# Lol what?

### 1NC

#### Interpretation – The affirmative debater must not defend the hypothetical enactment of a governmental policy

#### Violation – They do

#### Standards

#### 1 – ressentiment – It’s tautological that we can only ever live in the world we live in, imagining the government swooping in to create the perfect world breeds hatred of our actual existence

**White, 90** (Alan, Professor of Philosophy Williams College, “Delusion Frames, From Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth,” http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/Delusion%20frames.htm,)

I take as my starting point Nietzsche's assertion that the emergence of nihilism as a "psychological state" is bound up with the failure of the attempt to endow the world with value by at­tributing to it an ultimate "purpose," "unity," or "truth" (N:11[99] / WP:12).  This failure leads to nihilism as "the radi­cal rejection of value, meaning, and desirability" (N:2[127] / WP:1).  These descriptions suggest that nihilism has its origin in a negation, i.e., in the failure of an attempt, or in the rejection of a purported value.   Yet neither of these negations can be the first step towards nihilism, because neither is a first step at all.  The failure of an attempt presupposes that it has been made, and any rejection presupposes either prior accept­ance or, at least, prior awareness of a question.I therefore suggest that the first step towards nihilism -- a step that, in Nietzsche's view, leads historically to the second -- is the step taken with the **judgment that** the existence of our world of becoming would be justified only through a pur­pose that guides it, through an "infinitely valuable" unity that underlies it, or through another world, a "true world" or "world of being" that is accessible through it (N:11[99] / WP:12).  This step, like the step to rejection, is a negation in that it con­tains, at least implicitly, the judgment that our "world of becom­ing" as it presents itself, in isolation from such purpose, unity, or truth, "ought not to exist" (N:9[60] / WP:585); the step presupposes the judgment that without some such source of worth, which cannot be contained within the flux of a "world of becoming," that world -- our world -- would be worthless. Is the person who has taken this first step -- who has judged that the world requires justification -- a nihilist?  Cer­tainly not an avowed one:  this person will use the appellation "nihilist," if at all, only for others.  Nevertheless, this per­son is "nihilistic" in a way that one who simply accepts the world of becoming is not.  From the Nietzschean perspective, those who posit the extraneous source of value are nihilists in that (1) they judge of our world that it ought not to be (on its own), and (2) they believe in a world that is, despite their beliefs to the contrary, "fabricated solely from psychological needs," a world to which we have "absolutely no right" (N:11[99] / WP:12).  To be sure, they are not aware that the world of their belief is a mere fabrication; that is why they will deny being nihilists.  For this reason, if it is appropriate to term them "nihilists" at all, an essential qualification must be added:  their nihilism is unconscious.  Or, to adopt a more Nietzschean term, they are religious nihilists:  their affirmation of another world or source of value is a consequence of their denial of our world as bearer of its own value.Nihilism becomes conscious -- avowed or, in a Nietzschean term, "radical" -- with a second step, the step taken with the judgment that the sources of value are absent, that the three categories of value remain uninstantiated.  "Radical nihilism," in Nietzsche's explicit definition, is the conviction of an absolute untenability of existence when it is a matter of the highest values that one recognizes; plus the in­sight that we have not the slightest right to posit a being or an in-itself of things that would be 'divine' or incarnate morality. (N:10[192] / WP:3)

#### A – This is specifically true in the context of the aff – roleplaying as entities we have no control over breeds ressentiment

Antonio 95 [Robert; Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas. “Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History.” American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995] // BBM

 According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum .. . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors." The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely astring to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severelya god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

#### 2 – Predictability – Who knows how the plan will turn out? They sure as hell don’t and we really shouldn’t even care in the first place

Grimm 77 Ruediger Hermann, art historian and Goethe scholar, *Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge*, ed. M. Montinari, W. Miiller-Lauter & H. Wenzel, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pg. 30-33, Gender modified

Western logic and metaphysics have been traditionally founded upon a handful of principles which were regarded as being self-evidently true, and therefore neither requiring nor admitting of any further proof40• One of these principles we have already dealt with at some length, the notion that truth must be unchanging. Rather than further belabor the whole question of truth, we shall now turn to Nietzsche's analysis of why it is that truth should be regarded as necessarily unchanging in the first place. Nietzsche's view of reality (the will to power) is such that all that exists is an ever-changing chaos of power-quanta, continually struggling with one another for hegemony. Nothing remains the same from one instant to the next. Consequently there are no stable objects, no "identical cases," no facts, and no order. Whatever order we see in the world, we ourselves have projected into it. By itself, the world has no order : there is no intrinsically stable "world order," no "nature." Yet metaphysics, logic, and language indeed, our whole conceptual scheme is grounded in the assumption that there is such a stable order. Why? . • . die Annahme des seienden ist nothig, um denken und schliessen zu konnen : die Logik handhabt our Formeln fiir Gleichbleibendes deshalb ware diese Annahme noch ohne Beweiskraft fiir die Reali tat : ,,das Seiende" gehort zu unserer Optik48• This can perhaps be best clarified by anticipating our discussion of Nietzsche's perspectivism. Even if reality is a chaos of power-quanta, about which any statement is already an interpretation and "falsification," we nevertheless must assume some sort of order and continuity in order to function at all. But the assumption of order and continuity even if it is a necessary assumption is certainly not any sort of proof. We ourselves, as will to power, gain control over our environment by "interpreting" it, by simplifying and adapting it to our requirements. Life itself is an ongoing process of interpretation, a process of imposing a superficial order upon a chaotic reality. In Wahrheit ist Interpretation ein Mittel selbst, um Herr iiber etwas zu werden. (Der organische Prozess setzt fortwahrendes /nterpretieren voraus42• Thus we create for ourselves a world in which we can live and function and further enhance and increase our will to power. Even our perceptual apparatus is not geared to gleaning "truth" from the objects of our experience. Rather, it arranges, structures, and interprets these objects so that we can gain control over them and utilize them for our own ends. The "truth" about things is something we ourselves have projected onto them purely for the purpose of furthering our own power. Thus Nietzsche can say Wahrheit ist die Art von Irrthum, ohne welche eine bestimmte Art von lebendigen Wesen nicht leben konnte. Der Werth fiir das Leben entscheidet zuletzt43. Thus the "truth" about reality is simply a variety of error, a convenient fiction which is nevertheless necessary for our maintenance. In the last analysis it is not a question of "truth" at all, but rather, a matter of which "fiction," which interpretation of reality best enables me to survive and increase my power. In an absolute sense, the traditional standard of unchanging truth is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. But on the basis of Nietzsche's criterion for truth we can make a vital distinction. All statements about the truth or falsity of our experiential world are functions of the will to power, and in this sense, all equally true (or false). The difference lies in the degree to which any particular interpretation increases or decreases our power. The notion that truth is unchanging is the interpretation of a comparatively weak will to power, which demands that the world be simple, reliable, predictable, i. e. "true." Constant change, ambiguity, contradiction, paradox, etc. are much more difficult to cope with, and require a comparatively high degree of will to power to be organized (i. e. interpreted) into a manageable environment. The ambiguous and contradictory the unknown is frightening and threatening. Therefore we have constructed for ourselves a model of reality which is eminently "knowable," and consequently subject to our control. Pain and suffering have traditionally been held to stem from "ignorance" about the way the world "really" is : the more predictable and reliable the world is, the less our chances are of suffering through error, of being unpleasantly surprised. However, " darin driickt sich eine gedriickte Seele aus, voller MIBtrauen und schlimmer Erfahrung . . . 44." The demand that reality and truth be stable, reliable, predictable, and conveniently at our disposal is a symptom of weakness. The glossing over of the chaotic, contradictory, changing aspect of reality is the sign of a will to power which must reduce the conflict and competition in the world to a minimum. Yet resistance and competition are the very factors which enable any particular power-constellation to express itself and grow in power. As we saw earlier, the will to power can only express itself by meeting resistance, and any interpretation of reality which attempts to minimize these factors is profoundly anti-life (since life is will to power). Furthermore, a person embodying a strong and vigorous will to power will "interpret" the "threatening" aspect of the world the chaos, ambiguity, contradiction, danger, etc. as stimuli, which continually offer [them] a high degree of resistance which [they] must meet and overcome if [they are] to survive and grow. Rather than negate change and make the world predictable, a "strong" person would, according to Nietzsche, welcome the threat and challenge of a constantly changing world. Referring to those who require a world as changeless as possible in order to survive, Nietzsche says . . . (eine umgekehrte Art Mensch wiirde diesen Wechsel zum Reiz rechnen) Eine mit Kraft iiberladene und spielende Art W esen wiirde gerade die Aff ekte, die Unvernunft und den Wechsel in eudamonistischem Sinne gutheissen, sammt ihren Consequenzen, Gefahr, Contrast, Zu-Grunde-gehn usw-45. A large part of the intellectual energy of the West has been spent in trying to discover "facts," "laws of nature," etc., all of which are conceived to be "truths" and which, therefore, do not change. For Nietzsche, this conceptualization of our experience is tantamount to a "mummification" : when an experience is conceptualized, it is wrenched from the everchanging stream of becoming which is the world. By turning our experiences into facts, concepts, truths, statistics, etc. we "kill" them, rob them of their immediacy and vitality and embalm them, thus transforming them into the convenient bits of knowledge which furnish our comfortable, predictable, smug existences46• Der Mensch sucht ,,die Wahrheit" : eine Welt, die nicht sich widerspricht, nicht tiiuscht, nicht wechselt, eine wahre Welt, eine Welt, in der man nicht leidet : Widerspruch, Tauschung, Wechsel Ursachen des Leidens l47 For Nietzsche, this whole tendency to negate change which is so intimately connected with the presupposition that "truth" always means "unchanging, eternal truth," is a symptom of decadence, a symptom of the weakening and disruption of the will to power. This outlook says, in effect, "This far shall you go, and this much shall you learn, but no more than this . . . . " In the absence of any fixed and ultimate standard for truth, of course, this outlook is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. Yet it is not a question here of rightness or wrongness, but a question of power. More specifically, it is a matter of vital power. "Der Werth fur das Leben entscheidet zuletzt48." Nietzsche's conclusion is that this static world interpretation has a negative, depressing effect on a person's vital energies (will to power). It constricts growth, it sets limits and hampers the self-assertion of the will to power. The strong individual, whom Nietzsche so much admires, flourishes only in an environment of change, ambiguity, contradiction, and danger. The chaotic and threatening aspect of the world is a stimulus for such individuals, demanding that they constantly grow and increase their power, or perish49• It demands that they constantly exceed their previous limits, realize their creative potential and surpass it, become more than they were. In the absence of any stability in the world, the strong individual who can flourish in such an environment is radically free from any constraint, radically free to create. It need scarcely be said that this world-interpretation is immeasurably more conducive to the growth and enhancement of the will to power than the static worldview. And the increase of will to power is Nietzsche's only criterion : Alles Geschehen, alle Bewegung, alles Werden als ein Feststellen von Gradund Kraftverhaltnissen, als ein Kampf . . .0 0

#### Voters

#### 1 – Nihilism - To will against the world is to will for an existence where value is no longer possible.

**Kacou, 8** (“Why Even Mind?: On the a Priori Value of Life,” BA, Government & Politics, University of Maryland MA, Global Security Studies, Johns Hopkins Univ. JD, Florida Coastal School of Law, JPL)

We have also noted that circumstantial entanglements could conceivably make us think we want what we do not want. In other words, irrational behavior becomes possible: it becomes possible to find discrete pleasure in things that should not give us pleasure—say, because they compromise access to greater pleasure. This explains why it becomes possible to even deny the value of life-as-such. We can also reason that it is the circumstance that the perpetuation of life and pleasure seems practically (i.e., a posteriori) impossible—because we believe we are mortal and expect to die—that forces us to, not only reevaluate our death but also, focus more on the other dimensions of pleasure (intensity and diversity). And, what is even more interesting: it is the denial of the truth of this apparent circumstance, this imperfection of pleasure, which forms the central concern of theological worldviews (which devalue pleasure in its finite form—at least, to the extent that it does not seem conditioned by them). This concern finds expression in two assertions: that experience belongs to an immortal soul; and that perfect pleasure is guaranteed in “heaven.” \* “Heaven” is defined as a place where nothing bad can occur**—**a place where problems and dissatisfaction are not possible. (A place of absolute, necessary security.) As we have seen, however, any desire for such a place would seem to entail a desire for a place where value is no longer possible—because value always entails a preference over alternatives (one of which is bad). In other words, desiring to go to heaven would be the same as desiring the end of desire, the disappearance of value**.** We need not investigate in detail the circumstances that make it possible to say that such a place ought to exist. (Perhaps it relates to a fear of Murphy’s Law—“what can go wrong will go wrong.”)[35] But we can “see” how tempting it is to say so, and thus unwittingly sacrifice the possibility of the good to the desire for its necessity. Those who commit to such a place, we call “greedy nihilists.” Hamlet, for instance, even though he does not actually mention a place we would call “heaven,” shows that he is a greedy nihilist when he laments “outrageous fortune” to the point of finding value in the idea of the end of experience—he wishes that things in general were incapable of going wrong. (This is precisely the contrary of amor fati.)It is as if one needed to be able to believe in the possibility of a perfect, everlasting, totalitarian state of goodness in order to be able to find anything good at all**.** Heaven can be defined as “God’s realm.” That “God” may be defined as an inescapable (perhaps even all-inclusive, somehow), eternally consistent, committed and supreme preference and power. Through these attributes, It makes heaven possible. Therefore, it is Its authority that conditions the possibility of the good itself (which for greedy nihilists, as we have shown, is conditioned on the idea of its necessity). Thus, that “God” becomes the source or foundation of ethics and value. Accordingly, when the idea that such a “God” does not exist becomes contemplated, the idea that the good itself does not exist also becomes contemplated. With the idea of the disappearance of the duty imposed by that “God” also comes the idea of the disappearance of the good itself. Thus, it is as if the greedy nihilistic theist needed to feel compelled to love anything at all by such “God,” without which she would be terminally overcome with a sense of all-encompassing futility. In other words, she would become a passive nihilist—in the Nietzschean sense. In sum, there would be two sides to this paradoxical coin we can now call the Nietzschean God. On one side, it is something that guarantees the preservation of one’s “willingness to care,” so to speak, more or less like an anti-depressant. Because of immortality and heaven, it becomes impossible to “lose” the world. On the other side, it is something that forces one to care. Because of immortality and hell, it becomes impossible to “escape” the world—and costly to try to do so.

#### 2 – Education – The idea that we should subject education and overcoming of the self to the ideals of the state or “political education” is nihilism and turns their offense

**Hart, 9** (Thomas, 2009, “A Philosophy for Education,” *Nietzche, Culture and Education*, lecturer in philosophy and classical languages at University College Utrecht, pg. 57)

Here then, the concern is not with how the individual may see him or herself, but with how society attempts to constrain and limit that vision with the idea that there is some thing that an individual is ultimately meant to be. This teleological view of the self is, for Nietzsche, one of the most powerful aspects of nihilism because of its tendency to limit possibility through the practices and institutions of a given society which has subordinated itself to the perceived greater interests of the State, thus thwarting the will to overcome. “Here...we are experiencing the consequences of the doctrine.. .that the state is the highest goal of mankind and that a man has no higher duty than to serve the state...” (SE: 148). On Nietzsche’s interpretation then, religion, education and culture, even the day to day concerns of the individual, become largely dominated and thereby determined by the State, and a predetermined ‘self’ is born. In order for such a system to work, every individual must accept a hierarchically determined place or function in society which it then becomes ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’ to transcend because any such attempt undermines the institutionalized validity of the presuppositions of the system. A kind of existential conservatism becomes the rule, imposed from the top down, which breeds complacency and apathy thus giving rise to nihilism. In such a system, the contest becomes no more that a vestige of the old order, removed to the stadium for entertainment purposes, and here lies the essential contradiction that Nietzsche sees in contemporary attitudes towards this notion. While on the one hand “nothing should at any price undermine the ‘rational’ and the ‘real” (DS: 11), there remains great admiration for the sovereign individual who masters himself and wins contests, which is to say, the individual who sets his own limits and rules. The elitism that all true democrats fear as a great threat to their way of life, is at the same time the thing they gather in largest numbers to admire, it is one of their highest values. The contest, initially a process, becomes a spectacle to be enjoyed, rather than a positive activity to be engaged in. Against this self-contradictory understanding of the process, Nietzsche offers contest as the central activity in culture and education, which is to say in life. On the above model, education becomes a practice or habit rather than a task, and its application is expanded as much as possible with the aim of including as many people as possible, or what Nietzsche calls the “democratization of education,” which can only be achieved by adopting the lowest common denominator as the standard, breeding apathy, mediocrity and fragmentation. At this point it will be useful to introduce two separate uses for the word “knowledge” which Cooper (1983a) has outlined. In the first use the focus is on content, and in the second the focus is on the process of knowing. An education which focuses on knowledge in the first sense is essentially a process of assimilating a given body of facts, existing definitions and parameters that are said to comprise a discipline, and this is something which Nietzsche aggressively opposed because of its tendency toward overspecialization. The only remnant of the contest left in this type of education is almost entirely external insofar as the individual measures him or herself against little more than the ability of other individuals to assimilate the same body of facts. Creation and innovation are essentially spurned on account of the threat they pose to the existing structure and system. On the other hand, the type of education that focuses on the second sense of knowledge is an essential component of the pursuit of authenticity because it seeks to facilitate the creation of values and meaning; it encourages creation of truths by which one’s unique existence is made possible. But the kind of truth that this sense of knowledge creates is not the abstract, disinterested kind, “[this] truth must be truth which is felt in the blood” (Murphy 1984: 47). In this way the concept of contest becomes something all encompassing, which is to be expressed in all aspects of both private and public life.

#### 3 – Fairness – It’s like really important I promise

#### 4 – Advocacy skills – They’re the only real portable skill from debate, which should really tell you something about this godforsaken sport

Gilens and Page 14 (Martin, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, and Benjamin, Gordon S. Fulcher Professor of Decision Making at Northwestern University. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens", American Political Science Association, Perspectives on Politics, September 2014 | Vol. 12/No. 3, p. 575-577)

Each of our four theoretical traditions (Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, Majoritarian Interest-Group Pluralism, and Biased Pluralism) emphasizes different sets of actors as critical in determining U.S. policy outcomes, and each tradition has engendered a large empirical literature that seems to show a particular set of actors to be highly influential. Yet nearly all the empirical evidence has been essentially bivariate. Until very recently it has not been possible to test these theories against each other in a systematic, quantitative fashion. By directly pitting the predictions of ideal-type theories against each other within a single statistical model (using a unique data set that includes imperfect but useful measures of the key independent variables for nearly two thousand policy issues), we have been able to produce some striking findings. One is the nearly total failure of “median voter” and other Majoritarian Electoral Democracy theories. When the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy. The failure of theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy is all the more striking because it goes against the likely effects of the limitations of our data. The preferences of ordinary citizens were measured more directly than our other independent variables, yet they are estimated to have the least effect. Nor do organized interest groups substitute for direct citizen influence, by embodying citizens’ will and ensuring that their wishes prevail in the fashion postulated by theories of Majoritarian Pluralism. Interest groups do have substantial independent impacts on policy, and a few groups (particularly labor unions) represent average citizens’ views reasonably well. But the interest-group system as a whole does not. Overall, net interest-group alignments are not significantly related to the preferences of average citizens. The net alignments of the most influential, business-oriented groups are negatively related to the average citizen’s wishes. So existing interest groups do not serve effectively as transmission belts for the wishes of the populace as a whole. “Potential groups” do not take up the slack, either, since average citizens’ preferences have little or no independent impact on policy after existing groups’ stands are controlled for. Furthermore, the preferences of economic elites (as measured by our proxy, the preferences of “affluent” citizens) have far more independent impact upon policy change than the preferences of average citizens do. To be sure, this does not mean that ordinary citizens always lose out; they fairly often get the policies they favor, but only because those policies happen also to be preferred by the economically-elite citizens who wield the actual influence. Of course our findings speak most directly to the “first face” of power: the ability of actors to shape policy outcomes on contested issues. But they also reflect—to some degree, at least—the “second face” of power: the ability to shape the agenda of issues that policy makers consider. The set of policy alternatives that we analyze is considerably broader than the set discussed seriously by policy makers or brought to a vote in Congress, and our alternatives are (on average) more popular among the general public than among interest groups. Thus the fate of these policies can reflect policy makers’ refusing to consider them rather than considering but rejecting them. (From our data we cannot distinguish between the two.) Our results speak less clearly to the “third face” of power: the ability of elites to shape the public’s preferences. We know that interest groups and policy makers themselves often devote considerable effort to shaping opinion. If they are successful, this might help explain the high correlation we find between elite and mass preferences. But it cannot have greatly inflated our estimate of average citizens’ influence on policy making, which is near zero. What do our findings say about democracy in America? They certainly constitute troubling news for advocates of “populistic” democracy, who want governments to respond primarily or exclusively to the policy preferences of their citizens. In the United States, our findings indicate, the majority does not rule—at least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes. When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose. Moreover, because of the strong status quo bias built into the U.S. political system, even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not get it. A possible objection to populistic democracy is that average citizens are inattentive to politics and ignorant about public policy; why should we worry if their poorly informed preferences do not influence policy making? Perhaps economic elites and interest-group leaders enjoy greater policy expertise than the average citizen does. Perhaps they know better which policies will benefit everyone, and perhaps they seek the common good, rather than selfish ends, when deciding which policies to support.

#### Implication – Drop the debater. Drop them where? I don’t know.

#### TVA – Spend 6 minutes laughing at the absurdity of our existence in order to reject the ideals of the last man and affirm our own existence as it stands

**Owen and Ridley 2K** (David Owen is Reader in Political Philosophy and Deputy Director of the Centre for Post-Analytic Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He is the author of numerous books and articles in social and political philosophy with a focus on Nietzsche. Aaron Ridley is a professor of Philosophy at the School of Humanities at the University of Southampton. He has also written multiple books about Nietzschean ethics. Why Nietzsche still? page 149-54)

The threat here is obvious: What is to be feared, what has a more calamitous effect than any other calamity, is that man should inspire not profound fear but profound *nausea;* also not great fear but great *pity.* Suppose these two were one day to unite, they would inevitably beget one of the uncanniest monsters: the "last will" of man, his will to nothingness, nihilism. And a great deal points to this union. *(GM* III:I4) So suicidal nihilism beckons. The one response to the situation that is absolutely ruled out is the one that has so far proved most successful at addressing problems of this sort, namely, adoption of the ascetic ideal, because the present crisis is caused by the self-destruction of that ideal. But Nietzsche argues that two plausible responses to the crisis are nonetheless possible for modern man. Both of these involve the construction of immanent ideals or goals: one response is represented by the type the Last Man, the other by the type the *Ubermensch.* The first response recognizes the reality of suffering and our (post-ascetic) inability to accord transcendental significance to it and concludes that the latter provides an overwhelming reason for abolishing the former to whatever extent is possible. This has the effect of elevating the abolition of suffering into a quasi-transcendental goal and brings with it a new table of virtues, on which prudence figures largest. In other words, this response takes the form of a *rapport a soi* characterized by a style of calculative rationality directed toward the avoidance of suffering at any cost, for example, of utilititarianism and any other account of human subjectivity that accords preeminence to maximizing preference satisfaction. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Nietzsche portrays this type as follows: "What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?" thus asks the Last Man and blinks. The earth has become small, and upon it hops the Last Man, who makes everything small. His race is as inexterminable as the flea; the Last Man lives longest. "We have discovered happiness," say the Last Men and blink. They have left the places where living was hard: for one needs warmth. One still loves one's neighbor and rubs oneself against him: for one needs warmth. Sickness and mistrust count as sins with them: one should go about warily. He is a fool who still stumbles over stones or over men! A little poison now and then: that produces pleasant dreams. And a lot of poison at last, for a pleasant death. They still work, for work is entertainment. But they take care the entertainment does not exhaust them. Nobody grows rich or poor any more: both are too much of a burden. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both are too much of a burden. No herdsman and one herd**.** Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the madhouse "Formerly all the world was mad," say the most acute of them and blink. They are clever and know everything that has ever happened: so there is no end to their mockery. They still quarrel, but they soon make up-otherwise indigestion would result. They have their little pleasure for the day and their little pleasure for the night: but they respect health. "We have discovered happiness," say the Last Men and blink. *(Z:* I "Prologue" 5) Nietzsche's hostility to this first form of response is evident. His general objection to the Last Man is that the Last Man's ideal, like the ascetic ideal, is committed to the denial of chance and necessity as integral features of human existence. Whereas the ascetic ideal denies chance and necessity per se so that, while suffering remains real, what is objectionable about it is abolished, the Last Man's ideal is expressed as the practical imperative to abolish suffering, and hence, a fortiori, what is objectionable about it – that is, our exposure to chance and necessity. This general objection has two specific dimensions. The first is that the Last Man's ideal is unrealizable, insofar as human existence involves ineliminable sources of suffering-not least our consciousness that we come into being by chance and cease to be by necessity. Thus the Last Man's ideal is predicated on a neglect of truthfulness. The second dimension of Nietzsche's objection is that pursuit of the Last Man's ideal impoverishes and arbitrarily restricts our understanding of what we can be and, in doing so, forecloses our future possibilities of becoming otherwise than we are. Thus the Last Man's ideal entails an atrophying of the capacities (for self-overcoming, etc.) bequeathed by the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche brings these two dimensions together in *Beyond Good and Evil:* "You want, if possible – and there is no more insane 'if possible' – to *abolish suffering.* ... Well-being as you understand it – that is no goal, that seems to us an *end,* a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptible – that makes his destruction *desirable" (BGE 225).* The second response to the nihilistic threat posed by the selfdestruction of the ascetic ideal is definitive of the *Ubermensch* type. This response recognizes both the reality and the ineliminability of suffering and concludes that an affirmation of chance and necessity must therefore be built into the very conception of what it is for something to function as a (postascetic) ideal. So this response, insofar as it cultivates an affirmation of chance and necessity (i.e., amor fati), overcomes the (ascetic) hatred of or (modern) dissatisfaction with this-worldly existence.