’t done anything to make debate more inclusive

#### 6---Not inspiration porn – Nicolazzo is critiquing the instrumentalization of trans experiences, which has nothing to do with the aff

#### 7---Reasonability to preserve substance

#### 8---No normsetting – Debaters will just prep out theory instead of improving practices especially if they’re punished with a loss

#### 9---No epistemology – They haven’t indicted specific claims in the aff, and if adding A ONE SENTENCE CARD solves our epistemology, then the rest of the aff’s claims are probably fine too

#### 10---Reasonability doesn’t allow oppression – Instead debating substance gives us skills from incentivizing clash, research, advocacy skills, etc. that enable advocacy outside the round

#### 11---Either intervention is inevitable from competing offense claims OR weighing solves

# 1AR – AT: CP

## CP – Theory

### 1AR – Condo – Short – Clash

#### Condo’s a voter – reject the team for norm setting and dropping the arg is condo – Clash – incentivizes reading many short advocacies and going for the least covered which moots 1ar responses and prevents going in-depth on their position’s nuances. Outweighs because external education and multiple rounds solve their education impacts but clash only occurs in-round and is the only unique and portable skill

#### Competing interps is non-arbtrary and creates best long term norms

### 1AR – Condo – Long – Clash

#### Condo’s a voter for deterrence

#### 1] Strat skew – splits the 1ar by forcing me to argue against multiple worlds with different uniqueness conditions which precludes taking advantage of strategic interactions and contradictions

#### 2] Clash – incentivizes reading many short advocacies and going for the least covered which moots 1ar responses and prevents going in-depth on their position’s nuances. Outweighs because external education and multiple rounds solve their education impacts but clash only occurs in-round

#### 3] Dispo solves—they can kick it if we perm—allows sufficient neg flexibility while preserving 1ar strategic decision-making

### 1AR – Condo PICs Bad (DD)

#### Condo PICs are a voting issue – they make the 1AR functionally impossible and kill clash cuz you can turn parts of the case that the CP links to *and* steal the whole aff, which lets them get rid of a chunk of the 1AR since we have to go for the case to have a shot—destroys clash cuz they don’t have to defend their arguments against well-researched objections since they can kick what they’re losing

### 1AR – Consult Bad

#### Consult counterplans are a voting issue – obviates core advantage and discussion of the aff which eradicates clash and moots 6 minutes of aff offense which forces 1AR restart and kills fairness – reject the team for deterrence

### 1AR – PICs Need SAs (DD)

#### PICs without solvency advocates are a voting issue—they kill clash since they don’t have to answer most of the 1AC *and* we can’t predict and answer it since it’s not in the literature—neither of us have to defend our positions against well-researched objections

### 1AR – UQ PICs Bad

#### Uniqueness PICs are a voting issue—they moot the 1ac and are unpredictable because there’s no literature their arbitrary uniqueness claim – they arbitrarily inflate neg DA ground by blowing up tiny changes, moot key aff answers like uniqueness presses, and are unpredictable since it’s not a relevant consequence of the plan

### 1AR – UQ CP Bad

#### Uniqueness counterplans are a voting issue—generate artificial competition for disads not in the topical prep burden – means we lose every time killing fairness and substantive because we have nothing to debate a disad that shouldn’t exist.

## CP – Competition

### 1AR – Competition – Long

#### Counterplans must be functionally and textually competitive – crucial to weighing the aff, they moot the whole 1ac and make debating it impossible because its identical to our aff. Textual competition is best- Functional competition is when the aff is responsible for every single part of it like normal means, fiat, etc. Esp. unfair since the aff will lose to 1000s of CPS that are just take the aff and add 1 dumb part to it like delay or a consultation since the aff cant weigh and they cant perm under functional competition, so the aff is guaranteed to lose either to the CP or to theory arguments on the perm.

### 1AR – AT: Consult

#### Resolved means to consult.

**Webster’s ‘9** (Merriam Webster; 2009; Meriam Webster Dictionary, “Resolved,” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved)

# Main Entry: 1re·solve # Pronunciation: \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\ # Function: verb # Inflected Form(s): resolved; re·solv·ing 1 : to become separated into component parts; also : to become reduced by dissolving or analysis 2 : to form a resolution : determine 3 : consult, **deliberate**

### 1AR – AT: Process

#### PDCP – Plan is a rough draft

United States 20 [Last Updated: September 17, 2020, “How Laws Are Made and How to Research Them,” https://www.usa.gov/how-laws-are-made//lhs-ap]

Steps in Making a Law

A bill can be introduced in either chamber of Congress by a senator or representative who sponsors it.

Once a bill is introduced, it is assigned to a committee whose members will research, discuss, and make changes to the bill.

The bill is then put before that chamber to be voted on.

If the bill passes one body of Congress, it goes to the other body to go through a similar process of research, discussion, changes, and voting.

Once both bodies vote to accept a bill, they must work out any differences between the two versions. Then both chambers vote on the same exact bill and, if it passes, they present it to the president.

The president then considers the bill. The president can approve the bill and sign it into law or not approve (veto) a bill.

If the president chooses to veto a bill, in most cases Congress can vote to override that veto and the bill becomes a law. But, if the president pocket vetoes a bill after Congress has adjourned, the veto cannot be overridden.

### 1AR – AT: Immediate

#### “Ought” isn’t immediate

English Grammar 10 [“Must and Ought to”; English Grammar; August 16, 2010; <https://www.englishgrammar.org/must-and-ought-to/> //BWSWJ]

Ought expresses ideas such as duty, necessity and moral obligation. It is not as forceful as must, but it is stronger than should. You ought to be punctual. We ought to help the poor. You ought to visit your friends once in a while. Ought generally points to present and future time. It can point to past time when it is followed by the perfect infinitive (have + past participle).

### 1AR – AT: PICs

#### Permutation do the counterplan – ‘should’ tolerates exceptions

County of Riverside ‘15

(“Introduction,” Draft General Plan Amendment No. 960, p. I-12) BW

For a policy to be useful, it must be clear. However, not all policies are the same; they differ in terms of expected results, commitment of resources, and indication of importance or urgency. Therefore, it is important to simplify the language used in the General Plan and understand the distinctions between the different levels of policy. The following definitions of terms provide guidance in interpreting the policy language of the General Plan: • Shall: Policies containing the word “shall” indicate that an action must be taken in all cases. This represents absolute commitment to the policy, and the expectation is that the policy will always be carried out. • Should: Policies containing the word “should” indicate that an action will be taken in most cases, but exceptions are acceptable for good reason.

### 1AR – Ban = Partial

#### Bans can prohibit a subset

Crootof 15 [Rebecca Crootof is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School of Law, Dr. Crootof earned a B.A. cum laude in English with a minor in Mathematics at Pomona College; a J.D. at Yale Law School; and a PhD at Yale Law School.] 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 1837 (2015). “The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications” <https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2605&context=law-faculty-publications> | ahsBC

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### 1AR – Lethal – Death

#### Lethal means it must cause death

Merriam-Webster xx [Merriam-Webster, xx-xx-xxxx, "Lethal," No Publication, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/lethal, accessed 12-23-2020]LHSBC

Definition of lethal

 (Entry 1 of 2)

1a: of, relating to, or causing death death by lethal injection

b: capable of causing death lethal chemicals

### 1AR – Lethal – Intent

#### Lethality is based on *intent*, not nature – the goal of the weapon has to be to kill people, not just a second order effect

Roughton, 20 - (Randy, citing Ajey Lele and Heather Dinniss, "So Just What Is a Killer Robot?: Detailing the Ongoing Debate around Defining Lethal Auton" Washington Headquarters Services, 6-4-2020, https://www.whs.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2210967/so-just-what-is-a-killer-robot-detailing-the-ongoing-debate-around-defining-let/)//usc-br/

Lethality

The first element is that this definition explicitly states that fully autonomous weapons are Killer Robots. As part of the campaign’s name, this is obviously, a central element of the CSKR’s perspective. The term killer robot is a dysphemism that has been consistently used to focus the discourse on the capability of lethal aspect of LAWSs, particularly in media appearances and published materials, as well as in the central questions of the public surveys commissioned by CSKR over the past three years. While a legitimate and important concern, the lethal use of AWSs is the most controversial potential use of the underlying technologies and arguably distracts from the rapid progress that states are making on systems that are not designed primarily for the use of lethal force. Ajey Lele has argued that focusing on lethality makes it impossible to come to a “foolproof ” definition because sometimes the lethality of an autonomous system will depend on the purpose of its deployment.28 Heather Harrison Dinniss also argued that the purpose of deployment, target justification, and user intention were more important than the weapon’s inherent nature.29 While Lele referred specifically to cyberwarfare, other problematic autonomous systems could include AI-enabled battlefield decision-making aides, cyber warfare agents, and “support” unmanned ground vehicles whose stated purpose is for battlefield resupply, none of which would necessarily be covered by a ban that followed this definition, yet could be used in a manner that leads to death and injury.

## 1AR – AT: Advantage

### 1AR – AT: IHL

#### Pdb

#### 1 – Compliance doesn’t solve perception – states don’t know that no one else will circumvent AND counterplan only restricts use, not deployment which still causes instability

#### 2 – Zero binding force over great powers

Amnesty International 19 [Amnesty International, 5-22-2019, "The UN's catastrophic failure to protect civilians ravaged by war," No Publication, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/05/un-catastrophic-failure-as-civilians-ravaged-by-war-violations-70-years-after-geneva-conventions/, accessed 1-24-2021]LHSBC

In recent years alone, Amnesty International has documented a blatant disregard for civilian protection and international humanitarian law in armed conflicts where four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are parties – Russia, the USA, the UK and France. The fifth, China, has actively shielded neighbouring Myanmar as it carried out [war crimes](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/myanmars-borderlands-on-fire/), [crimes against humanity and possibly genocide](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/06/myanmar-military-top-brass-must-face-justice-for-crimes-against-humanity-targeting-rohingya/).

#### 3 – No verifiability or cred

Joyner 18 [Daniel H. Joyner, 10-31-2018, "Why I Stopped Believing in Customary International Law," Cambridge Core, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/asian-journal-of-international-law/article/why-i-stopped-believing-in-customary-international-law/B8DFADD291DD48D188A0381391B70B65, accessed 2-6-2021]LHSBC

Again, my problem is not with CIL itself as a source of law. In a theoretical sense, I have no problem with the idea that states can collectively make law that governs their interactions with each other, through an evolving process that is not necessarily written down in one law-making moment. Particularly under the modern approach that places emphasis and priority upon opinio juris, states can manifest their recognition of an obligation, and their consent to be bound thereby, through their subjective statements of legal understanding.∂ The problem is that we simply do not currently have a structural framework within the international legal system that can support this method of law creation in a manner that satisfies concerns about objectivity and empirical verifiability of that positivistic manifestation of affirmation and consent. And without this institutional structure, the black magic that stands in for identification of CIL in practice undermines the credibility of every assertion of CIL. It also, by extension, undermines the credibility of the international legal system itself.

### 1AR – AT: Arkin

#### 1---Perm do both

#### 2---Vagueness causes circumvention – Nobody knows what “guiding principles” or some rando’s recommendations are

#### 3---Guiding principles and IHL fail – Competitive incentives ensure non-compliance – That’s Altmann and Sauer and Maas

#### 4---Prolif measures don’t solve – States are developing tech now and dual use means circumvention

#### 5---Links to the net benefit – Regulations chill research because people are scared weapons won’t be used

#### 6---Research fails – Complexity, speed, secrecy, automation bias, lack of context, and security dilemma ensure miscalc and accidents

#### 7---Terrorism plank doesn’t solve – Our scenario is about states

#### 8---No ban circumvention – States are incentivized to promote compliance and inspections solve

### 1AR – AT: Con Con

#### Links to the net-benefit – states only apply for the convention – Congress must call it

Schlafly 18 Andy Schlafly, Esq. & attorney who practices before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit in Philadelphia, on behalf of Pennsylvania Eagle Forum Testimony Against a “Convention of States” (SR133 and SR134) Pennsylvania Senate State Government Committee (Oct. 17, 2018) http://stategovernment.pasenategop.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/30/2018/10/schlafly.pdf

7. The Name “Convention of States” Is Itself Misleading.

Their name itself is misleading. An Article V convention is not a “convention of states.” States can merely apply to Congress, and it is Congress alone that calls an Article V convention. California will have the most influence over a Convention of States because the Supreme Court requires that all representative bodies, other than the U.S. Senate, be based on population: “one man, one vote.”

Their real name should be a “Convention called by Congress,” because that is what it would be. This is the only one type of national constitutional convention authorized by the Constitution, and it is an Article V convention called by Congress. Euphemistic semantics cannot change the fact that Congress alone makes the call, and any amendments could then be proposed at a constitutional convention.

#### That assures delays and political debate

Rotunda & Safranek 96 - Professor of Law @ University of Illinois *&* Professor of Law @ University of Detroit Mercy [Ronald D. Rotunda *&* Stephen J. Safranek “ESSAY: AN ESSAY ON TERM LIMITS AND A CALL FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,” Marquette Law Review, Fall 1996, 80 Marq. L. Rev. 227

If Congress chooses to have the proposed amendment ratified by convention in each of the states, the procedures for the election of these delegates to the conventions will have to be decided. n77 Article V does not specify how or when delegates to a convention would be chosen. n78 Congress, which is given the responsibility to call the convention, n79 should also have the final power to specify the election procedures. Congress might decide to defer to state procedures, or enact its own procedures. Thus, while Congress has no choice but to call a convention once the requisite number of valid state applications has been received, n80 the power to "call" should give it an opportunity to craft the process by which delegates will be selected. n81

Using this power, Congress could create an election process that would **maximize the public debate** on the issue and ensure the accountability of the delegates. Congress could also provide for adequate debate by establishing a **long**er **campaign period**. The campaign would probably **generate intense media and public interest** because it would be the first convention that has ever been held to ratify an amendment. n82 The increased media exposure would draw political parties and interest groups into the campaign and ensure a **spirited discussion of the issues**.

#### If they fiat through it, the process will make the plan illegitimate---can’t solve anything.

Almond 74- Practicing Lawyer in North Carolina[MCHAEL A. ALMOND (JD from University of North Carolina), “Amendment by Convention: Our Next Constitutional Crisis?,” NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW, 53 N.C. L. Rev. 491, 1974]

In retrospect, perhaps the most striking feature of the above discussion is the sharp disagreement among legal scholars regarding the distribution and scope of the amendment power, particularly with respect to the convention procedure. Indeed, **on the subject of constitutional conventions, the Constitution is either textually ambiguous or provocatively mum**. In truth, then, **no one really knows how to amend the Constitution by convention,** and among - those who claim to know, there are general differences of opinion on even - the most fundamental propositions. Accordingly, **the debate** and discussion **concerning article V has resolved nothing,** but has instead merely isolated the major points of controversy.

In a word, the alternative amendment procedure is "imperfect"; and as such it is repugnant to the first of the three essential prerequisites for amendment discussed earlier. 202 **Our present** "imperfect" **understanding of the convention procedure could forever cloud the legitimacy of any amendment proposed and ratified under this process. The underlying political environment, if cankered by extreme partisanship on some issue of basic concern, could *poison the* *amendment process*; *and*** should any sizable portion of the people become convinced that a constitutional amendment was wrongfully adopted or rejected, ***respect for the authority of the Constitution*** generally ***would be undermined*. Pg. 526-527**

#### Turn – runaway convention – collapses democracy & causes such a political firestorm that it links to politics

Riestenberg 18 Jay Riestenberg, Deputy Communications Director @ Common Cause U.S. Constitution Threatened as Article V Convention Movement Nears Success https://www.commoncause.org/resource/u-s-constitution-threatened-as-article-v-convention-movement-nears-success/

Why the Article V Convention Process is a Threat∂ As outlined in Common Cause’s 2015 report, The Dangerous Path: Big Money’s Plan to Shred the Constitution, a constitutional convention is open to many problems, including:∂ THREAT OF A RUNAWAY CONVENTION: There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent a constitutional convention from being expanded in scope to issues not raised in convention calls passed by the state legislatures, and therefore could lead to a runaway convention.∂ INFLUENCE OF SPECIAL INTERESTS: An Article V convention would open the Constitution to revisions at a time of extreme gerrymandering and polarization amid unlimited political spending. It could allow special interests and the wealthiest to re-write the rules governing our system of government.∂ LACK OF CONVENTION RULES: There are no rules governing constitutional conventions. A convention would be an unpredictable Pandora’s Box; the last one, in 1787, resulted in a brand-new Constitution. One group advocating for a “Convention of States” openly discusses the possibility of using the process to undo hard-won civil rights and civil liberties advances and undermine basic rights extended throughout history as our nation strove to deliver on the promise of a democracy that works for everyone.∂ THREAT OF LEGAL DISPUTES: No judicial, legislative, or executive body would have clear authority to settle disputes about a convention, opening the process to chaos and protracted legal battles that would threaten the functioning of our democracy and economy.∂ APPLICATION PROCESS UNCERTAINTY: There is no clear process on how Congress or any other governmental body would count and add up Article V applications, or if Congress and the states could restrain the convention’s mandate based on those applications.∂ POSSIBILITY OF UNEQUAL REPRESENTATION: It is unclear how states would choose delegates to a convention, how states and citizens would be represented in a convention, and who would ultimately get to vote on items raised in a convention.∂ UNCERTAIN RATIFICATION PROCESS: A convention could try to re-define the ratification process(which currently requires 38 states to approve any new amendments) to make it easier to pass new amendments, including those considered at the convention. This happened in 1787, when the convention changed the threshold necessary for ratification.∂ Simply put, an Article V constitutional convention is a dangerous and uncontrollable process that would put Americans’ constitutional rights up for grabs.∂ At a time when extreme gerrymandering has created unprecedented polarization and big money buys access and influence for a few very wealthy special interests, a new constitutional convention would lead to chaos; the interests of everyday Americans would be shut out of the ultimate closed-door meeting. There would be no way to limit the scope of a constitutional convention and no way to guarantee that our civil liberties and constitutional process would be protected.∂ Bipartisan Group of Legislators & Organizations Oppose an Article V Convention∂ Due to the threat of a runaway convention and the lack of rules to protect Americans’ constitutional rights, more than 230 public interest, civil rights, government reform, labor, environmental, immigration, and constitutional rights organizations released a statement in April 2017 opposing calls for an Article V constitutional convention. Organizational signers of the letter include CommonCause, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Democracy21, the AFL-CIO, AFSCME, Americans for Democratic Action, the League of Women Voters of the United States, Dream Defenders, the Sierra Club, the NAACP, the National Council of La Raza Action Fund, the National Education Association (NEA), SEIU, the Campaign Legal Center, Greenpeace, People For theAmerican Way, Daily Kos, the National Women’s Law Center, and the Brennan Center for Justice.∂ As stated in the letter, the organizations “strongly urge state legislatures to oppose efforts to pass a resolution to call for a constitutional convention” and “urge state legislatures to rescind any application for an Article V constitutional convention in order to protect all Americans’ constitutional rights and privileges from being put at risk and up for grabs.”∂ Although pro-convention campaigns are being proposed on the right and left, Democratic and Republican legislators alike have opposed calls for a new convention due to the threat it poses to Americans’ civil rights and liberties. During the 2017 sessions, Republican-controlled legislative chambers in Idaho, South Dakota, North Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming voted against calls for an Article V convention proposed by conservative groups. Likewise, Democratic controlled legislatures in Delaware, New Mexico, Maryland, and Nevada have rescinded their applications for an Article V convention for a balanced budget amendment in recent years. In the 2018 sessions, numerous legislative committees and chambers controlled by both parties rejected Article V convention applications in New Mexico, Idaho, Colorado, Maryland, Hawaii, South Dakota, Massachusetts, Kansas, Virginia, and New Hampshire.∂ Legal Scholars Warn of the Dangers of an Article V Convention∂ “[T]here is no way to effectively limit or muzzle the actions of a Constitutional Convention. The Convention could make its own rules and set its own agenda. Congress might try to limit the convention to one amendment or one issue, but there is no way to assure that the Convention would obey.” – Warren Burger, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1969-1986)∂ “I certainly would not want a constitutional convention. Whoa! Who knows what would come out of it?” – Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1986-2016)∂ “There is no enforceable mechanism to prevent a convention from reporting out wholesale changes to our Constitution and Bill of Rights.” – Arthur Goldberg, Associate Justice of the US. Supreme Court (1962-1965)∂ “First of all, we have developed orderly procedures over the past couple of centuries for resolving [some of the many] ambiguities [in the Constitution], but no comparable procedures for resolving [questions surrounding a convention]. Second, difficult interpretive questions about the Bill of Rights or the scope of the taxing power or the commerce power tend to arise one at a time, while questions surrounding the convention process would more or less need to be resolved all at once. And third, the stakes in this case in this instance are vastly greater, because what you’re doing is putting the whole Constitution up for grabs.” –Laurence Tribe, professor of constitutional law at Harvard Law School∂ “The bigger threat is that a constitutional convention, once unleashed on the nation, would be free to rewrite or scrap any parts of the U.S. Constitution. Do we really want to open up our nation’s core defining values to debate at a time when a serious candidate for the White House brags about his enthusiasm for torture and the surveillance state, wants to “open up” reporters to lawsuits, scoffs at the separation of powers and holds ideas about freedom of religion that are selective at best?” – David Super, professor of law at Georgetown University∂ “Note what [Article V] does not say. It says not a word expressly authorizing the states, Congress, or some combination of the two to confine the subject matter of a convention. It says not a word about whether Congress, in calculating whether the requisite 34 states have called for a convention, must (or must not) aggregate calls for a convention on, say, a balanced budget, with differently worded calls arising from related or perhaps even unrelated topics. It says not a word prescribing that the make-up of a convention, as many conservatives imagine, will be one-state-one-vote (as Alaska and Wyoming might hope) or whether states with larger populations should be given larger delegations (as California and New York would surely argue).”- Walter Olson, senior fellow at the Cato Institute’s Center for Constitutional Studies∂ “Danger lies ahead. Setting aside the long odds, if California and 33 more states invoke Article V, there’s a risk that we’d end up with a “runaway” convention, during which delegates would propose amendments on issues including abortion, gun rights and immigration.” – Rick Hasen, Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of California, Irvine∂ “Holding a Constitutional convention when the U.S. is embroiled in extremely toxic, uninformed and polarized politics is a really, really bad idea.” – Shelia Kennedy, professor of law and policy at Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis∂ “But no rule or law limits the scope of a state-called constitutional convention. Without established legal procedures, the entire document would be laid bare for wholesale revision. Article V itself sheds no light on the most basic procedures for such a convention. How many delegates does each state get at the convention? Is it one state, one vote, or do states with larger populations, like California, get a larger share of the votes? The Supreme Court has made at least one thing clear — it will not intervene in the process or the result of a constitutional convention. The game has neither rules nor referees.” – McKay Cunningham, professor of law at Concordia University∂ “The result will be a disaster. I hate to think of the worst-case scenario. At best, the fight over every step along the way would consume our country’s political oxygen for years.” – David Marcus, professor of law at the University of Arizona∂ “At present, there are no rules regarding who can participate, give money, lobby or have a voice in a constitutional convention. There are no rules about conflicts of interest, disclosure of who is giving or expending money. No rules exist that address political action committees, corporate or labor union involvement or how any other groups can or should participate. Not only might legitimate voices of the people be silenced by convention rules, but special interests may be given privilege to speak and affect the deliberations…there are no rules limiting what can be debated at a constitutional convention. Given the potential domination by special interests, who knows the result?” – David Schultz, political science and election law professor at Hamline University∂ “An Article V convention might propose an amendment to restore or expand the liberties of the American people, but it also could propose an amendment that diminishes the liberties of the American people, or of some of the people. “ – John Malcolm, director of the Heritage Foundation’s Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies∂ “But nothing in the Constitution limits such a convention to the issue or issues for which it was called. In other words, anything and everything could be on the table, including fundamental constitutional rights. Nor are there any guarantees about who would participate or under what rules. Indeed, for these reasons, no constitutional convention has been called since the first in 1787.” – Helen Norton, professor and Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Chair in Constitutional Law at the University of Colorado, and David Super, professor of law at Georgetown University∂ “The lack of clear rules of the road, either in the text of the Constitution itself or in historical or legal precedent, makes the selection of the convention mechanism a choice whose risks dramatically outweigh any potential benefits.” – Richard Boldt, professor of law at the University of Maryland∂ “We live in deeply partisan times. There are no certainties about how a constitutional convention would play out, but the most likely outcome is that it would deepen our partisan divisions. Because there are no clear constitutional rules defining a convention’s procedures, a convention’s “losers” may deem illegitimate any resulting changes. Regardless of the ultimate outcome, the process itself would likely worsen our already vicious national politics.” – Eric Berger, associate dean professor of law at the University of Nebraska College of Law∂ “There are no such guarantees. This is uncharted territory…We should not now abandon the very document that has held us together as a nation for over two and one quarter centuries. Rewriting the Constitution is a dangerous errand that would not only unravel the legal ties that have kept us together for so long but would also undermine our sense of national identity and the way that view ourselves as a people.” – William Marshall, professor of law at University of North Carolina∂ “Terrible idea…Today’s politicians don’t have the timeless brilliance of our framers. If we were to rewrite our constitution today, we wouldn’t get a particularly good one.” – Adam Winkler, professor of constitutional law and history at the University of California, Los Angeles∂ “I believe it’s a time for constitutional sobriety. It’s a time to keep our powder dry and not to move on an uncharted course. We are not the founding fathers. This would be disastrous.” – Toni Massaro, constitutional law professor at the University of Arizona∂ “Having taught constitutional law for almost 40 years, and having studied constitutions from around the globe, I have difficulty imagining anything worse.” – Bill Rich, professor of law at Washburn University in Topeka, Kansas∂ “There are no constitutional limits on what the convention could do, no matter what the states say going into it.” – David Schwartz, professor of law at the University of Wisconsin Law School∂ “The Constitution allows for the calling of conventions on a petition of enough states, but not limited conventions of enough states. If the delegates decide they don’t want to be bound by the (state) resolution, they are right that they can’t be bound.” – Richard H. Fallon Jr., constitutional law professor at Harvard University∂ “Once you open the door to a constitutional convention, there are no sure guidelines left. This is the constitutional equivalent of opening a can of worms.” – Miguel Schor, constitutional law professor at Drake University School of Law∂ “Thus, neither the states nor Congress may limit the convention to specific subjects. While the goal to propose a balanced budget amendment may provide guidance to the convention, it would not have the force of law…Put simply, the rewards of any constitutional change is not worth the risks of a convention. ” – Sam Marcosson, professor of law at the University of Louisville∂ “Even more frightening is that the entire Constitution will be in play during a convention. The First Amendment could disappear, so could gun rights. There is no guarantee that any of our current constitutionally protected rights would be included in a new constitution. The only guarantee is that all of those rights would be imperiled.” – Mark Rush, the Waxberg Professor of Politics and Law at Washington and Lee University in Lexington∂ “Most significantly, we advise the Legislature that a federal constitutional convention called with this resolution could potentially open up each and every provision of the United States Constitution to amendment or repeal. In other words, a federal constitutional convention could propose amendments to eliminate the protections of free speech; the protections against racial discrimination; the protections of freedom of religion; or any of the other myriad provisions that presently provide the backbone of American law.” – March 2018 legislative testimony of Russell Suzuki, Acting Attorney General, and Deirdre Marie-Iha, Deputy Attorney General, of the state of Hawaii∂ “Whatever one thinks about these proposed amendments, trying to pass them through an Article V convention is a risky business. The Constitution does not specify how the delegates for such a convention would be chosen, how many delegates each state would have, what rules would apply at the convention or whether there would be any limits on what amendments the convention could consider. A convention that was called to address a specific issue, such as budget deficits, might propose changes to freedom of speech, the right to keep and bear arms, the Electoral College or anything else in the Constitution. There is no rule or precedent saying what the proper scope of the convention’s work would be.” – Allen Rostron, associate dean for students, the William R. Jacques Constitutional Law Scholar, and a professor at the University of Missouri∂ “Whether I like or dislike the specific proposal is not the point — the point is that a constitutional convention is a risky and potentially dangerous way to propose amendments.” – Hugh Spitzer, professor of law at the University of Washington School of Law∂ “If a national constitutional convention were held, all of our rights under the current Constitution, and all of the government’s reciprocal obligations, would be up for grabs. Nothing in the Constitution constrains the process that would apply if a convention is actually called. Anything could go, including the process for ratification itself, and there would be no Constitution cop on the block to ensure that things don’t go seriously haywire.” – Kim Wehle, professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a former assistant U.S. attorney and associate independent counsel in the Whitewater investigation

#### Democracy solves war, environmental destruction, and famine.

Christopher Kutz 16. PhD UC Berkeley, JD Yale, Professor, Boalt Hall School of Law @ UC Berkeley, Visiting Professor at Columbia and Stanford law schools, as well as at Sciences Po University. “Introduction: War, Politics, Democracy,” in On War and Democracy, 1.

Despite Churchill’s famous quip—“Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”2—democracy is seen as a source of both domestic and international flourishing. Democracy, understood roughly for now as a political system with wide suffrage in which power is allocated to officials by popular election, can solve or help solve a host of problems with stunning success. It can solve the problem of revolutionary violence that condemns autocratic regimes, because mass politics can work at the ballot box rather than the streets. It can help solve the problem of famine, because the systems of free public communication and discussion that are essential to democratic politics are the backbone of the markets that have made democratic societies far richer than their competitors. It can help solve the problem of environmental despoliation, which occurs when those operating polluting factories (whether private citizens or the state) do not need to answer for harms visited upon a broad public. And democracy has been famously thought to help solve the problem of war, in the guise of the idea of the “peace amongst democratic nations”—an idea emerging with Immanuel Kant in the Age of Enlightenment and given new energy with the wave of democratization at the end of the twentieth century.

### 1AR – AT: Eliminate Nukes – Drones

#### 1 – Circumvention – States see nukes as integral to deterring aggression and will rearm – aff doesn’t fiat through circumvention so neg doesn’t either – reciprocity key or else aff gets dunked on by abuse decking engagement

#### 2 – Disarm is too slow

Kelley 20 [Robert E. Kelley is a Distinguished Associate Fellow at SIPRI. 28 August 2020, “Starve nuclear weapons to death with a tritium freeze, SIPRI, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2020/starve-nuclear-weapons-death-tritium-freeze//lhs-ap]

Note that even under a nuclear weapon ban treaty such as the TPNW, disarmament would be a slow process. The actual dismantlement of nuclear weapons takes decades. For example, in 2013, thousands of Russian weapons were eliminated permanently by burning their HEU components in power reactors to produce electricity (ironically in the USA). It took about 20 years to dismantle the weapons, verify their dismantlement and convert the uranium to reactor fuel. No matter what treaty path is chosen this is an illustrative timeline.

#### 3 – LAWS prevent disarm

Boulanin, Ph.D., et al. 20 [Vincent, senior researcher at SIPRI; Moa Peldán Carlsson, research assistant on emerging military and security technologies at SIPRI; Lora Saalman, associate senior fellow on armament and disarmament at SIPRI and a senior fellow with the Global Cooperation in Cyberspace Programme of the EastWest Institute, New York; Fei Su, researcher with the China and Global Security Programme at SIPRI; Petr Topychkanov, senior researcher with the SIPRI Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme; June 2020; Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk; SIPRI; <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/other-publications/artificial-intelligence-strategic-stability-and-nuclear-risk//lhs-ap>]

Pakistan’s interventions in the CCW debate on LAWS also indicate that the Pakistani Government has given increasing thought to the wider security opportunities and risks posed by the advance of AI in military systems. They also show what Pakistan has already identified a redline for the military use of AI. Indeed, Pakistan was one of the first countries to support the idea of a ban on LAWS.348 Pakistan has justified its support for a ban over the years with a mix of ethical, legal and strategic considerations. Ethically, the use of LAWS could ‘make war even more inhumane’ since the ‘use of LAWS in the battlefield against a State fighting with human soldiers would amount to a situation of one-sided killing’.349 Legally, weapons that are not ‘under the direct control and supervision of humans’ could ‘create an accountability vacuum and provide impunity to the user due to the inability to attribute responsibility for the harm that they cause’.350 Strategically, LAWS could ‘undermine international peace and security. Their introduction would affect progress on disarmament and non-proliferation. Faced with the prospect of being overwhelmed by LAWS, states possessing [weapon of mass destruction (WMD)] capabilities would be reluctant to give them up, while others would feel encouraged to acquire them.’351

#### 4 – Perm do both

#### 5 – Conventional war is still devastating

**Dvorsky 12** — George Dvorsky, Chair of the Board for the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, co-founder and president of the Toronto Transhumanist Association, 2012 (“9 Ways Humanity Could Bring About Its Own Destruction,” *io9*, December 12th, Available Online at http://io9.com/5967660/9-ways-humanity-could-bring-about-our-own-destruction, Accessed 07-29-2014)

9. World War III

At the close of the Second World War, nearly 2.5% of the human population had perished. Of the 70 million people who were killed, about 20 million died from starvation. And disturbingly, civilians accounted for nearly 50 percent of all deaths — a stark indication that war isn't just for soldiers any more.

Given the incredible degree to which technology has advanced in the nearly seven decades since this war, it's reasonable to assume that the next global ‘conventional war' — i.e. one fought **without nuclear weapons** — would be **near apocalyptic in scope**. The degree of human suffering that could be unleashed would **easily surpass anything that came before it**, with combatants using many of the technologies already described in this list, including **autonomous killing machines** and **weaponized nanotechnology**. And in various acts of desperation (or sheer malevolence), some belligerent nations could choose to **unleash chemical and biological agents** that would result in **countless deaths**. And like WWII, food could be used as a weapon; agricultural yields could be brought to **a grinding halt**.

### 1AR – AT: DOD Directive

#### 1 – No verification measures through a treaty means states are uncertain about US capabilities

#### 2 – Pdb – not textually competitive because it adds words – prefer textual competition because it’s the only non-arbitrary stasis point and prevents explosion of infinite counterplans which obviate aff ground and nuanced clash

#### 3 – Perm do the counterplan – it bans all drone swarms

#### **4 – Our ev says US rollsback**

Johnson 20 [James Johnson, Dr. James Johnson is a postdoctoral research fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, Monterey. He holds a PhD in politics and international relations from the University of Leicester, where he is also an honorary visiting fellow with the School of History and International Relations., 4-1-2020, "Artificial Intelligence, Drone Swarming and Escalation Risks in Future Warfare," Taylor &amp; Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2020.1752026, accessed 3-25-2021]LHSBC

The proliferation of a broad range of AI-augmented autonomous weapon systems (most notably drones used in swarming tactics) could have far-reaching strategic implications for nuclear security and escalation in future warfare.24 Several observers anticipate that sophisticated AIaugmented AWSs will soon be deployed for a range of ISR and strike missions.25 Even if AWSs are used only for conventional operations, their proliferation could nonetheless have destabilizing implications and increase the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation. For example, AI augmented drone swarms may be used in offensive sorties targeting ground-based air defenses and by nuclear-armed states to defend their strategic assets (i.e., launch facilities and their attendant C3I and earlywarning systems), exerting pressure on a weaker nuclear-armed state to respond with nuclear weapons in a use-them-or-lose-them situation. Recent advances in AI and autonomy have substantially increased the perceived operational value that military great powers attach to the development of a range of AWSs,26 potentially making the delegation of lethal authority to AWSs an increasingly irresistible and destabilizing prospect.27 That is, in an effort to defend or capture the technological upper hand in the possession of cutting-edge war-fighting assets vis-à-vis strategic rivals’ traditionally conservative militaries, states may eschew the potential risks of deploying unreliable, unverified, and unsafe AWS. Today, the main risk for stability and escalation is the technical limitations of the current iteration of AI machine learning software (i.e., brittleness, explainability, unpredictability of machine learning, vulnerability to subversion or “data poisoning,” and the fallibility of AI systems to biases).28 To be sure, immature deployments of these nascent systems in a nuclear context would have severe consequences.29 Conceptually speaking, autonomous systems will incorporate AI technologies such as visual perception, speech, facial recognition, and decisionmaking tools to execute a range of core air interdiction, amphibious ground assaults, long-range strike, and maritime operations independent of human intervention and supervision.30Currently, only a few weapon systems select and engage their targets without human intervention. Loitering attack munitions (LAM)—also known as “loitering munitions” or “suicide drones”—pursue targets (such as enemy radars, ships, or tanks) based on preprogrammed targeting criteria and launch an attack when their sensors detect an enemy’s air defense radar.31 Compared to cruise missiles (designed to fulfill a similar function), LAMs use AI technology to shoot down incoming projectiles faster than a human operator ever could and can remain in flight (or loiter) for much longer periods. This attribute could complicate the ability of states to reliably and accurately detect and attribute autonomous attacks.32 A low-cost lone-wolf unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) would, for example, not pose a significant threat to a US F-35 stealth fighter, but hundreds of AI machine learning autonomous drones in a swarming sortie may potentially evade and overwhelm an adversary’s sophisticated defense capabilities—even in heavily defended regions such as China’s east and coastal regions.33 Moreover, stealth variants of these systems34—coupled with miniaturized electromagnetic jammers and cyberweapons—may be used to interfere with or subvert an adversary’s targeting sensors and communications systems, undermining its multilayered air defenses in preparation for drone swarms and long-range stealth bomber offensive attacks.35 In 2011, for example, MQ-1 and MQ-9 drones in the Middle East were infected with hard-to-remove malicious malware, exposing the vulnerability of US subset systems to offensive cyber.36 This threat might, however, be countered (or mitigated) by the integration of future iterations of AI technology into stealth fighters such as the F-35.37 Manned F-35 fighters will soon be able to leverage AI to control small drone swarms in close proximity to the aircraft performing sensing, reconnaissance, and targeting functions, including countermeasures against swarm attacks.38 In the future, extended endurance of UAVs and support platforms could potentially increase the ability of drone swarms to survive these kinds of countermeasures.39 Several prominent researchers have opined that, notwithstanding the remaining technical challenges as well as the legal and ethical feasibility,40 we can expect to see operational AWSs in a matter of years.41 According to former US deputy secretary of defense Robert Work, the United States “will not delegate lethal authority to a machine to make a decision” in the use of military force. 42 Work adds, however, that such self-restraint could be tested if a strategic competitor (especially China and Russia) “is more willing to delegate authority to machines than we are and, as that competition unfolds, we’ll have to make decisions on how we can best compete” (emphasis added).43 In short, pre-delegating authority to machines, and taking human judgment further out of the crisis decision-making process, might severely challenge the safety, resilience, and credibility of nuclear weapons in future warfare.44 The historical record is replete with examples of near nuclear misses, demonstrating the importance of human judgment in mitigating the risk of miscalculation and misperception (i.e., of another’s intentions, redlines, and willingness to use force) between adversaries during crises.45 Despite these historical precedents, the risks associated with unpredictable AIaugmented autonomous systems operating in dynamic, complex, and possibly a priori unknown environments remain underappreciated by global defense communities.46 Eschewing these risks, China and Russia plan to incorporate AI into unmanned aerial and undersea vehicles for swarming missions infused with AI machine learning technology.47 Chinese strategists have reportedly researched data-link technologies for “bee swarm” UAVs, particularly emphasizing network architecture, navigation, and anti-jamming military operations for targeting US aircraft carriers.48 Drones used in swarms are conceptually well suited to conduct preemptive attacks and nuclear ISR missions against an adversary’s nuclear and nonnuclear mobile missile launchers and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), along with their attendant enabling facilities (e.g., C3I and early warning systems, antennas, sensors, and air intakes).49 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), for example, is developing an autonomous surface vehicle (ASV) double outrigger, Sea Hunter, currently being tested by the US Navy to support antisubmarine warfare operations (i.e., submarine reconnaissance).50 Some observers have posited that autonomous systems like Sea Hunter may render the underwater domain transparent, thereby eroding the second-strike deterrence utility of stealthy SSBNs. The technical feasibility of this hypothesis is highly contested, however.51 On the one hand, several experts argue that deployed in large swarms, these platforms could transform antisubmarine warfare, rendering at-sea nuclear deterrence vulnerable. On the other hand, some consider such a hypothesis technically premature because (1) it is unlikely that sensors on board AWSs would be able to reliably detect deeply submerged submarines; (2) the range of these sensors (and the drones themselves) would be limited by battery power over extended ranges;52 and (3) given the vast areas traversed by SSBNs on deterrence missions, the chance of detection is negligible even if large numbers of autonomous swarms were deployed.53 Thus, significant advances in power, sensor technology, and communications would be needed before these autonomous systems have a gamechanging strategic impact on deterrence.54 However, irrespective of the veracity of this emerging capability, the mere perception that nuclear capabilities face new strategic challenges would nonetheless elicit distrust between nuclear-armed adversaries—particularly where strategic force asymmetries exist. Moreover, DARPA’s Sea Hunter demonstrates how the emerging generation of autonomous weapons is expediting the completion of the iterative targeting cycle to support joint operations, thus increasing the uncertainty about the reliability and survivability of states’ nuclear second-strike capability and potentially triggering use-them-orlose-them situations. Conceptually speaking, the most destabilizing impact of AI on nuclear deterrence would be the synthesis of autonomy with a range of machinelearning-augmented sensors, undermining states’ confidence in the survival of their second-strike capabilities and in extremis triggering a retaliatory first strike.55 Enhanced by the exponential growth in computing performance and coupled with advances in machine learning techniques that can rapidly process data in real time, AI will empower drone swarms to perform increasingly complex missions, such as hunting hitherto hidden nuclear deterrence forces.56 In short, the ability of future iterations of AI able to predict based on the fusion of expanded and dispersed data sets and then to locate, track, and target strategic missiles such as mobile ICBM launchers in underground silos, on board stealth aircraft, and in SSBNs is set to grow.57 The following four scenarios illustrate the possible strategic operations AI-augmented drone swarms would execute.58 First, drone swarms could be deployed to conduct nuclear ISR operations to locate and track dispersed (nuclear and nonnuclear) mobile missile launchers and their attendant enabling C3I systems.59 Specifically, swarms incorporating AIinfused ISR, autonomous sensor platforms, ATR, and data analysis systems may enhance the effectiveness and speed of sensor drones to locate mobile missiles and evade enemy defenses. Second, swarming could enhance legacy conventional and nuclear weapons delivery systems (e.g., ICBMs and SLBMs), possibly incorporating hypersonic variants (discussed below).60 AI applications will likely enhance the delivery system targeting and tracking and improve the survivability of drone swarms against the current generation of missile defenses. Third, swarming tactics could bolster a state’s ability to disable or suppress an adversary’s defenses (e.g., air, missile, and antisubmarine warfare defenses), clearing the path for a disarming attack.61 Drone swarms might be armed with cyber or EW capabilities (in addition to antiship, antiradiation, or regular cruise and ballistic missiles) to interfere with or destroy an adversary’s early warning detection and C3I systems in advance of a broader offensive campaign.62 Conversely, drone swarms might enhance states’ missile defenses as countervails to these offensive threats. For example, swarms could form a defensive wall to absorb incoming missile salvos, intercepting them or acting as decoys to throw them off course with mounted laser technology.63

## 1AR – AT: Harker Reform/Overwatch

### 1AR – AT: Sætra

#### Sætra evidence doesn’t’ apply – About political governance, not warzones – Doesn’t assume short reaction times, which cause miscalculation – That’s Altmann and Sauer

#### Even if AI is theoretically perfect, implementation ensures miscalculation –

#### 1--- Unique situations that can’t be tested and competitive incentives ensure faulty equipment – That’s Altmann and Sauer

#### 2---Complexity, automation bias, incomplete information, and secrecy ensure misuse that escalates and won’t be corrected – That’s Maas

#### 3---Security Dilemma – Other countries think AI to deescalate is actually a first strike – That’s Johnson

### 1AR – AT: Humans Bad

#### Even if human deterrence isn’t perfect, decision times ensure they’re at least better than AI – Prefer Altmann and Sauer – That’s the only evidence in this round that compares emerging AI technology that will be deployed soon with human reactions specifically in the context of nuclear decisions

### 1AR – AT: King

#### Humans solve deterrence – Even if they’re not perfect, slower reaction times allow communication and reconsideration that prevent miscalculation – That’s Altmann and Sauer

### 1AR – AT: Scarry

#### Scarry just says former presidents considered first use without answering the reconsideration defense from Altmann and Sauer

### 1AR – AT: Del Re/Barash

#### No stress impact – Del Re is in the context of a battlefield, not nuclear decisionmaking AND doesn’t assume decision time checks emotional reactions – Also answers Barash

### 1AR – AT: Wolff

#### AI Testing fails –

#### 1---Security Dilemma – Leaders prioritize new capabilities over safety – That’s Maas

#### 2---Secrecy – Competitive pressures incentivize leaders to hide failures and accelerate deployment of faulty AI – That’s Maas

#### 3---Quantity – Too many contingencies to test – ensures miscalculation – That’s Altmann and Sauer and Maas

#### 4---Bias – Human programmers transfer their cognitive biases – That’s Johnson

#### Concludes aff – Loyola reads Yellow

1NC Wolff 20 Wolff, Josephine. Assistant Professor of Cybersecurity Policy, The Fletcher School - Tufts University "How to improve cybersecurity for artificial intelligence." Brookings, 8 June 2020, www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-improve-cybersecurity-for-artificial-intelligence.

In January 2017, a group of artificial intelligence researchers gathered at the Asilomar Conference Grounds in California and developed 23 principles for artificial intelligence, which was later dubbed the Asilomar AI Principles. The sixth principle states that “AI systems should be safe and secure throughout their operational lifetime, and verifiably so where applicable and feasible.” Thousands of people in both academia and the private sector have since signed on to these principles, but, more than three years after the Asilomar conference, many questions remain about what it means to make AI systems safe and secure. Verifying these features in the context of a rapidly developing field and highly complicated deployments in health care, financial trading, transportation, and translation, among others, complicates this endeavor. Much of the discussion to date has centered on how beneficial machine learning algorithms may be for identifying and defending against computer-based vulnerabilities and threats by automating the detection of and response to attempted attacks.[1] Conversely, concerns have been raised that using AI for offensive purposes may make cyberattacks increasingly difficult to block or defend against by enabling rapid adaptation of malware to adjust to restrictions imposed by countermeasures and security controls.[2] These are also the contexts in which many policymakers most often think about the security impacts of AI. For instance, a 2020 report on “Artificial Intelligence and UK National Security” commissioned by the U.K.’s Government Communications Headquarters highlighted the need for the United Kingdom to incorporate AI into its cyber defenses to “proactively detect and mitigate threats” that “require a speed of response far greater than human decision-making allows.”[3] A related but distinct set of issues deals with the question of how AI systems can themselves be secured, not just about how they can be used to augment the security of our data and computer networks. The push to implement AI security solutions to respond to rapidly evolving threats makes the need to secure AI itself even more pressing; if we rely on machine learning algorithms to detect and respond to cyberattacks, it is all the more important that those algorithms be protected from interference, compromise, or misuse. Increasing dependence on AI for critical functions and services will not only create greater incentives for attackers to target those algorithms, but also the potential for each successful attack to have more severe consequences. “Increasing dependence on AI for critical functions and services will not only create greater incentives for attackers to target those algorithms, but also the potential for each successful attack to have more severe consequences.” This policy brief explores the key issues in attempting to improve cybersecurity and safety for artificial intelligence as well as roles for policymakers in helping address these challenges. Congress has already indicated its interest in cybersecurity legislation targeting certain types of technology, including the Internet of Things and voting systems. As AI becomes a more important and widely used technology across many sectors, policymakers will find it increasingly necessary to consider the intersection of cybersecurity with AI. In this paper, I describe some of the issues that arise in this area, including the compromise of AI decision-making systems for malicious purposes, the potential for adversaries to access confidential AI training data or models, and policy proposals aimed at addressing these concerns. Securing AI decision-making systems One of the major security risks to AI systems is the potential for adversaries to compromise the integrity of their decision-making processes so that they do not make choices in the manner that their designers would expect or desire. One way to achieve this would be for adversaries to directly take control of an AI system so that they can decide what outputs the system generates and what decisions it makes. Alternatively, an attacker might try to influence those decisions more subtly and indirectly by delivering malicious inputs or training data to an AI model.[4] For instance, an adversary who wants to compromise an autonomous vehicle so that it will be more likely to get into an accident might exploit vulnerabilities in the car’s software to make driving decisions themselves. However, remotely accessing and exploiting the software operating a vehicle could prove difficult, so instead an adversary might try to make the car ignore stop signs by defacing them in the area with graffiti. Therefore, the computer vision algorithm would not be able to recognize them as stop signs. This process by which adversaries can cause AI systems to make mistakes by manipulating inputs is called adversarial machine learning. Researchers have found that small changes to digital images that are undetectable to the human eye can be sufficient to cause AI algorithms to completely misclassify those images.[5] An alternative approach to manipulating inputs is data poisoning, which occurs when adversaries train an AI model on inaccurate, mislabeled data. Pictures of stop signs that are labeled as being something else so that the algorithm will not recognize stop signs when it encounters them on the road is an example of this. This model poisoning can then lead an AI algorithm to make mistakes and misclassifications later on, even if an adversary does not have access to directly manipulate the inputs it receives.[6] Even just selectively training an AI model on a subset of correctly labeled data may be sufficient to compromise a model so that it makes inaccurate or unexpected decisions. These risks speak to the need for careful control over both the training datasets that are used to build AI models and the inputs that those models are then provided with to ensure security of machine-learning-enabled decision-making processes. However, neither of those goals are straightforward. Inputs to their machine learning systems, in particular, are often beyond the scope of control of AI developers—whether or not there will be graffiti on street signs that computer vision systems in autonomous vehicles encounter, for instance. On the other hand, developers have typically had much greater control over training datasets for their models. But in many cases, those datasets may contain very personal or sensitive information, raising yet another set of concerns about how that information can best be protected and anonymized. These concerns can often create trade-offs for developers about how that training is done and how much direct access to the training data they themselves have.[7] Research on adversarial machine learning has shown that making AI models more robust to data poisoning and adversarial inputs often involves building models that reveal more information about the individual data points used to train those models.[8] When sensitive data are used to train these models, this creates a new set of security risks, namely that adversaries will be able to access the training data or infer training data points from the model itself. Trying to secure AI models from this type of inference attack can leave them more susceptible to the adversarial machine learning tactics described above and vice versa. This means that part of maintaining security for artificial intelligence is navigating the trade-offs between these two different, but related, sets of risks. Policy proposals for AI security In the past four years there has been a rapid acceleration of government interest and policy proposals regarding artificial intelligence and security, with 27 governments publishing official AI plans or initiatives by 2019.[9] However, many of these strategies focus more on countries’ plans to fund more AI research activity, train more workers in this field, and encourage economic growth and innovation through development of AI technologies than they do on maintaining security for AI. Countries that have proposed or implemented security-focused policies for AI have emphasized the importance of transparency, testing, and accountability for algorithms and their developers—although few have gotten to the point of actually operationalizing these policies or figuring out how they would work in practice. “Countries that have proposed or implemented security-focused policies for AI have emphasized the importance of transparency, testing, and accountability for algorithms and their developers.” In the United States, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) has highlighted the importance of building trustworthy AI systems that can be audited through a rigorous, standardized system of documentation.[10] To that end, the commission has recommended the development of an extensive design documentation process and standards for AI models, including what data is used by the model, what the model’s parameters and weights are, how models are trained and tested, and what results they produce. These transparency recommendations speak to some of the security risks around AI technology, but the commission has not yet extended them to explain how this documentation would be used for accountability or auditing purposes. At the local government level, the New York City Council established an Automated Decision Systems Task Force in 2017 that stressed the importance of security for AI systems; however, the task force provided few concrete recommendations beyond noting that it “grappled with finding the right balance between emphasizing opportunities to share information publicly about City tools, systems, and processes, while ensuring that any relevant legal, security, and privacy risks were accounted for.”[11] A 2018 report by a French parliamentary mission, titled “For a Meaningful Artificial Intelligence: Towards a French and European Strategy,” offered similarly vague suggestions. It highlighted several potential security threats raised by AI, including manipulation of input data or training data, but concluded only that there was a need for greater “collective awareness” and more consideration of safety and security risks starting in the design phase of AI systems. It further called on the government to seek the “support of specialist actors, who are able to propose solutions thanks to their experience and expertise” and advised that the French Agence Nationale pour la Sécurité des Systèmes d’information (ANSSI) should be responsible for monitoring and assessing the security and safety of AI systems. In a similar vein, China’s 2017 New Generation AI Development Plan proposed developing security and safety certifications for AI technologies as well as accountability mechanisms and disciplinary measures for their creators, but the plan offered few details as to how these systems might work. For many governments, the next stage of considering AI security will require figuring out how to implement ideas of transparency, auditing, and accountability to effectively address the risks of insecure AI decision processes and model data leakage. Transparency will require the development of a more comprehensive documentation process for AI systems, along the lines of the proposals put forth by the NSCAI. Rigorous documentation of how models are developed and tested and what results they produce will enable experts to identify vulnerabilities in the technology, potential manipulations of input data or training data, and unexpected outputs. Thorough documentation of AI systems will also enable governments to develop effective testing and auditing techniques as well as meaningful certification programs that provide clear guidance to AI developers and users. These audits would, ideally, leverage research on adversarial machine learning and model data leakage to test AI models for vulnerabilities and assess their overall robustness and resilience to different forms of attacks through an AI-focused form of red teaming. Given the dominance of the private sector in developing AI, it is likely that many of these auditing and certification activities will be left to private businesses to carry out. But policymakers could still play a central role in encouraging the development of this market by funding research and standards development in this area and by requiring certifications for their own procurement and use of AI systems. Finally, policymakers will play a vital role in determining accountability mechanisms and liability regimes to govern AI when security incidents occur. This will involve establishing baseline requirements for what AI developers must do to show they have carried out their due diligence with regard to security and safety, such as obtaining recommended certifications or submitting to rigorous auditing and testing standards. Developers who do not meet these standards and build AI systems that are compromised through data poisoning or adversarial inputs, or that leak sensitive training data, would be liable for the damage caused by their technologies. This will serve as both an incentive for companies to comply with policies related to AI auditing and certification, and also as a means of clarifying who is responsible when AI systems cause serious harm due to a lack of appropriate security measures and what the appropriate penalties are in those circumstances. The proliferation of AI systems in critical sectors—including transportation, health, law enforcement, and military technology—makes clear just how important it is for policymakers to take seriously the security of these systems. This will require governments to look beyond just the economic promise and national security potential of automated decision-making systems to understand how those systems themselves can best be secured through a combination of transparency guidelines, certification and auditing standards, and accountability measures.

## 1AR – AT: Process

### 1AR – AT: Rosert

#### Rosert supports ban

1AC Rosert 17 [Prof. Dr. Elvira Rosert is Junior Professor in Political Science, particularly International Relations, at the Universität Hamburg and at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH). “HOW TO REGULATE AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS,” PRIF Spotlight 6/2017, <https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/Spotlight0617.pdf//lhs-ap>]

We are, once again, witnessing a technological revolution in warfare: the progressing autonomy in weapons systems. Autonomy refers to capabilities of weapons to operate without human guidance, pertaining to less controversial functions such as navigation and reconnaissance – but also to the alarming prospect of robots making the killing decision. The latter in particular has given rise to fundamental ethical and legal concerns: To what extent is it morally acceptable to use robots in military operations? Are autonomous weapons capable of compliance with International Humanitarian Law? Who can be held accountable for their actions and how? Responding to these concerns, this Spotlight echoes the calls for a ban on killer robots, and proposes to adopt a new principle, which would turn meaningful human control of lethal weapons into an obligation under International Humanitarian Law.

### 1AR – AT: MTCR

#### 1 – perception of development still use or lose – states don’t trust the US

#### 2 – accidents means US regs are useless

#### 3 – Other states fielding means US fears

#### Hypersonics are impossible.

Omar **Lamrani 16**. Senior Military Analyst, Stratfor, private intelligence corporation, M.A. Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, B.A. international relations, Clark University. 03-21-2016. “What the Next Arms Race Will Look Like.” https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/what-next-arms-race-will-look

Hypersonic missiles travel at least five times the speed of sound. Only a few other manmade devices are capable of reaching hypersonic speeds, including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles and unmanned spacecraft such as the Boeing X-37. The only manned aircraft to achieve hypersonic speed is the rocket-powered North American X-15, which broke speed and altitude records when it was introduced in the 1960s. Recently, the focus of research in hypersonic technologies has shifted toward missile development, but several challenges must be overcome to make hypersonic missiles a reality. First, it is difficult to create a weapon that can reach hypersonic speeds while enduring the stress and extreme temperatures of hypersonic flight. It is harder still to ensure that the weapon can maintain those speeds for an extended period — enough time to reach its target. Second, high velocities can make a hypersonic vehicle sensitive to changes in flight conditions, resulting in instability in the missile's airframe during flight. Coupled with the fact that high speeds leave less time to course correct, this instability can make guidance of hypersonic missiles problematic. Finally, hypersonic vehicles' actual flight paths often do not match the predictions researchers derive from ground tests and theoretical models, lengthening the process of development. Despite these obstacles, hypersonic missiles have some considerable advantages. Their speed enables them to reach their targets much more quickly than other missiles and to better penetrate enemy defense systems. Those with gliding capabilities can also cover great distances, enabling one country to strike at another from farther away. Guided hypersonic missiles would be more accurate than traditional ballistic missiles, and they could conceivably be armed with nuclear warheads, becoming a strike asset or a deterrent in nuclear warfare.

### 1AR – AT: Congressional Consultaiton

#### Squo solves Congressional input---there’s robust informal consultation. BUT the plan removes the incentive to work with Congress in good faith.

Rachel **Stohl 10**. Associate Fellow of Chatham House, London, based in Washington, DC. April 2010. “U.S. Policy and the Arms Trade Treaty.” Working Paper 10-1. https://ploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/WP10.1.pdf

**While Congress does have a statutory responsibility to review sales, very rarely** **does Congress step in** **to** **stop** **a potential sale. To** **prevent a sale** from proceeding, **both the House and the Senate must pass identical joint resolutions of disapproval** **within a very short timeframe and then the resolution must be signed** into law by the President. **A Presidential signature is highly unlikely, however, since the administration supports the sale in the first place. Therefore, the resolution** of disapproval **would have to be passed by a two-thirds majority to be able to override the presidential veto. Because the process is so difficult,** **Congress prefers to work behind the scenes**, **highlighting** **potentially troublesome sales to the administration before the formal review** process. **In the past, the administration has provided** **informal** **reviews to Congress to** **test the waters** **on potential sales and avoid the** **embarrassment of Congressional opposition**. However, in July 2006, the Bush administration decided to waive the customary 20-day pre-notification for a major arms sale. As a result, House International Relations Committee (HIRC) Chairman Henry Hyde (R-IL) expressed his outrage to Assistant Secretary of State John Hillen in a public hearing, calling the attempt a “deliberate and wholly inappropriate maneuver to diminish **Congress’** lawful **oversight of arms sales**.” Hyde promised that the Congress would “take all appropriate actions to prevent the reoccurrence of the flouting of the Arms Export Control Act”. In fact, Rep. Hyde and ranking Democrat Tom Lantos (D-CA) introduced a bill (H.R. 5847) soon after that was intended to “reinforce longstanding oversight practices” of U.S. arms sales (Schroeder 2006). The hearing **embarrassed** **the** Bush **administration** and Pakistan, **which had not wanted** **concerns about the sale** **– namely the country’s poor human rights record, its questionable democratic processes, the possibility of diversion** of U.S. weapons and technology to China, **and** the **issues related to nuclear prolif**erator ringleader AQ Khan – **to be discussed in an open setting, and forced** Hillen to reveal **specifics** **about the sale not generally made public. Such a** **public vetting of the displeasure of Congress** **over a potential arms sale is something the executive branch wants to avoid**. **Thus, Congress and the executive** branch **generally** try to **work out kinks in the deal** **before it is made public. In addition, Congress may work to influence the** **budget authority** **of the agencies involved in the export process, request certifications** **or** **reports** related to a particular export, or simply establish a law that prohibits arms sales to a specific country. For example, in November 2005, Congress placed conditions on U.S. Foreign Military Financing – grants that allow eligible states to purchase weapons, training, and other defense articles and services from the United States – and lethal military exports to Indonesia, until Indonesia undertook steps to counter international terrorism, establish military reforms, and protect human rights and punish rights violators, except in cases of national security interests. One week after Congress passed the bill, the Bush administration announced that the legislative provisions were being waived due to U.S. national security interests, allowing Indonesia to receive weapons from the United States without delay.

#### Undermining quick and flexible presidential action risks survival

**Li, Georgetown J.D. candidate, 9**

[Zheyao, 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 373 2009 WAR POWERS IN THE FOURTH GENERATION OF WARFARE, ““War Powers for the Fourth Generation: Constitutional Interpretation in the Age of Asymmetric Warfare”, Lexis, accessed 7/13/19)

A. The Emergence of Non-State Actors

Even as the quantity of nation-states in the world has increased dramatically since the end of World War II, the **institution** of the nation-state has been in decline over the past few decades. Much of this decline is the direct result of the waning of major interstate war, which primarily resulted from the introduction of nuclear weapons.122 The proliferation of nuclear weapons, and their immense capacity for absolute destruction, has ensured that **conventional wars** remain limited in scope and duration. Hence, "both the size of the armed forces and the quantity of weapons at their disposal has declined quite sharply" since 1945.123 At the same time, concurrent with the decline of the nation-state in the second half of the twentieth century, non-state actors have increasingly been willing and able to use force to advance their causes. In contrast to nation-states, who adhere to the Clausewitzian distinction between the ends of policy and the means of war to achieve those ends, non-state actors do not necessarily fight as a mere means of advancing any coherent policy. Rather, **they see** their fight **as a life-and-death struggle**, wherein the ordinary terminology of war as an instrument of policy breaks down because of this blending of means and ends.124 It is the existential nature of this struggle and the disappearance of the Clausewitzian distinction between war and policy that has given rise to a new generation of warfare. The concept of fourth-generational warfare was first articulated in an influential article in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, which has proven highly prescient. In describing what they saw as the modem trend toward a new phase of warfighting, the authors argued that: In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). 125 It is precisely this blurring of peace and war and the demise of traditionally definable battlefields that provides the impetus for the formulation of a new theory of war powers. As evidenced by Part M, supra, the constitutional allocation of war powers, and the Framers' commitment of the war power to two co-equal branches, **was not designed** to cope with the current international system, one that **is characterized** by the persistent machinations of international terrorist organizations, the rise of multilateral alliances, the emergence of **rogue states**, and the potentially wide proliferation of easily deployable **w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction, **nuclear and otherwise.** B. The Framers' World vs. Today's World The Framers crafted the Constitution, and the people ratified it, in a time when everyone understood that the state controlled both the raising of armies and their use. Today, however, the threat of terrorism is bringing an end to the era of the nation-state's legal monopoly on violence, and the kind of war that existed before-based on a clear division between government, armed forces, and the people-is on the decline. 126 As states are caught between their decreasing ability to fight each other due to the existence of nuclear weapons and the increasing threat from non-state actors, it is clear that the Westphalian system of nation-states that informed the Framers' allocation of war powers is no longer the order of the day. 127 As seen in Part III, supra, the rise of the modem nation-state occurred as a result of its military effectiveness and ability to defend its citizens. If nation-states such as the United States are unable to adapt to the changing circumstances of fourth-generational warfare-that is, if they are unable to adequately defend against low-intensity conflict conducted by non-state actors-"**then clearly [the modem state] does not have a future in front of it**.' 128 The challenge in formulating a new theory of war powers for fourthgenerational warfare that remains legally justifiable lies in the difficulty of adapting to changed circumstances while remaining faithful to the constitutional text and the original meaning. 29 To that end, it is crucial to remember that the Framers crafted the Constitution in the context of the Westphalian system of nation-states. The three centuries following the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 witnessed an international system characterized by wars, which, "through the efforts of governments, assumed a more regular, interconnected character."' 130 That period saw the rise of an independent military class and the stabilization of military institutions. Consequently, "warfare became more regular, better organized, and more attuned to the purpose of war-that is, to its political objective."' 1 3' **That era is now over**. Today, the stability of the long-existing Westphalian international order has been greatly eroded in recent years with the advent of international terrorist organizations, which care nothing for the traditional norms of the laws of war. This new global environment exposes the limitations inherent in the interpretational methods of originalism and textualism and necessitates the adoption of a new method of constitutional interpretation. While one must always be aware of the text of the Constitution and the original understanding of that text, that very awareness identifies the extent to which fourth-generational warfare epitomizes a phenomenon unforeseen by the Framers, a problem the constitutional resolution of which must rely on the good judgment of the present generation. 13 Now, to adapt the constitutional warmarking scheme to the new international order characterized by fourth-generational warfare, one must understand the threat it is being adapted to confront. C. The Jihadist Threat The erosion of the Westphalian and Clausewitzian model of warfare and the blurring of the distinction between the means of warfare and the ends of policy, which is one characteristic of fourth-generational warfare, apply to al-Qaeda and other adherents of jihadist ideology who view the United States as an enemy. An excellent analysis of jihadist ideology and its implications for the rest of the world are presented by Professor Mary Habeck. 133 Professor Habeck identifies the centrality of the Qur'an, specifically a particular reading of the Qur'an and hadith (traditions about the life of Muhammad), to the jihadist terrorists. 134 The jihadis believe that the scope of the Qur'an is universal, and "that their interpretation of Islam is also intended for the entire world, which must be brought to recognize this fact peacefully if possible and through violence if not."' 135 Along these lines, the jihadis view the United States and her allies as among the greatest enemies of Islam: they believe "that every element of modern Western liberalism is flawed, wrong, and evil" because the basis of liberalism is secularism. 136 The jihadis emphasize the superiority of Islam to all other religions, and they believe that "God does not want differing belief systems to coexist."' 37 For this reason, jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda "recognize that the West will not submit without a fight and believe in fact that the Christians, Jews, and liberals have united against Islam in a war that will end in the complete destruction of the unbelievers.' 138 Thus, the adherents of this jihadist ideology, be it al-Qaeda or other groups, will continue to target the United States until she is destroyed. Their ideology demands it. 139 To effectively combat terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, it is necessary to understand not only how they think, but also how they operate. Al-Qaeda is a transnational organization capable of simultaneously managing multiple operations all over the world."14 It is both centralized and decentralized: al-Qaeda is centralized in the sense that Osama bin Laden is the unquestioned leader, but it is decentralized in that its operations are carried out locally, by distinct cells."4 AI-Qaeda benefits immensely from this arrangement because it can exercise direct control over high-probability operations, while maintaining a distance from low-probability attacks, only taking the credit for those that succeed. The local terrorist cells benefit by gaining access to al-Qaeda's "worldwide network of assets, people, and expertise."' 42 Post-September 11 events have highlighted al-Qaeda's resilience. Even as the United States and her allies fought back, inflicting heavy casualties on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and destroying dozens of cells worldwide, "al-Qaeda's networked nature allowed it to absorb the damage and remain a threat." 14 3 This is a far cry from earlier generations of warfare, where the decimation of the enemy's military forces would generally bring an end to the conflict. D. The Need for Rapid Reaction and Expanded Presidential War Power By now it should be clear just how different this conflict against the extremist terrorists is from the type of warfare that occupied the minds of the Framers at the time of the Founding. Rather than maintaining the geographical and political isolation desired by the Framers for the new country, today's United States is an international power targeted by individuals and groups that will not rest until seeing her demise. The Global War on Terrorism is not truly a war within the Framers' eighteenth-century conception of the term, and the normal constitutional provisions regulating the division of war powers between Congress and the President do not apply. Instead, this "war" **is a struggle for survival** and dominance against forces that threaten to destroy the United States and her allies, and the fourth-generational nature of the conflict, highlighted by an indiscernible distinction between wartime and peacetime, necessitates an evolution of America's traditional constitutional warmaking scheme. As first illustrated by the military strategist Colonel John Boyd, constitutional decision-making in the realm of war powers in the fourth generation should consider the implications of the OODA Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. 44 In the era of fourth-generational warfare, **quick reactions**, proceeding through the OODA Loop rapidly, and disrupting the enemy's OODA loop are the keys to victory. "In order to win," Colonel Boyd suggested, "we should operate at a **faster tempo** or rhythm than our adversaries." 145 In the words of Professor Creveld, "[b]oth organizationally and in terms of the equipment at their disposal, the armed forces of the world will have to adjust themselves to this situation by changing their doctrine, doing away with much of their heavy equipment and becoming more like police."1 46 Unfortunately, the existing constitutional understanding, which diffuses war power between two branches of government, necessarily (by the Framers' design) slows down decision- making. In circumstances where war is undesirable (which is, admittedly, most of the time, especially against other nation-states), the deliberativeness of the existing decision-making process is a positive attribute. In America's current situation, however, in the midst of the conflict with al-Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations, the existing process of constitutional decision-making in warfare may prove a **fatal hindrance** to achieving the initiative **necessary** for victory. As a **slow-acting**, deliberative **body**, Congress does not have the ability to adequately deal with **fast-emerging situations** in fourth-generational warfare. Thus, in order to combat transnational threats such as al-Qaeda, the executive branch **must** have the ability to operate by taking offensive military action even without congressional authorization, because **only the executive branch** is capable of the swift decision-making and action necessary to prevail in fourth-generational conflicts against fourth-generational opponents.

### 1AR – AT: Tort

#### Pdb – use textual competition – plan text only non-arbitrary stasis point – otherwise leads to infinitely regressive and unpredictable competition

#### Doesn’t solve – perception alone triggers miscalc

#### States will definite away what counts as harm

#### Tort fails – 9th circuit precedent proves harm is greenlighted as long as an official is doing their duty even if it violates ILaw

Practical Law Litigation 17 [Practical Law Litigation, 2-14-2017, "Bush Administration Officials Immune From Iraq War-Related Tort: Ninth Circuit," No Publication, https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I308af191f20c11e698dc8b09b4f043e0/View/FullText.html?contextData=(sc.Default)&amp;transitionType=Default&amp;firstPage=true, accessed 1-16-2021]LHSBC

On February 10, 2017, in Saleh v. Bush, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that former Bush administration officials were entitled to official immunity under the Westfall Act from a suit alleging violations of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) related to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. ([No. 15-15098 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2017)](http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/02/10/15-15098.pdf).)∂ An Iraqi plaintiff sued former Bush administration officials under the ATS on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals who suffered damage due to the invasion of Iraq. She claimed that the defendants had advocated for an invasion of Iraq before taking office and continued to pursue the policy once in office even when the available evidence failed to justify the invasion, thereby demonstrating an intent to invade Iraq from the beginning. She alleged that this constituted a "crime of aggression" which violated the "law of nations" under the ATS.∂ The US filed a certification that the defendants had been acting within the scope of their federal employment and under the Westfell Act, [28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)](https://content.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=28USCAS2679&originatingDoc=I308af191f20c11e698dc8b09b4f043e0&refType=SP&originationContext=document&transitionType=PLDocumentLink&billingHash=B2E3920A8ACE7C4C0D53204EEA03613C1484BB463549D03F92EBB40A802A1754&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_e07e0000a9f57), the US was substituted as the sole defendant. Because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required by the Federal Tort Claims Act for claims against the US, the district court dismissed the action. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the defendants were not acting within the scope of their office and therefore should not be afforded immunity.∂ The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under the Westfell Act, federal employees enjoy absolute immunity from tort claims arising out of acts they undertake in the course of their official duties. Federal courts apply the principles of respondeat superior of the state in which the alleged tort occurred to decide whether the acts were undertaken in the scope of employment. Applying the District of Columbia's respondeat superior principles, the Ninth Circuit decided that the defendants were acting in the scope of their employment because:∂ The alleged tortious act, the invasion of Iraq, took place once the defendants were in office, so they could not plan the invasion before they took office but could merely advocate for it.∂ Pre-employment statements of intent or belief cannot take the later acts of public officials outside the scope of their employment.∂ A preference for a certain policy, followed by an implementation of that policy, is not the same as performing an official act for personal gain, which would put it outside the scope of employment.∂ The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defendants' alleged performance of an act condemned by a treaty put it outside the scope of employment

#### Nuke terror has insurmountable barriers.

Mueller 18 John Mueller, Political Science Professor at Ohio State University. [Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter but Nuclear Hysteria Does, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/nuclear-weapons-dont-matter]//BPS

As for nuclear terrorism, ever since al Qaeda operatives used box cutters so effectively to hijack commercial airplanes, alarmists have warned that radical Islamist terrorists would soon apply equal talents in science and engineering to make and deliver nuclear weapons so as to destroy various so-called infidels. In practice, however, terrorist groups have exhibited only a limited desire to go nuclear and even less progress in doing so. Why? Probably because developing one’s own bomb from scratch requires a series of risky actions, all of which have to go right for the scheme to work. This includes trusting foreign collaborators and other criminals; acquiring and transporting highly guarded fissile material; establishing a sophisticated, professional machine shop; and moving a cumbersome, untested weapon into position for detonation. And all of this has to be done while hiding from a vast global surveillance net looking for and trying to disrupt such activities.

### 1AR – AT: NGA

#### Wrecks the rule of law and gets overturned because it violates the Supremacy Clause

Rakove 14 [Jack N. Rakove; 2014; William Robertson Coe Professor of History and American Studies, and Professor of Political Science and (by courtesy) Law, Stanford University; “Some Hollow Hopes of States'-Rights Advocates”; Arkansas Law Review, lexis]

Nullification is the easiest concept to eliminate. De minimis, beyond its plain absence from the text of the Constitution, nullification faces two major objections. The [\*83] first objection is the Supremacy Clause. n7 This momentous provision generated remarkably little discussion at Philadelphia, but it silently evolved into one of the most powerful tools of the final text. In its origins within the Constitutional Convention, the Supremacy Clause appeared as an element in the New Jersey Plan, and it first gained traction after the framers rejected James Madison's congressional negative on state laws. n8 Initially, the Clause bound state judges only to federal laws and treaties, "any thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding." n9 Article VI of the New Jersey Plan was silent, however, on what might happen should a state constitution impose some version of a loyalty test on provincial judges. n10 This language survived when Luther Martin moved to substitute it for Madison's negative on state laws on July 17, the day after the ostensible, if misnamed, Great Compromise over representation. n11 The decision to substitute was non-controversial, n12 but so were the subsequent changes that made the Federal Constitution - as well as national laws and treaties - superior to the constitutions and laws of the individual states, requiring state judges to abide thereby. n13 The change came in two parts: first, by the work of the committee of detail; and then, in an amendment proposed by John Rutledge of South Carolina, which made the Constitution the supreme law of the land. n14 No one at the time suggested that the states should retain some opt-out mechanism to negate federal laws they found deeply objectionable. The strongest complaint came later from Luther Martin, who claimed that the changes in the Clause rendered his original proposal ""worse than useless'" [\*84] because national acts ""were intended to be superior [only] to the laws of our state government, where they should be opposed to each other,' but not "to our constitution and bill of rights.'" n15 Yet at the time, Martin evidently did not object to the non-controversial amendments. n16 Thus, the Supremacy Clause provides a sufficient basis for rejecting the idea of nullification. But beyond the Supremacy Clause, one further consideration weighs heavily against nullification. The whole premise of rethinking American federalism in 1787, as seen from Madison's perspective, was to make national laws directly enforceable on the people of the United States - rather than allowing the states to implement the resolutions of the national government, as had been the case under the Articles of Confederation. n17 That premise was the genius of Madison's brilliant assessment of the underlying federalism problem of the Articles of Confederation in item seven of the Vices of the Political System of the U. States. n18 Any system of federalism that allowed the states to judge the propriety and necessity of federal decisions, Madison concluded, "will never fail to render federal measures abortive." n19 In this sense, the states should be thought of in relation to the Union as counties were in relation to the states. "If the laws of the States were merely recommendatory to their citizens, or if they were to be rejudged by County authorities, what security, what probability would exist, that they would be carried into execution?" n20 Whatever homage one would pay to the later genius of John C. Calhoun - and there is no doubt that his was indeed a formidable mind - he was not a founder of the federal [\*85] republic. Nullification is a terribly interesting argument, but it is neither part of the Constitution nor consistent with its meaning. Nullification advocates in South Carolina in the late 1820s and early 1830s understood that the ordinary state legislature could not apply the doctrine - saying a great deal about the doctrine's authority. n21 To make nullification effective, it had to be pronounced by a specially elected convention - one whose authority would somehow become tantamount to that of the ratification conventions of 1787-1788. n22 This convention would revive a potential exercise of popular sovereignty in a way that the ordinary processes of political representation and legislation could not, bringing the people of South Carolina closer to the original condition that permitted ratification of the Constitution in 1788. n23 No system of national legislation could work if states retained the capacity to threaten nullification. What possibility of collective deliberation would exist if states, somehow acting though their delegations, could ratchet up their opposition to particular measures and thwart the decision of constitutionally qualified majorities? However, a lesser version of state opposition to national legislation exists that is distinguishable from outright nullification: interposition.

#### Independently solves nuclear war

Kellman 89 (Barry, Professor @ Depaul University, “"JUDICIAL ABDICATION OF MILITARY TORT ACCOUNTABILITY: BUT WHO IS TO GUARD THE GUARDS THEMSELVES", December, 1989 Duke L.J. 1597, lexis)

In this era of thermonuclear weapons, America must uphold its historical commitment to be a nation of law. Our strength grows from the resolve to subject military force to constitutional authority. Especially in these times when weapons proliferation can lead to nuclear winter, when weapons production can cause cancer, when soldiers die unnecessarily in the name of readiness: those who control military force must be held accountable under law. As the Supreme Court recognized a generation ago, the Founders envisioned the army as a necessary institution, but one dangerous to liberty if not confined within its essential bounds. Their fears were rooted in history. They knew that ancient republics had been overthrown by their military leaders. . . .. . . We cannot close our eyes to the fact that today the peoples of many nations are ruled by the military. We should not break faith with this Nation's tradition of keeping military power subservient to civilian authority, a tradition which we believe is firmly embodied in the Constitution. 1 Our fears may be rooted in more recent history. During the decade of history's largest peacetime military expansion (1979-1989), more than 17,000 service personnel were killed in training accidents. 2 In the same period, virtually every facility in the nuclear bomb complex has been revealed to be contaminated with radioactive and poisonous materials; the clean-up costs are projected to exceed $ 100 billion. 3 Headlines of fatal B-1B bomber crashes, 4 the downing of an Iranian passenger plane, 5 the Navy's frequent accidents 6 including the fatal crash of a fighter plane into a Georgia apartment complex, 7 remind Americans that a tragic price is paid to support the military establishment. Other commentaries may distinguish between the specific losses that might have been preventable and those which were the random consequence of what is undeniably a dangerous military program. This Article can only repeat the questions of the parents of those who have died: "Is the military accountable to anyone? Why is it allowed to keep making the same mistakes? How many more lives must be lost to senseless accidents?" 8 This Article describes a judicial concession of the law's domain, ironically impelled by concerns for "national security." In three recent controversies involving weapons testing, the judiciary has disallowed tort accountability for serious and unwarranted injuries. In United States v. Stanley, 9 the Supreme Court ruled that an Army sergeant, unknowingly drugged with LSD by the Central Intelligence Agency, could not pursue a claim for deprivation of his constitutional rights. In Allen v. United States, 10 civilian victims of atmospheric atomic testing were denied a right of tort recovery against the government officials who managed and performed the tests. Finally, in Boyle v. United Technologies, 11 the Supreme Court ruled that private weapons manufacturers enjoy immunity from product liability actions alleging design defects. A critical analysis of these decisions reveals that the judiciary, notably the Rehnquist Court, has abdicated its responsibility to review civil matters involving the military security establishment. Standing at the vanguard of "national security" law, 13 these three decisions elevate the task of preparing for war to a level beyond legal accountability. They suggest that determinations of both the ends and the means of national security are inherently above the law and hence unreviewable regardless of the legal rights transgressed by these determinations. This conclusion signals a dangerous abdication of judicial responsibility. The very underpinnings of constitutional governance are threatened by those who contend that the rule of law weakens the execution of military policy. Their argument -- that because our adversaries are not restricted by our Constitution, we should become more like our adversaries to secure ourselves -- cannot be sustained if our tradition of adherence to the rule of law is to be maintained. To the contrary, the judiciary must be willing to demand adherence to legal principles by assessing responsibility for weapons decisions. This Article posits that judicial abdication in this field is not compelled and certainly is not desirable. The legal system can provide a useful check against dangerous military action, more so than these three opinions would suggest. The judiciary must rigorously scrutinize military decisions if our 18th century dream of a nation founded in musket smoke is to remain recognizable in a millennium ushered in under the mushroom cloud of thermonuclear [destruction] ~~holocaust.~~

## 1AR – AT: PIC – Use

#### Exemptions results in accountability gaps – shreds ban’s effect on deterrence

* Checked
* Can’t check back to ensure only usage in one instance – slippery slope
* No accountability – gaps for liability

HRW 15 Human Rights Watch 2015 "Mind the Gap: The Lack of Accountability for Killer Robots" <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/04/09/mind-gap/lack-accountability-killer-robots> (an international non-governmental organization, headquartered in New York City, that conducts research and advocacy on human rights)//Elmer

Some proponents of fully autonomous weapons argue that the use of the weapons **would be acceptable in limited circumstances**, but once they are developed and deployed, **it would be difficult to restrict** them to such situations. Proponents also note that a programmer or operator could be held accountable in certain cases, such as when criminal intent is proven. As explained in this report, **however, there are many other foreseeable cases involving fully autonomous weapons where criminal and civil liability would not succeed. Even if the law adopted a strict liability regime that allowed for compensation to victims**, it **would not serve the purposes of deterrence and retribution** that international humanitarian and human rights law seek to achieve. This report argues that states should eliminate this accountability gap by adopting an international **ban** on fully autonomous weapons.

### Pic – Greater Horn

#### Pdb, perm do aff and all non-competitive planks

#### 1 – Mere perception of capability triggers war – 1AC Johnson

#### 2 – exceptions deck treaty solvency – States are only incentivized to be transparent and not re-arm if other states are also transparent and follow a ban – 1AC Gubrud

### 1AR – BioD

#### Species loss is key to long-term evolutionary change. BOULTER 2002:

(Michael, professor of paleobiology at the University of East London, Extinction: Evolution and the End of Man, p. 170)

The same trend of long-drawn-out survival of the final relicts has been further considered by Bob May’s group at Oxford, particularly Sean Nee. The Oxford group are vociferous wailers of gloom and doom: ‘Extinction episodes, such as the anthropogenic one currently under way, result in a pruned tree of life.’ But they go on to argue that **the vast majority of groups survive** this **pruning**, so that **evolution goes on**, albeit **along a different path** if the environment is changed. Indeed, **the fossil record has taught us to expect a vigorous evolutionary response when the ecosystem changes significantly**. This kind of research is more evidence to support the idea that **evolution thrives on culling. The planet did really well from the Big Five mass-extinction events. The victims’ demise enabled new environments to develop and more diversification took place in other groups of animals and plants. Nature was the richer for it. In just the same way the planet can take advantage from the abuse we are giving it.** The harder the abuse, the greater the change to the environment. But it also follows that it

#### Species loss prevents an overpop-crunch that causes ultimate extinction. BOULTER 2002:

(Michael, professor of paleobiology at the University of East London, Extinction: Evolution and the End of Man, p. 67)

If biological evolution really is a self-organised Earth-life system there are some very important consequences. One is that life on this planet continues despite internal and external setbacks, because it is the system that recovers at the expense of some of its former parts. For example, the end of the dinosaurs enabled mammals to diversify. Otherwise if the exponential rise were to reach infinity, there would not be space or food to sustain life. It would come to a stop. Extinctions are necessary to retain life on this planet.

#### Biodiversity is bad – complex systems fail, simplicity is key. HEATH ’99:

(Jim, Orchids Australia, December, http://www.orchidsaustralia.com/whysave.htm)

Some people say we can’t afford to lose any species, no matter what species they are. Everything needs everything else, they say, to make nature balance. If that were right, it might explain why the six orchid species should be saved. Alas, no. We could pour weedkiller on all the orchids in Australia and do no ecological damage to the rest of the continent’s biology. But wouldn’t the natural ecological systems then become less stable, if we start plucking out species - even those orchids? Not necessarily. Natural biological systems are hardly ever stable and balanced anyway. Everything goes along steadily for a time, then boom - the system falls apart and simplifies for no visible reason. Diverse systems are usually more unstable than the less diverse ones. Biologists agree that in some places less diversity is more stable (in the Arctic, for example). Also, monocultures - farms - can be very stable. Not to mention the timeless grass of a salt marsh. In other words, there’s no biological law that says we have to save the orchids because they add diversity, and that added diversity makes the biological world more stable.

#### BioD isn’t existential - redundancy, intervening actors, boundaries will never be crossed

Kareiva & Carranza 18 (Peter Kareiva & Valerie Carranza. Institute of the Environment and Sustainability,. “Existential Risk Due to Ecosystem Collapse: Nature Strikes Back.” Volume 102, September 2018, Pages 39-50)

The interesting question is whether any of the planetary thresholds other than CO2 could also portend existential risks. Here the answer is not clear. One boundary often mentioned as a concern for the fate of global civilization is biodiversity (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2012), with the proposed safety threshold being a loss of greater than .001% per year (Rockström et al., 2009). There is little evidence that this particular .001% annual loss is a threshold—and it is hard to imagine any data that would allow one to identify where the threshold was (Brook et al., 2013; Lenton & Williams, 2013). A better question is whether one can imagine any scenario by which the loss of too many species leads to the collapse of societies and environmental disasters, even though one cannot know the absolute number of extinctions that would be required to create this dystopia. While there are data that relate local reductions in species richness to altered ecosystem function, these results do not point to substantial existential risks. The data are small-scale experiments in which plant productivity, or nutrient retention is reduced as species number declines locally (Vellend, 2017), or are local observations of increased variability in fisheries yield when stock diversity is lost (Schindler et al., 2010). Those are not existential risks. To make the link even more tenuous, there is little evidence that biodiversity is even declining at local scales (Vellend et al 2017; Vellend et al., 2013). Total planetary biodiversity may be in decline, but local and regional biodiversity is often staying the same because species from elsewhere replace local losses, albeit homogenizing the world in the process. Although the majority of conservation scientists are likely to flinch at this conclusion, there is growing skepticism regarding the strength of evidence linking trends in biodiversity loss to an existential risk for humans (Maier, 2012; Vellend, 2014). Obviously if all biodiversity disappeared civilization would end—but no one is forecasting the loss of all species. It seems plausible that the loss of 90% of the world’s species could also be apocalyptic, but not one is predicting that degree of biodiversity loss either. Tragic, but plausible is the possibility our planet suffering a loss of as many as half of its species. If global biodiversity were halved, but at the same time locally the number of species stayed relatively stable, what would be the mechanism for an end-of-civilization or even end of human prosperity scenario? Extinctions and biodiversity loss are ethical and spiritual losses, but perhaps not an existential risk. What about the remaining eight planetary boundaries? Stratospheric ozone depletion is one—but thanks to the Montreal Protocol ozone depletion is being reversed (Hand, 2016). Disruptions of the nitrogen cycle and of the phosphorous cycle have also been proposed as representing potential planetary boundaries (one boundary for nitrogen and one boundary for phosphorous). There are compelling data linking excesses in these nutrients to environmental damage. For example, over-application of fertilizer in Midwestern USA has led to dead zones in the Gulf of Mexico. Similarly, excessive nitrogen has polluted groundwater in California to such an extent that it is unsuitable for drinking and some rural communities are forced to drink bottled water. However, these impacts are local. At the same time that there is too much N loading in the US, there is a need for more N in Africa as a way of increasing agricultural yields (Mueller et al., 2012). While the disruption of nitrogen and phosphorous cycles clearly perturb local ecosystems, end-of-the-world scenarios seem a bit far-fetched. Another hypothesized planetary boundary entails the conversion of natural habitats to agricultural land. The mechanism by which too much agricultural land could cause a crisis is unclear—unless it is because land conversion causes so much biodiversity loss that is species extinctions that are the proximate cause of an eco-catastrophe. Excessive chemical pollution and excessive atmospheric aerosol loading have each been suggested as planetary boundaries as well. In the case of these pollution boundaries, there are well-documented mechanisms by which surpassing some concentration of a pollutant inflicts severe human health hazards. There is abundant evidence linking chemical and aerosol pollution to higher mortality and lower reproductive success in humans, which in turn could cause a major die-off. It is perhaps appropriate then that when Hollywood envisions an unlivable world, it often invokes a story of humans poisoning themselves. That said, it is doubtful that we will poison ourselves towards extinction. Data show that as nations develop and increase their wealth, they tend to clean up their air and water and reduce environmental pollution (Flörke et al., 2013; Hao & Wang, 2005). In addition, as economies become more circular (see Mathews & Tan, 2016), environmental damage due to waste products is likely to decline. The key point is that the pollutants associated with the planetary boundaries are so widely recognized, and the consequences of local toxic events are so immediate, that it is reasonable to expect national governments to act before we suffer a planetary ecocatastrophe.

## 1AR – AT: PIC – State

### 1AR – Top

#### State PICs don’t solve the aff – States won’t comply if they think another country is getting an unfair advantage from not being part of the ban – That’s 1AC Gubrud and Altman

#### Global regulation of emerging tech is key – excluding states sparks arms races

Wilson 13 (Grant Wilson, Deputy Director, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. J.D. from Lewis & Clark Law School, 2013. “MINIMIZING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC AND EXISTENTIAL RISKS FROM EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW.” Virginia Environmental Law Journal, Volume 31, No 2 (2013), pp. 307-364. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44679544?seq=1#page\_scan\_tab\_contents)

A. New International treaty GCRs/ERs arising out of emerging technologies are unique in that a single event can result in widespread destruction. If a GCR/ER regulatory regime only regulates some states but not others, dangerous emerging technologies could instead be developed and utilized in the unregulated states. An example of this is when Richard Seed, an American physicist who wished to be the first person to clone a human, threatened to conduct his cloning in Mexico or Japan if the United States banned human cloning.251 And if some states ban or regulate emerging technologies while others do not, this could threaten global security because rogue states would have a monopoly over dangerous emerging technologies.252 Furthermore, without a truly global treaty, countries competing to quickly develop emerging technologies may engage in a race to arms that promotes speed over safeguards.253 Finally, some states may believe that, absent regulations binding upon all states, their emerging technology industries will be placed at a competitive disadvantage to unregulated countries. Thus, all states should agree to an international treaty imposing evenhanded regulations.

### 1AR – PDCP

#### PDCP – States can leave

Gubrud and Altmann 13 [physicist Dr. Mark Avrum Gubrud from the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. “Compliance Measures for an Autonomous Weapons Convention,” ICRAC Working Paper #2, May 2013, https://autonomousweapons.org/compliance-measures-for-an-autonomous-weapons-convention//lhs-ap]

In case of a serious concern about strategically threatening noncompliance, a state party may seek private diplomatic conversation with the suspected perpetrator, formal consultations or inquiries through the treaty-mandated consultative bodies, or bring the matter to the attention of the UN Security Council. In the last resort, a state party may withdraw from the treaty, although this would be a highly provocative and destabilizing move.

## 1AR – AT: PIC – Weapon

### 1AR – Definition – Lethal

#### PDCP – “Lethal” in LAWS means it must target humans

Russell ND — (Stuart Russell, Professor of Computer Science and Smith-Zadeh Professor in Engineering, University of California, Berkeley and Honorary Fellow, Wadham College, Oxford, https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~russell/research/LAWS.html, accessed 12-9-2020, HKR-AR)

Autonomous weapons systems locate, select, and engage targets without human intervention; **they become lethal when those targets include humans.** LAWS might include, for example, armed quadcopters that can search for and eliminate enemy combatants in a city, but do not include cruise missiles or remotely piloted drones for which humans make all targeting decisions.

### 1AR – Definition – Ban – Practice Only

#### PDCP – Aff bans use of weapon for war not its construction

Altmann and Sauer 17 [Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer in international relations at Bundeswehr University in Munich, working on international security and arms control. (2017) Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability, Survival, 59:5, 117-142, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263//lhs-ap]

In short, preventive arms control for AWS would not mean the regulation or prohibition of specific technologies, nor even countable (stockpiles of) individual weapon systems.59 Instead, it would mean regulating or prohibiting a defined military practice, particularly certain applications of specific technologies for military purposes. An example of such an approach can be found in the preventive prohibition on blinding laser weapons added to the CCW in 1995.60 This prohibition protects soldiers’ eyes on the battlefield without banning laser technology in all its other military and civilian uses.

### 1AR – AT: Poseidon – Steak

#### 1---Doesn’t solve –

#### A---Counterplan says eliminate, not ban, so states can just rebuild in the future

Appellate Court of Connecticut 93

(Ballato v. Board of Education, 33 Conn. App. 78 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993), 633 A.2d 323, 11740, casetext)

The plaintiffs suggest that, in order for a "position" to be "eliminated," others cannot perform the functions that comprised that position. In other words, clinical nursing could not be 86 provided and health education \*86 could not be taught. Similarly, under the plaintiffs' interpretation of this section, a board could not reduce the number of math teachers from six to five, while the number of children taught remained constant, without removing math from the curriculum. Such a definition is too strained. "Position" is defined as "an employment for which one has been hired: job," while "eliminate" is defined as to . . . "get rid of." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 1993). A reasonable, common sense interpretation of the word "position" in this statute is that it applies to the specific job that the person has contracted to undertake rather than to an entire department or program. If a person is hired as a math teacher and the board chooses, pursuant to 10-151(d)(5), to "eliminat[e] . . . the position to which the teacher was appointed," the decision is specific to that person's job, rather than encompassing the entire department of math teachers. (Emphasis added.) In this case, the facts are less complex. No employee of the board currently has a job that involves both clinical nursing duties and health education instruction. The jobs or positions held by the nurse-teachers, for the purposes of the statute, have been eliminated. While the functions performed by those nurse-teachers are now performed by other personnel, a disbursement of duties after the board has determined in good faith that some positions need to be eliminated is 87 appropriate.11 Here, the board \*87 determined in good faith that budgetary constraints required the elimination and consolidation of various teaching positions. The trial court properly upheld the board's determination. 1 Similarly, in the example where the six math teachers' positions are reduced to five, with no reduction in the number of students, the position of one math teacher has been eliminated, it no longer exists. Such elimination and consolidation is appropriate if undertaken in good faith. Views similar to this have been expressed in other jurisdictions. In California, the Court of Appeals stated that the "particular kind of service of the employee may be eliminated even though a service continues to be performed or provided in a different manner by the district." Campbell Elementary Teachers Assn., Inc v. Abbott, 76 Cal.App.3d 796, 812, 143 Cal.Rptr. 281 (1978). The court cited approvingly a case where the school board discontinued the services of "traveling" art teachers who went from school to school and continued to offer art instruction by departmental teachers. Id.; see Davis v. Berkeley School District, 2 Cal.2d 770, 770-71, 40 P.2d 835 (1934). In addition, New York has also adopted this stance, stating that a school district may reorganize its teaching staff by the abolition or consolidation of teaching positions. Matter of Young v. Board of Education, 35 N.Y.2d 31, 34, 315 N.E.2d 768, 358 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1974). In that case, the court determined that in light of increasing budgetary constraints, abolishing the position of full-time attendance teacher and dividing those duties among the existing principals and assistant principals of the district was valid. Ryan v. Ambach, 419 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1979) (abolishment of position and fractionalization of duties not per se violative of teacher tenure laws).

#### B---Circumvention – Exceptions incentivize states to arms race to regain advantage – Only total ban solves

#### C---Err aff – No solvency advocate, so no enforcement mechanism

#### 2---Permutation – States ought to ban all lethal autonomous nuclear weapons except for Russia’s Poseidon submarine systems

#### Text competition good---Just functional competition greenlights infinite artificial and conditional disads about the infinite potential functions of the plan

#### 3---Their ev says Poseidon doesn’t exist

1NC Livermore 18 Doug Livermore (contracted operational advisor to ASD SO/LIC while continuing his military service as a Special Forces officer in the U.S. Army National Guard. Previously, Doug served for a decade on active duty as first an Infantry officer and later a Special Forces officer. He holds a Master of Arts degree in International Security Studies from Georgetown University, a Bachelor of Science degree in Military History from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and is a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Course. Doug is the National Director for External Communications for the Special Forces Association and the National Capital Region Ambassador for the Green Beret Foundation. He was also recently selected as a 2020-21 Fellow to West Point’s Modern War Institute), 9-20-2018, "Balancing Effectiveness and Ethics in Future Autonomous Weapons," No Publication, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/balancing-effectiveness-and-ethics-future-autonomous-weapons, SJBE //recut lhs-ap

As a matter of official policy, the Russian Federation has stated its intent to field robotic fighting vehicles with full autonomy to exercise lethal force. This approach maximizes battlefield flexibility for Russian forces and may very well minimize the negative impact of Russia's growing military manpower shortage, though it does expose Russia to significant ethical and legal vulnerabilities.[[viii]](https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/balancing-effectiveness-and-ethics-future-autonomous-weapons" \l "_edn8" \o ") Russia's new line of Armata universal armored fighting vehicles were designed specifically to be upgraded for autonomous use at a later date, creating the potential for a future in which battalions of autonomous armored vehicles range across the battlefield sowing death and destruction without Russian casualties.[[ix]](https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/balancing-effectiveness-and-ethics-future-autonomous-weapons" \l "_edn9" \o ") What remains to be answered is who would be held accountable for any potential violations of the laws of war by such fully autonomous systems. Perhaps more worrying is Russia's publicly stated plans to develop an autonomous undersea nuclear weapon, the "Status-6" Oceanic Multipurpose System, with the proposed mission of delivering a 100-megaton nuclear device to American ports.[[x]](https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/balancing-effectiveness-and-ethics-future-autonomous-weapons" \l "_edn10" \o ") Russian president Vladimir Putin suggested that his country would only use the “Poseidon” as a "last-ditch" measure to defend the Russian Federation. In March 2018, the “Status 6” was officially renamed by the Russian government as “Poseidon”.[[xi]](https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/balancing-effectiveness-and-ethics-future-autonomous-weapons" \l "_edn11" \o ")  Admittedly, many experts believe that the “Poseidon” might be purely in the aspirational stage or simply a deception measure designed to vex Western military strategists. However, a detonation of the system’s proposed nuclear payload could create an irradiated tidal wave intended to render U.S. ports and coastal regions uninhabitable for decades. This unmanned, autonomous weapon system would travel at high speeds and extreme depths to bypass all current American defenses and detonate its deadly payload near the American coast. The “Poseidon” would conduct this attack without outside intervention following a human decision to launch.[[xii]](https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/balancing-effectiveness-and-ethics-future-autonomous-weapons" \l "_edn12" \o ") In terms of flexibility and utility, proposed Russian systems would largely escape the command and control vulnerabilities that will inherently plague American fighting robots. However, this approach does raise thorny ethical and legal questions regarding the autonomous application of lethal effects against targets. Given recent controversial Russian military activity in Ukraine and Syria, it is possible that such questions do not much trouble the Russian government and will not prove a deterrent in the future.

#### 4---Poseidon doesn’t solve second strike

O’Brien 19 [Luke O’Brien is a contributing editor at War on the Rocks and is a weapon of mass destruction analyst and historian. He is mid-career cadre at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Project on Nuclear Issues. He was previously a National Defense University countering weapons of mass destruction graduate fellow, where his research focused on information management and nuclear escalation control. He is also a U.S. Army reservist. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not constitute those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government. SEPTEMBER 11, 2019, “WHITHER SKYNET? AN AMERICAN “DEAD HAND” SHOULD REMAIN A DEAD ISSUE,” War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/whither-skynet-an-american-dead-hand-should-remain-a-dead-issue//lhs-ap]

Russia is also arming itself with the Poseidon — a high-speed, deep-diving, and high-yield nuclear-powered torpedo with inter-continental range that can evade missile defenses and detonate upon arriving off coastal targets such as cities or ports. Of course, this target set should provide a hint as to the limits of this weapon. It would be an impressive feat indeed for this weapon to make its way to Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska and — as anyone who has sailed around the Chesapeake can attest — it would also be unlikely for the weapon to get close enough to the District of Columbia to threaten leadership targets there. It could also target nuclear submarine bases, but there are always ballistic missile submarines at sea in wait (more on these later).

#### 5---Squo solves – Zeigler is about modernization in general – Doesn’t even say the word Poseidon

#### 6---Communication time solves current hotspots since leaders can deescalate – Altmann and Sauer

### 1AR – AT: Space Weapons

#### 1---Doesn’t solve – Inadvertent escalation from inevitable malfunctions cause nuclear escalation – 1AC Scharre – If the United States thinks its being first striked because our defense against first strike is going off, we’ll launch nukes back for MAD.

#### 2---Turn – Missile defense causes Russia first strike

Arbatov 21 [Alexey Arbatov is the head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Arbatov is a former scholar in residence and the chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program. A former member of the State Duma, vice chairman of the Russian United Democratic Party (Yabloko), and deputy chairman of the Duma Defence Committee, he is currently member of, i.a., the research council of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the governing board of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2021) Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee for or Threat to Strategic Stability?. In: Osinga F., Sweijs T. (eds) NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020. NL ARMS (Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies). T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_5//lhs-ap>]

Another controversial response to the question of what to do in the event that deterrence fails is the concept of damage limitation in a nuclear war. The recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review says: “The goal of limiting damage if deterrence fails in a regional contingency calls for robust adaptive planning to defeat and defend against attacks, including missile defence and capabilities to locate, track, and target mobile systems of regional adversaries.” 35 Although this passage refers to regional adversaries, Russia sees itself as a target of these plans (likewise, it feels threatened by U.S. missile defences and long-range high-precision conventional weapons). In a nuclear war, the desire to limit damage to one side by offensive operations looks like a threat of disarming strike to the opposite side, especially when it comes to destroying Russia’s highly survivable forces, which in the form of mobile ICBMs are associated mainly with the concept of “deep second strike”—the basis of the philosophy of strategic stability.

Another dangerous area in which the degradation of nuclear deterrence is happening is the development of a variety of long-range (over 500 km) strike systems capable of delivering conventional warheads to targets that could previously only be destroyed with nuclear weapons. This has been made possible by new command-and-control information systems (including in space) and the miniaturization of electronics, which can significantly improve the accuracy of the guidance systems (allowing down to several meters of circular error probability).36 Existing non-nuclear cruise missiles have a relatively limited range (less than 2,000 km), subsonic speeds, and a long flight time to targets (about two hours). Yet the next generation of high-precision hypersonic or ballistic conventional weapons under development will make it possible to deliver these kinds of strikes at intercontinental ranges (over 5,500 km) with a relatively short flight time (up to 60 min).37

Non-nuclear long-range conventional systems are designed for and used by the superpowers primarily in regional wars (Iraq, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria). However, they impinge on the strategic balance through the concept of “conventional deterrence”, which has long been proclaimed in official U.S. documents,38 and since 2014, in the Russian military doctrine, which states that: “The use of high-precision weapons is envisaged by the Russian Federation within the framework of performing strategic deterrence use-of-force measures.” 39 Initially, this concept was conceived as the preferred alternative to a reliance on nuclear weapons and a way of raising the nuclear threshold. But, in fact, the opposite has turned out to be true: it results in lowering of the threshold. The issue of whether the accuracy of these capabilities will be sufficient to destroy hardened targets (ICBM silos and underground command posts) and whether they will be able to destroy ground-mobile missiles remains highly uncertain. However, there is no doubt that non-hardened strategic nuclear facilities are vulnerable even to existing subsonic non-nuclear cruise missiles. These include missile and air defence radars, light mobile ICBM shelters, submarines in port, bombers at base, forward nuclear warhead depots, and spacecraft control stations. These objects could be hit even in the event of a regional conflict between Russia and NATO.

In addition, many current and future weapons of this kind, as well as their launchers, are dual-purpose, and their character until the moment of detonation will be indistinguishable from a nuclear strike. This applies to heavy and medium bombers, tactical strike aircraft with missiles and bombs, ships, and attack submarines with missiles capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional warheads: the Kalibr and Tomahawk sea-based cruise missiles,40 air-launched cruise missiles of the Kh101/102 type or the AGM-158, and Iskander-type ground-launched tactical ballistic and cruise missiles. Such systems and associated operational plans could also trigger the rapid, uncontrolled escalation of a conventional local conflict or even a military incident into nuclear war.

Neither Russia nor the United States—nor their allies—want war, and they have no real political motives to unleash it. But it should be remembered that in many wars, both sides believed that they were only defending themselves, fighting off real or probable aggression, even if it was they themselves that carried out offensive operations. That is how World War I began in 1914. That conflict shaped the follow-on terrible history of the twentieth century, and its consequences are still playing out across the world, including in Russia. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 demonstrated clearly that a nuclear war could begin because of a loss of control over events, not as the result of planned aggression. Similar, though less dangerous, cases occurred during the Berlin crisis of 1961 and during three Middle East wars in 1956, 1967, and 1973, among a number of other similar situations. Since the events of 2014 in Ukraine, intense military confrontation between Russia and NATO has been renewed in Eastern Europe, the Baltic and Black Seas, and the Arctic. Regular large-scale military exercises (including with the participation of strategic systems and the imitation of nuclear weapon use) are frequent demonstrations of force.41 Dangerous close encounters of combat ships and aircraft are a common occurrence. The possibility of a major war between Russia and NATO, which seemed irrevocably consigned to the past just a few years ago, hangs over Europe and the world.

5.6 The Collapse of Nuclear Arms Control

The military, technical, strategic, and political trends discussed above are destroying the systems and regimes of nuclear arms control built over a half-century through the great efforts of the Soviet Union/Russia, the United States, and others. Scholars have warned about this scenario for years,42 and now the danger has become obvious to everyone. It is clear now that the weakest link in the nuclear arms control system is the INF Treaty. At the same time, the main claims of the parties against each other on compliance issues could be solved relatively quickly at the technical level if there was the political will and strategic interest in solving them. But instead, the Trump administration has officially announced its intention to denounce this historic treaty.

The crisis in nuclear arms control is also manifested in the fact that for eight years, Russia and the United States have not discussed how to progress to the next START agreement. This is the longest pause in fifty years for such negotiations. Although both parties fulfilled their reduction obligations under the current New START by the February 2018 deadline (though with certain misgivings from Russia), the treaty will expire in 2021, and this will create a vacuum in strategic arms control. There is little time for the conclusion of a new treaty, given the deep disagreement between the two parties on important issues. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration has been reluctant to extend New START to 2026 (which can be done once under the terms of the treaty) and faces resistance from Congress on such a step.

The United States and Russia are therefore on the threshold of a new large-scale arms race and, unlike the Cold War, this nuclear missile race will be augmented by competition in offensive and defensive non-nuclear strategic and medium-range weapons, as well as rivalry in the development of space weapons and cyber warfare. Beginning in the mid-2020s, the United States plans to modernize its strategic triad: new systems to replace the current heavy bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs.43 And Russia continues to modernize its triad, deploying and developing two new ICBM systems (Yars and Sarmat), one SLBM system (Borei-Bulava), and two heavy bomber systems (Tu-160M and PAK DA). In addition, the United States is developing the above-mentioned systems for limited nuclear strikes (Trident-2 SLBMs with low-yield warheads, LRSO, B-61-12, and nuclear sea-based cruise missiles). And Russia is developing the strategic systems unveiled in Putin’s 1 March 2018 address (that is, Burevestnik nuclear-powered intercontinental cruise missiles, Avangard hypersonic gliders, and Poseidon long-range nuclear super-torpedoes).44 The impact of these weapons on strategic stability requires special analysis, but is unlikely to be positive.

In addition, this arms race will be multilateral, involving states such as China, NATO members, India and Pakistan, North and South Korea, Japan, and others. The start of a nuclear arms race would undoubtedly undermine the norms and regimes for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2015 ended in failure, and there is a high probability that the same will happen at the next conference in 2020, especially in light of the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal. This will likely be followed by the collapse of the CTBT, which for twenty-three years has not entered into force because of the refusal of the United States and a number of other states to ratify it. Nor is there much hope for progress in negotiating the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, which has been stalled for more than a quarter-century. Iran and Saudi Arabia will likely join the nuclear club, as may Egypt, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Nigeria, Brazil, and other countries. Through them, nuclear weapons will sooner or later inevitably fall into the hands of international terrorists, with all the ensuing consequences.

5.7 Renewing Strategic Stability and Arms Control

At the Valdai forum in Sochi in 2016, Putin said “nuclear weapons are for deterrence and a factor of ensuring peace and security worldwide,” and cannot be considered “a factor of any potential aggression.” 45 As can be seen from the above analysis, nuclear deterrence can serve as a pillar of international security with one crucial reservation: namely, that it can only work in conjunction with negotiations and agreements on the limitation, reduction, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Without such checks, nuclear deterrence goes berserk. It endlessly fuels the arms race, brings the great powers to the brink of nuclear war in any serious crisis, and sometimes the very dynamics of nuclear deterrence can instigate confrontation.

By the early 1960s, the world had gone through a series of increasingly dangerous crises, edging closer to the brink of nuclear war. The culmination was the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when sheer luck saved humanity from disaster. Only after that, with the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, did the construction of a legal, treaty-based system of control over nuclear arms begin. A few years ago, the world once again embarked on the pernicious path of confrontation and military competition, as all areas of arms control stalled for technical, strategic, and political reasons. Only through the strengthening of strategic stability, rehabilitation, and improvement of the nuclear arms control system can we turn away from the path to the nuclear brink.

The Soviet-U.S. concept of strategic stability agreed upon in 1990 was perhaps even more revolutionary than the authors themselves understood.46 It stipulated that the two sides recognized each other’s right to a nuclear strike capability as a guarantor of their own security, but undertook not to develop offensive and defensive weapons that would deprive the other party of such an insurance. Moreover, the limitation of damage from a hypothetical nuclear war should not be carried out by developing disarming strike capabilities, large-scale anti-missile defences, and options for the selective use of nuclear weapons. Instead, it had to be achieved through minimizing the likelihood of such a war politically and reducing the destructive arsenals through treaties, transparency, and confidence-building measures, as well as improving mutual understanding of military doctrines and concepts.

Such a policy is not possible if the powers independently develop concepts, operational plans, and deterrence capabilities, since those are always aimed at defeating the alleged enemy “if deterrence fails”. As stated in the Russian military doctrine, in an analogy to U.S. strategic documents and those published by other states, the purpose of the armed forces is “defeating the aggressor’s troops (forces) and forcing the aggressor to cease hostilities on terms and conditions suiting the interests of the Russian Federation and its allies”. 47 However, deterrence in a crisis may collapse simply under the weight of plans and capabilities intended to deter the enemy. Responsibility for the decision to launch a nuclear strike is laid by the military at the feet of politicians, but those politicians are hostage to the operational plans and technical characteristics of weapons developed by the military and engineers.

Only an understanding of strategic stability that is agreed upon by both sides and embodied in arms limitation and reduction agreements can put strict limits on destabilizing concepts, plans, and arms of nuclear deterrence. Elements of this philosophy were enshrined in the 1990 strategic stability document Now, as then, the conditions of strategic stability can only be imagined between Russia and the United States if this concept is to have clear meaning (elimination of incentives for a nuclear first strike) rather than stand as wishful thinking for international peace and harmony. However, after nearly thirty years, it would be crucial to update the agreed principles of strategic stability in light of the changes that have taken place.

Moreover, the very definition of stability in Russian-U.S. strategic relations should be expanded to include not only “eliminating incentives for a nuclear first strike” but also “incentives for any use of nuclear weapons”. With regard to deterring a conventional attack, it should be based on sufficient general-purpose forces and capabilities and, better still, on agreements such as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (1990). Further to that point, the meaning of the provision on “measures that reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles” and “giving priority to highly survivable systems” should be expressed not indirectly but directly, and with mutual recognition that weapons systems threatening the survival of strategic forces and their command-and-control are destabilizing and should be limited and reduced as a matter of priority. If this condition is met, launch-on-warning concepts should be mutually cancelled in light of the possibility of initiating nuclear war due to false alarms, unauthorized use, or cyber sabotage.

In addition, weapons systems that blur the line between nuclear and conventional arms (that is, dual-purpose) should be recognized as destabilizing and should be subject to mutual restrictions and confidence-building measures. Missile defence systems intended to protect against third countries and non-state actors should once again be the subject of a mutually agreed “relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms”. Space weapons—above all, anti-satellite systems—should be acknowledged as destabilizing and be subject to a verifiable ban. Cyber warfare against each other’s strategic command-and-control information systems is also destabilizing and should be subject to prohibitions and confidence-building measures. Both sides should recognize that their nuclear doctrines and weapons could create the risk of unintended war as the result of an escalating crisis, which should be the subject of serious and ongoing dialogue at the state level. Finally, the involvement of third states in the process of nuclear arms limitation should be based on an objective assessment of their forces and programs and on an agreement on the sequence, principles, and objects of multilateral arms limitation agreements.

#### 3---No speed impact

O’Brien 19 [Luke O’Brien is a contributing editor at War on the Rocks and is a weapon of mass destruction analyst and historian. He is mid-career cadre at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Project on Nuclear Issues. He was previously a National Defense University countering weapons of mass destruction graduate fellow, where his research focused on information management and nuclear escalation control. He is also a U.S. Army reservist. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not constitute those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government. SEPTEMBER 11, 2019, “WHITHER SKYNET? AN AMERICAN “DEAD HAND” SHOULD REMAIN A DEAD ISSUE,” War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/whither-skynet-an-american-dead-hand-should-remain-a-dead-issue//lhs-ap]

Meet the New Missile, Same as the Old Missile

Lowther and Griffin make the assertion in their piece that recent technological advances by the Russians have placed excessive strain on the nuclear command and control apparatus, thus posing the risk that our land-based bombers and inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) could be destroyed after a successful decapitation strike on the United States. This risk thus necessitates the placing of U.S. nuclear forces under the control of an automated system and away from the squishy meatbags currently commanding and controlling the nuclear enterprise. Has the strategic picture really changed that much?

The answer is an obvious and emphatic “no.” Let’s consider the new Russian systems being fielded and decide if they will really change the strategic balance.

Russia is fielding a hypersonic glide vehicle, the Avangard, which will allow a nuclear warhead to ride to its target on an erratic and unpredictable flight-path. This theoretically would make them difficult to counter with existing mid-course missile defenses given the lower and more evasive flight path. What often goes unsaid, however, is that these systems are actually slower than a traditional ICBM on a long flightpath, thus increasing the amount of warning time for decision-makers. Yes, it is harder to track the flight and thus the potential point-of-impact of this weapon, which complicates things like providing timely civil defense warnings, but if the concern is decision-makers being attacked before they can either relocate or issue orders, then a boost-glide vehicle actually reduces pressure on this process. Bombers have more time to flush from their airfields, and the president has more time to consider relocating and could even possibly order a retaliation. The president may not know exactly where a given weapon is going to land, but he or she would likely know just how many are on their way, which would allow him or her time to gauge the scale of an attack and respond accordingly.

Russia is also arming itself with the Poseidon — a high-speed, deep-diving, and high-yield nuclear-powered torpedo with inter-continental range that can evade missile defenses and detonate upon arriving off coastal targets such as cities or ports. Of course, this target set should provide a hint as to the limits of this weapon. It would be an impressive feat indeed for this weapon to make its way to Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska and — as anyone who has sailed around the Chesapeake can attest — it would also be unlikely for the weapon to get close enough to the District of Columbia to threaten leadership targets there. It could also target nuclear submarine bases, but there are always ballistic missile submarines at sea in wait (more on these later).

Russia is also developing a nuclear-powered cruise missile: the Burevestnik. Like all cruise missiles, this system will have a small enough launch plume as to make detection of launch difficult. Its extreme range will allow the missile to fly in an evasive flight path that might take it to the United States from a number of different directions not easily monitored by air defense radar. Leaving aside, however, the obvious technical and operational issues with making a system like this work (the United States, after all, abandoned its own attempt for a reason), the detection challenges are not that unique compared to other cruise missiles.

This brings us to submarine-launched cruise missiles that could be fired off the coast of the United States and target the capital. Like all cruise missiles, these are difficult to detect by radar, can fly to their targets following an evasive route, and can allow for precise targeting. This is, of course, a problem. But it is one that has existed for decades. It was one of the reasons for the ill-fated JLENS program and explains why there are missile interceptors located around Washington. Of course, one could argue that this shows that Washington was, is, and will remain vulnerable to cruise missile strikes. Yet it is difficult to see the threat as having grown in scale since the Cold War, when potentially dozens of nuclear-powered attack submarines could be used to deliver missiles to the capital, and even then steps such as dispersing leadership at multiple fixed and mobile locations provided the degree of redundancy needed to continue operations.

Ballistic missiles have the advantage of being relatively predictable in their flightpath, which makes predicting where they will fly and hit a relatively simple physics problem. This predictability, however, also makes them theoretically vulnerable to missile defenses. The unpredictable nature of a cruise missile’s path to the target should point to their probable role: penetrating U.S. missile defenses. These systems are designed to counter a persistent Russian fear: that U.S. conventional precision strike capabilities, when paired with missile defenses, could give the United States a first-strike advantage.

Lowther and McGriffin insist that non-Russian analysts cannot possibly grapple with Russian views and intentions. This is delusory. Leaving aside their abuse of the case of Crimea in 2013, surely these two authors, like most nuclear analysts, noticed that Russian President Vladimir Putin wasn’t bashful about discussing how these systems were intended for use penetrating missile defenses.

The thinking on display in their article, in short, isn’t likely to give anyone an informed and measured assessment of Russian capabilities. It’s the kind of thinking that risks another Team B debacle. And while that affair was a lot of things, it wasn’t exactly a model for useful policy development.

#### 4---Perm, do the counterplan –

#### A---Aff bans use of weapon for war not its construction

Altmann and Sauer 17 [Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer in international relations at Bundeswehr University in Munich, working on international security and arms control. (2017) Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability, Survival, 59:5, 117-142, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263//lhs-ap]

In short, preventive arms control for AWS would not mean the regulation or prohibition of specific technologies, nor even countable (stockpiles of) individual weapon systems.59 Instead, it would mean regulating or prohibiting a defined military practice, particularly certain applications of specific technologies for military purposes. An example of such an approach can be found in the preventive prohibition on blinding laser weapons added to the CCW in 1995.60 This prohibition protects soldiers’ eyes on the battlefield without banning laser technology in all its other military and civilian uses.

#### B---The United States can withdraw

Gubrud and Altmann 13 [physicist Dr. Mark Avrum Gubrud from the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. “Compliance Measures for an Autonomous Weapons Convention,” ICRAC Working Paper #2, May 2013, https://autonomousweapons.org/compliance-measures-for-an-autonomous-weapons-convention//lhs-ap]

In case of a serious concern about strategically threatening noncompliance, a state party may seek private diplomatic conversation with the suspected perpetrator, formal consultations or inquiries through the treaty-mandated consultative bodies, or bring the matter to the attention of the UN Security Council. In the last resort, a state party may withdraw from the treaty, although this would be a highly provocative and destabilizing move.

#### C---Defensive systems in structured environments are automatic not autonomous

Altmann and Sauer 17 [Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer in international relations at Bundeswehr University in Munich, working on international security and arms control. (2017) Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability, Survival, 59:5, 117-142, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263//lhs-ap]

It is worth noting that some weapon systems, so far used only for defensive purposes, have long been able to identify, track and engage incoming targets on their own. These systems can already be set up so that humans are cut out of decision-making, a capability deemed necessary because there can be instances in which there is not enough time for humans to react, as during attacks with missiles or mortar shells.

These defensive weapons are stationary or fixed on ships or trailers, and are designed to fire at inanimate targets. They repeatedly perform pre-programmed actions within tightly set parameters and time frames in comparably structured and controlled environments. Consequently, they are commonly thought to be only the precursors to AWS, and might be described as automatic, as distinct from the autonomous systems currently being developed. The latter will be able to operate without human control or supervision in dynamic, unstructured, open environments, attacking various sets of targets, including inhabited vehicles, structures or even individuals. They will operate over an extended period of time after activation – and will potentially be able to learn and adapt their behaviour.

#### D---Lethal means targeting humans

Oxford n.d. [https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/lethal//lhs-ap]

lethal adjective /ˈliːθl/ /ˈliːθl/ ​ causing or able to cause death

#### 5----Permutation, States ought to ban lethal autonomous weapons, with the exception of the United States, which ought not ban space-based lethal autonomous weapons. The United States federal government ought to substantially increase investment, research, and development in lethal autonomous space-based missile defense systems.

#### Textual competition good –

#### 1---Words are objective---Lots of ways to interpret the function of the plan that invite arbitrary judge intervention

#### 2---Clash: Limits out infinite unpredictable “except for x” counterplans that moot the aff

#### 3--- Just functional competition greenlights infinite artificial and conditional disads about the infinite potential functions of the plan.

#### Reject new 2nr competition standards---Incentivizes shiftiness that moots the 1ar, skews the 2ar, and causes late-breaking debates and intervention

### 1AR – AT: UAVs PIC

#### UAVs are automated not autonomous

Anderson and Waxman 13 [Kenneth Anderson is a professor of international law at Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, DC, and a member of the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and Law. He is the author of Living with the UN: American Responsibilities and International Order (2011) and specializes in international law, human rights, and international business law. Matthew C. Waxman is a professor of law at Columbia Law School, an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a member of the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and Law. He previously served in senior positions at the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council. “LAW AND ETHICS FOR AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: WHY A BAN WON’T WORK AND HOW THE LAWS OF WAR CAN,” American University Washington College of Law Research Paper No. 2013-11, Columbia Public Law Research Paper, https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty\_scholarship/1803//lhs-ap]

The incremental march toward automated lethal technologies of the future, and the legal and ethical challenges that accompany it, can be illustrated by looking at today’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).10 Unmanned aircraft piloted from afar are already a significant component of the U.S. arsenal. At this writing, close to one in three U.S. Air Force aircraft is remotely piloted (though this number also includes many tiny tactical surveillance drones) and the unmanned aircraft proportion will only grow.11 Many other states are developing or importing such technology.12 Current unmanned military aircraft are not autonomous in the firing of weapons—the weapon must be fired in real-time by a human controller—and so far there are no known plans or, apparently in the view of U.S. military planners, reasons today to take the human out of the weapon firing loop.13

Nor are today’s UAVs truly autonomous as aircraft—they require human pilots in real-time to fly them, even when they are located far away. They are, however, increasingly automated in their flight functions—self-landing capabilities, for example, and particularly automation to the point that a single pilot can operate several unmanned aircraft at once, increasing efficiency considerably. The automation of flight is gradually increasing as sensors and aircraft control through computer programming improves. Looking into the future, some observers believe that one of the next generations of jet fighter aircraft will no longer be manned or, at least, that manned fighter aircraft will be joined by unmanned aircraft.14 Given that speed in every sense—including turning and twisting in flight, and reaction and decision times—is an advantage, design will emphasize automating as many of these functions as possible, in competition with the enemy’s systems.15

### 1AR – AT: Defensive/Stationary Systems

#### PDCP – Defensive systems in structured environments are automatic not autonomous

Altmann and Sauer 17 [Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer in international relations at Bundeswehr University in Munich, working on international security and arms control. (2017) Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability, Survival, 59:5, 117-142, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263//lhs-ap]

It is worth noting that some weapon systems, so far used only for defensive purposes, have long been able to identify, track and engage incoming targets on their own. These systems can already be set up so that humans are cut out of decision-making, a capability deemed necessary because there can be instances in which there is not enough time for humans to react, as during attacks with missiles or mortar shells.

These defensive weapons are stationary or fixed on ships or trailers, and are designed to fire at inanimate targets. They repeatedly perform pre-programmed actions within tightly set parameters and time frames in comparably structured and controlled environments. Consequently, they are commonly thought to be only the precursors to AWS, and might be described as automatic, as distinct from the autonomous systems currently being developed. The latter will be able to operate without human control or supervision in dynamic, unstructured, open environments, attacking various sets of targets, including inhabited vehicles, structures or even individuals. They will operate over an extended period of time after activation – and will potentially be able to learn and adapt their behaviour.

#### No distinction

Simpson 15 [Tom Simpson, 2015, "Will killer robots be the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow?," No Publication, https://www.ox.ac.uk/Research/will-killer-robots-be-kalashnikovs-tomorrow#, accessed 12-19-2020]LHSBC

One of the applications of small-scale automated weapons could be ‘swarm’ attacks, where hundreds of such units attack in simultaneous, coordinated assaults. Defending against swarms will require your own swarm. Whether the algorithm is set to identify machines rather than people is a matter of detail. So there is no relevant distinction between ‘offensive’ versus ‘defensive’ killer robots.

### 1AR – AT: Precision Guided Munitions

#### Perm do the counterplan—PGMs are distinct.

Wareham 17 ([Mary Wareham, Advocacy Director, Arms Division. Stephen Goose, Executive Director, Arms Division] “The Growing International Movement Against Killer Robots” Human Rights Watch, published in Harvard International Review, 5 Jan. 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/05/growing-international-movement-against-killer-robots>) LHSLA LH

If the trend towards autonomy continues, the fear is that humans will start to fade out of the decision-making loop, first retaining only a limited oversight role, and then no role at all. Most acknowledge that fully autonomous weapons do not currently exist, but the capacity to develop them is expected to be available within a matter of years rather than decades. The US affirmed in November 2015 that “there is broad agreement that lethal autonomous weapon systems do not exist” and do not refer to “remotely piloted drones, nor precision-guided munitions or defensive systems.”

### 1AR – AT: PGMs - Slijper

#### We’ll rehighlight the ev.

Slijper 17 (Frank [policy adviser with Dutch peace organization PAX and an associate of the Transnational Institute], “Where to draw the line”, November 2017, PAX, <https://www.paxforpeace.nl/media/files/pax-report-where-to-draw-the-line.pdf%20>) // ML

Precision Guided Munitions ¶ Precision guided munitions are self-propelled missiles with typically four system components: targeting/guidance, flight system, engine and warhead. They can be used for multiple purposes including surface-to-surface and air-to-surface (ballistic, cruise, anti-ship, anti-tank, etc.), surface-to-air, anti-ballistic, air-to-air, and anti-satellite. ¶ Of note, the MIM-104 Patriot system was one of the first systems to introduce autonomy, with its Initial Operational Capability in the US Army in 1984. Over the following 30 years, continual improvements have been made, so much so that the modern version shares little more than a name and basic purpose.45 It does, however, highlight the historical developments of a ‘legacy’ system through to ’futuristic’ LAWS. Whilst modern technology has improved the means by which information is acquired, analysed, and acted upon, as well as doctrine and concepts of operations, the advantages of incorporating automation into weapon systems have been understood at a tactical level for decades. ¶ AGM-158C LRASM ¶ What: The Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) is a stealthy cruise missile, armed with a 1,000 lb (454 kg) penetrator and blast fragmentation warhead46, that can find its own target autonomously by using active radar homing to locate ships in an area. The LRASM is also capable of hitting land targets. ¶ Automation: “It is intended to fly for hundreds of kilometers, manoeuvring on its own to avoid radar, and out of radio contact with human controllers. […] The Pentagon nonetheless argues that the new anti-ship missile is only semiautonomous and that humans are sufficiently represented in its targeting and killing decisions. But officials at the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which initially developed the missile, and Lockheed Martin declined to comment on how the weapon decides on targets, saying the information is classified.”47 ¶ Made by: Lockheed Martin with DARPA (USA)48 ¶ Sold to: Developed for the US Navy and Air Force; expected to be operational in 2018.49 ¶ Video: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h449oIjg2kY> ¶ MIM-104 PATRIOT ¶ What: Patriot is a missile defence system consisting of radars, command-and-control technology and multiple types of interceptors, all working together to detect, identify and defeat tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, advanced aircraft and other threats. Each missile has a range of 70 km and a maximum flight time of less than three and a half minutes.50 ¶ Automation: “A target engagement can be carried out in manual, semi-automatic or automatic mode. When the decision has been made to engage the target, the engagement control station selects the launch station or stations and pre-launch data is submitted to the selected missile. After launch the Patriot missile is acquired by the radar.”51 ¶ Made by: Raytheon (USA) ¶ Sold to: USA and twelve other nations.52 ¶ Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MjQqDiHfkoo SEARAM ¶ What: SeaRAM is an anti-ship missile defence system, designed to engage high performance, supersonic and subsonic threats, including sea-skimming anti-ship missiles, high-speed incoming vessels, rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, and other aerial and surface targets.53 It combines the accuracy, extended range and high manoeuvrability of the RAM missile with the high-resolution search-and-track sensor and reliable, quick-response capability of the Phalanx Block 1B system.54 ¶ Automation: The SeaRAM is capable of autonomously detecting, tracking and engaging enemy targets, with an increased ability to engage multiple targets at once, through the use of “automated dual-mode passive radio frequency and infrared guidance”.55 It works independently of the ship’s combat system, and has missile-to-missile fratricide avoidance.56 Made by: Raytheon (USA) ¶Sold to: US Navy

#### Defensive systems in structured environments are automatic not autonomous

Altmann and Sauer 17 [Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer in international relations at Bundeswehr University in Munich, working on international security and arms control. (2017) Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability, Survival, 59:5, 117-142, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263//lhs-ap]

It is worth noting that some weapon systems, so far used only for defensive purposes, have long been able to identify, track and engage incoming targets on their own. These systems can already be set up so that humans are cut out of decision-making, a capability deemed necessary because there can be instances in which there is not enough time for humans to react, as during attacks with missiles or mortar shells.

These defensive weapons are stationary or fixed on ships or trailers, and are designed to fire at inanimate targets. They repeatedly perform pre-programmed actions within tightly set parameters and time frames in comparably structured and controlled environments. Consequently, they are commonly thought to be only the precursors to AWS, and might be described as automatic, as distinct from the autonomous systems currently being developed. The latter will be able to operate without human control or supervision in dynamic, unstructured, open environments, attacking various sets of targets, including inhabited vehicles, structures or even individuals. They will operate over an extended period of time after activation – and will potentially be able to learn and adapt their behaviour.

### 1AR – AT: Landmines PIC

#### 1---Permutation do the counterplan – Autonomous refers to complex information processing. Mines, proximity fuses, and heat-seeking missiles are automated, not autonomous

Gubrud and Altmann 13 [physicist Dr. Mark Avrum Gubrud from the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. “Compliance Measures for an Autonomous Weapons Convention,” ICRAC Working Paper #2, May 2013, https://autonomousweapons.org/compliance-measures-for-an-autonomous-weapons-convention//lhs-ap]

Careful and explicit definitions will need to be given for each of the terms used; for example, “autonomous” is generally understood, in this context, to mean functioning independently of human action, though possibly under human supervision and with the possibility of human intervention. Here a distinction must be made with the word “automatic.” The general sense is that “autonomous” implies a higher level of complexity in a system’s ability to collect and process relevant information and in the relationship between that information and behavior; in other words, a higher level of (artificial) intelligence. It is possible to give a technical definition of “autonomy” in this sense which permits us to distinguish “autonomous” from “automatic” quantitatively, on the criterion of a measure of complexity.

As an alternative, it may be sufficient to define an “autonomous weapon” (AW),13 as any system that acts independently of human action in “engagement-related functions” such as the acquisition, tracking, identification, grouping, selection, prioritization and engagement of targets.14 Each step in this so-called “kill chain” or “loop” involves functions which the weapon system might fulfill autonomously. If any of these functions are autonomous, the weapon system may be classified as an AW, and if all of them are autonomous, the system is a fully autonomous weapon (FAW).

Under this paradigm, the treaty definition may simply exclude certain very simple systems, to be considered as merely “automatic” and not as AW. These exclusions, such as proximity fuses, mines, and heat-seeking missiles, can be enumerated and described in detail, either as an exhaustive list or as a set of typical examples. General technical criteria can also be given, including weapons type and complexity.

#### 2---Prefer for predictability – This definition best reflects academic debates

Sauer 16 [Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer at Bundeswehr University in Munich. He is the author of Atomic Anxiety: Deterrence, Taboo and the Non-Use of U.S. Nuclear Weapons (2015) and a member of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control. October 2016, “Stopping ‘Killer Robots’: Why Now Is the Time to Ban Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-09/features/stopping-%E2%80%98killer-robots%E2%80%99-why-now-time-ban-autonomous-weapons-systems//lhs-ap]

The Basics

Some weapons systems used for defensive purposes already can identify and track incoming targets and engage them without a human pushing the metaphorical button. Deemed precursors to autonomous weapons systems, they can react to incoming missiles or mortar shells in cases in which the timing does not allow for human decision-making. The Phalanx Close-In Weapon System on Navy ships is one example for such a weapons system, Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system is another.

Yet, these defensive systems are not the focus of the mainly forward-looking autonomous weapons systems debate. Juxtaposing automatic and autonomous systems is a helpful way to understand why. Defensive systems such as the Phalanx can be categorized as automatic. They are stationary or fixed on ships or trailers and designed to fire at inanimate targets. They just repeatedly perform preprogrammed actions and operate only within tightly set parameters and time frames in comparably structured and controlled environments.

Autonomous weapons are distinguish-able from their precursors. They would be able to operate without human control or supervision in dynamic, unstructured, open environments, attacking a variety of targets. They would operate over an extended period of time after activation and would potentially be able to learn and adapt to their situations. To be fair, this juxtaposition is artificial and glosses over an important gray area by leaving aside the fact that autonomous functionality is a continuum. After all, automatic systems, targeting humans at borders or automatically firing back at the source of incoming munitions, already raise questions relevant to the autonomy debate.

There arguably is a tacit understanding in the expert community and among diplomats in Geneva that the debate’s main focus is on future, mobile weapons platforms equipped with onboard sensors, computers, and decision-making algorithms with the capability to seek, identify, track, and attack targets autonomously. The autonomy debate thus touches on but is not primarily concerned with existing automatic defensive systems. In fact, depending on how the CCW ends up defining autonomous weapons systems, it might be well within reason to exempt those from regulation or a possible preventive ban if their sole purpose is to protect human life by exclusively targeting incoming munitions.

#### 3---Condo PICs are a voting issue – they make the 1AR functionally impossible and kill clash cuz you can turn parts of the case that the CP links to *and* steal the whole aff, which lets them get rid of a chunk of the 1AR since we have to go for the case to have a shot—destroys clash cuz they don’t have to defend their arguments against well-researched objections since they can kick what they’re losing

### ---AT: DMZ Landmines

#### Perm do the counterplan – Landmines already removed AND spur further demilitarization

Min-hyung 18 [Lee Min-hyung, reporter, 2018-10-19, “Two Koreas finish landmine cleanup in JSA. What's next?” The Korea Times, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/10/356\_257291.html//lhs-ap]

The two Koreas have finished their joint work to remove landmines in the Joint Security Area (JSA), laying the groundwork for them to begin their next military disarmament activities in the border area, the United Nations Command (UNC) said Friday.

Following the announcement, Seoul and Pyongyang plan to speed up their bilateral efforts to further disarm areas near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) next week. They include the withdrawal of guard posts and firearms there.

"The UNC, in close cooperation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in South Korea, has reviewed and verified the landmine clearance work done to date at the JSA in the inter-Korean border village of Panmunjeom as part of the comprehensive military agreement between the two Koreas," the UNC said in a statement.

Last month, Seoul and Pyongyang signed the agreement on the sidelines of this year's third inter-Korean summit between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

Both sides agreed on a package of bilateral measures to ease military tension on the Korean Peninsula, and the removal of landmines in the JSA ― starting Oct. 1 ― came against this backdrop.

The two Koreas are also expected to remove guard posts and weapons in the JSA by Oct. 25, according to the agreement. The North operates five posts, while the South has four.

"Future potential actions may include additional mine clearance, removing guard posts, reducing security personnel, removing certain weapons, and the return of the remains of service members to their parent nation," the UNC said.

Representatives from the two Koreas and the UNC gathered at Panmunjeom, Tuesday, to discuss the upcoming military disarmament measures. The three-way consultation body will continue holding additional talks for disarmament near the border area, according to the Ministry of National Defense.

UNC Commander Vincent Brooks pledged to continue negotiating with the two Koreas in order for them to fulfill their joint agreement in the future.

"The verification of initial land mine clearance operations in the DMZ lays the foundation for future progress of the implementation of the agreement," he said. "The UNC will continue to work closely with the two Koreas to synchronize implementation efforts on the way ahead."

The JSA disarmament, when finished, will allow for civilian and foreign tourists to visit the border area from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. without restrictions about what they can wear.

### 1AR – AT: Iron Dome

#### PDCP – Iron Dome is automated not autonomous

Haas and Fischer 17 [Michael Carl Haas is a researcher in the Global Security team at the Center for Security Studies at ETH and a doctoral student at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University. Sophie-Charlotte Fischer is a PhD candidate at the Center for Security Studies at ETH. Prior to her PhD studies, she held a Mercator Fellowship on International Affairs. 2017, The evolution of targeted killing practices: Autonomous weapons, future conflict, and the international order, Contemporary Security Policy, 38:2, 281-306, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1336407//lhs-ap]

However, this classification does not capture another relevant—and much more fine-grained—dimension of autonomy: namely, the complexity of machines’ decision-making processes. This dimension emphasizes the capability of a machine to incorporate uncertainties in its environment into the decision-making process and adapt to them (Boulanin, 2016a, p. 3). While systems that are classified as automatic, such as landmines, simply respond more or less mechanically to some well-defined input (Scharre, 2015, p. 10), the distinction between automated and autonomous weapons is more difficult. Often, missile defense systems such as Israel’s Iron Dome are considered highly automated as they are pre-programmed rule-based systems, which provide largely predictable outcomes (Scharre, 2015, p. 10). Truly autonomous systems are far more complex, as they would be able to reason probabilistically based on a set of inputs, compose different courses of actions, and then select and execute the best option without human intervention at any of these stages (Cummings, 2017, p. 3).

### 1AR – AT: Mines/Proximity Fuses/Heat Seeking Missiles

#### Perm do the counterplan – Mines, proximity fuses, and heat-seeking missiles are automated not autonomous

Gubrud and Altmann 13 [physicist Dr. Mark Avrum Gubrud from the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. “Compliance Measures for an Autonomous Weapons Convention,” ICRAC Working Paper #2, May 2013, https://autonomousweapons.org/compliance-measures-for-an-autonomous-weapons-convention//lhs-ap]

Careful and explicit definitions will need to be given for each of the terms used; for example, “autonomous” is generally understood, in this context, to mean functioning independently of human action, though possibly under human supervision and with the possibility of human intervention. Here a distinction must be made with the word “automatic.” The general sense is that “autonomous” implies a higher level of complexity in a system’s ability to collect and process relevant information and in the relationship between that information and behavior; in other words, a higher level of (artificial) intelligence. It is possible to give a technical definition of “autonomy” in this sense which permits us to distinguish “autonomous” from “automatic” quantitatively, on the criterion of a measure of complexity.

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### 1AR – AT: SGR-A1

#### Not autonomous because of its algorithm—their definition is misleading.

Caron 19, Jean-François, French military scholar (“Defining semi-autonomous, automated and autonomous weapon systems in order to understand their ethical challenges,” 24 Nov. 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s42984-020-00028-5)

Secondly, we find automated weapon systems that possess a destructive and/or lethal capacity. The best examples in this regard are the Israeli Iron Dome and the South Korean SGR-A1. Contrary to semi-autonomous weapons, these systems are able to fire at specific targets without the direct intervention of a human operator. Indeed, both systems are programmed to either identify incoming rockets and other projectiles or enemy combatants and to intercept or fire at them.Footnote2 We can also add to the list of examples the Sea Hunter, a prototype unmanned submarine tracking vessel developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) that will very soon join the US Naval fleet and has been described as “a highly autonomous unmanned ship that could revolutionize US maritime operations” and “a new vision of naval surface warfare” (Turner 2018). Even if the initial goal was to use this type of vessel for surveillance purposes, the US Navy tested the Sea Hunter in August 2017 with an offensive anti-submarine payload system which means that the likelihood is high that it might be able to locate, track, and engage enemy submarines in the near future. If the Navy ever decides to move forward with this vessel, it would become very similar to the Iron Dome. Similar to the Israeli defense system, the vessel could potentially replace whole fleets of destroyers that were previously dedicated to anti-submarine warfare thanks to a pre-programmed system that would only engage specific targets which would be detected because of their unique characteristics, such as Yasen or Akula class Russian submarines whose dimensions and features are different from US Los Angeles class submarines. Even though these systems are often referred to as being “autonomous” (see for instance Sparrow 2007,Footnote3 63), this designation is misleading. Indeed, the notion of autonomy refers clearly to features that are not associated with the previously discussed weapons systems, since an autonomous agent is someone who is first and foremost able to pose a deliberate and independent action that results from his own will. This means that breathing is not sufficient in itself to define a living creature as an autonomous agent, since this action is involuntary and a natural result of the parasympathetic nervous system. The same logic would apply to the photosynthesis process of plants and other organisms. On the contrary, an autonomous action refers to an act that results from deliberate intent, which implies free will. Similarly, an individual who is under hypnosis or whose mental faculties are impaired cannot be considered an autonomous agent. This also implies that the intended action must result from a deliberative process that takes into account the difference between what is right and wrong. This faculty is at the core of how criminal responsibility is understood.Footnote4 In the case of military technologies, this understanding of autonomy would refer to their capacity to determine on their own and without any form of human interference when and against whom to use lethal force. This is clearly not the case with these aforementioned weapons systems since their lethal potential lies either with humans (as in the case of drones) or through a pre-programmed algorithm. In order to talk about autonomous weapons systems, these technologies would need to possess the capacity to exercise moral judgment in their killing process. However, it must be noted that these weapons do not exist at the current time and considering the inherent difficulties associated with their potential development, it is impossible to say if scientists will ever be able to create them. On the contrary, it is clear that there is an intention to transform this fantasy into a reality. This conclusion is supported by the rhetoric of many senior military officers and by the tremendous investments that states have allocated in recent years for the research and development of these weapons. Indeed, we cannot ignore the fact that Russian military commanders have openly said that “a fully robotized unit will be created [in the near future], capable of independently conducting military operations”, while it has been stated by the US Department of Defense that the option of developing autonomous weapons able to determine on their own who should be targeted ought to be on the table (Scharre 2018, 6). Moreover, the Pentagon has recently announced that it will invest USD 18 billion in the research and development of such technologies.

# 1AR – AT: K

## General

### 1AR – FW

#### Framework – debate should be about the hypothetical consequences of the plan – most fair because the plan is the only predictable stasis point – infinite reps and epistemologies explodes prep burdens. Not weighing the aff moots 6 minutes of the 1AC and prevents comparison of practical impacts that refines scholarship to produce the best political strategy.

#### Fairness outweighs – Only impact the ballot can solve, necessary to evaluate all arguments, and debate is a game with switch sides and speech times

### 1AR – Extinction First v2

#### Extinction outweighs – future generations deserve the choice to live; life is a pre-req to theorizing and executing praxis like the alt; extinction is slow and painful for billions through starvation, dehydration and cancer; and If you’re unsure which value frame is right, stick around another day to find out.

### 1AR – Extinction Reps Good

#### The 1ac’s representation of nuclear war empowers critique and produces ethical solidarity

Aistrope and Fishel 20 [Tim Aistrope, Lecturer in International Relations, Stefanie Fishel, Lecturer of Politics and International Relations, University of the Sunshine Coast, “Horror, apocalypse and world politics,” International Affairs, Volume 96, Issue 3, May 2020, Pages 631–648, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa008//lhs-ap]

The representation of nuclear apocalypse gives a strong sense of the potential for ethical engagement at the intersection of horror and world politics. Indeed, we can see this engagement in practice in the powerful constraints often associated with the so-called ‘nuclear taboo’, which, at least in part, helps explain the non-use of nuclear weapons since the Second World War. Nina Tannenwald highlights the horrific effects of nuclear weapons as one of three pillars supporting the taboo.71 For Tannenwald, the early link between chemical and nuclear weapons, established through the association of radiation and poison gas, connected nuclear weapons with the chemical horrors of the First World War, since universally banned under the laws of war. No doubt the direct representation of those horrors for the general public in films like The War Game and Threads helped embed this deep aversion, not least by dramatizing nuclear fallout. Tannenwald also points to the constraining power of empathy, again strongly resonant with accounts of everyday life destroyed. As we have highlighted above with reference to Sontag and Rorty, ethical considerations can be provoked, grounded and sustained through narrative engagement with the experiences of others—and the horror genre narrates human suffering in a uniquely affecting and vicarious way. Indeed, Jessica Rapson has argued, persuasively, that The War Game provokes a profound cosmopolitanism, first, through references to Hiroshima and Nagasaki that bridge cultural and historical context, and second, through its focus on everyday life and common experience, which people everywhere can relate to.72 But nuclear war is also distinct in its destructiveness. As N. A. J. Taylor has explained in his ground-breaking treatment of the subject, nuclear harm shatters the biosphere and threatens the very conditions for life on earth.73 In that sense, it may be the most universal ground for ethics that has ever been available.

### 1AR – Fiat Good

#### Fiat good – puts us in charge of government action and DEMANDS that politicians like Mcconnell shouldn't control us, which resolves political passivity and motivates change through activism out of round -- spills over and outweighs on scope. key because political disengagement is widespread now and the alt only reinforces that by abstracting away from materiality.

### 1AR – Movements Good

#### Movements and Images of suffering good – inspired by George Floyd, BLM movements this summer caused material reductions in police budgets in cities like LA, Seattle, and New York – this is offense for us because the alt rejects these movements

### 1AR – Utopian Fiat

#### Utopian alts are a voting issue – impossible to generate offense against alternatives that wish away oppression and its structures

### 1AR – Floating PIKs

#### Floating PIKs are a voting issue – they moot the entirety of the aff and destroy predictable clash about its core literature

## AT: Afropess

### 1AR – Top Level – Pess

#### Framework – debate should be about the hypothetical consequences of the plan – most fair because the plan is the only predictable stasis point – infinite reps and epistemologies explodes prep burdens. Not weighing the aff moots 6 minutes of the 1AC and prevents rigorous comparison that refines scholarship to produce the best political strategy.

#### Fairness outweighs – Only impact the ballot can solve, necessary to evaluate all arguments, and debate is a game with switch sides and speech times.

#### Extinction outweighs – future generations deserve the choice to live; life is a pre-req to theorizing and executing praxis like the alt; extinction is slow and painful for all living beings through starvation, dehydration, and cancer; and If you’re unsure which value frame is right, stick around another day to find out.

#### Permutation do both—either the alt can overcome the instance of the aff or it can’t and it shatters when it hits the real world.

### 1AR – Libidinal Econ

#### Reject psychoanalysis

#### 1 – Doesn’t scale

[it can’t explain group phenomena, is unique to the individual studied, and is not a universal theory]

Gunder 5 - Senior planning lecturer in the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of Auckland, previous president of the New Zealand Planning Institute (Michael Gunder, 2005, “Lacan, Planning and Urban Policy Formation”, *Urban Policy and Research*, 23.1)

Not surprisingly, the application of Lacanian theory to the understanding of society and culture is not without concern. Some clinical practitioners of Lacanian psychoanalysis are “suspicious of the wider ‘application’ of the theory to those not actually in analysis” (Parker, [2004](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib74), p. 69). Alternatively, Lacan's teachings have been criticised by social theorists as being only theoretical and void of empirical material (Sarup, [1993](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib84), p. 26). Further, in contrast to psychology ([Rose, 1998](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib79)), the inability to reconcile the nuance of each particular psychoanalytical case to a meaningful universal theory of the unconscious that is testable is a fundamental constraint for considering psychoanalysis a science, or by extension, a valid scientific body of thought applicable to the understanding of aggregate human behaviours ([Fink, 2004](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib29)). In this regard, Lacan was unable to successfully legitimise and advance Freud's psychoanalytical theory as a science of the unconscious even with his application of mathematical theory and linguistics to Freud's metapsychology ([Althusser, 1996](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib2); [Morel, 2000](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib71); [Fink, 2004](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib29)). Consequently, this author views Lacan's work in a manner originated by Althusser ([1996](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib2), p. 93), as best being understood as a “philosophy of psychoanalysis” from which subsequent understandings of society and culture may be derived and, where possible, tested.

#### 2 – Group the rant – it’s based on completely bogus science

**Bunge, McGill University philosopher, 2010**

(Mario, “Should Psychoanalysis Be in the Science Museum?”, 10-5, <http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827806.200-should-psychoanalysis-be-in-the-science-museum.html>)

We should congratulate the Science Museum for setting up an exhibition on psychoanalysis. Exposure to pseudoscience greatly helps understand genuine science, just as learning about tyranny helps in understanding democracy. Over the past 30 years, psychoanalysis has quietly been displaced in academia by scientific psychology. But it persists in popular culture as well as being a lucrative profession. It is the psychology of those who have not bothered to learn psychology, and the psychotherapy of choice for those who believe in the power of immaterial mind over body. Psychoanalysis is a bogus science because its practitioners do not do scientific research. When the field turned 100, a group of psychoanalysts admitted this gap and endeavoured to fill it. They claimed to have performed the first experiment showing that patients benefited from their treatment. Regrettably, they did not include a control group and did not entertain the possibility of placebo effects. Hence, their claim remains untested (The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol 81, p 513). More recently, a meta-analysis published in American Psychologist (vol 65, p 98) purported to support the claim that a form of psychoanalysis called psychodynamic therapy is effective. However, once again, the original studies did not involve control groups. In 110 years, psychoanalysts have not set up a single lab. They do not participate in scientific congresses, do not submit their papers to scientific journals and are foreign to the scientific community - a marginality typical of pseudoscience. This does not mean their hypotheses have never been put to the test. True, they are so vague that they are hard to test and some of them are, by Freud's own admission, irrefutable. Still, most of the testable ones have been soundly refuted. For example, most dreams have no sexual content. The Oedipus complex is a myth; boys do not hate their fathers because they would like to have sex with their mothers. The list goes on. As for therapeutic efficacy, little is known because psychoanalysts do not perform double-blind clinical trials or follow-up studies. Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. Its concepts are woolly and untestable yet are regarded as unassailable axioms. As a result of such dogmatism, psychoanalysis has remained basically stagnant for more than a century, in contrast with scientific psychology, which is thriving.

#### 3 – It’s non-falsifiable – If society is invested within anti-blackness then you can't test it because that process of testing will necessarily be invested in anti-blackness.

### 1AR – Ontology

#### Zero ev, state reform good, and progress possible

McCarthy 20 (Jesse McCarthy is an assistant professor in the departments of English and of African and African American Studies at Harvard University. “On Afropessimism.” <https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/on-afropessimism/> //shree)

Nonetheless, the fact that the main current of Afropessimist thinking runs counter to all of Black political history and tradition thus far; the fact that the foundational thinker for this perspective, Frantz Fanon, came to completely opposing conclusions with respect to the nature of politics and solidarity in struggle; the fact that the theory often appears to evade scrutiny or contestation by proclaiming itself “meta-theoretical” and “ontological”; the fact that it asserts a “mandate” for which no empirical evidence is provided and in the face of overwhelming evidence that it constitutes at best a minoritarian and class-specific position — all of this has to be reckoned with by those who want to take Afropessimism to heart.∂ Perhaps it’s worth reminding ourselves that when he was murdered, Fred Hampton was encouraging poor whites to analogize their position to that of poor Blacks. At the time of his assassination, Malcolm X was embracing and actively seeking to incorporate a cross-racial coalition into his new organization. Ella Baker actively encouraged the deepening of organizational ties and activist links across different communities by emphasizing common struggle and common oppression. What evidence do we have, on the other hand, that the power behind the status quo is quaking at the thought of Black folk gathering in isolation to mourn the end of the world?∂ If the challenge is more narrowly intellectual and what is needed are correctives to white Marxist hubris, Cedric Robinson’s Black Marxism (1983) already exists. Black feminist thought offers its own counternarratives. Of course, Wilderson doesn’t have to agree with Robinson or the Combahee River Collective. But isn’t it a problem that they aren’t cited even once in his books? Are we to jettison our entire tradition? Were all those who came before us so hopelessly naïve? Are we going to cast aside Vincent Harding’s There Is a River and read nothing but Fanon, Lacan, and Heidegger? Is Bantu philosophy overdetermined by social death even if its worldview was constructed in the absence of the white gaze? Afropessimism has yet to tackle these questions, to take its opponent’s counterarguments and positions seriously.∂ David Marriott, who is cited by Wilderson as a fellow Afropessimist, asks in his own work: whither Fanon? I wonder this, too. Wilderson says he is the figure he modeled himself on as a young man. Clearly Fanon is central to all of his thinking; indeed, all Afropessimist theorists consider Black Skin, White Masks (1952) a cornerstone text. It is an extraordinary philosophical work, and they are right that it is too often underappreciated. But it is also an extremely complicated intellectual experiment. The third sentence of that book is: “I’m not the bearer of absolute truths.” Fanon proposes to work through the problem of the abjection of Blackness, and that process extends beyond the book into the engaged existentialist revolt and the analysis of colonial relations that he explicitly argues involves the colonized subject, regardless of their race, in The Wretched of the Earth (1961). But even if one were to read only Black Skin, White Masks, it is impossible to miss the humanist assumptions that it opens onto in its conclusion. What else can one make of Fanon stating that “I am not a slave to slavery that dehumanized my ancestors,” and that “the density of History determines none of my acts. I am my own foundation”? How can one miss the assumption of a shareable humanity when he insists that “at the end of this book we would like the reader to feel with us the open dimension of every consciousness.” How can Fanon’s trajectory into the Algerian War of Independence be reconciled with the null trajectories that Afropessimism proposes?∂ If Afropessimism pushes us to pose harder and sharper questions as Fanon prayed his Black body always would, if it serves to break the shallow cant of the media class and its operatives — then certainly it will have done some good. But on the terms of its own presiding genius it needs to be understood as a waystation and not a terminus on the road to disalienation that Fanon argued is the only path to freedom for Black people in the modern world. That path, which he described in terms of building a “new man,” required him to first understand the depth of abjection that Blackness had been cast into, and then to undo that abjection by mobilizing its ejection from the political order of the West in a grand historical struggle to reconstruct that civilization from the side of the oppressed, an embrace that clearly involves a radical solidarity with non-Black people. This was the mission Fanon was on when he died, and it was a mission he believed Black peoples would have a special, indeed, foundational role in ultimately seeing through.∂ Realizing these goals does not mean adhering to a formulaic principle or that Black people need to think, act, or speak as a monolith. Fanon and Wilderson are both fond of citing Aimé Césaire’s phrase about “the end of the world” from his poem Notebook of a Return to the Native Land:∂ One must begin somewhere.∂ Begin what?∂ The only thing in the world worth beginning:∂ The End of the world of course.∂ These lines do not appear at the end of the poem, however, but roughly halfway through it. The interjection, “of course,” stands in here for the French word “parbleu,” which, even in the late 1930s when Césaire was composing his poem in Paris, carried a folksy and bathetic ring that is only dimly captured in the English but is easier to hear if you imagine these lines as having strayed from a play by Samuel Beckett. Wilderson intones this phrase repeatedly in his book, wielding it like a totemic hammer portending world-destroying events that, in light of the commitments of his own theory, seem to suggest, and possibly wish for, a zero-sum war between the races. But Césaire’s usage is far more ambivalent and ironic, the cry of a man whose revolutionary action must first and foremost be directed inwardly toward a poetic reconstruction of the self, a liberation that requires a self-determined and self-realizing pursuit of truth.∂ Fanon admired and respected no other intellectual more than Césaire. We know from his letters to his French publisher François Maspero that he imagined his writings as adressed, in no small part, to and for him. The idiosyncratic prose style of Black Skin, White Masks is Fanon’s way of signifying upon a correspondence with Césaire’s poetics. Both writers are acutely aware that the Black thinker is poised precariously between the poles of reflection and action. But both are committed to a humanistic pursuit of truth and both believe in the promise of a radiant Blackness whose time is not yet come. This is why, even as the Algerian War raged around him, Fanon continued his psychiatric research, convinced that understanding the traumas of war and torture would be necessary for healing the postrevolutionary body politic. He wrote for the present and for the future in pursuit of an understanding of himself and of human nature, and for the cause of a political independence and freedom that he hoped would set the entire African continent on a new course. Had he lived, he would have persevered until every colonialist regime from Algiers to Cape Town (the title he had in mind for his last book was Alger-Le Cap) had been driven off the continent. Fanon was no pessimist: true revolutionaries never are.∂ But must we revolve around Fanon in the first place? Today many activists are more inspired by Fannie Lou Hamer. The US context has its own problems that Fanon only barely understood and addressed. Why not return instead, in this hour of national contestation, to a figure like David Walker and his Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World; But in Particular and Very Expressly to those of the United States of America from 1829? We still underappreciate the importance of this text, one of the seminal documents that captures the first great Black intellectual debate in the United States, which was an argument over whether or not we ought to stay in the country at all. Walker believed we should, and he was the first to define and defend the monumental implications of that choice. He attacked the mighty lobby of the American Colonization Society, which included the powerful senator Henry Clay, Abraham Lincoln, and many leading Black intellectuals of the day, who were convinced full equality for Blacks in America was neither possible nor desirable and advocated emigration. Their plans revolved around evacuating the Black population to the Pepper Coast, now the country of Liberia, which emerged from colonial schemes like “Mississippi-in-Africa” that the American Colonization Society founded in the 1830s.∂ We could have abandoned the country. History could have taken a very different course. American slaves could have returned to Africa and the United States could have become a white ethno-state, a second Europe. The 1820s and ’30s were the last possible moment of undoing or preventing the existence of a Black America. But Black American intellectuals made the choice to stay — to hold this ground and make something new here that the world had never seen. As the political scientist Melvin Rogers points out, Walker’s Appeal not only staked this argument in terms of a principled Black nationalist claim based on the enormous sacrifice of “blood and tears” in slavery; the rhetorical address of the text was also intended to awaken Black Americans to their own potential as a nationally self-consciously political community with a global outlook. “[F]or [Walker],” Rogers writes, “African Americans did not need a prophet to whom they should blindly defer. Rather they needed a community willing to confront practices of domination, capable of responding to their grievances, and susceptible to transcending America’s narrow ethical and political horizon.”∂ Wilderson’s Afropessimism insists that we are still slaves. Walker insisted in 1829 that the slaves are (and were even then) “colored citizens” of the United States and of the world. That if we are oppressed it is only because we are ignorant of our true strength, because we have been taught to disbelieve and disavow our worth to the world, to the nation, and to each other. Which of these two views is the correct one? I think the historical record and the present state of our politics tells us all we need to know on that score. For it is no coincidence that today it is Black Americans who are once again trying to save the country, to invest in finishing the work of making this place a home that we can live in. In what is a long-standing pattern, the “coloured citizens” of this country are at the forefront of practicing civics. Indeed, what could be more republican than risking one’s health to restore the health of the body politic? To ensure that one of the most basic promises of the state is properly fulfilled: that it apply its law enforcement equally, humanely, and in a manner accountable to the people it serves.∂ As in past struggles, our principled defense of an ethical civil code has attracted others with its moral force. We have seen a massive response, including from sources traditionally opposed to these concerns, who recognize the profoundly dysfunctional culture of US policing, prisons, and courts. Even many of those who do not agree that these are the result of actively racist policies and attitudes no longer deny that our exceptionally poor record cannot plausibly be unrelated to a long history of antiblack violence and antagonism. For this same reason, likeminded people around the world are hoping for a decisive break with the past‚ taking to the streets across the globe to demand that state actors acknowledge that there really is a history of injury that needs to stop being denied, and that we can and should work together to design a new social contract that will restore the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement and criminal justice in the eyes of all citizens and not just some.∂ The generation undertaking these endeavors does not seem to require a narrative of optimism in order to take the great risks they have incurred. They have a healthy indifference to both optimism and pessimism alike. Perhaps it results from the demands of carrying out politics in the real world. The incredibly difficult task of organizing and strategizing in order to elevate and amplify the best responses and to rein in and temper the counterproductive ones that delay and diminish a good cause. That’s hard to do in the best of cases: in a turbulent, paranoid, and instantly videotaped public sphere, it’s a Sisyphean task that bad-faith commentators take advantage of.∂ None of this diminishes the fundamental need for greater self-capacity of the kind Walker called for 200 years ago. Much of the work ahead will necessarily involve a growing capacity for self-reflection, self-criticism, irony, and joy in our politics. It will require acknowledging that struggles against white oppression will never be successful without deepened self-healing in our communities: repairing the relations in families, between men and women; ending the violence directed at trans, queer, and otherwise non-conforming people in our neighborhoods; ending the heinous blood feuds between rival gangs and sets; restoring education and communal trust as our highest priorities and most cherished aspirations. These will always remain preconditional to the realization of freedom and autonomy. It is pursuing these aims as an ongoing collective activity that will make unavoidable the realization as Walker said, that this country is “more ours” than anyone else’s — that we are a historic people with a world-historical destiny that understands our suffering as endowing us with both the right and the responsibility of civilizing the United States in such a way that it reflects the values that our historical experiences bring to it, the freedoms, equalities, and cultural pluralisms that we have made vital and central to its identity.∂ One doesn’t need to hang on desperately to a mirage of hope. If we look to history, we can see more than enough concrete evidence and example to support the conclusion that a racially defined caste system is unlikely to ever again prevail. Of course, that doesn’t mean history is a smoothly upward-trending curve. We have known terrible setbacks. Yes, the violent defeat of Reconstruction was successful. But the building of Black institutions and the Niagara Movement proceeded anyway. Tulsa was burned to the ground. But its Black citizens turned right around and rebuilt it out of the ashes. The Civil Rights movement was checked by the forces of reaction and the assassin’s bullet; but the world of unquestioned white superiority and authority that George Wallace hoped to preserve is reduced now to a twinkle in David Duke’s blue eye. Yes, creepy white supremacists still crawl out from under mossy stones at opportune moments to wail about their Nordic fantasies in their over-sized khaki pants. Yes, like the militants of the Islamic State, they are capable of carrying out horrific acts of terror and violence. But like that barbaric and fanatical sect, white supremacy is permanently confined to such rear-guard actions because it has already lost — it is trying to reverse a clock going forward — which explains the virulence and incoherence of its outbursts of spastic violence.

#### The K’s euro-centric

Thomas 18 (Greg Thomas, Associate Professor of English at Tufts, Ph.D. in Rhetoric from the University of California, Berkeley, M.A. in Philosophy from State University of New York, Binghamton, B.A. in Philosophy from Randolph-Macon College, 2018. “Afro-Blue Notes: The Death of Afro-pessimism (2.0)?”, Theory & Event, January 2018, Volume 21, Number 1, Available Online at: <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/685979/pdf> Accessed 4-4-18)

The conceptual-geopolitical trappings of "1865" fundamentally define the discourse of "Afro-Pessimism and the Ends of Redemption," like assorted neo-pessimist texts: "The expanding field of Afro-pessimism theorises [sic] the structural relation between Blackness and Humanity as an irreconcilable encounter, an antagonism. One cannot know Blackness as distinct from slavery, for there is no Black temporality which is antecedent to the temporality of the Black slave."25 Critically, Wole Soyinka details "pre-colonial" African languages of "black" self-identification from the Yoruba to the Ga to the Hausa peoples on continent, for starters, in "The African World and the Ethnocultural Debate" (1989). But these details do not enter modern Eurocentric discussions in the main, be they Marxist or anti-Marxist, etc.26 There is in Wilderson only the slaver's history of slavery—one slaver's official "national" or state history and discourse. The "expanding field" of "Afro-pessimism" (2.0) further expands anti-Black, anti-African conceptions of historical agency. There is nothing outside of, or before, or countering Wilderson's "slavery" for the African enslaved. There is only Wilderson's "Blackness," which is curious. For what he casts as "Black" rather than "black" is more accurately cast as "negro" (in this specifically English usage, moreover, with no memory of the Spanish or Portuguese etymology) and not even "Negro," quiet as it's kept—since all of Africa is flatly foreclosed by this acutely paradoxical "Afro-pessimism." Both Africa and diasporas eclipsed, his "Blackness" and "Human Life" turn out to be the blackness and humanism of white Americanism, specifically and restrictively, an isolationist or exceptionalist Americanism despite the past and present hegemony of white Western humanism and its "anti-Black racism" worldwide. What is the "Afro" in "Afro-pessimism," therefore, when this Afro-pessimism (2.0) revivifies in disguise the "negro" concept of white settler-slave state history and historiography? It ironically does so in the name of some "Blackness" itself or, rather, the "blackness" of whiteness, of white postulation—not the Blackness of Blackness or the transvaluations of manifold Black liberation movements themselves, even as it blithely misappropriates the ongoing if now naturalized cultural-political labor of that historic Blackness in the upper case. A dominant Anglo-American discourse of slavery is all that there is and ever was now when it comes to the Black and African, all anti-slavery discourses and counter-discourses of slavery as well as Blackness somehow vanished. A glaring absence of Black radical and revolutionary intellectual history should be expected from any expression of "Afro-pessimism." Indeed, could Afro-pessimism 2.0 take hold as another trend in mainstream academia except in the political void produced after the 1960s and '70s by local as well as global counter-revolution and counter-insurgency? This absence affects the shape and agenda of the critical analysis of "anti-Black racism" in essential ways. Wilderson's critique of the "ruse of analogy" in Red, White & Black becomes a refrain that naturalizes academic approaches to politics now institutionalized with the continued reign of Western bourgeois liberalism. For older and enduring Black radical perspectives, the existence of "anti-Black racism" among non-Black peoples, organizations, and movements is neither a new nor shocking phenomenon. For many Black revolutionary movement logics of the '60s and '70s, for instance, this did not preclude alliance (or the exhaustion of alliances made) or lead to a doctrinaire rejection of "solidarity" work and its international (or "intercommunal") possibilities.27 "Contradictions" were expected, so to speak, in theory and practice, which might be resolved or not, depending on material interest, circumstance, etc. For them, this work was not about gauging identity, or the perfection of a projected analogy, but mobilization for the political accomplishments of revolution—a revolutionism that could or may not work toward the development of a new humanism not white or racist or anti-Black after all. The reach for potential solidarities was not construed as a gift or an act of good-willed benevolence, wise or unwise given the risks. Even solidarity work with obviously problematic, openly enemy forces could be a strategic or tactical mode of advancing Black collective self-interests that might dispense with any alliance at any given moment in time without seeing the relationship as a statement of some total identity or non-identity of condition and interests. The notion of solidarity has nowadays been superficialized, remaining riveted on mere rhetorical proclamation and aesthetic or representational identification in neo-colonial culture industries here and there. An older, praxical approach to alliance, perhaps "analogy," and solidarity is not taken up by current analyses of identity conflicts that prevail with the resurgence of a more academic political-intellectualism and a now much less contested liberalism. This is imperial "multiculturalism" and its malcontents. As much as Afro-pessimism (2.0) may object to certain instances of liberalism, or [End Page 292] regulation white racist liberalism at least, it assumes these Western epistemic frameworks of white academic liberalism all the same, thereby ensconcing the colonialism and neo-colonialism it constantly and symptomatically denegates in text after text. Black anti-colonialism / anti-colonialist Blackness The great anti-colonialist poet of Négritude, Aimé Césaire wrote famously in his letter of resignation from the French Communist Party that he wanted Marxism and communism to be placed in the service of Black peoples and not Black peoples in the service of Marxism or communism. He maintained in 1956: "it is clear that our struggle—the struggle of colonial peoples against colonialism, the struggle of peoples of color against racism—is more complex, or better yet, of a completely different nature than the fight of the French worker against French capitalism, and it cannot in any way be considered a part, a fragment, of that struggle."28 As always, he was writing on behalf of Black people who were, proverbially, the only people on the planet who have been excluded from the "human race" by the "modern" history of Western racism and colonialism which obstructs "a true humanism—a humanism made to the measure of the world."29 What is this Négritude if not Blackness, Black anti-colonialism, or anti-colonial Blackness? This tradition is not a tradition in Wilderson who regularly critiques the analogical arrogance of Marxism, feminism, and an academic paradigm of "post-colonialism" with less common reference to "queer" or "gay and lesbian" categories of analysis as well—all in the name of pessimism. For him, none of these political frameworks with their privileged identarian subjects can capture the condition of "Blackness" and "slavery" (or "the Black/Slave"). While that perspective can allow for some insights—ones certainly seen before around the Black world and ones certainly avoided by so much institutional scholarship—it leaves the general categorical grid of established Western political epistemologies intact. The familiar academic terrain of "race, gender, class, and sexuality" frames the critique for "Blackness" of "gender, class, and sexuality" in addition to "post-coloniality" or "post-colonialism." The most conventional US academic categories of identity and analysis are still rendered in full as discrete, monolithic, and monological categories and referents (e.g., workers, women, etc.), like the respective political ideologies based upon them in the traditional ideological history of the white West (e.g., Marxism, feminism, etc.). There are "workers" and then there are "women," generically, and then sometimes there are "gays" by whatever name, not to mention "natives" or the colonized in this culturally specific epistemology of a specific culture of colonialism itself. The upshot is quite conservative, even anachronistically so. This critique is an internal if damning critique embodying and encouraging pessimism largely from within the established order of knowledge that it analytically engages and categorically replenishes and preserves. The grid politics of Wilderson's critique of "the ruse of analogy" leaves all manner of "Blackness" in a wasteland. The routine categorical contrast with "Native Americans" reduces all that and any colonial condition to a startlingly oversimplified matter of "land" (or "land restoration"); and it occludes "Afro-Indian" history as well as "Red-Black" maroonage all across the Americas. The constant generic contrast with "feminism" or "non-Black women" eclipses the more mammoth criticism of "gender" writ large in Diop and Amadiume's Black-African studies of Europe or "Western Civilization" as a "racial patriarchy" of pessimism and "anti-Black" imperialism. The contrast with Marxism and its "workers" never resurrects any issues of "class" or economics from any other perspective to recognize or to resist, for example, the white invention of Black elites as vital instruments of racism, anti-Blackness, and white-supremacism. There never appears a trace of any critique of Black "social class' (or political class) elitism in "Afro-pessimism" (2.0), which is a tell-tale sign of petty-bourgeois or "lumpen-bourgeois" articulations. Lastly, Wilderson's occasional categorical contrast of "Blackness" with Palestinians or al-Nakba (which aligns in Arabic with the Swahili substitution for the term "Middle Passage"—Maafa, the "Catastrophe") comprehends no Blackness in Palestine or among Palestinians. His Afro-pessimism can envision no Afro-Palestinianism, unlike a great tradition of Pan-African discourses that also do not dislocate Palestine from an anti-colonialist mapping of the African continent or the Afro-Asian landmass of a Pan-Africanist and "Bandung" imagination, one powerfully shared by Malcolm X and Fayez A. Sayegh. For "Black Power" internationally, Kwame Ture would refer to Palestine as the "tip of Africa" and uphold Fatima Bernawi, the iconic Black woman who's been named the "first Palestinian female political prisoner," as the paragon of "Black and Palestinian Revolutions."30 She is likewise canonized by other Afro-Palestinian icons themselves, such as Ali Jiddeh and Mahmoud Jiddeh of the African community of the Old City of Jerusalem, for example—or, say, Ahmad and Jumaa Takrouri of Occupied Jericho—who are each among the greatest of all icons across Historic Palestine, a country which has produced multiple Black Panther formations in Hebrew as well as Arabic in the 1970s and the 1980s. Again, Wilderson tacitly "nationalizes" his category of "Blackness" although this is scarcely in the interests of Black people in or outside of the US colonized mainland of Americanism; and so none of the above "Blackness" survives the critical grid of a very Anglo-American (and white racist state-bound) critique of "analogy," regardless of the "Afro-pessimist" text at hand. Do not the vulgar colonial-nativist politics of Incognegro's strangely overlooked comment on "West Indians" go full blown then in Red, White & Black and elsewhere?31 There is here a general critical erasure of the massive tradition of Black anti-colonialism—or anti-colonial Black resistance to "anti-Blackness" and anti-Black colonialism, which transcends nationalization. Wilderson's "Afro-pessimist" rejects the anti-colonialist paradigms of supposedly "other" peoples, and yet in a manner that reinstates US or Western coloniality nonetheless—a white colonialism that oppresses "the Black" inside and outside the United States's official geopolitical limits. This position can thus make a virtue out of automatic and absolute anti-alliance postures with no further, actual political action then required for Black people, "the Black critic," or any Black liberation struggle on this view. Such chauvinism without political commitment or engagement beyond critique is logically consistent, for pessimism, where mere resentment or ressentiment can masquerade as resistance or "pro-Black" "radicalism." After all, Afro-pessimism (2.0) begins with a proud suspicion of Black liberation or Black liberation movement, itself, no less than of its potentially "anti-racist" or "anti-Black" political alliances. This provincial "American" pessimism reveals more affinities with Créolite in the Caribbean than Césaire's anti-colonialist eruption of Pan-African Négritude, in reality, its narrowly and negatively delimited rhetoric of the "Blackness" of "the Black" (as "Slave," of course) notwithstanding. As if this too is a virtue, pessimism is not just suspicious of power but possibility—while, upholding dystopia, it is casually dismissive of all historical actuality that does not support a pessimist paradigm, orientation or sensibility. Analytically, moreover, there is somehow no white colonialism for Blacks to fight in Africa or Black countries of Black people anywhere and no terrible landlessness that afflicts the African diasporas of Blackness captive within white settler and/or imperial state formations, for Wilderson and Afro-pessimism (2.0).

## AT: Anthro K

### 1AR – Anthro K

#### Framework – debate should be about the hypothetical consequences of the plan – most fair because the plan is the only predictable stasis point – infinite reps and epistemologies explodes prep burdens. Not weighing the aff moots 6 minutes of the 1AC and prevents rigorous comparison that refines scholarship to produce the best political strategy.

#### Fairness outweighs – Only impact the ballot can solve, necessary to evaluate all arguments, and debate is a game with switch sides and speech times.

#### Extinction outweighs – future generations deserve the choice to live; life is a pre-req to theorizing and executing praxis like the alt; extinction is slow and painful for all living beings through starvation, dehydration, and cancer; and If you’re unsure which value frame is right, stick around another day to find out.

#### Permutation do both—either the alt can overcome the instance of the aff or it can’t and it shatters when it hits the real world.

#### Speciesm inevitable – distinction between plants and life is sentience which means humans are superior

Marvizon 14 ([Juan Carlos Marvizon, Ph.D. Researcher at UCLA studying the neurophysiology of pain and analgesia. His overall research goal is investigating cellular and molecular mechanisms that mediate central sensitization in the spinal cord.] “You cannot avoid Speciesism,” 20 Mar. 2014. <https://speakingofresearch.com/2014/03/20/speciesism-is-unavoidable/>) LHSLA LH

When one tries to argue that humans deserve a higher moral consideration than animals based on their ability to reason or their superior intellect, animal rights proponents answer that those characteristics are not morally superior; we simply choose them because they work in our favor. By the same token, for example, an elephant may reason that having a trunk makes him morally superior. This idea merits careful consideration in light of what we know about animals. But, first of all, let’s establish that speciesism logically works between any two species of animals. If there is no reason to say that a human is superior to a dog, then by the same token we cannot say that a dog is superior to a rat. That gets us quickly in trouble, because the collection of animal species is vast and includes some whose lives we generally hold in contempt, like roaches, worms, ticks and mosquitoes. Regardless, committed animal rights activists will argue that all animal life deserves protection. “A rat is a pig is a dog is a boy”, remember? To that end, they were quick to criticize President Obama for killing a fly. Ok, maybe some animal right activists will say that they are only talking about protecting mammals. How very speciesist of them! By what token would they prefer a stinky mouse over a beautiful (and highly intelligent) crow? Or a nice cuddly octopus, for that matter? The point is, any argument that you choose to decide that a species is better than another is going to be ultimately human-centric. Or not? Can we come up with an idea that would let us decide who gets to live and who gets to die? Animal right activists are often vegan, which means that they think is justifiable to kill plants to eat them. Plants are living beings, too. And they come in species, just like animals. So what does an animal have that a plant hasn’t? A nervous system? Well, not all animals have neurons, sponges don’t (sorry, SpongeBob!). OK, so sponges are off, and so are other nerve-less animals. How about jellyfish, corals and starfish which have a nervous system so rudimentary that they can barely feel anything? A while back, I presented animal rights philosopher Gary Francione with the following dilemma: “My dog has ticks, what do I do?” If I kill the ticks, that is morally wrong (according to his animal rights position), because I would be sacrificing the life of an animal (the tick) for the mere comfort of another (the dog). So obviously the only ethical action would be to leave the ticks on the dog. Any other action would be based on the assumption that the dog is somehow superior to the tick, which would be tantamount to speciesism. Gary Francione suggested that “sentience” has to be a factor in the decision. “Sentience” is a word that you hear animal right activists often toss around as the criterion to protect animal lives. But sentience is a notorious tricky concept. It is a synonym of “consciousness”, and understanding consciousness has been dubbed the “hard problem” by philosophers and neuroscientist alike. Some, like philosopher David Chalmer, even think that is intrinsically impossible to solve. Neuroscientists continue to work on this problem. Research on the neurophysiological correlates of consciousness is advancing at a good pace. Yes, we generally assume that a dog is conscious, but how about a rat, a fish, a roach? Is there a gradient or a scale in sentience? If we are going to make any kind of assumptions on what animals are conscious (“sentient”) and which are not, we need to bring in our knowledge of their nervous system. And, in this regard, the overwhelming majority of animal species seem to fall woefully short. For example, the mollusk Aplysia californica (widely used in the lab to study synaptic connections) only has 20,000 neurons, while we have in our guts (the enteric nervous system) a hundred million neurons. So, if our gut is not conscious, we have no reason to think that Aplysia and any mollusk like it are conscious, either. So, there you go, now you can eat clams with a clear conscience, they are no more sentient than carrots! The point is that we have come to admit that there is a scale of sentience: some animals are more sentient than others. We have also established the criterion of “sentience” as the one to decide on the moral value of beings. From there, it can be argued that humans deserve of special consideration because we have a special kind of sentience that no other animal has. But that is a discussion for some other day. The key issue is that we have sufficiently established that speciesism is unavoidable. No matter how we put it, we are always going to give some species a higher moral status than others. This leads us to the animal welfare position on how to treat animals, which is quite different from the animal rights absolutist position. As proponents of animal welfare, we care for pain and distress that animals may suffer and try to diminish it, but not because animals have rights, but because our human nature compels us to do so. Moreover, we do not think that all animals should be treated the same. A chimpanzee, a dog, a mouse, a fish and a fly do not have the same moral status. You can do things to one of these animals that you should not do to the other. They cannot be treated as equals. This may sound like a silly discussion, but in fact the issue of the value of the human life is hugely important because it goes to the very core of every system of ethics. If we say that a human life has the same value as the life of rat, that not only increases the moral value of the rat, it also decreases the moral stature of the human. Therefore, the argument for animal rights is a challenge to our more basic values and should not be taken lightly. Furthermore, there is a logical connection between the core idea of “animal rights” – that human lives and animal lives have the same value – and the violence of animal rights extremists. If the life of an animal is so valuable, then that justifies extreme action to protect it. And if human life is as valuable as the life of an animal, then the calculus of destroying a few human lives to save many animal lives is nothing more than a logical conclusion. Yes, one may argue that the end does not justify the means, but in fact we, as a society, constantly break that principle. For example, most would believe it justified to kill an assassin to save the lives of its victims. By the same token, the animal rights terrorist finds justifiable to kill a few scientist if that is going to save the lives of many of animals used in research. To quote Jerry Vlasak: “So yes, I think the threat of violence would save lives, innocent lives”. His logic may be sound, what is profoundly wrong is his assumption that the life of an animal has the same value as the life of a human being.

## AT: Baudrillard

### 1AR – Top Level

#### Framework – debate should be about the hypothetical consequences of the plan – most fair because the plan is the only predictable stasis point – infinite reps and epistemologies explodes prep burdens. Not weighing the aff moots 6 minutes of the 1AC and prevents rigorous comparison that refines scholarship to produce the best political strategy.

#### Fairness outweighs – Only impact the ballot can solve, necessary to evaluate all arguments, and debate is a game with switch sides and speech times.

#### Extinction outweighs – future generations deserve the choice to live; life is a pre-req to theorizing and executing praxis like the alt; extinction is slow and painful for all living beings through starvation, dehydration, and cancer; and If you’re unsure which value frame is right, stick around another day to find out.

### 1AR – Fiat Good

#### Fiat is good – puts US in charge of government action and DEMANDS that politicians like Mitch Mcconnel shouldn't control the world, which resolves political passivity and motivates change through activism out of round -- spills over and outweighs on scope. key because political apathy is widespread now and the alt only reinforces that by abstracting away from materiality

### 1AR – Debate Good

#### Repeated iteration through debate creates the persuasion to move the needle

**Gurney 18** [Kyra Gurney, 2-23-2018, "Debate program prepared Parkland students to speak out," miamiherald, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/education/article201678544.html, accessed 9-10-2018] BC

When students at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High debated gun control in class last November, they never imagined they were preparing to lead a national discussion on how to prevent school shootings. As the debate team filled Google docs with research on state laws, brainstormed arguments for and against universal background checks and wrote speeches, they were amassing information that would later help them formulate arguments on national TV, in face-to-face meetings with Florida legislators and at vigils for their murdered classmates. And it’s not just the students at Stoneman Douglas. Since a gunman opened fire at the high school last Wednesday, killing 17 people, teenagers from across Broward County have [joined the call](http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/article201013139.html) for stricter gun control policies. They have been praised for their composure and well-articulated arguments, which often appear so polished they have [fueled conspiracy theories](http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/article201177359.html) that the students are “crisis actors.” Top of Form But what really explains the students’ poise, said Broward Schools Superintendent Robert Runcie, is the school district’s system-wide debate program that teaches extemporaneous speaking from an early age. Every public high school and middle school in the county has a debate program, along with more than two dozen elementary schools. It’s one of the largest debate programs in the country — and, amid the heartbreak, it has helped Broward students position themselves on the front lines of the #NeverAgain movement. “I’m like a parent that is just beaming with pride in terms of how they have been able to express themselves, how they’ve exhibited a kind of courage that everybody needs to have and how they’re working to reclaim their future and do what they know is right,” Runcie said. “In some ways it seems like we’ve been preparing our kids for this moment without realizing it.” The debate program has certainly helped prepare David Hogg, a senior at Stoneman Douglas who has appeared on nearly every major network and cable news program over the past week. “It’s been immensely helpful because I’ve been able to speak articulately about these current events,” Hogg said Wednesday evening on his way to a [CNN town hall at the BB&T Center](http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article201486604.html) in Sunrise. With no time to prepare any new arguments in recent days, Hogg said he’s relied on the research he conducted in debate class last fall. “Exhausted is an understatement, but I like it,” he added, referring to the frequent media appearances. “The fast pace of the media cycle is what keeps me going.” Hogg said he joined Stoneman Douglas’ debate program on a whim in ninth grade. At the high school, debate is both a class and an after-school activity. Roughly 80 percent of the 150 students who take the class also participate in competitions, which means they spend time preparing for debates in the afternoons and on weekends. Although Hogg said he’s not a star on the team, he enjoys arguing about current events. “I’ve never won a single debate tournament, even come in 10th place,” he said. “I guess it shows you don’t have to be great at something to make an impact.” Sophomore Sari Kaufman has also used her debate training to advocate for stricter gun control policies. On Sunday, the 15-year-old Stoneman Douglas student wrote a letter to lawmakers, which was grounded in her debate class research, that has been shared hundreds of times on social media. Kaufman also brought her debate notes on a trip to Tallahassee earlier this week to meet with lawmakers. “I don’t think we made a huge change, but we definitely moved the needle a little more than it was before,” she said. Gun control isn’t the only lesson from debate class that’s come in handy this past week. Students recently studied special interest groups and lobbying, said debate teacher and program director Jesus Caro. They talked about political action committees, the groups that raise money for candidates, and about groups like the National Rifle Association. “Just to see that these kids aren’t bound by any of these rules ... it’s really moving,” Caro said. “It does make me proud.” Katherine Guerra, a sophomore at Stoneman Douglas and a debate team captain, has stayed out of the limelight. But she said the debate program has helped her classmates respond to the shooting. “We know what we want, and we have the research,” she said. “We know how things work and that gives us more liberty to speak out because we’re not unsure of things.” “The thing is in debate you have to argue both sides, which is also beneficial because as much as we want to change things we also need to see the different views,” she added. In recent years, some of the students on the team, which Caro described as “up and coming,” have traveled around the country to attend tournaments. This year, the national tournament will be held in Fort Lauderdale in June. The location was decided before the shooting, but Runcie said he plans to ask the National Speech & Debate Association to make gun control one of the topics at the competition. The Stoneman Douglas team has a long road ahead before the national competition. A beloved member, [14-year-old Alyssa Alhadeff](http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article200918174.html), was killed during the shooting and the team is grieving the loss of other classmates and staff as well. Caro said he hopes the open environment in debate class, where students have space to discuss controversial issues, will give them the opportunity to share what they’re feeling. “I just know I’m going to try to give everybody a chance to speak, try to create some sense of normalcy and definitely give them opportunities to develop solutions,” he said.

### 1AR – Movements Good

#### Movements good – empirics. This is offense because the alt forecloses them

Perry 21 [Tod Perry, 2-12-2021, "New study shows how the Black Lives Matter protests have saved hundreds of lives," GOOD, https://www.good.is/Culture/study-shows-how-black-lives-matter-protests-have-saved-hundreds-of-lives, accessed 4-10-2021]LHSBC

According [to a research paper](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3767097) by Travis Campbell of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, the answer is a resounding, yes. All of the blood, sweat, and tear gas Americans have endured has helped make people safer.∂ To determine BLM's efficacy, Campbell looked at cities that held demonstrations between 2014 and 2019, then examined the number of police homicides in their aftermath.∂ Campbell determined that "census places with Black Lives Matter protests experience a 15% to 20% decrease in police homicides over the ensuing five years." He believes the decrease in deadly force has saved over 300 lives.∂ Black people account for [about a third](https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2020-06-03/data-show-deaths-from-police-violence-disproportionately-affect-people-of-color) of all people murdered by police but are only 13% of the population. So, using Campbell's data, it's safe to say somewhere near 100 Black lives have been saved due to protests.∂ Campbell's data shows that in the cities that held a large number of protests, the number of police killings declined in all but three places, San Francisco, Portland, and St. Louis.∂ The study shows that "fall in lethal use-of-force is growing over time" and that it's prominent "when protests are large or frequent." Therefore, if BLM protests continue, even more lives will probably be saved.∂ One of the major reasons for the protests' success is they've inspired change in police policies.∂ "BLM protests also increase the probability of a police agency having body-cameras, expand community policing, and reduce the number of future property crime-related arrests, which may partially explain the lethal force reduction," the study says.

### 1AR – Truth

#### Ethics is a function of being right – their arguments that all knowledge is impossible greenlight gaslighting and fascism

Jones 4 (Branwen Gruffydd Jonens, Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy, Goldsmiths University of London, Ph.D. Development Studies, University of Sussex, “From Eurocentrism to Epistemological Internationalism: power, knowledge and objectivity in International Relations,” paper presented at Theorising Ontology, Annual Conference of the International Association for Critical Realism, University of Cambridge, August 2004, http://www.csog.group.cam.ac.uk/iacr/papers/Jones.pdf)

The ‘common-sense’ view pervading recent discussions of epistemology, ontology and methodology in IR asserts that objectivity implies value-free neutrality. However, objective social inquiry has an inherent tendency to be critical, in various senses. To the extent that objective knowledge provides a better and more adequate account of reality than other ideas, such knowledge is inherently critical (implicitly or explicitly) of those ideas. 30 In other words critical social inquiry does not (or not only) manifest its ‘criticalness’ through self-claimed labels of being critical or siding with the oppressed, but through the substantive critique of prevailing ideas. Objective social knowledge constitutes a specific form of criticism: explanatory critique. The critique of dominant ideas or ideologies is elaborated through providing a more adequate explanation of aspects of the world, and in so doing exposing what is wrong with the dominant ideology. This may also entail revealing the social conditions which give rise to ideologies, thus exposing the necessary and causal relation between particular social relations and particular ideological conceptions. In societies which are constituted by unequal structures of social relations giving rise to unequal power and conflicting interests, the reproduction of those structured relations is in the interests of the powerful, whereas transformation of existing structured relations is in the interests of the weak. Because ideas inform social action they are casually efficacious either in securing the reproduction of existing social relations (usually as an unintended consequence of social practice), or in informing social action aimed at transforming social relations. This is why ideas cannot be ‘neutral’. Ideas which provide a misrepresentation of the nature of society, the causes of unequal social conditions, and the conflicting interests of the weak and powerful, will tend to help secure the reproduction of prevailing social relations. Ideas which provide a more adequate account of the way society is structured and how structured social relations produce concrete conditions of inequality and exploitation can potentially inform efforts to change those social relations. In this sense, ideas which are false are ideological and, in serving to promote the reproduction of the status quo and avoid attempts at radical change, are in the interests of the powerful. An account which is objective will contradict ideological ideas, implicitly or explicitly criticising them for their false or flawed accounts of reality. The criticism here arises not, or not only, from pointing out the coincidence between ideologies and the interests of the powerful, nor from a prior normative stance of solidarity with the oppressed, but from exposing the flaws in dominant ideologies through a more adequate account of the nature and causes of social conditions 31 . A normative commitment to the oppressed must entail a commitment to truth and objectivity, because true ideas are in the interest of the oppressed, false ideas are in the interest of the oppressors. In other words, the best way to declare solidarity with the oppressed is to declare one’s commitment to objective inquiry 32 . As Nzongola-Ntalaja (1986: 10) has put it: It is a question of whether one analyses society from the standpoint of the dominant groups, who have a vested interest in mystifying the way society works, or from the standpoint of ordinary people, who have nothing to lose from truthful analyses of their predicament. The philosophical realist theory of science, objectivity and explanatory critique thus provides an alternative response to the relationship between knowledge and power. Instead of choosing perspectives on the basis of our ethical commitment to the cause of the oppressed and to emancipatory social change, we should choose between contending ideas on the basis of which provides a better account of objective social reality. This will inherently provide a critique of the ideologies which, by virtue of their flawed account of the social world, serve the interests of the powerful. Exemplars of explanatory critique in International Relations are provided in the work of scholars such as Siba Grovogui, James Gathii, Anthony Anghie, Bhupinder Chimni, Jacques Depelchin, Hilbourne Watson, Robert Vitalis, Sankaran Krishna, Michel-Rolph Trouillot 33 . Their work provides critiques of central categories, theories and discourses in the theory and practice of IR and narratives of world history, including assumptions about sovereignty, international society, international law, global governance, the nature of the state. They expose the ideological and racialised nature of central aspects of IR through a critical examination of both the long historical trajectory of imperial ideologies regarding colonized peoples, and the actual practices of colonialism and decolonisation in the constitution of international orders and local social conditions. Their work identifies the flaws in current ideas by revealing how they systematically misrepresent or ignore the actual history of social change in Africa, the Caribbean and other regions of the Third World, both past and present – during both colonial and neo-colonial periods of the imperial world order. Their work reveals how racism, violence, exploitation and dispossession, colonialism and neo-colonialism have been central to the making of contemporary international order and contemporary doctrines of international law, sovereignty and rights, and how such themes are glaring in their absence from histories and theories of international relations and international history. Objective social knowledge which accurately depicts and explains social reality has these qualities by virtue of its relation to its object, not its subject. As Collier argues, “The science/ideology distinction is an epistemological one, not a social one.” (Collier 1979: 60). So, for example, in the work of Grovogui, Gathii and Depelchin, the general perspective and knowledge of conditions in and the history of Africa might be due largely to the African social origins of the authors. However the judgement that their accounts are superior to those of mainstream IR rests not on the fact that the authors are African, but on the greater adequacy of their accounts with respect to the actual historical and contemporary production of conditions and change in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. The criteria for choosing their accounts over others derives from the relation between the ideas and their objects (what they are about), not from the relation between the ideas and their subjects (who produced them). It is vital to retain explicitly some commitment to objectivity in social inquiry, to the notion that the proper criterion for judging ideas about the world lies in what they say about the world, not whose ideas they are. A fundamental problem which underlies the origin and reproduction of IR’s eurocentricity is the overwhelming dominance of ideas produced in and by the west, and the wilful and determined silencing of the voices and histories of the colonised. But the result of this fundamental problem is flawed knowledge about the world. Eurocentricity is therefore a dual problem concerning both the authors and the content of knowledge, and cannot be resolved through normative commitments alone. It is not only the voices of the colonised, but the histories of colonialism, which have been glaring in their absence from the discipline of International Relations. Overcoming eurocentricity therefore requires not only concerted effort from the centre to create space and listen to hitherto marginalised voices, but also commitment to correcting the flaws in prevailing knowledge – and it is not only ‘the Other’ who can and should elaborate this critique. A vitally important implication of objectivity is that it is the responsibility of European and American, just as much as non-American or non-European scholars, to decolonise IR. The importance of objectivity in social inquiry defended here can perhaps be seen as a form of epistemological internationalism. It is not necessary to be African to attempt to tell a more accurate account of the history of Europe’s role in the making of the contemporary Africa and the rest of the world, for example, or to write counter-histories of ‘the expansion of international society’ which detail the systematic barbarity of so-called Western civilisation. It is not necessary to have been colonised to recognise and document the violence, racism, genocide and dispossession which have characterised European expansion over five hundred years.

#### The critique of truth-telling destroys global politics – truth commissions and protests across the Global South rely on making public governmental lies and atrocities, which the K’s politics foreclose. There is a zero-sum tradeoff between their approach and ours.

Kivisto ‘14(Peter, Richard Swanson Prof. of Social Thought, Chair of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Welfare @ Augustana College, “Postmodernity as an Internal Critique of Modernity”, *Postmodernism in a Global Perspective*, pp. 105-108)

Because signs no longer refer to real referents, because the real has collapsed into the hyperreal, meaning has evaporated. In a rather notorious instance of applying this thinking to a concrete event, Baudrillard (1991) claimed that the Gulf War was nothing more than a television and computer graphics spectacle—the difference between this war and the war games in a video arcade presumably having essentially disappeared. Of course, there is an element of truth to this claim. Indeed, a similar claim was made by Slavoj Zizek (2002: 37) about the war in Afghanistan that took place in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, which he depicted as “a virtual war fought behind computer screens.” Lost in Baudrillard’s vision, however, as David Lyon (1994: 52) pointedly noted, is the fact that there really (i.e., not hyperreally) were “blood—stained sand and bereaved families.” Lost, too, are beliefs about patriotic duty, geopolitical realities, the economics of oil, and similar very real considerations that lead nations into war. In his book on terrorism, which is described in the subtitle as a “Requiem for the Twin Towers,” Baudrillard (2002) describes Al Qaeda’s attack on the United States in terms of the “symbolism of slaughter” and “sacriﬁcial death” as a mode of challenging American hegemony. Again, he treats a bloody event only as a spectacle and not as the consequence of a complex interplay of political, economic, and social forces that underlie the spectacle. Incidentally, and not noted by Baudrillard, the architect of the Twin Towers was Minoru Yamasaki, who had earlier designed the ill-fated Pruitt-Igoe. My criticism of Baudrillard revolves around the obvious point that there is a reality that people experience, emotionally respond to, and attempt in some fashion to shape. There is a life outside of the television set and outside of cyberspace. The emotionless and meaningless worlds depicted in ﬁlms such as David Lynch’s Blue Velvet and Quentin Tarantino’s ﬁlms from Pulp Fiction to his more recent offerings, Inglourious Basterds and Django Unchained, are not synonymous with our lived experiences, nor do most people convolute the two (Denby, 2009; Bauman, 1992: 149-55; Best and Kellner, 1991: 137-44). Although it is certainly true that the world of consumerism has changed considerably in recent years, little evidence can be mustered to claim that we have left modern culture for postmodern culture. The continued potency of religious belief, for example, calls into question the pervasiveness of meaninglessness Baudrillard envisions. The existence of the new social movements concerned with such issues as the environment, peace, feminism, civil rights, and poverty also calls into question the extent to which people in advanced industrial societies have opted for political passivism and escapism. By claiming that we have moved from production to consumption, this version of postmodernism shows evidence of a serious blind spot. It is obvious that goods continue to be produced, although in a global economy this might mean that they are being produced in poor countries, where workers are paid abysmal wages and are forced to work exploitatively long hours in unsafe and unsanitary factories. The clothes purchased at the shopping mall and online are the products of this darker side of our contemporary culture. Moreover, as Alex Callinicos (1989: 162) has pointedly noted, not only are most of the world’s inhabitants excluded from the consumerism Lyotard and Baudrillard describe but also poor people in the advanced industrial societies have only a limited involvement in this kind of consumption. In a generous assessment of Baudrillard that appeared shortly after his death in 2007, Robert Antonio (2007: 2) pointed out that Baudrillard’s abandonment of leftist politics was a reflection of his assessment of the failure of the 1968 student/worker protests. This event led to his the abandonment of the Marxist dream of a radiant future. Unlike Zizek (2008), who some continue to describe as a Marxist, Baudrillard was not inclined to argue “in defense of lost causes.” Nor was he prepared to endorse the anti-utopian pragmatism of liberal democracy. Rather, in relentlessly promoting his often contradictory but deeply pessimistic diagnoses of our times, he became a media star, which included homage to him in one of the Matrix ﬁlms and a US lecture tour that was part of the Institute of Contemporary Arts’ “Big Thinkers” series. He played a major role in creating and sustaining the postmodern moment, but near the end of his life he claimed that the term that best deﬁned him was nihilist. Liquid Modernity Baudrillard was the most explicit and insistent advocate for radical postmodernism (Lemert, 2005: 36-40). Other postmodemists have offered more tempered assessments of the postmodern condition, viewing it in many respects as a new phase of modernity rather than constituting a radical rupture between past and present. No one better exempliﬁes this position than the Polish-born sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman, who has published a series of books explicitly devoted to postmodern concerns (Bauman, 1993, 1995, and 1997). Of particular emphasis in these theoretical reflections is an appreciation of the signiﬁcance of ambivalence in postmodernity. Peter Bielharz (2009: 97) sees a parallel between Bauman’s thought and that of Simmel, contending that in both one ﬁnds a commitment “to the idea of ambivalence as a central orienting device and motif of modernity." By the turn of the century, Bauman (2000) opted to replace the term postmodern with the idea of “liquid modernity.” Perhaps to avoid the confusions and incessant debates about postmodernism and perhaps also to distance himself from postmodernism’s more radical proponents, this original term can be seen as useful in carving out an intellectual space in which to articulate his own position. Agreeing with the claim that grand narratives had ceased to be compelling, Bauman (2007) sees the present as an “age of uncertainty.” The preceding stage of modernity can be characterized as “solid.” In contrast, the current stage is “liquid” insofar as patterned social conduct and the social structures essential to making such forms of everyday social relations durable no longer exist. Instead, we live during times in which these structures no longer keep their shape for very long, “because they decompose and melt faster than the time it takes to cast them...” The consequence is that structured forms today “cannot serve as frames of reference for human actions and long-term life strategies because of their short life expectations" (Bauman, 2007: 1). In short, people in the contemporary world are consigned to living out their lives with a far greater focus on the present and immediate future rather than with the “open horizon of the future" that Wagner (2008: 1) associated with the early phase of modernity. What makes Bauman so dramatically different from someone like Baudrillard is that his assessment of our current condition does not lead him to nihilism. On the contrary, he thinks that today, more than ever before, ethical conduct must be grounded in a sense of personal responsibility. We may live in uncertain times, but we don’t live in amoral times. It’s for this reason that Bauman continues to deﬁne himself as a socialist. He would thus likely agree with Bielharz (2009: 140) that socialism today should be viewed, not so much as an alternative economic system to capitalism, but as its “alter ego.”

### 1AR – More Things

#### Oversaturation and disengagement is not absolute – individual actions are context specific have a material impact in spite of the linguistic economy

Mattson 12 professor of German politics and culture, Rhodes College, ‘12(Michelle, “Rebels Without Causes: Contemporary German Authors Not in Search of Meaning,” Monatshefte Volume 104, Number 2, Summer 2012)

While I find Liesegang’s argument plausible, **there are** other explanations **for this apparent disinterest and disengagement outside of Baudrillard’s theory of the postmodern condition** or a desire to neutralize the German past, although it does have to do with socio-economic status. One of the things that many of us familiar with German culture admire about it is the state’s commitment to creating livable conditions for virtually all of its citizens. The social welfare network in Germany (indeed in Western Europe more broadly) may be under siege in the current economic climate, but from health care to housing the state has managed to offer its citizens a level of basic support that Americans cannot really fathom and—as the most recent health care debate demonstrated—in large numbers appear not to condone. Thus, **the** glaring **need for individual citizens** **to offer their services to their fellow human beings has remained somewhat underdeveloped** in Germany (Wiedermann and Held) **and has led to a set of expectations that the government will address the society’s most basic needs**. **Recent studies of volunteerism** in Germany indicate that this is changing **and that a substantive portion of the population** **now gives of its time to myriad social organizations** in ways that would seem entirely futile to the characters in the texts analyzed here.13 Furthermore, sociological and social psychological studies indicate that **people who volunteer do feel a greater connection to other people and a greater level of personal satisfaction than those who do not.**14 The findings of this research, as mentioned above, [End Page 258] have led me to question whether the literature analyzed in this article reflects the perspective of a highly specific section of German society far more than it offers a broader portrait of central European society today, namely that of a disaffected, disengaged intellectual class that no longer sees itself as called upon to participate in the improvement of society now that the great German political problem of the 20th century appears to have been “solved.” This may have something to do with the specific situation of Germany in the first decades after the fall of the Wall but it may also be a result of the socio-economic structures of the Federal Republic. **I do not wish to present here an overly simplified** and naïve **argument** **that Hermann’s characters should go out and get involved in volunteer organizations** and that doing so would make the pervasive sense of sadness and ennui vanish. **Nor would it necessarily reorient the consumerist attitudes or patterns of consumption** of Naters’ group of friends or Regener’s Herr Lehmann into more socially productive outlets. **However, I do question the individual, social, and even aesthetic value of** wallowing in indecision **and isolation and presenting them as representative of a crisis in human subjectivity**. Steven **Best describes the world** according to Baudrillard **as “an abstract non-society devoid of cohesive relations**, social meaning, and collective representation” (Best 51). The characters of Mau Mau, Herr Lehmann, and the stories of Sommerhaus, später and Nichts als Gespenster inhabit the same or at least a similar world to Baudrillard’s. Thus **Baudrillard’s work offers an effective tool in understanding the implications of the world these literary characters inhabit and their creators’ perspective** on contemporary German society. **Their world, however, is itself a human projection**, a choice**. It is an** interpretation of reality **that allows individuals to become resigned and passive.** Furthermore, it is a perspective possible only from a position of relative affluence. **I shall not venture to judge whether Baudrillard’s diagnosis** of postmodern society **is accurate**, although it appears that many of Germany’s current writers agree with him or were influenced by postmodern theories of late 20th-century consumerist societies**. I can**, however**, say in conclusion that it** is not helpful **or productive on either an individual or social level in imagining ways of living in today’s world**. As Steven Best points out: **Baudrillard’s radical rejection** **of referentiality is premised upon a one-dimensional, No-Exit world of self-referring simulacra. But**, **however, reified and self-referential postmodern semiotics is,** signs do not simply move in their own signifying orbit. **They are** historically produced **and circulated and while they may not translucently refer to some originating world, they none the less can** be socio-historically contextualized, **interpreted, and critiqued.**(57) In other words, **human beings generate the simulacra in specific historical contexts that are** subject to interpretation and challenge. **Regardless of** how pervasively the media spin our reality**,** real people suffer **and**—**occasionally** [End Page 259] prosper—**because of political decisions made at the local, national, and international level**. **Media images may overpower us, but they** shouldn’t make us lose sight of the real ramifications of political and economic development. **Many critics have suggested that Baudrillard’s chief accomplishment** **was to serve as an agent provocateur.** In an interview with Mike Gane, **Baudrillard himself saw his method of reflection as “provocative, reversible**, [ . . . ] **a way of raising things to the ‘N’th power** [ . . . ] It’s a bit like a theory-fiction” (Poster 331). **One could argue that this is precisely the function of such novels and short stories as the ones examined here: to provoke us**. But to what end? Naters, Regener, and Hermann all write very readable literature, and they challenge us to understand the world of the insipid, self-centered, and myopic characters that they have created. **It would indeed be a disservice to the authors to imply that they do not view their own characters with** critical distance. Thus, I am not suggesting that they believe their readers should emulate the characters they have created. **They have not, however, successfully demonstrated either why we should care about them or**—**more importantly**—**what we can learn from them**.

#### It’s not all simulacra --- reality still exists outside the text --- should take into account the people whose lives are actually affected by these images

Simon Blackburn 7, professor of philosophy at Cambridge University, 4-29-07, “Au revoir Baudrillard,” Prospect , http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2007/04/aurevoirbaudrillard/---- {hors texte = outside the text}

Baudrillard was not concerned with the artist’s touch but with what happens when television and other media purport to take us to the field of action. The 1990 Gulf war was modelled by planners using simulations; it was won, if we call a massacre a victory, largely by pilots looking at computer screens; and it was relayed to the public by television. Most consumers of these images get no reality check; the image is all we have to go on. And the image does not come to us innocently. What happened in 1990 may, indeed, have been something more than a war: an episode in America’s cultural narcissism, a hallucinatory projection of its fears and fantasies, a Faustian pact between developed capitalism and virtual reality, a promotional video, or a simulacrum indistinguishable from Disneyland. So Baudrillard’s hyperbole had a serious point. He often provoked outrage by it, but when, for instance, he tactlessly suggested that the iconic place of Nazi atrocities as a symbol of evil makes it “logical” to ask whether they even existed, his point was not to ally himself with the David Irvings of this world, but to suggest that for many political and cultural purposes, the answer is irrelevant. As with God, it is our investment that matters, not whether it is invested in a fiction.¶ Baudrillard’s ideas about simulated reality seem to have touched on an old philosophical panic. Perhaps our senses are no better than our televisions. Perhaps nature has varnished and spun the pictures we receive. They too are commodities, bought in to provide sustenance. Perhaps, at the limit, we live in a virtual reality, unable to comprehend our real position, sentenced to a woeful life of dreams, myth, fiction and illusion. Baudrillard, the inspiration for the Matrix films, tried to distance himself from the trite opposition of one moment seeing through the glass darkly and then coming face to face with reality, yet he enjoyed playing with its ingredients. I do not think this was wise, since generalised scepticism implies that there is nothing especially wrong about America or late capitalism or consumer society—and would any self-respecting culture critic want to draw that conclusion?¶ In any event, it is not all simulacra. We are participants in a public world, not hermits trapped in our own private cinemas. The cure for the sceptical nightmare is action. Nobody stays sceptical while crossing the street, or choosing dinner. Nor while dodging bombs and shells, even if they are sent by people watching computer screens. In the hurly-burly of survival, there isa lot that is hors texte—although this is more true for the artisan driving nails or baking bread than for the politician (or academic) whose work is confined to the production of signs and messages.

#### 1) they’re just a reproduction of Michigan KM who didn’t do shit to change debate other than get high schoolers to emulate them. Disproves all their solvency claims.

#### 2) If info is dissuasive, they shouldn’t have communicated at all

#### 3)The NC is a double turn – despite their posturing, they communicate, isolate acts of violence like at the top of the 1NC, and use empiricism to make all their impact claims – proves you have to evaluate the contextual instances of their theories

### 1AR – Democracy Works

#### Governments listen to citizens concerns – impact turns the alts passivity

Matthews 16 -- Dylan Matthews is one of the staff members at Vox, an online media venture along with Ezra Klein, Melissa Bell, and Matthew Yglesias, 5-9-2016, "Remember that study saying America is an oligarchy? 3 rebuttals say it's wrong.," Vox, accessed 9-14-2017 at https://www.vox.com/2016/5/9/11502464/gilens-page-oligarchy-study#czou

Since its initial release, **the Gilens/Page paper**'s findings **have been targeted in three separate debunkings**. Cornell professor Peter Enns, recent Princeton PhD graduate Omar Bashir, and a team of three researchers — UT Austin grad student J. Alexander Branham, University of Michigan professor Stuart Soroka, and UT professor Christopher Wlezien — have all taken a look at Gilens and Page's underlying data and found that their analysis doesn't hold up. Gilens and Page used a database of 1,779 policy issues — which included data on the opinions of median-income Americans, the rich, business interests, and non-business interest groups like unions or the National Rifle Association — to determine whose opinions correlated most closely with actual government policy. But the researchers critiquing the paper found that **middle-income Americans and rich Americans** **actually agree on an overwhelming majority of topics**. Out of the 1,779 bills in the Gilens/Page data set, majorities of the rich and middle class agree on 1,594; there are 616 bills both groups oppose and 978 bills both groups favor. That means the groups agree on 89.6 percent of bills. That leaves **only 185 bills on which the rich and the middle class disagree**, and even there the disagreements are small. On average, the groups' opinion gaps on the 185 bills is 10.9 percentage points; so, say, 45 percent of the middle class might support a bill while 55.9 percent of the rich support it. Bashir and Branham/Soroka/Wlezien find that **on these 185 bills, the rich got their preferred outcome 53 percent of the time and the middle class got what they wanted 47 percent of the time. The difference between the two is not statistically significant.** And there are some funny examples in the list of middle-class victories. For instance, the middle class got what they wanted on public financing of elections: in all three 1990s surveys included in the Gilens data, they opposed it, while the rich favor it. That matches up with more recent research showing that wealthy people are more supportive of public election funding. So it's hard to say definitively, based on this data, that the rich are getting what they want more than the middle class. And **it's hard to claim, as Gilens and Page do, that "ordinary citizens get what they want from government only when they happen to agree with elites or interest groups that are really calling the shots."** Even when they disagree with elites, ordinary citizens get what they want about half the time. Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien also look at which specific issues spur disagreement: Do they fall down on ideological lines? Sort of, but not dramatically so. The authors find that the middle class got 26 liberal policy wins (either a bill they supported passing or one they opposed getting blocked), 20 conservative wins, and 29 ideologically neutral wins. The rich got 28 liberal wins, 26 conservative wins, and 37 neutral wins. The rich's wins are slightly more conservative on average, but not hugely so. Okay, but maybe those conservative wins for the rich were all on issues that mattered most to the rich. Maybe the middle class wins occasionally on social issues, but the rich succeed in preventing redistribution and other economic policies they don't like. Again, not really. **The researchers found the rich’s win rate for economic issues where there's disagreement is 57.1 percent, compared with 51.1 percent for social issues. There's a difference, but not a robust one.** "The win rates for the two issue types are not statistically different from one another," Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien conclude. They also looked at the views of the poor — those at the 10th percentile of the income scale. Here, too, there's lots of agreement. The poor, middle class, and rich agree on 80.2 percent of policies. But here they find more evidence for differences in income-based representation. Bills supported just by the rich but not the poor or middle class passed 38.5 percent of the time, and those supported by just the middle class passed 37.5 percent. But policies supported by the poor and no one else passed a mere 18.6 percent of the time. "These results suggest that the rich and middle are effective at blocking policies that the poor want," the authors conclude. "Policy ends up about where it would have been" social security One place where the rich lose: They are more favorable to cutting Social Security. Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images Bashir's paper prods at the Gilens data even more and finds a number of holes. Bashir concludes that strong support from the middle class is about as good a predictor of a policy being adopted as strong support from the rich. **"In the original data set, change is enacted 47 percent of the time that median-income Americans favor it at a rate of 80 percent or more," Bashir writes. "Yet change is enacted 52 percent of the time that elites favor it at that rate."** And the two groups fare roughly as poorly when interest groups are pitted against them: "The rich get their favored outcome despite the combined opposition of [interest groups and the middle] at a rate of 32 percent; meanwhile, average Americans’ favored outcome occurs 30 percent of the time that they face combined opposition from interest groups and the wealthy. " Bashir also notes that the Gilens and Page model explains very little. Its R-squared value is a measly 0.074. That is, 7.4 percent of variation in policy outcomes is determined by the measured views of the rich, the poor, and interest groups put together. So even if the rich control the bulk of that (and Bashir argues they do not), the absolute amount of sway over policy that represents is quite limited indeed. Peter Enns's paper takes another approach to analyzing cases of rich versus middle-class disagreement. He notes that it's not just that the rich and middle class agree a lot; their levels of support for various policies also move in tandem. If policy A is more popular among the rich than policy B, then it's probably more popular than policy B among the middle class as well. This means the policies you'd most expect to pass, based on rich people's opinions, are also the policies you'd most expect to pass based on middle-class people's opinions. So the actual policy outcomes you'd predict based on a model where only the rich matter aren't very different from the ones you'd predict based on a model where only the middle class matters. "Even when policy preferences differ across groups … policy ends up about where it would have been if those in the middle received the exact same representation as the wealthy," Enns concludes. "These conclusions hold when we only consider economic and social welfare policies and when we include the preferences of organized interest groups in the statistical model." **Gilens and Page's defense doesn't really rescue the argument** I reached out to Gilens and Page to see what they made of the emerging critique of their work, and in particular the one included in the Bashir and Branham/Soroka/Wlezien papers. Gilens made four main points. First, the definition of "rich" here is "at the 90th percentile of the income distribution." Households at the 90th percentile currently make $160,000 a year. They're rich, for sure, but not superrich. It's impractical to use surveys to measure the opinions of the ultra rich (millionaires, billionaires), but Gilens argues that their opinions would diverge from the middle class more dramatically. That might be, but it's somewhat orthogonal to the claims about the influence of the 90th percentile made in the original Gilens/Page paper. Second, he insists that the issues where the rich win despite middle-class opposition are important ones relating to redistribution and economic policy. But Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien found that win rates for the rich weren't significantly different between economic and social issues. Third, he writes that even though the middle class and rich agree on most things, "a political system that responds to the preferences of average citizens is profoundly different from one in which average citizens get their way only when they happen to agree with the preferences of the well to-do." This is a fair point, but again, the average citizen does not only win when they agree with the well-to-do. When they disagree, they win about half the time anyway. Finally, Gilens argues that the use of "win rates" by Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien is misleading. By focusing on whether majorities of each group support a policy, they ignore gradations in the level of support. He also takes issue with them lumping in wins that consisted of a policy not passing — pretty common in a system with strong status quo bias, like American politics — with ones that consisted of a policy passing, a much rarer event: When the rich (but not the middle-class) favor a policy, the policy is adopted 37 percent of the time; when the middle-class (but not the rich) favor a policy, the policy is adopted 26 percent of the time. Conversely, when the rich (but not the middle-class) oppose a policy, the policy fails 74 percent of the time and when the middle-class (but not the rich) oppose a policy, the policy fails 63 percent of the time." In other words, the tiny gap in win rates gets somewhat wider when you break it down a little. Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien say this criticism misses the point. "While the rich do slightly better when explicitly taking into account the status quo, the rich still do not dominate the middle," they note. The middle class still gets its preferred policies enacted 26 percent of the time even when the rich are opposed. The picture Gilens and Page painted of a world where the opinions of the middle class literally count for nothing doesn't hold up. "Our argument is not that American democracy is perfect," they say in a prepared response to Gilens. **"Our paper responds to a specific claim made by Gilens and Page, namely, that when a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose." That contention, they argue, is vastly overstated.** How much does representation really matter? mission accomplished aircraft carrier A high point in the representativeness of American government. Steven Jaffe/AFP/Getty Images The implicit argument behind the Gilens/Page paper, and of Gilens's book Affluence and Influence, is that in a democracy, there should be strong congruence between policy outcomes and the opinions of the American middle class — or, at the very least, between policy outcomes and the views of the American public as a whole. This might seem intuitive. In a democracy, if 80 percent of people want universal health care, shouldn't there be universal health care? But this contention relies on a rather literal, and implausible, definition of democracy. As Vox's Matt Yglesias once put it, "The idea that the point of democracy is to implement legislative outcomes that are supported by broad-based surveys seems almost like a straw man dreamed up by an eighteenth-century monarchist." Think about it. Most Americans aren't very politically engaged — and most don't want to be politically engaged, preferring that professional policymakers make decisions for them, so long as the economy stays on track. What are the odds that they've formed stable, durable opinions on dozens of highly specific policy issues? For example, the Gilens data set includes a 1986 poll about the creation of an investment tax credit for corporations, a 2002 poll asking if the federal government spends enough on HIV/AIDS research and treatment, a 1997 poll asking whether trade agreements should be subject to a simple up-or-down vote, and a 1991 poll on whether non-bank corporations like GE should be allowed to own banks. These are all fairly technical points that require a decent amount of background knowledge to understand, let alone develop a coherent opinion about. I write about economic policy for a living and you'd have to give me a couple of days before I had a real, informed opinion about investment tax credits. What are the odds that people whose jobs don't mandate they follow policy debates would have that kind of background knowledge? What are the odds that the 2002 respondents even knew how much the US was spending on HIV/AIDS, let alone whether that was too high or too low? This is known in public opinion research as the problem of "non-attitudes," and while Gilens and Page do what they can to address it, it's hard to eliminate entirely. And if you look at the times in history when government was most responsive to public opinion, it doesn't appear that responsiveness is super well-correlated with good governance. For example, Affluence and Influence finds that the nadir of representativeness was the mid-1960s, when Medicare, the war on poverty, and the Voting Rights Act were enacted; and the peak was George W. Bush's first term. Does that mean LBJ's administration was a democratic failure and Bush's was a democratic success? Or does it just suggest that the Bush administration was effective at getting highly persuadable voters to back big tax cuts and the Iraq War, rather than reflecting their wishes? It's for reasons like this that most political theorists don't use pure representation as their test of whether a democracy is functioning well. **Political theorist Andrew Sabl writes that while empirical political scientists like Gilens "assume that the normative standard for a well-functioning democracy is whether policy outcomes track public preferences," political theorists argue that the standard should be "something — as it might seem, almost anything — else." There are "deliberative democrats," who think democracies should strive to enact the policies the people would support after calm, careful deliberation; there are small-r republicans, who measure democracies' success by the civic virtue of their residents; but you won't find basically any support for the idea that democracies should enact the people's opinions exactly as currently stated. It's entirely possible, of course, to think the political theorists are wrong and that responsiveness really is the most important thing. These are matters of values, not of empirical truth or falsity. But strict responsiveness is not obviously the most important feature of a democracy.**

## AT: Complexity K

### Framework

#### Framework – debate should be about the hypothetical consequences of the plan – most fair because the plan is the only predictable stasis point – infinite reps and epistemologies explodes prep burdens. Not weighing the aff moots 6 minutes of the 1AC and prevents rigorous comparison that refines scholarship to produce the best political strategy.

#### Fairness outweighs – Only impact the ballot can solve, necessary to evaluate all arguments, and debate is a game with switch sides and speech times.

### 1AR – Extinction First v2

#### Extinction outweighs – future generations deserve the choice to live; life is a pre-req to theorizing and executing praxis like the alt; extinction is slow and painful for billions through starvation, dehydration and cancer; and If you’re unsure which value frame is right, stick around another day to find out.

### 1AR – Predictions

#### Haven’t touched the specific scenarios of the aff

#### Predictions are inevitable AND accurate because of modernization in data and technique, but vetting particular scenarios makes them more accurate and prevents war from bad forecasting

* Inevitable
* New data better
* Response to pressure 🡪 self-refining
* Funding si good
* Particularity

Ward & Metternich 13 [Michael D. Ward received his B.S. degree in Chemistry from the William Paterson College of New Jersey in 1977 and his Ph.D. degree at Princeton University in 1981. He was a Welch postdoctoral fellow at the University of Texas, Austin, between 1981 and 1982. He joined the research staff at Standard Oil of Ohio in Cleveland in 1982, and in 1984 he became a member of the research staff at the Dupont Central Research and Development Laboratories in Wilmington, Delaware. Ward joined the faculty of the Department of Chemical Engineering and Materials Science at the University of Minnesota in 1990, where he held a joint appointment in the Department of Chemistry. Ward was named a Distinguished McKnight University Professor in 1999, and he was the Director of the University of Minnesota Materials Research Science and Engineering Center (MRSEC) from 1998 – 2005. Dr Nils W. Metternich is an Associate Professor in International Relations at the School of Public Policy. He joined the Department in 2013 and holds a PhD in political science from the University of Essex. Prior to joining UCL he was a postdoctoral research fellow at Duke University (2011-12). "Learning from the Past and Stepping into the Future: Toward a New Generation of Conflict Prediction." https://experts.syr.edu/en/publications/learning-from-the-past-and-stepping-into-the-future-toward-a-new-]

Political events are frequently framed as unpredictable. Who could have predicted the Arab Spring, 9/11, or the end of the cold war? This skepticism about prediction reflects an underlying desire to forecast. Predicting political events is difficult because they result from complex social processes. However, in recent years, our capacity to collect information on social behavior and our ability to process large data have increased to degrees only foreseen in science fiction. This new ability to analyze and predict behavior confronts a demand for better political forecasts that may serve to inform and even help to structure effective policies in a world in which prediction in everyday life has become commonplace.

Only a decade ago, scholars interested in civil wars undertook their research with constrained resources, limited data, and statistical estimation capabilities that seem underdeveloped by current standards. Still, major advances did result from these efforts. Consider “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War” by Fearon and Laitin (2003), one of the most venerated and cited articles about the onset of civil wars. Published in 2003, it has over 3,000 citations in scholar.google.com and almost 900 citations in the Web of Science (as of April 2013). It has been cited prominently in virtually every social science discipline in journals ranging from Acta Sociologica to World Politics; and it is the most downloaded article from the American Political Science Review. 2 This article is rightly regarded as an important, foundational piece of scholarship. However, in the summer of 2012, it was used by Jacqueline Stevens in a New York Times Op-Ed as evidence that political scientists are bad forecasters. That claim was wildly off the mark in that Fearon and Laitin do not focus on forecasting, and Stevens ignored other, actual forecasting efforts in political science. Stevens’ funding point—which was taken up by the US Congress—was that government on quantitative approaches was being wasted on efforts that did not provide accurate policy advice. In contrast to Stevens, we argue that conflict research in political science can be substantially improved by more, not less, attention to predictions through quantitative approaches.

We argue that the increasing availability of disaggregated data and advanced estimation techniques are making forecasts of conflict more accurate and precise, thereby helping to evaluate the utility of different models and winnow the good from the bad. Forecasting also helps to prevent overfitting and reduces confirmation bias. As such, forecasting efforts can be used to help validate models, to gain greater confidence in the resulting estimates, and to ultimately present robust models that may allow us to improve the interaction with decision makers seeking greater clarity about the implications of potential actions.

**Predictions are possible and useful**

**Mearsheimer, 01** (John, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001 p. 8, googleprint)

As a result, all political forecasting is bound to include some error. Those who venture to predict, as I do here, should therefore proceed with humility, take care not to exhibit unwarranted confidence, and admit that hindsight is likely to reveal surprises and mistakes. Despite these hazards, social scientists should nevertheless use their theories to make predictions about the future. Making predictions helps inform policy discourse, because it helps make sense of events unfolding in the world around us. And by clarifying points of disagreement, making explicit forecasts helps those with contradictory views to frame their own ideas more clearly. Furthermore, trying to anticipate new events is a good way to test social science theories, because theorists do not have the benefit of hindsight and therefore cannot adjust their claims to fit the evidence (because it is not yet available). In short, the world can be used as a laboratory to decide which theories best explain international politics. In that spirit I employ offensive realism to peer into the future, mindful of both the benefits and the hazards of trying to predict events.

### 1AR – Top Level

#### Permutation do both – No IR theory gets it 100% right always – we should use different IR theories to explain different phenomena

#### Nationalism doesn’t turn the case – they highlighted zero warrants – it’s security, not nationalism which precedes

### 1AR – Realism

#### Realism inevitable

**de Araujo,** professor for Ethics at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, **14**

(Marcelo, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 24(2): 29-43)

Some moral enhancement theorists argue that a society of morally enhanced individuals would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in the future such as, for instance, the threats posed by climate change, grand scale terrorist attacks, or the risk of catastrophic wars. The assumption here is quite simple: our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ moral motivation. If human beings were morally better – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – there would be fewer wars, less terrorism, and more willingness to save our environment. Although simple and attractive, this assumption is, as I intend to show, false. At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions, but the endurance of an old political arrangement that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis. The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view, moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea. Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs relating, for instance, to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily, or to the moral requirement to help people in need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory (Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people,and to trust unknown prospective cooperators, may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytocin in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future. The assumption that there is a relationship between, on the one hand, threats to the survival of humankind and, on the other, a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is clearly made by some moral enhancements theorists. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a “mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand, both positions are correct in recognizing the real possibility of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for instance, biotechnology or nuclear capabilities. The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction” (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The attempt to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently been resumed, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings” (Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman 2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future, implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu and Persson, Sparrow correctly argues that “structural issues,” rather than human nature, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests. Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But the question, of course, is whether moral enhancement will also improve the prospect of our coping successfully with some major threats to the survival of humankind, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or to reduce evil in the world, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within the tradition of political realism itself. “Structural realism,” unlike “human nature realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of the moral shortcomings of human nature. Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the states are the main, if not the only, relevant actors in the context of international relations; and second, that states compete for power in the international arena. Moral considerations in international affairs, according to realists, are secondary when set against the state’s primary goal, namely its own security and survival. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states (Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, it is this structure that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is its “anarchical structure,” i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It means that each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival. In the absence of a superior authority, over and above the power of each sovereign state, political leaders often feel compelled to favor security over morality, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,” their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus, even if human beings turn out to become morally enhanced in the future, humankind may still have to face the same scary scenarios described by some moral enhancement theorists. This is likely to happen if, indeed, human beings remain compelled to cooperate within the present structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced Yeltsin might have given orders to launch a devastating nuclear response – and that in spite of strong moral dispositions to the contrary. Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). What has to be changed, therefore, is not human moral dispositions, but the very structure of the political international system of states within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While moral enhancement may possibly have desirable results in some areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it will not motivate political leaders to dismantle their nuclear weapons. Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability, at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see prospective cooperators in the present as possible enemies in the future. The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will often fail to cooperate, and occasionally engage in conflicts and wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, this is likely to continue to happen, even if, in the future, political leaders become less egoistic and power-seeking through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of bioengineering is unlikely to yield the expected results, so long as moral enhancement is pursued within the present framework of the international system of states.

#### Evolution proves

**Johnson and Thayer 16** – Dominic D. P. Johnson, D.Phil., Ph.D.\* and Bradley A. Thayer, Ph.D., “The evolution of offensive realism Survival under anarchy from the Pleistocene to the present,” https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/56B778004187F70B8E59609BE7FEE7A4/S073093841600006Xa.pdf/div-class-title-the-evolution-of-offensive-realism-div.pdf

Few principles unite the discipline of international relations, but one exception is anarchy—the absence of government in international politics. Anarchy is, ironically, the ‘‘ordering’’ principle of the global state system and the starting point for most major theories of international politics, such as neoliberalism and neorealism.42,43,44,45 Other theoretical approaches, such as constructivism, also acknowledge the impact of anarchy, even if only to consider why anarchy occurs and how it can be circumvented.46,47 Indeed, the anarchy concept is so profound that it defines and divides the discipline of political science into international politics (politics under conditions of anarchy) and domestic politics (politics under conditions of hierarchy, or government). Given the prominence of the concept in present-day international relations theory, it is striking that anarchy only took hold as a central feature of scholarship in recent decades, since the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics in 1979. In fact, however, **anarchy has been a constant feature of the entire multimillion year history of the human lineage (and indeed the 3.5 billion–year history of the evolution of all life on Earth before that). It is not just that we lack a global Leviathan today; humans never had such a luxury. The fact that human evolution occurred under conditions of anarchy, that we evolved as hunter-gatherers in an ecological setting of predation, resource competition, and intergroup conflict, and that humans have been subject to natural selection** for millions of years **has profound consequences for understanding human behavior**, not least how humans perceive and act toward others. Scholars often argue over whether historically humans experienced a Hobbesian ‘‘state of nature,’’ but—whatever the outcome of that debate—it is certainly a much closer approximation to the prehistoric environment in which human brains and behavior evolved. **This legacy heavily influences our decision-making and behavior today, even—perhaps especially—in the anarchy of international politics**. We argue that **evolution under conditions of anarchy has predisposed human nature toward the behaviors predicted by offensive realism: Humans**, particularly men, **are strongly self-interested, often fear other groups, and seek more resources, more power, and more influence** (as we explain in full later). **These strategies** are not unique to humans and, in fact, **characterize a much broader trend in behavior among mammals as a whole—especially primates**—as well as many other major vertebrate groups, including birds, fish, and reptiles. **This recurrence of behavioral patterns** across different taxonomic groups **suggests that the behaviors characterized by offensive realism have broad and deep evolutionary roots**. This perspective does not deny the importance of institutions, norms, and governance in international politics. On the contrary, it provides or adds to the reasons why we demand and need them, and indeed why they are so hard to establish and maintain. Until recently, **international relations theorists rarely used insights from the life sciences to inform their understanding of human behavior**. However, **rapid advances in the life sciences offer increasing theoretical and empirical challenges to scholars in** the social sciences in general and **international relations** in particular, who are therefore under increasing pressure to address and integrate this knowledge rather than to suppress or ignore it. Whatever one’s personal views on evolution, **the time has come to explore the implications of evolutionary theory for mainstream theories of international relations**. **The most obvious challenge that evolutionary theory presents to international relations concerns our understanding of human nature**. Theories purporting to explain human behavior make explicit or implicit assumptions about preferences and motivations, and mainstream theories in international politics are no exception. Many **criticisms of international relations theories focus on these unsubstantiated or contested assumptions about underlying human nature. The parsimony of general theories depends on how well they explain phenomena across space and time**; in other words, the more closely they coincide with empirical observations across cultures and throughout history. The most enduring theories of international relations, therefore, will be ones that are able to incorporate (or at least do not run against the grain of) evolutionary theory. Although Thomas Hobbes claimed to have deduced Leviathan scientifically from ‘‘motion’’ and the physical senses, he was writing two hundred years before Darwin and so had no understanding of evolution. International relations scholars have tended to claim to deduce their own theories from Hobbes, or subsequent philosophers who followed him, and we suggest it is time to revisit the idea of foundational scientific principles. **Starting with biology, or with human evolutionary history, has never been typical in international relations scholarship**, but this approach is now less exotic than it once seemed as innovators in a range of social sciences, including economics, psychology, sociology, and political science, pursue this line of inquiry. **International relations stands to gain from** similar **interdisciplinary insights**. At the dawn of the 21st century, an era that will be dominated by science at least as much as philosophy, **we have the opportunity to move away from untested assumptions about human nature. Instead, we can make more concrete predictions about how humans tend to think and act in different conditions, based on new scientific knowledge about human cognition** and behavior, **and in particular a greater understanding of the social and ecological context in which human brains and behaviors evolved**. But what was that context?

### 1AR – Warming

#### Extinction requires 12 degrees

Sebastian Farquhar 17, leads the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective Altruism, et al., 2017, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction.15 The existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable,16 and would completely devastate agriculture.17 This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.18 Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.19 Moreover, the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios.

The probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.20 If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,21 which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.22 The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,23 and of 10°C is around 3%.24 These estimates are of course highly uncertain.

It is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO2 emissions and eventual warming,25 and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.26 Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO2 emissions. If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures.

## AT: Settler Colonialism K

#### Framework – debate should be about the hypothetical consequences of the plan – most fair because the plan is the only predictable stasis point – infinite reps and epistemologies explodes prep burdens. Not weighing the aff moots 6 minutes of the 1AC and prevents rigorous comparison that refines scholarship to produce the best political strategy.

#### Fairness outweighs – Only impact the ballot can solve, necessary to evaluate all arguments, and debate is a game with switch sides and speech times.

### 1AR – Extinction First v2

#### Extinction outweighs – future generations deserve the choice to live; life is a pre-req to theorizing and executing praxis like the alt; extinction is slow and painful for billions through starvation, dehydration and cancer; and If you’re unsure which value frame is right, stick around another day to find out.

### 1AR – AT: Rifkin 14

#### Psychoanalysis does not justify the immutability of settler colonial ontologies.

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Apprehending this history as what Jodi Byrd has called the “transit” over which the international “postwestern” cityscape of Las Vegas is realized leads us into a reading of a very different type of frontier than the one memorialized on Fremont Street (Transit xv). Read this way, as a site of Indigenous dispossession, the West cannot be seen as a dynamic site of pure possibility, as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have represented it, as “a rhizomatic West, with its Indians without ancestry, its ever- receding limit, its shifting and displaced frontiers” (19). The repetitive revisitation of frontier tropes recalls what critic Hamish Dalley calls “the frozen temporality of settler- colonial narrative,” which, “fixated on the moment of the frontier, recalls nothing so much as Freud’s description of the ‘repetition compulsion’ attending trauma” (Dalley). The “hyperreal West” in this context emerges as a fantasy (Lewis 194), in the sense that theorist Jacqueline Rose describes in her work on Israel/Palestine. “Never completely losing its grip, fantasy is always heading for the world it only appears to have left behind” (3).5 Of course settler colonialism is but one of the “secret histories of Las Vegas” that underwrite the postmodern wonderland visitors fi nd on Fremont Street and the strip, and but one of many structures of violence that shape life in the contemporary western United States.6 Nonetheless, it remains a structure central to the consideration of “westness.” As the postwestern critics argue, “westness” is neither contained by geography (as the popularity of the Western genre internationally attests), nor necessarily representative of cultural production being produced within the western United States (Kollin x– xi). When we speak of a cultural production as “Western,” we are speaking of a work that addresses the process and consequences of settler conquest, whether we are discussing a California memoir, an Australian novel, or an Italian fi lm.7 This is not to say that Western cultural production is always a result of settler colonial ideology, but rather that it is engaged with questions pertaining to it. Th e problem of the West is, in a crucial sense, the problem of settler colonialism. Imagining postwestern futures thus requires a critical outlook that is more than just inclusive in its politics, transnational in its scope, and poststructuralist in its methodology. Our movement toward the “post” in the conceptual space of the Western must be decolonial in its orientation. Such a critique would abandon unilateral settler attempts at postnational place-making in order to critique settler colonial structures of violence. Such a critique would not work to reify these structures as permanent or inevitable, but rather to probe their contradictions, and to promote the Indigenous intellectual traditions that have long been at work critiquing the settler colonial present in order to shape a decolonial future.8 We hope that this special issue of Western American Literature, which features critical readings of western American film and literature by three scholars from different fields and national backgrounds, can contribute toward this effort.

#### Their understanding of the state as unified and inevitably dangerous to Indigenous actors stifles Indigenous agency and activism.

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Pessimism Trap 2: The State is Unified, Deliberate and Unchanging in Its Desire to Dispossess Indigenous Peoples and Gain Unfettered Access to Indigenous Lands and Resources In other words, colonialism by settler states is a constant, not a variable, in both outcome and intent. Further, the state is not only intentionally colonial, but it is also unifed in its desire to co-opt Indigenous peoples as a method and means of control. In 2005’s Wasase, Alfred presents the state as unitary, intentional and unchanging in its desire to colonise and oppress Indigenous peoples noting, ‘I think that the only thing that has changed since our ancestors first declared war on the invaders is that some of us have lost heart’.22 Referring to current state policies as a ‘self-termination movement’, Alfred states, ‘It is senseless to advocate for an accord with imperialism while there is a steady and intense ongoing attack by the Settler society on everything meaningful to us: our cultures, our communities, and our deep attachments to land’.23 Alfred’s Peace, Power, Righteousness (2009) also argues that the state is deliberate and unchanging, stating quite plainly that ‘it is still the objective of the Canadian and US governments to remove Indians, or, failing that, to prevent them from benefitting, from their ancestral territories’.24 Contemporary states do this, he argues, not through outright violent control but ‘by insidiously promoting a form of neo-colonial self-government in our communities and forcing our integration into the legal mainstream’.25 According to Alfred, the state ‘relegates indigenous peoples’ rights to the past, and constrains the development of their societies by allowing only those activities that support its own necessary illusion: that indigenous peoples today do not present a serious challenge to its legitimacy’.26 Linking back to the aim of co-option, Alfred argues that while the state’s desire to control Indigenous peoples and lands has never changed, the techniques for doing so have become subtler over time. ‘Recognizing the power of the indigenous challenge and unable to deny it a voice’, due to successful Indigenous resistance over the years, ‘the state has (now) attempted to pull indigenous people closer to it’.27 According to Alfred, the state has outwitted Indigenous leaders and ‘encouraged them to reframe and moderate their nationhood demands to accept the fait accompli of colonization, (and) to collaborate in the development of a “solution” that does not challenge the fundamental imperial lie’.28 In a similar vein, Coulthard’s central argument is centred on his understanding of the dual structure of colonialism. Drawing directly from Fanon, Coulthard finds that colonialism relies on both objective and subjective elements. The objective components involve domination through the political, economic and legal structures of the colonial state. The subjective elements of colonialism involve the creation of ‘colonized subjects’, including a process of internalisation by which colonised subjects come to not only accept the limited forms of ‘misrecognition’ granted through the state but can even come to identify with it.29 Through this dual structure, colonial power now works through the inclusion of Indigenous peoples, actively shaping their perspectives in line with state discourses, rather than merely excluding them, as in years past. Therefore, any attempt to seek ‘the reconciliation of Indigenous nationhood with state sovereignty is still colonial insofar as it remains structurally committed to the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of our lands and self-determining authority’.30 Concerning the state in relation to Indigenous peoples on the international level, Corntassel argues that states and global organisations, for years, have been consistently framing Indigenous peoples’ self-determination claims in ways that ‘jeopardize the futures of indigenous communities’.31 He claims that states frst compartmentalise Indigenous self-determination by separating lands and resources from political and legal recognition of a limited autonomy. Second, he notes, states sometimes deny the existence of Indigenous peoples living within their borders. Thirdly, a political and legal entitlement framing by states deemphasises other responsibilities. Finally, he claims that states, through the rights discourse, limit the frameworks through which Indigenous peoples can seek self-determination. Like Alfred and Coulthard, Corntassel has concluded that states are deliberate and never changing in their behaviour. With this move, Corntassel limits and actually demeans Indigenous agency, overlooking the reality that Indigenous organisations themselves chose the human rights framework and rights discourse as a target sphere of action precisely because, as was evident in earlier struggles like slavery, civil rights or women’s rights, these were tools available to them that had a proven track record of opening up new possibilities and shifting previous state positions and behaviour. Indigenous advocates also cleverly realised, by the 1970s, that the anti-discrimination and decolonisation frames could be used together against states. States did, in no way, nefariously impose a rights framework on Indigenous peoples. Rather, Indigenous organisations and savvy Indigenous political actors deliberately chose to frame their self-determination struggles within the human rights framework in order to bring states into a double bind where they could not credibly claim to adhere to human rights and claim that they uphold equality while simultaneously denying Indigenous peoples’ human rights and leaving them with a diminished and unequal right of self-determination. But, because he is caught in the pessimism trap of seeing the state only as unified, deliberate and unchanging, Corntassel overlooks and diminishes the clear story of Indigenous agency and the potential for positive change in advancing self-determination in a multitude of ways. Pessimism Trap 3: Engagement with the Settler State is Futile, if Not Counter-Productive Since the state always intends to maintain, if not expand, colonial control, and is seeking to co-opt as many Indigenous peoples as possible in order to maintain or expand its dispossession and control, it is therefore futile, at best, and actually dangerous to Indigenous existence to engage with the state. Furthermore, all patterns of engagement will lead to co-optation as the state is cunning and unrelenting in its desire to co-opt Indigenous leaders, academics and professionals in order to gain or maintain control of Indigenous peoples. Alfred argues, in both his 2005 and 2009 books, that any Indigenous engagement with the state, including agreements and negotiations, is not only futile but fundamentally dangerous, as such pathways do not directly challenge the existing colonial structure and ‘to argue on behalf of indigenous nationhood within the dominant Western paradigm is self-defeating’.32 Alfred states that a ‘notion of nationhood or self-government rooted in state institutions and framed within the context of state sovereignty can never satisfy the imperatives of Native American political traditions’33 because the possibility for a true expression of Indigenous self-determination is ‘precluded by the state’s insistence on dominion and its exclusionary notion of sovereignty’.34 Worst of all, according to Alfred, when Indigenous communities frame their struggles in terms of asserting Aboriginal rights and title, but do so within a state framework, rather than resisting the state itself, it ‘represents the culmination of white society’s efforts to assimilate indigenous peoples’.35 Because it is impossible to advance Indigenous self-determination through any sort of engagement with the state, Coulthard also advocates for an Indigenous resurgence paradigm that follows both his mentor Taiaiake Alfred but also Anishinaabe feminist theorist Leanne Simpson.36 As Coulthard writes, ‘both Alfred and Simpson start from a position that calls on Indigenous peoples and communities to “turn away” from the assimilative reformism of the liberal recognition approach and to instead build our national liberation efforts on the revitalization of “traditional” political values and practices’.37 Drawing upon the prescriptive approach of these theorists, Coulthard proposes, in his concluding chapter, five theses from his analysis that are intended to build and solidify Indigenous resurgence into the future: 1. On the necessity of direct action, meaning that physical forms of Indigenous resistance, like protest and blockades, are very important not only as a reaction to the state but also as a means of protecting the lands that are central to Indigenous peoples’ existence; 2. Capitalism, No More!, meaning the rejection of capitalist forms of economic development in Indigenous communities in favour of land-based Indigenous political-economic alternative approaches; 3. Dispossession and Indigenous Sovereignty in the City, meaning the need for Indigenous resurgence movements ‘to address the interrelated systems of dispossession that shape Indigenous peoples’ experiences in both urban and land-based settings’38; 4. Gender Justice and Decolonisation, meaning that decolonisation must also include a shift away from patriarchy and an embrace of gender relations that are non-violent and refective of the centrality of women in traditional forms of Indigenous governance and society; and 5. Beyond the Nation-State. While Coulthard denies that he advocates complete rejection of engagement with the state’s political and legal system, he does assert that ‘our efforts to engage these discursive and institutional spaces to secure recognition of our rights have not only failed, but have instead served to subtly reproduce the forms of racist, sexist, economic, and political confgurations of power that we initially sought…to challenge’.39 He therefore advocates expressly for ‘critical self-refection, skepticism, and caution’ in a ‘resurgent politics of recognition that seeks to practice decolonial, gender-emancipatory, and economically nonexploitative alternative structures of law and sovereign authority grounded on a critical refashioning of the best of Indigenous legal and political traditions’.40 Corntassel also demonstrates the third pessimism trap, that all engagement with the state is ultimately futile. For the most part, however, Corntassel’s observation is that the UN system operates like a reverse Keck and Sikkink ‘boomerang model’ and ‘channels the energies of transnational Indigenous networks into the institutional fiefdoms of member countries’, by which an ‘illusion of inclusion’ is created.41 He argues that, in order to be included or their views listened to, Indigenous delegates at the UN must mimic the strategies, language, norms and modes of behaviour of member states and international institutions. Corntassel fnds that ‘what results is a cadre of professionalized Indigenous delegates who demonstrate more allegiance to the UN system than to their own communities’.42 In his final analysis, he charges that the co-optation of international Indigenous political actors is highly ‘effective in challenging the unity of the global Indigenous rights movement and hindering genuine dialogue regarding Indigenous self-determination and justice’.43 Finding that states deliberately co-opt and provide ‘illusions of inclusion’ to Indigenous political actors in UN settings, Corntassel comes to the same conclusion as Alfred concerning the futility of engagement, arguing that because transnational Indigenous networks are ‘channeled’ and ‘blunted’ by colonial state actors, ‘it is a critical time for Indigenous peoples to rethink their approaches to bringing Indigenous rights concerns to global forums’.44 Imagining a Post-Colonial Future: Pessimistic ‘Resurgence’ Versus the Optimism and Tenacity of Indigenous Movements on the Ground All of these writers advocate Indigenous resurgence, through a combination of rejecting the current reconciliation politics of settler colonial states, coupled with a return to land-based Indigenous expressions of governance as the only viable, ‘authentic’ and legitimate path to a better future for Indigenous peoples, which they refer to as decolonisation. While inherently critical in their orientation, these three approaches do make some positive and productive contributions to Indigenous movements. They help shed light on the various and subtle ways that Indigenous leaders and communities can become co-opted into a colonial system. They help us to hold leadership accountable. They also help us keep a strong focus on our traditional, cultural and spiritual values as well as our traditional forms of governance which then also helps us imagine future possibilities. As I have pointed out here, however, all three theorists are also caught in the same three pessimism traps: authenticity versus co-option; a vision of the state as unified, deliberate and never changing in its desire to colonise and control; and a view of engagement with the state as futile, if not dangerous, to Indigenous sovereignty and existence. When combined, these three pessimism traps aim to inhibit Indigenous peoples’ engagement with the state in any process that could potentially re-imagine and re-formulate their current relationship into one that could be transformative and post-colonial, as envisioned by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The pessimism traps together work to foreclose any possibility that there could be credible openings of opportunity to negotiate a fairer and just relationship of co-existence with even the most progressive state government. This pessimistic approach is not innocuous. By overemphasising structure and granting the state an enormous degree of agency as a unitary actor, this pessimistic approach does a remarkable disservice to Indigenous resistance movements by proscribing, from academia, an extremely narrow view of what Indigenous self-determination can and should mean in practice. By overlooking and/or discounting Indigenous agency and not even considering the possibility that Indigenous peoples could themselves be calculating, strategic political actors in their own right, and vis-à-vis states, the pessimistic lens of the resurgence school unnecessarily, unproductively and unjustly limits the field of possibility for Indigenous peoples’ decision-making, thus actually countering and inhibiting expressions of Indigenous self-determination. By condemning—writ large—all Indigenous peoples and organisations that wish to seek peaceful co-existence with the state, negotiate mutually beneficial agreements with the state, and/or who have advocated on the international level for a set of standards that can provide a positive guiding framework for Indigenous-state relations, the pessimistic lens of resurgence forecloses much potential for new and improved relations, in any form, and is very likely to lead to deeper conflicts between states and Indigenous peoples, and potentially, even violent action, which Fanon indicated was the necessary outcome. The pessimism traps of the resurgence school are therefore, likely self-defeating for all but the most remote and isolated Indigenous communities. Further, this approach is quite out of step with the actions and vision of many Indigenous resistance movements on the ground who have been working for decades to advance Indigenous self-determination, both domestically and globally, in ways that transform the colonial state into something more just and may eventually present creative alternatives to the Westphalian state form in ways that could respect and accommodate Indigenous nations. Rather, it aims to shame and blame those who wish to explore creative and innovative post-colonial resolutions to the colonial condition. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration or UN Declaration) was adopted by the General Assembly in 2007 after 25 years of development. The Declaration is ground-breaking, given the key leadership roles Indigenous peoples played in negotiating and achieving this agreement.45 Additionally, for the first time in UN history, the rights holders, Indigenous peoples, worked with states to develop an instrument that would serve to promote, protect and affirm Indigenous rights, both globally and in individual domestic contexts.46 Many Indigenous organisations and movements, from dozens of countries around the world, were involved in drafting and negotiating the UN Declaration and are now advocating for its full implementation, both internationally and in domestic and regional contexts. In Canada, some of the key organisational players—the Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee), the Assembly of First Nations, and the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, or their predecessor organisations—were involved in the drafting and lengthy negotiations of the UN Declaration during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. In the United States, organisations like the American Indian Law Alliance and the Native American Rights Fund have been involved as well as the Navajo Nation and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, who represent themselves as Indigenous peoples’ governing institutions. From Scandinavia, the Saami Council and the Sami Parliaments all play a key role in advancing Indigenous rights. In Latin America, organisations like the Confederación de Nationalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) and the Consejo Indio de Sud America (CISA) advocate for implementation of the UN Declaration. The three, major transnational Indigenous organisations— the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the International Indian Treaty Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Council—were all key members of the drafting and negotiating team for the UN Declaration, and the latter two, which are still in existence, continue their strong advocacy for its full implementation. Implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples requires fundamental and significant change, on both the international and domestic levels. Because implementation of Indigenous rights essentially calls for a complete and fundamental restructuring of Indigenous-state relationships, it expects states to enact and implement a signifcant body of legal, constitutional, legislative and policy changes that can accommodate such things as Indigenous land rights, free, prior and informed consent, redress and a variety of self-government, autonomy and other such arrangements. States are not going to implement this multifaceted and complex set of changes on their own, however. They will require significant political and moral pressure to hold them accountable to the rhetorical commitments they have made to support this level of change. They will also require ongoing conversation and negotiation with Indigenous peoples along the way, lest the process becomes problematically one-sided. Such processes ultimately require sustained political will, commitment and engagement over the long term, to reach the end result of radical systemic change and Indigenous state relationships grounded in mutual respect, co-existence and reciprocity. This type of fundamental change requires creative thinking, careful diplomacy, tenacity, and above all, optimistic vision, on the part of Indigenous peoples. The pessimistic approaches of the resurgence school are ultimately of little use in these efforts, other than as a cautionary tale against state power, of which the organisational players are already keenly aware. Further, by dismissing and discouraging all efforts at engagement with states, and especially with the blanket accusations that all who engage in such efforts are ‘co-opted’ and not ‘authentically’ Indigenous, the resurgence school actually creates unnecessary negative feelings and divisions amongst Indigenous movements who should be pooling limited resources and working together towards better futures.

### 1AR – AT: Mitchell – Long

#### The 1ac’s representation of nuclear war is not futurism or voyeurism, but rather empowers critique and produces ethical solidarity

Aistrope and Fishel 20 [Tim Aistrope, Lecturer in International Relations, Stefanie Fishel, Lecturer of Politics and International Relations, University of the Sunshine Coast, “Horror, apocalypse and world politics,” International Affairs, Volume 96, Issue 3, May 2020, Pages 631–648, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa008//lhs-ap]

The representation of nuclear apocalypse gives a strong sense of the potential for ethical engagement at the intersection of horror and world politics. Indeed, we can see this engagement in practice in the powerful constraints often associated with the so-called ‘nuclear taboo’, which, at least in part, helps explain the non-use of nuclear weapons since the Second World War. Nina Tannenwald highlights the horrific effects of nuclear weapons as one of three pillars supporting the taboo.71 For Tannenwald, the early link between chemical and nuclear weapons, established through the association of radiation and poison gas, connected nuclear weapons with the chemical horrors of the First World War, since universally banned under the laws of war. No doubt the direct representation of those horrors for the general public in films like The War Game and Threads helped embed this deep aversion, not least by dramatizing nuclear fallout. Tannenwald also points to the constraining power of empathy, again strongly resonant with accounts of everyday life destroyed. As we have highlighted above with reference to Sontag and Rorty, ethical considerations can be provoked, grounded and sustained through narrative engagement with the experiences of others—and the horror genre narrates human suffering in a uniquely affecting and vicarious way. Indeed, Jessica Rapson has argued, persuasively, that The War Game provokes a profound cosmopolitanism, first, through references to Hiroshima and Nagasaki that bridge cultural and historical context, and second, through its focus on everyday life and common experience, which people everywhere can relate to.72 But nuclear war is also distinct in its destructiveness. As N. A. J. Taylor has explained in his ground-breaking treatment of the subject, nuclear harm shatters the biosphere and threatens the very conditions for life on earth.73 In that sense, it may be the most universal ground for ethics that has ever been available.

Paradoxes of the heart and the horror point of view

We began this article by discussing the intersection of horror and IR, after which we turned to examples in film to explore the ethical potential. Now we ask again: ‘Why would anyone want to be horrified?’ We may shudder in the moment, but there are strong motives related to the aesthetic experience of horror that draw viewers in and keep them coming back. The puzzling attraction of fear and suffering, what Noël Carroll refers to as a ‘paradox of the heart’, also points towards more complicated dynamics.74 In this section, we foreground one of the most prominent and politically pertinent explanations, the horror genre's transgressive critique of social orders, and suggest that this can pose powerful ethical challenges to the viewer. We then highlight the way the genre works to create a spectator who takes the victim's view. We have suggested already that the horrific is mediated in a way that allows it to be approached, where we might otherwise look away. It is this gaze that is key: the audience's point of view is also shifted from one character to another, from one dire experience to the next, facilitating a subjectivity more open to ethical engagement.

There are several prominent and potentially persuasive accounts for the appeal of horror. One explanation, made famous by H. P. Lovecraft (though originating with Edmund Burke), is that horror draws us towards the sublime with a mix of awe and cosmic fear.75 Other explanations focus on the narrative arc of horror stories or the working through of underlying psychological dynamics of individual subjects.76 For our purposes, we emphasize an account that points to the transgressive power of horror, which often probes the limits of the human condition through the fantastic and profane, unsettling social mores and received wisdom. According to Rosemary Jackson, the horror genre

points to or suggests the basis on which the cultural order rests, for it opens up, for the briefest moment, on disorder, onto illegality, onto that which is outside the dominant value system … [it] traces the unsaid and unseen of culture: that which has been silenced, made invisible, covered over and made absent.77

This connects with Cavarero's insight, discussed above, that horror narratives challenge the status quo view of contemporary violence, shifting the perspective from the view of the warrior to that of the victim, so often left out of the picture. It is this concern with what is left out in prevailing representations of extreme violence that is particularly useful. Indeed, while fearful stories are as old as human society, the modern horror genre originally emerged, under the rubric of Gothic fiction, during the late eighteenth century, as a reaction against the forces of Enlightenment, which had, at least in some minds, disenchanted the world and unleashed a maelstrom of unintended calamities that were not adequately captured in prevailing narratives about progress and mastery.78 The truly shocking violence of the recent past and looming future can certainly be understood as the double edge of modernity: from total war and the concentration camps to laser-guided wars of choice; through nuclear Armageddon, global pandemics and climate catastrophe.79 What we are pointing to here is a shift in perspective that may be at the heart of the horror paradox. The transgressive function of horror can unseat the common sense of the day and reveal other experiences and standpoints. We suggest—alongside Rorty, Sontag and many others—that this is an important dynamic for normative reasoning and ethical engagement.

This suggestion is buttressed by the aesthetic characteristics of the horror genre. In the cinematic context, horror films take up and subvert the audience's point of view, and so ‘force’ them to connect and engage with the character on the screen.80 In this way, film can become, as Jerry Goodenough argues, ‘a refutation of the Cartesian project’, which is built around solipsistic individualism.81 Drawn into the narrative, given a timeline, asked to identify with multiple viewpoints—it is here that the viewer can engage ethically in a way that moves beyond voyeurism. Brigid Cherry deepens this point, suggesting that the gaze of the spectator creates a ‘constructed subjectivity’, transforming the viewer into a part of the cinematic experience.82 Drawing from early cinematic theory, she writes that the spectator is a part of the cinematic apparatus and therefore ‘the screen becomes a mirror upon which the spectator (figuratively speaking) sees their own reflection’.83

The ‘gaze’ of the spectator, a core element in cinema theory, also takes on other forms in horror cinema. Slasher films (Halloween, The Texas Chain Saw Massacre) often use point-of-view shots, which frame the victim and deepen the sense of identification with the character. This standpoint is never static, however, and, as Carol Clover posits, the shifting point of view between the killer, the victim and the outsider creates a sense of empathy with the ‘victim’. For example, as the story unfolds, an allegiance to the killer may well shift:84

The point-of-view shot can thus be read as signalling a sense of threat for the character being looked at rather than objectifying them. This suggests a sense of identification and empathy with the victim … the horror is not necessarily that of voyeuristic pleasure in enacting violence on the female body, but fear of violence being done to oneself or one's friends.85

This empathetic identification with the victim brings us back to where we began—with the horrific character of contemporary violence and the experience of vulnerable human beings. As the case analysis on nuclear horror demonstrated, it is the propensity of the horror genre to put the audience in the dire circumstances of its protagonists that generates ethical responses. Both The War Game and Threads swing between a documentary style, enacting an aesthetic of objectivity, and intense character perspectives, the former standing in for the status quo and the latter taking the victims' viewpoint. The viewer is drawn into the familiar everyday, for instance in the burgeoning romance of Jimmy and Ruth, including the surrounding rhythms of family life. When the nuclear attack comes, the thin veneer of social order is laid bare, vulnerable innocence is annihilated, and the audience is forced to consider what this would mean to them if their own meaningful relationships were put at risk. Yet the normative traction and ethical significance of the films lay not just in the shocking human consequences of nuclear war, but also in the contrast between vantage-points. Along with the switch between objective and subjective aesthetics, the point of view shifts between recognizable characters from across the spectrum of English society, from authority figures through to children. For a spectator vicariously standing in these positions, thinking and feeling as the calamity befalls them, the possibility of ethical engagement is acute.86 After all, this positional interplay was inextricably wedded to the most pressing international political issue of the day, which was the unavoidable context in which these films were viewed.

Conclusion

Renewed nuclear tensions, coupled with the seemingly cavalier attitude of many world leaders, have brought the prospect of nuclear annihilation back onto the agenda in the first decades of the twenty-first century. In these circumstances, a return to The War Game and Threads seems warranted—in classrooms, living rooms and the citadels of power. Perhaps a contemporary viewing might, as it once did, provoke scepticism about the logic and moral status of nuclear war, connect abstract strategic language with human consequences, and instigate a public debate about the necessity or otherwise of nuclear weapons.87

This article has argued that the horror genre is at once a potential access point for this sort of ethical engagement and a complex terrain where dark imaginings can be politically loaded, culturally specific and ethically ambiguous. We have shown that horrific representations of apocalypse, from zombie outbreaks to nuclear war, can bring audiences into close quarters with the human consequences of extreme violence. The horror genre takes the victim's view in an era of techno-rationalist war-fighting and spiralling global uncertainty, and does so in a powerful combination of shocking content and gripping narrative. At the same time, the horror genre expresses our deepest anxieties about the societies we live in and the futures that confront us. It taps deep reservoirs of fear and loathing latent in political discourse around security and order, including loaded characterizations of enemy others and troubling ambivalence about violence and degradation. Taking these elements together, while the horror genre offers the opportunity for ethical encounters, it also centres the powerful dynamics that help constitute our reckoning with existential threats. It is precisely this complexity that a nuanced engagement with world politics must take seriously.

### 1AR – AT: Mitchell – Short

#### The 1ac’s representation of nuclear war is not futurism or voyeurism, but rather empowers critique and produces ethical solidarity

Aistrope and Fishel 20 [Tim Aistrope, Lecturer in International Relations, Stefanie Fishel, Lecturer of Politics and International Relations, University of the Sunshine Coast, “Horror, apocalypse and world politics,” International Affairs, Volume 96, Issue 3, May 2020, Pages 631–648, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa008//lhs-ap]

The representation of nuclear apocalypse gives a strong sense of the potential for ethical engagement at the intersection of horror and world politics. Indeed, we can see this engagement in practice in the powerful constraints often associated with the so-called ‘nuclear taboo’, which, at least in part, helps explain the non-use of nuclear weapons since the Second World War. Nina Tannenwald highlights the horrific effects of nuclear weapons as one of three pillars supporting the taboo.71 For Tannenwald, the early link between chemical and nuclear weapons, established through the association of radiation and poison gas, connected nuclear weapons with the chemical horrors of the First World War, since universally banned under the laws of war. No doubt the direct representation of those horrors for the general public in films like The War Game and Threads helped embed this deep aversion, not least by dramatizing nuclear fallout. Tannenwald also points to the constraining power of empathy, again strongly resonant with accounts of everyday life destroyed. As we have highlighted above with reference to Sontag and Rorty, ethical considerations can be provoked, grounded and sustained through narrative engagement with the experiences of others—and the horror genre narrates human suffering in a uniquely affecting and vicarious way. Indeed, Jessica Rapson has argued, persuasively, that The War Game provokes a profound cosmopolitanism, first, through references to Hiroshima and Nagasaki that bridge cultural and historical context, and second, through its focus on everyday life and common experience, which people everywhere can relate to.72 But nuclear war is also distinct in its destructiveness. As N. A. J. Taylor has explained in his ground-breaking treatment of the subject, nuclear harm shatters the biosphere and threatens the very conditions for life on earth.73 In that sense, it may be the most universal ground for ethics that has ever been available.

#### Definitely not the root cause of oppression—structural concerns.

Grey and Cleffie 18 ([Sarah, Sarah Grey is a freelance writer and editor. She lives in Fishtown, Philadelphia. Joe Cleffie's writing has appeared in International Socialist Review, Socialist Worker, and Socialism and Democracy.] “Peter Singer’s Race Problem,” 6 Aug. 2018, <https://jacobinmag.com/2015/08/animal-rights-cecil-the-lion-peter-singer-speciesism>) LHSLA LH

The absurdity of arguing that speciesism and racism are equivalent is quickly evident. Though science-fiction worlds like Star Trek use a variety of morally equivalent, sentient fictional species to draw analogies about racism and difference, here on Earth race is — at its core — a social construction enforced by social codes, not a biological category. Attempts to structure ideas of race in terms of biological difference have always been deeply rooted in the material need to justify racism in order to perpetuate systems such as slavery. (See, for example, Steven Jay Gould’s classic The Mismeasure of Man for a comprehensive look at the roots of “race science” or “bioracism,” and Karen Fields and Barbara Fields’s masterful Racecraft for more on the relationship between slavery, racism, and the construction of race.) Human beings, whatever their racial identity, possess agency. Enslaved human beings, even in the most brutal days of the chattel system, were self-directed beings who not only felt pain and experienced self-perception but who loved, reasoned, wrote, and above all fought for their own freedom. Other species will never display that kind of agency. Ultimately, it is Singer’s individualism — his insistence on seeing racism as an individual moral and intellectual failing rather than as a social system in an unequal society — that prevents him from understanding the problem with posing speciesism and racism as equivalent. Singer argues that “we should treat beings as individuals, rather than as members of a species” because he believes, in classic liberal fashion, that regarding every being as a freestanding entity to be evaluated on its own merits, unmoored from any larger context, is the fairest option. Unfortunately, this method of analysis fails utterly to take social, systemic, and even species-level factors into account. It’s quite similar to the liberal argument that racism can be ended through simple “colorblindness.” In addition, his only proposed solutions are based on the individual as the primary unit of agency. Actions you can take toward animal liberation include becoming a vegetarian or vegan, avoiding products where animal experimentation is used, and so on, and arguing with others to do the same. These actions have been ineffective in actually changing the current food system. If you applied this logic to the fight against racism you could avoid racist behaviors, avoid purchasing things from companies with racist practices or policies, or refuse to give your tourist dollars to states or countries with a bad record of racist practices. These individual solutions, however, are ineffective if the goal is to fight racism on a systemic level. Racism is woven into the fabric of US capitalism; boycotts are only effective when they are part of the strategy of a mass movement that directly challenges the systemic nature of racism. In another interview in the same series, conducted in January 2015, Yancy asks philosopher Judith Butler about the slogan “All Lives Matter.” Yancy notes that white people — the kinds of liberals who “can’t see color” — often espouse “All Lives Matter” whenever the cry goes up that Black Lives Matter. Do all lives matter? Of course they do — but in a context in which black lives are treated by the police, by the courts, and by the majority of whites as less valuable, the very universality of “All Lives Matter” becomes a mockery, a dismissal of black lives in particular. As Butler puts it: We cannot have a race-blind approach to the questions: which lives matter? Or, which lives are worth valuing? If we jump too quickly to the universal formulation, “all lives matter,” then we miss the fact that black people have not yet been included in the idea of “all lives.” To make that universal formulation concrete, to make that into a living formulation, one that truly extends to all people, we have to foreground those lives that are not mattering now, to mark that exclusion, and militate against it. In the same vein, to make purely utilitarian arguments about the worth of the lives of people with disabilities and people of color without regard for the historical context in which such lives have been and still are consistently treated as being of less worth — to pretend that the playing field is level — is, whatever the intent of conclusion of those arguments, itself a form of moral violence. Of course, there are plenty of good reasons to become a vegetarian, to advocate for better treatment for animals, or to oppose factory farming. At the end of the day, though, the “speciesism” argument, with its false equivalence to racism and its insistence that “animal lives matter,” is simply incompatible with a genuine antiracism.

#### Link turn—we prevent AI from overtaking animals and save the lives of billions of insects by preventing them from being mistaken as enemies.

#### No links—

#### @ Pop – we ban AI because we think it’ll be way faster and better than humans—we are human inferiority.

#### @ Estrada – we don’t like LAWs because they trigger accidental war—that harms everything—see the weighing above

## AT: Nationstate K

### 1AR – Nationstate K

#### Framework – debate should be about the hypothetical consequences of the plan – most fair because the plan is the only predictable stasis point – infinite reps and epistemologies explodes prep burdens. Not weighing the aff moots 6 minutes of the 1AC and prevents rigorous comparison that refines scholarship to produce the best political strategy.

#### Fairness outweighs – Only impact the ballot can solve, necessary to evaluate all arguments, and debate is a game with switch sides and speech times.

#### Perm do both: Either the alt solves the links or it can’t overcome the status quo

#### Alt Fails:

#### 1 – Localized politics has no chance at deterring revisionist powers

#### 2 – Only alternative to the aff is nationalist politicians arms racing and amping up the divide between countries as they fear each others’s intentions.

#### 3 – rupture doesn’t create a blueprint, but the plan does create a new paradigm of arms control allowing coop.

#### 4 – Nation-state inevitable and resilient – economic and national identity data both prove.

Rodrik, Prof. of Economics, 12

(Dani Rodrik, Prof. in Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard, “Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography— Who Needs the Nation-State?” *Economic Geography*, 89(1): 1-19)

Yet the nation-state refuses to wither away. It has proved remarkably resilient and remains the main determinant of the global distribution of income, the primary locus of market-supporting institutions, and the chief repository of personal attachments and affiliations. Consider a few facts. To test my students’ intuition about the determinants of global inequality, I ask them on the first day of class whether they would rather be rich in a poor country or poor in a rich country. I tell them to consider only their own consumption level and to think of rich and poor as referring to the top and bottom 10 percent of a country’s income distribution. A rich country, in turn, is one in the top decile of the intercountry distribution of per capita incomes, while a poor country is one in the bottom. Armed with this background, typically a majority of the students respond that they would rather be rich in a poor country. They are in fact massively wrong. Defined the way I just did, the poor in a rich country are more than three times richer than the rich in a poor country (Rodrik 2011, chap. 7). The optical illusion that leads the students astray is that the superrich with the BMWs and gated mansions they have seen in poor countries are a miniscule proportion of the population—significantly fewer than the top 10 percent I asked them to focus on. By the time we consider the average of the top decile as a whole, we have taken a huge leap down the income scale. The students have just discovered a telling feature of the world economy: our economic fortunes are determined primarily by where (which country) we are born and only secondarily by our location on the income-distribution scale. Or to put it in more technical but also more accurate terms, most of global inequality is accounted for by inequality across rather than within nations (Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002). So much for globalization having revoked the relevance of national borders. Second, consider the role of national identity. One may imagine that attachments to the nation-state have worn thin between the push of transnational affinities, on the one hand, and the pull of local connections, on the other hand. But this does not seem to be the case. National identity remains alive and well, even in some surprising corners of the world. To see the strength of national identity, let us turn to the 2004–8 round of the World Values Survey, which covered about 83,000 individuals in 57 countries (http:// www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). The respondents to the survey were asked a range of questions about the strength of their local, national, and global attachments. I measured the strength of national attachments by computing the percentages of respondents who “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the statement “I see myself as a citizen of [country, nation].” I measured the strength of global attachments, in turn, by the percentages of respondents who “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the statement “I see myself as a world citizen.” In each case, I subtracted these percentages from analogous percentages for “I see myself as a member of my local community” to provide for some kind of normalization. In other words, I measured national and global attachments relative to local attachments. Figure 1 shows the results for the entire global sample, as well as for the United States, the European Union, China, and India individually. What stands out is not so much that national identity is vastly stronger than identity as a “global citizen” —that much was predictable. The surprising finding is how it apparently exerts a stronger pull than membership in the local community, as can be observed in the positive percentages for normalized national identity. This tendency is true across the board and the strongest in the United States and India, two vast countries where we may have expected local attachments to be, if anything, stronger than attachment to the nation-state. I find it also striking that European citizens feel so little attachment to the European Union. In fact, as Figure 1 shows, the idea of citizenship in the European Union seems as remote to Europeans as that of global citizenship, despite long decades of European integration and institution building. It bears saying that these survey results pertain to the period before the present crisis. One can safely guess that European attachments have worn even thinner since 2008.

#### 5 – The international sphere is anarchic and states are self interested—there is no overarching government body we can deal with.

#### Use of the nation isn’t a link—we use it to make international coop through alliances

#### Their theory of power is too restrictive and lacks predictive power---The existence of the nation-state alone cannot explain conflict because it ignores specific tensions and doesn’t explain alliance—the US doesn’t go to war with France because they’re a nation-state

#### Link Turn:

#### 1---Aff is about how specific leaders and military doctrine can affect foreign policy---We do take into account subnational issues.

#### 2---Aff creates international cooperation in banning laws that defuses nationalist arms racing—think back to the cold war and how politicized every issue became—that new LAWs cold war is coming now except it wont remain cold.

#### 3---Aff is the best of both worlds---We maintain deterrence, while also enabling a politics that takes into account localized voices and produces egalitarian policies that reflect the populace

### 1AR – Nation State K Impact Turn Variation

#### The complexity thesis is wrong---makes policymaking impossible

Dr. Sebastian L. V. Gorka et al 12, Director of the Homeland Defense Fellows Program at the College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University, teaches Irregular Warfare and US National Security at NDU and Georgetown, et al., Spring 2012, “The Complexity Trap,” Parameters, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/2012spring/Gallagher_Geltzer_Gorka.pdf>

We live in a world of unprecedented complexity, or so we are told. President Obama’s words above echo an increasingly common narrative in the American foreign policy and national security establishments: the forces of globalization, rising nonstate actors, irregular conflict, and proliferating destructive technologies have made crafting sound national security strategy more elusive than ever before. 2 If “strategy is the art of creating power” by specifying the relationship among ends, ways, and means, 3 then the existence of unprecedented complexity would seem to make this art not only uniquely difficult today but also downright dangerous, inasmuch as choosing any particular course of action would preclude infinitely adaptive responses in the future. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates memorably described, the pre-9/11 challenges to American national security were “amateur night compared to the world today.” 4 And as former State Department Director of Policy Planning Anne-Marie Slaughter recently stated, there is a “universal awareness that we are living through a time of rapid and universal change,” one in which the assumptions of the twentieth century make little sense. 5 The “Mr. Y” article that occasioned her comments argued that, in contrast to the “closed system” of the twentieth century that could be controlled by mankind, we now live in an “open system” defined by its supremely complex and protean nature. 6 Unparalleled complexity, it seems, is the hallmark of our strategic age.¶ These invocations of complexity permeate today’s American national security documents and inform Washington’s post-Cold War and -9/11 strategic culture. The latest Quadrennial Defense Review begins its analysis with a description of the “complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. Not since the fall of the Soviet Union or the end of World War II has the international terrain been affected by such farreaching and consequential shifts.” 7 In a similar vein, the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025 argues that the international system is trending towards greater degrees of complexity as power is diffused and actors multiply. 8 The Director of National Intelligence’s Vision 2015 terms our time the “Era of Uncertainty,” one “in which the pace, scope, and complexity of change are increasing.” 9 Disturbingly, the younger generation of foreign policy and national security professionals seems to accept and embrace these statements declaiming a fundamental change in our world and our capacity to cope with it. The orientation for the multi-thousand-member group of Young Professionals in Foreign Policy calls “conquering complexity” the fundamental challenge for the millennial generation. Complexity, it appears, is all the rage. ¶ We challenge these declarations and assumptions—not simply because they are empirically unfounded but, far more importantly, because they negate the very art of strategy and make the realization of the American national interest impossible. We begin by showing the rather unsavory consequences of the current trend toward worshipping at complexity’s altar and thus becoming a member of the “Cult of Complexity.” Next, we question whether the world was ever quite as simple as today’s avowers of complexity suggest, thus revealing the notion of today’s unprecedented complexity to be descriptively false. We then underscore that this idea is dangerous, given the consequences of an addiction to complexity. Finally, we offer an escape from the complexity trap, with an emphasis on the need for prioritization in today’s admittedly distinctive international security environment. Throughout, we hope to underscore that today’s obsession with complexity results in a dangerous denial of the need to strategize.

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#### Nation State identity protects the environment

Contorno 2012[Lauren- "The Influence of Cosmopolitan Values on Environmental Attitudes: An International Comparison," Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research:Vol. 17 (2012)]NM

In contrast to the idea of cosmopolitanism evoking environmentalism, others have argued that patriotic values would serve as an effective basis for the environmental movement. Phillip Cafaro argues that patriotism is a virtue, and “environmentalism is one of its most important manifestations.”23 Cafaro defines patriotism as “love, devotion, and a strong differential concern for one’s own locality, state, region, or country, shown both in thought and action.”24 Instead of advocating for a cosmopolitan conception of citizenship, Cafaro charges that it is an attachment to one’s own nation that leads to environmental concern. He bolsters his argument by noting how patriotism has been an important influence in several environmental conservation movements throughout U.S. history. “In the campaigns to create Yellowstone, Yosemite, Grand Canyon, and other national parks in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, patriotic rhetoric often figured prominently.”25 Convincingly, Cafaro argues that “environmentalism can only be a life-affirming and personally enriching activity if it involves connection to the land and communities around you.”26 In other words, it may be difficult for the everyday citizen to form an attachment and moral obligation to ecosystems around the world, because a connection with landscapes often only materializes when one has meaningful, first-hand interactions with it. His overarching defense for patriotic values’ place in the environmental movement is summarized when he says “dividing the world up into smaller units called nations is one way to facilitate real, effective citizenship in an immense world of 6.7 billion people. In the same way, knowledge and devotion to particular landscapes makes environmentalism possible.”27

#### Cosmopolitanism is a neocolonialist reinscription of the first world on the weak making borders inevitable

Rasch, 2010 [Henry H. H.William Remak Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University" Human Rights as Geopolitics: Carl Schmitt and the Legal Form of American Supremacy." Cultural Critique 54 (2003): 120-47. Project Muse. Web. 9 Jan 2012]

And yet, despite—indeed, because of—the all-encompassing embrace, the detested other is never allowed to leave the stage altogether. Even as we seem on the verge of actualizing Kant's dream, as Habermas puts it, of "a cosmopolitan order" that **unites all peopl**es and abolishes war **under** the auspices of "**the states of the First World**" who "can afford to harmonize their national interests to a certain extent with the norms that define the halfhearted cosmopolitan aspirations of the UN" (1998, 165, 184), it is still fascinating to see how the barbarians make their functionally necessary presence felt. John Rawls, in his The Law of Peoples (1999), conveniently divides the world into well-ordered peoples and those who are not well ordered. Among the former are the "reasonable liberal peoples" and the "decent hierarchical peoples" (4). Opposed to them are the "outlaw states" and other "burdened" peoples who are not worthy of respect. Liberal peoples, who, by virtue of their history, possess superior institutions, culture, and moral character (23-25), have not only the right to deny non-well-ordered peoples respect, but the duty to extend what Vitoria called "brotherly correction" and Habermas "gentle compulsion" (Habermas 1997, 133). 13 That is, Rawls believes that the "refusal to tolerate" those states deemed to be outlaw states "is a consequence of liberalism and decency." Why? Because outlaw states violate human rights. What are human rights? "What I call human rights," Rawls states, "are ... a proper subset of the rights possessed by citizens in a liberal constitutional democratic regime, or of the rights of the members of a decent hierarchical society" (Rawls 1999, 81). Because of their violation of these liberal rights, nonliberal, nondecent societies do not even have the right "to protest their condemnation by the world society" (38), and decent peoples have the right, if necessary, to wage just wars against them. Thus, [End Page 140] liberal societies are not merely contingently established and historically conditioned forms of organization; they become the universal standard against which other societies are judged. Those found wanting are banished, as outlaws, from the civilized world. Ironically, one of the signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy, on sovereignty. As Rawls states, "Human rights are a class of rights that play a special role in a reasonable Law of Peoples: they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to a regime's internal autonomy. In this way they reflect the two basic and historically profound changes in how the powers of sovereignty have been conceived since World War II" (79). Yet, what Rawls sees as a postwar development in the notion of sovereignty—that is, its restriction—could not, in fact, have occurred had it not been for the unrestricted sovereign powers of the victors of that war, especially, of course, the supreme power of the United States. The limitation of (others') sovereignty is an imposed limitation, imposed by a sovereign state that has never relinquished its own sovereign power.

#### Nation state identity is inevitable and key to solving multiple scenarios for violence and war

Calhoun 7 [Craig, Prof of Social Science at New York University and President of the Social Science Research Council”, Nations Matter: Citizenship, Solidarity and the Cosmopolitcan Dream, p 3-7]

The idea of a nation-state is arguably pernicious. The hyphen ties the notion of a historically or naturally unified people who intrinsically belong together to that of a modern polity with unprecedented military power and capacity for effective internal administration. It has been a recipe for conflicts both internal and external. Populations straddle borders or move long distances to new states while retaining allegiances to old nations. Dominant groups demand that governments enforce cultural conformity, challenging both the individual freedom and the vitality that comes from cultural creativity. And yet, the nation-state neither can be nor should be wished away. Source of so many evils, it is also the framework in which the modern era produced history’s most enduring and successful experiments in largescale democracy. It continues to shape not just the fact of democracy but diversity in its forms (as Chapter 7 suggests). It is basic to the rule of law, not only because most law remains a domestic matter of nation-states but because most international law is literally that: structured by agreements among nation-states. Not least of all, while globalization has produced innumerable paths across state borders, it has opened these very unevenly and disproportionately to the benefit of those with access to high levels of fluid capital. Conversely, it has made belonging to a nation-state and having clear rights within a nation-state more, not less, important. The fact that Hannah Arendt observed more than half a century ago remains true: human rights are secured mainly when they are institutionalized as civil rights.1 In the 1990s, optimistic after the end of the Cold War, a number of enthusiasts for globalization suggested that sovereign states were obsolete. Money, media, and human migrations all flowed across borders; Why should military and political power maintain borders? States bolstered by nationalist passions – and nationalists eager to gain state power – were behind many of the twentieth century’s bloody wars. Surely there was – and remains – a good prima facie case for hoping nation-states might organize less of human loyalty, power, and conflict. And of course new reasons for hating abuses of state authority merged with ancient resentments of state power. But it is one thing to seek limits on the exercise of state power and another to contemplate transcending it. It is one thing to encourage a cosmopolitan pluralism of perspectives and another to regard nationalism as merely a fading inheritance and not a recurrently renewed source of solidarity. It is one thing to seek to advance global civil society and another to imagine democracy can thrive without effective states. The many evils of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries called forth a widespread indignation and, among many, a determination to act. The idea of human rights moved to the forefront not only of discussion but of court cases and treaties. Humanitarian interventions were proposed and implemented in a widening range of circumstances. Ethnic cleansing and genocidal nationalism made the notion that sovereignty should be a barrier to international efforts to do good ring hollow. An international criminal court was created (if not universally recognized). Indeed for a time there seemed no occupation more virtuous than that of a human rights activist or humanitarian aid worker. Almost imperceptibly these shifted from volunteer pursuits and accidental careers for physicians and pacifists to new professional roles, complete with academic courses and credentials, funding from major foundations and national governments, and increasing bureaucracy. And humanitarian action became increasingly intertwined with military interventions, whether for peacekeeping or regime change. At the same time, protesters challenged the dominance of capitalist corporations over the course of globalization. This was misleadingly termed the anti-globalization movement. Though there were some campaigners truly bent on enhancing the autonomy of local populations, most were actually proponents of a different sort of globalization. They objected to environmental depredation, sweatshops, and high prices for necessary drugs but they worked on a global scale and imagined the world in terms of global connections – albeit connections among ordinary people without the powerful mediation of corporations and states. The movement contesting capitalist globalization has not been theory-driven, but its protagonists have shared a general account of the problems of the world in which the twin centers of power – capitalist corporations and nation-states – pursue a logic of self-aggrandizement that neither the natural world nor its human inhabitants can afford. Many have found the language of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri sympathetic: they represent the heterogeneous “multitude” of the world who struggled to be free of a seamless and destructive but nearly exhausted “empire.”2 Something of the same quasi-theory – that states and corporations are both bad and unnecessary – has been widespread among human rights activists and humanitarian aid workers. Both groups, of course, saw first hand the vicious ways in which state elites pursued or held on to power and firms sought or sustained profits. The Sudan is one of the largest scale and longest-lasting examples. Its central government has seldom cared much for the people of Darfur in its west, the non-Arabs of its south, or for that matter most ordinary Sudanese. But the central government has cared about holding the country together and defeating any secessionist movements. It cared all the more when oil was discovered in the south – as did global corporations seeking to extract that oil in “peace.” And it cared all the more when it took on a more pronounced Islamic identity and mission. Despite religious commitment (and partly because of intra-Islamist struggles), it became a peculiarly bad government, but also one too weak to establish peace or prosperity in the Sudan; it unleashed brutal war and civil violence against and among its own people. So there were refugees and internally displaced people, rape as a tactic of war, robber militias, and spreading diseases left untreated. The state did not look very good. Yet by the beginning of the twenty-first century, there were not many left for whom the fantasy of overcoming the state was not tinged with anxiety. Yes, state power was often overweaning, often corrupt, and often mobilized in evil ways. But weak states typically failed their citizens and crises in strong states often unleashed violence and disrupted both lives and livelihoods. Pandemic diseases, global crime, human rights abuses, and forced migration all revealed the dark side to globalization – yet all seemed to call at least in part for better states, not an end to states. Could outsiders make peace in Sudan or would that depend on a more representative, honest, and competent Sudanese government? Or in a range of other African countries, could outside interventions contain the spread of AIDS unless states joined the struggle? And yet, partly because of structural adjustment programs pushed with fiscal good intentions and disastrous human consequences by the World Bank and others, most African states had neither money nor personnel nor health care systems to address AIDS – or for that matter malaria and other diseases. The “failed state” seemed as problematic as the abusive state. And this was not only an issue in Africa but in different local configurations around the world. A great buzzword of the 1990s was “civil society” (see Chapter 4). And indeed, strengthening civil society – loose institutions part neither of the state nor of large-scale projects of capital accumulation – has been an important trend in many places. Both local and transnational voluntary organizations have grown and played crucial roles. Many are religiously inspired and some denominationally organized. Others are secular. All reflect efforts to create social organization on the basis of voluntary relations among people rather than the coercion of either political authority or capital. And yet, civil society organizations depend on money as well as personal connections. And except where states are able to regulate such organizations they are largely unaccountable and nontransparent. Civil society without a public sphere is not necessarily democratic. Civil society is a hugely valuable complement and sometimes corrective to states and markets, but not a substitute for either.3 It is no accident that “global governance” has become almost as ubiquitous a concern in the current decade as global civil society was in the last. But the issues are not only global; they are also national and local. Intermediate powers and solidarities still matter. Individual sovereign states confront a variety of global flows and processes against which they are weak and which in turn weaken some of their other capacities. Global currency and equity markets make it hard for individual countries to operate autonomous fiscal or industrial policies. Global crime is hard to fight with the tools of national legal systems (and especially their domestic criminal law). Global diseases challenge domestic health care systems. Yet these challenges faced by contemporary states no more make them irrelevant than the history of abuses of state power makes the stability and public services states can deliver unimportant. And crucially, most actually existing democracy has been achieved in and through states.

#### Global governance and one-world are bad – nation-states lead to institutional experimentation and diversity – the alternative leads to stagnation and homogeneity

Rodrik, Prof. of Economics, 12

(Dani Rodrik, Prof. in Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard, “Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography— Who Needs the Nation-State?” *Economic Geography*, 89(1): 1-19)

Finally, since there is no fixed, ideal shape for institutions and diversity is the rule rather than exception, a divided global polity presents an additional advantage. It enables experimentation, competition among institutional forms, and learning from others. To be sure, trial and error can be costly when it comes to society’s rules. Still, institutional diversity among nations is as close as we can expect to come to a laboratory in real life. Ober (2010) discussed how competition among Greek city-states during 800–300 BCE fostered institutional innovation in areas of citizenship, law, and democracy, sustaining the relative prosperity of ancient Greece. There are nasty sides to institutional competition. One of them is the nineteenth- century idea of a Darwinian competition among states, whereby wars are the struggle through which we get progress and self-realization of humanity (Kedourie 1993, 47). The equally silly, if less bloody, modern counterpart of this idea is the notion of economic competition among nations, whereby global commerce is seen as a zero-sum game. Both ideas are based on the belief that the point of competition is to lead us to the one perfect model. But competition works in diverse ways. In economic models of “monopolistic competition,” producers compete not just on price but on variety—by differentiating their products from others’ (Lancaster 1971; Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). Similarly, national jurisdictions can compete by offering institutional “services” that are differentiated along the dimensions I discussed earlier. One persistent worry is that institutional competition sets off a race to the bottom. To attract mobile resources—capital, multinational enterprises, and skilled professionals— jurisdictions may lower their standards and relax their regulations in a futile dynamic to outdo other jurisdictions. Once again, this argument overlooks the multidimensional nature of institutional arrangements. Tougher regulations or standards are presumably put in place to achieve certain objectives: they offer compensating benefits elsewhere. We may all wish to be free to drive at any speed we want, but few of us would move to a country with no speed limit at all where, as a result, deadly traffic accidents would be much more common. Similarly, higher labor standards may lead to happier and more productive workers; tougher financial regulation to greater financial stability; and higher taxes to better public services, such as schools, infrastructure, parks, and other amenities. It is interesting that at the time that I wrote this essay, the European debate on bank capital requirements focused not on ensuring that countries do not undercut harmonized rules but on ensuring that they do not raise their requirements too far above Basel III norms.

**Predictions are possible and useful**

**Mearsheimer, 01** (John, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001 p. 8, googleprint)

As a result, all political forecasting is bound to include some error. Those who venture to predict, as I do here, should therefore proceed with humility, take care not to exhibit unwarranted confidence, and admit that hindsight is likely to reveal surprises and mistakes. Despite these hazards, social scientists should nevertheless use their theories to make predictions about the future. Making predictions helps inform policy discourse, because it helps make sense of events unfolding in the world around us. And by clarifying points of disagreement, making explicit forecasts helps those with contradictory views to frame their own ideas more clearly. Furthermore, trying to anticipate new events is a good way to test social science theories, because theorists do not have the benefit of hindsight and therefore cannot adjust their claims to fit the evidence (because it is not yet available). In short, the world can be used as a laboratory to decide which theories best explain international politics. In that spirit I employ offensive realism to peer into the future, mindful of both the benefits and the hazards of trying to predict events.

## AT: Fem

### 1AR – AT: Fem K

#### Framework – debate should be about the hypothetical consequences of the plan – most fair because the plan is the only predictable stasis point – infinite reps and epistemologies explodes prep burdens. Not weighing the aff moots 6 minutes of the 1AC and prevents rigorous comparison that refines scholarship to produce the best political strategy.

#### Fairness outweighs – Only impact the ballot can solve, necessary to evaluate all arguments, and debate is a game with switch sides and speech times.

#### Extinction outweighs – future generations deserve the choice to live; life is a pre-req to theorizing and executing praxis like the alt; extinction is slow and painful for all living beings through starvation, dehydration, and cancer; and If you’re unsure which value frame is right, stick around another day to find out.

#### Perm, do both – Either the alt can solve the links, or cannot solve the status quo

#### Alt can’t solve – interrogation of gendered representations does nothing to convince the patriarchy to stop destroying the world

#### Empirics prove perm is best and progress possible – arms control incorporating gender analysis

Acheson 18 (Ray, director of Reaching Critical Will, interviewed by Kristina Lunz, CFFP Germany Director, Center for Feminist Foreign Policy, 12/6/18, <https://centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/interviews/2018/12/5/ray-acheson)>///AG

* GBV = Gender-based violence
* WILPF = Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

KL: The Arms Trade Treaty from 2014 was the first treaty on disarmament that included gender specific issues such as GBV. Can you elaborate a bit more on where gender specific aspects are included in disarmament work and especially what is missing? RA: Yes, there was a campaign that was lead by WILPF together with the [International Action Network on Small Arms](https://www.iansa.org/) and Amnesty International to ensure that [gender-based violence was included](https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/20150317/) in the Arms Trade Treaty as a legally binding provision so that states would not be able to export arms if there was a risk of gender-based violence being committed. It was a tough campaign in the beginning, countries were not convinced at all about the relationship between gender-based violence and the arms trade, but we did a lot of work over a seven-year period to educate diplomats and other officials, and to work with civil society groups to raise these issues, and, by the end of the negotiations, we had over 100 countries agreeing that there should be a legally binding provision in the Treaty. That now is a **legally binding requirement** for any country that has joined the [Arms Trade Treaty](https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/att/). But what we're seeing is that a lot of countries keep saying that they don't really understand how to implement it, so a few years ago RCW did a big study on what resources export officials need to look at, how they can find information about the risk of gender-based violence and how to make proper decisions on this issue. Of course, for WILPF, it's a little bit tricky because we're opposed to militarism and the arms trade is a big contributor to the use and proliferation of weapons around the world, but we are trying to provide government with tools to implement this provision and think about how conflict and gender-based violence are intimately related. In the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons there is also a reference to the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons specifically in relation to women and girls because of the impact that [ionising radiation physically has on women and girls’ bodies](https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2017/07/20170707%2003-42%20PM/Ch_XXVI_9.pdf). There is also a recognition of the **importance of women's participation** in disarmament and **arms control** negotiations and policies and practices in the TPNW. Some other strides that been made; [recently at the UN, 57 countries came together to join a statement on gender and disarmament](https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/securing-our-common-future-promoting-gender-responsive-disarmament-and-security/) looking at the way in which countries need to take up the question of gender diversity, including **women's participation** in disarmament negotiations and processes, and also the **gendered impacts** of weapons. There was also a reference to the need to understand how gender norms impact disarmament and arms control policies. There is a **growing recognition** of the importance of women being included in peacebuilding and peace processes and disarmament, but it really often stops there. Sometimes we get acknowledgement of the gendered impacts, which means how women might be physically or even socially impacted differently from the use of proliferation of weapons, but we haven't gone further than that. The work that has been done so far largely leaves out an analysis of gendered norms and dynamics, such as consideration of violent masculinity and the ways in which ideas about the what is “feminine” and “masculine” affect our approaches to disarmament and disarmament issues. It also excludes anybody who does not identify as a **cisgender** man or a woman, as there is no recognition of a non-binary, transgender, genderqueer or other identities and experiences. Including these perspectives and people in disarmament discussions is going to be of vital importance moving forward in order to develop a robust understanding of gender and weapons, implications for disarmament, and for developing feminist foreign policies.

#### 1 – Survivalism wrong – we want people to live because they’re people but also flips the other way because men have reproductive capabilities

#### The 1ac’s representation of nuclear war empowers critique and produces ethical solidarity

Aistrope and Fishel 20 [Tim Aistrope, Lecturer in International Relations, Stefanie Fishel, Lecturer of Politics and International Relations, University of the Sunshine Coast, “Horror, apocalypse and world politics,” International Affairs, Volume 96, Issue 3, May 2020, Pages 631–648, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa008//lhs-ap]

The representation of nuclear apocalypse gives a strong sense of the potential for ethical engagement at the intersection of horror and world politics. Indeed, we can see this engagement in practice in the powerful constraints often associated with the so-called ‘nuclear taboo’, which, at least in part, helps explain the non-use of nuclear weapons since the Second World War. Nina Tannenwald highlights the horrific effects of nuclear weapons as one of three pillars supporting the taboo.71 For Tannenwald, the early link between chemical and nuclear weapons, established through the association of radiation and poison gas, connected nuclear weapons with the chemical horrors of the First World War, since universally banned under the laws of war. No doubt the direct representation of those horrors for the general public in films like The War Game and Threads helped embed this deep aversion, not least by dramatizing nuclear fallout. Tannenwald also points to the constraining power of empathy, again strongly resonant with accounts of everyday life destroyed. As we have highlighted above with reference to Sontag and Rorty, ethical considerations can be provoked, grounded and sustained through narrative engagement with the experiences of others—and the horror genre narrates human suffering in a uniquely affecting and vicarious way. Indeed, Jessica Rapson has argued, persuasively, that The War Game provokes a profound cosmopolitanism, first, through references to Hiroshima and Nagasaki that bridge cultural and historical context, and second, through its focus on everyday life and common experience, which people everywhere can relate to.72 But nuclear war is also distinct in its destructiveness. As N. A. J. Taylor has explained in his ground-breaking treatment of the subject, nuclear harm shatters the biosphere and threatens the very conditions for life on earth.73 In that sense, it may be the most universal ground for ethics that has ever been available.

#### 2 – Jones wrong – war is bad but it could get infinitely worse – independently, aff’s argument is about how human development of unstable AI will cause conflict

#### 3 – Utopian fiat is a voting issue – impossible for the affirmative to generate offense against alternatives that wish away oppression

### Root Cause

#### War turns structural violence, not the other way around.

Goldstein 01 Joshua S. Goldstein, professor of International Relations at American University, Washington D.C. He is the author of a broad range of research works on international conflict, cooperation, and political economy, with a central focus on great-power relations and world order. 2001. War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa. Cambridge University Press. pp. 412

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.10

### AT: Shepherd/Pos Peace

#### Negative peace precedes positive peace—absence of war is a prerequisite to social justice.

Folk 78 Jerry Folk, Professor of Religious and Peace Studies at Bethany College, 1978 ("Peace Education – Peace Studies Programs: Towards an Integrated Approach," Peace & Change, Volume 5, Number 1, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 58)

Those proponents of the positive peace approach who reject out of hand the work of researchers and educators coming to the field from the perspective of negative peace too easily forget that **the prevention of a nuclear confrontation of global dimensions is the prerequisite for all other peace research, education, and action. Unless such a confrontation can be avoided there will be no world left in which to build positive peace**.12 Moreover, **the blanket condemnation of** all such **negative peace** oriented research, education or action **as a reactionary attempt to support and reinforce the status quo is doctrinaire**. **Conflict theory and resolution, disarmament studies, studies of the international system and of international organizations, and integration studies are in themselves neutral. They do not intrinsically support either the status quo or revolutionary efforts to change or overthrow it. Rather they offer a body of knowledge which can be used for either purpose or for some purpose in between. It is much more logical for those who understand peace as positive peace to integrate this knowledge into their own framework and to utilize it in achieving their own purposes. A balanced peace studies program should therefore offer the student exposure to the questions and concerns which occupy those who view the field essentially from the point of view of negative peace**.13

## AT: Mitchell Extinction Reps

### 0 – Note

#### Answers are in order of importance – If you don’t have time, its ok to stop reading as long as you get through framework and extinction outweighs

### 1AR – AT: Mitchell Extinction K

#### Framework – Weigh the aff and alt must materially solve. Else moot the aff since advantages are based on the desirability of the plan, not its rhetoric.

#### 1---Fairness---Only impact the ballot can solve---outweighs---intrinsic good---debate is a game and turns critical engagement

#### 2---Clash---Develops skills like argument comparison that enable long-term movements

#### Extinction outweighs –

#### 1] Nukes hurt – Nuclear war would be a slow, painful death from starvation, radiation poisoning, resource wars, etc.

#### 2] Agency – Involuntary mass death forecloses subject formation – Turns [K Impact] by deciding who lives and who dies.

#### 3] Extinction focus bad collapses to tautology – The only warrant for [K Impact] outweighs is [K Impact] outweighs.

#### Perm, do both – Either the alt can solve the links, or cannot solve the status quo

#### Extinction bad impact turns the alt’s apathy towards extinction

#### The 1ac’s representation of nuclear war is not futurism or voyeurism, but rather empowers critique and produces ethical solidarity

Aistrope and Fishel 20 [Tim Aistrope, Lecturer in International Relations, Stefanie Fishel, Lecturer of Politics and International Relations, University of the Sunshine Coast, “Horror, apocalypse and world politics,” International Affairs, Volume 96, Issue 3, May 2020, Pages 631–648, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa008//lhs-ap]

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## AT: Security

### 1AR – AT: Security

#### Framework – debate should be about the hypothetical consequences of the plan – most fair because the plan is the only predictable stasis point – infinite reps and epistemologies explodes prep burdens. Not weighing the aff moots 6 minutes of the 1AC and prevents rigorous comparison that refines scholarship to produce the best political strategy.

#### Fairness outweighs – Only impact the ballot can solve, necessary to evaluate all arguments, and debate is a game with switch sides and speech times.

#### 2---Extinction outweighs---forecloses infinite future value, war would be a slow, painful death, only irreversible impact, AND VTL is subjective and never zero.

#### 3---No link – Threats real – Their authors don’t speak to our specific evidence backed by rigorous research

#### 4---Perm do both---Either the alt can solve the links or it can’t solve the status quo

#### 5---Our securitization is good, no impact, perm solves

Eric Van Rythoven 19. PhD in Political Science from Carleton University. Journal of Global Security Studies and the International Studies Association and the Canadian Political Science Association. “The Securitization Dilemma.” <https://academic.oup.com/jogss/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jogss/ogz028/5532523#137694797>.

Tragedy is largely absent from the existing normative debate on securitization. Instead, the debate has become organized around whether securitization is a “negative” or “positive” concept. In the classic formulation, the Copenhagen School points to how “[n]ational security should not be idealized. It works to silence opposition and has given power-holders many opportunities to exploit ‘threats’ for domestic purposes” (Buzan et al. 1998, 29; Williams 2003). Securitization has negative effects when it functions as “a political technology that consistently favors the interests of the powerful and enables violence and exclusion” (McDonald 2015, 154). Correspondingly, Wæver admits a “‘bias’ for desecuritization” or de-escalation, although he quickly notes that this is “not always better than securitization” (Wæver 2011, 469). At the same time, a number of approaches point to cases where securitization is ethically desirable. In her compelling consequentialist argument, for example, Floyd asks “whether the consequences of, and the gains from, the securitization are preferable relative to the consequences and gains from a politicization” (2007, 338). Relatedly, Roe contends that “the extent to which securitization necessitates a lack of openness and deliberation has been overexaggerated” and suggests it may even elicit unappreciated forms of cooperation (2012, 250).

The problem with the negative/positive debate is that it appears to impose moral certitude where there often is none. Registering securitizing moves as clearly positive or negative can be difficult because their effects can be mixed and temporally distant. The difficulty in making this determination may also be an indicator of the uncertainty surrounding securitizing moves. In the end, because the outcomes of security claims are uncertain, we cannot know in advance whether they will lead to positive or negative consequences. Instead, we should entertain a distinctly tragic vision of securitization that councils an ethic of self-limitation. The core of this tragic vision is a recognition that the powerful allure of using security talk to “gain control” over a situation will always be present (Wæver 1995, 54). However, we should also recognize that this control is always illusory because it presumes all of its effects can be predetermined. The tragedy of securitization is that the failure to recognize how contingency imposes limits on action lures political actors into a false sense of certainty and the conviction that they can determine the future. This leads to a hubristic adoption of “misplaced certainty,” such as when Vice President Dick Cheney declared in August of 2002 that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction” (quoted in Mitzen and Schweller 2011, 3). A similar situation emerged when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld subsequently claimed in November that the Iraq conflict could be “[f]ive days or five weeks or five months, but it certainly isn’t going to last any longer than that” (Esterbrook 2002). A similarly misplaced certainty is evident in US General Stanley McChrystal’s assurances to the Obama administration in 2009 that a surge in troops and resources were critical to stave off American defeat in Afghanistan (Woodward 2009). More recently, it is visible in President Donald Trump’s 2018 assertion that he was “100 percent right” on the weaknesses of the Iran nuclear deal (CNN 2018).

Yet, tragedy cuts both ways. Blanket opposition to securitizing moves can also have unanticipated effects. Ironically, the desecuritization of an issue may not just result in its repoliticization, but in its disappearance from public view (Floyd 2010, 57–58). Viewing security discourse as negative also underplays how the management of threats can serve as a focal point for democratic cooperation among different political actors (Roe 2012, 250, 257–58). The point is not that every security discourse and the practices it justifies has catastrophically perverse consequences. Instead, the goal is to highlight a sensible restraint over the limits of seeing into the future, how this shapes choice, and the dangers of hubris that follow. When properly adapted to this constructivist context, the tragic vision of securitization can be an important tool in cultivating prudence and restraint (cf. Lebow 2003, 364).

The problem with this tragic vision is that it points to processes that are never entirely in our possession. Whether in the form of background knowledge (Pouliot 2008), habits (Hopf 2010), or routines (Mitzen 2006), much of social life occurs without conscious deliberation and reflection. These forms of unthinking action impair reflexivity and limit actors’ ability to see how the world might be different and thus how outcomes can be uncertain. In some cases, this can be benign, such as the unreflexive amity between Canada and the United States that allows these countries to “escape” from the traditional security dilemma (Collins 2014, 572–73). But just as practices of amity can be habitual, so too can enmity. The hawkish US senator may designate Iran’s nuclear program as threatening because that is what hawkish US senators do, and there is no perceived way to be hawkish otherwise. The result is that the uncertainty surrounding securitizing moves becomes concealed under an unthinking veil of common sense. The tragedy of securitization then is not only that political figures often exceed their limitations by ignoring how contingency can derail securitizing moves—it is that these limitations often never even register

This means overcoming the tragedy of securitization require a certain degree self-reflexivity. This is similar to what Booth and Wheeler describe as the “security dilemma sensibility,” or an actor’s ability and willingness to reflect upon their actions, including one’s own role in provoking insecurity in others (2008, 7). By sensitizing leaders to how uncertainty is an endemic feature of political life, and how their actions can be interpreted in unintended ways, security competition can be mitigated, at least in part (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 265). Yet, these moments of self-awareness and reflection are difficult precisely because there are powerful forces that demand simplicity and closure: namely our desire for a stable sense of self or what is widely referred to as ontological security (Mitzen 2006). Reflecting on the uncertainty of international politics can erode one’s sense of identity and agency, ultimately leading to a “deep, incapacitating state of not knowing how to get by in the world” (Mitzen and Schweller 2011, 29). Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma sensibility may have the laudable goal of alerting leaders to the role of uncertainty in political life, but this confronts the problem that many would prefer that it remain hidden.

The consequence is that this tragic aspect of the securitization dilemma takes on an intractable character. Either unwilling or unable to “know one’s limits,” as Herz would say (1950, 179), the role of uncertainty becomes hidden and security claims appear as a reliable strategy for control and influence. Like the classic realist dilemma, the securitization dilemma is pervasive because it is often invisible. The compelling need for a logic of selflimitation—of a careful and reflective use of security language and how it can be derailed by contingency— is obscured because of an aversion to recognizinguncertainty. It is this specter of a need for reflection and restraint that may not be realized, I suggest, which demands that we rethink the role of the analyst in provoking reflexivity among power-holders.

Conclusion: Rethinking the Role of the Analyst

Motivated by the absence of unintended and perverse consequences in constructivist theorizing of security, this article has pursued a reconceptualization of the security dilemma. Viewing the dilemma as a logic of limitation shaped by choice, uncertainty, and tragedy, the argument focuses on transposing this logic to the constructivist context of securitization theory. By showing how the choice to engage in the social construction of threats is complicated by uncertainty and the tragic failure to recognize one’s own limits, the dilemma analytic helps us to understand how securitization can be both a potent instrument for mobilization, as well as a volatile source of unpredictability. Moreover, this conceptual lens lays the foundation for an ethical imperative of self-limitation among securitizing actors—albeit one made difficult given the desire for simplicity and closure. Far from a rebuke of constructivist theorizing, the argument shows that taking the social character of security seriously means appreciating how political claims are always vulnerable to being derailed by different types of contingency.

This reconstructive move has important implications for studying the social construction of security. First, while the initial influence of realism on securitization theory is well-documented (Floyd 2010; Gad and Peterson 2011), few attempts have been made to show how engaging with these realist roots can yield new insights.22 Here, the reconstruction of the security dilemma demonstrates how returning to realist themes can yield a fresh insights. Second, the argument pushes scholars studying securitization to expand their universe of outcomes beyond the reductive binary of success and failure and to consider cases of perverse and unintended consequences. Not only are these outcomes relatively common, they undercut the prevailing image of securitization as a reliable technology of control. Third, the securitization dilemma shows why uncertainty is more of an enduring problem for social action than constructivists typically acknowledge. Contra earlier arguments where learning and socialization effectively mitigate the problem of uncertainty (Wendt 2006, 208–9), this perspective stresses how contingency means that social acts like securitizing moves can have unpredictable effects.

The most important result of this reconstruction, however, may be in how taking the tragic element of the dilemma seriously reorders the political role of the analyst. Rather than assessing the validity of a particular security discourse, or exposing its socially constructed nature, this perspective asks the analyst to provoke reflexivity on behalf of power-holders over the risks associated with securitization. While this entails a bias toward deescalation and desecuritization, unlike other approaches this is not achieved through overt references to any liberal, democratic, or emancipatory ideal. Instead, it is packaged for power-holders as a strategy of self-preservation. Here, the analyst presents the move to securitize as a risk-laden and potentially self-defeating strategy. The analyst points to a series of precedents showing how such a strategy can produce perverse consequences: how today's tough talk can become tomorrow's liability; how audiences can interpret threatening messages in unexpected ways; and how today's framing of security can lead to perverse consequences tomorrow. By foregrounding the problem of uncertainty, the analyst works to accentuate and impress upon actors the dilemmatic quality of securitizing moves.

Yet, the problem with presenting the move to securitize as a risk is that it may become accepted. Ironically, framing an escalation in enmity as possible but dangerous is precisely what may legitimize such a move in the eyes of risk-insensitive actors. This is Huysmans’ (2002) now familiar normative dilemma of writing security. The indeterminacy of language means that political actors may interpret advice in unpredictable ways. Frustratingly, this may include the precise opposite of the analyst's intention. This situation is likely inescapable, but it may be mitigated. What I suggest is that analysts should strive to cultivate a deeper subjectivity of risk sensitivity, comparable to Booth and Wheeler's security-dilemma sensibility, among political actors.

Key to this argument is how visions of the future satisfy the human desire for certainty. As Berenskoetter argues, “visions depicting the self in an imagined future order serve as anxiety controlling mechanisms” (2011, 654). Visions of the future inoculate actors against the anxiety of uncertainty by providing a narrative of where they are going and how to get there. Indeed, normative debates on securitization are already loaded with such visions. The impulse to securitize is underpinned by a utopian future where the security frame can finally mobilize a response to an otherwise intractable problem. Conversely, the impulse to desecuritize is sustained by a dystopian future defined by unrestrained authoritarian politics. A tragic vision of the future does something different: it presents a future where the only thing we can know decisively is that it is indeterminate and attempts to conclusively control it are vulnerable to failure. The very recognition of fundamental limits on human freedom (Steele 2007, 281–82) becomes transformed into a source of ontological security. This tempers the human need for cognitive closure by reconfiguring it into what Herz understood as a “fundamentally humble posture toward the value and precariousness of life” (Sylvest 2008, 442). An actor with a greater sensitivity to indeterminacy may still pursue securitizing moves, but with a cautious awareness that they are volatile acts best pursued sparingly. The analyst does not simply educate political leaders by pointing to the indeterminacy of the world; she seeks to make political subjects more sensitive toward it by crafting visions of a precarious future.

Finally, this tragic vision cannot, and should not, escape its own need for reflexivity. Its scholarly proponents need to engage in their own process of self-reflection, focusing on how their knowledge and interests are themselves historically situated. The ethic of restraint is a value, and not necessarily the value for all historical circumstances. A recognition of the social construction of security “facts” must be sobered by a recognition of the social construction of security “values” (Hamati-Ataya 2012, 685).

#### 6---Perf Con is a voter---justifies bad research and makes offense impossible since they can cross-apply contradictory offense---at worst, justifies severance.

### 1AR – AT: Daynova

#### 1---No us vs them – The aff does not scapegoat another country – We have just said a specific weapon is bad

#### 2---No link – The aff’s solution to security problems is demilitarizing by banning bad weapons, not intervening in other countries

#### 3---Turn – Extinction threats create global empathy that produce more ethical subjects because nuclear war affects everyone – That’s key to avert ethical localism and mobilize debaters for activism beyond themselves – That’s Aistrope and Fishel

#### 4---Turn – Extinction threat challenges dominant social order because pointing out how the threat of extinction still exists despite narratives of progress catalyzes activism to improve the world – That’s Aistrope and Fishel

### 1AR – AT: Dean

#### 1---Perm do both – Either the alt can solve the links or it can’t solve the status quo

#### 2---Refusal is bad – We should be proactive and eliminate bad weapons like LAWS that cause nuclear war – Means we have impact turned the alternative

#### 3---Doesn’t solve – Opacity means other countries don’t know our intentions, so desecuritization is useless absent banning laws

#### 4---Alt fails – Inherent uncertainty in international relations means military tensions will always exist – The aff’s specific arms control policy is necessary to reduce the risk of nuclear war – That’s Blagden

## AT: Managerialism

### 1NC – Tech Managerialism Good

#### Attempts to manage technological problems are inevitable and good – they tend to a fragile working order WITHOUT falling into a strictly managerial approach. That uniquely lets us recognize complexity and accept insecurity

Nordmann, Professor of Philosophy and History of Science and Technoscience at Darmstadt Technical University, ‘18

(Alfred, “Four Horsemen and a Rotten Apple. On the Technological Rationality of Nuclear Security,” in *Jahrbuch Technikphilosophie: Arbeit und Spiel*, pg. 279 – 294)

The apple is rotting. During the times of the Cold War, the precarious equilibrium of strategic threats had its own working order. It could be trusted and, in fact, had to be trusted in many ways. The weapons were carefully monitored, subject to permanent surveillance from many points of view. They were closely watched through the eyes of one's own strategists, technicians and engineers, military personnel, local opposition forces, but also through the eyes of friends and foes, international agencies and monitoring groups. Everyone was attending to the weapons for different, perhaps conflicting reasons, and yet the many observations were maintained in a relation of mutual support. The weapons themselves became fixated and paralyzed at their center of attention.

When the so-called »four horsemen« (Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry, Sam Nunn) and political leaders like Barack Obama have called for a world without nuclear arms, it is because they are worried about the break-down of this working order.24 In their view, the current modes of monitoring, proliferation, negotiation, and sanctioning represent a deviation from the Cold War rationality of deterrence with its system of mutual checks and balances. Accordingly, they call for adequate ways of controlling material flows, of regulating access, of instituting transparency and accountability. Their question is a technical question: Given the half-life of plutonium and given the volatility of systems of government in many parts of the world, how does one institute a robust international system of arms-control? Thus, they worry only secondarily whether the weapons might get into the wrong hands, politically speaking and in the short term. They pose primarily a question from within a technologically advanced, economically and politically robust knowledge society — aside from the United States, who can be counted upon to reliably provide the necessary know-how in the long term? Who can take responsibility for the management of what was once and is no longer a denumerable, firmly circumscribed set of nuclear things?

This point can be further developed by briefly considering three other aspects of the current state of debate: First, as Christopher Daase has pointed out, the extension into the future of the nuclear privilege of weapon states in the NPT becomes questionable when this privilege no longer serves to maintain a taboo in times of strategic conflict but when it somewhat arrogantly declares whose hands are the good hands such that they can be entrusted to carry out a managerial process. Inclusion and exclusion can be justified more easily on the criterion of the possession of nuclear weapons, it becomes contestable if the criterion is the cultural competence of handling with due diligence and care a dangerous and globally endangering commodity.25 Second, this may prove to be the reason why some of the non-nuclear states like Norway, Austria, Mexico are seizing the moment to claim that, if anyone, they are best suited to frame the question or redefine the terms of the debate. They wish to bring the humanitarian consequences to the fore and thus the mishandling of the bomb, irrespective of a balance of power or terror.26 Finally, when the question is one of maintaining or recreating a safe working order for a dangerous technology and when the arms race is taking place between knowledge societies and their claims that the technology is with them in good hands, the general technical capabilities of these societies become increasingly important. The responsibility of diplomats and negotiators in the political and military sphere to create conditions for global security is shifting to the maintenance, broadly speaking, of a safety culture in civil society.

If this diagnosis is correct, the rules of the game have changed as has the rationale for inclusion and exclusion in the club of nuclear-weapon states, and the definition of the community of responsible actors. The global challenge is defined not as preserving peace or security in an age of ideological conflict and competing national interests. Instead, the challenge is one of tending to a working order of nuclear safety and safeguards. Issues of proliferation and disarmament, transparency and control now appear in the collective consciousness as analogous to the global threat of climate change. Both put national and stakeholder interests into a managerial mode. The Earth and the Bomb need to be handled with care — grounded in the perhaps illusory hope that in good hands, with a technical mindset, and attunement to the complexity of affairs, the challenge can be met and the danger contained.

Hazardous Waste

At this point it may appear as if I wanted to recommend or valorize an engineering approach that abstains from moral and political judgement but brings to the table the requisite understanding for maintaining, modulating, recreating a working order or technological system. This is not the case. I am arguing merely that one need to take seriously the different modes of conceiving the problems that are in need of solution — not only because the definition of a problem entails a conception of its solution and the reasoning processes adequate to it. If only for heuristic purposes we should attend to the implications of a shift from the logic of warfare and deterrence to a logic of attunement and trust — attunement to a working order and trust in the good hands of technical expertise. In conclusion, here are some of these implications, briefly stated.

First of all, the acquisition of working knowledge and the ability to maintain and modulate a working order does nothing to justify technocratic approaches or to en-throne the expertise of managers and engineers. As the case of the klu(d)ge served to remind us, deviations from strategic rationality coincide with deviations from top-down engineering or rational design. The situations in which working knowledge comes to the fore are highly ambivalent, whether it is the challenge of maintaining a rotten apple or of managing material flows in an ageing nuclear arsenal. In these situations, rational decision making is of the kind where a security update is scheduled to the operating system of a computer and users wonder a bit nervously whether it is really such a good idea to install the update. Not only the readers of Charles Per-row's Normal Accidents will wonder whether the security updates might increase the complexity, perhaps instability, perhaps insecurity of the operating system.27 And of course, with the end of the Cold War, the operating system of nuclear security has been changed, prompting us to ask anew what are the conditions for stability and security.

## AT: Arms Control

### Link – Humanitarian

#### Perm do both – Humanitarian discourse is compatible with the alternative’s radical agenda

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However, strategic adoption of the discourse of humanitarianism and human security – with its problematic detente with militarism – does not mean campaigners are beholden to it. As Caliban retorts in Shakespeare’s Tempest, learning the language of his oppressors means he can now curse Prospero and Miranda in language they understand (Act 1, Scene 2: 363–364). One of the mistakes of many critical studies of humanitarian disarmament is an assumption that all campaigners have wholly bought into their own rhetoric. One can have a radical agenda while speaking the language of the diplomatic arena. The discourse of humanitarian disarmament has been subversive – as evidenced in this case by the fierce defensiveness of the nuclear-armed states. That a ban on nuclear weapons is a partial solution does not necessarily mean a legitimation of the ‘remainder’ problem. A ban can build a precedent, just as the landmine ban has done – having spin-off effects for many years and on unexpected sectors. Of course, it can be difficult for those who do wish to retain a more radical agenda in the everyday ‘common sense’ of nuclear discourse. It requires what Kapoor (2004) calls ‘hyperself-reflexivity’ – relentless self-examination to ensure that the strategic adoption of the humanitarian discourse does not shut down a more sweeping critique of militarization. In aiming to maintain their integrity, it may be useful for these disarmament campaigners to draw on the paradigm of ‘critical solidarity’ (Peters, 2014): humanitarian compassion must be augmented by recognition of privilege and a sense of mutuality with and accountability to those most oppressed by the nuclear order.

#### Abstract Ks of militarism fail – finishing Bryant

Bryant 12 – (9/15, Levi, professor of Philosophy at Collin College and Chair of the Critical Philosophy program at the New Centre for Research and Practice, “War Machines and Military Logistics: Some Cards on the Table,” https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/war-machines-and-military-logistics-some-cards-on-the-table/)

We need answers to these questions to intervene effectively. We can call them questions of “military logistics”. We are, after all, constructing war machines to combat these intolerable conditions. Military logistics asks two questions: first, it asks what things the opposing force, the opposing war machine captured by the state apparatus, relies on in order to deploy its war machine: supply lines, communications networks, people willing to fight, propaganda or ideology, people believing in the cause, etc. Military logistics maps all of these things. Second, military logistics asks how to best deploy its own resources in fighting that state war machine. In what way should we deploy our war machine to defeat war machines like racism, sexism, capitalism, neoliberalism, etc? What are the things upon which these state based war machines are based, what are the privileged nodes within these state based war machines that allows them to function? These nodes are the things upon which we want our nomadic war machines to intervene. If we are to be effective in producing change we better know what the supply lines are so that we might make them our target. What I’ve heard in these discussions is a complete indifference to military logistics. It’s as if people like to wave their hands and say “this is horrible and unjust!” and believe that hand waving is a politically efficacious act. Yeah, you’re right, it is horrible but saying so doesn’t go very far and changing it. It’s also as if people are horrified when anyone discusses anything besides how horribly unjust everything is. Confronted with an analysis why the social functions in the horrible way, the next response is to say “you’re justifying that system and saying it’s a-okay!” This misses the point that the entire point is to map the “supply lines” of the opposing war machine so you can strategically intervene in them to destroy them and create alternative forms of life. You see, we already took for granted your analysis of how horrible things are. You’re preaching to the choir. We wanted to get to work determining how to change that and believed for that we needed good maps of the opposing state based war machine so we can decide how to intervene. We then look at your actual practices and see that your sole strategy seems to be ideological critique or debunking. Your idea seems to be that if you just prove that other people’s beliefs are incoherent, they’ll change and things will be different. But we’ve noticed a couple things about your strategy: 1) there have been a number of bang-on critiques of state based war machines, without things changing too much, and 2) we’ve noticed that we might even persuade others that labor under these ideologies that their position is incoherent, yet they still adhere to it as if the grounds of their ideology didn’t matter much. This leads us to suspect that there are other causal factors that undergird these social assemblages and cause them to endure is they do. We thought to ourselves, there are two reasons that an ideological critique can be successful and still fail to produce change: a) the problem can be one of “distribution”. The critique is right but fails to reach the people who need to hear it and even if they did receive the message they couldn’t receive it because it’s expressed in the foreign language of “academese” which they’ve never been substantially exposed to (academics seem to enjoy only speaking to other academics even as they say their aim is to change the world). Or b) there are other causal factors involved in why social worlds take the form they do that are not of the discursive, propositional, or semiotic order. My view is that it is a combination of both. I don’t deny that ideology is one component of why societies take the form they do and why people tolerate intolerable conditions. I merely deny that this is the only causal factor. I don’t reject your political aims, but merely wonder how to get there. Meanwhile, you ~~guys~~ behave like a war machine that believes it’s sufficient to drop pamphlets out of an airplane debunking the ideological reasons that persuade the opposing force’s soldiers to fight this war on behalf of the state apparatus, forgetting supply lines, that there are other soldiers behind them with guns to their back, that they have obligations to their fellows, that they have families to feed or debt to pay off, etc. When I point out these other things it’s not to reject your political aims, but to say that perhaps these are also good things to intervene in if we wish to change the world. In other words, I’m objecting to your tendency to use a hammer to solve all problems and to see all things as a nail (discursive problems), ignoring the role that material nonhuman entities play in the form that social assemblages take. This is the basic idea behind what I’ve called “terraism”. Terraism has three components: 1) “Cartography” or the mapping of assemblages to understand why they take the form they take and why they endure. This includes the mapping of both semiotic and material components of social assemblages. 2) “Deconstruction” Deconstruction is a practice. It includes both traditional modes of discursive deconstruction (Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralist feminist critique, Foucaultian genealogy, Cultural Marxist critique, etc), but also far more literal deconstruction in the sense of intervening in material or thingly orders upon which social assemblages are reliant. It is not simply beliefs, signs, and ideologies that cause oppressive social orders to endure or persist, but also material arrangements upon which people depend to live as they do. Part of changing a social order thus necessarily involves intervening in those material networks to undermine their ability to maintain their relations or feedback mechanisms that allow them to perpetuate certain dependencies for people. Finally, 3) there is “Terraformation”. Terraformation is the hardest thing of all, as it requires the activist to be something more than a critic, something more than someone who simply denounces how bad things are, someone more than someone who simply sneers, producing instead other material and semiotic arrangements rendering new forms of life and social relation possible. Terraformation consists in building alternative forms of life. None of this, however, is possible without good mapping of the terrain so as to know what to deconstruct and what resources are available for building new worlds. Sure, I care about ontology for political reasons because I believe this world sucks and is profoundly unjust. But rather than waving my hands and cursing because of how unjust and horrible it is so as to feel superior to all those about me who don’t agree, rather than playing the part of the beautiful soul who refuses to get his hands dirty, I think we need good maps so we can blow up the right bridges, power lines, and communications networks, and so we can engage in effective terraformation

#### You have to act to change things – theorizing fails

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West's stated conditions for becoming a successful organic intellectual are an empirical claim about what is necessary, although not sufficient, for real change. If the Left did indeed lose in the decades following the civil rights movement, as West has also claimed, then that in itself would indicate that these necessary conditions are not sufficient for lasting, sustainable change.6 But West's conditions do give us an important distinction between political oppositional discourse as speech, and as action. In a society that protects free speech and recognizes academic freedom, speech by academics is not action. The answer to the question of whether academic enrollment and employment plus relevant group membership and liberatory discourse in speech or writing is enough to qualify a person as an organic intellectual is No. Academics are granted their status as intellectuals by the academy and not in the course of group activism. This is not to say that academic intellectuals might not also be activists. But for those who talk and write as a profession, action can be very difficult to undertake. While action add-ed to academic intellectual status does not confer organic intellectual status, it is beyond speech and writing. So there are two distinctions worth keeping in mind, the first between organic intellectuals and academic intellectuals and the second between academic intellectuals and activists. The main purpose of this distinction between words and action is to clear the way for an appreciation of the difficulty, uncertainty, and perplexity of real-life political activism, and how it requires dedicated (i.e., self-aware and committed) organized action over time by those who do not have official political power. The distinction thus drawn is intended to remind liberatory theorists that their words alone do not have the power to directly change the material world—people have to do things in the world if they hope to change the world, even though what they do may not have even a strong probability of getting the results they hope for. So, for example, when progressives do no more than eloquently express the shamefulness of hungry school children in a land of plenty, they remain on the side of spoken and written discourse. But if they organize a school breakfast program in a local neighborhood with real food going into the bellies of real kids, then their discourse h moved out of speech and writing, into real-life action. Or, today’s Kan-tians may argue that it is wrong for individuals to give to beggars because that supports a government system that is not doing its duty to the poor." But without assurance that the government cares about the poor and will pick up the slack in the absence of private charity, or efforts to change the meanness of the government, such argument is not activist in either speech or action. Both verbal and active forms of discourse have their value and place because there has to be a certain amount of division of labor in society. Still, liberatory participants should be aware of the nature of their projects and engagements, to avoid confusing themselves and others, and for the sake of efficiency in that division of labor. To state this is not to raise skepticism about good intent motivating the speech, writing, or even activism of some academic intellectuals, but is rather a plea for self-orientation. Academics should say whatever they want to say for its own sake, or because they think what they say will support their status in the academy, but not all discourse about injustice and “what should be done” has a discernible link to reality.

#### No endless intervention

Joe **Barnes 15**, Bonner Means Baker Fellow, Rice University’s Baker Institute For Public Policy; and Andrew Bowen, Ph.D., Senior Fellow and Director of Middle East Studies, Center for the National Interest, 2015, “Rethinking U.S. Strategy in the Middle East,” https://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/0b23aade/CME-Pub-StrategyMiddleEast-061915.pdf

We may argue about the wisdom of invading Iraq in the first place. We can enter into what is now an extensive debate upon the success or failure of the 2007 “surge” or the advisability of withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq in 2010. But the **bottom line** remains: the experience of the Iraq invasion is a cautionary tale about the limits of U.S. power— however immense—to remake fractured polities. Afghanistan, where the U.S. has been fighting for 13 years without a conclusive victory over the Taliban, is another case in point. One might contend that the U.S. response to such failures should be to increase the human and financial resources it commits to “victory,” however defined: more troops, more budgetary outlays, permanent stationing of significant numbers of U.S. troops in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Putting aside the question of whether such a response would merely mire the U.S. even more deeply in never-ending conflict, there is **little evidence** that **the American public would support such a policy**. U.S. power is not just limited by its ability to shape developments on the ground; it is also limited by the necessity of creating and, more importantly, **sustaining domestic support** for costly foreign military ventures. Finally, there are **real financial limits to U.S. freedom of action**. After all, the U.S. already spends immense sums on defense; a major new military intervention would further increase the cost. The public might accept substantially higher taxes, sharply reduced expenditures, or the acquisition of even greater debt in a true national emergency. But there is **little taste to do so**, for the sake of yet another large-scale intervention in Iraq.

#### Their K of arms control relies on a false history that closes the door on conflict mediation – instead, debate should privilege a nuanced articulation of restraint’s benefits

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To understand the history or the contemporary practice of arms control, one must recognize that arms-limitation agreements often serve multiple and contradictory purposes. In the quest to prevent war, arms limitation may assist in disarmament, stability, or advantage, each of which is rooted in a plausible explanation for what causes war and each of which can credibly claim the mantle of “arms control.” Absent consensus on which approach is most effective at preventing war, the formation of arms-control policy has been difficult. In practice, policymakers have juggled the differing time horizons of competing arms-control constituencies to produce compromises capable of advancing all three arms-control aims simultaneously, at least for a time. Recognizing the multiple purposes of arms control has critical implications for scholars and policymakers.

For scholars, recognizing arms control’s multiple goals is important for expanding an understanding of arms control and international politics more broadly. Arms control is not always a cooperative enterprise: Such agreements have served as vehicles for promoting the relative military advantages of great and minor powers. Studies that treat arms control as a purely cooperative endeavor will inevitably capture only half of the picture. For political scientists, this may involve recoding cases in which the existence of arms-control negotiations is treated ipso facto as evidence of improving cooperation between states rather than a different form of competition.117 For historians, this will require reconsidering the success or failure of arms-control negotiations in light of their ability to advance multiple agendas rather than a single logic.118 For both political scientists and historians, the flexibility of what arms control means may pose deeper questions concerning the nature of cooperation and competition in international politics and whether those concepts are mutually exclusive or interrelated.

Given the difficulties entailed in producing a unified theory of arms control, scholars would do well to consider lessons from the practical world of statecraft, where theoretical rigor is often less important than political necessity. This is especially the case when arms-control arrangements must be cobbled together out of multiple competing purposes, assembling the parallel coalitions required to prevail in complex two-level negotiations. Under these circumstances, one of the most important resources available to a would-be arms controller is time. Competing interests with different time horizons can be assembled into arms-control compromises in which each side gets what it wants but at different points. Furthermore, initial compromises on the meaning of arms control are open to reinterpretation and revision over time, as arms-control regimes gain new meanings and contexts. Recognizing that arms-control agreements can serve multiple purposes, and that these objectives might change over time, can lead to a better understanding of why some agreements last, why some end, a

nd why those that end break down when they do. The longest-lasting arms-limitation agreements are likely to be those that can continue to embody multiple agendas while also adapting to new contexts. An agreement is unlikely to last when it no longer appears to serve a sufficiently large range of purposes and when leaders become disillusioned with the utility of arms control for achieving their objectives.

For policymakers, recognizing the existence of multiple arms-control agendas is both good and bad. The bad news is that understanding the policy implications of existing and notional arms-control agreements is extremely difficult, because agreements often serve several purposes and may have different meanings for different actors. As a result, the State and Defense Departments may have radically different understandings of a given agreement’s purpose, while foreign interlocutors are likely to have views of their own.119 Balancing these competing views is tremendously difficult, especially in periods of significant international and domestic political confusion and rancor. As in the Cold War, the goal of enacting arms control is likely to remain very challenging.

The good news is that significant opportunities exist in the contemporary U.S. political scene for effective coalition building in favor of arms-control proposals, with figures as far apart politically as John Bolton, Bill Clinton, and Derek Johnson all calling for an arms-control solution to the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.120 There is strong reason to suspect that Bolton, Clinton, and Johnson each prefer an arms-control solution to the North Korean nuclear threat for different reasons.121 Nonetheless, the fact that three prominent figures with such different views about national security affairs have arrived at a similar policy aim, even in a period of tremendous partisan division, is surely cause for hope.

As the example of the ABM Treaty demonstrates, appeals to cooperation and normative leadership are unlikely to be sufficient to advance a successful policy of arms control. Proponents of arms-control solutions would do better to cast a “big tent” on any such policy and seek to justify their prescriptions to multiple constituencies based on multiple logics. In doing so, considerable advantage can be derived by emphasizing that each constituency can receive what it wants, just at different times. Some good work has been done concerning how “progress” on arms-control issues might be organized into timelines,122 which could provide different benefits to different arms-control constituencies at different times. Such an approach stands a chance of succeeding, even in the face of tremendous division over America’s proper role in the world. The future of arms control, much like its past, will depend on effective compromise between competing purposes.

## AT: Cap

### 2AC – Transition Wars

#### The transition would be violent which is separate offense for us AND means that it would inevitably fail – also its sustainable

**Koch** and Büchs **19** [Max Koch, Faculty of Social Sciences, Socialhögskolan, Lund University, Milena Büchs, Sustainability Research Institute, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, “Challenges for the degrowth transition: The debate about wellbeing”, Futures Volume 105, January 2019, Pages 155-165, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#!]

3.2. Implications of rapidly transforming social systems

The social practices lens is also useful for thinking about possible wellbeing implications of rapid social change more generally, and a transition away from a growth-based economy specifically. While the concept of social practices inherently implies the possibility of change (with its focus on agency and creativity), it equally strongly highlights the structural aspects of practices which provide stability and orientation. During times of rapid social transitions, social norms and ‘mental infrastructures’ often lag behind, creating disorientation, social conflict, and negative impacts on wellbeing (Büchs & Koch, 2017: ch. 6).

Stability of structural dimensions of social practices offers orientation and some extent of predictability of how oneself and other people are likely to act in the future, providing a framework within which flexibility and change are possible. This orienting function of structural dimensions of practices is likely to be an important condition for people to form reasonably stable identities and relationships – key ingredients for wellbeing. Examples from classical and contemporary sociological and psychological research suggest that different speeds of changing social structures can establish misalignments and disruptions of social practices which can, in turn, negatively influence health and other wellbeing outcomes. For instance, in his classical study, Durkheim presents suicide at least partly as an outcome of a failure of cultural resources to provide meaning and orientation in the context of other, more rapid social changes (Durkheim, 2006; Vega & Rumbaut, 1991: 375). This idea also links to Bourdieu’s concept of the “hysteresis effect”. Here, Bourdieu emphasises that, especially during phases of social transition, people’s habitus and “objective” social circumstances can become disjointed: as a result of hysteresis, dispositions can be “out of line with the field and with the ‘collective expectations’ which are constitutive of its normality. This is the case, in particular, when a field undergoes a major crisis and its regularities (even its rules) are profoundly changed” (Bourdieu, 2000: 160). This can contribute to a deterioration of people’s wellbeing as it makes them feel “out of place” or let them be perceived that way, “plung[ing] them deeper into failure” (Bourdieu, 2000: 161) because they cannot make use of new opportunities or are mistreated or socially excluded by others.

Empirical research which partly builds on the idea of hysteresis has shown that wide-ranging organisational change can have a range of negative effects on people’s health and mortality (Ferrie et al., 1998; McDonough & Polzer, 2012). One study found that across 174 countries, several measures of wellbeing and social performance, including life satisfaction, health, safety and trust, voice and accountability, were highest in periods of economic stability, but lower in times of GDP growth or contraction (O’Neill, 2015); and other studies concluded that life expectancy can be negatively affected by both rapid economic growth and contraction (Notzon et al., 1998; Szreter, 1999).

Several scholars have recently highlighted the potential for social conflict inherent in (rapid) social change. For instance, Maja Göpel (2016: 49) remarks: “Unsurprisingly, the navigation or transition phase in shifting paradigms as well as governance solutions is marked by chaos, politicization, unease and power-ridden struggles”. Wolfgang Streeck has issued similar warnings (Streeck et al., 2016: 169). It is not difficult to see how such scenarios bear the potential of undermining some of the fundamental conditions that are necessary for the satisfaction of basic needs as discussed above, and hence the danger of generating substantial wellbeing losses for current and near-future generations.

In the current context, it is very difficult to imagine that we might be able to observe a rapid and radical cultural change in which people adopt identities and related lifestyles that value intrinsically motivated activities over pursuing satisfaction and status through careers and consumption. Even more worryingly, political events in Europe, the United States and elsewhere since the ‘Great Crash’ of 2008 indicate that times of negative or stagnant growth can provide a breeding ground for populist, nationalistic and anti-democratic movements. Economic insecurity, a perceived threat of established identities through migrants, and deep mistrust against ‘elite’ politicians are amongst the main explanations for previously unimaginable events such as the Brexit vote, Trump presidency, and recent electoral successes for far right-wing parties in a range of European countries.

#### Warming irreversible---only cap solves through CCS and a bridge to renewables

**Graciela** 9/1/**16** – Professor of Economics and of Statistics at Columbia University and Visiting Professor at Stanford University, and was the architect of the Kyoto Protocol carbon market (being interviewed by Marcus Rolle, freelance journalist specializing in environmental issues and global affairs, “Reversing Climate Change: Interview with Graciela Chichilnisky,” http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/01/09/2016/reversing-climate-change-interview-graciela-chichilnisky)//cmr

GC: Green capitalism is a new economic system that values the natural resources on which human survival depends. It fosters a harmonious relationship with our planet, its resources and the many species it harbors. It is a new type of market economics that addresses both equity and efficiency. Using carbon negative technology™ it helps reduce carbon in the atmosphere while fostering economic development in rich and developing nations, for example in the U S., EU, China and India. How does this work? In a nutshell Green Capitalism requires the creation of global limits or property rights nation by nation for the use of the atmosphere, the bodies of water and the planet’s biodiversity, and the creation of new markets to trade these rights from which new economic values and a new concept of economic progress emerges updating GDP as is now generally agreed is needed. **Green Capitalism is needed** now **to** help **avert climate change** and achieve the goals of the 2015 UN Paris Agreement, which are very ambitious and universally supported but have no way to be realized within the Agreement itself. The Carbon Market and its CDM play critical roles in the foundation of Green Capitalism, creating values to redefine GDP. These are needed to remain within the world’s “CO2 budget” and avoid catastrophic climate change. As I see it, the **building blocks** for Green Capitalism are then as follows; (1) Global limits nation by nation in the use of the planet’s atmosphere, its water bodies and biodiversity - these are global public goods. (2) New global markets to trade these limits, based on equity and efficiency. These markets are relatives of the Carbon Market and the SO2 market. The new market create new measures of economic values and update the concept of GDP. (3) Efficient use of Carbon Negative Technologies to avert catastrophic climate change by providing a smooth transition to clean energy and ensuring economic prosperity in rich and poor nations. These building blocks have immediate practical implications in reversing climate change and can assist the ambitious aims of Paris COP21 become a reality. MR: What is the greatest advantage of the new generation technologies that can capture CO2 from the air? GC: These technologies build carbon negative power plants, such as Global Thermostat, that clean the atmosphere of CO2 while producing electricity. Global Thermostat is a firm that is commercializing a technology that takes CO2 out of air and uses mostly low cost residual heat rather than electricity to drive the capture process, making the entire process of capturing CO2 from the atmosphere very inexpensive. There is enough residua heat in a coal power plant that it can be used to capture twice as much CO2 as the plant emits, thus transforming the power plant into a “carbon sink.” For example, a 400 MW coal plant that emits 1 million tons of CO2 per year can become a carbon sink absorbing a net amount of 1 million tons of CO2 instead. Carbon capture from air can be done anywhere and at any time, and so inexpensively that the CO2 can be sold for industrial or commercial uses such as plastics, food and beverages, greenhouses, bio-fertilizers, building materials and even enhanced oil recovery, all examples of large global markets and profitable opportunities. Carbon capture is powered mostly by low (85°C) residual heat that is inexpensive, and any source will do. In particular, renewable (solar) technology can power the process of carbon capture. This can help advance solar technology and make it more cost-efficient. This means more energy, more jobs, and it also means economic growth in developing nations, all of this while cleaning the CO2 in the atmosphere. Carbon negative technologies can literally transform the world economy. MR: One final question. You distinguish between long-run and short-run strategies in the effort to reverse climate change. Would carbon negative technologies be part of a short-run strategy? GC: Long-run strategies are quite different from strategies for the short-run. Often **long-run strategies do not work in the short run** and different policies and **economic incentives are needed.** In the long run the best climate change policy is to replace fossil fuel sources of energy that by themselves cause 45% of the global emissions, and to plant trees to restore if possible the natural sources and sinks of CO2. But the fossil fuel power plant infrastructure is about **87%** of the power plant infrastructure and about $45-55 trillion globally. This infrastructure cannot be replaced quickly, **certainly not in the short time period in which we need to take action to avert catastrophic climate change**. The issue is that CO2 once emitted remains hundreds of years in the atmosphere and we have emitted so much that unless we actually **remove the CO2** that is already there, **we cannot remain** long **within the carbon budget**, which is the concentration of CO2 beyond which we fear catastrophic climate change. In the short run, therefore, **we face significant time pressure**. The **IPCC indicates** in its 2014 5th Assessment Report that we must actually **remove the carbon that is already in the atmosphere** and do so **in massive quantities**, this century (p. 191 of 5th Assessment Report). This is what I called a carbon negative approach, which works for the short run. Renewable energy is the long run solution. Renewable energy is too slow for a short run resolution since replacing a $45-55 trillion power plant infrastructure with renewable plants could take **decades**. We need action sooner than that. For the short run we need carbon negative technologies that capture more carbon than what is emitted. Trees do that and they must be conserved to help preserve biodiversity. Biochar does that. But trees and other natural sinks are too slow for what we need today. Therefore, negative carbon is needed now as part of a blueprint for transformation. It must be part of the blueprint for Sustainable Development and its short term manifestation that I call **Green Capitalism**, while in the long run renewable sources of energy suffice, including Wind, Biofuels, Nuclear, Geothermal, and Hydroelectric energy. These are in limited supply and cannot replace fossil fuels. Global energy today is roughly divided as follows: 87% is fossil, namely natural gas, coal, oil; 10% is nuclear, geothermal, and hydroelectric, and less than 1% is solar power — photovoltaic and solar thermal. Nuclear fuel is scarce and nuclear technology is generally considered dangerous as tragically experienced by the Fukushima Daichi nuclear disaster in Japan, and it seems unrealistic to seek a solution in the nuclear direction. Only solar energy can be a long term solution: Less than 1% of the solar energy we receive on earth can be transformed into 10 times the fossil fuel energy used in the world today. Yet **we need a short-term strategy that accelerates long run renewable energy**, or we will defeat long-term goals. In the short term as the IPCC validates, we need carbon negative technology, carbon removals. The short run is the next 20 or 30 years. **There is no time in this period of time to transform the entire fossil infrastructure** — it costs $45-55 trillion (IEA) to replace and it is slow to build. We need to directly reduce carbon in the atmosphere now. We cannot use traditional methods to remove CO2 from smokestacks (called often Carbon Capture and Sequestration, CSS) because they are not carbon negative as is required. CSS works but does not suffice because it only captures what power plants currently emit. Any level of emissions adds to the stable and high concentration we have today and CO2 remains in the atmosphere for years. We need to remove the CO2 that is already in the atmosphere, namely air capture of CO2 also called carbon removals. The solution is to combine air capture of CO2 with storage of CO2 into stable materials such as biochar, cement, polymers, and carbon fibers that replace a number of other construction materials such as metals. The most recent BMW automobile model uses only carbon fibers rather than metals. It is also possible to combine CO2 to produce renewable gasoline, namely gasoline produced from air and water. CO2 can be separated from air and hydrogen separated from water, and their combination is a well-known industrial process to produce gasoline. Is this therefore too expensive? There are new technologies using algae that make synthetic fuel commercially feasible at competitive rates. Other policies would involve combining air capture with solar thermal electricity using the residual solar thermal heat to drive the carbon capture process. This can make a solar plant more productive and efficient so it can out-compete coal as a source of energy. In summary, the blueprint offered here is a **private/public approach**, based on **new industrial tech**nology and **financial markets**, **self-funded** and using **profitable greenmarkets**, with securities that utilize carbon credits as the “underlying” asset, based on the KP CDM, as well as new markets for biodiversity and water providing abundant clean energy to stave off impending and actual energy crisis in developing nations, fostering mutually beneficial cooperation for industrial and developing nations. The blueprint proposed provides the two sides of the coin, equity and efficiency, and can assign a critical role for women as stewards for human survival and sustainable development. My vision is **a carbon negative economy** that **represents green capitalism** in **resolving** the Global Climate negotiations and **the North–South Divide**. Carbon negative power plants and capture of CO2 from air and ensure a clean atmosphere together innovation and more jobs and exports: the more you produce and create jobs the cleaner becomes the atmosphere. In practice, Green Capitalism means economic growth that is harmonious with the Earth resources.

# 1AR – AT: NC

## 1AR – AT: LogCon

#### Reject log con---Makes being aff impossible because we’re either not inherent or not a logical consequence---kills substantive education, which outweighs because we only have the topic for 2 months

**Reject philosophical interpretations that auto-negate---Incentivizes reusing arguments and intellectual laziness instead of doing research. At best, the research they do do is worthless and doesn’t mirror academic research practices that are the only portable skill.**

#### Textuality cuts both ways---Dictionaries also define ought as a moral obligation. That means you should default to pragmatics because we’re both semantically correct, which we’ve won because log con always negates, so you should reject it because it causes stale debates

#### Debatability goes neg---Log con is impossible for the aff to win and everyone preps for moral obligation, check the wiki AND we coopt your offense because we can use empirical trends in deciding morality of the resolution

#### No is/ought fallacy [Extend FW Warrants]

# 1AR – AT: DA

## AT: AI Research DA

### 1AR – Defense – AI Research DA

#### 1 – No Link – governments can still develop other autonomous weapons

#### 2 – Private sector thumps

Brookings 20 [Brookings, ranked #1 thinktank in the world for 12 years straight, 9-29-2020, "What investment trends reveal about the global AI landscape," https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/what-investment-trends-reveal-about-the-global-ai-landscape/, accessed 1-13-2021]LHSBC

“We aren’t what we were in the ’50s and ’60s and ’70s,” former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter [recently reflected](https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/13/18617081/secretary-defense-ash-carter-ai-lethal-kill-ethics-harvard-facebook-kara-swisher-decode-podcast). “In those days, all technology of consequence for protecting our people, and all technology of any consequence at all, came from the United States and came from within the walls of government. Those days are irrevocably lost.” To get that technology now, “I’ve got to go outside the Pentagon no matter what,” Carter added.∂ The former Pentagon chief may be overstating the case, but when it comes to artificial intelligence, there’s no doubt that the private sector is in command. Around the world, nations and their governments rely on private companies to build their AI software, furnish their AI talent, and produce the AI advances that underpin economic and military competitiveness. The United States [is no exception](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf).

#### 3 – No Link – Government still pours tons of funding into research universities – computer science programs still do research and construct super computers

### 1AR – Link Turn – AI Research DA

#### Ban increases civilian research

Sauer 16 [Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer at Bundeswehr University in Munich. He is the author of Atomic Anxiety: Deterrence, Taboo and the Non-Use of U.S. Nuclear Weapons (2015) and a member of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control. October 2016, “Stopping ‘Killer Robots’: Why Now Is the Time to Ban Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-09/features/stopping-%E2%80%98killer-robots%E2%80%99-why-now-time-ban-autonomous-weapons-systems//lhs-ap]

This underlines the importance of the current opportunity for putting a comprehensive, verifiable ban in place. The hurdles are high, but at this point, a ban is clearly the most prudent and thus desirable outcome. After all, as long as no one possesses them, a verifiable ban is the optimal solution. It stops the currently commencing arms race in its tracks, and everyone reaps the benefits. A prime goal of arms control would be fulfilled by facilitating the diversion of resources from military applications toward research and development for peaceful purposes—in the fields of AI and robotics no less, two key future technologies

### 1AR – Covid Defense – AI research DA

#### 1 – Vaccines, masks, social distancing, lockdowns, quarantines all work now

#### 2 – Covid evolves to become less lethal.

Al Jazeera 8/17 (“Mutated coronavirus may be less deadly, expert suggests,” 17 Aug. 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/mutated-coronavirus-deadly-expert-suggests-200818040211070.html#:~:text=Singapore%20infectious%20disease%20doctor%20says,with%20drop%20in%20death%20rates.&text=Tambyah%20said%20most%20viruses%20tend%20to%20become%20less%20virulent%20as%20they%20mutate>.) LHSLA LH

An increasingly common mutation of the novel coronavirus found in Europe, North America and parts of Asia may be more infectious but appears to be less deadly, according to a prominent infectious disease specialist. Paul Tambyah, senior consultant at the National University of Singapore and president-elect of the International Society of Infectious Diseases, said evidence suggests the proliferation of the D614G mutation in some parts of the world has coincided with a drop in death rates, suggesting it is less lethal. "Maybe that's a good thing to have a virus that is more infectious but less deadly," Tambyah was quoting by a Reuters report published on Tuesday. Tambyah said most viruses tend to become less virulent as they mutate. "It is in the virus' interest to infect more people but not to kill them because a virus depends on the host for food and for shelter," he said. Scientists discovered the mutation as early as February, and it has circulated in Europe and the Americas with no evidence that it has led to more severe disease, the World Health Organization (WHO) said.

### 1AR – Econ Defense – AI research DA

#### No econ impact – data, cooperation, and less defense spending

Clary ’15 (Christopher; 4/25/15; Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, M.A. in National Security Affairs, Postdoctoral fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University; MIT Political Science Department Research Paper, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2597712)

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns **encourage austerity and economizing behavior** in foreign policy? This paper provides **new evidence** that economic stress is associated with **conciliatory policies** between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on **data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950**, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately **twice as likely to terminate** during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may **result from economic troubles**. I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing **quantitative literature** most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant politicalmilitary threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from **1494 to 2010** that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry. Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to **austerity pressures**, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to **cut defense expenditures**. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to **threat deflation**, where elites attempt to **downplay** **the seriousness** of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to **consider threat prioritization**, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from **international economic cooperation**. Leaders **seek foreign aid**, **enhanced trade**, and **increased investment** from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as **capable of resolving economic difficulties**, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it **much more likely** that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this **causal logic** in greater detail, while also providing **historical examples** that these mechanisms recur in practice.

#### More recent stats

Drezner 16 Daniel W. Drezner, International Politics Professor at Tufts University. [The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression, Oxford University Press, Reprint Edition (2016), Chapter 3: Why the Misperception?]//BPS

Finally, the Great Recession did not lead to a deterioration in international security. Because political instabil¬ity and violence can impinge on cross-border flows, in¬creases in international conflict can dampen cross-bor¬der trade and exchange. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the Great Reces¬sion would lead states to increase the use of political viol¬ence as a tool to stay in power.44They voiced genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater in¬ternal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great-power rivalries. Violence in the Middle East, piracy on the high seas, border disputes in the South China Sea, riots in European cities, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impres-sions of a global surge in public disorder. As fiscal aus¬terity in the developed economies curtailed social spend¬ing, economists predicted an explosion of unrest.45 Initially, there was some evidence of deterioration. Following the 2008 financial crisis, there was a spike in global piracy, particularly off the Horn of Africa. The In¬ternational Maritime Bureau reported that in 2009 alone, there was a 40 percent surge in piracy attacks, with attacks near Somalia quadrupling during the same period. The Institute for Economics and Peace, which has constructed the Global Peace Index annually since 2007, reported in 2013 that there had been a 5 percent deterioration in global peace since 2008.46 72/452 A closer look at the numbers, however, reveals more encouraging findings. What seemed to be an inexorable increase in piracy, for example, turned out to be a blip. By September 2013, the total numbers of piracy attacks had fallen to their lowest levels in seven years. Attacks near Somalia, in particular, declined substantially; the total number of attacks fell by 70 percent in 2012 and an additional 86 percent in the first nine months of 2013. Actual hijackings were down 43 percent compared to 2008/9 levels.47 The US Navy's figures reveal similar de¬clines in the number and success rate of pirate attacks.48 Security concerns have not dented the opening of the global economy. As for the effect of the Great Recession on political conflict, the aggregate effects were surprisingly modest. A key conclusion of the Institute for Economics and Peace in its 2012 report was that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."49 The institute's concern in its 2013 report about a decline in peace was grounded primarily in the increase in homicide rates—a source of concern, to be sure, but not exactly the province of global governance. Both interstate violence and global military expenditures have declined since the start of the financial crisis. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict. Looking at the post-crisis years, Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude, "The pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."50 The de-cline in secular violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker 73/452 observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."51

### 1AR – Warming Internal Link Turn – AI research DA

#### 1 – AI Data doesn’t solve warming – we already have tons of scientists and climate modeling – the problem is politicians don’t want to pass climate reform

#### 2 – AI generates CO2 now – outweighs all their offense on timeframe

Toews 20 [Rob Toews, 6-17-2020, "Deep Learning’s Carbon Emissions Problem," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/robtoews/2020/06/17/deep-learnings-climate-change-problem/?sh=7b7c34a06b43, accessed 1-13-2021]LHSBC

Modern AI models consume a massive amount of energy, and these energy requirements are growing at a breathtaking rate. In the deep learning era, the computational resources needed to produce a best-in-class AI model has on average doubled [every 3.4 months](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/); this translates to a 300,000x increase between 2012 and 2018. GPT-3 is just the latest embodiment of this exponential trajectory.∂ The bottom line: AI has a meaningful carbon footprint today, and if industry trends continue it will soon become much worse. Unless we are willing to reassess and reform today’s AI research agenda, the field of artificial intelligence could become an antagonist in the fight against climate change in the years ahead.∂ Bigger Is Not Always Better∂ In today’s deep learning-centric research paradigm, advances in artificial intelligence are primarily achieved through sheer scale: bigger datasets, larger models, more compute.∂ GPT-3 illustrates this phenomenon well. The model consists of a whopping 175 billion parameters. To put this figure in perspective, its predecessor model GPT-2—which was considered state-of-the-art when it was released last year—had only 1.5 billion parameters. While last year’s GPT-2 took a few dozen petaflop-days to train—already a massive amount of computational input—GPT-3 required [several thousand.](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.14165.pdf)∂ The problem with relying on ever-larger models to drive progress in AI is that building and deploying these models entails a tremendous amount of energy expenditure and thus carbon emissions.∂ In a widely discussed [2019 study](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.02243.pdf), a group of researchers led by Emma Strubell estimated that training a single deep learning model can generate up to 626,155 pounds of CO2 emissions—roughly equal to the total lifetime carbon footprint of five cars. As a point of comparison, the average American generates 36,156 pounds of CO2 emissions in a year.∂ To be sure, this estimate is for a particularly energy-intensive model. Training an average-sized machine learning model today generates far less than 626,155 pounds of carbon output.∂ At the same time, it is worth keeping in mind that when this analysis was conducted, GPT-2 was the largest model available for study and was treated by the researchers as an upper bound on model size. Just a year later, GPT-2 looks tiny—one hundred times smaller, in fact—compared to its successor.∂ Why exactly do machine learning models consume so much energy?∂ The first reason is that the datasets used to train these models [continue to balloon](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.10597.pdf) in size. In 2018, the BERT model achieved best-in-class NLP performance after it was trained on a dataset of 3 billion words. XLNet outperformed BERT based on a training set of 32 billion words. Shortly thereafter, GPT-2 was trained on a dataset of 40 billion words. Dwarfing all these previous efforts, a weighted dataset of roughly 500 billion words was used to train GPT-3.∂ Neural networks carry out a lengthy set of mathematical operations (both forward propagation and back propagation) for each piece of data they are fed during training, updating their parameters in complex ways. Larger datasets therefore translate to soaring compute and energy requirements.∂ Another factor driving AI’s massive energy draw is the extensive experimentation and tuning required to develop a model. Machine learning today remains largely an exercise in trial and error. Practitioners will often build hundreds of versions of a given model during training, experimenting with different neural architectures and hyperparameters before identifying an optimal design.∂ The 2019 paper mentioned above includes a telling case study. The researchers picked an average-sized model—much smaller than headline-grabbing behemoths like GPT-3—and examined not just the energy required to train the final version, but the total number of trial runs that went into producing that final version.∂ Over the course of six months, 4,789 different versions of the model were trained, requiring 9,998 total days’ worth of GPU time (more than 27 years). Taking all these runs into account, the researchers estimated that building this model [generated](https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/06/06/239031/training-a-single-ai-model-can-emit-as-much-carbon-as-five-cars-in-their-lifetimes/) over 78,000 pounds of CO2 emissions in total—more than the average American adult will produce in two years.∂ To this point, the discussion has only addressed training machine learning models. But training is just the beginning of a model’s lifecycle. After a model is trained, it is then put to use in the real world.∂ Deploying AI models to take action in real-world settings—a process known as inference—consumes [even more energy](https://towardsdatascience.com/deep-learning-and-carbon-emissions-79723d5bc86e) than training does. Indeed, Nvidia [estimates](https://www.forbes.com/sites/moorinsights/2019/05/09/google-cloud-doubles-down-on-nvidia-gpus-for-inference/#244ad92a6792) that 80% to 90% of the cost of a neural network is in inference rather than training.∂ As an example, consider the AI underlying an autonomous vehicle. The neural networks first must be trained upfront to learn to drive. After training is completed and the autonomous vehicle is deployed, the model then performs inference on a continuous basis in order to navigate its environment—nonstop, day after day, for as long as the vehicle is in use.∂ Needless to say, the more parameters the model has, the steeper the energy requirements are for this ongoing inference.∂ Energy Use and Carbon Emissions∂ An assumption at the heart of this topic is the relationship between AI’s energy use and carbon emissions. What is the best way to think about this relationship?∂ According to the EPA, one kilowatt-hour of energy consumption [generates](https://www.epa.gov/energy/emissions-generation-resource-integrated-database-egrid) 0.954 pounds of CO2 emissions on average in the United States. This average reflects the varying carbon footprints and relative proportions of different electricity sources across the U.S. energy grid (e.g., renewables, nuclear, natural gas, coal).∂ Strubell’s analysis, mentioned above, applies this U.S.-wide average in order to calculate the carbon emissions of various AI models based on their energy needs. It is a reasonable assumption. The power source mix for Amazon Web Services, for instance, roughly mirrors that of the U.S. as a whole, and most AI models are trained in the cloud.

## AT: Assurances DA

### 1AR – Link Turn – Assurances

#### AWS will replace human soldiers overseas and reduce credibility of defense commitments inducing South Korea proliferation

Leys 18 [Nathan Leys is a JD candidate at Yale Law School. He previously studied international security at George Mason University. “Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Crises,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2018, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12\_Issue-1/Leys.pdf//lhs-ap]

Citing potential cost savings and reduced risk to American Soldiers, a Congressional report urges DOD to withdraw them from the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and replace them with autonomous robotic sentries.66 Liberal doves and conservative hawks, persuaded by the report’s assertion that AWS will be at least as effective as the currently deployed US forces, unite in support of the proposal. The South Korean government supports the addition of the autonomous sentries but opposes the withdrawal of American troops.

This scenario draws on Thomas Schelling’s observation that although small forces of American troops stationed on allied soil cannot repel a mass invasion, “bluntly, they can die. They can die heroically, dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there.”67 The notion, applying James Fearon’s formulation, is that if these tripwire troops are killed in an attack on an ally’s territory, the potential domestic political costs imposed on a US leader who chooses not to respond guarantee an overwhelming military response, making the US commitment to South Korea more credible. But AWS, by definition and design, cannot “die heroically.” If AWS physically displace human soldiers from an ally’s territory, the potential domestic political costs to leaders of not responding in the event of attack would be diminished. Hence, South Korean leaders might perceive the United States’ commitment as less credible.

One of the primary arguments for the development and deployment of AWS is that robots can remove humans from harm’s way. This assertion runs directly counter to the DOD’s insistence that AWS will fight alongside human soldiers, rather than displacing them.68 Whatever the Pentagon’s insistence today and regardless of whether AWS could replace humans without impacting military effectiveness, it is entirely plausible that placing soldiers in harm’s way will become politically untenable if AWS are seen as a viable replacement for human soldiers. This is particularly true if the most visible permutations of AWS are autonomous unmanned underwater, surface, and air vehicles rather than AI-enabled computer systems designed to support military logistics and decision making. Congress and the public are more likely to demand the replacement of human soldiers with AWS if they can picture a robot armed with high-tech firearms storming onto the battlefield.

Designing AWS to support—rather than replace—human soldiers may make sense from a military perspective, but it raises political risks domestically and internationally. First, public misunderstandings of AI, steeped in science fiction archetypes of hyper-advanced robot warriors, may lead to the overestimation of AWS’ capabilities, even as they fuel pacifist opposition to AWS’ development. This overestimation, in turn, may convince supporters of AWS that new weapons can replace human soldiers without reducing military effectiveness.

The second danger to the international credibility of the United States and its commitments to its allies also flows from this potential for domestic overestimation of AWS’ capabilities. To the extent political pressure leads to AWS geographically displacing forward-deployed forces instead of supporting them, they may make US commitments to defend allies less credible. If South Korea is less certain of the US defense commitment, it might choose to self-help by building up its own military, possibly including the development of nuclear weapons or its own AWS.

### 1AR – Defense – Assurances

#### Security guarantees don’t prevent prolif.

Philipp C. **Bleek &** Eric B. **Lorber 18**. Bleek is a Fellow at CNS and an Associate Professor in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Program at the Graduate School of International Policy and Management; Lorber is an adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Senior Associate at the Financial Integrity Network, and a senior adviser at the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 02/22/2018. “Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation.” The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters, Oxford University Press.

Conventional wisdom among policymakers, less support from scholars The literature on extended nuclear guarantees broadly divides into policy-focused work—arguing that such guarantees, if properly calibrated, can prevent allied nuclear proliferation, and prescribing mechanisms for increasing their credibility (Congressional Commission 2008)—and academically-oriented research, examining whether guarantees can be credible in the first place. Although the policy literature considers which factors may affect credibility (Murdock 2009), its primary limitation is assuming guarantees can be effective in stemming allied proliferation. The literature presents a toolbox of options for how to increase credibility, but gives short shrift to the prior question of whether security guarantees can prevent allied proliferation. The academic literature on guarantees also has shortcomings. Some argue that guarantees do not stem allied proliferation because they are incredible (Goldstein 2000), but base the conclusion on analysis of a few cases in which allies chose to proliferate. Other scholars in the qualitative tradition dispute these results, noting that such guarantees can prevent allied proliferation activity (Knopf 2012). A modest but growing quantitative literature addresses the question of why states do and do not proliferate, but reaches contradictory conclusions on security guarantees (see Table 4.1). And none of these studies focused narrowly on guarantees—they were either “garbage can” approaches that sought to test a host of potentially relevant variables, or focused on other independent variables—and therefore did not subject their security guarantee findings to robustness checks. [[TABLE 4.1 OMITTED]] Two recent studies catalyzed a resurgence of interest in applying sophisticated quantitative tools to the proliferation puzzle. 5 Employing hazard analysis, Singh and Way (2004) found that states with nuclear-armed allies were neither less nor more likely to explore nuclear weapons options, launch weapons programs, or acquire weapons. Multinomial logit analysis, reported as a robustness check, similarly found no relationship between guarantees and states’ likelihood of launching weapons programs, but did find a robust negative relationship to both exploration and acquisition. Jo and Gartzke (2007) employed probit regression analysis, and concluded that states receiving security guarantees were no less likely to have active nuclear weapons programs, though they were less likely to possess nuclear weapons. Finally, two scholars tweaked Singh and Way’s earlier work. Kroenig (2009) reported that two out of three hazard models found a negative relationship between guarantees and acquisition, while one found no relationship. In a subsequent 2010 book that conducted analysis along similar lines yet came to the opposite conclusion, Kroenig (2010) reported that all four models that controlled for guarantees found no relationship to acquisition. Fuhrmann (2009)— employing probit regression analysis but, unusually, structured like Singh and Way’s hazard analysis to drop countries from the data set once they reach a given threshold—reported that all of his models found no relationship between guarantees and nuclear weapons program initiation or acquisition.

## AT: Authoritarianism DA

### 1AR – AT: DA – Authoritarianism

#### 1---No link – Other tech solves – Their internal link is precision, not autonomy – Insert yellow

Rabkin and Yoo '17 [Jeremy and John; 9/1/17; Professor of Law at the Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University; Professor of Law at the University of California Berkeley; Striking Power: How Cyber, Robots, and Space Weapons Change the Rules of War, Chapter 1]//GJ

Two trends now seem to be converging. On the one hand, the underlying architecture of international politics is becoming more disordered. Instability is spreading throughout the world, in Eastern Europe, East Asia and Central Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East. The European Union has not developed any military capacity of its own but NATO is under more internal stress than ever before. Meanwhile, insurgent or revanchist forces have found ways to project intimidating force without the risk of full-scale military invasion. We face hybrid war in Eastern Europe, terror campaigns in Western Europe, and the construction of new islands to extend maritime claims in the South China Sea.

Part of the response may be new weapons technologies, but only if they are accompanied with new thinking on how and where they can be used. The most important characteristic of new technologies, in cyber, drone, and robotic weapons, is the capacity for remarkable degrees of precision. It was once possible to claim that bombs aimed at “military objectives” were only incidentally working “collateral damage” on civilian objects. Now, military technology gives us the capacity to strike with precision, which means destroying relatively little beyond intended targets. New technologies may offer a compelling response to the challenges of our time by allowing western nations to respond to the provocations of authoritarian aggressors or reach out to strike terrorists far removed from a battlefield.

We are not claiming that new weapons will, by themselves, resolve every challenge and deliver us to a new era of stability and peace. Every weapon, even supposedly autonomous or robotic ones, requires human guidance and strategy in the background. We may misjudge our challenges or our opportunities. We may underestimate the resolve of enemies or overrate the immediate threats they pose. Technology does not make statecraft obsolete. It simply offers more tools and options.

Embracing new technologies does not require us to believe in literal magic bullets that will render confrontational opponents supine after one volley. Nor would relaxing current understandings of the laws of war. The point is to provide alternatives to avoid the choice between all-out war and fatalistic resignation. The aim of many interventions would not be so much to disable the military capacity of the opposing side as to indicate the Western capacity and willingness to impose costs.

Short of completely incapacitating the opposing side, even large-scale war is a tacit bargaining situation, as Thomas Schelling pointed out more than fifty years ago.67 Part of the bargaining may involve inflicting harm on an opponent to signal readiness to do so on a larger scale. It may not be feasible to penetrate the delusions of the most crazed, megalomaniacal dictator—but even sobering those in his circle may be helpful. At any rate, most tyrants have concerns about preserving themselves. Signaling, as we will argue later on, is an important element of military exchanges. One might think of new technologies as providing us the capacity to communicate with more exclamation points, and to indicate that our enemies cannot rely on the protections afforded by highly restrictive interpretations of the laws of war.

#### 2---No link – LAWS are for counterforce attacks, not stopping authoritarians – 1AC Klare

#### 3---Turn – Misperception escalates conflict and incentivizes more breakouts since LAWS are seen as a first strike

#### 4---Biden thumps – Obviously not a fan of interventions

#### 5---LAWS fail – Authoritarians will spoof – That’s Scharre and Klare

## AT: AVC DA

### 1AR – Defense – AVC

### 1AR – Top Level – Open Skies

#### 1 – Dropped Kallenborn – drone swarms unquestionaly autonomous because there’s an impossible large number of feeds

#### 2 – Fiat solves – we fiat that the treaty is negotiated promptly and passed immediately

#### 3 – Intrinsicness - Do the plan and pass Open Skies - it's good - key to in-depth discussion over the affirmative policy - the disad doesnt prove an opportunity cost to the plan

### 1AR – UQ – AVC

#### Not enough work – overwhelmed offices aren’t about open skies

**Office of Inspections 14 [**United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General, “Inspection of the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance] JJ

VC’s offices are structured to bring resources and activities to bear on the key functions of verification and compliance with existing agreements and on negotiation of new agreements. Four of the bureau’s seven offices are structured around supporting activities related to specific treaties. These offices are small, with between 10 and 15 staff members, and each has a director who focuses on the treaties within that office’s purview. AVC fields five treaty commissioners or representatives overseas who are responsible for leading U.S. delegations to international arms control and disarmament organizations based in Geneva, Vienna, and The Hague and for staffing the U.S.-Russia Special Verification Commission (for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Agreement) and Bilateral Consultative Commission (for New START). The Office of Missile Defense and Space Policy deals exclusively with national security space policy and has the lead for missile defense cooperation. Although AVC offices are well organized to manage current and near-term arms control, missile defense, and verification policies and issues, the OIG team found an uneven distribution of workload. Employees in some of these offices, such as the Office of Euro-Atlantic Security Affairs and the Office of Missile Defense and Space Policy, report that they had consistently moderate to heavy workloads, while employees in other offices said they often did not have enough work. This problem of a lack of work for bureau staff echoes one identified in the 2004 OIG inspection of the former Bureau of Arms Control. Though the verification workload is constant and consistent, the arms control workload tends to be cyclical, event driven, and associated with periodic meetings of arms control and disarmament organizations. As previously mentioned, a strategic plan that identifies workload imbalances and reallocates portfolios and positions accordingly would help assure that the bureau’s human and financial resources are being managed effectively to achieve the bureau’s priorities.

## AT: Cyber Espionage

#### 1 – hash codes can only go one way

#### 2 – Inspections are conducted by a neutral party

#### 3 – AI Bad – that was the case page

## AT: Deterrence/Disarm

### Top Level

#### 1 – Counterforce capabilities bad – creates use or lose presusres – impact above

#### 2 – LAWS prevent disarm

Boulanin, Ph.D., et al. 20 [Vincent, senior researcher at SIPRI; Moa Peldán Carlsson, research assistant on emerging military and security technologies at SIPRI; Lora Saalman, associate senior fellow on armament and disarmament at SIPRI and a senior fellow with the Global Cooperation in Cyberspace Programme of the EastWest Institute, New York; Fei Su, researcher with the China and Global Security Programme at SIPRI; Petr Topychkanov, senior researcher with the SIPRI Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme; June 2020; Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk; SIPRI; <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/other-publications/artificial-intelligence-strategic-stability-and-nuclear-risk//lhs-ap>]

Pakistan’s interventions in the CCW debate on LAWS also indicate that the Pakistani Government has given increasing thought to the wider security opportunities and risks posed by the advance of AI in military systems. They also show what Pakistan has already identified a redline for the military use of AI. Indeed, Pakistan was one of the first countries to support the idea of a ban on LAWS.348 Pakistan has justified its support for a ban over the years with a mix of ethical, legal and strategic considerations. Ethically, the use of LAWS could ‘make war even more inhumane’ since the ‘use of LAWS in the battlefield against a State fighting with human soldiers would amount to a situation of one-sided killing’.349 Legally, weapons that are not ‘under the direct control and supervision of humans’ could ‘create an accountability vacuum and provide impunity to the user due to the inability to attribute responsibility for the harm that they cause’.350 Strategically, LAWS could ‘undermine international peace and security. Their introduction would affect progress on disarmament and non-proliferation. Faced with the prospect of being overwhelmed by LAWS, states possessing [weapon of mass destruction (WMD)] capabilities would be reluctant to give them up, while others would feel encouraged to acquire them.’351

#### 3 – Empirics – 70 years and thousands of nuclear weapons with no accidents proves they’re hype

#### 4 – No accidents --- checks are built into the system

Kehler 17 (C. ROBERT KEHLER, retired US Air Force General appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the authority to use nuclear weapons, November 14, 2017, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111417\_Kehler\_Testimony.pdf, accessed 7/18/18)

Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) US nuclear forces operate under strict civilian control. Only the President of the United States can authorize the use of US nuclear weapons, and the President’s ability to exercise that authority and direction is ensured by the people, procedures, facilities, equipment, and communications capabilities that comprise the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS). The NCCS has been designed with resilience, redundancy, and survivability to ensure that an adversary cannot hope to neutralize our deterrent by successfully attacking any of its elements and thereby “disconnecting” the President and other civilian and military leaders from one another or from the nuclear forces—even in the most stressing scenarios. These features enhance deterrence and contribute to crisis stability. NCCS capabilities and procedures are designed to enable the authorized use of nuclear weapons while also preventing their unauthorized, accidental, or inadvertent use. Operations and activities involving US nuclear weapons are surrounded by layers of safeguards. While many of the specifics are highly classified, general methods range from personnel screening and monitoring to codes and use controls. In addition, sensors and communications links that contribute to nuclear decision making are specially certified, and tests and exercises are frequently held to validate the performance of both systems and people. Before I retired in late 2013, we had also begun to evaluate networks and systems for potential or actual cyber intrusions. Other factors contribute to the prevention of unauthorized, inadvertent, or accidental use. “Today’s triad of nuclear forces is far smaller and postured much less aggressively than its Cold War ancestor”. ii Not only are the long-range bombers and supporting aerial tankers no longer loaded and poised to take off with nuclear weapons (unless ordered back into a nuclear alert configuration), but ballistic missiles are aimed at open areas of the ocean. Also, while the possibility of a massive surprise nuclear attack still exists (and must be deterred), decision time is longer in many other potential nuclear scenarios that may prove more likely in today’s global security environment. As I mentioned earlier, the decision to employ nuclear weapons is a political decision requiring an explicit order from the President. The process includes “assessment, review, and consultation…(via) secure phone and video conferencing to enable the President to consult with his senior advisors, including the Secretary of Defense and other military commanders.”iii Once a decision is reached, the order is prepared and transmitted to the forces using “procedures…equipment, and communications that ensure the President’s nuclear control orders are received and properly implemented…”.iv The law of war governs the use of US nuclear weapons. Nuclear options and orders are no different in this regard than any other weapon. Here, US policy as articulated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provided important context regarding the consideration of US nuclear use (i.e., extreme circumstances when vital national interests are at stake). The 2010 NPR also restated the “negative security guarantee” (i.e., the US will not consider using nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state that is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations). In addition, the legal principles of military necessity, distinction, and proportionality also apply to nuclear plans, operations, and decisions. Legal advisors are deeply involved with commanders at all steps of the deliberate and crisis action processes to offer perspective on how force is to be used as well as the decision to use force. The decision to use nuclear weapons is not an all or nothing decision. Over the years, successive Presidents have directed the military to prepare a range of options designed to provide flexibility and to improve the likelihood of controlling escalation if deterrence fails. Options are clearly defined in scope and duration and the President retains the ability to terminate nuclear operations when necessary. Military members are bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to follow orders provided they are legal and come from appropriate command authority. They are equally bound to question (and ultimately refuse) illegal orders or those that do not come from appropriate authority. As the commander of US Strategic Command, I shared the responsibility with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior military and civilian leaders to address and resolve any concerns and potential legal issues on behalf of the men and women in the nuclear operating forces during the decision process. It was our duty to pose the hard questions, if any, before proceeding with our military advice. Nuclear crew members must have complete confidence that the highest legal standards have been enforced from target selection to an employment command by the President.

### 1AR – China Revisionism

#### China isn’t revisionist – it’s a diversionary aggressive power that is responding to domestic unrest – no risk of pocketing concessions– failure to distinguish between the two guarantees conflict escalation

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China’s “rise” is among the great challenges of the 21st century, in part because China’s domestic politics compel risky behavior on the international stage. Xi’s attempts to consolidate power have made diversionary foreign policy more likely, but China’s political system itself incentivizes this behavior. Indeed, my research suggests that diversionary aggression may account for as much as 40 percent of all conflict that the Chinese government initiates with the United States. It is critically important for U.S. policymakers to distinguish between diversionary aggression, which evaporates with the resolution of China’s domestic tensions, and revisionist aggression, in which China seeks to permanently reshape the strategic landscape in East Asia. For the United States, responding to diversion as though it were revision risks antagonizing China precisely when Xi is trying to appear tough on foreigners. This risks creating a spiral of escalating conflict. Yet responding to revision as though it were diversion also carries risk: allowing China to expand its influence in East Asia unchecked. When does China employ diversionary aggression? How can U.S. policymakers recognize it? And how should Washington respond? Fortunately, China’s diversionary aggression emanates at specific moments and has key distinguishing features, which I discuss below. Ultimately, the U.S. government should respond to diversion with strategic restraint, and to revisionism with containment. THE REASON Why would tensions between Xi Jinping and senior government officials compel the Chinese government to initiate conflicts with the United States? Understanding this requires understanding China’s domestic political struggles, which are competitive, factional, and ubiquitous. Deng Xiaoping ousted Mao’s successor in a bloodless coup in 1978. The Bo Xilai affair scandalized the regime in 2012. And today, rumors of assassination attempts against senior leaders are common. Accordingly, Chinese presidents take steps to insulate themselves from the conspiracies of regime insiders. This is how China’s diversionary foreign policy should be understood. Scholars have long believed that autocrats can employ popular support to inoculate themselves against elite conspiracies. This dynamic was first observed by Machiavelli, who wrote that “one of the most efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people.” When a conspirator “can only look forward to offending them, he will not have the courage to take such a course.” Machiavelli’s observation has special implications for China, where the population is widely regarded as nationalist. Citizens express high support for the government in international conflict scenarios. For instance, when presented with a hypothetical dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, Chinese survey respondents overwhelmingly support not only Chinese defense of the islands against Japan, but even Chinese invasion of the islands. International crises enable leaders to showcase their competence and cue an “us-versus-them” dynamic that fosters national solidarity and, in turn, domestic support. Domestic support protects Xi against dissatisfied elites, who recognize that toppling a popular leader would invite a backlash. In short, diversionary aggression is an investment. When elites are dissatisfied, Xi can employ diversionary aggression to cue nationalism among Chinese citizens and so inoculate himself from elite conspiracies. EVIDENCE How do we know that diversionary aggression is a critical element of Chinese foreign policy? China’s unique political economy enables us to measure just how much of the conflict that China initiates toward the United States is diversionary. The Chinese regime is underpinned by an autocratic social contract: In exchange for loyalty, elites expect the regime to compensate them. In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping transformed China’s emerging equity markets into a massive patronage system. To reward loyal supporters, Deng appointed them to senior positions at state-owned enterprises about to go public. There, they could purchase ownership shares prior to the IPO. Because initial share prices were dramatically undervalued, this constituted a massive arbitrage opportunity. Since the 1990s, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) has served primarily to reward elites.[1] To reassure them, Chinese leaders have repeatedly pledged to protect elite investments in the stock market. In contrast, there is virtually no connection between stock returns and public interests. In 2011, only 9 percent of Chinese households invested in the SSE. Strikingly, the SSE has no relationship with growth, inflation, or unemployment, and so there is no evidence that SSE shocks foster popular discontent. To explore the relationship between elite welfare and China’s foreign policy more systematically, I created a day-level dataset of over 3,000 bilateral interactions between the United States and China from 1990 to 2010 by coding some 10,000 pages of primary and secondary historical materials.[2] Controlling for a range of features,[3] I find that when the SSE declines by 5 percent to 15 percent, the Chinese government is twice as likely to initiate disputes with the United States. This level of volatility is extraordinarily common. It occurs in three of every 12 months. Two other features of China’s diversionary aggression suggest that its key objective is to cultivate public support. First, it is routinely accompanied by propaganda that broadcasts to senior government officials just how popular the regime is: how its chief aim is to advance public welfare. The People’s Daily is the regime’s flagship propaganda newspaper. Its principal function is to communicate regime doctrine to elites. When the SSE declines, the People’s Daily covers “party-mass relations” (dangqun guanxi) much more positively. The size of the difference is equivalent to the difference in how positively Fox News covers Democrats versus Republicans. In short, when elite interests suffer, the regime’s propaganda apparatus informs elites that it is widely supported by the public. Second, China reliably undertakes diplomatic charm offensives after episodes of diversionary aggression. For China, diversionary aggression is risky. The United States might mistake it for a genuine attempt to revise the power balance in East Asia and respond with containment policies. Accordingly, whenever China employs diversionary aggression, it quadruples its diplomacy the following month. Critically, this diplomacy is virtually always private, since Chinese citizens might view more public forms of cooperation with the United States as capitulation to the foreign adversary so recently demonized. Newly released diplomatic cables provide a unique opportunity to observe this process in action. Between January and July 2010, the SSE lost one-third of its value. A range of evidence suggests that this crisis profoundly shaped Chinese foreign policy towards the United States. In March, U.S. policymakers were subjected to a “lengthy presentation” on China’s rights in the South China Sea, which were described as a “national priority.” Chinese propaganda reported that bilateral relations were “strained” and “at a low point.” Simultaneously**,** the editor of the Global Times, the government’s most nationalist state-run newspaper, told U.S. Ambassador John Huntsman “not to be concerned” because China’s belligerence was “necessary to satisfy the Chinese people.” Huntsman reported to Washington that “over the coming months, China would stomp around and carry a small stick.” “This attitude,” he advised, “has more form than substance and is designed to play to Chinese public opinion.” In July 2010, the SSE stabilized, and the economic interests of Chinese elites recovered. China quickly backpedaled.[4] Chinese officials accepted a longstanding offer for President Hu to visit Washington, agreed to support a U.N. Security Council statement condemning North Korea, reauthorized military exchanges with the United States, said they had not authoritatively called the South China Sea a “core interest,” and told US officials they were “willing to begin expert talks on a code of conduct in the South China Sea.” State Councilor Dai Bingguo even traveled to Pyongyang on a secret mission on behalf of the United States to warn North Korea not to respond to South Korean military exercises. China ensured that these signals were correctly interpreted by American policymakers. Organization Department Minister Li Yuanchao told National Security Adviser Tom Donilon that China “would not challenge the United States for global leadership” and that “there was no inevitable conflict in their interests.” China’s private behavior during this period offers additional clues that its aggression was diversionary rather than revisionist. Despite headlines proclaiming that China was “incensed” with American “containment,” Beijing agreed to help with an Iran resolution at the United Nations, on one condition: that it could keep its assistance private. WHY THIS MATTERS In attempting to secure near-dictatorial powers, Xi has created enemies among the Chinese elite. Financial crises and political purges create incentives for elites to oppose Xi. Some will try to remove him. To inoculate himself against their conspiracies, Xi will employ diversionary foreign policy even more frequently than past generations of Chinese leaders, for whom such incentives motivated 40 percent of conflict initiation with the United States, my estimates suggest. For the U.S. government, of course, this creates a dilemma. It is almost certainly better off ignoring China’s diversionary conflicts. As the cables above make clear, the Chinese government has no interest in pursuing these crises beyond saber-rattling, and so forbearance is ultimately relatively costless. The risk, of course, is that the Chinese government will exploit U.S. strategic restraint to genuinely expand its influence in East Asia. Given this dilemma, what is the best strategy for the U.S. government?

### 1AR – Russia Revionism

#### Russia is neo-revisionist, it challenges the unfair implementation of rules within the system, not the system itself

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The essence of neo-revisionism is not the attempt to create new rules or to advance an alternative model of international order but to ensure the universal and consistent application of existing norms. It is not the principles of international law and governance that Russia condemns but the practices that accompany their implementation. This reflected Russia’s broader perception that it was locked into a strategic stalemate, and that the country was forced into a politics of resistance. As far as Russia is concerned, it was the West that had become revisionist, not Russia. Although the implementation of applicable norms was patchy, Russia did not repudiate them.78 In its relations with the EU, Russia’s neo- revisionist stance means that it was unable to become simply the passive recipient of EU norms, and instead tried to become a co-creator of Europe’s destiny.79 The struggle is not only over contested norms, but also over who has the prerogative to claim their norms as universal.80 However, it was precisely at the level of practices that there was least room for compromise, and thus Russian neo-revisionism became another form of the impasse, and only intensified tensions between Russia and the Atlantic system. A revisionist state would seek to challenge the existing balance of power in the system and threaten the foundations of the system itself. This does not apply to contemporary Russia. It is a country that seeks to enhance its status within the existing framework of international society. However, its aspiration to advance its own world order in the two-level international system generates the neo-revisionist impulse. This has been interpreted as spoiler behaviour, characterised by opposition to the initiatives and policies of others without the commensurate advancement of one’s own. Elements of this were evident when Russia advanced policies with didactic intent, to teach the West how to obey its own rules. One of Russia’s persistent grievances has been the way that the West called for a rule-based international society, but when these rules were at cross-purposes with Western intent (as in Iraq in 2003), the rulebook was abandoned. Nevertheless, Russia remains a profoundly status quo power, since it has nothing to gain from the collapse of the international system. Elements of revisionism do creep in when it comes to creating a cultural alternative non- Western order. It is this combination of conservatism and challenges to contemporary practices that generates neo-revisionism, which can be defined as an unstable combination of attempts to modify the structures and practices of the hegemonic global order while remaining firmly ensconced in that order.

## AT: Environment Da

### 1AR – Link Turn – Environment

#### Turn – Autonomous warfare is worse for the environment

Sparrow and Lucas 16 [Robert Sparrow received his BA from the University of Melbourne and his PhD from the Australian National University and is presently at Monash University. At Monash he is a professor in the philosophy program, a chief investigator in the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Electromaterials Science, and an adjunct professor in the Centre for Human Bioethics. He has authored numerous papers and book chapters on the ethics of military robotics, just war theory, human enhancement, and nanotechnology. He is a co-chair of the IEEE Technical Committee on Robot Ethics and was one of the founding members of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control. George Lucas received his BS from the College of William and Mary and his PhD from Northwestern University. He is professor emeritus at the U.S. Naval Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School. He is the author of the book Military Ethics: What Everyone Needs to Know. “WHEN ROBOTS RULE THE WAVES?” Naval War College Review, Autumn 2016, Vol. 69, No. 4, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1142&context=nwc-review//lhs-ap]

On the other hand, there is another proportionality calculation that is especially difficult in the context of war at sea. Military operations may have significant and long-term implications for civilian life via their impact on the environment.67 Consequently, combatants now are also held to be under an obligation to consider and, where possible, to minimize the damage to the environment their activities cause. These obligations must be balanced against considerations of military necessity. In practice, then, combatants are required to make a calculation of proportionality when contemplating an attack to determine whether the military advantage the attack will achieve justifies the environmental damage it is likely to cause. However, the role played by wind, waves, and tides in distributing the debris resulting from war at sea and the complex nature of marine ecosystems make calculations of the environmental impacts of naval operations especially difficult. Determination of the intrinsic value of significant features of the environment (such as, for instance, clean rivers, coral reefs, or the spawning grounds of fish) is controversial, as is assessment of the instrumental value they have in terms of their contribution to human well-being. Judgments about such matters inevitably involve balancing a range of complex considerations as well as arguments about matters of (moral) value. For both these reasons, calculations of proportionality in attack in relation to damage to the environment seem likely to remain beyond the capacity of computers for many years yet.

## AT: FON DA

### 1AR – FON

#### Perception of AWS miscalculation chills FON

Sparrow and Lucas 16 [Robert Sparrow received his BA from the University of Melbourne and his PhD from the Australian National University and is presently at Monash University. At Monash he is a professor in the philosophy program, a chief investigator in the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Electromaterials Science, and an adjunct professor in the Centre for Human Bioethics. He has authored numerous papers and book chapters on the ethics of military robotics, just war theory, human enhancement, and nanotechnology. He is a co-chair of the IEEE Technical Committee on Robot Ethics and was one of the founding members of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control. George Lucas received his BS from the College of William and Mary and his PhD from Northwestern University. He is professor emeritus at the U.S. Naval Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School. He is the author of the book Military Ethics: What Everyone Needs to Know. “WHEN ROBOTS RULE THE WAVES?” Naval War College Review, Autumn 2016, Vol. 69, No. 4, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1142&context=nwc-review//lhs-ap]

Of course, armed UUVs and USVs operating on the high seas would appear to pose risks to commercial shipping and to the warships of neutral nations beyond simply the risk of collision; they might (accidentally) fire on them, for example. Their significance for the right of freedom of navigation is therefore likely to depend on their capacity to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets of attack, as discussed in sections 5 and 6 below.

A key question in the larger debate about the ethics of autonomous weapons concerns whether—by analogy to what we suggested was the case with regard to the capacity to avoid collision—it would be sufficient to render the use of such weapons permissible if they were capable of achieving results similar to the standard required of human beings with respect to compliance with the moral principles of distinction and proportionality. Those inclined to understand the principles of jus in bello as grounded primarily in a concern for the rights of noncombatants are likely to believe that this would be sufficient to render the use of AWSs permissible—and indeed may be tempted to the conclusion that their use will be mandatory once such weapons become capable of exceeding human performance in this regard.47 On the other hand, a number of authors have suggested that if we think of the requirements of jus in bello fundamentally as ethical demands on the human being making the decision to use lethal force, we may conclude that the absence of a human will at the moment the attack is carried out means that autonomous weapons cannot be said to comply with these principles at all.48 Insofar as our concern is with the compatibility of the operations of AWSs with the right to freedom of navigation rather than with the wider conceptual debate concerning the ethics of autonomous targeting, though, it appears that the relevant standard of discrimination is just that required of human beings in similar circumstances.

However, there is another reason to worry that achieving a high standard when it comes to the capacity to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets may not be sufficient to render the use of AWSs ethical on the high seas. The presence of AWSs operating in particular waters might exercise a “chilling” effect on commercial shipping over a wide area—and thus impinge on the right of freedom of navigation—even if the chance of an accidental attack by AWSs was extremely remote, given the capacities of these systems. This possibility seems especially likely if we think of autonomous UUVs and USVs as weapons rather than vessels. Indeed, one well might argue that armed autonomous UUVs at least should be understood as sophisticated versions of free-floating mines, and consequently should be prohibited.49 The use of drifting mines that do not disarm themselves within an hour is prohibited under international law because of the threat they pose to freedom of navigation.50 The fact that the chance of any particular ship being struck by any particular drifting mine is small does not seem to affect the force of this concern.

An important point of reference for our intuitions here is CAPTOR, which is a moored torpedo-launch system capable of detecting the acoustic signature of approaching enemy submarines and firing a torpedo to destroy them.51 This system is arguably already autonomous insofar as the “decision” to launch a torpedo is made without direct human input at the time. Versions of the system have been in use since 1979 without causing significant international outcry, which suggests that concerns about freedom of navigation in open waters need not rule out the deployment of autonomous weapon systems.

However, there are at least three reasons to be cautious about this conclusion. First, because the CAPTOR itself is fixed—even if its range of operations is extended—the system would appear to pose less of a danger to navigation than hypothetical free-ranging AWSs.52 Second, insofar as this weapon is advertised as an antisubmarine system, those plying the surface of the waters may feel they have little to fear from it. International opinion might be very different should it become common knowledge that similar systems were being tasked with destroying surface vessels. Finally, the absence of any outcry against CAPTOR and similar systems needs to be understood in the context of a history over which they have not been responsible—to date—for any noncombatant casualties. The first time an AWS deployed at sea attacks a commercial—or, worse, a passenger— vessel, we might expect public and international opinion about their legitimacy to change dramatically.

Even very reliable AWSs therefore may jeopardize freedom of navigation if vessels are unwilling to put to sea in waters in which AWSs are known to be operating. While fear of (accidental) attack by an AWS might appear to be irrational when compared with the risks that manned systems pose, beliefs about risk are notoriously complex and difficult to assess because they often contain hidden value judgments. In this case, a reluctance to risk attack by an AWS may express the value judgment that human beings alone should be responsible for decisions to take human lives. Insofar as the right of freedom of navigation exists to protect and sustain international commerce, what matters is the willingness of ships to ply the oceans. Subjective judgments of risk may be just as significant for the existence of freedom of navigation as—indeed, may be more so than—the objective risks that ships actually take when they leave port.

## AT: Hypersonics

### 1AR – Hypersonics Good – Link Turn

#### Drone swarms become hypersonics and blunts any defenses

Johnson 20 [James Johnson, 4-1-2020, "Artificial Intelligence, Drone Swarming and Escalation Risks in Future Warfare," Taylor &amp; Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2020.1752026, accessed 3-25-2021]LHSBC

In the future, swarms of AI-augmented UAVs might be used to locate and track dispersed targets such as mobile missile launchers and suppress enemy air defences, clearing the path for swarms of hypersonic autonomous delivery systems armed with conventional or nuclear payloads.51 The development and deployment of offensive-dominant weapons such as hypersonic boost-glide vehicles (HGVs), which use boost-glide technology to propel warheads with conventional, and potentially nuclear, payloads,52 may eventually exacerbate the problem of target ambiguity, increase the risks of inadvertent escalation and, in turn, lower the nuclear threshold.53

### 1AR – Hypersonics Bad – Impact Turn

#### Hypersonics cause nuclear war.

John **Kester 17**. Policy analyst and international journalist with Foreign Policy, citing RAND. 10-2-2017. "Report: Hypersonic Missiles Could Trigger a War." Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/02/report-hypersonic-missiles-could-trigger-a-war/

Imagine if a foreign country launched a nuclear attack on the continental United States and the Pentagon had only six minutes to respond. That’s the potential of a new generation of weapons on the horizon, according to a recent Rand Corp. report. Rand is urging the United States, China, and Russia to form an agreement on how to handle hypersonic missiles, which travel at more than five thousand kilometers per hour (about 3,100 mph). Hypersonic weapons are more than five times faster than a regular cruise missile and would not be detected by U.S. air defense systems as early as ballistic missiles. The United States, China, and Russia are all known to be close to achieving deployable hypersonic systems and are ahead of other countries, according to Rand. “Hypersonic missile proliferation would increase the chances of strategic war,” said Richard Speier, lead author of Rand’s report, in a press release. The speed forces quick military counter-decisions with potentially disastrous effect. “It would give nations an incentive to become trigger-happy,” he said. The United States likely has less than a decade to counter the proliferation of hypersonic missiles, though they are not yet operational, according to the report. Current missile defense systems would not be effective at defending against hypersonic missiles, and Rand urges changes to the existing missile technology control regime to anticipate and address them. Crunched for time with dire stakes, countries might adopt a so-called launch-on-warning doctrine, or they might just strike first. Without time to consult a traditional chain of command, nations might feel compelled to give the military command and control, increasing the likelihood of accidental war. Countries might also scatter their weapons in order to better respond, which would give terrorists greater opportunity to steal the weapons for themselves, the report said. “None of these options is very good,” Speier said. The broad term “hypersonic missiles” actually refers to two distinct weapons: hypersonic cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles. The former is propelled throughout its flight by a specialized “scramjet” engine, while its glider counterparts are propelled at the start by a rocket but glide dexterously using aerodynamic forces in flight. That maneuverability means gliders can conceal their eventual target until seconds before they hit. Yet the very complexity of the technologies needed to develop a usable hypersonic missile could on its own limit the spread of such weapons, according to Werner Dahm, a former chief scientist of the U.S. Air Force and the founding director of the Security and Defense Systems Initiative at Arizona State University. “Hypersonic missiles are not transformative in the way that nuclear weapons were in the late 1940s,” he wrote to Foreign Policy. “Instead, the warfighting capabilities they can provide are best viewed as part of the natural evolution of missile technology. As such, the existing [Missile Technology Control Regime] or additions to it may be sufficient to support efforts at limiting access to those technologies.”

### 1AR – Tech Impossible

#### Hypersonics are impossible.

Omar **Lamrani 16**. Senior Military Analyst, Stratfor, private intelligence corporation, M.A. Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, B.A. international relations, Clark University. 03-21-2016. “What the Next Arms Race Will Look Like.” https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/what-next-arms-race-will-look

Hypersonic missiles travel at least five times the speed of sound. Only a few other manmade devices are capable of reaching hypersonic speeds, including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles and unmanned spacecraft such as the Boeing X-37. The only manned aircraft to achieve hypersonic speed is the rocket-powered North American X-15, which broke speed and altitude records when it was introduced in the 1960s. Recently, the focus of research in hypersonic technologies has shifted toward missile development, but several challenges must be overcome to make hypersonic missiles a reality. First, it is difficult to create a weapon that can reach hypersonic speeds while enduring the stress and extreme temperatures of hypersonic flight. It is harder still to ensure that the weapon can maintain those speeds for an extended period — enough time to reach its target. Second, high velocities can make a hypersonic vehicle sensitive to changes in flight conditions, resulting in instability in the missile's airframe during flight. Coupled with the fact that high speeds leave less time to course correct, this instability can make guidance of hypersonic missiles problematic. Finally, hypersonic vehicles' actual flight paths often do not match the predictions researchers derive from ground tests and theoretical models, lengthening the process of development. Despite these obstacles, hypersonic missiles have some considerable advantages. Their speed enables them to reach their targets much more quickly than other missiles and to better penetrate enemy defense systems. Those with gliding capabilities can also cover great distances, enabling one country to strike at another from farther away. Guided hypersonic missiles would be more accurate than traditional ballistic missiles, and they could conceivably be armed with nuclear warheads, becoming a strike asset or a deterrent in nuclear warfare.

### 1AR – AT: Ambiguity

#### Tons of mechanisms to discriminate exist now

Thomas Scheber 12, Vice President, National Institute for Public Policy, et al., June 2012, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike: A Fresh Perspective,” <http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CPGS_REPORT-for-web.pdf>

This description of Russia’s current and planned capabilities to detect missile launches, track objects in space, and calculate impact points for ballistic objects in flight should inform U.S. thinking on the potential for misinterpretation or ambiguity over use of CPGS weapons. The description of observable distinguishing features of each CPGS concept (in Part One), combined with Russia’s ability to observe these features, can contribute significantly to a timely characterization of the threat by leaders in Moscow. In addition, observable and distinguishable weapon characteristics can be supplemented by non-weapon-related measures, such as briefings and demonstrations for Russian officials, to provide transparency on U.S. CPGS weapon characteristics, doctrine, and use.191 Numerous communication links exist between U.S. officials and their Russian counterparts. U.S. and Russian officials can use these communication links to resolve rapidly any uncertainty arising from CPGS use.

#### Impact is overstated – any country that can detect a missile can also distinguish the type – technical characteristics, flight profile, cooperative measures – even if they think it might be nuclear, they’ll exercise restraint

Thomas Scheber 12, Vice President, National Institute for Public Policy, et al., June 2012, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike: A Fresh Perspective,” <http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CPGS_REPORT-for-web.pdf>

Concerns over the ability to distinguish between CPGS use and the launch of nuclear weapons appear to be exaggerated. Countries with the ability to detect the launch of a CPGS weapon should be able to distinguish CPGS concepts from a nuclear missile given the technical and operational characteristics of the system and its flight profile. Multiple options exist for deploying CPGS capabilities and each is characterized by distinct attributes that would mitigate the nuclear ambiguity issue. In addition, cooperative measures could be implemented to further reduce this concern.

Russia has revitalized its launch detection and tracking capability since the 1990s and would have little difficulty distinguishing the launch of a CPGS weapon from a nuclear missile. Should any uncertainty exist, nevertheless, Russia’s behavior in the past demonstrates a realistic amount of caution in responding to ambiguous missile threats. There is no reason to believe Russia’s response would be different today.

### 1AR – AT: BMD

### 2AR – AT: PGS ≠ Hypersonics

#### PGS is hypersonics

Stevenson 16 [Beth Stevenson, 10-3-2016, "USA's hypersonic programme could rile Russia and China," Flight Global, https://www.flightglobal.com/space/usas-hypersonic-programme-could-rile-russia-and-china/121867.article, accessed 4-12-2021]LHSBC

The Prompt Global Strike (PGS) programme aims to develop a hypersonic, precision-guided conventional weapon that can deploy anywhere in the world within one hour.

## AT: Infrastructure

### 2AC---Gun Control Thumper

#### Gun control thumps.

Kristina Peterson 3-23; “Biden Calls for Stronger Gun Control After Shooting in Colorado”; 3/23/23; https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-says-congress-should-ban-assault-weapons-high-capacity-magazines-11616519976; AS

WASHINGTON—President Biden called for tightening gun laws after a deadly shooting at a supermarket in Colorado, reviving debate on Capitol Hill and increasing pressure on Democrats as they weigh trying to change Senate rules to more easily pass their priorities.

Mr. Biden urged Congress to pass legislation approved by the House earlier this month that would among other things expand background checks. He also called on Congress to ban assault-style weapons such as the kind used by the Boulder, Colo., suspect, who was identified Tuesday as 21-year-old Ahmad Al Aliwi Alissa.

The Monday afternoon shooting, in which 10 people died, came less than a week after a gunman opened fire at spas in the Atlanta area, killing eight people. The pair of killings, after a lull in such attacks during the pandemic, swiftly intensified a long-running debate on Capitol Hill about how to prevent such violence and moving it to the top of the new president’s agenda.

“I don’t need to wait another minute, let alone an hour, to take common sense steps that will save lives in the future,” Mr. Biden, a Democrat, said. The White House said he was also contemplating unspecified executive actions.

Republicans said many Democratic proposals would do little to address gun violence but would instead infringe on Second Amendment rights, underlining the starkly different stances of the parties in the face of decades of mass shootings through both Democratic and Republican administrations.

“Every time there’s a shooting we play this ridiculous theater where this committee gets together and proposes a bunch of laws that would do nothing to stop these murders,” said Sen. Ted Cruz (R., Texas), a member of the Judiciary Committee, which held a gun violence hearing Tuesday. “What happens in this committee after every mass shooting is Democrats propose taking away guns from law-abiding citizens because that’s their political objective.”

Democrats, who narrowly control the 50-50 Senate, said Tuesday that they would bring up for votes the House-passed legislation to expand background checks to nearly all gun sales and extend the window for background checks to 10 days from three days, with the goal of flagging people with criminal or mental-health histories that disqualify them from gun ownership. But without the support of 10 Senate Republicans, those bills stand no chance of becoming law unless a bipartisan deal is struck or Democrats decide to change the chamber’s rules to require a simple majority to advance legislation instead of 60 votes.

“If the filibuster is the only thing that stops a wildly popular proposal from becoming law, then…it should be part of the conversation as to why the rules need to change,” said Sen. Chris Murphy (D., Conn.), who became an outspoken proponent of tightening gun laws after the Sandy Hook elementary school shooting in his state in 2012. Mr. Murphy said Tuesday he was talking to both Democratic and GOP colleagues in hopes of reaching an agreement.

Proposals from Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D., Calif.) and others to ban the manufacture and sale of certain semiautomatic weapons and ban high-capacity ammunition magazines have failed in the Senate in previous years. A 1994 law that banned such magazines and limited such ammunition expired in 2004 and wasn’t renewed.

Mr. Biden, asked if he had enough political capital to move forward on gun-control measures in Congress, said, “I hope so. I don’t know. I haven’t done any counting yet.”

The White House didn’t elaborate on which executive actions the president is contemplating, but press secretary Jen Psaki said the administration was looking to “address not just gun safety measures but violence in communities.”

Gun-control groups have urged the president to take executive action, including appointing a senior aide tasked with gun-policy oversight and pursuing stricter enforcement of existing rules.

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D., N.Y.) said the Senate would vote on the House-passed legislation, although he didn’t specify when. He also didn’t indicate whether Democrats would seek to lower the threshold for passing legislation to just a simple majority if no bipartisan agreement can be reached.

On Tuesday, the House bills appeared short of even getting all Democrats onboard, with Sen. Joe Manchin of West Virginia, who had helped craft a bill expanding background checks in 2013, saying he didn’t support the House legislation.

The Senate narrowly blocked that 2013 legislation from Mr. Manchin and Sen. Pat Toomey (R., Pa.) that would have expanded background checks to all commercial sales, including all sales advertised online and at gun shows. Currently, the checks are needed only for sales by federally licensed dealers. The House bill expands background checks to nearly all sales but includes exemptions for family members and some temporary transfers while hunting or at a shooting range, for example.

Mr. Toomey said he was talking to colleagues about whether they could tweak the Manchin-Toomey proposal to garner enough bipartisan support.

“We’re having preliminary conversations, and I hope we can get something across the goal line, but it’s very difficult,” he said Tuesday. Mr. Toomey said he didn’t think the House gun bills could pass the Senate.

### ---Immigration Thumper

#### Border crisis tanks PC and the agenda

Anthony Zurcher 3-19, North America reporter for the BBC, 3/19/21, “President Joe Biden's 'big problem' at the US border,” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-56446814

When Joe Biden took the presidential oath of office in January, he faced two massive, related crises - the coronavirus pandemic and its resulting economic fallout.

Those were challenges as obvious as they were anticipated. Now, however, the president is confronting his first political and policy crisis from a different direction - on immigration, as the US-Mexico border experiences yet another surge in undocumented entries.

The nature of the crisis is hardly novel, as most recent presidents have grappled with some kind of immigration-related challenge during their time in office. For Biden, however, it comes at a moment when he would prefer to focus elsewhere.

Politics doesn't care what politicians would prefer, however. The immigration situation has the potential to derail Biden's other best-laid plans, as he is squeezed by criticism from Republican foes and some within his own party.

A 'big problem'

Speaking to reporters in the White House briefing room on Monday, press secretary Jen Psaki acknowledged that the current situation on the US-Mexico border has become a "big problem".

The overall number of undocumented migrants encountered on the US border is higher than at the same point in any of the previous three years - and growing at a faster pace toward the traditional peak entry time in late spring.

In particular, the figures for unaccompanied minors at the border have sharply increased in the past few months.

About 15,000 unaccompanied youth migrants have been detained at the border in January and February. The total for all of last year was 37,000. In 2019, before the coronavirus pandemic slowed migrant movement, it was 75,000. At this pace, that mark will be easily surpassed.

As of Sunday, US Customs and Border Protection were housing 4,200 children in detention facilities along the border and admitting an average of 565 children - most between the ages of seven and 13 - a day.

Some of this is the result of decisions made by Joe Biden early in his presidency. He reversed a Trump administration policy of turning away unaccompanied children at the border, instead opting to process them and place them with sponsoring families in the US.

Criticism and complications

Like many Democrats, Biden has been critical of Donald Trump's since-rescinded decision in 2018 to separate the children of undocumented migrants from their parents - and the former president's draconian immigration enforcement policies in general.

"Securing our borders does not require us to ignore the humanity of those who seek to cross them," Biden wrote in an executive order reversing the unaccompanied minor policy and announcing an overall review of federal immigration procedures.

But with such moves come complications. Migrants travelling from Central America have told the BBC that they are doing so because they believe the Biden administration will give them amnesty. The president's attempts to discourage the journey have, so far, had no appreciable effect.

In her press conference, Psaki also pointed her finger squarely at Trump.

"The last administration left us a dismantled and unworkable system, and like any other problem, we are going to do everything we can to solve it. So our focus here is on solutions… The president's very focused on expediting what's happening at the border at every step in the process."

Blaming the previous guy for a current problem is an age-old political manoeuvre - and it's one that tends to have a limited shelf life. If the situation on the border doesn't improve, the "big problem" will be squarely in Biden's lap.

Republicans sense an opening

The president's political adversaries on the right appear to be relishing the chance to use the situation on the border to their advantage.

While Biden and top administration officials have criss-crossed the US to tout the benefits of the recently passed $1.9tn (£1.4tn) Covid relief package, Republican officeholders have been travelling to the Mexican border - and blaming Biden for what they see as an overburdened system and presidential actions that are encouraging more illegal entries.

"The sad part about that is this didn't have to happen," House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy said at a press event in Texas. "This crisis is created by the presidential policies of this new administration."

After Democrats attacked Trump for "children in cages" - a result of his family separation policy - Republicans are returning the favour, accusing Biden of implementing policies that put unaccompanied minors in similarly harsh situations.

Immigration and border security were the lynchpin of Donald Trump's successful presidential bid in 2016, and some Republicans may see it as a pathway back to power in future elections, including the 2022 mid-term congressional elections. The former president himself has joined in the chorus, although he glossed over the fact that recent immigration trends began when he was still president.

"When I was president, our southern border was in great shape — stronger, safer, and more secure than ever before," he said in a statement issued last week. "Our country is being destroyed at the southern border, a terrible thing to see!"

For conservatives, immigration is the quintessential "wedge" issue - engaging their base and exacerbating divisions within the Democratic Party.

Activists growing impatient

Those Democratic Party divisions have been on display in recent days, as Biden's more liberal supporters have grown restless over the Trump-era policies and provisions that have yet to be rolled back by the new administration.

For now, the US border with Mexico remains largely closed. And while unaccompanied children have been permitted entry into the US, most others have been turned away - and their asylum requests delayed. While the Trump-era ban on entry from certain majority Muslim nations has been lifted, the visa-approval process for foreign workers is still suspended because of Covid restrictions, and temporary visas for students are facing significant backlogs.

Patience among some on the left is wearing thin.

"The longer we sort of slow-walk that restoration of normalcy and how we would address the issues at the border with migrants - whether they're adults or children - the [worse] the problem gets," Congresswoman Ilhan Omar of Minnesota - herself a former refugee - told Politico this week.

"Once we think of the humans at the border as humans ... we will have policies that are just, humane, and give them dignity."

Meanwhile, Democratic moderates - like Congressman Henry Cuellar, who represents an area along the Mexican district - said the Biden team needs to do more to discourage migrants from travelling to the US and falling prey to human traffickers.

"They're trying to be different from Trump, which I agree with," he told Newsweek. "They need to be different; we don't separate kids. But [Biden's] 'humane' approach, is actually feeding the narrative that the bad guys are twisting to get people over; no ifs, no buts."

Biden has unveiled comprehensive immigration legislation, but the prospects for passage in Congress - at least as long as the Senate rule requiring 60 out of 100 votes to approve most bills endures - is dim.

His administration is still not fully staffed, with delays caused by the lack of transition co-operation from the Trump administration and the Senate impeachment trial in February preventing top presidential nominees - who then select staff for their agencies and departments - from being confirmed quickly.

Over the course of four years, Trump officials dramatically altered the way the federal government handles immigration in the US. Liberals want those changes reversed as quickly as possible, but Biden - with multiple demands on his time and political capital - will be challenged to keep them satisfied.

His ability to do so, however, could determine how successful he is in keeping together the coalition of disparate interests that made his presidential victory last year possible.

### 2AC---Infrastructure---Top

#### Won’t pass

Peter Nicholas 3-16, staff writer at The Atlantic, 3/16/21, “Why an Infrastructure Deal Everyone Wants May Fail,” <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/03/why-an-infrastructure-deal-everyone-wants-may-fail/618290/>

Democrat or Republican, left or right, business or labor—everyone, it seems, agrees that the United States needs to upgrade its infrastructure, and needs to do it now.

During the presidential campaign, Joe Biden promised a national rebuilding program worthy of Franklin D. Roosevelt. He spoke of half a million new charging stations that would power a growing fleet of electric vehicles; of commuters gliding over sparkling new bridges; of trucks rumbling through freshly bored tunnels.

Last fall’s wildfires in California and this winter’s ice storm in Texas exposed, once again, the frailties of the country’s power grid. The pandemic brought attention, once again, to the great swaths of rural America without broadband. For the past two decades, the nation’s civil engineers have compiled a report card that rates the nation’s infrastructure. This year, the grade was a C-minus. That’s an improvement: Most years, the grade has been in the Ds.

The need exists. Powerful organizations are putting their muscle behind it. Both parties proclaim that it’s a top priority. So why will Congress struggle to pass an infrastructure bill? The answer’s pretty basic: What’s missing is even the outlines of a deal. The two sides cannot agree on just what a package should contain or how it would be paid for. Nor is there unanimity within the parties on either point.

Biden wants to go big, calling for a program that would exceed $2 trillion, respond to global warming, and address economic inequality by paying workers union wages. Progressives aim to go bigger still. Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York and Senator Edward Markey of Massachusetts envision a Green New Deal that would end the nation’s dependence on fossil fuels and guarantee that every American has a job that pays a living wage. Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts wants the package to include provisions for child care. “Infrastructure is about making it possible for people to go to work and for businesses to conduct business,” she told me. “For parents to be able to participate in that, we need child care.”

The Democratic Party’s moderate wing is wary of a package on a scale that their liberal colleagues have embraced. Senators Joe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona voted against the Green New Deal in 2019, as did Senator Angus King of Maine, an independent who caucuses with the Democrats. Manchin, who in a 2010 campaign ad memorably shot a bullet through a climate-change bill, said he was not prepared to forswear fossil fuels.

It’s not entirely clear what the Republicans have in mind, other than that they prefer something more modest. A Venn diagram would show that both parties see the need for wiring rural homes for the internet and modernizing highways and tunnels—and not much else. Republicans favor deregulatory steps that speed approval for projects; Democrats are leery of ditching regulations tied to public safety or environmental protection. “It doesn’t do any good to spend $1 billion on roads and bridges if you can’t get a permit to build the damn road or bridge,” Senator Ted Cruz told me. “But we won’t see that if Pelosi and Schumer and Biden only listen to the extreme-left wing of their party.”

Another sticking point is how to pay for it all. Biden has called for increasing corporate taxes, which would reverse a core component of the Trump tax cut signed into law in 2017. It’s hard to imagine that Republicans would agree to this. When I asked Senator Rick Scott of Florida about the best way to fund expanded infrastructure, he was adamant: “I completely oppose raising taxes to do it.”

Yet the Republicans have some cover if they’re willing to take it. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce says it’s open to raising the federal gas tax, which has remained the same (18.4 cents per gallon) since 1993. At the very least, such an increase could finance some of the road improvements both parties envision. Trouble is, the White House doesn’t want to raise the gas tax. When Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg floated the idea at his Senate confirmation hearing in January, his spokesperson quickly walked it back. “The president has been very committed to the idea that we’re not going to raise taxes on people earning less than $400,000 a year,” Buttigieg told me. “So that’s the starting point that needs to be held in mind.” (Many Democrats don’t buy that reasoning. As Representative Peter DeFazio of Oregon, who chairs the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, told me, a gas tax is like a user fee, borne only by the people who drive.)

#### Buttigieg pushes---prevents other fights from interfering

Ted Mann 3-4, reporter in the Wall Street Journal’s Washington bureau, 3/4/21, “Biden, Buttigieg Push Infrastructure Plan,” https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-buttigieg-to-push-infrastructure-plan-11614859200

The last time the federal government raised the gas tax that is supposed to fund improvements to America’s highways, Pete Buttigieg was 11 years old.

Some 28 years removed from that gas-tax increase, signed by President Bill Clinton in August 1993, Mr. Buttigieg is the federal transportation secretary, working for another president who will try to deliver where predecessors of both parties have failed: crafting a program to rebuild aging roads, dams and railroads, and finding the political will to pay for it.

President Biden met Thursday with Republican and Democratic members of the House of Representatives to discuss his plans for an infrastructure package, a goal that has eluded Democratic lawmakers and his Republican predecessor, former President Donald Trump, even as members of both parties and outside groups claim there is bipartisan support for such a measure.

Mr. Biden told reporters at the outset of the Oval Office meeting that the subject of their discussion would be American competitiveness. The group would be talking about “what we’re going to do to make sure we once again lead the world across the board on infrastructure.”

After the meeting, Rep. John Garamendi (D., Calif.) said the president didn’t discuss any specific amount of money to be spent. But there was a discussion about how to pay for the program, he said, with one of the Republican lawmakers suggesting a tax on carbon emissions could be used to help fund infrastructure projects.

“He clearly wants a bipartisan approach to this,” Mr. Garamendi said of Mr. Biden. “That’s why he had four Democrats and four Republicans.”

The president was joined at the meeting by Mr. Buttigieg, now 39, a former mayor of South Bend, Ind., and presidential candidate who says his local experience will help him lead the department that is a major source of federal grants for states and towns.

Mr. Biden campaigned on a promise to pass a $2 trillion infrastructure package and is expected to send Congress an infrastructure proposal after the passage of a Covid-19 relief bill.

Mr. Trump’s example may show how hard it is to deliver on something that all parties say they want. Campaigning for president in 2016, Mr. Trump promised during a TV appearance to do twice as much as Democratic opponent Hillary Clinton, who had initially proposed a $500 billion package, leading his aides to begin working to meet a $1 trillion target.

In office, Mr. Trump’s plans were undermined by his other priorities, such as the unsuccessful effort to overturn Obamacare, and his own resistance to elements of the plan designed by his administration. When Mr. Trump finally delivered a proposal to Congress in 2018, it was dead on arrival, thanks in part to the decision to put the burden for raising money for new projects overwhelmingly on states and cities, not the federal government.

House Democrats passed their own $1.5 trillion package last year, but it too went nowhere, thanks to opposition in the then-Republican-controlled Senate.

Democrats hope Mr. Biden can succeed where they and Mr. Trump failed.

Rep. Peter DeFazio (D., Ore.), chairman of the House Transportation committee, was among the lawmakers attending Thursday’s meeting. Afterward, he put out a statement saying, “It is time to get out of the 1950s and move forward on a transformational infrastructure bill.”

Mr. Buttigieg said during his Senate confirmation hearing that he was eager to work on the administration’s infrastructure proposal. “Good transportation policy can play no less a role than making possible the American dream,” he said at the time.

#### There’s no bill yet and it’ll get split into pieces at worst

Shannon Pettypiece 3-22, the senior White House reporter for NBCNews.com; and Jonathan Allen, senior political analyst for NBC News, 3/22/21, “Biden's multitrillion-dollar infrastructure jam,” https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-s-multi-trillion-dollar-infrastructure-jam-n1261613

President Joe Biden is signaling that his next big push in Congress will be for legislation implementing the transportation, infrastructure and green-energy elements of his "Build Back Better" campaign platform, with a reported potential price tag of $3 trillion.

But Biden has yet to develop a roadmap for getting the effort through Congress, where partisan divisions, the massive cost and possible tax hikes could all lead to a dead end.

Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., and her House Democrats are moving forward on plans to pass legislation that would not only fund roads, bridges and mass transit but also deliver on Biden's vow to address climate change. But in the Senate, that plan doesn't appear to have enough support even among Democrats, with Sen. Joe Manchin of West Virginia saying he wants new spending to be both bipartisan and paid for with tax increases. Raising taxes is as anathema to the GOP as the Democrats' Green New Deal.

All of that means Biden will likely have to take the scenic route, according to congressional officials and lobbyists who are working on the issue. Biden was able to score a relatively easy win in his first two months with a Covid-19 relief bill that passed along party lines. But allies say the hard part begins now. His promise to work across party lines will be tested — and how he’s able to navigate the competing demands of progressives, centrist Democrats and Republicans amid this push could set the tone for the rest of his presidency.

"They have a long way to go before they get from here to there," one business lobbyist said of a push to enact legislation that could reshape federal policy on transportation, energy, the environment and broadband access while injecting trillions of dollars into the economy.

Biden will be briefed on the size and scope of the infrastructure planning this week to get his thoughts, said White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki. No decision has been made on what a final package would look like, she said.

Top Biden advisers have said they see his first address to a joint session of Congress as a pivot point for the new president to move from selling the just-enacted American Rescue Plan Act to his infrastructure initiative. That speech has not yet been scheduled, but it is expected to come in the next several weeks.

At the same time, Biden is trying to find a way to avoid a snarl on Capitol Hill. He and his top aides are in ongoing discussions with top lawmakers in both parties, business leaders and labor officials about their wish lists and red lines on the measure. The public will get a preview of Biden's priorities when Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg testifies before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee on Thursday.

Buttigieg should "eat his Wheaties" before that session, the panel's chairman, Rep. Peter DeFazio, D-Ore., said in announcing the hearing.

DeFazio, a founder of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, is in charge of drafting a rewrite of the nation's surface transportation laws that will sit at the heart of any major infrastructure legislation. The version DeFazio wrote in the last Congress, which passed the House and died in the Senate, included a variety of provisions designed to address climate change by shifting away from traditional energy sources and limiting pollutants.

By comparison, that bill would have cost just $450 billion in infrastructure spending and green-energy incentives.

While Pelosi pushes her lieutenants to move forward on one track, White House advisers are hoping Congress can pass a few smaller bipartisan bills, like legislation that would improve American competitiveness against China and some other items on the national security front, to build momentum and show a willingness to work with Republicans.

Republicans are currently suggesting less willingness to work with Biden. "We’re hearing the next few months might bring a so-called infrastructure proposal that may actually be a Trojan horse for massive tax hikes and other job-killing left-wing policies," Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., said on the Senate floor Monday. "Remember, the House Democrats tipped their hand last year. They published a sprawling proposal that pretended to be a highway bill but was really just a multithousand-page cousin of the Green New Deal."

One outside adviser to the White House cautioned that Biden will give Republicans a limited window of time before turning to more partisan means to enact an infrastructure law. It was one of his key campaign pledges, and he backed it with a stated goal of spending $2 trillion to rebuild highways and bridges, transition toward clean power, create jobs in the auto industry, and improve mass transit.

Getting something done is a priority for both Biden and congressional Democrats. Party strategists say they see the passage of any infrastructure bill — whether it is tailored narrowly to fund existing programs or written to sweep in progressive priorities — as a major selling point in the 2022 midterm elections. If earmarks are allowed in the process, members will be able to jockey to get millions of dollars for pet projects in their district.

"Every member has something they need, and everyone will get to stand with a check," said a Democratic Senate staffer. "This is the Recovery Act on steroids in the gym with cocaine."

But if earmarks aren't enough to attract Republicans, Biden will be pressured to find an alternative path for his infrastructure package.

Already, White House officials and Democrats in Congress are plotting out the possibilities, including breaking the plan into pieces. In one scenario, they would try to use the filibuster-proof reconciliation process — the vehicle for the American Rescue Plan Act — to push a more-progressive bill through Congress without GOP support.

#### Federal infrastructure fails

Henry Cisneros 21, former secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and former mayor of San Antonio, Texas; and William Fulton, director of the Kinder Institute for Urban Research at Rice University and former mayor of Ventura, California, 2/22/21, “Biden's infrastructure plan needs input from cities and regions,” https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/539661-bidens-infrastructure-plan-needs-input-from-cities-and-regions

For the pressing challenges before our nation — recovery from the pandemic, racial inequity and economic mobility, regional dispersal of opportunity, economic competitiveness, digital equity and climate change — infrastructure is at least part of the means to addressing each one.

There is no silver bullet, but for all these issues, it is part of the answer.

There’s no question the Biden administration will pursue a major infrastructure plan. But too often in the past, U.S. infrastructure policy has taken a top-down approach, with the federal government dictating what will be built, much of it based on inside-the-Beltway lobbying.

We need a way to map out a new national infrastructure strategy.

Cities and regions are the true engines of American prosperity, producing most of the economic output and jobs. The pandemic has seared an indelible awareness of infrastructure priorities on local officials. To meet the challenges listed above, a new approach must include a market-based, bottom-up component that is responsive to the needs on the ground in cities, metros, and regions.

### 1AR – Link

#### Federal spending results in a net decrease of overall spending,

D.J. Gribbin, general counsel of the U.S. Department of Transportation from 2007-2009, founder of Madrus, LLC, a strategic consulting firm focused on infrastructure development, 03/27/2019, Three reasons to think twice about an infrastructure bill, Politico, <https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2019/03/27/infrastructure-funding-bill-000886/> accessed 3/8/21

In physics, Newton’s Third Law states that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. In policy, too, every action creates a reaction, albeit rarely equal or opposite. In fact, the challenge of policy is that reactions, while inevitable, are difficult to predict. When weighing federal expenditures on infrastructure, policymakers need to keep in mind that allocating more federal funds to infrastructure might backfire. Here are three ways that could happen:

The “coupon effect”

The prospect of federal funding can dampen state and local funding. While voters overwhelmingly support increased infrastructure spending, their strong preference is that someone else pay for it. This dynamic makes it difficult for state and local leaders (who own 90 percent of governmental infrastructure) to turn to their electorate and ask for a tax or fee increase if the federal government is offering “free” funding.

This dynamic can be called the “coupon effect.” Imagine if shoppers in the market for a new suit were told that there is a small likelihood they will receive a coupon for 80 percent off their next suit purchase. Consumers will rationally engage in what economists call strategic delay and postpone their purchase in the hope of receiving a coupon, even if the chance of getting the coupon is very small. Every time a consumer considers heading to the store and buying a suit, he will ask, “But what if a coupon arrives tomorrow?” As a result, many will continue to delay until their suits (or our infrastructure) become unacceptably shoddy and worn.

In my experience, the prospect of federal funding has this same impact on state and local leaders considering a tax or user fee increase to expand or improve the quality of their infrastructure. This dynamic was clearly apparent in Kentucky in 2014, for instance. That year, a candidate for the U.S. Senate encouraged the communities around the Brent Spence Bridge (connecting Cincinnati and Covington, Ky.) to oppose a toll increase, because if elected, she would get the federal government to pick up the $2.6 billion tab to replace the bridge. Her campaign successfully increased opposition to tolling. Yet five years later, the debate on how to fund the bridge is still unresolved, and the probability of full federal funding is still just about zero (notwithstanding the fact that the state is represented by the Senate majority leader, who is married to the Secretary of Transportation).

While further study needs to be done, the coupon effect could actually result in a net decrease in infrastructure funds, especially when coupled with the challenges of substitution; states and local governments receiving an influx of federal dollars frequently substitute the new federal dollars for funds previously allocated to infrastructure and transfer their dollars to other policy priorities. As a result, a dollar in new federal infrastructure spending does not necessarily result in an additional dollar available for infrastructure.

The current non-federal to federal ratio of infrastructure spending is 3:1. Thus, if a 30 percent increase in federal spending (along with celebrations that the coupon is in the mail) dampened by 11 percent non-federal spending increases, our nation would be left with a net national decrease in infrastructure funding.

The goal of infrastructure policy should be a significant increase in infrastructure funding overall. As counterintuitive as it sounds, an increase in federal funding could work counter to that goal.

#### Federal funding causes delays which is comparatively worse.

Gribbin and Smetters 18 – (D.J Gribbin is a Former White House infrastructure adviser, Kent Smetters is a professor of business economics and public policy, Oct 22, 2018, 10-22-2018, "The White House Infrastructure Plan: A Tale of Two Views," Knowledge@Wharton, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/white-house-infrastructure-plan/

Knowledge@Wharton: Let’s turn to some broader questions about infrastructure. Kent, states seem to be strategic in how they approach federal cost share by withholding projects until a federal grant program comes along. And you referred to the “coupon effects” that D.J. has spoken about in the past. Do you agree with that? And what can be done about it?

Smetters: D.J. is absolutely right. He’s the first person I’ve heard use that term – “coupon effect.” I think it’s exactly right, where states will often withhold doing projects because they’re anticipating the federal government coming up with some type of matching money later on. It’s somewhat analogous to corporations holding so much money overseas hoping that the federal government would eventually change the tax code so that they could repatriate that money at a much lower tax rate. It’s a completely rational thing to do, from a company or from a state perspective. From a social perspective, it just creates a bigger substitution effect. It now becomes harder to distinguish what’s truly new and additional.

Knowledge@Wharton: What do you think, D.J.?

Gribbin: Yes, I agree. If we can get additional information or different benefits in the future, then it’s highly economic-rational for us to say, “Let me delay that decision.” Right now, we talked about the program having limited funding. The federal government opposes costs on that funding, so you net fewer dollars as a result of federal restrictions. But I think you need to add onto it this very real political dynamic, which is this coupon effect of, “I am incentivized as a leader — a political leader — to delay any increase in revenue.” Because state and local governments provide three to four times more funding for infrastructure than the federal government does, it can have this very distorting impact, where a federal dollar could, in essence, lock up three to four state local dollars — just the prospect of that hanging out there. So again, part of what we’re trying to do in our proposal is to flip that around and say, “Instead of engaging in strategic delay, act now and raise revenue, and we’ll incentivize you for that behavior.”

## AT: Iran Dip Cap

### 1AR – Iran

#### Plan passes immediately – means we regain dipcap immediately

#### Consensus of international relations scholars demonstrates the US can multi-task.

**Ribar, ’14** [Matthew, Research Assistant at the Teaching, Research, and International Policy project in the William & Mary-University of St. Andrews Joint Degree Programme, “How Much Diplomacy is ‘Too Much’?” Diplomatic Courier, June 6, 2014, http://www.diplomaticourier.com/how-much-diplomacy-is-too-much/]

In fact, there is broad consensus amongst I.R. scholars. Of the respondents, 71.4 percent of scholars reported that heavy diplomatic involvement by the U.S. around the world did not hamper U.S. efforts to facilitate Middle East peace talks. Only 16.8 percent of scholars answered “yes” (11.8 percent responded “don’t know”). Often, the academic community faces allegations of liberal bias. These range from memoirs about a conservative academic being met “with enmity, suspicion, and a refusal to engage in reasoned debate” to Senator Rick Santorum’s famous response to President Obama wanting every American to go to college: “what a snob.” So, perhaps liberal professors are blindly following the president in foreign policy. If this were the case, one would expect a much larger ratio of “yes” answers among conservatives. The following chart shows responses to the snap poll question broken down according to political ideology and gender: Variations are underwhelming, and consensus is again strong: 18.8 percent of conservatives replied that the U.S. is stretched too thin diplomatically, whereas 16 percent of liberals also agreed. That difference, 2.8 percent, is minuscule. Gender played a bigger role in responses than ideology, with women more likely to say that the U.S. is overstretched. But even amongst women, 60.7 percent replied “no.” T.R.I.P. also conducts more substantive polls every few years. One question asked on the larger 2011 T.R.I.P. poll was “how much influence, on a scale of one to ten, will the U.S. have on the world in 2020.” An answer of 10 means that the scholar thought the U.S. would be very influential in 2020. Broadly, scholars who think the U.S. will be more influential in 2020 are less likely to say that the U.S. is overstretched diplomatically. Even amongst those with the gloomiest opinions of the U.S.’s future effect on the world overwhelmingly answer “no.” Only 16.6 percent of those who said the influence of the U.S. would be from 1 to 2 and 23.2 percent of those who responded with answers from 3 to 4 said that the U.S. was overstretched diplomatically. Despite frequent criticism that the administration needs to focus on a smaller number of diplomatic initiatives, there is actually an overwhelming consensus amongst I.R. scholars, irrespective of gender, ideology, or predictions of the future of U.S. power. The takeaway is that even though there are certainly plenty of critiques to be made of the president’s foreign policy, there is agreement amongst I.R. scholars that diplomatic multitasking is not one of them.

#### Talks going nowhere and Nantz explosion complicates

Ward 4/12 [Alex Ward, 4-12-2021, "Israel’s suspected attack on an Iranian nuclear site complicates US-Iran talks," Vox, https://www.vox.com/2021/4/12/22379713/israel-iran-natanz-nuclear-cyberattack-usa-deal, accessed 4-12-2021]LHSBC

Tensions were already high, with neither Washington nor Tehran wanting to appear to be caving to the other. The optics mattered so much that the US delegation posted up at a [hotel across the street from the hotel](https://www.politico.eu/article/us-iran-nuclear-talks-eu-jcpoa/) where the Iranians held their meetings, requiring European diplomats to shuttle back and forth.∂ Even with those complications, the US and Iran struck a tiny bargain: They set up [two working groups](https://www.vox.com/2021/4/7/22371593/us-iran-nuclear-deal-vienna-malley), which by diplomatic standards is considered progress.∂ The first one will examine how the US can return to compliance with the deal, namely by lifting the sanctions the Trump administration put back on Iran after the US withdrew. The second working group will explore how Iran can return to compliance, requiring it to once again restrict its nuclear program.∂ [More talks are planned in Vienna this week](https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/voa-news-iran/iran-launches-advanced-centrifuges-marking-its-national-nuclear-day), and experts say the specter of the Natanz explosion will haunt the talks — though they’re divided on just what impact it will have.∂ Some say it’ll complicate negotiations.∂ “The attack at Natanz will undoubtably complicate talks to restore the nuclear deal. The window may not close completely, but Iran will likely harden its position about the sequencing of actions for the US and Iran to return to compliance,” said Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, which supports the US returning to the deal. “The nuclear agreement will not last if its benefits to Iran are continually undermined.”∂ Those making this argument say that Iran has less political space to agree to a deal with the US now, because doing so would be extra embarrassing after being attacked. As a result, any progress on this front will at best be delayed and at worst derailed indefinitely. “Iran doesn’t like to appear that it is negotiating from a weakened position or under pressure,” [Eric Brewer](https://twitter.com/BrewerEricM/status/1381565756379443201?s=20), who worked on nuclear issues in Trump’s National Security Council, tweeted on Monday.

#### Neither side wants to go first

Financial Tribune 4/13 [Financial Tribune, 4-13-2021, "Russian Diplomat: US Unwilling to Remove Trump-Era Sanctions on Iran," https://financialtribune.com/articles/national/108160/russian-diplomat-us-unwilling-to-remove-trump-era-sanctions-on-iran, accessed 4-12-2021]LHSBC

A senior Russian diplomat said the administration of US President Joe Biden is not willing to remove sanctions imposed by his predecessor, Donald Trump, on Iran.∂ Russia’s Permanent Representative to the International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov made the statement in an interview with the Russian radio of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting.∂ “What is clear is that the Iranian side wants the lifting of all sanctions at once, but the Americans are only ready to lift the sanctions related to the JCPOA,” he said, referring to the 2015 nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.∂ Trump abandoned the JCPOA three years after its conclusion and unleashed what his team called a “maximum pressure” campaign with the stated objective of forcing Iran to negotiate “a better agreement”.∂ The Islamic Republic refused to bow down to the pressure and adopted instead a “maximum resistance” policy, which includes economic measures to weather the bans as well as reducing Tehran’s compliance with JCPOA.∂ Biden has claimed that his administration is willing to rejoin JCPOA, but conditioned the move to Tehran’s full compliance. ∂ Tehran says Washington abandoned JCPOA and therefore, it has to take the first step to unconditionally remove all its sanctions on Iran in a verifiable manner, given its long record of not playing by the rules.

#### New START and Putin should thump

Singman 4/13 [Brooke Singman, 4-13-2021, "Biden proposes summit with Putin in coming months&nbsp;," Fox News, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-proposes-putin-summit-russia, accessed 4-17-2021]LHSBC

[President Biden](https://www.foxnews.com/category/person/joe-biden) on Tuesday proposed a summit with Russian President [Vladimir Putin](https://www.foxnews.com/category/world/personalities/vladimir-putin) in the coming months, but suggested it take place in a third country – outside of the United States and [Russia](https://www.foxnews.com/category/world/world-regions/russia).∂ The president spoke with Putin on Tuesday to discuss a number of "regional and global issues."∂ "President Biden reaffirmed his goal of building a stable and predictable relationship with Russia consistent with U.S. interests, and proposed a summit meeting in a third country in the coming months to discuss the full range of issues facing the United States and Russia," the White House said in a statement Tuesday.∂ The two also discussed the intent of the U.S. and Russia to pursue a "strategic stability dialogue on a range of arms control and emerging security issues" to build on the extension of the New START Treaty, according to the White House.The START Treaty enhances U.S. national security by placing verifiable limits on all Russian deployed intercontinental-range nuclear weapons. The treaty began on Feb. 5, 2011, and according to the State Department, the U.S. and the Russian Federation have agreed to extend it through Feb. 4, 2026.

#### No Iran war – no support, allied cred, or rationale

Maalouf 17 [Massoud Maalouf, Retired Ambassador (served Lebanon to Canada, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Chile and expert in diplomacy, foreign affairs, and advocacy, 12-18-2017, "Why the US Won’t Go to War with Iran," No Publication, https://ahtribune.com/us/trump-at-war/2063-war-iran.html, accessed 12-4-2019]LHSBC

However, talk of going to war with Iran and actually declaring war are two different things. Many factors tamper down the US administration from following such a dangerous path. First of all, what reason could Trump offer to the American people to convince them to accept sending their sons and daughters to fight in Iran? When George W. Bush made the decision to invade Iraq, his intelligence services erroneously persuaded the Americans that Saddam Hussein was responsible for terrorist attacks against US citizens and that he possessed weapons of mass destruction that he could transfer to terrorists in order to attack America. What danger does Iran constitute now to the Americans, especially given that the international community, through the JCPOA, has been able to put a stop to Iran’s “nuclear military” ambitions? The President needs a legitimate reason to take such an important and risky path. The war on Afghanistan came in the aftermath of 9/11 with the tragic and unacceptable attacks on US soil. Can Trump justify a war with Iran now? Secondly, in addition to a legitimate reason for war, it is imperative to have the military and political support of an international coalition. In the current circumstances, can the US assemble such a coalition as the [US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley was calling for a few days ago](https://ahtribune.com/us/trump-at-war/2062-nikki-haley-iran.html)? The closest US allies in Europe already have criticized Trump’s decertification of the JCPOA and have expressed in no uncertain terms, their support for the Iran deal and their non-acceptance of renewed negotiations. Some of them are already involved in large infrastructure contracts and commercial deals with Iran. Important allies of the United States, such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany do not hide their lack of confidence in Presidents Trump and it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to assemble a coalition of powerful and influential countries against Iran in the current circumstances. Third, it is clear that the American population has no appetite for war, of any sort. After the US military adventures in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, it will be extremely hard to find support for such a war, absent a hostile terror or military action by Iran against the US which is highly unlikely. Fourth, we should not ignore the North Korea looming crisis where a leader is close to having his fingers on a nuclear bomb and repeatedly threatens the United States. Can Trump afford going to war with a country that has not directly threatened the US and whose nuclear capabilities have been put in check, while a rising nuclear power is proffering direct and extremely dangerous threats at the US?

#### Iran doesn’t want war – They’re defensive and isolated.

Lockie 18 (Alex, “Iran launched an attack on Israel — and it got badly beaten and internationally abandoned”, May 10, 2018 <http://www.businessinsider.com/iran-attack-on-israel-defeated-internationally-abandoned-2018-5>)

Iran launched a missile strike on northern Israel late Wednesday night, with 20 Grad and Fajr rockets taking off from Syria in what was widely seen as retaliation after months of Israeli airstrikes punishing their forces. Israel's response reportedly crushed Iranian forces in Syria. After the attack, not even Iran's allies came to its defense, with even Bahrain condemning Iran's attack, though Iran was badly punished for it. Now, Iran's only recourse may be to silently take the beating or unleash Hezbollah for all-out war on Israel. Iran launched a missile strike on northern Israel late Wednesday night, with 20 Grad and Fajr rockets taking off from Syria in what was widely seen as retaliation after months of Israeli airstrikes punishing their forces — but it looks like it got crushed. Not only does Israel say it intercepted a number of the Iranian missiles, it says the other missiles failed to reach their target and sputtered out while still in Syria. The response from Israel included many more missiles, and, according to Israel, did serious damage that will take a long time to rebuild. How we got here For years, Iran's clerical regime has chanted "Death to Israel" and supported Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas on Israel's borders in Gaza and the West Bank, which the US designates as terror organizations.Since Iran became involved in Syria's civil war, Israel assesses it has attempted to move in forces and military assets to the Jewish state's borders in an attempt to arm its allies and attack Israel within its borders. Israel rarely admits to specific strikes, but owns that it has struck Iranians in Syria more than 100 times since 2012. In February, Israel reported that an armed Iranian drone flew into its airspace, which it shot down. Israel then launched massive air raids on Iranian-linked targets in Syria, and claimed to have wiped out half of Syria's air defenses in the process. Scattered strikes in April escalated tensions by targeting not just Iranian proxies but actual uniformed Iranian soldiers, and some high-up ones at that. Israel started warning of prospective Iranian retaliation around this point.Israel released maps and even a simulated video of the strikes it carried out on Iranian targets in Syria. Russia claimed Syrian defenses downed more than half of the Israeli missiles, but they have consistently made dubious, unverified claims about Syrian missile defenses in the past. Here are the Israeli media posts: The aftermath Iran's long-awaited retaliation finally came. Former Israeli deputy defense minister Ephraim Sneh told Business Insider that Israel targeted "the intelligence and the infrastructure" of Iran's forces in Syria, doing "heavy damage" which "will take time to repair." Israel's current defense minister said it took out most of Iran's infrastructure in Syria. In the end, the US, UK, and France all condemned Iran for its missile attack on Israel without mentioning Israeli incursions into Syria to strike Iranians. France went as far as saying that Iran's actions toward Israel merit revisiting and expanding the Iran nuclear deal to rein in Tehran's regional activity. Bahrain, a Gulf Arab country that rarely speaks to Israel, even condemned Iran's attack and asserted Israel's right to defend itself. Jonathan Schanzer of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies told Business Insider that while they might not say it, other Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, probably support Israel pushing back Iran's influence. Russia urged mutual calm after the massive air war in which its ally, Iran, suffered badly. What was missing was a total lack of international outrage. Israel carried out the strike with impunity after entering Syrian airspace uninvited. It lost no soldiers or civilians. Iran has been badly beaten by its great enemy and condemned on the world stage days after the US withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal. Now, Iran's only recourse may be to silently take the beating or unleash Hezbollah for all-out war on Israel. But Israel may be ready for that as well, as Israeli reporter Barak Ravid quoted Israel's defense minister as saying, "If it rains in Israel, it will pour in Iran."

## AT: New Start

### 1AR – New Start

#### New start was renewed

State Department [State Department, No Date, "New START Treaty," United States Department of State, https://www.state.gov/new-start/, accessed 4-7-2021]LHSBC

Treaty Structure: The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, also known as the New START Treaty, enhances U.S. national security by placing verifiable limits on all Russian deployed intercontinental-range nuclear weapons. The United States and the Russian Federation have agreed to extend the treaty through February 4, 2026.

### 1AR – Impact Turn – New Start

#### New START expiration is key to US nuclear deterrence---solves first strike incentives and motivates genuine arms control in the future

Geller 20 - Policy Analyst for Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense in the Center for National Defense, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for Foreign Policy and National Security, at The Heritage Foundation. (Patty-Jane, “New START: The U.S. Should Not Extend the Dangerously Flawed Treaty for Five More Years,” *Heritage Foundation*, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/new-start-the-us-should-not-extend-the-dangerously-flawed-treaty-five-more-years>)//BB

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia is set to expire on February 5, 2021. The treaty officially restricts the number of delivery systems and warheads that each country can deploy, and technically provides a monitoring and verification regime—but the treaty’s many flaws have allowed Russia to build up its forces without even violating the treaty. Arms control advocates have encouraged the President to extend New START for another five years, but extending a flawed treaty would only create a false sense of security. While the current Administration should continue its worthwhile effort to engage the Russians in nuclear discussions, absent concrete progress on fixing the treaty, the Administration should let New START expire and continue to focus on modernizing U.S. nuclear programs. Russia will ultimately have an incentive to negotiate an improved arms control agreement once the United States begins to field new systems.∂ New START: Flawed and Outdated∂ New START was a flawed agreement from the very beginning. It did not require Russia to reduce its deployed warheads or delivery vehicles; instead it allowed Russia to build up its forces to reach treaty limitations.1∂ Mark B. Schneider, “New START: The Anatomy of a Failed Negotiation,” National Institute for Public Policy, July 2012, p. 45, https://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/New-start.pdf (accessed March 2, 2020).∂ As Russia built up its forces in accordance with the treaty, it took advantage of the capabilities not covered by New START. The treaty does not contain limits on the throw-weight of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which measures the weight of the payload the ICBM can carry, or on the number of warheads that can be deployed as multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).2∂ Michaela Dodge, “New START and the Future of U.S. National Security,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3407, May 21, 2019, p. 5, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/BG3407\_0.pdf (accessed February 20, 2020).∂ Russia took advantage of this lack of constraint by deploying ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with MIRVs, a destabilizing force posture that places a premium on having a Russian first-strike capability.3∂ Dodge, “New START and the Future of U.S. National Security,” p. 4.∂ If Russia can use a smaller number of missiles with MIRVs to take out the U.S. strategic deterrent, it will have an incentive to do so and strike first.

## AT: Open Skies DA

### 1AR – Top Level – Open Skies

#### 1 – Dropped Kallenborn – drone swarms unquestionaly autonomous because there’s an impossible large number of feeds

#### 2 – Uniqueness overwhelms the link - Biden is supporting it because of his commitment to allies - zero warrant for why extra time would change his mind

#### 3 – Fiat solves – we fiat that the treaty is negotiated promptly and passed immediately

#### 4 – Intrinsicness - Do the plan and pass Open Skies - it's good - key to in-depth discussion over the affirmative policy - the disad doesnt prove an opportunity cost to the plan

### 1AR –  UQ – AVC

#### Not enough work – overwhelmed offices aren’t about open skies

**Office of Inspections 14 [**United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General, “Inspection of the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance] JJ

VC’s offices are structured to bring resources and activities to bear on the key functions of verification and compliance with existing agreements and on negotiation of new agreements. Four of the bureau’s seven offices are structured around supporting activities related to specific treaties. These offices are small, with between 10 and 15 staff members, and each has a director who focuses on the treaties within that office’s purview. AVC fields five treaty commissioners or representatives overseas who are responsible for leading U.S. delegations to international arms control and disarmament organizations based in Geneva, Vienna, and The Hague and for staffing the U.S.-Russia Special Verification Commission (for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Agreement) and Bilateral Consultative Commission (for New START). The Office of Missile Defense and Space Policy deals exclusively with national security space policy and has the lead for missile defense cooperation. Although AVC offices are well organized to manage current and near-term arms control, missile defense, and verification policies and issues, the OIG team found an uneven distribution of workload. Employees in some of these offices, such as the Office of Euro-Atlantic Security Affairs and the Office of Missile Defense and Space Policy, report that they had consistently moderate to heavy workloads, while employees in other offices said they often did not have enough work. This problem of a lack of work for bureau staff echoes one identified in the 2004 OIG inspection of the former Bureau of Arms Control. Though the verification workload is constant and consistent, the arms control workload tends to be cyclical, event driven, and associated with periodic meetings of arms control and disarmament organizations. As previously mentioned, a strategic plan that identifies workload imbalances and reallocates portfolios and positions accordingly would help assure that the bureau’s human and financial resources are being managed effectively to achieve the bureau’s priorities.

## AT: PLA

### Top Level – PLA

#### NO card that says LAWs are a core element of conditional compliance, just that they’re pursuing them now---their OWN card concedes that the PLA is only following orders---loyola is blue

Kania '20 [Elsa; April 2020; adjunct senior fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security; “"AI Weapons” In Chinese Military Innovation," https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP\_20200427\_ai\_weapons\_kania.pdf]//GJ

Chinese military initiatives in AI are motivated by an acute awareness of global trends in military technology and operations;18 concerns about falling behind the U.S. military, which is perceived and often characterized as the “powerful adversary” (强敌);19 and recognition of potential opportunities inherent in this military and technological transformation.20 “China’s military security is confronted by risks from technology surprise and a growing technological generation gap,” according to the official white paper on “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” released in July 2019.21 “Intelligent(ized) warfare is on the horizon,” the assessment finds, and the ongoing “Revolution in Military Affairs” will change the very mechanisms for victory in future warfare.22 Chinese military scientists and strategists, including from such authoritative institutions as the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, National Defense University, and National University of Defense Technology, envision AI and intelligent weapons playing an increasingly important if not decisive role in future warfare. They closely examine antecedents in U.S. strategy and capabilities to inform their own assessments.23∂ The PLA’s quest for innovation is an element of the Chinese national strategy to leverage science and technology in pursuit of great power status.24 In the process, the Chinese military is developing more traditional and emerging capabilities, while concentrating on asymmetric approaches against the U.S. military. President Xi Jinping has emphasized, “under a situation of increasingly fierce international military competition, only the innovators win.”25 Moreover, on the importance of “aiming at the frontier of global military scientific and technological developments,” he urged: “We must attach great importance to the development of strategic frontier technologies, striving to surpass the predecessor as latecomers, turning sharply to surpass.”26∂ As early as 2011, the PLA’s official dictionary included a definition of an “AI weapon” (人工智能武器), characterized as “a weapon that utilizes AI to pursue, distinguish, and destroy enemy targets automatically; often composed of information collection and management systems, knowledge base systems, decision assistance systems, mission implementation systems, etc.”27 Similarly, Chinese military strategists and scientists tend to discuss “AI weapons” or “intelligentized weapons” (智能化武器) more often than “autonomous weapons” (自主武器) in academic and technical writings.28 This terminological difference is subtle but potentially significant, implying a focus on the “smartness” or “intelligence” of weapons systems in selecting and engaging targets.29 For instance, techniques for adaptive or autonomous control can leverage a range of algorithms, including neural networks. Even as the function of certain weapons systems becomes “unmanned” (无人化) and to some degree automatic (自动化), greater degrees of autonomy or “intelligence” in function can remain elusive.∂ While Chinese leaders have prioritized advances in AI as an important direction for military modernization, China’s Central Military Commission has yet to release any policy or official strategy that formally clarifies such plans and priorities. However, in July 2017, the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan called for China to “strengthen the use of AI in military applications that include command decisionmaking, military deductions,30 and defense equipment.”31 In the fall of 2017, Xi, in his address to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), urged, “accelerate the development of military intelligentization, and improve joint operations capabilities and all-domain combat capabilities based on network information systems.”32 His remarks provided authoritative guidance to pursue military applications of AI that could be integrated across the whole system for future operations.33 This emerging emphasis on “military intelligentization” (军事智能化), or the “development of an intelligent military,”34 extends beyond AI-enabled systems and autonomy to include the development of weapons systems leveraging adaptive control or involving autonomy in various aspects of their operation.35∂ The PLA is actively pursuing AI-enabled systems and autonomous capabilities in its military modernization.36 Across services and for all domains of warfare, it has fielded a growing number of robotic and unmanned systems, as well as advanced missiles with precision guidance, some of which may possess at least limited degrees of autonomy. For instance, the PLA Army (PLAA) has concentrated on military robotics and unmanned ground vehicles, which could be used for logistics.37 The PLA Navy (PLAN) is experimenting with unmanned surface vessels that may operate with some autonomy and is reportedly developing autonomous submarines.38 The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) operates advanced unmanned systems with limited autonomy that could be upgraded to include greater autonomy, while exploring options for manned-unmanned teaming.39 The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) may leverage use cases in remote sensing, targeting, and decision support,40 and its missiles may be augmented to become more “intelligentized” in their capabilities, incorporating higher levels of automation to facilitate operations.41 There are indications that the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) could apply advances

#### The PLA are overwhelmingly responsive to civilian leadership – what limited input they have is technical and not strategic

Char & Bitzinger 17 [S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Email: isjtschar@ntu.edu.sg (corresponding author). † S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. "A New Direction in the People’s Liberation Army’s Emergent Strategic Thinking, Roles and Missions." <http://www.viet-studies.net/kinhte/PLANewDirection_ChinaQuarterly.pdf>]

Looking at the bigger picture of Beijing’s grand strategy to mobilize and utilize all available resources to advance Xi Jinping’s “China dream,”33 one can reasonably infer that the PLA would seek to operationalize its efforts towards realizing an international order conducive to Chinese geopolitical and economic objectives. While the PLA remains an understandably strong interest group within the context of China’s foreign policy formulation and implementation, one can expect that the PLA’s professional worldview will continue to be shaped first and foremost by assessments of the international order as determined by China’s civilian leaders.34 To be sure, although the military’s emphases may differ from those of its civilian counterparts, it inherently focuses on parochial issues. Whilst the balance between subjective and objective control remains an ideal to aspire to, rather than fact,35 the extent to which China’s military leaders seek to influence national policymaking is largely restricted to those areas in which they clearly have the expertise – and not just underlying interests – and where their professional advice is sought. Such areas would include US arms sales to Taiwan; sovereignty and territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas; maritime security; and the growing threat of American naval operations in the Indo-Pacific region. However, alongside a less restrictive ideological environment within Chinese society in the post-Deng era, the PLA’s own opening up to the world and overseas experiences may yet have serious ramifications for the worldview of its rank-and-file.

#### Taiwan thumps

DeAeth 19 (Duncan DeAeth, Taiwan News, Staff Writer. “PLA putting pressure on Xi Jinping over Taiwan: CSIS analyst.” 2019/07/04, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3738389)

Taipei (Taiwan News) – According to a senior analyst at the Washington D.C.-based Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), senior officials of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are dissatisfied with how Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平) has been handling cross-strait issues.

Based on information gleaned from insider sources in China, CSIS researcher Bonnie Glaser claims that senior PLA generals are unhappy with Xi’s leadership as well as with the current policies of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). Glaser’s remarks were made at an event hosted by another D.C.-based think-tank, the Heritage Foundation, on July 2.

The forum was entitled “Cross-Strait Relations: Present Challenges and Future Developments” and was also attended by the minister of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), Chen Ming-tong (陳明通).

Glaser stated that most Chinese leaders believe that time is on their side with regard to Taiwan. However, she said that Xi Jinping may be under increasing pressure from prominent military figures to take more decisive action.

She also suggested that some figures within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and PLA who are critical of Xi may be using the Taiwan issue as leverage to put pressure on what they perceive as one of his weak points.

#### The PLA is defensive, economically motivated, and reputationally limited – no war

Char & Bitzinger 17 [S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Email: isjtschar@ntu.edu.sg (corresponding author). † S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. "A New Direction in the People’s Liberation Army’s Emergent Strategic Thinking, Roles and Missions." <http://www.viet-studies.net/kinhte/PLANewDirection_ChinaQuarterly.pdf>]

Indeed, China’s growing economic footprint has progressively influenced its military strategy, which has to keep up with the country’s expanding national interests.80 This has caused a rethink in the PLA’s role in protecting Chinese sea lines of communications in the Persian Gulf across which more than three-fifths of China’s oil imports traverse. Still, in line with its long-held “five principles of peaceful coexistence,” the PLA’s missions have unsurprisingly been limited to non-traditional security issues, in particular those with implications for Chinese economic interests and Beijing’s image-building.81 In that regard, nowhere has China’s contribution to its overseas security interests been more prominent than in the international anti-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden.82 More recently, the mass evacuations of Chinese and foreign nationals from Libya and Yemen would have also informed Beijing of the benefits of having permanent bases, or something more akin to overseas strategic support bases, in the event of having to conduct military operations other than war in future contingencies in the world’s troubled regions. It follows that the decision by the Chinese leadership to break with tradition and build a military facility in Djibouti was also informed by pressing concerns of “replenishing soldiers and resupplying fuel and food” for fleets operating far from home and for extended periods of time.83 Yet, despite that Beijing has dismissed speculation that the PLA is harbouring plans to establish a “string of pearls” across the Indian Ocean towards the Atlantic,84 one need only look at the PLA’s previous attempts at distancing itself from similar rumours in the past.85 Such a course of action is understandable given the unwanted international attention that a forward-deployed strategic presence will generate, and its adverse effects on China’s “peaceful development” narrative. The same argument also means that the PLA is unlikely to emulate its American counterpart’s global military operations, in view of the high strategic cost and prohibitively exorbitant financial resources required.86

#### Reforms ended “conditional compliance” – Xi has full control

Dossi 18 [Simone, Postdoctoral Research Fellow and Adjunct Professor of History and Politics of the Far East at the Department of International Legal, Historical and Political Studies, University of Milan “’Upholding the Correct Political Direction’. The PLA Reform and Civil-Military Relations in Xi Jinping’s China” 4-4 https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.1457302]

On the contrary, the evidence presented above is coherent with the assumptions behind the conditional compliance model: that politicisation and professionalism coexist within the PLA, and that in China “civil-military relations” remains a synonym for “party-army relations”. The military reform, however, has changed the way conditional compliance concretely works. In the past, the party ‘bought’ PLA compliance by granting it a considerable degree of autonomy in its internal affairs. The reform has dramatically reduced that autonomy through the centralisation of authority in the CMC and the expanded role of its civilian Chairman. As a result, the internal affairs of the PLA are now more exposed to civilian oversight than they ever have been in the past twenty-five years. What the evidence collected so far suggests, then, is that the CCP is now able to ‘buy’ PLA compliance at a much lower price.

There are two main reasons for this. First, the anti-corruption campaign has dramatically cut the ‘price’ that the PLA can exact for its compliance. By targeting retired military leaders, the campaign has neutralised political opposition from the officers they had promoted while in power. Second, the lower degree of autonomy has been partly compensated by recognition of a greater role for the PLA in the party’s grand design for China’s future. The PLA was given a central place in Xi’s narrative of “national rejuvenation” with the “dream of building a strong military” (qiang jun meng) consistently presented as a key component of the broader “China dream”.49 In implementing the anti-corruption campaign and the military reform, the CCP leadership has thus been careful to emphasize the PLA’s contribution to China’s national cause and to shift its attention outward, toward defence from external threats.50

These changes in the way conditional compliance works point to a deeper shift in CCP-PLA coalitional dynamics. The party and the army continue to interact as the coalition partners described in Perlmutter and LeoGrande’s model, since both institutions continue to rely on each other for their survival. Yet, on the one hand, the PLA has lost part of its political power vis-à-vis the CCP and is now left with the role of junior partner in a very unbalanced coalition. On the other hand, the CCP has consolidated its grip over the PLA, but much of the power that it has regained is now concentrated in the hands of its General Secretary qua CMC Chairman. The Party’s control of the gun is more centralised than it has been for the past twenty-five years.

Such centralisation is in fact just one dimension of the wider centralisation of power that has pervasively characterised Chinese politics since the 18th Party Congress. After becoming CCP General Secretary, CMC Chairman and PRC President between late 2012 and early 2013, Xi rapidly concentrated more power in his hands than his two predecessors ever did. With the anti-corruption campaign, Xi was able to neutralise his political rivals and secure full control of crucial policy arenas.51 His overwhelming role in the party was formally recognised in 2016, with the 6th Plenum elevating him to “core” (hexin) of the CCP. One year later, the centralisation was sanctioned at the 19th Party Congress, which failed to appoint an heir apparent to the Politburo Standing Committee and wrote “Xi Jinping thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era” into the Party Constitution. The unprecedented amount of power that is now concentrated in Xi’s hands has led some commentators to argue that China is returning to “the days of Mao Zedong”.52

### AT: Perkinson 12

#### Thumpers – econ and environment – your author – READ BLUE

Perkinson 12 — Jessica, Faculty of the School of International Service of American University in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs; reviewed by: Quansheng Zhao, Professor of international relations and Chair of Asian Studies Program Research Council at American University, and John C. King, Assistant Professor School of International Service, 2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” American University, April 19th, Available Online at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson\_american\_0008N\_10238display.pdf?sequence=1)

There are a number of points of instability that have caused large-scale unrest in China in the past, and that continue to threaten the stability of the CCP as the sole governing body of China today. Examined as case studies and analyzed through the lens of IR theory, the issues of economic and environmental instability in China are enlightening as a framework through which to understand specific challenges that the CCP faces to the satisfaction of its people with its governance. Though China continues to grow at an astounding rate (upwards of 10% growth in GDP, annually1 ) there are a number of critical issues facing the economic planners in the Chinese government, including a staggering income gap, a historically unsustainable growth rate, a disagreement between economic and political ideologies and rising unemployment. In addition, as China grows economically, environmental degradation has begun to weigh heavily on the lives of the Chinese people. Among the most pervasive environmental issues are indiscriminate dam building, critically polluted water resources, and waste-dumping by foreign countries into China’s loosely environmentally regulated society. If China is unable to correct for these conditions through economic and environmental policy reform, it is likely that the country will see increased level of unrest from the Chinese population.

**[HARKER STARTS]**

Should the CCP undergo some sort of dramatic transformation – whether that be significant reform or complete collapse, as some radical China scholars predict2 – the implications for international and US national security are vast. Not only does China and the stability of the CCP play a significant role in the maintenance of peace in the East Asian region, but China is also relied upon by many members of the international community for foreign direct investment, economic stability and trade. China plays a key role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula as one of North Korea’s only allies, and it is argued that instability within the Chinese government could also lead to instability in the already sensitive military and political situation across the Taiwan Strait. For the United States, the effect of instability within the CCP would be widespread and dramatic. As the United States’ largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP could threaten the stability of the already volatile economic situation in the US. In addition, China is the largest trading partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive goods to feed demand within the US.

It is with this in mind that China scholars within the United States and around the world should be studying this phenomenon, because the potential for reform, instability or even collapse of the CCP is of critical importance to the stability of the international order as a whole. For the United States specifically, the potential - or lack thereof - for reform of the CCP should dictate its foreign policy toward China. If the body of knowledge on the stability of the Chinese government reveals that the Chinese market is not a stable one, it is in the best interests of the United States to look for investors and trade markets elsewhere to lessen its serious dependence on China for its economic stability, particularly in a time of such uncertain economic conditions within the US.

## AT: Terror DA

### 1AR – UQ

#### Non-uq – terror high now

Sales 19 [Nathan A. Sales, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2019, "Country Reports On Terrorism 2019," Bureau Of Counterterrorism, https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/, accessed 4-3-2021]LHSBC

* Bracketed for ableist language

Despite these successes, dangerous terrorist threats persisted around the world. Even as ISIS lost its leader and territory, the group adapted to continue the fight from its affiliates across the globe and by inspiring followers to commit attacks. In Africa, ISIS formally recognized a number of new branches and networks in 2019, and ISIS-affiliated groups were active across the continent, including in the Sahel, the Lake Chad region, and East Africa. In South and Southeast Asia, ISIS affiliates carried out attacks and inspired others to do so as well. The ISIS-inspired attacks in Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday killed more than 250 innocent victims, including five U.S. citizens, representing one of ISIS’s deadliest attacks ever.∂ The Iranian regime and its proxies continued to plot and commit terrorist attacks on a global scale. In the past, Tehran has spent as much as $700 million per year to support terrorist groups, including Hizballah and Hamas, though its ability to provide financial support in 2019 was constrained by ~~crippling~~ [debilitating] U.S. sanctions. The regime was directly involved in plotting terrorism through its IRGC and Ministry of Intelligence and Security, including plots in recent years in North and South America, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Tehran also continued to permit an al-Qa’ida (AQ) facilitation network to operate in Iran, sending money and fighters to conflict zones in Afghanistan and Syria, and it still allowed AQ members to reside in the country. Finally, the Iranian regime continued to foment violence, both directly and through proxies, in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.∂ In 2019, the United States and its partners pursued AQ around the world. The organization faced a significant setback with the elimination of Hamza bin Laden, Usama bin Laden’s son and a rising AQ leader. Yet the group and its associated forces remained resilient and continued to pose a threat in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin in the Sahel, and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham/Al-Nusrah Front in Syria are among the world’s most active and dangerous terrorist groups. In December, a member of the Royal Saudi Air Force opened fire at Naval Air Station Pensacola in Florida, where he was receiving training, killing three people and wounding eight. Before the shooting, the gunman had coordinated with al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which claimed credit for the attack. Today, AQ’s network continues to exploit under-governed spaces, conflict zones, and global security gaps to recruit, fundraise, and plot attacks.∂ The threat posed by racially or ethnically motivated terrorism (REMT), particularly white supremacist terrorism, remained a serious challenge for the global community. Continuing a trend that began in 2015, there were numerous deadly REMT attacks around the world in 2019, including in Christchurch, New Zealand; Halle, Germany; and El Paso, Texas.

### 1AR – LAWs key to Counter Terror – Link

### 1AR – Marks 20

#### Other defenses – READ BLUE

**Marks 20** [Robert J Marks, Meet the U.S. Army’s New Drone Swarms, https://mindmatters.ai/2020/09/meet-the-u-s-armys-new-drone-swarms/, **Marks** is a Distinguished Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Baylor University and serves as the Director of the Walter Bradley Center for Natural and Artificial Intelligence]JJ

The left-wing producers of the original Slaughterbot video depict military contractors as stereotypical heartless beasts, only interested in killing and a fast buck, and calls for a ban on all autonomous weapons. That will be about as effective as Neville Chamberlain’s agreement with Adolf Hitler on “peace for our time.”

One problem is that drones are cheap and easy to arm and deploy. In 2015, a teenage tinkerer jury-rigged a drone with a handgun. The gun was fired from the flying drone using remote control. If a lone teenager can do this, think what almost any nation with a modicum of technical expertise and publicly available AI software can do.

Offensive drone swarms are chilling because of their survivability. Kick over an ant hill and stomp as much as you want. When you come back in a few weeks, the ant colony has survived and rebuilt their ant hill. An attacking swarm of drones can likewise be decimated by ninety percent and the surviving members can still accomplish their mission.

What technology can counter an attack swarm of drones? Security analyst Paul Scharre notes that, in some cases, something as simple as chicken wire can bar small drone swarms from an area. Meanwhile, Israel has developed a laser weapon capable of destroying a single flying drone. Such a weapon might be generalized to engage a small swarm of drones. But operation on foggy days still seems questionable.

Swarm-on-swarm dogfights are another possible defense against drones, But they would require autonomous reaction times far shorter than can be achieved by a human. Total autonomy would become a necessity.

What is the most dangerous aspect of the Army’s development of a defensive autonomous drone swarm? Unintended outcomes. To ensure that they don’t happen (as well as can reasonably be expected), the Army requires expert programmers and extensive testing under different scenarios and in numerous environments.

Swarming drones might be chilling, but the US military must consider them. China has invested $30 billion dollars in AI research. Russia’s leader, Vladimir Putin, has said “Whoever becomes the leader in … [AI] will become the ruler of the world.” To remain militarily viable, the US must continue to develop AI embedded weapons.

#### Case outweighs – states have move resources which means swarms are larger and devloped faster

### 1AR – Terrorist Use LAWs – Link

#### No link---Defense isn’t AWS

Future of Life Institute [Future of Life Institute, No Date, "Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems," https://futureoflife.org/lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems/, accessed 12-20-2020]LHSBC

Myth: Adopters of human control can’t defend against lethal AWS. Fact: The best anti-drone technology isn’t drones, just as the best defense against chemical weapons isn’t chemical weapons.∂ The defense systems required for lethal AWS are likely to be different technologies than lethal AWS. Furthermore, if a technology is developed using AI to defend against lethal AWS, much like missile defense systems, it would not be subject to any requirement for human control as the target of the weapon is another weapon as opposed to a human target.

#### Turn---Ban stigmatizes laws preventing use

**Ware 19** - Jacob Ware (Jacob Ware holds a master’s in security studies from Georgetown University and an MA (Hons) in international relations and modern history from the University of St Andrews. His research has previously appeared with the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague), "Terrorist Groups, Artificial Intelligence, and Killer Drones," War on the Rocks, 9-24-2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/terrorist-groups-artificial-intelligence-and-killer-drones/ WJ

Counter-Terrorism Options∂ Drones and AI provide a particularly daunting counter-terrorism challenge, simply because effective counter-drone or anti-AI expertise does not yet exist. That said, as Daveed Gartenstein-Ross has noted, “in recent years, we have seen multiple failures in imagination as analysts tried to discern what terrorists will do with emerging technologies. A failure in imagination as artificial intelligence becomes cheaper and more widely available could be even costlier.” Action is urgently needed, and for now, counter-terrorism policies are likely to fit into two categories, each with flaws: defenses and bans.∂ Firstly, and most likely, Western states could strengthen their defenses against drones and weaponized AI. This might involve strengthening current counter-drone and anti-AI capabilities, improving training for local law enforcement, and establishing plans for mitigating drone or autonomous weapons incidents. AI technology and systems will surely play an important role in this space, including in the development of anti-AI tools. However, anti-AI defenses will be costly, and will need to be implemented across countless cities throughout the entire Western world, something Michael Horton calls “a daunting challenge that will require spending billions of dollars on electronic and kinetic countermeasures.” Swarms, Scharre notes, will prove “devilishly hard to target,” given the number of munitions and their ability to spread over a wide area. In addition, defenses will likely take a long time to erect effectively and will leave citizens exposed in the meantime. Beyond defenses, AI will also be used in counter-terrorism intelligence and online content moderation, although this will surely spark civil liberties challenges.∂ Secondly, the international community could look to ban AI use in the military through an international treaty sanctioned by the United Nations. This has been the strategy pursued by activist groups such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, while leading artificial intelligence researchers and scientific commentators have published open letters warning of the risk of weaponized AI. That said, great powers are not likely to refrain from AI weapons development, and a ban might outlaw positive uses of militarized AI. The international community could also look to stigmatize, or delegitimize, weaponized AI and lethal autonomous weapons sufficiently to deter terrorist use. Although modern terrorist groups have proven extremely willing to improvise and innovate, and effective at doing so, there is an extensive list of weapons — chemical weapons, biological weapons, cluster munitions, barrel bombs, and more — accessible to terrorist organizations, but rarely used. This is partly down to the international stigma associated with those munitions — if a norm is strong enough, terrorists might avoid using a weapon. However, norms take a long time to develop, and are fragile and untrustworthy solutions. Evidently, good counter-terrorism options are limited.∂ The U.S. government and its intelligence agencies should continue to treat AI and lethal autonomous weapons as priorities, and identify new possible counter-terrorism measures. Fortunately, some progress has been made: Nicholas Rasmussen, former director of the National Counterterrorism Center, admitted at a Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee hearing in September 2017 that “there is a community of experts that has emerged inside the federal government that is focused on this pretty much full time. Two years ago this was not a concern … We are trying to up our game.”∂ Nonstate actors are already deploying drones to attack their enemies. Lethal autonomous weapon systems are likely to proliferate to terrorist groups, with potentially devastating consequences. The United States and its allies should urgently address the rising threat by preparing stronger defenses against possible drone and swarm attacks, engaging with the defense industry and AI experts warning of the threat, and supporting realistic international efforts to ban or stigmatize military applications of artificial intelligence. Although the likelihood of such an event is low, a killer robot attack could cause massive casualties, strike a devastating blow to the U.S. homeland, and cause widespread panic. The threat is imminent, and the time has come to act.

### 1AR – Nuke Terror

#### Nuke terror has insurmountable barriers.

Mueller 18 John Mueller, Political Science Professor at Ohio State University. [Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter but Nuclear Hysteria Does, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/nuclear-weapons-dont-matter]//BPS

As for nuclear terrorism, ever since al Qaeda operatives used box cutters so effectively to hijack commercial airplanes, alarmists have warned that radical Islamist terrorists would soon apply equal talents in science and engineering to make and deliver nuclear weapons so as to destroy various so-called infidels. In practice, however, terrorist groups have exhibited only a limited desire to go nuclear and even less progress in doing so. Why? Probably because developing one’s own bomb from scratch requires a series of risky actions, all of which have to go right for the scheme to work. This includes trusting foreign collaborators and other criminals; acquiring and transporting highly guarded fissile material; establishing a sophisticated, professional machine shop; and moving a cumbersome, untested weapon into position for detonation. And all of this has to be done while hiding from a vast global surveillance net looking for and trying to disrupt such activities.

#### Even if terrorists acquire nuclear weapons, they won’t use them.

McIntosh, PhD, and Storey, PhD, 18 – Christopher McIntosh [PhD Political Science from University of Chicago (Go Maroons!), Assistant Professor of Political Studies @ Bard] and Ian Storey [PhD Political Science from University of Chicago (Go Maroons!), Associate Fellow @ the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and Humanities, Bard College], “Between Acquisition and Use: Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol 62, 2018, <https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/62/2/289/4976557> C.VC

Our approach offers a point of departure for strategically assessing the options, likely responses, and potential outcomes that could arise from the different paths available to a nuclear-armed non-state group. Too often analysts treat the decision by such groups to use nuclear weapons as if it occurs in a vacuum. In practice, terrorist groups face many short-term and long-term considerations. They are influenced by factors both external and internal to their organization. These include the potential for backlash among supporters, internal factionalization over nuclear strategy and doctrine, and an overwhelming response by the target state and the international community.

Moreover, we suggest a way to bring the recursivity of strategic choice into the account of terrorist organizational decision-making. These organizations must consider the long-term effects of a nuclear attack. An attack occurs in the context of an ongoing campaign by a well-established organization. Opportunity costs exist because escalating to nuclear attack forecloses future options. As well, conducting an attack may not only preclude other strategies, but the continued existence of the group itself. This changes the game significantly. In most cases, a nuclear attack must present not just an effective option for the moment, but the only strategic option worth pursuing going forward.

Once we take these considerations into account, the detonation of a nuclear weapon generally appears the least strategically advantageous option for non-state groups. Indeed, the factors presented here are analytically independent, adaptable, and scalable to particular threat contexts. We can therefore use our framework to study the opportunities and constraints faced by specific future groups. It should therefore assist in the process of planning responses to potential nuclear acquisition by terrorist groups.

Successive governments have now identified nuclear terrorism as a critical concern in the formulation of security policy. This line of thinking systematically underspecifies, or simply misunderstands, key considerations that terrorist organizations take into account. These include the group’s organizational survival, opportunity costs, and the conflation of victory with the end of hostilities. Each factor presents strong disincentives to immediate nuclear attack. A nuclear-armed terrorist group is exceedingly dangerous, but for different reasons than normally assumed. The options available to the group that fall short of detonation or attack remain considerable, albeit less spectacular and immediate.

Just as scholars like Bunn et al. (2015) are careful to do, political actors and analysts should resist uncritically deploying the term “nuclear terrorism” in an umbrella fashion. This point goes beyond even the attempts at disaggregating “use” presented here. The threat of an attack involving an improvised nuclear device is vastly different than that of a “dirty bomb,” and both have little in common with the threat posed by an attack on a nuclear facility. Each deserves separate consideration when formulating policy, even if measures taken to address these concerns, such as controlling nuclear leakage, ultimately overlap. If any of the acquisition or threat scenarios we explore come to fruition, then potential target states will need strategies that potentially employ positive, as well as negative, incentives to lessen the attractiveness of nuclear attack. As we argue, a crisis involving a nuclear-armed terrorist group will be a negotiation— regardless of what the target state chooses to label it. Far from demonstrating weakness, employing threats while dangling the possibility of political concessions can widen internal divisions, heightening the overall organizational costs of escalating violence (Toros 2008; Cronin 2009).

Finally, efforts designed to improve intelligence capabilities both prior to and post-attack remain vital. Signature analysis as a forensic measure has shown promise as a way of identifying the origin of nuclear material—in some cases it can identify whether or not it was provided by a state (Kristo and Tumey 2013). These efforts would be improved with a more widespread international commitment via the IAEA to placing signature markers in weapons and weaponizable material (Korbatov et al. 2015, 70; Findlay 2014, 6).

Ultimately, when it comes to the threat of a nuclear attack by a terrorist, presumption should lie squarely on the side of skepticism rather than inevitability. While some terrorist organizations have some incentives for nuclear acquisition, paradoxically and thankfully, the most strategic uses of a nuclear weapon fall well short of actual nuclear attack. From a scholarly perspective, as well as a political one, we need to start to think through how states would act in a world with nuclear-armed non-state actors. In doing so, we should avoid assumptions that fit neither with known nuclear strategy nor the empirical behavior of non-state organizations. Like most clichés, the post–Cold War trope that the threat of attack is higher now than it was during the US-USSR arms race (Litwak 2016) obscures much more than it reveals.

### 1AR – Bioweapons

#### No attacks, and public health institutions solve

Seitz 16 (Sam, Director of Nuclear Security Studies @ the Global Intelligence Trust, “Why WMD Terrorism Isn’t as Scary as it Seems” https://politicstheorypractice.wordpress.com/2016/08/26/why-wmd-terrorism-isnt-as-scary-as-it-seems/)

Biological attacks are equally unlikely to occur for many of the same reasons. There simply aren’t many biological weapons programs because the use of these kinds of systems is prohibited by international law. Thus, few individuals have the requisite knowledge to engineer and produce effective bio-agents. Without proper expertise and infrastructure, it is unlikely that terrorist networks will ever possess the knowledge or means to produce weapons grade biological agents (7). Like chemical weapons, biological weapons also have a poor track record when it comes to inflicting serious damage. As Alan Dove explains, “Terrorist groups have… deployed biological weapons twice… The first was [in] 1984… [when] a cult in Oregon inoculated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella… 751 people got sick, but nobody died.” The second biological terrorist attack was conducted by another cult, the same one that launched the chemical attack in Tokyo; its bio-attack was even less effective than its chemical attack. Despite the cult being “well-financed, and [having] many highly educated members… Nobody got sick or died” (8). Finally, it’s important to remember that the United States and other Western countries have impressively modern and well-funded public health institutions. Thus, even if terrorists are able to execute a potent biological attack against metropolitan areas in North America or Europe, it is unlikely that casualties would be high, as well-stocked hospitals and emergency response units would be able to mitigate the impact and prevent worst case scenarios.

#### No impact to bioweapon---multiple barriers.

Mueller 10 [John —Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and a Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, *Atomic Obsession – Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda*, Oxford University Press, Emory Libraries]

Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could potentially, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used. For the most destructive results, they need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Since aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, while their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. Such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. In the summary judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties-as an aerosol that could be inhaled-requires a delivery system of enormous sophistication, and even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteorological conditions.

### 1AR – Inevitable

#### Terrorism is inevitable.

Bing West 17, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 7/26/17, "The Middle East: Terrorism Forever?" https://www.hoover.org/research/middle-east-terrorism-forever

The short response is yes. Crime forever? Also, yes. Turbulence, terror, pestilence, famine, love, procreation, taxes, families, sunsets, rain, shine, etc.—all are components of the human condition. There is no arc toward perfection in human nature. The jihadists will remain our mortal enemy; no negotiations or deterrence theories will alter their murderous intent. Unlike in the case of the Vietnam War, there is no strong, unified domestic political opposition to waging a low-level war against terrorists. The mainstream press acknowledges that the jihadists are abhorrent. We are at war against Islamist terrorists. As Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has repeatedly said, the goal should be their annihilation. Our martial resources for achieving that goal, however, should be modest and no time horizon should be set. Promises or assurances pointing toward to a “political endgame” should be avoided. We should pace ourselves and run a steady course. Gradually the jihadist disease within the Islam religion will run its course and be rejected or at least largely contained. That will take decades, given the despotic or chaotic nature of far too many Arab governments. In essence, our Mideast strategy is to remain a pivotal player, not to “win” the war against jihadist terrorists by maintaining a large military force and heavy diplomatic/political influence in Arab capitals, as we did in South Korea. Our military strategy in Iraq and Syria appears sensible. We are shrewdly employing our relative advantages—extraordinary overhead surveillance, sound logistics, precision firepower, and experienced advisers and fire control teams. At the same time, we are largely avoiding American casualties. Under President Obama, our diplomatic strategy focused upon reaching an accord—a détente—with Iran. Our traditional Sunni de facto allies—Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States—were spurned. Indeed, they were told to “share the neighborhood” with a Shiite Iranian theocracy intent upon regional sedition and upheaval. President Trump has pivoted back to our Sunni friends. Granted, the political aftermath in Iraq will be messy. Iran is emerging with more influence than the U.S., and the Sunnis in Iraq will continue to be mistreated. In Syria, the Assad regime will persist, and Russian and Iran will consolidate power inside the Assad/Alawite enclave. Gradually, all overt territorial holdings of the Islamic State—cities like Raqqa—will be seized. The Sunni eastern sector of Syria will be an impoverished, violence-wracked ward of some Arab and Kurdish martial coalition, aided in the background by the U.S. The de facto Kurdistan, partially in Iraq and partially in Syria, will remain at odds with Turkey and Iraq. In none of these cases will America take the lead as the key decision-maker. We can sustain interminable “skirmishing” in the Middle East due to geography and military prowess. Most of the countries consist of open terrain, deserts and plains devoid of vegetation. Most of the populations live in villages or urban centers, with vehicles essential for transportation. Our CIA has not been given the public credit it deserves for establishing vast networks of informers. Combining open terrain with information about the transit of terrorists ensures systematic destruction by our drones loitering overhead. Taking the next step of bringing forward small artillery bases with our advisers and fire control teams several hundred meters behind the frontlines has resulted in the gradual but inevitable destruction of the Islamic State in Mesopotamia. We should not extend this second step to other states like Yemen, Somalia, Chad, and Libya. However, we obviously should undertake air strikes and ground raids whenever our commanders perceive targets of opportunity. Amongst all the boiling cauldrons in the Middle East, remote and medieval Afghanistan presents the most vexing challenge. Our goal is not to permit an overt terrorist sanctuary or safe haven. That is an elastic concept. Put bluntly, our baseline objective is not to permit the Taliban to seize major cities or to drive us from Kabul, as we were driven from the roof of our embassy in Saigon in 1975. Unlike in Mesopotamia, the terrain works against us. The vast mountain ranges and the “Green Zone” along the major rivers provide shelter for the hardy Taliban who walk and hide in small groups to coordinate attacks. The challenge we face is complex. Afghans have a scant concept of nationalism. Tribal identity is pervasive, with the Pashtuns comprising the Taliban core and with most Afghan soldiers belonging to other tribes. The central government lacks cohesion, with no charismatic leaders. The opium/heroin trade provides half of GDP, with corruption affecting all levels from the farmer to the ministries in Kabul. Pakistan is determined to continue with its policy of providing the Taliban both shelter and aid. President Trump, as our commander-in-chief, has made clear his impatience and exasperation with this civil war that sputters on and on. The Taliban are so inextricably entangled with other Islamists that a political compromise seems no more possible than it was with the North Vietnamese during the Nixon/Kissinger years. Under current conditions, a political settlement would be a fig leaf, unlikely to provide even a “decent interval” before a bloody and total collapse. Thus it is likely we will commit several thousand more troops, using roughly the model now employed in Iraq and Syria. It will not, due to the terrain and other factors mentioned above, be as effective. America’s major challenge is not with violence and terrorism in the Middle East. Conditions there are not critical to our future. Some problems you don’t solve. You mitigate them and apply resources and strategies to avoid catastrophe.

### 1AR – Yoo War Criminal

#### They should lose for reading evidence by John Yoo – sets a precedent for endorsing crimes against humanity

Glenn **Greenwald 8**, J.D. from NYU, co-founded his own litigation firm where he litigated cases concerning issues of U.S. constitutional law and civil rights for ten years, contributor at Salon where he reported about the 2001 anthrax attacks and the candidacy of former CIA official John O. Brennan for the jobs of either Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) or the next Director of National Intelligence (DNI) after the election of Barack Obama, “**John Yoo's war crimes**”, Apr 2 2008, Salon, <https://www.salon.com/2008/04/02/yoo_2/>

Yet again, the ACLU has performed the function which Congress and the media are intended to perform but do not. As the result of a FOIA lawsuit the ACLU filed and then prosecuted for several years, numerous documents relating to the Bush administration's torture regime that have long been baselessly kept secret were released yesterday, including an 81-page memorandum (.pdf) issued in 2003 by then-Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo (currently a Berkeley Law Professor) which asserted that the President's war powers entitle him to **ignore multiple laws which criminalized the use of torture:** If a government defendant were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in a manner that might arguably violate a criminal prohibition, he would be doing so in order to **prevent further attacks on the United States** by the al Qaeda terrorist network. In that case, we believe that he could argue that the executive branch's constitutional authority to protect the nation from attack justified his actions. As Jane Mayer reported two years ago in The New Yorker -- in which she quoted former Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora as saying that "the memo espoused an extreme and virtually unlimited theory of the extent of the President's Commander-in-Chief authority" -- **it was precisely Yoo's torture-justifying theories,** ultimately endorsed by Donald Rumsfeld, that were communicated to Gen. Geoffrey Miller, the commander of both **Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib** at the time of the **most severe detainee abuses** (the ones that are known). It is not, of course, news that the Bush administration adopted (and still embraces) legal theories which vest the President with **literally unlimited power**, including the power to break our laws. There are, though, several points worth noting as a result of the disclosure of this Memorandum: (1) The fact that John Yoo is a Professor of Law at Berkeley and is treated as a respectable, serious expert by our media institutions, reflects the **complete destruction over the last eight years of whatever moral authority the United States possessed**. Comporting with long-held stereotypes of two-bit tyrannies, we're now a country that literally exempts our highest political officials from the rule of law, and have decided that there should be no consequences when they commit serious felonies. John Yoo's Memorandum, as intended, directly led to -- **caused** -- **a whole series of war crimes at both Guantanamo and in Iraq**. The reason such a relatively low-level DOJ official was able to issue such influential and extraordinary opinions was because he was working directly with, and at the behest of, the two most important legal officials in the administration: George Bush's White House counsel, Alberto Gonzales, and Dick Cheney's counsel (and current Chief of Staff) David Addington. Together, **they deliberately created and authorized a regime of torture and other brutal interrogation methods that are**, by all measures, **very serious war crimes.** If writing memoranda authorizing torture -- actions which then directly lead to the systematic commission of torture -- doesn't make one a war criminal in the U.S., **what does?** Here is what John Yoo is and what he did: "It depends on why the President thinks he needs to do that." Yoo **wasn't just a law professor theorizing about the legalization of torture**. He was a government official who, in concert with other government officials, set out to enable a **brutal and systematic torture regime**, and did so. **If this level of depraved criminality doesn't remove one from the realm of respectability and mainstream seriousness** -- if not result in war crimes prosecution -- **then nothing does.** That John Yoo is a full professor at one of the country's most prestigious law schools, and a welcomed expert on our newspaper's Op-Ed pages and television news programs, speaks volumes about what our country has become. We sure did take care of that despicable Pvt. Lyndie England, though, because we don't tolerate barbaric conduct of the type in which she engaged completely on her own. (2) While Yoo's specific Torture Memos were ultimately rescinded by subsequent DOJ officials -- primarily Jack Goldsmith -- the **underlying theories of omnipotent executive power remain largely in place**. The administration continues to embrace precisely these same theories to assert that it has the power to violate a **whole array of laws** -- from our nation's spying and surveillance statutes to countless Congressional oversight requirements -- and to detain even U.S. citizens, detained on American soil, as "enemy combatants." So for all of the dramatic outrage that this Yoo memo will generate for a day or so, **the general framework on which it rests**, despite being weakened by the Supreme Court in Hamdan, is the one under which we continue to live, without much protest or objection. (3) **This incident provides yet more proof of how rancid and corrupt is the premise** that as long as political appointees at the DOJ approve of certain conduct, then that conduct must be shielded from criminal prosecution. That's the premise that is being applied over and over to remove government lawbreaking from the reach of the law. That's the central argument behind both telecom amnesty and protecting Bush officials from their surveillance felonies (it's unfair to hold them accountable for their illegal spying behavior because the DOJ said they could do it). It's the same argument that CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden just made on Meet the Press as to why CIA interrogators should be immunized from the consequences of their illegal conduct ("when I go and tell him to do something in the shadows and point out to him it is perfectly lawful, that the Department of Justice has reviewed it . . . I need him to have confidence in that DOJ opinion"). The DOJ is not the law. They are not above the law and they do not make the law. They are merely charged with enforcing it. The fact that they assert that blatantly illegal conduct is legal does not make it so. DOJ officials, like anyone else, can violate the law and have done so not infrequently. High DOJ officials -- including Attorneys General -- have been convicted of crimes in the past and have gone to prison. Embracing this twisted notion that the DOJ has the authority to immunize any conduct by high government officials or private actors from the reach of the law is a **recipe for inevitable lawlessness**. **It enables the President to break the law, or authorize lawbreaking**, simply by having his political appointees at DOJ -- including ideologues like John Yoo -- declare that he can do it. As these incidents ought to demonstrate rather vividly, the mere fact that Bush officials at the DOJ declare something to be legal cannot provide license to break the law with impunity. (4) Since the Nuremberg Trials, "war criminals" include not only those who directly apply the criminal violence and other forms of brutality, but also government officials who authorized it and military officials who oversaw it. Ironically, the Bush administration itself argued in the 2006 case of Hamdan -- when they sought to prosecute as a "war criminal" a Guantanamo detainee whom they allege was a driver for Osama bin Laden -- that one is guilty of war crimes not merely by directly violating the laws of war, but also by participating in a conspiracy to do so. That legal question was unresolved in that case, but Justices Thomas and Scalia both sided with the administration and Thomas wrote (emphasis added): "[T]he experience of our wars," Winthrop 839, is rife with evidence that establishes beyond any doubt that conspiracy to violate the laws of war is itself an offense cognizable before a law-of-war military commission. . . . . In [World War II], the orders establishing the jurisdiction of military commissions in various theaters of operation provided that conspiracy to violate the laws of war was a cognizable offense. See Letter, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific (Sept. 24, 1945), Record in Yamashita v. Styer, O. T. 1945, No. 672, pp. 14, 16 (Exh. F) (Order respecting the "Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals" provided that "participation in a common plan or conspiracy to accomplish" various offenses against the law of war was cognizable before military commissions). The political reality is that **high government officials in the U.S. are never going to be held accountable for war crimes**. In practice, "international law" exists as a justifying instrument for powerful countries to impose their will on those which are less powerful, and war crimes tribunals are almost always a form of victor's justice. So **neither John Yoo, David Addington nor Alberto Gonzales**, and certainly not their bosses at whose behest they were working, are going to be sitting in a dock charged with war crimes **any time soon -- regardless of whether they ought to be.** But those who propound these principles and claim to believe in them ought to apply them consistently. **John Yoo is not some misguided conservative legal thinker with whom one should have civil, pleasant, intellectually stimulating debates** at law schools and on PBS. **Respectfully debating the legality and justification of torture regimes, and treating systematic torture perpetrators like John Yoo with respect, isn't all that far off from what Yoo and his comrades did**. It isn't pleasant to think about high government officials in one's own country as war criminals -- that's something that only bad, evil dictatorships have -- but, **pleasant or not, it rather indisputably happens to be what we have.** Lawyers can make really bad legal arguments that argue for very unjust things in perfectly legal sounding language. I hope nobody is surprised by this fact. It is very commonplace. Today we are talking about lawyers making arguments defending the legality of torture. In the past lawyers have used legal sounding arguments to defend slavery, the genocide of Native Americans, rape (both spousal and non-spousal), Jim Crow, police brutality, denials of habeas corpus, destruction or seizure of property, and compulsory sterilization. . . . . Orin [Kerr] wants to know whether John [Yoo]'s theories are consistent with my views of the living constitution. If he wants to know as a substantive matter whether John's theories of Presidential dictatorship are consistent with the Constitution's text and underlying principles, they are not. **The fact that a lawyer does something in his capacity as a lawyer does not mean it's proper, legitimate or legal**. **The fact that an argument is packaged in lawyerly wrapping doesn't mean it's reasonable or offered in good faith**. All sorts of lawyers -- from those representing crime families to those representing terrorists -- have been convicted of crimes because they concealed and/or promoted their clients' illegal acts. Lawyers aren't any more immune from the rule of law than anyone else. Harper's Scott Horton makes the point in much the same way: These memoranda have been crafted not as an after-the-fact defense to criminal charges, but rather as a roadmap to committing crimes and getting away with it. They are the sort of handiwork we associate with the consigliere, or mob lawyer. But these consiglieri are government attorneys who have sworn an oath, which they are violating, to uphold the law. Along those lines, Marcy Wheeler and Slate's Emily Bazelon both demonstrate how un-lawyerly Yoo's opinions were. Yoo wasn't acting as a lawyer in order legally to analyze questions surrounding interrogation powers. He was acting with the **intent to enable illegal torture and used the law as his instrument to authorize criminality.**

#### John yoo is a war criminal – reject him

**Wiener 2014** – Citing Chemerinsky, Dean of Law @ UC Irvine  
Jon, "Prosecute John Yoo, Says Law School Dean Erwin Chemerinsky," Dec 12, https://www.thenation.com/article/prosecute-john-yoo-says-law-school-dean-erwin-chemerinsky/

Torture is a crime, a violation of the Federal Torture Act. Those who engaged in the torture documented in such exhaustive detail in the Senate Intelligence Committee’s torture report should be prosecuted, and those who conspired in that torture should also be prosecuted. They include UC Berkeley law professor John Yoo, says Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of the Law School at the University of California Irvine.∂ Yoo was co-author of the infamous “torture memo” of 2002, when he was Deputy Assistant US Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel of the Bush Justice Department. In the memo he declared that—in the words of Jane Mayer in her book The Dark Side—“cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment of detainees could be authorized, with few restrictions.”∂ Yoo’s memo “directly led to the torture policy that resulted,” Chemerinsky said in an interview, citing Mayer’s evidence. “That’s being part of a conspiracy to violate a federal statute. Someone isn’t excused from criminal liability just because they work for the federal government.”∂ The Federal Torture Act defines torture broadly, as “an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering…upon another person within his custody or physical control.” The penalty for violating the Torture Act is imprisonment “for not more than 20 years.”∂ Most important for the case of John Yoo, the Federal Torture Act specifically includes conspiracy, stating that “a person who conspires to commit an offense under this section shall be subject to the same penalties…as the penalties prescribed for the offense.” That means Yoo could be sentenced to up to twenty years in prison if found guilty.∂ “I think he should be,” Chemerinsky said. “All who planned, all who implemented, all who carried out the torture should be criminally prosecuted. How else do we as a society express our outrage? How else do we deter it in the future—except by criminal prosecutions?”∂ Chemerinsky, an authority on constitutional law who has argued cases before the Supreme Court, is the founding dean of the law school at UC Irvine, a sister campus of Berkeley in the University of California System. He is the author of hundreds of law review articles and eight books, including most recently The Case Against the Supreme Court.∂ Yoo defended his work on torture in an op-ed published by the New York Daily News. “In 2002,” he wrote, “I believed that the federal law prohibiting torture allowed the CIA to use interrogation methods that did not cause injury—including, in extraordinary cases, waterboarding—because of the grave threat to the nation’s security in the months after the 9/11 attacks.” He added that he was “swayed by the fact” that he believed “the CIA would use the technique only on top Al Qaeda leaders thought to have actionable information on pending plots.” He said the Senate report was wrong in its conclusion that torture was ineffective in exposing plots, citing CIA head John Brennan’s statements to that effect.∂ But, Chemerinsky said, there’s nothing in the federal torture law that provides an exception for “pending plots.”∂ For a law school dean to call for the criminal prosecution of a law professor at another campus of the same university is unprecedented. When demands were raised in 2008 that Berkely fire Yoo, the dean of the law school at Berkeley at the time, Christopher Edley Jr., said that, while he agreed that “Yoo offered bad ideas and even worse advice during his government service,” he believed that advocating “bad ideas” was protected by academic freedom, and such advocacy “would not warrant dismissal” from Berkeley. The only ground for dismissal, he said, was specified in the official university policy: “Commission of a criminal act which has led to conviction in a court of law and which clearly demonstrates unfitness to continue as a member of the faculty.”∂ Chemerinsky’s argument is that Yoo has committed a criminal act—conspiracy to torture—and that he should be put on trial for it.

### 1AR – AT: FON DA

#### 1---No uniqueness – Yoo doesn’t say LAWS are getting deployed for FON now

#### 2---No uniqueness – Swarm LAWS are for nuclear first strike, not FON – That’s 1AC Altmann and Sauer

#### 3---Turn – China LAWS create underwater great wall that interferes with FON – That’s 1AC Johnson

#### 4---Empirics prove no escalation

Ian Bowers 18, Associate Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, PhD in War Studies from King’s College London, Escalation at Sea: Stability and Instability in Maritime East Asia, Naval War College Review, Volume 71, Number 4, Article 5, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7672&context=nwc-review

Despite such sentiments, to date the Chinese have not challenged U.S. FONOPs substantially on an operational level, instead preferring to engage on a political and rhetorical one. Under the Obama administration, U.S. naval vessels conducted five widely reported FONOPs in the South China Sea, and at the time of this writing the U.S. Navy has conducted four more FONOPs since President Trump took office. 68 So far no case of FONOPs has resulted in escalation to the use of substantial force; however, robust incidents have occurred. These incidents, as with clashes over maritime disputes, conform to the pattern of low-level instability seen in recent years at sea. The now-infamous 2009 incident of Chinese harassment of USNS Impeccable highlighted the potential for diverging views of freedom of navigation to lead to isolated clashes at sea. The general Chinese response has been to shadow vessels conducting such operations with naval and coast guard assets. Additionally, it has been reported that in the case of USS Lassen a number of Chinese fishing and merchant ships maneuvered around the U.S. ship as it sailed by the Chinese installation on Subi Reef. 69 In December 2016, a Chinese vessel removed a U.S. underwater drone from the water within eyeshot of a U.S. naval vessel. 70 This was a blatant obstruction of U.S. navigation rights, yet it did not result in an escalation to violence. FONOPs also were carried out during the Cold War. The initial Soviet response was diplomatic, but the Soviets felt that such FONOPs were unnecessarily provocative, and responses escalated to more-forcible measures, notably the ramming of USS Yorktown in 1988 while it was conducting a FONOP in the Black Sea. However, the parties found military and political solutions. 71 The military solution prescribed further rules for interaction between vessels. The political solution, agreed to in 1988, saw the Soviet Union acceding to the U.S. interpretation of the law of the sea and the United States determining that it no longer needed to assert its right of freedom of navigation in the Black Sea. 72 This was an elegant solution for both sides, in that the United States did not give up its right to perform FONOPs, yet it got the USSR to agree to the established laws of the sea, while the Soviet Union put a stop to what it perceived as destabilizing behavior. This suggests that political solutions to freedom of navigation issues can be found and that clashes over FONOPs, if they occur, can be managed once it is in the interests of both parties to do so. The Potential for Escalation Currently, available data suggest that the trend of maritime interactions in the seas of East Asia is mirroring that seen during and after the Cold War. This would indicate that sustained low-level instability will continue to characterize the strategic picture, but that escalation is unlikely.

#### 5---Economic interdependence as a theory oversimplifies why states go to war and ignores counter-examples

Joel Einstein 17, Masters of Strategic Studies at the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at Australian National University, reviewed by Charles Miller, Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University, Professor at Australian National University, 1/17/17, “Economic Interdependence and Conflict – The Case of the US and China,” https://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/17/economic-interdependence-and-conflict-the-case-of-the-us-and-china/

Economic Interdependence and Conflict¶ The theory that increased economic interdependence reduces conflict rests on three observations: trade benefits states in a manner that decision-makers value; conflict will reduce or completely cut-off trade; and that decision-makers will take the previous two observations into account before choosing to go to war. Based on these observations, one should expect that the higher the benefit of trade, the higher the cost of a potential conflict. After a certain point, the value of trade may become so high that the state in question has become economically dependent on another. Proponents of this theory argue that if two states have reached this point of mutual dependence (interdependence), their decision-makers will value the continuation of trade relations higher than any potential gains to be made through war.[3] It is on this argument that Pinker rests his statement that the economic relationship between the US and China precludes war. One can see evidence of this when analysing US views on China as trade rises. A 2014 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey indicates that only a minority of Americans see China as a critical threat, compared to a majority in the mid-1990s. This number is even higher when analysing Americans who directly benefit from trade with China.[4]¶ As compelling as this argument may be, high levels of economic interdependence have not always resulted in peace. The decades preceding WW1 saw an unprecedented growth in international trade, communication, and interconnectivity but needless to say, war broke out.[5] This instance alone is not enough to disprove Pinker’s logic. War may become very unlikely but began nonetheless.[6] Let us take two hypothetical scenarios, one in which the chances of war is 80% and the other in which trade has reduced the likelihood of war to 10%. Just knowing that war did indeed take place does not tell us which scenario was in play. Similarly, the fact that WW1 took place gives us no information about whether economic interdependence made war unlikely or not. In fact, evidence even exists to suggest that economic linkages prevented a war from breaking out during the sequence of crises that led up to WW1.[7] However, the fact that a war as detrimental as WW1 could break out despite a supposed reduction of the likelihood of conflict gives us an impetus to examine whether this reduction does take place. Additionally, if this is the case, what variables can weaken this pacifying effect?¶ Does Conflict Cut off Trade?¶ Economic interdependence theory makes the assumption that conflict will reduce or cut-off trade. This assumption appears to be logical, as one would expect that the moment two states are officially adversaries, fear of relative gains would ensure that policy makers want to completely cut-off trade. However, there are many historical examples of trade between warring states carrying on during wartime, including strategic goods that directly affect the ability of the enemy to carry out the war.[8] For example, in the Anglo-Dutch Wars, British insurance companies continued to insure enemy ships and paid to replace ships that were being destroyed by their own army.[9] Even during WW2, there are numerous examples of American firms continuing to trade strategic goods with Nazi Germany.[10] Barbieri and Levy argue that these examples and their own statistical analysis suggest that the outbreak of war does not radically reduce trade between enemies, and when it does, it often quickly returns to pre-war levels after the war has concluded.[11]¶ In response to this result, Anderton and Carter conducted an interrupted time-series study on the effect war has on trade in which they analysed 14 major power wars and 13 non-major power wars. Seven of the non-major power wars negatively impacted trade (although only four of these reductions were significant), but in the major war category, all results bar one showed a reduction of trade during wartime and a quick return to pre-war levels at its conclusion.[12] Accompanying this contradictory finding one must take into account that even if war does not radically reduce trade, if a state believes that it does then potential opportunity cost would still figure in their calculations.¶ Variables that Impact the Pacifying Effect of Economic Interdependence¶ The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the pacifying effect of economic interdependence is not constant. It achieves this via a discussion of the effect of changes in a number of variables pertaining to how and what a state trades. Once it is established that changes in such variables may alter the effect of economic interdependence on the likelihood of conflict, Pinker’s statement (that the level of trade between the US and China makes conflict unlikely) can be considered to be an over-simplification.

#### 6---SCS retrenchment averts conflict

**Yoder 18** (Brandon Yoder is a Research fellow at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation, and was previously an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Old Dominion University, 10/11/18, “Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts, Strategic Withdrawal, and Credible Signals,” American Journey of Political Science, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ajps.12395>)SEM

Conclusion This article introduces a novel theoretical insight to the retrenchment debate. Both optimists and pessimists regarding the efficacy of retrenchment have heretofore considered it a “last resort” strategy for a declining state to reduce its foreign commitments after it has already lost the power to sustain them. Both sides in the debate agree about the content of the costs and benefits of retrenchment, and simply disagree about their relative magnitudes. In contrast, the retrenchment game suggests that retrenchment early in a power shift can benefit a declining state for an entirely different (though not mutually exclusive) reason: By removing constraints over a rising state's behavior in a particular region, retrenchment makes that behavior more informative as a signal of the riser's future intentions elsewhere. That information, in turn, allows the declining state to adopt a more optimal strategy toward the riser, increasing its degree of cooperation with benign rising states, while more effectively opposing the rise of hostile types. These findings have substantial implications for contemporary U.S. foreign policy, particularly regarding a rising China. First, they identify conditions under which China's cooperative signals are more or less credible. Over the course of China's rise, the United States has adopted a “hedging” strategy that imposes constraints over China's behavior through a combination of deterrent threats and positive inducements.32 This strategy has been quite effective in achieving its intended purpose of inducing China to cooperate under the rule of the U.S.‐led liberal order in the short term. However, the argument in this article implies that by imposing high constraints over a rising China, the United States has increased China's incentives to misrepresent any hostile intentions, and thus reduced the credibility of China's cooperation as a signal of its long‐term intentions. Although this effect has been recognized by some (e.g., Goldstein 2005), much of the academic and policy literature on U.S.–China relations has taken China's cooperative behavior under high constraints at face value.33 Conversely, this article suggests that China's cooperation is more credible on issues where U.S. influence is low and China's behavior is relatively unconstrained. This implies that there may be a previously unrecognized silver lining to two recent U.S. foreign policy choices that have been roundly derided by U.S.–China experts: failure to join the China‐led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or to prevent U.S. allies from doing so in 2015, and the recent U.S. withdrawal from its own initiative, the Trans‐Pacific Partnership. Although expert consensus is that these policy outcomes are clearly harmful to U.S. interests, they also open up space for China to assume a leadership role regarding regional economic governance in an institutional setting where U.S. power is not immediately present (e.g., Babones 2016; Parameswaran 2016). The argument here suggests that how China shapes regional institutions under relatively low constraints is more informative of its long‐term preferences for the broader, global international economic order than its previous cooperation within U.S.‐led institutions has been. Second, this article identifies informational benefits of retrenchment that are likely novel to policy makers, as evidenced by the absence of informational considerations in the academic or policy literature on retrenchment. The magnitude of this informational incentive for retrenchment in U.S.–China relations—like the magnitude of noninformational incentives—is difficult to measure and requires extensive empirical work. Yet given the ambiguity about the net costs and benefits of American retrenchment manifested in the current retrenchment debate, even relatively small informational incentives for retrenchment vis‐à‐vis China could potentially alter the U.S. calculus. This is particularly true regarding issues that both the model and the existing literature suggest are strong candidates for U.S. retrenchment, such as the maritime disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) and the status of Taiwan (e.g., Glaser 2015). Each of these issues is significantly more valuable to China (which considers them “core national interests”) than to the United States, which is when the informational benefits of retrenchment are greatest. Of course, Taiwan and the SCS still have significant strategic value to the United States, which may outweigh the net informational and material benefits of withdrawal. This is ultimately an empirical question. Answering it will require that the informational effects of retrenchment be included alongside noninformational variables in subsequent work on retrenchment in U.S. foreign policy.

## AT: Xi Diversion DA

### 1AR – Top Level

#### Host of thumpers outweigh

Blanchette ‘19 --- Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies [Jude Blanchette, 8-30-2019, "Red Flags: Why Was China’s Fourth Plenum Delayed?" CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/red-flags-why-was-chinas-fourth-plenum-delayed]

One important point stands out from the announcement from China’s Xinhua News Agency and the four minutes dedicated to the meeting on the flagship nightly TV news program, Xinwen Lianbo. First, the documents to be reviewed by the Central Committee in October all relate internal CCP governance rather than focusing on economic reform. Given that last year’s Third Plenum was used to discuss governance reforms in the lead-up to the NPC, the Fourth Plenum might well be used to focus on the economy, as discussed above. Clearly, Xi Jinping views political concerns and Party governance as taking precedence over adhering to convention. This comes through in the longer statement made on the Xinhua website, which reads: “The meeting will be held during a time of significant upheaval not seen for 100 years, and a critical period for China as it realizes the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This undoubtedly relates to events in Hong Kong, the deterioration of relations with the United States, and the upcoming Taiwan presidential election, to name just a few. Xi Jinping and his administration are facing challenging times, perhaps the most precarious period of his rule thus far.

#### Mounting challengers thump OR Xi’s inevitably powerful.

Bloomberg ‘19 --- Singapore/Beijing coverage [Bloomberg, 8-31-2019, "Chinese Communist Party's top leadership to convene in October," Japan Times, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/08/31/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/chinese-communist-partys-top-leadership-convene-october/#.XW-2yehKh0l]

China is facing greater international push back as U.S. President Donald Trump piles tariffs on the country’s goods in an effort to secure trade concessions. That dispute has exacerbated concerns about the China’s economic slowdown and contributed to diplomatic tensions over pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong and American military support for Taiwan. The plenum will be the fourth Central Committee conclave since Xi secured a second term as the party’s general secretary in October 2017. In February 2018, the committee held an additional summit to discuss ending the constitutional provision that barred China’s head of state from serving more than two consecutive terms — paving the way to Xi staying in power indefinitely.

#### Concentration of power AND decline are inevitable.

Cheng ‘19 --- Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation [Dean Cheng, 6-6-2019, "The Perfect Storm Confronting Xi Jinping," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/the-perfect-storm-confronting-xi-jinping]

Entering 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping appeared to be charting a very new path not only for China but for himself. With the 13th National People’s Congress, Xi effectively ended term limits, amending the constitution of the People’s Republic of China to ensure he could remain president indefinitely. Since there are not formal term limits on the position of general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the actual top position of power, nor on the attendant chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, this meant Xi could hold the reins of power for as long as he wished. Xi was now the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping. Not only had Xi overturned Deng’s efforts to ensure orderly and regular transfers of power within the CCP system, he was also ever more clearly abandoning Deng’s famous dictum governing foreign policy: “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” This was evidenced in Xi’s willingness to take up the challenge posed by President Donald Trump on U.S.-China trade relations. Whether it was confidence due to his growing domestic strength, a belief that the balance of economic power in the U.S.-China relationship had already shifted, or a concern about appearing weak in front of Trump, Xi seems to have reached the conclusion that China, under his leadership, can successfully challenge the United States. This appears to have been a dangerous miscalculation. Xi may soon find that a perfect storm of agricultural problems, internal unhappiness, and his own chosen hard line on the trade war could undermine the domestic power he has worked so hard to consolidate. Even before the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi had been steadily consolidating power. Since rising to the position of general secretary in 2012, he has become the head of many of the “leading small groups,” which coordinate interactions between the CCP (which sets policy) and the various ministries of the government (which have the bureaucratic means of implementing power). In essence, he has been concentrating power in himself to an extent not seen since Deng, if not Mao Zedong. Xi’s efforts to concentrate power, however, have had the ironic effect of also increasing internal duress. Juliette Genevaz, for example, has noted the impact of divergent national and local economic policies, the anti-corruption campaign, and the crackdown on social media and dissent in elevating pressures on his leadership.

#### At worst, the government spins it – media and censorship.

Chen ‘19 --- Cornell University - Department of Government, Associate Professor [Jessica Chen, 3-7-2019, "How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public? Another Look at “Rising Nationalism” and Chinese Foreign Policy," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2019.1580427]

The Chinese government has also strategically minimized the publicity its propaganda organs have given to foreign actions or incidents that could incite public opinion. The PRC has often chosen to downplay international incidents that could derail U.S.-China relations, including the 2001 EP-3 incident and the 2009 Impeccable incident. Nonetheless, the Chinese government is not able to hide events altogether, particularly when reported by foreign media. As recent research by Molly Roberts suggests, censorship can backfire by encouraging information-seeking. Given the limited efficacy of censorship, the Chinese government often chooses to broadcast but frame international events in a way that casts the government’s actions in a positive light. For example, the international publicity surrounding the October 2015 resumption of US Freedom of Navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea made it difficult for the Chinese government and media not to publicize and denounce US actions in strong terms.

### 1AR – Xi Defense

#### No Xi diversion.

Yin 19 George Yin, government PhD from Harvard, political economy MSc from the London School of Economics, Dickey Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy and International Security at Dartmouth College. [Domestic repression and international aggression? Why Xi is uninterested in diversionary conflict, 1-22-2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/domestic-repression-and-international-aggression-why-xi-is-uninterested-in-diversionary-conflict/]//BPS

Crucially, diversionary war theory rests on a number of assumptions, two of which do not hold for Xi today. Assumption 1: Leaders prefer foreign adventure over addressing domestic troubles. As discussed earlier, in the realm of domestic policies, Xi has been criticized for primarily two things: his promotion of his cult of personality and a slowing Chinese economy overly focused on inefficient SOEs. It is easy for Xi to dial back his cult of personality, and he has already done so. Reverting his policy of guo jin min tui (“as the state advances, the private sector retreats”) is not going to be easy and would entail important financial system and legal reforms (see discussions from the 2018 Chinese Economists 50 forum), but is quite doable. There is little reason why Xi would want to create international tension to distract his critics when it is much more straightforward to directly address the domestic issues. Furthermore, a diversionary skirmish involving Vietnam or the Philippines over one of the South China Sea islands would hardly be significant enough for diversion. To rally the nation behind him, Xi must pick on Taiwan, Japan, or even the United States. The problem is that a confrontation with either Taiwan or Japan is highly risky. The Chinese military, which has not fought a war since the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1979 and is embroiled in corruption scandals, might well suffer defeat. Perhaps China could take on the United States in the economics arena, but China has been unable to react effectively to the ongoing trade war with the United States. CCP elites do not want international conflict, especially one involving the United States. Assumption 2: Key domestic political players want conflict. Most importantly, the CCP elites do not want international conflict, especially one involving the United States. This is not because the CCP elites like the United States, which is still seen by many as an imperial power that supports Japanese militarism and secessionism in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang. However, in Fan’s words, it is important “to deal with domestic issues before pacifying the barbarians” (an nei rang wai). In the eyes of his critics, any foreign adventure would indicate that Xi was getting the priorities wrong and further deviate from Deng’s grand strategy of fostering a favorable foreign environment to promote development. A diversionary conflict is therefore likely to further galvanize Xi’s opposition. In conclusion, the Xi administration’s performance since 2012 has been attacked by a wide range of groups that constitute China’s governing elites; Xi can do little to eliminate rival factions who are waiting for the opportune moment to strike back. Xi is unlikely to be interested in a foreign adventure that would at best distract him from domestic power struggles, and at worst provide more political ammunition for his opponents to use against him. Instead, Xi actually faces a lot of pressure to improve China’s relations with the U.S. in his second term, which could help him deal with his domestic troubles or at least not exacerbate them.

### 1AR – Senkakus

#### No Senkaku impact.

Beauchamp 14 — Zach Beauchamp, Writer for *ThinkProgress* and *Vox*, M.Sc. in international relations from the London School of Economics, 2014 (“Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China,” *ThinkProgress,* February 7th, Accessible Online at <https://thinkprogress.org/why-everyone-needs-to-stop-freaking-out-about-war-with-china-29354eaa709d#.iwfkfwd3p>, Accessed On 09-15-2016)

This is all dramatically overblown. War between China and Japan is more than unlikely: it would fly in the face of most of what we know about the two countries, and international relations more broadly. It’s not that a replay of 1914 is impossible. It’s just deeply, vanishingly unlikely.

Power

One of the easiest ways to evaluate the risks of Sino-Japanese war is by reference to three of the most important factors that shape a government’s decision to go to war: the balance of power, economic incentives, and ideology. These categories roughly correspond to the three dominant theories in modern international relations (realism, liberalism, and constructivism), and there’s solid statistical evidence that each of them can play a significant role in how governments think about their decisions to use military force. So let’s take them in turn.

The main source of tension is an East China Sea island chain, called the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyus in China. While there are other potential flashpoints, the current heightened tensions are centered on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Japan currently controls the islands, but China claims them, and the Chinese military has made increasingly aggressive noises about the islands of late.

But there’s one big factor shaping the balance of power in East Asia that means the talk is likely to remain just that: nuclear weapons. The tagline for World War I in 1914 — “The War To End All Wars” — would have a decidedly different meaning in 2014, as war’s end would be accomplished by the world’s end. So whereas, in 1914, all of the European powers thought they could win the war decisively, East Asia’s great powers recognize the risk of a nuclear exchange between the United States and China to be catastrophic. Carleton University’s Stephen Saideman calls this the end of the “preemption temptation;” nobody thinks they can win by striking first anymore. Indeed, despite the words of some of its military leaders, China (at least nominally) has a no-clash-with-Japan policy in place over the islands.

That also helps explain why the most commonly-cited Senkaku/Diaoyu spark, accidental escalation, isn’t as likely as many suggest. When The Wall Street Journal’s Andrew Browne writes that there’s a “real risk of an accident leading to a standoff from which leaders in both countries would find it hard to back down in the face of popular nationalist pressure,” he’s not wrong. But it won’t happen just because two planes happen across each other in the sky. In 2013, with tensions running high the whole year, Japan scrambled fighters against Chinese aircraft 433 times.

Indeed, tensions have flared up a number of times throughout the years (often sparked by nationalist activists on side of the other) without managing to bleed over into war. That’s because, as MIT East Asia expert M. Taylor Fravel argues, there are deep strategic reasons why each side is, broadly speaking, OK with the status quo over and above nuclear deterrence. China has an interest in not seeming like an aggressor state in the region, as that’s historically caused other regional powers to put away their differences and line up against it. Japan currently has control over the islands, which would make any strong moves by China seem like an attempt to overthrow the status quo power balance. The United States also has a habit of constructive involvement, subtly reminding both sides when tensions are spiking that the United States — and its rather powerful navy — would prefer that there be no fighting between the two states.

Moreover, the whole idea of “accidental war” is also a little bit confusing. Militaries don’t just start shooting each other by mistake and then decide it’s time to have a war. Rather, an incident that’s truly accidental — say, a Japanese plane firing on a Chinese aircraft in one of the places where their Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) overlap — changes the incentives to go to war, as the governments start to think (perhaps wrongly) that war is inevitable and the only way to win it is to escalate. It’s hard to envision this kind of shift in calculation in East Asia, for all of the aforementioned reasons.

Money

It’s wrong to talk about incentives to go war in purely military terms. A key component of the Senkaku/Diaoyou is economic: the islands contain a ton of natural resources, particularly oil and gas. But far more valuable are the trade ties between the two countries. China is Japan’s largest export market, so war would hurt Japan more than China, but it’d be pretty painful for both.

Proponents of the World War I parallel find a lot to criticize about this point. They like to cite Norman Angell, a pre-World War I international relations theorist famous for arguing that war was becoming economically obsolete. Angell is now often used interchangeably with Dr. Pangloss in international relations talk, a symbol of optimism gone analytically awry.

But Angell gets a bad rap. He didn’t actually say war was impossible; he merely claimed that it no longer was worth the cost (if you remember the aftermath of World War I, he was right about that). The real upshot of Angell’s argument is that, unless there’s some other overwhelming reason to go to war, mutually profitable trade ties will serve as a strong deterrent to war.

Despite a year of heated rhetoric and economic tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, bilateral trade has been recovering nicely of late.

Angell may have been wrong about Europe, but he’s probably right about East Asia. M.G. Koo, a political scientist at Chung-Ang University, surveyed several Senkaku-Diaoyu flareups between 1969 and 2009. He found that economic ties between the two countries played an increasingly large role in defusing tensions as the trade relationship between the two countries deepened.

### 1AR – Straight Turn

#### Straight turn –

#### A---US China war coming now – Interdependence, leadership, and deterrence don’t solve

Layne 20 [CHRISTOPHER LAYNE is University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M University and the author of the forthcoming book After the Fall: International Politics, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the End of the Pax Americana. “Coming Storms The Return of Great-Power War,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/coming-storms//lhs-ap]

Since the closing days of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers, pundits, international relations scholars, and policy analysts have argued that great-power war is a relic of a bygone age. In 1986, the historian John Lewis Gaddis termed the post–World War II era a “Long Peace” because the Soviet Union and the United States had not come to blows. A few years later, the political scientist John Mueller suggested that changing norms had made great-power conflict obsolete. By 2011, the psychologist Steven Pinker was arguing that the Long Peace had morphed into a “New Peace,” marked by a generalized decrease of violence in human affairs.

Of course, as evidenced by ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, to name a few, there is currently no shortage of organized armed violence involving smaller countries. Still, given the blood-drenched course of politics since the start of the modern international system in the sixteenth century, the absence of war among great powers since 1945 is striking. That does not mean, however, that these kinds of conflicts are off the table. In fact, despite attempts by academics and politicians to write off great-power war as a real threat, the conditions that make it possible still exist. Tensions persist among today’s great powers—above all the United States and China—and any number of flash points could trigger a conflict between them. These two countries are on a collision course fueled by the dynamics of a power transition and their competition for status and prestige, and without a change in direction, war between them in the coming decades is not only possible but probable.

MISPLACED OPTIMISM

Even as geopolitical competition between the United States and China intensifies, most Americans who think seriously about foreign policy and grand strategy refuse to believe that war is likely. This optimism is primarily rooted in several prominent theories of state behavior. The first is that a high level of economic interdependence between two countries reduces the risk of violent conflict. But history provides many examples to counter this hypothesis. The countries of Europe were never more interdependent—both economically and culturally—than they were just before the outbreak of World War I, and the economies of two of that conflict’s main belligerents, the United Kingdom and Germany, were closely linked. And even if the interdependence of the United States and China might theoretically reduce the risk of war between them, their economic ties have begun to unravel in recent years, as each begins to decouple from the other’s economy.

Skepticism about the prospect of a great-power war also stems from faith in the strength of nuclear deterrence. The risk of mutual assured destruction from a nuclear war surely played a role in preventing the Cold War from turning hot. In recent decades, however, technological advances have weakened this deterrent. The combination of miniaturized, low-yield nuclear warheads and highly accurate delivery systems has made thinkable what once was unthinkable: a “limited” nuclear war, which would not result in apocalyptic destruction.

Finally, other scholars have argued that the so-called liberal international order will preserve peace. In this view, U.S. leadership—through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund—and the spread of the principles of peaceful cooperation now provide regularity and predictability in international conduct. Some, such as the political scientist G. John Ikenberry, optimistically forecast that this order can survive for many decades into the future, notwithstanding China’s rise and the eventual end of U.S. predominance. This assumption, however, is problematic. The order is being challenged not only by changing international dynamics but also by political developments in the countries that have traditionally defended it. In the United States and Europe, the rise of populism and illiberal democracy is a backlash against the current order and the elites who champion and profit from it. As domestic support for the order decreases and the balance of power shifts toward other countries, the system will inevitably become less effective at mediating conflict. Rising powers may also see an opening to revise the structure entirely, raising the likelihood of war.

#### B---Backlash deescalates conflicts

Linus Mattsson 16, Uppsala Universitet Department of Government, Fall 2016, “Unrest as Incentive for Cooperation? The Diversionary Peace Theory, Turkish-Syrian Relations and the Kurdish Conflict,” <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1067590/FULLTEXT01.pdf>

3. Theoretical framework 3.1 Diversionary War theory First, let us look at the founding theory again. The Diversionary war theory, as previously explained, is claimed to be an explanation of the outbreak of war. The theory assumes that in times of domestic turmoil or discontent, leaders initiate conflict in the international arena in order to divert the citizens' attention away from the politically unpopular domestic situation, thus making sure they stay in office. The breakout of a large number of conflicts in history, from the Middle Ages to modern times, has been explained in terms of diversionary use of force. The actions of Napoleon III have been interpreted as frequent uses of diversionary tactics: not only did the Emperor provoke the Crimean war (1852-1856) to “divert the eyes of Frenchmen from their own government's weaknesses” (Blainey, 1988:72), but also the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 has been interpreted in the same way. Perhaps the most well-known example is the RussoJapanese war of 1904. The Russian Interior Minister at that time, Plehve, is cited in the memoirs of Count Witte, Minister of Finance, as saying “you are not familiar with Russia's internal situation. We need a little victorious war to stem the tide of revolution” (Blainey, 1988:76). The theory has been widely supported and is a long-lived one, appearing long before the established scholarly field of International Relations. Historically, it has been a conventional wisdom on the outbreak of war, based upon a number of ad hoc observations rather than a well-established theoretical scientific hypothesis. As Morgan and Bickers put it: “virtually every war since 1800 has been attributed, at least in part, to efforts of state leaders to deal with domestic problems” (Morgan and Bickers, 1992:27). However, throughout the years, this enigma has become widely researched by political scientists, resulting in a more developed theory. What theoretical arguments do the advocates of the Diversionary War theory rely upon? In summary, the main mechanisms of the DWT have said to be three: The In-group/Out-grouphypothesis or Rally-Round-The-Flag-Effect, Scapegoating and Gambling for Resurrection (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:445). The first one, the In-group/Out-group theory, or conflict-cohesion theory, originates from the field of sociology and the two sociologists Simmel and Coser. It suggests that identities of a group, in this case national identities, become stronger in times of external threats – that the in-group identity becomes more united during conflicts with the out-group (Levy, 1989:261). The Rally-Round-The-FlagEffect is a consequence of this. Not only does external pressure strengthen the group identities – in addition, it also leads to the group's unification around leader. The tenure of the leader should therefore be extended in times of external crisis (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:445). However, for the theory to be effective, there are some conditions that should be met: the group has to be fairly salient to begin with, has to already perceive itself as a group and also view the survival of the group as something worthwhile (Levy 1989:261). In addition, Simmel recognized that the outcome of conflict might be of importance: “[War] might either cause domestic quarrels to be forgotten, or might on the contrary aggravate them beyond reconciliation” (Levy, 1989:261). The second mechanism, Scapegoating, means that leaders retort to war to shift the blame of failed policies onto the states enemies (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:445). This is a consequence of the first theory, implying that leaders are aware of the psychological effect external pressure has on national identity and, in turn, their own tenure. The third mechanism, Gambling for resurrection, stemming from rational choice literature, argues that state leaders who are confronted with a possible loss of power can afford starting a foreign conflict, since their risk of losing office is imminent. If creating a conflict increases their chance of staying in office even by a small percentage, it would be worth it (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:446). Consequently, we should be able to observe the following patterns or mechanisms, according to the theory: When a domestic issue in a state threatens the legitimacy or political power of the ruling elite, said elite should a) be likely to use aggressive foreign policy behaviour as a tool to divert the attention of the public from the domestic issue, since a) the leaders are aware that the people will become more united or nationalistic under such external pressure, b) the people will give more support to the leader leading to c), a return of the popular support of the political elite. However, as already touched upon in the introduction, most of the research in support of the DWT have been either backed up by anecdotal evidence or lack quantitative evidence, which leads to both theoretical and empirical issues. 3.2 The Critiques of Diversionary War Theory The Diversionary War theory has been heavily criticized throughout the years. Only few modern scholars working on the subject ultimately support the initial theory. The main critique against the DWT is that there are insignificant links between the theory and the empirical findings (Levy, 1989:282). The historical and theoretical literature strongly suggests that political leaders should use diversionary force to strengthen their own positions, while the empirical studies, often quantitative, have found little or no support for the relationship between domestic strife and foreign conflict. The reasons for this are, in summary, two: 1. There might be something wrong with the theory itself. 2. The methodology used (mostly statistical analysis of a large number of states) might not be the right one (Morgan and Bickers, 1992:28). Regarding the theory, the idea that external enemies unite the group might not be as strong as initially thought. As Simmel himself explained, the in-group/out-group theory needs strict conditions to work – one of them is the in-group being fairly small. Thus, extrapolating the concept from small group psychological behaviour into a large, complex entity as modern day states might be difficult (Morgan and Bickers 1992:32). Although commonly treated almost as a general law, some scholars have paid attention to under what circumstances diversionary tactics would be used. The level of internal conflict should matter for the use of diversionary tactics. If the level of internal conflict is too low, aggressive foreign policy should be an exaggerated tool to use. If the level of internal conflict instead is too high, it would not be wise to turn to diversionary tactics. Blainey noted that during open civil war, diversionary use of force is rare since states turn to deal with their internal issue first as a part of its rational calculations (Blainey, 1988:86). In conclusion, we should only be able to observe diversionary actions at the moderate levels of internal strife. Another issue with the Diversionary War theory has to do with the assumptions that it makes regarding the management of conflict (or war). It presumes that war is something that can be easily managed. However, war requires a warring opponent who the state leaders cannot control. The situation is very likely to get out of hand and therefore open conflict should probably be an unlikely goal for leaders who seek to divert the attention of the public. Thus, actions short of war, like escalation of threat of force should be observable (Morgan and Bickers, 1992:29). However, this has also been challenged. Rummel, conducting a study on the link between internal and external conflict upon 77 states between 1955-57 found that “foreign conflict behavior is generally completely unrelated to domestic conflict behavior” (Levy 1989:262). These two facts about the variables give us some clue to why the quantitative studies that have been conducted might fail to produce any results in favor of the DWT. Large scale studies of the relationship between domestic strife and foreign conflict using correlation analysis and regressions all rely on the assumption that the relationship between the variables should be linear. The problem is that the theory does not imply that this is the case. Rather, the relationship should differ depending on the level of internal strife. There are more clues as to why the large, statistical analyses have failed to produce any results. One reason could be that scholars mainly have focused on correlations rather than offering any explanations through causality. One such scholar is Blainey. In his observations, he finds support for the linkage between civil strife and foreign conflict, but not due to diversionary actions. Instead, a state torn by civil strife often end up in conflict because it is perceived as weakened, and thus easily become a target for other states seeking to exploit the shift in power balance (Blainey 1988:82). It has also been argued that the direction of the relationship between internal and external conflict could be reversed. Foreign conflict could easily lead to internal turmoil and finally revolution at the home front, giving us internalization of external conflict rather than externalization of internal conflict (Levy, 1989:267). However, that this could happen would not per se be a problem for the theory – it is only problematic when the direction of the relationship is unaccounted for, given that there probably should be different casual mechanisms active during externalization and internalization of conflict, which would affect the results. In summary, the biggest obstacle to the research is a common, cumulative theoretical framework. As Levy puts it: “Little attention is given to questions of under what kinds of conditions what kind of states resort to what kinds of external conflict in response to what kinds of threats to the security of political elites” (Levy, 1989:283). 3.3 Diversionary Peace Theory The Diversionary Peace Theory, as put forward by Fravel is an alternative critical engagement with the Diversionary War Theory. In a case study on China and its territorial disputes, he finds that in times of internal turmoil or regime insecurity, China seeks compromises with foreign states, rather than confrontation (Fravel, 2005:47). Internal or domestic turmoil is referred to as regime insecurity. Fravel specifically dwells on social discontent, such as protests and legitimacy crises, and ethnic violence or uprisings. His observations are that when China is in a state of regime insecurity, the state chooses not to escalate any of the territorial conflicts with the neighbouring states. Instead, China seeks cooperation, contrary to what the DWT predicts. Instead of diversion, good relations with foreign state is one key way to solve internal problems, in addition to domestic tools. This is connected to the theoretical concept of Omnibalancing (David, 1991:235), which explains that leaders of third-world countries would be inclined to cooperate with an adversary, if there is an enemy deemed as more threatening. There are several ways leaders could benefit from cooperating with other states to deal with regime insecurity: they can gain direct assistance in dealing with the domestic threat, such as an external state denying rebel groups a harbor, as in Syria harboring Öcalan in our case, or they can improve border patrols. They can avoid a costly two-front war, and focus their resources on the domestic issues instead of the defense budget. Cooperation could also lead to an improvement of the regimes' international recognition, which would delegitimize any domestic contestors (Fravel, 2005:52). According to Fravel, leaders have three strategy options in ongoing disputes: they can delay, i.e. maintain claims to the issue, escalate via threat or use of force, and finally cooperate by dropping claims or offering concessions (Fravel, 2005:52). The least costly alternative is the delaying strategy, whereas escalation is costly due to risk of ending up in a military defeat, and cooperation is costly since it can be perceived as weakness by domestic audiences and lead to a removal from office. However, his argument is that when facing regime insecurity, the cost of the cooperation strategy is significantly lowered, since whatever one might lose on domestic discontent is won through the assistance in dealing with the original threat (Fravel, 2005:53). This is especially true if the threat to the regime emerges in the form of a threat to territorial integrity, which would drastically enhance the incentives to offer concessions to the neighbouring countries to prevent them from aiding events such as uprisings (Fravel 2005:53). This has clear implications for our case. When the armed Kurdish struggle for independence (i.e. a threat to territorial integrity) escalates, Turkey would have strong incentives to cooperate with or give concessions to Syria, an adjacent state that could serve as a base for the rebels. Fravel mainly studies behavior in territorial issues as the main independent variable. In this study, I will broaden this framework and include other contested foreign policy issues as well as long as there is a bargain situation for the two related states where concessions can be made. Although he backs his claims by an empirical study, only some attempt is made by Fravel to theoreticize his findings. He claims it is a “counterintuitive argument about the effects of domestic conflict on foreign policy” (Fravel, 2005:49). He does elaborate on why states would chose to cooperate, but does not offer any deeper explanation of the intervening variables in action. However, we can draw some theoretical conclusions from Fravel's observations and thoughts. First, we assume that leaders are rational. They would, in times of a crisis, assess the problem, identify possible courses of action and then choose the alternative that is most effective. By assuming this, we can draw the conclusion that leaders do not engage in a new conflict simply because the conflict is not manageable. The logic of the DWT is that leaders can control new conflicts – otherwise they would not be able to initiate them in order to divert attention. For Fravel, in contrast, leaders choose to focus on what they can control, which leads to cooperation rather than war. Secondly, we can assume that conflict is costly. The resources of the state might be too scarce to manage two crises. Therefore, it is not rational to engage in a new, foreign conflict before the domestic one is solved.

## AT: Taiwan Mines

#### Case turns the DA—US underwater LAWs near Taiwan cause Chinese pre-emption because of threats to their nuclear subs.

#### Chinese mines are necessary for their invasion of Taiwan and decimate the US navy’s capabilities.

Goldstein 19 ([Lyle J. Goldstein is Associate Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI] “Chinese Sea Mines Are Threatening the U.S. Navy,” 13 Sept. 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinese-sea-mines-are-threatening-us-navy-80251>) LHSLA LH

Today, the evidence continues to mount that the employment of sea mines remains a core tenet of Chinese naval war-fighting doctrine. This edition of Dragon Eye will review a few examples from this evidence. Unfortunately, American defense analyses continue to downplay this threat, for example in the recently released (and generally well done) RAND report, the US-China Military Scorecard. Sea mines, which have been employed since ancient times, are certainly not as mesmerizing as anti-ship ballistic missiles, supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, or the hypersonic weapons that Beijing is also apparently working on. Nor are sea mines likely to directly threaten U.S. aircraft carriers, as the above weapons might. However, skillfully deployed mines in massive numbers could prove a critical difference maker during the early phases of naval combat in the Western Pacific. A fascinating interview appeared several years ago in the Chinese military magazine 兵工科技 [Ordnance Science and Technology]. The interview was with a professor from the Qingdao Submarine Academy, but the subject matter exclusively concerned methods for deploying sea mines. Of course, that is telling in itself: the very fact that the theme of mine warfare was treated so comprehensively by a submarine academy professor suggests the great importance of these weapons in China’s conception of naval warfare. The professor goes on to cite yet another example of a U.S. Navy ship, the frigate Samuel B. Roberts, holed by an Iranian mine back in 1988. He says explicitly that “甚至渔船经过简单改装” [even fishing boats that undergo a simple modification] can deploy mines effectively. After insisting that submarines provide the most ideal method for laying mines, he goes on to suggest that “专门的外挂装置” [specialized external conformal apparatus] can be used to increase a submarine’s mine payload by a factor of 1-2 times. The above interview is especially disturbing because submarine-laid mines could provide the most unpleasant and deadly surprises in a U.S.-China naval conflict. In another article, I have discussed the troubling possibility that Chinese submarines would purposefully seek to strike America’s “soft rib” by the strategy of “破交” [attacking transport nodes], which could mean striking key American bases in the mid and eastern Pacific, or even in the Atlantic. If a single submarine could sow a highly challenging minefield of in excess of 50 weapons, as suggested by the Qingdao submarine academy professor above, the threat to close critical U.S. ports for a week or more seems a very troubling possibility. Just as perturbing is a brief report on Chinese mine warfare in the August 2015 issue of the naval magazine 现代舰船 [Modern Ships]. This article in turn cites a study from China’s National Defense University, which envisions a Chinese mine blockade in response to a Taiwan declaration of independence. That Chinese study apparently envisions a first phase lasting 4-6 days in which 5-7,000 sea mines would be deployed into the water. That would be followed by a second phase planting another 7,000 mines. For a reference point, that total number of mines would exceed the number placed around Japan in Operation Starvation in 1945–the very effective U.S. military campaign referenced above. The Chinese article goes on to suggest that laying 2,000 mines per day should be relatively easy for Chinese ships and aircraft. In combination with these two phases above, moreover, “阻止外敌干预方面, 中国海军飞机潜艇和部分渔船只要在第一岛连关键水道布设一定数量水雷…” [For the purpose of blocking foreign enemy intervention, Chinese ships, submarines, and some fishing boats would need to plant a certain quantity of sea mines in critical sea passages of the first island chain…].” A chart in the article labeled “布雷实力” [Mine-laying Strength] suggests nearly 500 military ships and aircraft (putting fishing boats aside) that could be employed in the campaign described above, with many of these platforms able to carry two dozen or more mines. A final article to consider when taking a measure of Chinese mine warfare might be a Chinese technical study published in 2014 with the title “激光指导技术在出水攻击水雷上使用的可行性探讨” [A Feasibility Study on Laser Guided Technology for Water-exit Attack Mine]. Well, what is a “water-exit attack mine,” you might reasonably ask? This is a sea mine, which upon detecting a suitable target, does not explode as most mines do, but rather surfaces and launches a missile at close range. As the authors, from the PLAN Dalian Naval Academy, point out, this type of mine could radically compress the reaction time for surface combatant crews attempting to employ countermeasures to defend their ships. Rather more disturbing even, however, is the clear suggestion in the study that such mines would be used to target aircraft. Understanding the huge role that aircraft, fixed wing and rotary, play in U.S. Navy surveillance, anti-submarine, mine-countermeasures (MCM), etc. missions, this development is rather troubling. And yet seasoned watchers of China’s military are beginning to get used to the idea that Beijing has advanced to the cutting edge of military technology development in a variety of areas, including mine warfare. It needs to be stated one more time that the U.S. Navy’s recent record in coping with the mine warfare challenge is not particularly encouraging. An official history of the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf War calls out MCM problems as the service’s primary shortcoming in that conflict. The report reads: “The mine warfare operations in Korea and Vietnam did not set off the Navy’s alarm bells, as they should have. The relative ease with which the Navy’s MCM helicopters and surface units seemed to handle their duties masked the inadequacy of these platforms and their command and control establishments.” Nor are the teething problems experienced by the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) particularly encouraging in this regard as that vessel type is set to replace the aging and expensive specialized MCM force, raising numerous doubts among close observers of mine warfare.

#### Collapse of US naval hegemony causes conflict over Taiwan and SCS

Edward **Wong 18**--(Edward Wong, Military Competition in Pacific Endures as Biggest Flash Point Between U.S. and China, No Publication, 11-14-2018 accessed 6-28-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/world/asia/usa-china-trade-pacific.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FUnited%20States%20Politics%20and%20Government&amp;action=click&amp;contentCollection=timestopics%C2%AEion=stream&amp;module=stream\_unit&amp;version=latest&amp;contentPlacement=31&amp;pgtype=collectionWASHINGTON)//ND

WASHINGTON — Trade disputes have for months been the focus of souring relations between the United States and China. But intractable problems in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait underscore that competition for dominance of the Pacific Ocean remains the most volatile source of conflict between the two nations — and the tensions are rising. That became clear in barbed comments during a meeting in Washington last week in which Mike Pompeo, the secretary of state, and Jim Mattis, the defense secretary, negotiated with their Chinese counterparts. And it is evident as Vice President Mike Pence is in Asia this week to talk to East Asian and Southeast Asian leaders to shore up support for American efforts to counterbalance China. Mr. Pence’s trip includes stops at two Asia-Pacific summit meetings, where he plans to speak about checking China’s influence and power projection. Since his [broad speech](https://www.hudson.org/events/1610-vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-administration-s-policy-towards-china102018) last month on American competition with China, Mr. Pence has become the face of the administration’s aggressive approach to Beijing. Some Asia analysts say, though, that President Trump’s absence sends a signal that the United States is not committed to the region: President Xi Jinping of China and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia are each attending at least one of the gatherings. Strategy for the region, in Washington and Beijing, revolves around how each country can assert [military dominance](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/politics/defense-strategy-china-russia-.html?module=inline) in the Pacific. For now, the most powerful military in the region is still that of the United States, which relies on the ability to have unfettered naval access to the South China Sea and the support of the self-governing island of Taiwan to bolster its standing. But China has become more aggressive in trying to assert dominance over both. And its state-owned companies are making inroads in the islands of Oceania — from Saipan to [Vanuatu](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/world/asia/vanuatu-china-wharf.html?module=inline) — with infrastructure projects. American officials say those could eventually become beachheads for the People’s Liberation Army, which would pose a challenge to the United States Navy’s operational command in the far island chains. Australia is also watching closely because the South Pacific has traditionally been its sphere of influence. Closer to home, China has continued to place military equipment and installations on rocks and reefs in the South China Sea, over which it claims sovereignty. And it is persuading some nations to [sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/us/politics/us-latin-america-china.html?module=inline) while forcing foreign companies, including hotels and airlines, to [drop any mention of Taiwan](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/business/taiwan-american-airlines-china.html?module=inline). There is a consensus in Washington that American officials need to find ways of pushing back. In the South China Sea, that has mainly taken the form of what are called freedom-of-navigation operations by the Navy, in which ships sail near the islands or features claimed by Beijing to establish that the waters are international — and not Chinese territory. On Sept. 30, American and Chinese warships [nearly collided](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/world/asia/south-china-sea-risks.html?module=inline), coming within 45 yards of each other. On Tuesday, Mr. Pence’s plane flew over the South China Sea to Singapore, where he attended the annual summit meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Mr. Pence [told a Washington Post columnist on the plane](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/11/13/pence-its-up-to-china-to-avoid-a-cold-war/?utm_term=.212a6d0153b4) that the flight, which passed within 50 miles of the contested Spratly Islands, was a type of freedom-of-navigation operation. “We will not be intimidated,” he said. “We will not stand down. We will continue to exercise freedom of navigation.” Graham Allison, a Harvard Kennedy School professor who wrote a book [on the potential for war between the United States and China](https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/03/31/how-trump-and-chinas-xi-could-stumble-into-war/?utm_term=.854ea00ac3f0), said most people in the region had thought it was “game over” on the South China Sea — too late to roll back China’s presence from rocks and reefs, as well as islands it created by dredging sand. But “the Trump administration now means to fight back vigorously on all fronts, including on the South China Sea — and perhaps even on Taiwan,” Mr. Allison said. Last Friday, at the close of the Washington meeting with their Chinese counterparts, Mr. Pompeo and Mr. Mattis made sharp comments on Pacific issues. “Regarding our strong ties with a democratic Taiwan, I reiterated the U.S. policy has not changed and that we are concerned about China’s increasing efforts to coerce others, constraining Taiwan’s international space,” Mr. Pompeo said, notably, in opening remarks to journalists. Later, Gen. Wei Fenghe, the Chinese defense minister, made his own assertive comments on Taiwan, referencing the American Civil War and the United States Pledge of Allegiance. “To achieve reunification is a mission for our party and our country,” General Wei said. “In the Pledge of Allegiance to the U.S., there is this sentence saying this is a nation under God, indivisible. So it is the same with Taiwan. It is an inalienable part of China.” If “this territorial integrity is under threat,” he said, China would move to maintain it “at any cost,” just as the United States had to do “in the Civil War.” Analysts in Washington took note of the remarks. “I believe it’s rare that the U.S. side raises Taiwan in a news conference with the Chinese in an opening statement,” said Bonnie S. Glaser, a senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Pompeo referred to ‘democratic Taiwan.’ That will surely rankle the Chinese. I expect China’s remarks in private regarding Taiwan were even sharper.” The United States has been [more aggressive](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/29/world/americas/trump-china-taiwan-el-salvador.html?module=inline) in defending Taiwanese interests since John R. Bolton [became national security adviser](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/us/politics/john-bolton-trump.html?module=inline) in April. Last month, the Pentagon sailed two warships through the Taiwan Strait, which underscored the potential for conflict. The White House had initially considered sending an aircraft carrier through the strait — something the United States has not done since 2007. That most likely would have ignited a furious response from China. Instead, the Pentagon sent a cruiser and a destroyer. Defense Department officials had argued that the carrier would be too provocative at a time when Washington and Beijing are already at loggerheads over trade and other issues. That includes [Communist Party repression of ethnic Uighur Muslims](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-detention-camp.html?module=inline), which Mr. Pompeo regularly denounces. On Wednesday, American legislators [introduced bills](https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/1045ec83-597c-4418-9299-cb5973dd24c8/997C1A8CB02CAABCEB7A415B11E8A6A2.dav18g88.pdf) calling on the Trump administration to [take action](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/10/world/asia/us-china-sanctions-muslim-camps.html?module=inline)to defend the Uighurs. Mr. Mattis and Mr. Wei have tried to lower the temperature on tensions in the Pacific. Before the Washington talks, the two met in Singapore last month on the sidelines of a conclave of Southeast Asian defense ministers. But one Defense Department official said that cordial talks were the limits of what the two nations could achieve for now. Both countries have dug into seemingly nonnegotiable positions on China’s militarization of disputed land features in the South China Sea — the issue that most bedevils the military relationship. The Chinese do not describe their actions as militarization; they accuse the United States of militarizing the sea with its freedom-of-navigation ship operations and [overflights](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/world/asia/south-china-sea-navy.html?module=inline). Now, officials from Britain and France [say their navies](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2149062/france-britain-sail-warships-contested-south-china-sea) are also taking part in the operations, even though Southeast Asian nations contesting China’s claims have not publicly committed to participating. Yang Jiechi, the senior Chinese foreign policy official who attended the Washington meeting, said China was building what he described as civilian facilities and necessary defense facilities “on its own territory.”“The Chinese side made it clear to the United States that it should stop sending its vessels and military aircraft close to Chinese islands and reefs, and stop actions that undermine China’s sovereignty and security interest,” Mr. Yang said. Michael Pillsbury, an [author on the Chinese military](https://thehundredyearmarathon.com/) cited by Mr. Trump and Mr. Pence, said the Chinese would no doubt continue to see the actions in a hostile light. They are, he said, “interpreting these freedom-of-navigation exercises, even when they’re innocent passage, as something more — provocations, or a declining hegemon trying to maintain its power.”

# 2AR

## 2AR T

### Nebel – Infinite Regress

#### When will the cult of limit ever give it a rest – their model of debate is one where negatives will pick a fringe T interpretation that the aff violates and then whine about how it was hard to be negative – that’s terrible for debate as a whole because it means every debate is T which crowds out substantive clash which was the only terminal impact to the shell – you should draw a line in the sand and vote aff if we win definitions so it prevents the moral hazard of infinite T

#### Independently, vote aff because our interpretation is better for clash – their form of clash