# JanFeb Israel V2 Aff

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### 1AC – WMDFZ

#### WMD free zone is supported and likely in the Middle East – Israeli security emphasis and nuclear arsenal prevents this.

Ingram et al 19 [Paul Ingram and Emad Kiyaei, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, "Middle East WMD-Free Zone: Thinking the Possible – The Cairo Review of Global Affairs", Fall 2019, https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/middle-east-wmd-free-zone-thinking-the-possible/] **IV**  
The idea of a WMD-Free Zone (hereafter WMDFZ, or simply “zone”) in the Middle East is decades old. It enjoys the support of every government on the planet, and has featured heavily in international disarmament diplomacy. Yet, many people involved appear to act as if it is near impossible to achieve, and claim that the issue has been responsible for the failure of several global negotiations on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Big obstacles lie in the widespread perception that such a zone requires a level of cooperation which is beyond the capabilities of states in the region due to ideological and religious conflict and strong national assertiveness that undermine regional cooperation. This is compounded by the particular dynamics of Israel’s strategic relationship with its neighbors and its tendency to adopt independent security policies based on maximizing its military capabilities. This pessimism has been self-fulfilling. However, a new initiative has arisen in this context which seeks to inspire optimism based on re-establishing a shared commitment, refocusing on the steps necessary to implement the WMDFZ, and creating a new institution to implement the zone with confidence. The Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) would lead the initiative. The Diplomatic History of the WMDFZ The decades-long pursuit to realize a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction has faced a myriad of geopolitical and security setbacks, made worse by the lack of sustained political will to overcome them. The fact that there are no WMDFZs in any region complicates matters. However, successful examples of nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ), which exclude other weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and biological weapons, could be used as a basis on which to establish the broader WMDFZ. There are eight NWFZs around the world: Antarctica (1961); Outer Space (1967); Latin America and the Caribbean (1969); Seabed (1972); the South Pacific (1986); Southeast Asia (1997); Central Asia (2009); and Africa (2009). The majority of NPT members are non-nuclear weapon states which have joined these NWFZs in recognition of the mutual regional benefits they can reap by building additional cooperative safeguards that assure them their neighbors are not cheating and producing nuclear weapons. But these NWFZs were not easy to create. They arose out of initiatives from states within the regions concerned, sometimes in the face of skepticism or even resistance from the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS): China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, who feared that these arrangements would limit their own freedom of nuclear deployment. The current problems over NWS protocols concerning implementation of the 1997 Bangkok Treaty to create a NWFZ in Southeast Asia illustrate this problem. Even when the NWS do give guarantees that they will not use nuclear weapons to threaten states in the region, these are not unconditional promises. A NWFZ for the Middle East and North Africa was first formally proposed by Egypt in 1974, with backing from Iran, in the form of a joint resolution to the UN General Assembly (UNGA). A key motivation for the resolution was to constrain the nuclear weapons capabilities Israel had developed in the late 1960s and to prevent further proliferation in the Middle East. The proposal, however, has been a great deal more difficult to achieve than in other regions. For starters, Israel saw the proposal that focused on nuclear weapons as an attempt to strip the country of its nuclear weapons monopoly in the region. Many Israelis believe their country exists in a state of existential threat, with neighbors possessing other weapons of mass destruction, and that their security relies on a robust and overwhelming military capability and a readiness to use it. This is a fearsome obstacle to any possible NWFZ, but is not the only one. This was part of the rationale for expanding the scope of the zone to include all weapons of mass destruction. In such a scenario, Israeli nuclear disarmament would be matched by the commitments of other regional countries to dispose of their chemical and biological weapons. In 1995, the NPT Review and Extension Conference decided upon the indefinite extension of the NPT. At the same time, it adopted a resolution, co-sponsored by Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, that called for “the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems,” and for all NPT members, and in particular the nuclear weapon states, to “extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment” of the zone. This resolution is widely seen to have been essential and linked (at least politically) to the indefinite extension of the treaty. From this point on, the fate of NPT Reviews came to be inextricably and uniquely linked to the debate over the WMDFZ. The 2000 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the 1995 resolution and stated that the resolution would be “valid until its goals and objectives are achieved”. It was only at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, however, that practical steps were agreed upon to progress this objective. Specifically, the UN secretary-general and the three co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution would convene a conference on the WMDFZ by the end of 2012, to be attended by all states in the Middle East without prejudice or specific commitment. They belatedly appointed Finland Ambassador Jaakko Laajava to serve as the conference facilitator and Finland as host. In late 2012, however, the WMDFZ conference was called off by the United States because, “states in the region have not reached agreement on acceptable conditions for a conference”. While officially in favor of the zone, Arab countries and Israel disagreed on the terms and the sequence of steps leading to its establishment. Israel insists on reaching a comprehensive peace agreement with its Arab neighbors before committing to any talks on the zone, while other regional states emphasize the need for the creation of the zone first, before the details of a comprehensive peace agreement are finalized. In subsequent years, further attempts were made to revive the WMDFZ process with little success. From 2013 to 2014, a series of informal meetings between regional countries (with Israel participating) in Geneva and Glion in Switzerland seemed promising but were abandoned due to lack of progress. At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the final draft document calling to restart talks on the WMDFZ was derailed once again by the United States (with support from Canada and the UK) for lack of “consensus and equality”. In recent years, however, there have been encouraging developments that strengthen the chance of achieving a WMDFZ, specifically the breakthrough in nuclear talks between Iran and the EU3+3 (the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, China, and Germany, later also known as P5+1) coupled with efforts to rid Syria of its chemical weapons. However, even these positive developments face uncertainty, particularly with President Donald Trump’s unilateral decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement and further cases of chemical weapons use in Syria. More recently, another Arab proposal to hold a conference on the WMDFZ arose at the 2018 session of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. States adopted a decision requesting that the UN secretary-general convene a regional conference on the zone by the end of 2019. Despite explicit opposition from both the United States and Israel, this is scheduled to take place at UN Headquarters in New York under the care of UNGA in November 2019. Ambitions for the conference at present are modest; most believe that a conference that actually meets, discusses some of the key issues, and lays the groundwork for future conferences would itself be a success. It will be important that delegates use the opportunity to take a constructive approach which envisions the workings of the zone, the modalities of the processes most likely to achieve progress, and an openness to what improvement might look like. Most importantly, the door needs to be open to all states to participate in the future, meaning that some attention will need to be put into maximizing the chances of greater inclusivity. Conceiving the Possible It has been all too easy to approach this situation with pessimism. Dialogue in the region is beset by multidimensional conflicts alongside other complexities that frustrate efforts to find appropriate venues, frameworks that facilitate honest communication, and framing that respects different perspectives. Different parties blame one another for the inflexible attachment to regional conflicts which have plagued Middle Eastern countries and their societies. Resolving the technical challenges presents a challenging mess of problems when trust between once-warring countries and rivals in the region is weak. One of the critical controversies surrounding a WMDFZ involves its link to regional security, and more specifically about recognition of Israel and its security situation. While Israel believes it to be an essential prerequisite to talks that its neighbors acknowledge its status and legitimate security needs, the Arabs and Iran see a WMDFZ as a critical contribution to regional security and stability, and that this must come first. Israel’s insistence on talking about confidence and security building mechanisms first is seen by the Arab states as a “long corridor,” a stalling and blame-shifting tactic. Israel feels its strategic security concerns are not considered by its Arab neighbors. Both perspectives have some legitimacy and need to be accommodated, but progress also requires goodwill on both sides toward the process of establishing the zone, something that so far appears to be lacking. Most efforts to progress the establishment of the zone have focused on bringing together official and unofficial interlocutors for the conflicting states in the belief that this will create the necessary trust. These efforts also focus on establishing the diplomatic and political conditions first, as a contribution to firming up the commitment in international fora to formal negotiations, and then establishing the relevant institutions. But such efforts have been thwarted by constant external shocks, and by the difficulties in accepting and incorporating opposing views. Frustration and pessimism have deepened,and have themselves become additional impediments to progress. When one acknowledges that the disagreement around the zone is a proxy for deeper strategic conflicts around identity and territory, one finds that the politics appears to have become intractable. Success requires not only an injection of energy and commitment, but also new directions. A focus exclusively on diplomatic solutions in the current circumstances simply leads to more delay and frustration. In this context, a core group of civil society individuals from the region has come together with international experts and diplomats to work on a draft treaty text for the establishment of the zone, with the express purpose of facilitating a more constructive approach where the emphasis is on process. By leaping in and discussing the elements of a draft treaty, participants not only identify the challenges but also possible resolutions to them. Considering the mess of obstacles in the context of solutions requires people to think about what might give their counterparts the assurances they need to collaborate in the process, and eventually to commit. The idea is that by drawing in as many people across differing perspectives as possible, and cooperatively identifying the features and elements of an inclusive treaty and regime that would be necessary to build confidence, those involved would be tackling the obstacles in a constructive manner. This is not about being in denial of the political obstacles, rather it is about suspending the ambition to directly resolve each and every resentment, and instead envisaging and constructing the technical and working arrangements that would be needed for reassurance within the context of suspicion. The messy and confrontational politics is not resolved, rather it forms the context in which technical approaches can slowly build confidence. Our experiences with the network have been that there exists a powerful desire for progress on a WMDFZ, and a commitment to move in the direction of progress. Given a tool to focus the mind and heart, participants in our workshops have showed a remarkable willingness to express their perspectives in good faith, to listen attentively, and to work constructively with others of very different perspectives within the region to attempt to find improvements and overcome the current deadlock. The group started by surveying best practice in NWFZs from other parts of the world. The primary resource was the 2009 Pelindaba Treaty, Africa’s NWFZ, because it was recently agreed (and enforced) and already covers the North African states in the proposed zone. It was used to compare and contrast the desirable elements relevant to the situation in the Middle East when drawing up the first draft. We also considered the conventions and treaties covering chemical and biological weapons control. Meeting together and operating remotely over many months, we built the draft up carefully, whilst slowly establishing a network of friends willing to support the process. Complexities of Considering a Draft Treaty This was a challenging proposition. While we were not setting about to find the finished text that would convince everyone we had cracked the problems, the draft treaty needed to be sufficiently credible to draw people into a process that would deepen understanding and start to build confidence. It needed to have clarity in identifying the key challenges, and to be inclusive in the manner in which it tackled controversial aspects. We were conscious of the risk that by publishing our draft treaty, people might think we had the answers, or worse that the text would be seen as insensitive or biased, and thereby destroy any hope of collaboration. Having a text might also encourage people to focus on the more controversial and wicked problems, and have the effect of closing down hope, rather than encouraging constructive comment. As a result, we consulted with a variety of people across the region and improved the text before we felt able to share it widely. When we did, we were clear to say that the intention was to draw people into a process of constructive dialogue. To reduce the chances that this draft treaty be used to stoke more disagreement, we began the text by stating: “This is a draft treaty and it will remain a draft only. We do not represent states, but civil society. We are not attached to the text itself, but with the idea that such a text can contribute to a process that might one day lead to a treaty, and then, hopefully, a reality.” Scope of the Draft Treaty There were many complexities to grapple with, and here we can only scratch the surface in explaining some of them. Establishing a workable scope for the draft treaty was a major challenge. Since 1990, the official zone proposal covered all WMDs and their means of delivery across the Middle East and North Africa. The original reason for expanding beyond nuclear weapons to other forms of WMD (seen as chemical and biological weapons) was to assure the Israelis that this wasn’t just about disarming them (the only country with nuclear weapons in the region). This makes political sense, but lumping so-called WMDs together in one treaty framework presents many technical, definitional, and verification challenges, and risks creating misleading comparisons between the different forms of weapon systems. There are still no other weapons that can compare to nuclear weapons on the scale of their impact and destruction. Nevertheless, the commitment to a WMDFZ is well entrenched, so we took that to be understood and proceeded accordingly. But we did, for the time being, decide to leave out means of delivery. Missiles (cruise and ballistic) are particularly egregious problems with massive challenges revolving around the willingness to agree to exercise restraint and allow verification. We decided early on that we would plan to address the issues of missiles and delivery separately from the draft treaty text. This would be done later in the process because they merited particular focus. We also discussed the issue of emerging disruptive technologies that could also deliver mass destructive impact. The most obvious today is the growing threat of cyber disruption, but there are a number of other candidates. We decided it would be necessary to maintain some awareness of these particular complications but that our focus would remain on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The geographical scope formally includes all Arab states, Israel, and Iran. Crucially, this excludes Turkey, which has become a major actor within the region, and which is believed to host U.S.-NATO free fall nuclear bombs at its Incirlik air base. Pakistan, as a neighboring state with nuclear weapons and close military relationships with Arab Gulf states, also has influence. Both states may need to be closely involved as observers. Mechanisms of Compliance Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons each have their own global regime which all states in the region will need to join as members eventually, though the level of verification and inspection provided by each of these regimes varies enormously. Biological weapons have no established international verification mechanisms. Verification presents deeply complex technical challenges and requires significant financial and human resources to provide assurance against cheating, particularly when trust is low. We have been considering the necessary level of intrusive inspections to bring sufficient confidence, but have only scratched the surface. The process would require the participating states to engage in good faith. But some regional states have a strong ideological attachment to robust military capabilities, and a deep suspicion of cooperative regimes. Convincing them to place trust in any verification system requires a very high level of confidence indeed. Even verification practices with high technical confidence levels can be called into question for domestic or diplomatic political purposes. Delivering verification in these circumstances is deeply problematic, and provides strong motive for our calls to set up a regional body tasked with building up the capacity and confidence for this. We decided therefore to work toward a double level of verification—global and regional. There exists a global regime for each of the three WMD concerned—the NPT, backed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the Chemical Weapons Convention, backed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. It is logical to work toward universalizing these conventions within the region, but an approach that takes this as a point of departure would block progress prematurely because of opposition from Israel, so a regional approach in the first instance has greater chance of success. Global institutions such as the IAEA and OPCW have a great deal of expertise and experience relevant to the necessary tasks of verification, inspection, and other practices, and it will be necessary to call upon them throughout the process. It may also be appropriate to develop these capabilities at a regional level within the proposed Middle East Treaty Organization or METO. Dismantlement None of the existing NWFZs has involved membership of states that possessed nuclear weapons whilst they were members. South Africa dismantled its bombs and nuclear weapons facilities prior to joining the African NWFZ, inviting IAEA officials to confirm it had become nuclear-weapons free. South Africa’s nuclear program itself remains shrouded in mystery. This raises a question around chronology in the Middle East case: should a WMDFZ follow a similar path, requiring states to unilaterally disarm and to have that verified before they join (though this is fraught with uncertainty if conducted after the dismantlement and destruction) or have a timetable for dismantlement under supervision? We decided upon retaining the option of either course. Control and external influences Power within the region is very unbalanced. On the one hand, Israel possesses significant military and political influence, largely by virtue of its alliance with the United States. The Arab League represents by far the majority of the region’s population, but it is far from united, the legitimacy of many of its governments fragile. Like Israel, Iran often finds itself isolated, but has built up a culture of self-sufficiency independent of outside powers. In such a context, setting up any processes or international organizations requires careful planning to assure all parties that their voices will be heard and accounted for in all disputes. It is impossible to imagine any processes that garner sufficient respect from all parties unless they operate from consensus. Yet, consensus offers veto to all parties who have demonstrated a tenacious willingness to exercise it unless they can be absolutely sure they benefit from change with minimal risk. External states have always had a big interest in and impact upon the region, and any approaches will need to involve key stakeholders such as the United States, Russia, China, and the European states. The nuclear armed states will also need to give security assurances to states within the zone, a process governed by additional protocols to the relevant treaty. Our Process Our first public explanation of the METO process was at the May 2017 NPT Preparatory Committee in Vienna. This experience drew out some of the inevitable suspicions people had of this process. Would this be another exercise in excuses? How could we hope to transcend the divisions? Were we not in denial by talking about the details of a zone before tackling the political obstacles? We had more progress to report by the time of the UN First Committee later in October, with the sponsorship of the Irish government, which was to support the reporting process twice a year over the following years at both NPT and UN meetings. Whilst the meeting was low-key, the room was packed, and the atmosphere surprisingly positive. Soon after, a number of core group members, advisors, and interested experts met under the care of the Scottish government in Edinburgh in January 2018 to trawl through the elements of the draft treaty, address the critical challenges, and explore constructive proposals. By the time state parties met in Geneva for the 2018 NPT Preparatory Committee, the draft treaty was in a state to be presented formally. This time, we were in a very large room and we had well over a hundred hard-bitten diplomats attend the discussion. There was an atmosphere in the room that was unfamiliar to many of them. With Iranian, Israeli, and Arab speakers on the panel, the can-do message was one of vision, possibility, and optimism. And it was infectious. One ambassador from a nuclear weapon state said it was the most positive meeting he had attended in the whole two weeks, and was astounded that it was one devoted to the Middle East. A month later, with the support of Green Cross Switzerland and the Swedish Foreign Ministry—an extraordinary vote of confidence based upon the potential of the project and its approach to the problem—the group hosted a major three-day roundtable in Zurich with around fifty participants from Egypt and a number of other Arab states, Israel, Iran, Europe, Russia, and the United States. Participants discussed the elements of the draft treaty, the principal questions it raised, and the strategy for the project. From the start, the draft treaty envisaged the creation of a new regional intergovernmental institution—the METO—that would collaborate with global institutions such as the IAEA and CWC and focus on building capacity within the region for verification and inspections. Other NWFZs (with the exception of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1968, covering Latin America and the Caribbean) had been hampered by insufficient institutional support and collation of best-practice. At our roundtable in Zurich in June 2018, it became clear that there was a strong case for attempting to set up METO operations to build capacity sooner rather than later, and well before any final formal treaty was agreed. METO could focus at an early stage on issues of implementation and verification, educational programs for capacity-building, creating a regional network, advocacy campaigns, and other related projects. It could also provide a venue for negotiations and support meetings. We were ambitious when it came to imagining its creation. We pictured it as a physical location on a Mediterranean island as a hub for capacity-building, training, and meetings. We considered ways to draw larger sections of civil society into the process, and the means by which to communicate to those prospective groups. As a result, establishing the organization has become a principal objective of the group that has come to be known as the METO Project. Finally, there is a great deal of cynicism associated with the Middle East when it comes to talking about international cooperation generally, and about the prospects of establishing a WMDFZ in the region specifically. The issue has caused a great deal of diplomatic friction over recent decades. Our experience within the METO Project has shown that there are reasons to be optimistic—it takes a change of frame and an approach that seeks to overcome the obstacles.

#### Israel nuclear arsenal makes anti-proliferation movements in the Middle East impossible –

#### 1] First is opacity – undermines Israeli security by normalizing and encouraging shadow proliferation by other Middle Eastern countries.

Ferrero 18 [Christopher J. Ferrero, **Christopher J. Ferrero** received his Ph.D. from the University of Virginia in 2011, where he focused on the US-Iran relationship Coastal Carolina University, "Intelligence and Assurance: Israel's Path to a Nuclear-Free Region", March 2018, https://www.stratcom.mil/Portals/8/Documents/AA\_Proceedings/4.pdf?ver=2018-10-04-141147-477] **IV**  
Israel is simultaneously central to and peripheral to nonproliferation. It is central because any Middle East NWFZ would require its inclusion. It is also central insofar as Iran’s nuclear dissembling and hedging within the NPT may be, in part, a reaction to Israel’s nuclear posture.3 Iran appears interested in acquiring at least a breakout capability – or the ability to quickly redirect ostensibly peaceful nuclear resources to the development of a weapon on short notice. This would constitute Iran’s own version of opacity. While superficially preserving the NPT, it would fundamentally undermine the treaty and increase the risk of a nuclear conflict between Iran and Israel. Israel, however, has long been a peripheral and exceptional player in nonproliferation. It is not a member of the NPT and is widely believed to have possessed nuclear weapons since the late 1960s. Israel neither confirms nor denies its possession of nuclear weapons. This policy – often referred to as opacity or ambiguity, and known in Hebrew as amimut – grants Israel the benefit of nuclear deterrence while sparing it the consequences of overtly flaunting global nonproliferation norms. Israel posits that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. In this formulation, “introduce…into” is quietly understood by the world to mean use – not possess. This exceptional posture has been made possible by the unique circumstances of the Jewish people and their state. A people targeted for annihilation in the Holocaust established a new state with minimal territorial depth, and subsequently fought a series of wars against other regional states opposed to its existence and seeking its erasure. It is a compelling case for a nuclear exception. Remarkably, even Israel’s enemies have made little public fuss about amimut. The lack Deterrence and Assurance Academic Alliance Working Paper March 2018 | Christopher J. Ferrero | Coastal Carolina University Intelligence and Assurance: Israel’s Path to a Nuclear-Free Region 4 of any declared opposition, however, should not be construed as a guarantee of the arrangement’s durability, especially as Iran adopts its own ambiguous and threatening posture. One may be inclined to view Israel’s absence from nonproliferation regimes as evidence of its opposition to arms control. This would be wrong, however. Israel was not willing to forego the option of a nuclear weapon at NPT adoption in 1968 because of its precarious strategic circumstances. It did not have support to sign onto the treaty as a Nuclear-Weapon State; doing so, in fact, may have sabotaged the treaty by forcing Israel’s enemies to publicly enshrine the Jewish State’s nuclear superiority. This, by the logic of nuclear deterrence, would have effectively validated the continued existence of the State of Israel. Non-membership in the NPT, combined with amimut, allowed enemies of the Jewish State to commit to nuclear nonproliferation while saving face, and allowed Israel the freedom to quietly cultivate a nuclear deterrence option.4 Amimut was a smart policy when its impact was to bolster nonproliferation and keep nuclear weapons out of enemy hands. Fifty years on, amimut may be more of an impediment to regional nonproliferation. It normalizes opaque proliferation and feeds the argument of an enduring double standard, which undermines the NPT. Avner Cohen, the most prolific writer on the history of amimut, observes that “although amimut has served Israel well in many respects, not acknowledging its possession of nuclear weapons may now limit [Israel’s] ability to address the Iranian problem in a straightforward, internationally supported way.”5 Amimut also contributes to uncertainty, which is recognized by realist international relations theory as a primary cause of war. One might anticipate a number of counterarguments to Israeli disarmament. Some might consider calls for Israeli disarmament and leadership on nonproliferation tantamount to surrender. Disarming in response to Iranian behavior would reward the Islamic Republic for blackmail. Yet Deterrence and Assurance Academic Alliance Working Paper March 2018 | Christopher J. Ferrero | Coastal Carolina University Intelligence and Assurance: Israel’s Path to a Nuclear-Free Region 5 Iran is not publicly linking its nuclear decisions to Israel, and Israel would not disarm in a manner that would surrender any strategic advantage. Israel would lock Iran (and others) into a nonproliferation regime while preserving advantages in intelligence (important for monitoring compliance) and conventional weapons. Nuclear proliferation – even if opaque and only to the threshold of a breakout capability – would strategically disadvantage Israel insofar as even a threshold nuclear threat could be a “great equalizer” for Israel’s conventionally-inferior foes. Israel recognizes this, and it is one reason why Jerusalem deems an Iranian breakout capability unacceptable and has so vigorously lobbied the international community to hold Tehran accountable under the NPT.

#### 2] Second is arms race – Israeli possession leads to WMD arms race and CBW prolif

**Hussain 2019** (Zain, Zain Hussain was a Quaker Peace and Social Witness (QPSW) Peaceworker at BASIC. He worked on helping to overcome the obstacles to a WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) Free Zone in the Middle East. MA in International Politics at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London and a degree in Arabic and Hebrew from the same. He continues to work in interfaith dialogue between the Muslim and Jewish communities. He also works as a Hebrew teacher for King’s College London. “Why the Israeli Policy of Nuclear Ambiguity is Harmful for Prospects of a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East” <https://basicint.org/why-the-israeli-policy-of-nuclear-ambiguity-is-harmful-for-prospects-of-a-wmd-free-zone-in-the-middle-east/> June 21, 2019)DR 19

Zeev Maoz, after examining the Israeli policy of nuclear ambiguity, its effectiveness, Israeli public opinion on the issue, and whether or not the nuclear programme itself is what has deterred an all-out Arab attack to annihilate Israel, concludes a number of important insights. Firstly, there is no direct proof that Israel’s nuclear policy has provided an effective deterrent against a collective Arab attack on Israel. Secondly, there is no evidence that, when there were attacks on Israel, Israel’s nuclear policy in any way affected Arab operational plans. Thirdly, there is no evidence that directly links Israel’s nuclear weapons’ capability with the willingness of Arab states and Palestinians to negotiate with Israel.

In light of this evidence, **Israel’s nuclear programme**, contrary to what Israeli strategists and academics have claimed, **has not contributed to Israel’s security in any meaningful way**. Maoz’s conclusions also show the inherent contradictions in the policy.

In response to such criticism, other authors, academics and policy thinkers have explained their reasons for Israel’s continual need for nuclear weapons and it’s ambiguity policy. Louis Rene Beres has responded directly to Maoz. To him, the Arab states cannot be trusted to uphold peace agreements with Israel. He also believes that, given the slightest chance, Arab countries would attack Israel. He also points to present cases of Middle Eastern Countries, such as Iran, calling for the destruction of Israel.

He argues that, even if other countries in the Middle East were to sign up to a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East, or sign disarmament agreements in Israel, verification of compliance in these matters would be incredibly difficult.  For Beres, the problem is not so much with nuclear weapons as it is with what he perceives as an Arab-Iranian commitment to destroy Israel. This commitment means that the “peace plan” is a futile attempt at peace with actors which want nothing less than Israel’s destruction. At least one Arab country that has signed peace agreements with Israel, according to Beres, is “effectively at war” with it. With nuclear weapons, Israel can deter strategic conventional attacks by these states. They could also target hard state targets that threaten Israel’s existence through non nuclear preemptive strikes, which would otherwise look like a call to war, since there would be no context of a credible potential retaliation threat from Israel.

Beres argues further that Israel’s nuclear amimut policy may need to be reviewed and replaced by a policy of more transparent disclosure in the future, for the purpose of highlighting to enemy states and forces the capabilities that Israel has and to let them know that Israel is willing to use them in response to some strategic first-strike attacks… a message supported by the modernisation of Israel’s nuclear weapon systems. It was important to elucidate Beres’ comments because many of the arguments he raises are accepted as conventional wisdom among those who support Israel’s nuclear programme.

Maoz has responded to many of Beres’s assertions and grievances. While Beres asserts that Israeli possession of nuclear weapons is necessary to safeguard Israel from a state of catastrophic war, there is no evidence that the Arab states have invested in such a war, **it has not deterred the Arab states from forming coalitions to attack Israel** in 1967 and 1973, and there is no evidence that nuclear weapons have inclined the Arab states more towards or against peace. However, there may be evidence that Israel’s nuclear weapons programme could have increased the non conventional arms race in the region. Maoz points out **the effects that Israel’s nuclear programme may have had on** Iraq’s WMD programme, and in Egypt and Syria pursuing and developing chemical weapons, biological weapons, and surface to surface missiles.

Maoz questions Beres’ assumptions about Arab states and particularly their supposed lack of willingness to have peace with Israel. Maoz refers to a letter written by Yasir Arafat in 1988 for President Clinton, in which he wrote that, “the Palestine National Council’s resolution is a comprehensive amendment of the Covenant. All of the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the PLO commitment to recognize and live in peace side by side with Israel are no longer in effect….I can assure you on behalf of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority that all the provisions of the Covenant that were inconsistent with the commitments of September 9/10, 1993 to Prime Minister Rabin, have been nullified.” He also argues that, even if the PA were not to stand behind this, and were to be committed to Israel’s destruction, nuclear weapons would not deter them.

Maoz points out that Egypt has not violated its peace treaty with Israel, even when Israel launched an unprovoked attack on Syria and Lebanon in 1982. Similarly, when its forces were attacked by Israeli forces, Syria did not violate its May 1974 agreement with Israel. In 2000, when the al-Aqsa intifada started, Syria, Jordan and Egypt did not violate their treaty agreements.

After its 1979 peace treaty with Israel, Egypt reduced its defense budget, from a height of 22 percent in 1974 to 2.75 percent in 2002. In 2002, Syria’s defence budget was roughly 6.7 percent of its GDP. By contrast, Israel, at the time Maoz was writing in 2004, had a defense burden approaching 10 percent of a much larger GDP, whilst also receiving substantial military assistance from the United States. Maoz continues to note:

“The combined defense expenditures of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon (the four contiguous states to Israel), amount only to 58 percent of Israel’s defense expenditures. Coupled with Israeli nuclear weapons, if anyone should be more concerned about security, it is the leaders of these Arab states. These figures also suggest that Israeli weapons did not play an important role in reducing its defense burden.”

At the same time, Israel’s policy of amimut may well have done more harm than good. It may have encouraged other states in the region to increase their WMD capacity. The policy both seeks to prevent Israel from being held accountable for its nuclear weapons programme, while also making it clear through leaks (intentional and not) and behaviour that it has one, for deterrence purposes. Even some proponents of the nuclear weapons programme, such as Beres, have argued that the policy should be jettisoned in favour of more open disclosure for deterrence purposes.

Israel has not permitted international inspection of its sensitive nuclear facilities. It’s unwillingness to be held accountable to the international community deepens mistrust in the region towards Israel.

Israeli Amimut and a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East

Israel’s opacity over its nuclear weapons possession has been a principal hindrance to the establishment of a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East. Yet, it appears that for many states within the international community Israel’s nuclear possession is more acceptable than other states having any ambiguity in their nuclear capability. This explicit double standard deepens the sense of injustice within the region, further driving hostility to Israel, and undermining the ability of much of the international community to play the role of honest broker.

#### 3] Third is Escalation – it’s imminent between Israel and Iran – triggers WMD conflict.

Allinson 2-1 [Tom Allinson, Deutsche Welle, "Israel-Iran conflict to be major Middle East issue in 2020 | Middle East| News and analysis of events in the Arab world | DW | 02.01.2020", February 1, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/israel-iran-conflict-to-be-major-middle-east-issue-in-2020/a-51600787] **IV**  
Tensions between Israel and Iran have increased since President Donald Trump unilaterally pulled the United States out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action— the 2015 accord to wind back Iran's nuclear program in return for sanctions relief — in 2018. European signatories to the JCPOA have been unable to effectively lift the renewed embargoes on trade with Iran, prompting Tehran to gradually restart uranium enrichment as the deal crumbled in mid-2019. Meanwhile, tit-for-tat confrontations on Iranian and US proxies in the Persian Gulf, along with Israeli attacks on Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq, have escalated. Israel and Iran have been antagonists since the 1980s. But, after the US's 2003 invasion of Iraq and the formal withdrawal of American troops in 2011, the regional balance of power was broken, leaving the Middle East without a clear hegemon. That created a vacuum that has brought the countries into increasing conflict. Despite their aggressive rhetoric, officials in neither country seek an all-out, direct war. But differences in perception, deteriorating commitment to the vestiges of the JCPOA, and the vagaries of elections in Israel, Iran and the US all ratchet up the prospect that an inadvertent clash could escalate the conflict. Ali Vaez, an Iran analyst for the International Crisis Group, told DW that the conflict has become "a screw that only turns in one direction, getting tenser and tenser over time." "There are serious risks of miscalculation that could push the parties into even greater and more direct confrontation," Vaez said. Read more: Iran's calculated escalation in the Persian Gulf Iran's expanding influence In recent years, Iran has expanded its influence in the region. In Syria, it has bolstered the operations of President Bashar Assad. In Iraq, it has supported political parties and various militias since the US invasion in 2003 and, according to anonymous US officials cited by The New York Times, has recently been building up an arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles there. In Yemen, it has backed the Houthis against Saudi Arabia; in December the US claimed it had intercepted a transfer of advanced Iranian missile parts to the Houthis. To Israel's north, Iran has maintained strategic support for Hezbollah, Lebanon's strongest political party, with a paramilitary wing widely considered to be more powerful than the Lebanese army. Tehran is trying to establish a balance in a region where Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates massively outspend Iran militarily and Israel already possesses nuclear weapons, Trita Parsi, the executive vice president of the Washington-based think tank Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told DW. With a limited, aging air force that cannot compete with regional and US combat aircraft, missiles are Iran's only conventional deterrent. Series of attacks Israel has long carried out undeclared strikes on Iranian targets in Syria, but recent months have seen officials publicly claim the operations, intensify the attacks and expand the theater of war. A map of the Middle East Israel's military hit more than 200 Iran-backed targets in Syria in 2017 and 2018. In a rare public admission in late November, the military claimed one of the largest strikes in recent years on Iranian and Syrian targets in Damascus, in the midst of a flare-up of violence with Gaza. The intensity of the operations has increased since the latest standoff in the Persian Gulf started in May, when the United States deployed military assets around the Strait of Hormuz, a number of tankers were sabotaged and seized, and rival drones were shot down in what appeared to be active if indirect engagement between forces operating on behalf of the US and Iran. Vaez said Iranian officials had come to the conclusion that Israel was behind an October attack on an Iranian-flagged tanker in the Red Sea in what would be an expansion of military operations. In November, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel would widen its operations to Yemen "to prevent Iran from entrenching itself in the region." This year, Iraq's government blamed Israel for targeting Iran-allied Popular Mobilization Forces positions in Iraq, along with Shiite militia bases near Baghdad. In line with policy, officials from Israel refused to confirm responsibility for the attacks. Read more: Iran's allies in Iraq and Lebanon Aramco 'game changer' Israel's threat perception changed dramatically at the height of the Gulf standoff in September when a swarm of drones and low-flying cruise missiles hit Saudi Arabia's state-owned Aramco oil facilities and cut its production in half — an attack widely believed to have been carried out by Iran. But the attack was claimed by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, and Iran has denied involvement. Abqaiq oil facility (Reuters) Aramco's Abqaiq oil production facility is one of the largest in the world "Aramco was a game changer in terms of balance of deterrence in the region," Vaez said, pointing out that Israeli defenses are calibrated for ballistic missiles rather than the low-flying cruise missiles used against Saudi Arabia. Vaez said none of Israel's existing defenses would be able to prevent a "nightmare scenario" attack on chemical plants or nuclear facilities — "making parts of Israel uninhabitable for decades." In the face of this "biggest risk," said Vaez, the "question for Israel is whether that means it should avoid the clash and let the threat grow over time or whether it should take the risk and try to nip it in the bud." Broken nuclear deal Netanyahu has long advocated taking that risk. In September, The New York Times reported that in 2012 Netanyahu was closer than ever to carrying out a unilateral strike on Iran that would have drawn a reluctant, diplomacy-oriented US into war. But, as Iran reestablishes its nuclear program, his allies might increasingly find his call for strikes on Iran persuasive. Since Trump pulled out of the JCPOA, the United Kingdom, Germany and France have tried to bring other countries into the INSTEX trading body, which was designed to get around US sanctions, but they have almost entirely failed to stop companies from fleeing the Iranian market. Watch video02:43 Iran defends plan to speed up uranium enrichment As a way to create leverage for itself, Iran has taken several successive steps that violate the terms of the nuclear deal. It has brought new facilities online, increased its stockpiles of nuclear material and enriched some of it to 4.5%. Getting to that level of concentration takes more than 80% of the effort for producing weapons-grade uranium, according to the World Nuclear Association. Vaez said Iran's aim was not to get a bomb but to "raise the cost on the US's maximum-pressure strategy and compel the remaining signatories to throw them a lifeline." EU signatories to the JCPOA have held off from triggering a dispute mechanism that would see new UN sanctions and a possible end to not only the deal but also the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, President Hassan Rouhani has signaled that Iran will take another step in violation of the deal in early January. Differences in perception The European Union's position is slowly aligning with that of the US, said Sanam Vakil, the head of the Iran Forum at Chatham House. Enrichment beyond 20% would see the deal collapse ⁠— a red line for Israel, Vakil said. Protests this autumn in Lebanon and Iraq against Iran's regional influence and a short but bloody uprising at home could pressure the government into pursuing diplomatic negotiations, Vakil said. Iranian protesters gather around a burning car during a demonstration against an increase in gasoline prices in the capital Tehran (AFP) Amnesty has said more than 200 people were killed in recent protests in Iran "As news trickled out, we understood [the protests] were much more violent and threatening than we previously thought them to be," Vakil said. "This could alter Iran's calculations domestically and with regards to negotiations or potential for an escalation. Iran is backed into a corner right now, and it has few avenues that it can further pursue." Officials in Washington also consider the protests a sign that economic pressure has worked, Vaez said. But, he added, Iranian officials are operating with increased self-confidence after successfully pushing back against the US across the region at little cost, attacking Aramco with no consequence and crushing protests in a matter of days. Vaez said that those differences in perception raised a "major risk of the two sides remaining locked in the cycle of escalation" and "potentially ending up in a conflict that nobody wants but can easily spiral out of control." Read more: Iran's bloody protests are just the beginning Electoral wild cards With elections looming in Iran, the US and Israel, the window for diplomacy is closing. Both Netanyahu and Trump could benefit from a distraction. Netanyahu has been indicted on charges of fraud, bribery and breach of trust. Trump faces impeachment for abuse of power and obstruction of Congress. Iran, meanwhile, might see little reason for dealing with Trump with his foot potentially out the door, and, without concessions from the United States, Rouhani will lose support in parliament to the hard-liners. Trump's reputation as the "Twitter tiger" also provides room for miscalculation in Iran, Vaez said. The president may stand to gain domestically by responding to a provocation. "Beyond the first few months of next year, it will be almost impossible to de-escalate tensions," Vaez said. Iran has less to lose after remaining faithful to a broken JCPOA brought no reprieve, and pushing back with its nuclear program didn't work. Tehran may also calculate that whatever they do, Trump won't respond. "That combination of less to lose and less to fear is a very dangerous one," he said.

#### Soleimani assassination guarantees Iranian nukes.

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-blue is flashy statements but arent warrents

Norman 1/5 Aresu Eqbali in Tehran, Sune Engel Rasmussen in Beirut and Laurence Norman in London, January 5, 2020 7:26 PM ET, Wall Street Journal, “Iran Says It No Longer Will Honor Nuclear Enrichment Limits Under 2015 Pact”, [https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-says-it-will-no-longer-comply-with-nuclear-enrichment-limits-under-2015-deal-11578249461 //](https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-says-it-will-no-longer-comply-with-nuclear-enrichment-limits-under-2015-deal-11578249461%20//) cca

Iran said Sunday it no longer will comply with limits on uranium enrichment under its 2015 nuclear pact, as hundreds of thousands gathered across the country to mourn the death of a military leader killed Friday in a U.S. airstrike in Iraq. Sunday’s move and Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani’s death opened a new chapter in Iran’s tense relationship with Western nations, pushing the nuclear accord closer to collapse and raising the risk of a military confrontation with the U.S. In its announcement on Iranian television Sunday, Tehran stopped short of an abrogation of the nuclear pact, which limited the country’s nuclear program in return for lifting multination sanctions. But its decision, the latest step by Iran to scale back compliance with the deal, means Tehran could install new centrifuges—machines that produce enriched uranium—and further ramp up the purity of the fuel it produces closer to weapons-grade material. That would allow Iran to reduce to less than six months the time needed to amass enough nuclear fuel for one bomb, once it reinstalls a sufficient number of its centrifuges, a process expected to take months, nuclear experts have said. If Iran significantly boosts production of enriched uranium, Europe would almost certainly trigger a dispute mechanism in the pact, which could lead to reimposed international sanctions within two months. Iran has said its nuclear program is purely civilian and it doesn’t seek to build a bomb. The leaders of Germany, the U.K. and France late Sunday called on Iran and the U.S. to refrain from further escalation in Iraq and urged Iraq to continue to back the presence of coalition forces in that country. Iran’s statement on the nuclear deal came as hundreds of thousands of Iranians gathered in two cities to mourn the death of Gen. Soleimani. State television showed a massive gathering in the southwestern city of Ahvaz, where crowds marched Gen. Soleimani’s casket on a vehicle in a prelude to larger rallies planned for four cities through Tuesday. The funeral processions are expected to be the largest in Iran since the 1989 death of the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Crowds also gathered in the northeastern city of Mashhad and chanted “death to America”. Some thanked Gen. Soleimani, who commanded the foreign wing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, for keeping the country safe, shouting: “Iran is clad in black, revenge, revenge.” State media estimated a million people attended the Mashhad rally, though numbers were impossible to verify. The throngs offered a stark image of unity just weeks after economy-related protests rocked the country, prompting a security crackdown that left hundreds dead, according to Amnesty International and Iranian reformist media. Iranian leaders, who for years portrayed Gen. Soleimani as a national hero, are likely to use his death as a tool to rally Iranians around the flag and whip up popular support at a time of domestic dissent, which now will be suppressed even harder, experts said. “This, to me, is one of the biggest repercussions of Soleimani’s assassination,” said Narges Bajoghli, author of “Iran Reframed,” a 2019 book on Iranian state propaganda and assistant professor at Johns Hopkins University. Many Iranians disagree fundamentally with the Islamic Republic, and Gen. Soleimani has numerous critics inside the country, particularly due to the Revolutionary Guard’s history of oppressing domestic dissent. “But there is now an external enemy who has assassinated a top government official and threatened war. In this atmosphere, civic dissent becomes extremely hard,” she said. Rallies were further fueled by reactions to President Trump, who Saturday night warned that the U.S. could target 52 sites in Iran if any Tehran retaliation hit an American or American assets, including “some at a very high level & important to Iran & the Iranian culture”. “Iranian leaders would have used this as an effort to rally around the flag,” Ms. Bajoghli said, but Mr. Trump’s tweets “served to draw out even more Iranians as a national show of force against any attack.” Support for Iran was also on display elsewhere Sunday. Thousands of supporters of the Iran-backed Hezbollah militia, whose rise to power was guided in part by Gen. Soleimani, gathered to mourn the general in Beirut. Meanwhile, the Iraqi parliament approved a bill to expel U.S. soldiers from the country. The resolution has no legal force but cast the future of the U.S. presence in Iraq in doubt. As commander of the Quds Force, Gen. Soleimani built a network of militias loyal to Tehran across the Middle East, which according to the U.S. were responsible for thousands of deaths, including those of hundreds of Americans. He also led Iran’s fight against the extremist Islamic State, earning him widespread adulation at home. Iran’s response to Gen. Soleimani’s death marks a high point in tensions between the U.S. and Iran since Washington drastically shifted its Iran policy under President Trump, pulling out of the 2015 nuclear deal and reimposing sanctions on Iran as part of a campaign of “maximum pressure” on Tehran. That move deepened an economic crisis in Iran, prompting its government to introduce austerity measures that triggered the recent nationwide protests. Supporters of the Trump policy hoped it would bring Tehran back to the bargaining table to reach a tougher and broader nuclear pact. Instead, tensions between Washington and Tehran deepened, culminating in Gen. Soleimani’s killing. In its statement Sunday, Iran said it would continue cooperating with the United Nations atomic agency, which has broad oversight of Iran’s nuclear facilities and many nonnuclear sites under the pact. The statement also said Iran’s uranium enrichment production would move in line with “technical needs.” Iran also said it will stick to some other aspects of the deal, like limits on work that could be useful for eventually making a nuclear weapon. But Iran said it would no longer abide by any of the restrictions on production of enriched uranium. On Twitter, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif wrote this latest and final step away from the pact’s limits would mean Iran could install as many centrifuges as it wanted, though he added that all steps “are reversible upon EFFECTIVE implementation” of the other parties’ commitments to the deal. Mr. Zarif wasn’t specific about how many machines would be reinstalled. Under the original nuclear deal, Iran removed two thirds of the roughly 19,000 centrifuges it had installed by mid-2015 and placed them under the watch of the U.N. atomic agency. Nuclear experts say it would take Iran months to re-install all 19,000 centrifuges. David Albright, a former weapons inspector who is president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, said he estimates Iran could re-install around 170 centrifuges every two weeks. Iran had already begun scaling back its commitments a year after the U.S. pulled out of the agreement in 2018, leaving European participants, along with Russia and China, to try to salvage it. Iran had exceeded limits on its stockpile of enriched uranium and was producing uranium at levels slightly higher than those permitted in July. In September, it said it would conduct research on more-advanced machines for enriching uranium than permitted under the agreement—a step that also saw Iran install more centrifuges than permitted by the deal. In November, it started enriching uranium at its underground site of Fordow, a step banned under the pact. Tensions are expected to continue building in the coming days. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameni will lead prayers at Tehran University on Monday morning over Gen. Soleimani’s coffin, which will then be carried 3.5 miles from the capital’s Revolution Square to Freedom Square. The processions conclude Tuesday with Gen. Soleimani’s burial in his home city of Kerman.

#### Any threat of an Iranian bomb triggers Israeli preemptive strike

Farley 19 [Robert Farley, [*Dr.*](http://twitter.com/drfarls?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor)[*Robert Farley*](https://twitter.com/drfarls?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor), a frequent contributor to TNI, teaches at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. The National Interest, "If Israel And Iran Go To War, Would Israel Launch a Nuclear War? | The National Interest", November 16, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/if-israel-and-iran-go-war-would-israel-launch-nuclear-war-96296] **IV**  
If a hostile power (let’s say Iran, for sake of discussion) appeared to be on the verge of mating nuclear devices with the systems needed to deliver them, Israel might well consider a preventive nuclear attack. In the case of Iran, we can imagine scenarios in which Israeli planners would no longer deem a conventional attack sufficiently lethal to destroy or delay the Iranian program. In such a scenario, and absent direct intervention from the United States, Israel might well decide to undertake a limited nuclear attack against Iranian facilities. Given that Iran lacks significant ballistic missile defenses, Israel would most likely deliver the nuclear weapons with its Jericho III intermediate range ballistic missiles. Israel would likely limit its attacks to targets specifically linked with the Iranian nuclear program, and sufficiently away from civilian areas. Conceivably, since it would be breaking the nuclear taboo anyway, Israel might target other military facilities and bases for attack, but it is likely that the Israeli government would want to limit the precedent for using nuclear weapons as much as possible. Would it work? Nuclear weapons would deal more damage than most imaginable conventional attacks, and would also convey a level of seriousness that might take even the Iranians aback. On the other hand, the active use of nuclear weapons by Israel would probably heighten the interest of everyone in the region (and potentially across the world) to develop their own nuclear arsenals.

#### War with Iran risks extinction

Avery, 13 - John Avery received a B.Sc. in theoretical physics from MIT and an M.Sc. from the University of Chicago. He later studied theoretical chemistry at the University of London, and was awarded a Ph.D. there in 1965. He is now Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of Chemistry, University of Copenhagen. Fellowships, memberships in societies: Since 1990 he has been the Contact Person in Denmark for Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. In 1995, this group received the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts. He was the Member of the Danish Peace Commission of 1998. Technical Advisor, World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe (1988- 1997). Chairman of the Danish Peace Academy, April 2004 (“An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War” Countercurrents, 11/6, <https://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm>

Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems. The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy. In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.

#### Plan – The State of Israel ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals

Enforcement: Accedes to the NPT

Mechanism: Elimination through disarmament and then storage of all disassembled materials in cannisters and stored in a safe location.

Ferrero 18 [Christopher J. Ferrero, **Christopher J. Ferrero** received his Ph.D. from the University of Virginia in 2011, where he focused on the US-Iran relationship Coastal Carolina University Coastal Carolina University, "Intelligence and Assurance: Israel's Path to a Nuclear-Free Region", March 2018, https://www.stratcom.mil/Portals/8/Documents/AA\_Proceedings/4.pdf?ver=2018-10-04-141147-477] **Tfane23**  
Given the many trends discussed in this paper, Israel should actively promote and work for a Middle East Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone and accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a Non-Nuclear-Weapons State by 2030. Meanwhile, it should continue to enhance its conventional deterrence and power projection capabilities, its missile defense infrastructure, and its superior intelligence collection capabilities. Global nonproliferation regimes and norms are under strain. Their failure could ultimately prove fatal for Israel, which is small and has many enemies. Nuclear deterrence is of dubious reliability, and the risk of an adversary successfully cheating on a nuclear arms control agreement will decrease as technologies for intelligence collection and nuclear monitoring improve. In 2030 – one year before JCPOA restrictions on Iran’s use of fissile material expire – Israel will have an extensive unmanned and stealth air force capable of projecting power and collecting intelligence at reduced risk to Israeli lives. With proper investment, new technologies that can detect illicit nuclear activity will be sufficiently advanced to be deployed for monitoring and enforcement of nuclear arms control treaties. Deterrence and Assurance Academic Alliance Working Paper March 2018 | Christopher J. Ferrero | Coastal Carolina University Intelligence and Assurance: Israel’s Path to a Nuclear-Free Region 25 This vision is not excessively optimistic or unrealistic. Monitoring technologies will not be able to see everything happening everywhere at every time. But the probability of being caught cheating will increase as monitoring technologies mature. Where international assets, such as those of the IAEA and CTBTO, fall short, Israel is well-positioned (along with its allies) to collect intelligence in time to detect and forestall cheating. The dissuasive and reassuring effects of monitoring technologies should be matched by dissuasive and reassuring norms. The normative prohibition on nuclear weapons needs a boost. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is likely to sputter, and disillusionment over NPT Article VI is likely to grow as Great Power competition re-emerges among the recognized Nuclear Weapon States. Israeli accession to the NPT would inject much-needed life into the beleaguered regime, and a regional NWFZ would draw Iran and other Middle Eastern states into doubling down on their own nuclear nonproliferation commitments. Ideally, norms against nuclear proliferation and war in the Middle East would be internalized as substantively rational by all parties. But even if they were not, they could still affect cost-benefit calculations. Cheating on both NPT and NWFZ commitments would carry increased political costs and would increase the credibility of an Israeli threat of conventional strikes. Currently, Israel’s threat to use force against a country violating the NPT lacks the legitimacy that it would carry if Israel and its neighbors were together more deeply embedded in an arms control regime. Though Israel often thumbs its nose at international opinion, even Katz and Bohbot acknowledge that international legitimacy is a force multiplier for a conventionally-superior Israel. In celebrating Israel’s weapons wizardry, they write: Deterrence and Assurance Academic Alliance Working Paper March 2018 | Christopher J. Ferrero | Coastal Carolina University Intelligence and Assurance: Israel’s Path to a Nuclear-Free Region 26 All of this, though, is meaningless if Israel’s operations lack the international stamp of legitimacy. The state can develop, manufacture, and even sell weapons around the world, but that won’t mean much if the world refuses to support Israel’s actions…For a country like Israel, legitimacy is not trivial.69 Beyond reinforcing norms, a Middle East NWFZ should improve upon the monitoring and verification mechanisms employed by the IAEA under the NPT. Safeguards agreements with the IAEA are the basis for monitoring and verifying compliance in most of the world’s NWFZs. The Middle East, however, may benefit from a more aggressive model given the lack of trust among the region’s actors. Any robust monitoring regime will surely test the member states’ political and counterintelligence sensitivities. To address the specific concern of fissile material diversion, the region’s actors should consider a fissile material consortium with only a few regional sites engaging in processing and enrichment. The concentration of fissile material would ease the task of monitoring and reduce the risk of diversion while also reducing the risk that terrorists could illicitly acquire significant quantities of fissile material. Several technical and political hurdles indeed remain before the realization of a Middle East NWFZ.70 The details of these hurdles are beyond the scope of this paper, which makes the broader strategic case that a NWFZ is in Israel’s interest. The presence of political and technical hurdles is why work should begin immediately. A starting point would be re-engagement with sponsoring state Finland, which last hosted a Middle East WMD-Free Zone conference in 2011. No country in the Middle East is opposed in principle to a NWFZ. Even Israel supports one, but considers a comprehensive regional peace a prerequisite. This position not only ignores current trends, but turns the logic of arms control on its head. Arms control is not a luxurious byproduct of good relations. Its purpose is to reduce the risk inherent in the conflicts that inevitably plague the world. Conflict is likely to plague the Middle East into the foreseeable future. Critics may Deterrence and Assurance Academic Alliance Working Paper March 2018 | Christopher J. Ferrero | Coastal Carolina University Intelligence and Assurance: Israel’s Path to a Nuclear-Free Region 27 contend that the political and technical path to a regional NWFZ is too difficult or unclear. However, it is much clearer than any foreseeable path to regional harmony. The world has changed since 1968. Proceeding down the path of nuclear transparency and disarmament is less risky now for Israel than it has been in the past. Technological trends in conventional military systems and intelligence should reassure Israel. Moreover, while caution and some skepticism are smart, Israel cannot thrive as a nation that has no faith in international norms and regimes. Prolonged cynicism may eventually produce a catastrophic self-fulfilling prophecy.

#### Nuke war and winter cause extinction.

Steven Starr, 8-14-2015, "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation Of American Scientists, <https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/> ccajs

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs. Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.] The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences.] Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet. Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?

**Bioweapons cause extinction – mathematically outweighs, even if they win mitigation.**

**Millett & Snyder-Beattie ‘17**. Millett, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford; and Snyder-Beattie, M.S., Director of Research, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. 08-01-2017. “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” Health Security, 15(4), PubMed

In the decades to come, advanced bioweapons could **threaten human existence**. Although the **probability** of human extinction from bioweapons **may** be low, the **expected value** of **reducing** the risk could **still** be **large**, since such risks jeopardize the existence of **all future generations**. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. **Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls** on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to **remote populations**, overcome **rare genetic resistances**, and **evade detection**, cures, and **countermeasures**. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: **Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off**, and so **evolutionary pressures** could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they **do not rule** the possibility **out** entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of **species going extinct due to disease**—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also **historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out** by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include **native American tribes** exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But **many diseases are proof** of principle that **each worst-case attribute can be realized independently**. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, **natural evolution** would be an **unlikely** source for pathogens with the **highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach**. But **advances in biotech**nology might allow the creation of diseases that **combine such traits**. Recent controversy has **already emerged** over a number of **scientific experiments** that resulted in viruses with enhanced **transmissibility**, **lethality**, and/or the ability to overcome **therapeutics**.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a **long historical track record** of**state-run bioweapon research** applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and **m**utually **a**ssured **d**estruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25 The **possibility of a war** between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27 **Non-state actors** may also pose a risk, especially those with **explicitly omnicidal aims**. While rare, there are examples. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan sought biological weapons for the express purpose of causing extinction.28 Environmental groups, such as the Gaia Liberation Front, have argued that “we can ensure Gaia's survival only through the extinction of the Humans as a species … we now have the specific technology for doing the job … several different [genetically engineered] viruses could be released”(quoted in ref. 29). Groups such as R.I.S.E. also sought to protect nature by destroying most of humanity with bioweapons.30 Fortunately, to date, non-state actors have **lacked the capabilities** needed to pose a catastrophic bioweapons threat, but this could change in future decades as **biotech**nology becomes **more accessible** and the **pool of experienced users grows**.31,32 What is the appropriate response to these speculative extinction threats? A balanced biosecurity portfolio might include investments that reduce a mix of proven and speculative risks, but striking this balance is still difficult given the massive uncertainties around the low-probability, high-consequence risks. In this article, we examine the traditional spectrum of biosecurity risks (ie, biocrimes, bioterrorism, and biowarfare) to categorize biothreats by likelihood and impact, expanding the historical analysis to consider even lower-probability, higher-consequence events (catastrophic risks and existential risks). In order to produce reasoned estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreats, we bring together relevant data and theory and produce some first-guess estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreat, and we use these initial estimates to compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing existential risks with more traditional biosecurity measures. We emphasize that these models are highly uncertain, and their utility lies more in enabling order-of-magnitude comparisons rather than as a precise measure of the true risk. However, **even with the most conservative models**, we find that reduction of **low-probability, high-consequence risk**s can be more cost-effective, as measured by **quality-adjusted life year** per dollar, especially when we account for the lives of future generations. This suggests that **despite** the **low probability** of such events, society **still ought to invest more in preventing the most extreme possible biosecurity catastrophes**.

### 1AC – NEW Escalation

#### Escalation is imminent between Israel and Iran – triggers WMD conflict.

Allinson 2-1 [Tom Allinson, Deutsche Welle, "Israel-Iran conflict to be major Middle East issue in 2020 | Middle East| News and analysis of events in the Arab world | DW | 02.01.2020", February 1, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/israel-iran-conflict-to-be-major-middle-east-issue-in-2020/a-51600787] **IV**  
Tensions between Israel and Iran have increased since President Donald Trump unilaterally pulled the United States out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action— the 2015 accord to wind back Iran's nuclear program in return for sanctions relief — in 2018. European signatories to the JCPOA have been unable to effectively lift the renewed embargoes on trade with Iran, prompting Tehran to gradually restart uranium enrichment as the deal crumbled in mid-2019. Meanwhile, tit-for-tat confrontations on Iranian and US proxies in the Persian Gulf, along with Israeli attacks on Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq, have escalated. Israel and Iran have been antagonists since the 1980s. But, after the US's 2003 invasion of Iraq and the formal withdrawal of American troops in 2011, the regional balance of power was broken, leaving the Middle East without a clear hegemon. That created a vacuum that has brought the countries into increasing conflict. Despite their aggressive rhetoric, officials in neither country seek an all-out, direct war. But differences in perception, deteriorating commitment to the vestiges of the JCPOA, and the vagaries of elections in Israel, Iran and the US all ratchet up the prospect that an inadvertent clash could escalate the conflict. Ali Vaez, an Iran analyst for the International Crisis Group, told DW that the conflict has become "a screw that only turns in one direction, getting tenser and tenser over time." "There are serious risks of miscalculation that could push the parties into even greater and more direct confrontation," Vaez said. Read more: Iran's calculated escalation in the Persian Gulf Iran's expanding influence In recent years, Iran has expanded its influence in the region. In Syria, it has bolstered the operations of President Bashar Assad. In Iraq, it has supported political parties and various militias since the US invasion in 2003 and, according to anonymous US officials cited by The New York Times, has recently been building up an arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles there. In Yemen, it has backed the Houthis against Saudi Arabia; in December the US claimed it had intercepted a transfer of advanced Iranian missile parts to the Houthis. To Israel's north, Iran has maintained strategic support for Hezbollah, Lebanon's strongest political party, with a paramilitary wing widely considered to be more powerful than the Lebanese army. Tehran is trying to establish a balance in a region where Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates massively outspend Iran militarily and Israel already possesses nuclear weapons, Trita Parsi, the executive vice president of the Washington-based think tank Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told DW. With a limited, aging air force that cannot compete with regional and US combat aircraft, missiles are Iran's only conventional deterrent. Series of attacks Israel has long carried out undeclared strikes on Iranian targets in Syria, but recent months have seen officials publicly claim the operations, intensify the attacks and expand the theater of war. A map of the Middle East Israel's military hit more than 200 Iran-backed targets in Syria in 2017 and 2018. In a rare public admission in late November, the military claimed one of the largest strikes in recent years on Iranian and Syrian targets in Damascus, in the midst of a flare-up of violence with Gaza. The intensity of the operations has increased since the latest standoff in the Persian Gulf started in May, when the United States deployed military assets around the Strait of Hormuz, a number of tankers were sabotaged and seized, and rival drones were shot down in what appeared to be active if indirect engagement between forces operating on behalf of the US and Iran. Vaez said Iranian officials had come to the conclusion that Israel was behind an October attack on an Iranian-flagged tanker in the Red Sea in what would be an expansion of military operations. In November, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel would widen its operations to Yemen "to prevent Iran from entrenching itself in the region." This year, Iraq's government blamed Israel for targeting Iran-allied Popular Mobilization Forces positions in Iraq, along with Shiite militia bases near Baghdad. In line with policy, officials from Israel refused to confirm responsibility for the attacks. Read more: Iran's allies in Iraq and Lebanon Aramco 'game changer' Israel's threat perception changed dramatically at the height of the Gulf standoff in September when a swarm of drones and low-flying cruise missiles hit Saudi Arabia's state-owned Aramco oil facilities and cut its production in half — an attack widely believed to have been carried out by Iran. But the attack was claimed by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, and Iran has denied involvement. Abqaiq oil facility (Reuters) Aramco's Abqaiq oil production facility is one of the largest in the world "Aramco was a game changer in terms of balance of deterrence in the region," Vaez said, pointing out that Israeli defenses are calibrated for ballistic missiles rather than the low-flying cruise missiles used against Saudi Arabia. Vaez said none of Israel's existing defenses would be able to prevent a "nightmare scenario" attack on chemical plants or nuclear facilities — "making parts of Israel uninhabitable for decades." In the face of this "biggest risk," said Vaez, the "question for Israel is whether that means it should avoid the clash and let the threat grow over time or whether it should take the risk and try to nip it in the bud." Broken nuclear deal Netanyahu has long advocated taking that risk. In September, The New York Times reported that in 2012 Netanyahu was closer than ever to carrying out a unilateral strike on Iran that would have drawn a reluctant, diplomacy-oriented US into war. But, as Iran reestablishes its nuclear program, his allies might increasingly find his call for strikes on Iran persuasive. Since Trump pulled out of the JCPOA, the United Kingdom, Germany and France have tried to bring other countries into the INSTEX trading body, which was designed to get around US sanctions, but they have almost entirely failed to stop companies from fleeing the Iranian market. Watch video02:43 Iran defends plan to speed up uranium enrichment As a way to create leverage for itself, Iran has taken several successive steps that violate the terms of the nuclear deal. It has brought new facilities online, increased its stockpiles of nuclear material and enriched some of it to 4.5%. Getting to that level of concentration takes more than 80% of the effort for producing weapons-grade uranium, according to the World Nuclear Association. Vaez said Iran's aim was not to get a bomb but to "raise the cost on the US's maximum-pressure strategy and compel the remaining signatories to throw them a lifeline." EU signatories to the JCPOA have held off from triggering a dispute mechanism that would see new UN sanctions and a possible end to not only the deal but also the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, President Hassan Rouhani has signaled that Iran will take another step in violation of the deal in early January. Differences in perception The European Union's position is slowly aligning with that of the US, said Sanam Vakil, the head of the Iran Forum at Chatham House. Enrichment beyond 20% would see the deal collapse ⁠— a red line for Israel, Vakil said. Protests this autumn in Lebanon and Iraq against Iran's regional influence and a short but bloody uprising at home could pressure the government into pursuing diplomatic negotiations, Vakil said. Iranian protesters gather around a burning car during a demonstration against an increase in gasoline prices in the capital Tehran (AFP) Amnesty has said more than 200 people were killed in recent protests in Iran "As news trickled out, we understood [the protests] were much more violent and threatening than we previously thought them to be," Vakil said. "This could alter Iran's calculations domestically and with regards to negotiations or potential for an escalation. Iran is backed into a corner right now, and it has few avenues that it can further pursue." Officials in Washington also consider the protests a sign that economic pressure has worked, Vaez said. But, he added, Iranian officials are operating with increased self-confidence after successfully pushing back against the US across the region at little cost, attacking Aramco with no consequence and crushing protests in a matter of days. Vaez said that those differences in perception raised a "major risk of the two sides remaining locked in the cycle of escalation" and "potentially ending up in a conflict that nobody wants but can easily spiral out of control." Read more: Iran's bloody protests are just the beginning Electoral wild cards With elections looming in Iran, the US and Israel, the window for diplomacy is closing. Both Netanyahu and Trump could benefit from a distraction. Netanyahu has been indicted on charges of fraud, bribery and breach of trust. Trump faces impeachment for abuse of power and obstruction of Congress. Iran, meanwhile, might see little reason for dealing with Trump with his foot potentially out the door, and, without concessions from the United States, Rouhani will lose support in parliament to the hard-liners. Trump's reputation as the "Twitter tiger" also provides room for miscalculation in Iran, Vaez said. The president may stand to gain domestically by responding to a provocation. "Beyond the first few months of next year, it will be almost impossible to de-escalate tensions," Vaez said. Iran has less to lose after remaining faithful to a broken JCPOA brought no reprieve, and pushing back with its nuclear program didn't work. Tehran may also calculate that whatever they do, Trump won't respond. "That combination of less to lose and less to fear is a very dangerous one," he said.

#### Israeli nuclear opacity normalizes shadow prolif and wrecks deterrence.

Ferrero 18 [Christopher J. Ferrero, **Christopher J. Ferrero** received his Ph.D. from the University of Virginia in 2011, where he focused on the US-Iran relationship Coastal Carolina University, "Intelligence and Assurance: Israel's Path to a Nuclear-Free Region", March 2018, https://www.stratcom.mil/Portals/8/Documents/AA\_Proceedings/4.pdf?ver=2018-10-04-141147-477] **IV**  
Israel is simultaneously central to and peripheral to nonproliferation. It is central because any Middle East NWFZ would require its inclusion. It is also central insofar as Iran’s nuclear dissembling and hedging within the NPT may be, in part, a reaction to Israel’s nuclear posture.3 Iran appears interested in acquiring at least a breakout capability – or the ability to quickly redirect ostensibly peaceful nuclear resources to the development of a weapon on short notice. This would constitute Iran’s own version of opacity. While superficially preserving the NPT, it would fundamentally undermine the treaty and increase the risk of a nuclear conflict between Iran and Israel. Israel, however, has long been a peripheral and exceptional player in nonproliferation. It is not a member of the NPT and is widely believed to have possessed nuclear weapons since the late 1960s. Israel neither confirms nor denies its possession of nuclear weapons. This policy – often referred to as opacity or ambiguity, and known in Hebrew as amimut – grants Israel the benefit of nuclear deterrence while sparing it the consequences of overtly flaunting global nonproliferation norms. Israel posits that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. In this formulation, “introduce…into” is quietly understood by the world to mean use – not possess. This exceptional posture has been made possible by the unique circumstances of the Jewish people and their state. A people targeted for annihilation in the Holocaust established a new state with minimal territorial depth, and subsequently fought a series of wars against other regional states opposed to its existence and seeking its erasure. It is a compelling case for a nuclear exception. Remarkably, even Israel’s enemies have made little public fuss about amimut. The lack Deterrence and Assurance Academic Alliance Working Paper March 2018 | Christopher J. Ferrero | Coastal Carolina University Intelligence and Assurance: Israel’s Path to a Nuclear-Free Region 4 of any declared opposition, however, should not be construed as a guarantee of the arrangement’s durability, especially as Iran adopts its own ambiguous and threatening posture. One may be inclined to view Israel’s absence from nonproliferation regimes as evidence of its opposition to arms control. This would be wrong, however. Israel was not willing to forego the option of a nuclear weapon at NPT adoption in 1968 because of its precarious strategic circumstances. It did not have support to sign onto the treaty as a Nuclear-Weapon State; doing so, in fact, may have sabotaged the treaty by forcing Israel’s enemies to publicly enshrine the Jewish State’s nuclear superiority. This, by the logic of nuclear deterrence, would have effectively validated the continued existence of the State of Israel. Non-membership in the NPT, combined with amimut, allowed enemies of the Jewish State to commit to nuclear nonproliferation while saving face, and allowed Israel the freedom to quietly cultivate a nuclear deterrence option.4 Amimut was a smart policy when its impact was to bolster nonproliferation and keep nuclear weapons out of enemy hands. Fifty years on, amimut may be more of an impediment to regional nonproliferation. It normalizes opaque proliferation and feeds the argument of an enduring double standard, which undermines the NPT. Avner Cohen, the most prolific writer on the history of amimut, observes that “although amimut has served Israel well in many respects, not acknowledging its possession of nuclear weapons may now limit [Israel’s] ability to address the Iranian problem in a straightforward, internationally supported way.”5 Amimut also contributes to uncertainty, which is recognized by realist international relations theory as a primary cause of war. One might anticipate a number of counterarguments to Israeli disarmament. Some might consider calls for Israeli disarmament and leadership on nonproliferation tantamount to surrender. Disarming in response to Iranian behavior would reward the Islamic Republic for blackmail. Yet Deterrence and Assurance Academic Alliance Working Paper March 2018 | Christopher J. Ferrero | Coastal Carolina University Intelligence and Assurance: Israel’s Path to a Nuclear-Free Region 5 Iran is not publicly linking its nuclear decisions to Israel, and Israel would not disarm in a manner that would surrender any strategic advantage. Israel would lock Iran (and others) into a nonproliferation regime while preserving advantages in intelligence (important for monitoring compliance) and conventional weapons. Nuclear proliferation – even if opaque and only to the threshold of a breakout capability – would strategically disadvantage Israel insofar as even a threshold nuclear threat could be a “great equalizer” for Israel’s conventionally-inferior foes. Israel recognizes this, and it is one reason why Jerusalem deems an Iranian breakout capability unacceptable and has so vigorously lobbied the international community to hold Tehran accountable under the NPT.

#### Soleimani assassination guarantees Iranian nukes.

-green is very important to read

-blue is flashy statements but arent warrents

Norman 1/5 Aresu Eqbali in Tehran, Sune Engel Rasmussen in Beirut and Laurence Norman in London, January 5, 2020 7:26 PM ET, Wall Street Journal, “Iran Says It No Longer Will Honor Nuclear Enrichment Limits Under 2015 Pact”, [https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-says-it-will-no-longer-comply-with-nuclear-enrichment-limits-under-2015-deal-11578249461 //](https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-says-it-will-no-longer-comply-with-nuclear-enrichment-limits-under-2015-deal-11578249461%20/) cca

Iran said Sunday it no longer will comply with limits on uranium enrichment under its 2015 nuclear pact, as hundreds of thousands gathered across the country to mourn the death of a military leader killed Friday in a U.S. airstrike in Iraq. Sunday’s move and Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani’s death opened a new chapter in Iran’s tense relationship with Western nations, pushing the nuclear accord closer to collapse and raising the risk of a military confrontation with the U.S. In its announcement on Iranian television Sunday, Tehran stopped short of an abrogation of the nuclear pact, which limited the country’s nuclear program in return for lifting multination sanctions. But its decision, the latest step by Iran to scale back compliance with the deal, means Tehran could install new centrifuges—machines that produce enriched uranium—and further ramp up the purity of the fuel it produces closer to weapons-grade material. That would allow Iran to reduce to less than six months the time needed to amass enough nuclear fuel for one bomb, once it reinstalls a sufficient number of its centrifuges, a process expected to take months, nuclear experts have said. If Iran significantly boosts production of enriched uranium, Europe would almost certainly trigger a dispute mechanism in the pact, which could lead to reimposed international sanctions within two months. Iran has said its nuclear program is purely civilian and it doesn’t seek to build a bomb. The leaders of Germany, the U.K. and France late Sunday called on Iran and the U.S. to refrain from further escalation in Iraq and urged Iraq to continue to back the presence of coalition forces in that country. Iran’s statement on the nuclear deal came as hundreds of thousands of Iranians gathered in two cities to mourn the death of Gen. Soleimani. State television showed a massive gathering in the southwestern city of Ahvaz, where crowds marched Gen. Soleimani’s casket on a vehicle in a prelude to larger rallies planned for four cities through Tuesday. The funeral processions are expected to be the largest in Iran since the 1989 death of the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Crowds also gathered in the northeastern city of Mashhad and chanted “death to America”. Some thanked Gen. Soleimani, who commanded the foreign wing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, for keeping the country safe, shouting: “Iran is clad in black, revenge, revenge.” State media estimated a million people attended the Mashhad rally, though numbers were impossible to verify. The throngs offered a stark image of unity just weeks after economy-related protests rocked the country, prompting a security crackdown that left hundreds dead, according to Amnesty International and Iranian reformist media. Iranian leaders, who for years portrayed Gen. Soleimani as a national hero, are likely to use his death as a tool to rally Iranians around the flag and whip up popular support at a time of domestic dissent, which now will be suppressed even harder, experts said. “This, to me, is one of the biggest repercussions of Soleimani’s assassination,” said Narges Bajoghli, author of “Iran Reframed,” a 2019 book on Iranian state propaganda and assistant professor at Johns Hopkins University. Many Iranians disagree fundamentally with the Islamic Republic, and Gen. Soleimani has numerous critics inside the country, particularly due to the Revolutionary Guard’s history of oppressing domestic dissent. “But there is now an external enemy who has assassinated a top government official and threatened war. In this atmosphere, civic dissent becomes extremely hard,” she said. Rallies were further fueled by reactions to President Trump, who Saturday night warned that the U.S. could target 52 sites in Iran if any Tehran retaliation hit an American or American assets, including “some at a very high level & important to Iran & the Iranian culture”. “Iranian leaders would have used this as an effort to rally around the flag,” Ms. Bajoghli said, but Mr. Trump’s tweets “served to draw out even more Iranians as a national show of force against any attack.” Support for Iran was also on display elsewhere Sunday. Thousands of supporters of the Iran-backed Hezbollah militia, whose rise to power was guided in part by Gen. Soleimani, gathered to mourn the general in Beirut. Meanwhile, the Iraqi parliament approved a bill to expel U.S. soldiers from the country. The resolution has no legal force but cast the future of the U.S. presence in Iraq in doubt. As commander of the Quds Force, Gen. Soleimani built a network of militias loyal to Tehran across the Middle East, which according to the U.S. were responsible for thousands of deaths, including those of hundreds of Americans. He also led Iran’s fight against the extremist Islamic State, earning him widespread adulation at home. Iran’s response to Gen. Soleimani’s death marks a high point in tensions between the U.S. and Iran since Washington drastically shifted its Iran policy under President Trump, pulling out of the 2015 nuclear deal and reimposing sanctions on Iran as part of a campaign of “maximum pressure” on Tehran. That move deepened an economic crisis in Iran, prompting its government to introduce austerity measures that triggered the recent nationwide protests. Supporters of the Trump policy hoped it would bring Tehran back to the bargaining table to reach a tougher and broader nuclear pact. Instead, tensions between Washington and Tehran deepened, culminating in Gen. Soleimani’s killing. In its statement Sunday, Iran said it would continue cooperating with the United Nations atomic agency, which has broad oversight of Iran’s nuclear facilities and many nonnuclear sites under the pact. The statement also said Iran’s uranium enrichment production would move in line with “technical needs.” Iran also said it will stick to some other aspects of the deal, like limits on work that could be useful for eventually making a nuclear weapon. But Iran said it would no longer abide by any of the restrictions on production of enriched uranium. On Twitter, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif wrote this latest and final step away from the pact’s limits would mean Iran could install as many centrifuges as it wanted, though he added that all steps “are reversible upon EFFECTIVE implementation” of the other parties’ commitments to the deal. Mr. Zarif wasn’t specific about how many machines would be reinstalled. Under the original nuclear deal, Iran removed two thirds of the roughly 19,000 centrifuges it had installed by mid-2015 and placed them under the watch of the U.N. atomic agency. Nuclear experts say it would take Iran months to re-install all 19,000 centrifuges. David Albright, a former weapons inspector who is president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, said he estimates Iran could re-install around 170 centrifuges every two weeks. Iran had already begun scaling back its commitments a year after the U.S. pulled out of the agreement in 2018, leaving European participants, along with Russia and China, to try to salvage it. Iran had exceeded limits on its stockpile of enriched uranium and was producing uranium at levels slightly higher than those permitted in July. In September, it said it would conduct research on more-advanced machines for enriching uranium than permitted under the agreement—a step that also saw Iran install more centrifuges than permitted by the deal. In November, it started enriching uranium at its underground site of Fordow, a step banned under the pact. Tensions are expected to continue building in the coming days. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameni will lead prayers at Tehran University on Monday morning over Gen. Soleimani’s coffin, which will then be carried 3.5 miles from the capital’s Revolution Square to Freedom Square. The processions conclude Tuesday with Gen. Soleimani’s burial in his home city of Kerman.

#### Israeli prolif heightens Middle Eastern prolif – spillover ensures escalation

Farley 19 (Dr. Robert Farley; Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received a BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and a Ph.D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014) and the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money; 11-16-2019; “If Israel and Iran go war would Israel launch nuclear war,” <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/if-israel-and-iran-go-war-would-israel-launch-nuclear-war-96296>, The National Interest, accessed 12-2-2019; JHsu)

1 The National Interest Submissions Subscribe Contact Advertising About Search Search Submit Magazine Blogs Military Economics Technology Regions SUBSCRIBE Share on FacebookF Share on TwitterL Share on LinkedInI Subscribe to RSSR Print November 16, 2019 Topic: Security Blog Brand: The Buzz Tags: IranMilitaryTechnologyWorldIsraelNuclear Weapons If Israel And Iran Go To War, Would Israel Launch a Nuclear War? The Middle East would never be the same. by Robert Farley Follow drfarls on TwitterL Key point: Israel has considered preemptive attacks before. SPONSORED CONTENT Recommended by Israel’s nuclear arsenal is the worst-kept secret in international relations. Since the 1970s, Israel has maintained a nuclear deterrent in order to maintain a favorable balance of power with its neighbors. Apart from some worrying moments during the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli government has never seriously considered using those weapons. The most obvious scenario for Israel to use nuclear weapons would be in response to a foreign nuclear attack. Israel’s missile defenses, air defenses, and delivery systems are far too sophisticated to imagine a scenario in which any country other than one of the major nuclear powers could manage a disarming first strike. Consequently, any attacker is certain to endure massive retaliation, in short order. Israel’s goals would be to destroy the military capacity of the enemy (let’s say Iran, for sake of discussion) and also send a message that any nuclear attack against Israel would be met with catastrophic, unimaginable retaliation. But why might Israel start a nuclear war? Nuclear Pre-emption 10 SECONDS Do You Know What Happened Today In History? If a hostile power (let’s say Iran, for sake of discussion) appeared to be on the verge of mating nuclear devices with the systems needed to deliver them, Israel might well consider a preventive nuclear attack. In the case of Iran, we can imagine scenarios in which Israeli planners would no longer deem a conventional attack sufficiently lethal to destroy or delay the Iranian program. In such a scenario, and absent direct intervention from the United States, Israel might well decide to undertake a limited nuclear attack against Iranian facilities. Given that Iran lacks significant ballistic missile defenses, Israel would most likely deliver the nuclear weapons with its Jericho III intermediate range ballistic missiles. Israel would likely limit its attacks to targets specifically linked with the Iranian nuclear program, and sufficiently away from civilian areas. Conceivably, since it would be breaking the nuclear taboo anyway, Israel might target other military facilities and bases for attack, but it is likely that the Israeli government would want to limit the precedent for using nuclear weapons as much as possible. Would it work? Nuclear weapons would deal more damage than most imaginable conventional attacks, and would also convey a level of seriousness that might take even the Iranians aback. On the other hand, the active use of nuclear weapons by Israel would probably heighten the interest of everyone in the region (and potentially across the world) to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Nuclear Transfer One of Israel’s biggest concerns is the idea that a nuclear power (Iran, Pakistan, or North Korea, presumably) might give or sell a nuclear weapon to a non-governmental organization (NGO). Hamas, Hezbollah, or some other terrorist group would be harder to deter than a traditional nation-state. Even if a terrorist organization did not immediately use the weapon against an Israeli target, it could potentially extract concessions that Israel would be unwilling to make. In such a scenario, Israel might well consider using nuclear weapons in order to forestall a transfer, or destroy the enemy nuclear device after delivery. This would depend on access to excellent intelligence about the transfer of the device, but it is hardly impossible that the highly professional and operationally competent Israeli intelligence services could provide such data. Why go nuclear? The biggest reason would be to ensure the success of the strike; both the device itself and the people handling the device would be important targets, and a nuclear attack would ensure their destruction more effectively than even a massive conventional strike (which might well accompany the nuclear attack). Moreover, committing to the most extreme use forms of the use of force might well deter both the NGO and the originating state (not to mention any states that facilitated transfer through their borders; hello, Syria!) from attempting another transfer. However, the active use of nuclear weapons against a non-state actor might look to the world like overkill, and could reaffirm the interest of the source of the nuclear device in causing more problems for Israel. Conventional Defeat The idea that Israel might lose a conventional war seems ridiculous now, but the origins of the Israeli nuclear program lay in the fear that the Arab states would develop a decisive military advantage that they could use to inflict battlefield defeats. This came close to happening during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as the Egyptian Army seized the Suez Canal and the Syrian Arab Army advanced into the Golan Heights. Accounts on how seriously Israel debated using nukes during that war remain murky, but there is no question that Israel could consider using its most powerful weapons if the conventional balance tipped decisively out of its favor. How might that happen? We can imagine a few scenarios, most of which involve an increase in hostility between Israel and its more tolerant neighbors. Another revolution in Egypt could easily rewrite the security equation on Israel’s southern border; while the friendship of Saudi Arabia seems secure, political instability could change that; even Turkish policy might shift in a negative direction. Israel currently has overwhelming conventional military advantages, but these advantages depend to some extent on a favorable regional strategic environment. Political shifts could leave Israel diplomatically isolated, and vulnerable once again to conventional attack. In such a situation, nuclear weapons would remain part of the toolkit for ensuring the survival of the nation. Conclusion It is unlikely, but hardly impossible, that Israel could decide to use nuclear weapons first in a future conflict. The best way to prevent this from happening is to limit the reasons why Israel might want to use these weapons, which is to say preventing the further proliferation of nukes. If Israel ever does use nuclear weapons in anger, it will rewrite the diplomatic and security architecture of the Middle East, and also the nonproliferation architecture of the world as a whole.

#### Prolif causes nuclear war—specifically, Israel-Iran escalates—defense doesn’t assume pre-emptive Israeli strikes.

Kroenig 15 (Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2015. “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015)DR 19

The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program.

*Nuclear War*

The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, **the greater the probability** that somewhere, someday, there will be **a catastrophic nuclear war.**

To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plusyear tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but **it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time**. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dotcom bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 **This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime.**

Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, **if Iran acquires nuclear weapons**, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, **Israel**, will have a secure, **second-strike capability**. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, **Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond** with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force.

In these pre-MAD situations, **there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur**. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, **Israel might**, therefore, decide to **launch a** preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that **emphasizes preemptive action**. Second, **the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal**, in this case **Iran**, might feel use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, **Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed**. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack **from an opponent**.

Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction.

One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency.

Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’. 52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. **By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship**, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. **Historical crises** have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, **have come close**. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as **Iran and Israel,** **with fewer sources of stability than** existed **during the Cold War**, we can see that there is **a real risk** that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.

Nuclear Terrorism The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.54 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a ‘religious duty’ for Al- Qa’eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.55 Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56 Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.57

Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, **that Iran**, **with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah**, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, **a new nuclear state**, **with underdeveloped security procedures**, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologicallymotivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.5

Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become **a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority**, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal.

#### Israel-Iran war causes *extinction* – WMDs ensure Bioweapon response

Stirling 11[Earl of Stirling, Governor & Lord Lieutenant of Canada, Lord High Admiral of Nova Scotia, & B.Sc. in Pol. Sc. & History, M.A. in European Studies, “General Middle East War Nears - Syrian events more dangerous than even nuclear nightmare in Japan,” March, 2011, http://europebusines.blogspot.com/2011/03/general-middle-east-war-nears-syrian.html]

Any Third Lebanon War/General Middle East War is apt to involve WMD on both side quickly as both sides know the stakes and that the Israelis are determined to end, once and for all, any Iranian opposition to a 'Greater Israel' domination of the entire Middle East. It will be a case of 'use your WMD or lose them' to enemy strikes. Any massive WMD usage against Israel will result in the usage of Israeli thermonuclear warheads against Arab and Persian populations centers in large parts of the Middle East, with the resulting spread of radioactive fallout over large parts of the Northern Hemisphere. However, the first use of nukes is apt to be lower yield warheads directed against Iranian underground facilities including both nuclear sites and governmental command and control and leadership bunkers, with some limited strikes also likely early-on in Syrian territory. The Iranians are well prepared to launch a global Advanced Biological Warfare terrorism based strike against not only Israel and American and allied forces in the Middle East but also against the American, Canadian, British, French, German, Italian, etc., homelands. This will utilize DNA recombination based genetically engineered 'super killer viruses' that are designed to spread themselves throughout the world using humans as vectors. There are very few defenses against such warfare, other than total quarantine of the population until all of the different man-made viruses (and there could be dozens or even over a hundred different viruses released at the same time) have 'burned themselves out'. This could kill a third of the world's total population. Such a result from an Israeli triggered war would almost certainly cause a Russian-Chinese response that would eventually finish off what is left of Israel and begin a truly global war/WWIII with multiple war theaters around the world. It is highly unlikely that a Third World War, fought with 21st Century weaponry will be anything but the Biblical Armageddon.

#### War with Iran risks extinction

Avery, 13 - John Avery received a B.Sc. in theoretical physics from MIT and an M.Sc. from the University of Chicago. He later studied theoretical chemistry at the University of London, and was awarded a Ph.D. there in 1965. He is now Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of Chemistry, University of Copenhagen. Fellowships, memberships in societies: Since 1990 he has been the Contact Person in Denmark for Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. In 1995, this group received the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts. He was the Member of the Danish Peace Commission of 1998. Technical Advisor, World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe (1988- 1997). Chairman of the Danish Peace Academy, April 2004 (“An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War” Countercurrents, 11/6, <https://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm>

Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems. The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy. In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.

#### ME prolif causes nuke war – miscalc and rapid escalation.

Goldberg 12 Jeffrey (Bloomberg View columnist and a national correspondent for the Atlantic.) “How Iran Could Trigger Accidental Armageddon: Jeffrey Goldberg” January 23rd 2012 Bloomberg <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2012-01-24/how-iran-may-trigger-accidental-armageddon-commentary-by-jeffrey-goldberg>

Jan. 24 (Bloomberg) -- One of the arguments often made in favor of bombing Iran to cripple its nuclear program is this: The mullahs in Tehran are madmen who believe it is their consecrated duty to destroy the perfidious Zionist entity (which is to say, Israel) and so are building nuclear weapons to launch at Tel Aviv at the first favorable moment. It’s beyond a doubt that the Iranian regime would like to bring about the destruction of Israel. However, the mullahs are also cynics and men determined, more than anything, to maintain their hold on absolute power. Which is why it’s unlikely that they would immediately use their new weapons against Israel. An outright attack on Israel - - a country possessing as many as 200 nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems -- would lead to the obliteration of Tehran, the deaths of millions, and the destruction of Iran’s military and industrial capabilities. The mullahs know this. But here’s the problem: It may not matter. The threat of a deliberate nuclear attack pales in comparison with the chance that a nuclear-armed Iran could accidentally trigger a cataclysmic exchange with Israel. WARP-SPEED ESCALATION The experts who study this depressing issue seem to agree that a Middle East in which Iran has four or five nuclear weapons would be dangerously unstable and prone to warp-speed escalation. Here’s one possible scenario for the not-so-distant future: Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, launches a cross-border attack into Israel, or kills a sizable number of Israeli civilians with conventional rockets. Israel responds by invading southern Lebanon, and promises, as it has in the past, to destroy Hezbollah. Iran, coming to the defense of its proxy, warns Israel to cease hostilities, and leaves open the question of what it will do if Israel refuses to heed its demand. Dennis Ross, who until recently served as President Barack Obama’s Iran point man on the National Security Council, notes Hezbollah’s political importance to Tehran. “The only place to which the Iranian government successfully exported the revolution is to Hezbollah in Lebanon,” Ross told me. “If it looks as if the Israelis are going to destroy Hezbollah, you can see Iran threatening Israel, and they begin to change the readiness of their forces. This could set in motion a chain of events that would be like ‘Guns of August’ on steroids.” Imagine that Israel detects a mobilization of Iran’s rocket force or the sudden movement of mobile missile launchers. Does Israel assume the Iranians are bluffing, or that they are not? And would Israel have time to figure this out? Or imagine the opposite: Might Iran, which will have no second-strike capability for many years -- that is, no reserve of nuclear weapons to respond with in an exchange -- feel compelled to attack Israel first, knowing that it has no second chance? Bruce Blair, the co-founder of the nuclear disarmament group Global Zero and an expert on nuclear strategy, told me that in a sudden crisis Iran and Israel might each abandon traditional peacetime safeguards, making an accidental exchange more likely. “A confrontation that brings the two nuclear-armed states to a boiling point would likely lead them to raise the launch-readiness of their forces -- mating warheads to delivery vehicles and preparing to fire on short notice,” he said. “Missiles put on hair-trigger alert also obviously increase the danger of their launch and release on false warning of attack -- false indications that the other side has initiated an attack.” Then comes the problem of misinterpreted data, Blair said. “Intelligence failures in the midst of a nuclear crisis could readily lead to a false impression that the other side has decided to attack, and induce the other side to launch a preemptive strike.” ‘COGNITIVE BIAS’ Blair notes that in a crisis it isn’t irrational to expect an attack, and this expectation makes it more likely that a leader will read the worst into incomplete intelligence. “This predisposition is a cognitive bias that increases the danger that one side will jump the gun on the basis of incorrect information,” he said. Ross told me that Iran’s relative proximity to Israel and the total absence of ties between the two countries -- the thought of Iran agreeing to maintain a hot line with a country whose existence it doesn’t recognize is far-fetched -- make the situation even more hazardous. “This is not the Cold War,” he said. “In this situation we don’t have any communications channels. Iran and Israel have zero communications. And even in the Cold War we nearly had a nuclear war. We were much closer than we realized.” The answer to this predicament is to deny Iran nuclear weapons, but not through an attack on its nuclear facilities, at least not now. “The liabilities of preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear program vastly outweigh the benefits,” Blair said. “But certainly Iran’s program must be stopped before it reaches fruition with a nuclear weapons delivery capability.” Ross argues that the Obama administration’s approach -- the imposition of steadily more debilitating sanctions -- may yet work. There’s a chance, albeit slim, that he may be right: New sanctions are just beginning to bite and, combined with an intensified cyberwar and sabotage efforts, they might prove costly enough to deter Tehran. But opponents of military action make a mistake in arguing that a nuclear Iran is a containable problem. It is not.

#### Middle East war outweighs – deterrence and taboo can’t check our specific conflict

**Russell ‘9**

James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf

**Strategic stability in the region is** thus **undermined by** various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) **the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists**; (3) **incompatible assumptions about** the structure of **the deterrent relationship that makes** the **bargaining** framework strategically **unstable;** (4) **perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity** for military **action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack**; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) **the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants**. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors**, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of** **chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons**. **It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used** **in the context of an unstable strategic framework.** **Systemic asymmetries** between actors in fact s**uggest** a certain increase in **the probability of war** – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. **Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own** and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent **such an outcome**, which **would be an unprecedented disaster for the** peoples of the **region, with substantial risk for the entire world**.

#### Plan – The State of Israel ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals

Enforcement: NPT Accession

Mechanism: Elimination through disarmament and then storage of all disassembled materials in cannisters and stored in a safe location.

#### Plan solves prolif.

Ingram et al 19 [Paul Ingram and Emad Kiyaei, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, "Middle East WMD-Free Zone: Thinking the Possible – The Cairo Review of Global Affairs", Fall 2019, https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/middle-east-wmd-free-zone-thinking-the-possible/] **IV**  
The idea of a WMD-Free Zone (hereafter WMDFZ, or simply “zone”) in the Middle East is decades old. It enjoys the support of every government on the planet, and has featured heavily in international disarmament diplomacy. Yet, many people involved appear to act as if it is near impossible to achieve, and claim that the issue has been responsible for the failure of several global negotiations on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Big obstacles lie in the widespread perception that such a zone requires a level of cooperation which is beyond the capabilities of states in the region due to ideological and religious conflict and strong national assertiveness that undermine regional cooperation. This is compounded by the particular dynamics of Israel’s strategic relationship with its neighbors and its tendency to adopt independent security policies based on maximizing its military capabilities. This pessimism has been self-fulfilling. However, a new initiative has arisen in this context which seeks to inspire optimism based on re-establishing a shared commitment, refocusing on the steps necessary to implement the WMDFZ, and creating a new institution to implement the zone with confidence. The Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) would lead the initiative. The Diplomatic History of the WMDFZ The decades-long pursuit to realize a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction has faced a myriad of geopolitical and security setbacks, made worse by the lack of sustained political will to overcome them. The fact that there are no WMDFZs in any region complicates matters. However, successful examples of nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ), which exclude other weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and biological weapons, could be used as a basis on which to establish the broader WMDFZ. There are eight NWFZs around the world: Antarctica (1961); Outer Space (1967); Latin America and the Caribbean (1969); Seabed (1972); the South Pacific (1986); Southeast Asia (1997); Central Asia (2009); and Africa (2009). The majority of NPT members are non-nuclear weapon states which have joined these NWFZs in recognition of the mutual regional benefits they can reap by building additional cooperative safeguards that assure them their neighbors are not cheating and producing nuclear weapons. But these NWFZs were not easy to create. They arose out of initiatives from states within the regions concerned, sometimes in the face of skepticism or even resistance from the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS): China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, who feared that these arrangements would limit their own freedom of nuclear deployment. The current problems over NWS protocols concerning implementation of the 1997 Bangkok Treaty to create a NWFZ in Southeast Asia illustrate this problem. Even when the NWS do give guarantees that they will not use nuclear weapons to threaten states in the region, these are not unconditional promises. A NWFZ for the Middle East and North Africa was first formally proposed by Egypt in 1974, with backing from Iran, in the form of a joint resolution to the UN General Assembly (UNGA). A key motivation for the resolution was to constrain the nuclear weapons capabilities Israel had developed in the late 1960s and to prevent further proliferation in the Middle East. The proposal, however, has been a great deal more difficult to achieve than in other regions. For starters, Israel saw the proposal that focused on nuclear weapons as an attempt to strip the country of its nuclear weapons monopoly in the region. Many Israelis believe their country exists in a state of existential threat, with neighbors possessing other weapons of mass destruction, and that their security relies on a robust and overwhelming military capability and a readiness to use it. This is a fearsome obstacle to any possible NWFZ, but is not the only one. This was part of the rationale for expanding the scope of the zone to include all weapons of mass destruction. In such a scenario, Israeli nuclear disarmament would be matched by the commitments of other regional countries to dispose of their chemical and biological weapons. In 1995, the NPT Review and Extension Conference decided upon the indefinite extension of the NPT. At the same time, it adopted a resolution, co-sponsored by Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, that called for “the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems,” and for all NPT members, and in particular the nuclear weapon states, to “extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment” of the zone. This resolution is widely seen to have been essential and linked (at least politically) to the indefinite extension of the treaty. From this point on, the fate of NPT Reviews came to be inextricably and uniquely linked to the debate over the WMDFZ. The 2000 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the 1995 resolution and stated that the resolution would be “valid until its goals and objectives are achieved”. It was only at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, however, that practical steps were agreed upon to progress this objective. Specifically, the UN secretary-general and the three co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution would convene a conference on the WMDFZ by the end of 2012, to be attended by all states in the Middle East without prejudice or specific commitment. They belatedly appointed Finland Ambassador Jaakko Laajava to serve as the conference facilitator and Finland as host. In late 2012, however, the WMDFZ conference was called off by the United States because, “states in the region have not reached agreement on acceptable conditions for a conference”. While officially in favor of the zone, Arab countries and Israel disagreed on the terms and the sequence of steps leading to its establishment. Israel insists on reaching a comprehensive peace agreement with its Arab neighbors before committing to any talks on the zone, while other regional states emphasize the need for the creation of the zone first, before the details of a comprehensive peace agreement are finalized. In subsequent years, further attempts were made to revive the WMDFZ process with little success. From 2013 to 2014, a series of informal meetings between regional countries (with Israel participating) in Geneva and Glion in Switzerland seemed promising but were abandoned due to lack of progress. At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the final draft document calling to restart talks on the WMDFZ was derailed once again by the United States (with support from Canada and the UK) for lack of “consensus and equality”. In recent years, however, there have been encouraging developments that strengthen the chance of achieving a WMDFZ, specifically the breakthrough in nuclear talks between Iran and the EU3+3 (the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, China, and Germany, later also known as P5+1) coupled with efforts to rid Syria of its chemical weapons. However, even these positive developments face uncertainty, particularly with President Donald Trump’s unilateral decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement and further cases of chemical weapons use in Syria. More recently, another Arab proposal to hold a conference on the WMDFZ arose at the 2018 session of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. States adopted a decision requesting that the UN secretary-general convene a regional conference on the zone by the end of 2019. Despite explicit opposition from both the United States and Israel, this is scheduled to take place at UN Headquarters in New York under the care of UNGA in November 2019. Ambitions for the conference at present are modest; most believe that a conference that actually meets, discusses some of the key issues, and lays the groundwork for future conferences would itself be a success. It will be important that delegates use the opportunity to take a constructive approach which envisions the workings of the zone, the modalities of the processes most likely to achieve progress, and an openness to what improvement might look like. Most importantly, the door needs to be open to all states to participate in the future, meaning that some attention will need to be put into maximizing the chances of greater inclusivity. Conceiving the Possible It has been all too easy to approach this situation with pessimism. Dialogue in the region is beset by multidimensional conflicts alongside other complexities that frustrate efforts to find appropriate venues, frameworks that facilitate honest communication, and framing that respects different perspectives. Different parties blame one another for the inflexible attachment to regional conflicts which have plagued Middle Eastern countries and their societies. Resolving the technical challenges presents a challenging mess of problems when trust between once-warring countries and rivals in the region is weak. One of the critical controversies surrounding a WMDFZ involves its link to regional security, and more specifically about recognition of Israel and its security situation. While Israel believes it to be an essential prerequisite to talks that its neighbors acknowledge its status and legitimate security needs, the Arabs and Iran see a WMDFZ as a critical contribution to regional security and stability, and that this must come first. Israel’s insistence on talking about confidence and security building mechanisms first is seen by the Arab states as a “long corridor,” a stalling and blame-shifting tactic. Israel feels its strategic security concerns are not considered by its Arab neighbors. Both perspectives have some legitimacy and need to be accommodated, but progress also requires goodwill on both sides toward the process of establishing the zone, something that so far appears to be lacking. Most efforts to progress the establishment of the zone have focused on bringing together official and unofficial interlocutors for the conflicting states in the belief that this will create the necessary trust. These efforts also focus on establishing the diplomatic and political conditions first, as a contribution to firming up the commitment in international fora to formal negotiations, and then establishing the relevant institutions. But such efforts have been thwarted by constant external shocks, and by the difficulties in accepting and incorporating opposing views. Frustration and pessimism have deepened,and have themselves become additional impediments to progress. When one acknowledges that the disagreement around the zone is a proxy for deeper strategic conflicts around identity and territory, one finds that the politics appears to have become intractable. Success requires not only an injection of energy and commitment, but also new directions. A focus exclusively on diplomatic solutions in the current circumstances simply leads to more delay and frustration. In this context, a core group of civil society individuals from the region has come together with international experts and diplomats to work on a draft treaty text for the establishment of the zone, with the express purpose of facilitating a more constructive approach where the emphasis is on process. By leaping in and discussing the elements of a draft treaty, participants not only identify the challenges but also possible resolutions to them. Considering the mess of obstacles in the context of solutions requires people to think about what might give their counterparts the assurances they need to collaborate in the process, and eventually to commit. The idea is that by drawing in as many people across differing perspectives as possible, and cooperatively identifying the features and elements of an inclusive treaty and regime that would be necessary to build confidence, those involved would be tackling the obstacles in a constructive manner. This is not about being in denial of the political obstacles, rather it is about suspending the ambition to directly resolve each and every resentment, and instead envisaging and constructing the technical and working arrangements that would be needed for reassurance within the context of suspicion. The messy and confrontational politics is not resolved, rather it forms the context in which technical approaches can slowly build confidence. Our experiences with the network have been that there exists a powerful desire for progress on a WMDFZ, and a commitment to move in the direction of progress. Given a tool to focus the mind and heart, participants in our workshops have showed a remarkable willingness to express their perspectives in good faith, to listen attentively, and to work constructively with others of very different perspectives within the region to attempt to find improvements and overcome the current deadlock. The group started by surveying best practice in NWFZs from other parts of the world. The primary resource was the 2009 Pelindaba Treaty, Africa’s NWFZ, because it was recently agreed (and enforced) and already covers the North African states in the proposed zone. It was used to compare and contrast the desirable elements relevant to the situation in the Middle East when drawing up the first draft. We also considered the conventions and treaties covering chemical and biological weapons control. Meeting together and operating remotely over many months, we built the draft up carefully, whilst slowly establishing a network of friends willing to support the process. Complexities of Considering a Draft Treaty This was a challenging proposition. While we were not setting about to find the finished text that would convince everyone we had cracked the problems, the draft treaty needed to be sufficiently credible to draw people into a process that would deepen understanding and start to build confidence. It needed to have clarity in identifying the key challenges, and to be inclusive in the manner in which it tackled controversial aspects. We were conscious of the risk that by publishing our draft treaty, people might think we had the answers, or worse that the text would be seen as insensitive or biased, and thereby destroy any hope of collaboration. Having a text might also encourage people to focus on the more controversial and wicked problems, and have the effect of closing down hope, rather than encouraging constructive comment. As a result, we consulted with a variety of people across the region and improved the text before we felt able to share it widely. When we did, we were clear to say that the intention was to draw people into a process of constructive dialogue. To reduce the chances that this draft treaty be used to stoke more disagreement, we began the text by stating: “This is a draft treaty and it will remain a draft only. We do not represent states, but civil society. We are not attached to the text itself, but with the idea that such a text can contribute to a process that might one day lead to a treaty, and then, hopefully, a reality.” Scope of the Draft Treaty There were many complexities to grapple with, and here we can only scratch the surface in explaining some of them. Establishing a workable scope for the draft treaty was a major challenge. Since 1990, the official zone proposal covered all WMDs and their means of delivery across the Middle East and North Africa. The original reason for expanding beyond nuclear weapons to other forms of WMD (seen as chemical and biological weapons) was to assure the Israelis that this wasn’t just about disarming them (the only country with nuclear weapons in the region). This makes political sense, but lumping so-called WMDs together in one treaty framework presents many technical, definitional, and verification challenges, and risks creating misleading comparisons between the different forms of weapon systems. There are still no other weapons that can compare to nuclear weapons on the scale of their impact and destruction. Nevertheless, the commitment to a WMDFZ is well entrenched, so we took that to be understood and proceeded accordingly. But we did, for the time being, decide to leave out means of delivery. Missiles (cruise and ballistic) are particularly egregious problems with massive challenges revolving around the willingness to agree to exercise restraint and allow verification. We decided early on that we would plan to address the issues of missiles and delivery separately from the draft treaty text. This would be done later in the process because they merited particular focus. We also discussed the issue of emerging disruptive technologies that could also deliver mass destructive impact. The most obvious today is the growing threat of cyber disruption, but there are a number of other candidates. We decided it would be necessary to maintain some awareness of these particular complications but that our focus would remain on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The geographical scope formally includes all Arab states, Israel, and Iran. Crucially, this excludes Turkey, which has become a major actor within the region, and which is believed to host U.S.-NATO free fall nuclear bombs at its Incirlik air base. Pakistan, as a neighboring state with nuclear weapons and close military relationships with Arab Gulf states, also has influence. Both states may need to be closely involved as observers. Mechanisms of Compliance Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons each have their own global regime which all states in the region will need to join as members eventually, though the level of verification and inspection provided by each of these regimes varies enormously. Biological weapons have no established international verification mechanisms. Verification presents deeply complex technical challenges and requires significant financial and human resources to provide assurance against cheating, particularly when trust is low. We have been considering the necessary level of intrusive inspections to bring sufficient confidence, but have only scratched the surface. The process would require the participating states to engage in good faith. But some regional states have a strong ideological attachment to robust military capabilities, and a deep suspicion of cooperative regimes. Convincing them to place trust in any verification system requires a very high level of confidence indeed. Even verification practices with high technical confidence levels can be called into question for domestic or diplomatic political purposes. Delivering verification in these circumstances is deeply problematic, and provides strong motive for our calls to set up a regional body tasked with building up the capacity and confidence for this. We decided therefore to work toward a double level of verification—global and regional. There exists a global regime for each of the three WMD concerned—the NPT, backed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the Chemical Weapons Convention, backed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. It is logical to work toward universalizing these conventions within the region, but an approach that takes this as a point of departure would block progress prematurely because of opposition from Israel, so a regional approach in the first instance has greater chance of success. Global institutions such as the IAEA and OPCW have a great deal of expertise and experience relevant to the necessary tasks of verification, inspection, and other practices, and it will be necessary to call upon them throughout the process. It may also be appropriate to develop these capabilities at a regional level within the proposed Middle East Treaty Organization or METO. Dismantlement None of the existing NWFZs has involved membership of states that possessed nuclear weapons whilst they were members. South Africa dismantled its bombs and nuclear weapons facilities prior to joining the African NWFZ, inviting IAEA officials to confirm it had become nuclear-weapons free. South Africa’s nuclear program itself remains shrouded in mystery. This raises a question around chronology in the Middle East case: should a WMDFZ follow a similar path, requiring states to unilaterally disarm and to have that verified before they join (though this is fraught with uncertainty if conducted after the dismantlement and destruction) or have a timetable for dismantlement under supervision? We decided upon retaining the option of either course. Control and external influences Power within the region is very unbalanced. On the one hand, Israel possesses significant military and political influence, largely by virtue of its alliance with the United States. The Arab League represents by far the majority of the region’s population, but it is far from united, the legitimacy of many of its governments fragile. Like Israel, Iran often finds itself isolated, but has built up a culture of self-sufficiency independent of outside powers. In such a context, setting up any processes or international organizations requires careful planning to assure all parties that their voices will be heard and accounted for in all disputes. It is impossible to imagine any processes that garner sufficient respect from all parties unless they operate from consensus. Yet, consensus offers veto to all parties who have demonstrated a tenacious willingness to exercise it unless they can be absolutely sure they benefit from change with minimal risk. External states have always had a big interest in and impact upon the region, and any approaches will need to involve key stakeholders such as the United States, Russia, China, and the European states. The nuclear armed states will also need to give security assurances to states within the zone, a process governed by additional protocols to the relevant treaty. Our Process Our first public explanation of the METO process was at the May 2017 NPT Preparatory Committee in Vienna. This experience drew out some of the inevitable suspicions people had of this process. Would this be another exercise in excuses? How could we hope to transcend the divisions? Were we not in denial by talking about the details of a zone before tackling the political obstacles? We had more progress to report by the time of the UN First Committee later in October, with the sponsorship of the Irish government, which was to support the reporting process twice a year over the following years at both NPT and UN meetings. Whilst the meeting was low-key, the room was packed, and the atmosphere surprisingly positive. Soon after, a number of core group members, advisors, and interested experts met under the care of the Scottish government in Edinburgh in January 2018 to trawl through the elements of the draft treaty, address the critical challenges, and explore constructive proposals. By the time state parties met in Geneva for the 2018 NPT Preparatory Committee, the draft treaty was in a state to be presented formally. This time, we were in a very large room and we had well over a hundred hard-bitten diplomats attend the discussion. There was an atmosphere in the room that was unfamiliar to many of them. With Iranian, Israeli, and Arab speakers on the panel, the can-do message was one of vision, possibility, and optimism. And it was infectious. One ambassador from a nuclear weapon state said it was the most positive meeting he had attended in the whole two weeks, and was astounded that it was one devoted to the Middle East. A month later, with the support of Green Cross Switzerland and the Swedish Foreign Ministry—an extraordinary vote of confidence based upon the potential of the project and its approach to the problem—the group hosted a major three-day roundtable in Zurich with around fifty participants from Egypt and a number of other Arab states, Israel, Iran, Europe, Russia, and the United States. Participants discussed the elements of the draft treaty, the principal questions it raised, and the strategy for the project. From the start, the draft treaty envisaged the creation of a new regional intergovernmental institution—the METO—that would collaborate with global institutions such as the IAEA and CWC and focus on building capacity within the region for verification and inspections. Other NWFZs (with the exception of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1968, covering Latin America and the Caribbean) had been hampered by insufficient institutional support and collation of best-practice. At our roundtable in Zurich in June 2018, it became clear that there was a strong case for attempting to set up METO operations to build capacity sooner rather than later, and well before any final formal treaty was agreed. METO could focus at an early stage on issues of implementation and verification, educational programs for capacity-building, creating a regional network, advocacy campaigns, and other related projects. It could also provide a venue for negotiations and support meetings. We were ambitious when it came to imagining its creation. We pictured it as a physical location on a Mediterranean island as a hub for capacity-building, training, and meetings. We considered ways to draw larger sections of civil society into the process, and the means by which to communicate to those prospective groups. As a result, establishing the organization has become a principal objective of the group that has come to be known as the METO Project. Finally, there is a great deal of cynicism associated with the Middle East when it comes to talking about international cooperation generally, and about the prospects of establishing a WMDFZ in the region specifically. The issue has caused a great deal of diplomatic friction over recent decades. Our experience within the METO Project has shown that there are reasons to be optimistic—it takes a change of frame and an approach that seeks to overcome the obstacles.

#### **Plan solves for Middle East Stability**

Ferrero 18 [Christopher J. Ferrero, **Christopher J. Ferrero** received his Ph.D. from the University of Virginia in 2011, where he focused on the US-Iran relationship Coastal Carolina University Coastal Carolina University, "Intelligence and Assurance: Israel's Path to a Nuclear-Free Region", March 2018, https://www.stratcom.mil/Portals/8/Documents/AA\_Proceedings/4.pdf?ver=2018-10-04-141147-477] **Tfane23**  
Given the many trends discussed in this paper, Israel should actively promote and work for a Middle East Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone and accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a Non-Nuclear-Weapons State by 2030. Meanwhile, it should continue to enhance its conventional deterrence and power projection capabilities, its missile defense infrastructure, and its superior intelligence collection capabilities. Global nonproliferation regimes and norms are under strain. Their failure could ultimately prove fatal for Israel, which is small and has many enemies. Nuclear deterrence is of dubious reliability, and the risk of an adversary successfully cheating on a nuclear arms control agreement will decrease as technologies for intelligence collection and nuclear monitoring improve. In 2030 – one year before JCPOA restrictions on Iran’s use of fissile material expire – Israel will have an extensive unmanned and stealth air force capable of projecting power and collecting intelligence at reduced risk to Israeli lives. With proper investment, new technologies that can detect illicit nuclear activity will be sufficiently advanced to be deployed for monitoring and enforcement of nuclear arms control treaties. Deterrence and Assurance Academic Alliance Working Paper March 2018 | Christopher J. Ferrero | Coastal Carolina University Intelligence and Assurance: Israel’s Path to a Nuclear-Free Region 25 This vision is not excessively optimistic or unrealistic. Monitoring technologies will not be able to see everything happening everywhere at every time. But the probability of being caught cheating will increase as monitoring technologies mature. Where international assets, such as those of the IAEA and CTBTO, fall short, Israel is well-positioned (along with its allies) to collect intelligence in time to detect and forestall cheating. The dissuasive and reassuring effects of monitoring technologies should be matched by dissuasive and reassuring norms. The normative prohibition on nuclear weapons needs a boost. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is likely to sputter, and disillusionment over NPT Article VI is likely to grow as Great Power competition re-emerges among the recognized Nuclear Weapon States. Israeli accession to the NPT would inject much-needed life into the beleaguered regime, and a regional NWFZ would draw Iran and other Middle Eastern states into doubling down on their own nuclear nonproliferation commitments. Ideally, norms against nuclear proliferation and war in the Middle East would be internalized as substantively rational by all parties. But even if they were not, they could still affect cost-benefit calculations. Cheating on both NPT and NWFZ commitments would carry increased political costs and would increase the credibility of an Israeli threat of conventional strikes. Currently, Israel’s threat to use force against a country violating the NPT lacks the legitimacy that it would carry if Israel and its neighbors were together more deeply embedded in an arms control regime. Though Israel often thumbs its nose at international opinion, even Katz and Bohbot acknowledge that international legitimacy is a force multiplier for a conventionally-superior Israel. In celebrating Israel’s weapons wizardry, they write: Deterrence and Assurance Academic Alliance Working Paper March 2018 | Christopher J. Ferrero | Coastal Carolina University Intelligence and Assurance: Israel’s Path to a Nuclear-Free Region 26 All of this, though, is meaningless if Israel’s operations lack the international stamp of legitimacy. The state can develop, manufacture, and even sell weapons around the world, but that won’t mean much if the world refuses to support Israel’s actions…For a country like Israel, legitimacy is not trivial.69 Beyond reinforcing norms, a Middle East NWFZ should improve upon the monitoring and verification mechanisms employed by the IAEA under the NPT. Safeguards agreements with the IAEA are the basis for monitoring and verifying compliance in most of the world’s NWFZs. The Middle East, however, may benefit from a more aggressive model given the lack of trust among the region’s actors. Any robust monitoring regime will surely test the member states’ political and counterintelligence sensitivities. To address the specific concern of fissile material diversion, the region’s actors should consider a fissile material consortium with only a few regional sites engaging in processing and enrichment. The concentration of fissile material would ease the task of monitoring and reduce the risk of diversion while also reducing the risk that terrorists could illicitly acquire significant quantities of fissile material. Several technical and political hurdles indeed remain before the realization of a Middle East NWFZ.70 The details of these hurdles are beyond the scope of this paper, which makes the broader strategic case that a NWFZ is in Israel’s interest. The presence of political and technical hurdles is why work should begin immediately. A starting point would be re-engagement with sponsoring state Finland, which last hosted a Middle East WMD-Free Zone conference in 2011. No country in the Middle East is opposed in principle to a NWFZ. Even Israel supports one, but considers a comprehensive regional peace a prerequisite. This position not only ignores current trends, but turns the logic of arms control on its head. Arms control is not a luxurious byproduct of good relations. Its purpose is to reduce the risk inherent in the conflicts that inevitably plague the world. Conflict is likely to plague the Middle East into the foreseeable future. Critics may Deterrence and Assurance Academic Alliance Working Paper March 2018 | Christopher J. Ferrero | Coastal Carolina University Intelligence and Assurance: Israel’s Path to a Nuclear-Free Region 27 contend that the political and technical path to a regional NWFZ is too difficult or unclear. However, it is much clearer than any foreseeable path to regional harmony. The world has changed since 1968. Proceeding down the path of nuclear transparency and disarmament is less risky now for Israel than it has been in the past. Technological trends in conventional military systems and intelligence should reassure Israel. Moreover, while caution and some skepticism are smart, Israel cannot thrive as a nation that has no faith in international norms and regimes. Prolonged cynicism may eventually produce a catastrophic self-fulfilling prophecy.

#### Nuke war and winter cause extinction.

Steven Starr, 8-14-2015, "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation Of American Scientists, <https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/> ccajs

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs. Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.] The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences.] Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet. Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?

### 1AC – Framing

#### The standard is maximizing expected well being

#### A] Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

### 1AC – Theory

#### 1] 1AR Theory – a) AFF gets it because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible, b) drop the debater – the 1AR is too short for theory and substance so ballot implications are key to check abuse, c) no RVIs – they can stick me with 6min of answers to a short arg and make the 2AR impossible, d) competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time.

#### 2] Aff Reasonability on T – a) Evaluate with a brightline of open source disclosure and link and impact turn ground, b) prefer due to bidirectional theory – aff can never be topical due to bidirectional interps which makes reasonability the only way to fairly adjudicate aff topicality, c) resolvability – competing interps leads to race to the top and no one interp is the best so infinite possible interps with no way to aggregate.

#### 3] Aff RVI’s on T – a) Skew – no 2AC for carded offense which means that they invest more time into substance and theory. The crowded 1AR can’t cover both sufficiently making rounds structurally neg skewed. Give aff RVI to make up for time with ballot access, b) Reciprocity – make theory a two way street to allow both debaters equal access to the ballot. Access is k2 fairness bc w/o it db8ers can’t engage fairly within the round since it structurally favors one of them.

#### 4] Reject circumvention args and presumption – a] moots topic education by not engaging with the aff – topic ed k2 debate because it’s the only education we get from debate that meets educational standards, b] moots 6 minutes of AC offense and creates 13-7 time skew – time skew k2 fairness bc time is necessary to make arguments, c] they’re silly – doesn’t allow the aff to even debate because they assume that something’s gonna go wrong with enforcement. That’s a fiat issue and fiat good because that’s the only way we can have debate in the first place.

### 1AC – Method

#### Criticisms of the aff without a coherent way to sole for the harms are wishful thinking that dooms them to political irrelevance.

**Bryant 12** [Levi, Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied 'disclosedness' with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze, “Critique of the Academic Left”, <http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/>] \*\*EDITED FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE – the author said “she” and it was replaced with the word “to” \*\*

I must be in a mood today– half irritated, half amused –because I find myself ranting. Of course, that’s not entirely unusual. So this afternoon I came across a post by a friend quoting something discussing the environmental movement that pushed all the right button. As the post read, For mainstream environmentalism– conservationism, green consumerism, and resource management –humans are conceptually separated out of nature and mythically placed in privileged positions of authority and control over ecological communities and their nonhuman constituents. What emerges is the fiction of a marketplace of ‘raw materials’ and ‘resources’ through which human-centered wants, constructed as needs, might be satisfied. The mainstream narratives are replete with such metaphors [carbon trading!]. Natural complexity,, mutuality, and diversity are rendered virtually meaningless given discursive parameters that reduce nature to discrete units of exchange measuring extractive capacities. Jeff Shantz, “Green Syndicalism” While finding elements this description perplexing– I can’t say that I see many environmentalists treating nature and culture as distinct or suggesting that we’re sovereigns of nature –I do agree that we conceive much of our relationship to the natural world in economic terms (not a surprise that capitalism is today a universal). This, however, is not what bothers me about this passage. **What I wonder is just what we’re supposed to do even if all of this is true?** What, given existing conditions, are we to do if all of this is right? At least green consumerism, conservation, resource management, and things like carbon trading are **engaging in activities that are making real differences.** From this passage– and maybe the entire text would disabuse me of this conclusion –it sounds like we are to reject all of these interventions because they remain tied to a capitalist model of production that the author (and myself) find abhorrent. The idea seems to be that **if we endorse these things we are tainting our hands** and would therefore do well to reject them altogether. The problem as I see it is that **this is the worst sort of abstraction** (in the Marxist sense) **and wishful thinking**. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities. **Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction**. **It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives**. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be **remade to create a workable alternative**. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park: The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this: Phase 1: Collect Underpants Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Profit! They even have a catchy song to go with their work: Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. **Our plan seems to be as follows: Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!** Our problem is that **we seem perpetually stuck at phase** 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing? But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done! But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc. What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle. I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? **What is your plan? What is your alternative?** I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. **If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans?** But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation. “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. **We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique?** What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. **Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them.** Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. **None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.**

## 1AR – Case

### Overview – vs LARP

#### The Middle East wants peace – talks about a WMD free zone have been constant and in the interest of MOST middle eastern nations. Israeli nuclear arsenals are reversing this trend out of necessity. Shadow proliferation makes opacity the new norm in the ME, shattering deterrence logic. Increased ME prolif triggers Iran-Israel war – Israel will do anything to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Middle Easter war drags in great powers as allies and terminally leads to extinction. Only the aff solves – we break down the obstacle that makes the ME unstable and lead to the Middle Eastern WMDFZ.

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### A2 No Israeli Strike

#### The risk of an Israel-Iran hot confrontation is *high* – American silence on Israeli hawkishness has created an *escalatory spiral*

[Rogers,](https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=616303fa-8807-4174-8eb0-d526b177493b) 18 – Paul Rogers is Global Security Consultant to Oxford Research Group and Professor of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford (Paul, “The Risk and Consequences of an Israel-Iran War”, OxfordResearchGroup, May 2018, https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=616303fa-8807-4174-8eb0-d526b177493b)//RCU

Israeli military capabilities The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) has consolidated the improvements covered in the report and its air force, in particular, has conducted numerous air strikes in Syria, around a hundred in the last five years. Until recently most of these have been directed at Hezbollah, especially any kind of supply chain that assists the group in transferring weapons to southern Lebanon. More recently, Israel has been active in attacking facilities directly used by Iran, especially the Iranian Quds Force. On 10 May alone, Israel’s air force claimed to have struck 70 different sites used by Iranian military and intelligence forces within Syria, as well as Syrian air defence sites. Moreover, these air strikes reportedly marked the global combat debut of the Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lightning stealth fighter. If true, this makes Israel the only country other than the United States (which designs, builds and sells the F-35) to field operational combat aircraft essentially invisible to radar. This would be a major advance in capability over 2010, although Israel’s ability to use the aircraft at long range, which would require refuelling by non-stealthy tanker aircraft, may still be incomplete. Israel has also made advances in its defensive infrastructure in response to the steady increase of Hezbollah rocket and missile stocks. In 2011 it began to deploy its Iron Dome system to protect Israel from short-range rocket attacks and has used it many times since then with relative success. This is part of a multi-layered missile defence system that does not wholly negate the threat of rockets or ballistic missiles but certainly makes Israel feel safer than it did in 2010. The US military has tracking facilities within southern Israel that feed into this system and in September 2017 the US Army broke ground on a facility in the Negev desert that will soon house US missile interceptors. Israel has continued to maintain connections with Azerbaijan but there are indications that it has also enhanced its links with Georgia. If, in the event of a conflict, Israel was in a position to use forward operating bases in either or both countries this would enhance its abilities to attack targets in norther Iran. However, use of the intervening air space has potentially become more difficult for Israeli aircraft given that Russia now has an air defence capability in northern Syria, Turkey has remained opposed to the Israeli government, and the US no longer controls Iraqi air space. Israeli and US relations Israel has continued its drift towards a more hawkish stance, with the Netanyahu government, in power since 2009, feeing especially empowered by the support it is receiving from the United States under Donald Trump. It is particularly pleased with the manner in which conservative evangelical Christians in the United States are so forward in their support and it notes the especially strong role of Vice President Mike Pence and the participation of leading evangelical pastors in the recent inauguration of the US Embassy in Jerusalem. This support available from the United States is certainly one of the reasons why it has felt able to use considerable force in containing unrest in Gaza, to the extent of killing over one hundred Palestinians there since March, and injuring well over two thousand, many by sniper fire in the past month. In the United States, Donald Trump campaigned vigorously against the Iran nuclear agreement during the 2016 election campaign and this was greatly welcomed by many evangelical Christians, especially those that embrace the Christian Zionist view of Israel as a God-given entity that is a core component of the coming “End Days” era. In the past two months Israel has been particularly appreciative of two new senior appointments to the Trump team, Mike Pompeo as the new Secretary of State and especially John Bolton as the National Security Advisor. In the most significant indicator of the Trump administration’s policy on Israel Mr Pompeo gave a speech to the Heritage Foundation in Washington on 21 May in which he warned of punitive sanctions against Iran unless it accepted twelve conditions. These include stopping all uranium enrichment, halting launches of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, ending support for Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, ending support for Houthi rebels in Yemen and withdrawing all Iranian military forces in Syria. While not specifically demanding regime change in Tehran his speech implied support for this. Although this is hugely welcome in Israel, government security analysts may be concerned at the persistent instability around the White House with many changes of senior staff in the past eighteen months. The current make-up of the Trump team may currently be highly conducive to Israeli thinking but there is no guarantee that it will last, so the window of opportunity for strong US support for a conflict with Iran may be small. Iranian Politics The Iranian government led by Hassan Rouhani was convincingly re-elected for a second four-year term in May last year but continuing economic problems and pervasive maladministration have dented support. While President Rouhani has adopted a much less confrontational foreign policy than his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, real power remains with the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who takes a stronger line. In addition, the IRGC has a considerable degree of independence in pursuing its military policies in Yemen, Iraq and Syria. That being said, the recent US decision to withdraw from the nuclear agreement has prompted a substantial degree of political unity across the spectrum, so much so that the idea that tougher sanctions will lead to the fall of the government is hardly tenable. Moreover, any military attack on Iran from Israel, with or without overt US support, should be expected to lead to a substantially united country. Conclusion: Risks and Consequences The 2010 report argued that the result of an attack on Iran “would almost certainly not be the wholesale destruction of Iranian nuclear capabilities, yet there would be considerable damage done in terms of physical infrastructure. There would also be many civilian casualties, both directly in terms of civilians working on Iran’s nuclear programme, but also their families […] and others in research stations, university departments and factories.” The report further argued that Iran would have many options in retaliation. Apart from immediate withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a determined effort to develop nuclear weapons, they might include any of the following: “Missile attacks on Israel using conventionally-armed systems might be carried out primarily to demonstrate the survival of a capability after an initial Israeli attack. These would be intended principally to undermine Israeli morale rather than have any serious military effect. Closure of the Straits of Hormuz, however brief, would cause a sharp rise in oil prices and be a reminder of Iran’s leverage over Gulf shipping routes. Any sustained price rise would have a potentially catastrophic impact on the global economy. Paramilitary and/or missile attacks on western Gulf oil production, processing and transportation facilities would be of very deep concern to the producer states, especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. While such facilities have much more intense security than a decade ago, they remain essentially soft targets. Action in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of those groups opposing western involvement could be tailored to discourage further attacks on Iran.” All of these options remain, with many additional options in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. Furthermore, as the 2010 report argued, when a bombing campaign against Iran starts, and given that the Iranian government will not accept demands from Israel or the United States, the war will not be one brief episode but will be prolonged. Once the bombing starts it will not easily stop. Apart from Iranian involvement in Syria, the key difference between 2010 and the present is the attitude of the United States towards Iran, Mr Pompeo’s recent speech demonstrating that it is singularly uncompromising, to the extent that the United States would be likely to become directly involved in a war between Israel and Iran.

#### Prolif causes nuke war and terror – accidents, risk-taking, and preemptive strikes.

Kroenig ‘15 (Matthew Kroenig 15. Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. 2015. "The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?" Journal of Strategic Studies. Volume 38. Issue 1-2. 2015. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2014.893508/.)

The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange. Nuclear Terrorism The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.54 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a ‘religious duty’ for Al- Qa’eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.55 Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56 Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.57 Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. Regional Instability The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers, contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the ‘stability-instability paradox’ maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.60 Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.62 Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange.

#### If threatened Netanyahu will launch a diversionary war with Iran

Bloomfield 18

(Douglas, <https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Washington-Watch-Wag-the-Dog-543317> 2-21)

At the annual Munich Security Conference last weekend, Netanyahu was rattling his saber in the shape of a part from an Iranian-made drone Israel shot down last week, saying he’s ready to go to war. He threatened to not just hit “Iran’s proxies” but “Iran itself” if it gets too close to Israel’s borders. He is rightfully concerned that Iran, with potential Russian protection, may build permanent bases in Syria to manufacture missiles and other weapons and to train its proxies for war against Israel. Talk of tangling with Iran will be at the top of Netanyahu’s agenda when he goes to the White House. Trump has said he will no longer certify Iran to be in compliance with the nuclear agreement, which Netanyahu will applaud although many among both countries’ nations’ military and intelligence leaders urge their leaders not to break the pact. It’s working, they’re saying, and if it is broken Iran will feel free to build a bomb now, not in a dozen years. Iran isn’t the only enemy the two leaders face. Both are at war with their nations’ top law enforcement agencies and the media. Both are under wide-ranging investigation and could face criminal charges that threaten to drive them from office and possibly to the slammer. Netanyahu faces the more immediate threat. He is under scrutiny in four separate corruption cases (in one, several close associates have recently been arrested) and police have just recommended his indictment in two other cases involving bribery, fraud and breach of trust. Among the charges is trading political favors for tens of thousands of dollars worth of Cohiba Siglo V Cuban cigars and Dom Perignon pink champagne for his wife, Sara, who late night comedian John Oliver dubbed “Israel’s Marie Antoinette.” Police have recommended her indictment as well. In Washington special counsel Robert Mueller is looking into the Russian role in the 2016 presidential election and other crimes. One of those lines of inquiry is believed to be possible obstruction of justice by the president for firing FBI director James Comey for refusing to shut down the investigation of then-national security advisor Mike Flynn. Flynn is one of two former Trump campaign and White House officials to have pleaded guilty to charges in the Russia investigation. Two others have been indicted and 13 Russian nationals have been charged with election interference. A lot more shoes are expected to fall. Trump and Netanyahu are understandably nervous about these investigations and can’t make them go away. That has led to speculation in both countries that they may be looking for a military diversion. Trump has been talked out – for now at least – of his yearning to give North Korea’s “little Rocket Man” Kim Jong-un a “bloody nose” strike against his nuclear facilities. That could quickly ignite a major war and cause millions of deaths, Trump was told. A surgical strike against Iran – maybe its factories and militia allies in Syria or even a nuclear site in Iran – could be less costly, but also lead to wide-ranging consequences. Thousands of American military and civilian personal in the region are potential targets. And Israel faces an estimated 150,000 missiles belonging to Hezbollah in Lebanon alone, plus thousands more in Syria and Iran, plus ground attacks on three fronts. Netanyahu has said if attacked by Iranian forces or proxies in Syria, Israel would retaliate against Iran itself. Similarly he has warned that if Hezbollah attacks, no part of Lebanon would be off limits to Israeli retaliation. The Gaza border is also heating up with the familiar cycle of rocket attacks and Israeli retaliation, and though both sides say they don’t want it, a new war could erupt soon. That offers Netanyahu yet another opportunity for a diversionary war.

### A2 No Nuke Extinction

#### Nuclear winter causes famine and climate change – extinction

Ward 18 [(Alex, Staff writer covering international security and defense issues former associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security) internally cites Reisner (Jon, Scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory) and Robock (Alan, Distinguished Professor in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University) “This is exactly how a nuclear war would kill you” VOX, 12/26/2018] BC  
It’s worth reiterating that all of the above are estimates for one strike on one location. An actual nuclear war would have much wider and more devastating consequences. And if that war spiraled out of control, the effects after the conflict would be much worse than the attacks themselves — and change the course of human history.

“Almost everybody on the planet would die”

It’s possible you have an idea of what a post-nuclear hellscape looks like. After all, disaster movies are obsessed with that kind of world. But scientists and other nuclear experts care deeply about this issue too — and their research shows the movies may be too optimistic.

Alan Robock, an environmental sciences professor at Rutgers University, has spent decades trying to understand what a nuclear war would do to the planet. The sum of his work, along with other colleagues’, is based on economic, scientific, and agricultural models.

Here’s what he found: The most devastating long-term effects of a nuclear war actually come down to the black smoke, along with the dust and particulates in the air, that attacks produce.

[image]

In a nuclear war, cities and industrial areas would be targeted, thereby producing tons of smoke as they burn. Some of that smoke would make it into the stratosphere — above the weather — where it would stay for years because there’s no rain to wash it out. That smoke would expand around the world as it heats up, blocking out sunlight over much of Earth.

As a result, the world would experience colder temperatures and less precipitation, depleting much of the globe’s agricultural output. That, potentially, would lead to widespread famine in a matter of years.

The impact on the world, however, depends on the amount of rising smoke. While scientists’ models and estimates vary, it’s believed that around 5 million to 50 millions tons of black smoke could lead to a so-called “nuclear autumn,” while 50 million to 150 millions tons of black smoke might plunge the world into a “nuclear winter.”

If the latter scenario came to pass, Robock told me, “almost everybody on the planet would die.”

Let’s take each in turn.

1) “Nuclear autumn”

A nuclear fight between New Delhi and Islamabad could cause a “nuclear autumn.”

“Even a ‘small’ nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs,” Robock and Toon, the University of Colorado Boulder professor, wrote in 2016, “could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply.”

Here’s why: an India-Pakistan nuclear fight of that size could emit at least 5 million to 6 million tons of black smoke into the stratosphere.

At that point, American and Chinese agricultural production, particularly in corn and wheat, would drop by about 20 to 40 percent in the first five years. It’s possible that the cooling would last [at least a decade](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/AlanAGUfellowsLecture.mp4), plunging temperatures to levels “colder than any experienced on Earth in the past 1,000 years,” Robock and Toon wrote.

Ira Helfand, a board director at the anti-nuclear war Physicians for Social Responsibility, calls this scenario a “nuclear autumn.”

As many as [2 billion people](https://www.psr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/two-billion-at-risk.pdf) would be at risk of starvation even in that “limited” range, he estimates, most of them in Southeast Asia, Latin America, North America, and Europe. “The death of 2 billion people wouldn’t be the end of the human race,” he told me, “but it would be the end of modern civilization as we know it.”

The effects could get worse. The lack of food would drive up prices for what sustenance remains. Surely there would be worldwide skirmishes — and perhaps wars — over remaining resources. The situation could get so bad that we might see another nuclear war as states try to seize control of more food and water, Helfand fears.

That’s a scary scenario — but it could be even more horrifying still.

2) “Nuclear winter”

The absolute doomsday scenario is a “nuclear winter.” For that to happen, the US and Russia would have to use about 2,000 nukes each and destroy major cities and targets, Toon told me. Each country would effectively take out the other — and likely bring down most of humanity as well.

According to [Robock and others](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockNW2006JD008235.pdf), the roughly 150 million tons of black smoke rising from burning cities and other areas would spread around to most of the planet over a period of weeks. That would plunge surface temperatures by about 17 to 20 degrees Fahrenheit for the first few years, and then come back up just by 5 degrees Fahrenheit for the following decade.

The Northern Hemisphere would suffer the coldest temperatures, but the world would feel the impact. “[T]his would be a climate change unprecedented in speed and amplitude in the history of the human race,” they wrote.

Global precipitation would also drop by around 45 percent. Between that and the cold, almost nothing would grow, ensuring those who didn’t die in the nuclear firefight soon would of starvation. And if that didn’t do it, the depleted [ozone layer](http://www.pnas.org/content/105/14/5307) — a side effect of a major nuclear war — would allow large amounts of ultraviolet light to make it to the surface. That would harm nearly every ecosystem and make it harder for some humans to go outside. “A Caucasian person couldn’t go outside for a few minutes before getting a sunburn,” Toon told me.

A close up of a map

Description automatically generated

Christina Animashaun/Vox

Some experts, however, disagree with the conclusions of Robock and his colleagues’ work. In 1990, five scientists who coined the term “nuclear winter” said their original findings were overblown and that a large-scale nuclear war wouldn’t extinguish humanity. And in February 2018, Jon Reisner and others in a government-backed study wrote that the impact of smoke in the atmosphere would be bad, but not as dire as Robock’s crew have predicted.

Still, the point remains the same: A nuclear war would almost certainly affect hundreds of millions or billions of people not directly caught in the fighting. Its effects would reverberate, sometimes literally, around the planet.

That’s why some don’t ever want to run the risk of a nuclear conflict — and are trying to do something about it.

What to do about nuclear weapons?

There’s only one surefire way to stop the future use of nuclear weapons: remove them entirely.

Former senior US leaders have made this case for years. Four of America’s elder statesmen — former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former Sen. Sam Nunn — wrote in 2007 in the [Wall Street Journal](https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116787515251566636) that they wanted to see “a world free of nuclear weapons.” Having nukes in the Cold War made sense, they said, but now they’re “increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.”

And current health and humanitarian officials worry about nuclear use’s impact on the world.

“Even a limited use of nuclear weapons would have devastating, long-lasting and irreparable humanitarian consequences,” Kathleen Lawland, the arms unit chief for the International Committee of the Red Cross, said at the UN on October 17. “The only safeguard against nuclear catastrophe is nuclear disarmament. It is a humanitarian imperative.”

#### Our study is best—Reisner et al is garbage

Toon et al 19 [Owen B. Toon, Physics at Cornell; Charles G. Bardeen, Atmospheric Chemistry Observations and Modeling Laboratory, National Center for Atmospheric Research; Alan Robock, Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University, New Brunswick] “Comment on “Climate Impact of a Regional Nuclear Weapon Exchange: An Improved Assessment Based on Detailed Source Calculations” by Reisner et al.” 10-19-19 RE

Reisner et al. (2019, hereafter Reisner et al.) revisit a study we had done (Mills et al., 2014) modeling the climate impacts of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, in which fires started by 100 15‐kt atomic bombs would produce 5 Tg of soot injected into the upper troposphere. When Reisner et al. repeated our climate model simulations with a 5‐Tg soot injection, they reproduced the same climate response. Similar results have also been reported using different models (Mills et al., 2008; Pausata et al., 2016; Robock et al., 2007). However, using results from their simulation of a mass fire in suburban Atlanta with HIGRAD‐FIRETEC, a model which is not available from them preventing others from recreating their calculations, Reisner et al. calculate that much less soot would be injected into the upper troposphere because the plumes from fires would not rise as high in the atmosphere, and therefore there would be less climate response. While we agree that this reduced smoke input would result in a much smaller climate response, we have serious concerns that the fire they modeled is not typical of the type of mass fire likely to result from a nuclear attack on densely populated cities in India and Pakistan and therefore their smoke estimate may significantly underestimate the amount of smoke likely to rise into the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere during a nuclear war.

Reisner et al. state that they are simulating a mass fire, presumably of the sort that would be expected in an urban area after a nuclear explosion. However, it is clear that they did not simulate a firestorm such as occurred in Hamburg, Dresden, and Hiroshima during World War II. Without them demonstrating that their model can accurately simulate these actual firestorms, it is difficult to interpret conclusions from their simulations. Firestorms have strong inflowing winds so that they have little spread, extremely tall convection columns or smoke plumes, and burn for long durations until all the fuel within their perimeter is consumed (e.g., Glasstone & Dolan, 1977). Numerous studies of firestorms (e.g., Badlan et al., 2017; Cotton, 1985; Penner et al., 1986; Small et al., 1989; Small & Heikes, 1988) show smoke rising into the stratosphere from simulated firestorms, and explore the dependence of smoke altitude on fire intensity, atmospheric stability, moisture, fire size, wind speed, and other parameters. In a nuclear conflict over a large country involving a large number of weapons many of the fires would be expected to develop into firestorms. Glasstone and Dolan (1977) suggested, based on the experience with 69 mass fires in Japan and many others in Germany during World War II, that firestorms occur when the following criteria are met:

a minimum burning area of about 1.3 km2;

half the structures in the area are on fire simultaneously;

a fuel load of at least 4 g/cm2; and

ambient winds less than 3.6 m/s.

Glasstone and Dolan (1977) and results from Reisner et al. show that, assuming flat topography, a 15‐kt weapon would ignite fires in a ~13‐km2 area including a majority of the structures within that area, thus fulfilling the first two criteria. However, the second two criteria were not met in the Reisner et al. study.

The fuel load in Reisner et al. is too small to generate a fire storm. Mills et al. (2014) used smoke estimates from Toon et al. (2007), who calculate fuel loads ranging from 12.6 to 94.5 g/cm2 for the top 50 urban targets in India and Pakistan. These values are all significantly above the 4 g/cm2 threshold value needed to support a firestorm. In their paper, Reisner et al. do not provide either the target location or the fuel loads used in their fire model. Rather they state that they visually examined Google images of Indian and Pakistani cities and chose a similar area of Atlanta. In personal communications, Jon Reisner did connect us with the provider of their fuel loads, Joseph Crepeau of Applied Research Associates, Inc., so that we could assess these critical data. Their ground zero is near the East Lake Golf Club in suburban Atlanta (33.750°N, 84.305°W), more than 5 km east of downtown Atlanta. A Google Earth map of this region (Figure 1) shows that this suburban region with a golf course looks nothing like a city in India or Pakistan (e.g., Figure 2). From their fuel load maps, we were able to calculate the average burnable fuel load in the 13 km2 target area to be 0.14 g/cm2 and in the 10‐km × 10‐km domain of their model to be 0.91 g/cm2. Both of these values are well below the fuel load threshold for a firestorm, and the target area has 6 times less fuel density than the domain average. The fuel load for the target area is also well below the value calculated using maps of population density following Toon et al. (2007) of 0.87 g/cm2. Fundamentally Reisner et al. simply chose a target with very little fuel. The 0.14 g/cm2 value for the Reisner et al. target area is 15 to 110 times smaller than the top 50 targets in India and Pakistan which were considered in the Mills et al. (2014) study.

Reisner et al. assume a wind profile with 6–8 m/s winds in the boundary layer, which they call “very calm,” but which are significantly above the threshold of 3.6 m/s for a firestorm. Toon et al. (2007) did not consider the effects of surface winds in assuming firestorm conditions. For the top targets in India and Pakistan, during May our own numerical simulations with the version of the WACCM model used by Mills et al. (2014) suggest that surface winds for likely targets would be expected to be above the firestorm threshold about 50% of the time, so assuming sufficient fuel loads, about half of the targets should develop into firestorms and half into conflagrations.

Because of the choice of target location and wind speed, Reisner et al. simulated a weak conflagration rather than a firestorm. Furthermore, for their climate simulation they assume that all 100 targets have the same smoke emissions as this case. In Toon et al. (2007), targets were identified and smoke production scaled by population density and thus each location injected a different amount of smoke proportional to the population. Figure 5 of Reisner et al. shows that their fire is blowing downwind. Conflagrations were observed in World War II mass fires, and indeed were desired in order to burn the largest possible area. They are also commonly observed in modern forest fires. Reisner et al. state “As indicated below, the simulations include various worst case assumptions with regard to the specification of the fuel, weather conditions, and height of burst of the device. Therefore, they serve as upper bounds with regard to the expected outcome of an urban mass fire caused by a nuclear detonation.” We argue that the Reisner et al. simulation is clearly not a worst case. As we have already discussed Reisner et al. do not have a high fuel load, but one that is more than an order of magnitude smaller than even the lowest fuel loads in the urban areas of Pakistan and India considered in the Mills et al. (2014) study. Firestorms were also observed in World War II and lofted material to high altitudes (see Penner et al., 1986). Moreover, numerous conflagrations in forest fires with fuel densities similar to those assumed by Reisner et al. have produced smoke plumes that reached into the stratosphere (e.g., Peterson et al., 2018). In 2017 a fire in British Columbia produced a stratospheric smoke pall that was observed by satellites for 8 months (Yu et al., 2019). Aircraft studies have shown that debris from recent fires is common in the lower stratosphere (Ditas et al., 2018).

Reisner et al. neither compared their simulation with previous studies of mass fires, nor listed the basic parameters that would allow comparisons with past or future studies. They claim they have validated their model against observed mass fires, referring to their Figure 1 and three references (Linn, Canfield, et al., 2012; Linn, Anderson, et al., 2012; Pimont et al., 2009). However, two of these references (Linn, Canfield, et al., 2012; Pimont et al., 2009) and their Figure 1 focus on line fires emitting smoke into the boundary layer, which is not relevant to urban mass fires. The third reference (Linn, Anderson, et al., 2012) focuses on 150 m × 150 m or smaller burn plots, also not representative of a mass fire.

Unfortunately, Reisner et al. did not report where the fire they simulated was located, fuel loading, fraction of fuels burned, fire energy release, or energy release rate when simulations were terminated so their results could not be duplicated. They have subsequently provided us with the target location and fuel loads, which is an important first step to assessing their results and recreating their fire simulation in other models.

Additionally, Reisner et al. chose several parameters for their fire model that could suppress the vertical development of fires including: a stable boundary layer, a dry atmosphere, and a short simulation time. A less stable boundary layer (such as a daytime convective boundary layer) would support more upward motion. Water vapor allows for latent heat release when clouds form. Numerous studies have shown that sensible and latent heat release is essential to lofting smoke in either firestorms (e.g., Penner et al., 1986) or conflagrations (Luderer et al., 2006). Reisner et al. stated “A dry atmosphere was utilized, and pyrocumulus impacts or precipitation from pyro‐cumulonimbus were not considered. While latent heat released by condensation could lead to enhanced vertical motions of the air, increased scavenging of soot particles by precipitation is also possible. These processes will be examined in future studies using HIGRAD‐FIRETEC.” By not considering pyrocumulonimbus clouds, which by the latent heat of condensation can inject soot into the stratosphere, they have eliminated a major source of buoyancy that would loft the soot. They seem to suggest that any lofting of soot would be balanced by significant precipitation scavenging, but there is no evidence for that assumption. In fact, forest fires triggered pyrocumulonimbus clouds that lofted soot into the lower stratosphere in August 2017 over British Columbia, Canada. Over the succeeding weeks, the soot was lofted many more kilometers, as observed by satellites, because it was heated by the Sun (Yu et al., 2019). This fire is direct evidence of the self‐lofting process Robock et al. (2007) and Mills et al. (2014) modeled before. It also shows that precipitation in the cloud still allowed massive amounts of smoke to reach the stratosphere.

Reisner et al. stated that their fires were of surprisingly short duration, “because of low wind speeds and hence minimal fire spread, the fires are rapidly subsiding at 40 min.” However, they do not show the energy release rate so that we can tell if the fuel has been consumed within 40 minutes. And their claims of low wind speed are erroneous, as they choose wind speeds higher than typically observed in Atlanta. Real‐world experience with firestorms such as in Hiroshima or Hamburg during World War II or in San Francisco after the 1906 earthquake (London, 1906), and of conflagrations, such as after the bombing of Tokyo during World War II (Caidan, 1960), suggests that a 40‐minute mass fire is a dramatic underestimate; most of these fires last for many hours. A longer fire would make available more heat and buoyancy to inject soot to higher altitudes. If their fire had a short duration, and did not simply blow off their grid, it was likely due to the low fuel load assumed in their target area and combustion that did not consume all of the available fuel.

The claim that observations and models of the effects of volcanic eruptions support their results is erroneous. They refer to a paper by Timmreck et al. (2010) who modeled the climate effects of the 74 BP Toba eruption, taking into account growth of sulfate aerosol particles due to large SO2 emissions. This process represents completely different physics than would apply to black carbon aerosols. Black carbon (soot) is black, and highly absorptive of sunlight, causing lofting to the upper stratosphere and prolonging the lifetime in the stratosphere by years. This was shown in all our modeling work and observed after the 2017 British Columbia pyrocumulonimbus event (Peterson et al., 2018; Yu et al., 2019). Soot aerosol particles grow as fractals, limiting the effects of mass on fall speed. Sulfate aerosols only weakly absorb sunlight, and their growth reduces their stratospheric lifetime. These differences do not support volcanic sulfate growth as an analog for soot in the stratosphere.

In summary, Reisner et al. (2019) modeled a fire in an area with much different characteristics than considered in our studies including the following:

targeting a sparsely populated suburb surrounding a country club, not a city center;

having a fuel load that is more than an order of magnitude less than any of the 100 urban areas of Pakistan or India considered by Robock et al. (2007) and Mills et al. (2014);

omitting factors known to be important to smoke lofting (e.g., latent heat release); and

failing to model the full duration of the event.

Because of these choices, they did not simulate firestorms, which would be expected in densely populated urban areas and are known to have high altitude smoke plumes. Critically, they have not shown that their model is capable of reproducing historic firestorms, thus making it impossible to interpret their failure to generate a classic firestorm. Reisner et al. do raise an important point that not all mass fires in a nuclear war will be firestorms; however, these mass fires cannot be assumed to be weak conflagrations, either. Accurate understanding of target locations, fuel loads, and the effects of meteorology on the fire and smoke injection heights are critical to understanding the climatic consequences of fires from a nuclear war. Fire models like HIGRAD‐FIRETEC can be valuable tools for studying these issues, but the case presented by Reisner et al. is not typical of the conditions that would be expected in a nuclear war between India and Pakistan and certainly does not represent an upper bound on these effects.

### **A2 Iran Prolif Good**

#### Turning the turn – surprise!! Nuclear Iran destabilizes the region and causes proliferation- both regional and international actors

Einhorn and Nephew, 2016

(Robert Einhorn, senior fellow with the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, and Richard Nephew, nonresident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program and affiliated with the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative housed within the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, "The Iran Nuclear Deal: Prelude to Proliferation in the Middle East?", Brookings, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Series Paper 11, May 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2016/05/iran-deal-regional-proliferation/The-Iran-Nuclear-Dealwebv4.pdf?la=en, Accessed 6/30/16, JL @ RKS)

In the last 10 to 15 years, concerns about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East have centered on Iran. The international community’s deep suspicions about Tehran’s nuclear intentions were based on many factors, including the 2002 public disclosure by an Iranian dissident group of two previously secret nuclear facilities capable of producing fissile material for nuclear weapons; the absence of a convincing peaceful rationale for constructing and operating sensitive fuel-cycle facilities; the IAEA’s discovery of many Iranian violations of its safeguards obligations starting in 1981 and continuing through the 2000s; and the IAEA’s assessment—offered initially in 201l on the basis of over five years of investigations and recently strengthened in December 2015—that, before 2003 and as late as 2009, Iran engaged in activities relevant to the development of nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran has been viewed in the Middle East and more widely as an acute threat to regional and international security. Many in Israel, which has been repeatedly threatened with annihilation by Iran’s leaders, and in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are engaged in intense proxy, religious, and ideological struggles with Iran, fear that Tehran might actually use nuclear weapons against them. But even if Iran would be deterred from initiating nuclear war, many in the region are convinced that it would use the umbrella provided by a nuclear weapons capability to interfere more aggressively in the affairs of its neighbors and engage in other destabilizing activities to advance its goal of regional hegemony. Aside from these direct threats posed by Iran’s nuclear program, the United States and many other countries have been concerned that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would prompt other states in the Middle East, and beyond, to pursue their own nuclear capabilities. This concern was heightened in June 201l, when Prince Turki al Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s former intelligence chief and ambassador to the United States, hinted that the Kingdom would seek to match Iran’s nuclear capability: “It is in our interest that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon, for their doing so would compel Saudi Arabia, whose foreign relations are now so fully measured and well assessed, to pursue policies that could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences.”4

#### De-Stabilizes the Region Waltz is wrong- a nuclear Iran would destabilize the region- laundry list of reasons

KAHL, associate Professor at Georgetown University, 2012

(COLIN H. KAHL, "Iran and the Bomb: Would a Nuclear Iran Make the Middle East More Secure?" One Step Too Far", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5 (SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2012), JSTOR, Accessed 7/2/16, JL @ RKS)

Kenneth Waltz is probably right that a nuclear-armed Iran could be deterred from deliberately using nuclear weapons or transferring a nuclear device to terrorists ("Why Iran Should Get the Bomb," July/ August 2012). But he is dead wrong that the Islamic Republic would likely become a more responsible international actor if it crossed the nuclear threshold. In making that argument, Waltz mischaracterizes Iranian motivations and badly misreads history. And despite the fact that Waltz is one of the world s most respected inter- national relations theorists, he ignores important political science research into the effects of nuclear weapons, including recent findings that suggest that new nuclear states are often more reckless and aggressive at lower levels of conflict. RATIONAL BUT DANGEROUS Waltz correctly notes that Iran's leaders, despite their fanatical rhetoric, are fundamentally rational. Because Iran's leadership is not suicidal, it is highly unlikely that a nuclear-armed Iran would deliberately use a nuclear device or transfer one to terrorists. Yet even though the Islamic Republic is rational, it is still dangerous, and it is likely to become even more so if it develops nuclear weapons. Iran's government currently sponsors terrorist groups and supports militants throughout the Middle East, in part to demonstrate a capability to retaliate against the United States, Israel, and other states should they attack Iran or undermine its interests. If the Iranian leadership's sole concern was its own survival and it believed that a nuclear deterrent alone could give it enough protection, then as a nuclear state, it might curtail its support for proxies in order to avoid needless disputes with other nuclear powers. But Iran is not a status quo state, and its support for terrorists and militants is intended to be for more than just defense and retaliation. Such support is an offensive tool, designed to pressure and intimidate other states, indirectly expand Iran's influ- ence, and advance its revisionist agenda, which seeks to make Iran the preeminent power in the Middle East, champion resistance to Israel and "arrogant powers" in the West, promote its brand of revolu- tionary Islamist ideology, and assert its leadership in the wider Islamic world. Tehran currently calibrates its support for militants and sponsorship of terrorism to minimize the risks of a direct confron- tation with more powerful states. But if Iranian leaders perceived that a nuclear arsenal provided a substantially more robust deterrent against retaliation, they would likely pursue their regional goals more aggressively Specifically, a nuclear-armed Tehran would likely provide Hezbollah and Palestinian militants with more sophisti- cated, longer-range, and more accurate conventional weaponry for use against Israel. In an effort to bolster the deterrent capabilities of such allies, Iran might con- sider giving them "dual-capable" weapons, leaving Israel to guess whether these systems were conventional or armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear material. A nuclear-armed Iran might also give its proxies permission to use advanced weapons systems instead of keeping them in reserve, as Tehran reportedly instructed Hezbollah to do during the militant group's 2006 war with Israel. A nuclear-armed Iran, believing that it possessed a powerful deterrent and could thus commit violence abroad with near impunity, might also increase the frequency and scale of the terrorist attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets carried out by Hezbollah and the Quds Force, the covert operations wing of Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. And a bolder Iran might increase the number of Revolutionary Guard forces it deployed to Lebanon, allow its navy to engage in more frequent shows of force in the Mediterranean, and assert itself more aggressively in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. To further enhance its image in the eyes of domestic and regional audiences as the leader of an anti-Western resistance bloc, a nuclear-armed Iran might respond to regional crises by threatening to use all the means at its disposal to ensure the survival of the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah, or Palestinian groups. And Iran might be emboldened to play the spoiler in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process by encouraging large-scale militant attacks and might try to destabilize its neighbors through more coercive diplomacy and subversion in Iraq and the Gulf states.

### A2 Circumvention

#### 1] Don’t give them the Connecticut evidence – It’s in the context of elimination of governmental and educational bodies of individuals. You should be highly skeptical of voting on this with a nuclear policy topic.

#### 2] No circumvention – NPT accession guarantees

#### 3] No circumvention – WMDFZ solves

#### 4] No circumvention – Read our method it’s great

#### 5] Even if circumvention is true, it would take so ling that it would remain unfeasible.

### A2 Counterforce

#### 1] Kroenig evidence really bad – indicates that counterforce might work if managed carefully, which means that we should err on the side that it doesn’t work to prevent an existential risk.

#### 2] The aff creates a WMD free zone – just as good as a counterforce but also eliminates deterrence logic.

#### 3] Supercharges the aff – Iranian nukes must be eliminated and the only way to ensure that is to prevent the future proliferation of WMD’s in the region.

### A2 Spark

#### No superintelligence – tech barriers and diminishing Moore’s law means it’d happen slowly

Edward Moore Geist 8-9-2015; MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Is artificial intelligence really an existential threat to humanity? http://thebulletin.org/artificial-intelligence-really-existential-threat-humanity8577

In the 1950s, the founders of the field of artificial intelligence assumed that the discovery of a few fundamental insights would make machines smarter than people within a few decades. By the 1980s, however, they discovered fundamental limitations that show that there will always be diminishing returns to additional processing power and data. Although these technical hurdles pose no barrier to the creation of human-level AI, they will likely forestall the sudden emergence of an unstoppable “superintelligence.” The risks of self-improving intelligent machines are grossly exaggerated and ought not serve as a distraction from the existential risks we already face, especially given that the limited AI technology we already have is poised to make threats like those posed by nuclear weapons even more pressing than they currently are. Disturbingly, little or no technical progress beyond that demonstrated by self-driving cars is necessary for artificial intelligence to have potentially devastating, cascading economic, strategic, and political effects. While policymakers ought not lose sleep over the technically implausible menace of “superintelligence,” they have every reason to be worried about emerging AI applications such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s submarine-hunting drones, which threaten to upend longstanding geostrategic assumptions in the near future. Unfortunately, Superintelligence offers little insight into how to confront these pressing challenges.

#### Governments aren’t looking to fund geoengineering – the public is against it and too focused on renewables

Goodman, 2015 (Bryce Goodman, Clean Tech Entrpreneur, 02/17/2015 11:59 pm EST, “Geoengineering and the Fight Against Climate Change: An Interview with David W. Keith”, published by Huffington Post in partnership with Generation Change NRG, < http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bryce-goodman/geoengineering-and-the-fi\_b\_6680948.html>)

Unsurprisingly, there are a number of uncertainties and undesirable side-effects with this plan and some [oppose even studying geoengineering](http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2015/02/nrc_geoengineering_report_climate_hacking_is_dangerous_and_barking_mad.2.html). To date, there has been no major publicly funded research program in geoengineering. However, while the NAS report concluded that deploying geoengineering now would be "irrational and irresponsible", it was broadly supportive of public research to improve "understanding of the physical potential and technical feasibility of geoengineering approaches". That's one of the things about geoengineering that is so striking: people aren't just against geoengineering practice, they're also against geoengineering research. I cannot really think of another scientific field where this is the case. Do you have a sense of why this is? Trying to do this kind of deliberate intervention is a step that is different from what humanity has done before. Of course you can argue that we have transformed the environment in all sorts of ways for agriculture, etc. But this is the first thing that is really planetary scale with a deliberate effect. Another part has to do with the very strong, politically motivated commitment by some people in the climate activist world to only talk about emissions mitigation. They want to talk about renewable energy and nothing else. And while I think that large scale use of renewables is a very sensible thing to do, I think that this attitude is a kind of dangerous monomania. [Steve Rayner](http://www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/people/who-are-we/steve-rayner/) has said it is like the Southern Baptist attitude towards sexual education--if you don't talk about it people won't do it. Geoengineering is relatively cheap--you've said [a program costing $1 billion a year could have substantial effects](http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/scientist-david-keith-on-slowing-global-warming-with-geoengineering-a-934359.html). So in theory a single country--or wealthy person for that matter--could decide to start deploying this tomorrow. Should geoengineering only proceed with a formal treaty and the blessing of the UN? We need international dialogue and collaboration but I'm not sure we need a formal treaty. And if geoengeering does happen I think the dynamic will be very simple. Some countries will do it--likely not the US--other countries will publicly say "we decry these actions without a UN treaty" but privately be happy because someone else is taking the heat and they get the benefit. **So then what's holding you back on conducting your proposed research?** The government wont fund it. And I think it's important in a democracy that these experiments go through a proper external risk assessment with substantial public funding.

#### No grey goo

Ronald Bailey, 2003 Member of American Scientist for Bioethics and Reason Correspondent, The Limitless Promise of Nanotechnology) http://www.dimaggio.org/A-nanotechnology.htm

The fact is that no one has yet definitively shown that Drexler's vision of molecular manufacturing using nanoassemblers is impossible. So let's suppose Smalley and Roco are wrong, and such nanobots are possible. How dangerous would self-replicating nanobots be? One of the ironies of the debate over regulation of nanotechnology is that it was nanotech boosters like Drexler who first worried about such risks. To address potential dangers such as the uncontrolled self-replication envisioned in his gray goo scenario, Drexler and others founded the Foresight Institute in 1989. Over the years, Foresight devised a set of guidelines aimed at preventing mishaps like a gray goo breakout. Among other things, the Foresight guidelines propose that nanotech replicators "must not be capable of replication in a natural, uncontrolled environment." This could be accomplished, the guidelines suggest, by designing devices so that they have an "absolute dependence on a single artificial fuel source or artificial 'vitamins' that don't exist in any natural environment." So if some replicators should get away, they would simply run down when they ran out of fuel. Another proposal is that self-replicating nanotech devices be "dependent on broadcast transmissions for replication or in some cases operation." That would put human operators in complete control of the circumstances under which nanotech devices could replicate. One other sensible proposal is that devices be programmed with termination dates. Like senescent cells in the human body, such devices would stop working and self-destruct when their time was up. "The moratorium is not a new proposal," says Foresight Institute President Christine Peterson. "Eric Drexler considered that idea a long time ago in The Engines of Creation and dismissed it as not a safe option. With a moratorium, we, the good guys, are going to be sitting on our hands. It's very risky to let the bad guys be the ones developing the technology. To do arms control on nanotechnology, you'd better have better nanotechnology than the bad guys." Software entrepreneur Ray Kurzweil is confident that nanotech defenses against uncontrolled replication will be stronger than the abilities to replicate. Citing our current ability to reduce computer viruses to nuisances, Kurzweil argues that we will be even more vigilant against a technology that could kill if uncontrolled. Smalley suggests we can learn how to control nanotech by looking at biology. The natural world is filled with self-replicating systems. In a sense, living things are "green goo." We already successfully defend ourselves against all kinds of self-replicating organisms that try to kill us, such as cholera, malaria, and typhoid. "What do we do about biological systems right now?" says Smalley. "I don't see that it's any different from biotechnology. We can make bacteria and viruses that have never existed before, and we'll handle [nanobots] the same way."

#### No extinction – or cosmic rays would have destroyed us

Don Lincoln 2-10-2016; Don Lincoln, Senior Scientist, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory; Adjunct Professor of Physics, University of Notre Dame “Will the World's Largest Supercollider Spawn a Black Hole? (Op-Ed)” http://www.livescience.com/53669-can-particle-accelerators-spawn-black-holes-and-global-extinction.html

Luckily, we have the most compelling answer of all: Nature has been running the equivalent of countless LHC experiments since the universe began — and still does, every day, on Earth. Space is a violent place, with stars throwing off literally tons of material every second — and that's the tamest of phenomena. Supernovas occur, blasting star stuff across the cosmos. Neutron stars can use intense magnetic fields to accelerate particles from one side of the universe to another. Pairs of orbiting black holes can merge, shaking the very fabric of space itself. All of those phenomena, as well as many others, cause subatomic particles to be flung across space. Mostly consisting of protons, those particles travel the lengths of the universe, stopping only when an inconvenient bit of matter gets in their way. And, occasionally, that inconvenient bit of matter is the Earth. We call these intergalactic bullets — mostly high-energy protons — "cosmic rays." Cosmic rays carry a range of energies, from the almost negligible, to energies that absolutely dwarf those of the LHC. To give a sense of scale, the LHC collides particles together with a total energy of 13 trillion (or tera) electron volts of energy (TeV). The highest-energy cosmic ray ever recorded was an unfathomable 300,000,000 TeV of energy. Now, cosmic rays of that prodigious energy are very rare. The energy of more common cosmic rays is much lower. But here's the point: Cosmic rays of the energy of a single LHC beam hit the Earth about half a quadrillion times per second. No collider necessary. Remember that cosmic rays are mostly protons. That's because almost all of the matter in the universe is hydrogen, which consists of a single proton and a single electron. When they hit the Earth's atmosphere, they collide with nitrogen or oxygen or other atoms, which are composed of protons and neutrons. Accordingly, cosmic rays hitting the Earth are just two protons slamming together — this is exactly what is happening inside the LHC. Two protons slamming together. Thus, the barrage of cosmic rays from space have been doing the equivalent of LHC research since the Earth began — we just haven't had the luxury of being able to watch. Now one must be careful. It's easy to throw numbers around a bit glibly. While there are lots of cosmic rays hitting the atmosphere with LHC energies, the situations between what happens inside the LHC and what happens with cosmic rays everywhere on Earth are a bit different. Cosmic ray collisions involve fast-moving protons hitting stationary ones, while LHC collisions involve two beams of fast-moving protons hitting head-on. Head-on collisions are intrinsically more violent; so to make a fair comparison, we need to consider cosmic rays that are much higher in energy, specifically about 100,000 times higher than LHC energies. Cosmic rays of that energy are rarer than the lower energy ones, but still 500,000,000 of them hit the Earth's atmosphere every year. When you remember that the Earth is 4.5 billion years old, you realize that the Earth has experienced something like 2 billion billion cosmic ray collisions with LHC-equivalent energies (or higher) in the atmosphere since the Earth formed. In order to make that many collisions, we'd need to run the LHC continuously for 70 years. Given that we're still here, we can conclude that we're safe.

## 1AR – Counterplans

### A2 CP – Asteroids PIC

#### 1] Don’t buy their risk analysis – you shouldn’t vote for them if they’re not winning a scenario or a credible probability argument. Don’t make it the aff’s burden to do their weighing for them.

#### 2] No ! to asteroids—collisions are basically impossible, and it’s low magnitude anyway.

Feltman 19—Rachel Feltman, Science Editor (“We were not almost killed by an asteroid this week,” July 26th, *Popular Science*, <https://www.popsci.com/asteroid-close-earth-ok-2019/>)

"Scientists stunned by 'city-killer' asteroid that just missed Earth" is an awfully compelling headline. But it paints a much sexier—and scarier—portrait than the truth.

Let’s look at the facts. Did a big rock fly by Earth on Thursday morning? Yup: Asteroid 2019 OK is an estimated 187-427 feet across and moved at around 55,000 miles per hour. Did it catch scientists pretty much totally unaware? Yes indeed. Truly, they were shook. Did it “just miss” a collision with our planet? Yes and no.

When Asteroid 2019 OK careened through our neighborhood on Thursday, it came within 45,000 miles of Earth. That’s close, cosmically speaking; the moon is nearly 240,000 miles away. We don’t generally want big, smashy rocks coming closer to us than our own moon.

It might sound horrifying that this asteroid made such a close encounter, or like some serious scientific negligence must have occurred. Neither of these things is actually true.

For starters, asteroid strikes are a lot less scary than a headline can make them sound. Yes, you could dub 2019 OK a "city-killer" based on its size. A rock that large could cause serious harm to a city if it hit one. But according to experts, an asteroid at the lower end of 2019 OK's size estimate is only likely to hit our planet once every 1,000 years. An object on the high end of the size estimate only makes impact around once every 20,000 years.

And there's a reason we don't have tons of stories about less-than-city-killer-level asteroids walloping humans and their homes: rocks break up as they hurtle through our atmosphere, so they're much more likely to cause explosions in the sky (and potentially dangerous sonic booms) than leave craters in your backyard. When you factor in the fact that more than 70 percent of Earth is mostly-open ocean (and, while it's easy to forget if you live in the cities or 'burbs, that our landmasses are full of open spaces), the likelihood of a rock big enough to do damage hitting us, surviving entry, and then colliding with a populated area is infinitesimally small.

#### 3] Relying on nukes fails and causes fragmentation which independently cause extinction

Andrews ’19 - PhD in experimental volcanology, citing a study from Charles El Mir who researches asteroid destruction at Johns Hopkins

Robin George Andrews, “If We Blow Up an Asteroid, It Might Put Itself Back Together,” The New York Times, March 8, 2019, sec. Science, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/science/asteroids-nuclear-weapons.html>.

Faced with the prospect of a sizable asteroid heading toward Earth and causing doomsday, humanity has come up with various responses.

Hollywood may reckon that the best way to destroy an errant space rock is with nuclear weapons. This is [rarely the preferred option](http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20160510-what-we-would-actually-do-to-stop-a-doomsday-asteroid) of experts, but using some sort of spacecraft system to smash an asteroid into small, harmless pieces is seen as [a real-world possibility](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/National-Near-Earth-Object-Preparedness-Strategy-and-Action-Plan-23-pages-1MB.pdf). A new study, looking at a gigantic space rock-on-space rock clash, hints at how utterly ineffective this type of asteroid assassination attempt may be.

Using computer models, scientists simulated a 4,000-foot asteroid smashing into a 15.5-mile asteroid at 11,200 miles per hour. Immediately after colliding, the large asteroid cracked considerably, with debris flowing outward like a cascade of Ping-Pong balls. Despite some deep fractures, the heart of the asteroid was not comprehensively damaged.

As time went on, the gravitational pull of the asteroid’s resilient core was able to pull back ejected shards. It seems that asteroids don’t just absorb mind-boggling amounts of damage, but, as previous work [has hinted](https://www.aanda.org/articles/aa/abs/2013/06/aa21657-13/aa21657-13.html), they also are able to rebuild themselves.

Charles El Mir, who studies asteroid annihilation at Johns Hopkins University and is the paper’s lead author, said his findings “could be interpreted as an argument against ‘blowing up’ an asteroid as a defensive strategy.”

Asteroid collisions and demolitions have been simulated many times in recent decades. Earlier studies suggested that large asteroids are full of internal scars because of their violent history, and that a fast enough impact would completely shatter them.

The new study, published this month in the journal Icarus, tried a different simulation.

K.T. Ramesh, director of the Hopkins Extreme Materials Institute, said that Andy Tonge, a former graduate student, had developed a computational model that looked at how materials like bulletproof vests respond to impacts. Realizing that Dr. Tonge’s model could simulate asteroid impact events, the team merged it with another model that also replicated the effects of a large asteroid’s gravitational field.

This hybrid model allowed them to more realistically see how an asteroid responds to being hit by a powerful projectile. It captured previously missing but vital small-scale details, including where fractures would appear and precisely how they would spread.

Michele Bannister, a planetary astronomer at Queen’s University Belfast, described the research as “a nice upgrade on modeling the complex physical realities” of the solar system’s enigmatic rocky monsters.

The study has limitations. Both asteroids are modeled as simple, nonrotating chunks of rock, whereas real asteroids are far more variable. In addition, the larger asteroid, despite featuring a starting collection of cracks, did not have a history of multiple impacts as true asteroids would. A large space rock smashing into a humongous space rock also differs from a missile onslaught, or an atomic bomb exploding on or beneath an asteroid’s surface while a popular rock band plays.

The study doesn’t rule out using projectiles to destroy an incoming asteroid, Dr. El Mir said. But, he added, shattering a large asteroid may end up causing more problems than it solves. Turning a cannonball into shotgun-shell fragments could still result in Armageddon if the shards strike Earth.

NASA’s Planetary Defense Coordination Office, which keeps an eye on asteroids and comets that will one day pass close to Earth, instead suggests changing a space rock’s trajectory by giving it a small nudge well in advance of reaching our world. NASA and others aim to test this strategy in 2022 with the Double Asteroid Redirection Test, in which a spacecraft will deliberately crash into the smaller member of a binary asteroid system in an attempt to change its orbit around the larger body.

Ultimately, the choice between deflection and destruction largely depends on how quickly an incoming asteroid is spotted.

“A successful deflection becomes more difficult to execute as warning time decreases,” said Megan Bruck Syal, a planetary defense researcher at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. “For the shortest warning times, robust disruption and dispersal of the fragments may be the only viable option to prevent the impact.”

#### 4] It’s their burden to prove that Israel nuclear arsenal has the capacity to deflect asteroids – otherwise they lose this arg.

#### 5] No need for the CP – the US can just do it.

#### PICs are a voting issue – 1] they moot the entire AC and force a 1ar restart creating a 13-7 time skew - kills reciprocity and fairness which is a voter since it’s constitutive of a competitive activity. 2] incentivizes debaters to find the most obscure and tiny parts of the lit that that are impossible for the aff to research and have little to no quality aff ground – also un-educational because it shifts the debate from the core of the topic to cheaty positions that avoid clash and engagement.

#### Vote for fairness and fairness outweighs education – it’s a gateway issue to clash, and only clash creates unique education in the debate space. Err aff on this substance – if we’re not winning the substance of this argument it’s because the position’s abusive

#### Drop the debater to deter them from further abuse and because the abuse has already happened – I had to spend a minute on this shell. Competing interps because they get more time and should have to defend their norm. No RVI’s – they can stick 6 min of answers to a short arg and win the debate.

### A2 CP – First Strike Iran

#### 1] Turn – first strike means that Arab allies turn on Israel. That independently causes a second war and CBW use leading to extinction.

#### 2] Doesn’t solve the aff – CBW prolif and Arabian coalition still happens meaning that there’s still an extinction scenario.

#### 3] Doesn’t solve the aff – you don’t create a WMDFZ in the middle east, which is the only way to solve the CBW link.

#### 4] Doesn’t solve the aff – you still replicate figures of nuclear colonialism by authorizing a western nuclear power to nuke another nation so that they don’t get nukes, legitimizing the notion that only western nations can have nukes. Independent reason to vote aff.

#### 5] Their evidence doesn’t factor in Hezbollah intervention into the war for Iran – super flawed bc it’s obvious they’ll play a key part in hindering Israeli military ops.

#### 6] Don’t buy this Rogan evidence – way too optimistic regarding US intervention given recent events. The US doesn’t want to fight a war with Iran.

### A2 CP – NFU

#### 1] Doesn’t solve the aff – new nuclear powers like Saudi Arabia that rise up from Israeli nuclear possession are much worse because they don’t have experience with nukes. Leads to loose nukes and higher chance of miscalc

#### 2] Turn – NFU reveals Israeli nukes to the middle east and guarantees nuke prolif and these countries aren’t bound by NFU meansing that the cp creates a new nuclear regime.

#### 3] Doesn’t solve the aff – CBW attacks can still happen and Israel can’t use their deterrence against other Arab states. Means that you prevent deterrence uniquely in this region.

#### 4] Perm do both – no one would have a clue of Israeli disarm and NFU claim means that neighboring states still think Israel has an arsenal.

#### 5] NFU causes conventional shift – turns the cp

Tiwari 16 (Dr Neha Kumar Tiwari has completed her PhD from Centre of International Politics, Orgnisation, Disarmament and Diplomacy, “Put an end to the threat,” 8-9, <https://www.telegraphindia.com/1160809/jsp/opinion/story_101314.jsp>)

There has been an endless debate about whether the US should adopt the NFU approach or not. However, the main question is whether an NFU policy would be sufficient to end the mad race for nuclear weapons. Since the advent of nuclear weapons, the world has been caught in a cycle of nuclear proliferation which is difficult to end. An NFU declaration by the US would mean that the nation would depend more on its advanced conventional weapons to deal with threats. Mad race Obviously, the US has vast resources to spend on conventional weapons; its inventory includes technologically complex ballistic missile defence systems, prompt global strike systems and even smart conventional weapons which can almost be considered an equivalent to nuclear weapons in their destructive power, minus radiation. The idea behind the US's policy could be about spending more on weapons it can actually use, rather than investing in nuclear weapons which have become mere showpieces in strategic circles. On the contrary, other nations do not have the capability or the resources to spend excessively on conventional weapons in order to compete with the US. America's adversaries include big nations like China and Russia, and small ones like Iran and North Korea. These countries have obvious reasons to be wary of the US's superiority when it comes to conventional weapons. Both allies and adversaries of the US have already seen the role played by technologically superior conventional weapons during the first Gulf war. As a result, they will depend on nuclear weapons during any kind of conflict in order to deal with America's conventional superiority. Russia had mentioned that it would resort to its nuclear weapons - including the policy of de-escalation - to counter any conventional weapons threat. The result of all this would be an inadvertent nuclear arms race, which even the US's NFU policy would not be able to deal with. It is like a vicious cycle of proliferation from which the world cannot escape. Therefore, the declaration of an NFU policy alone will not end nuclear proliferation. In fact, the conventional domination of the US is an impediment to achieving success in nuclear disarmament. The answer to ending this cycle of proliferation is to put a limit on conventional weapons along with an NFU declaration. The issue of conventional weapons has seldom been debated or discussed at international fora. It is high time that such issues were paid attention, so that real disarmament can be achieved on the international front.

### 1AR – Condo Module

#### Conditionality is a voter – 1] Recirpocity – condo means they can kick the counterplan but I lose if I kick the AC. Recirpocity k2 fairness bc it ensures equal paths to the ballot. 2] Skew – they can just kick out of CP’s if I straight turn them or win any offense, which skews an already terrible 13-7 time skew. Time k2 fairness because we can’t make arguments without time – whoever has used their time more efficiently wins and shortchanging me with condo args eliminates any fair aspect. 3] Engagement – condo args encourage shifty debate where neg debaters decide to go for the most under covered argument while disregarding arguments that they lost. Engagement k2 education bc we won’t learn anything from a one-sided lecture of an issue. Clash is the only education unique to debate.

#### Vote aff for fairness and education – 1] debate is a game that requires a winner, and fairness is intrinsic in such activities. 2] education is the reason why schools fund debate.

#### Drop the debater to deter them from further abuse and because the abuse has already happened – I had to spend a minute on this shell. Competing interps because they get more time and should have to defend their norm. No RVI’s – they can stick 6 min of answers to a short arg and win the debate.

### 1AR – PIC’s Bad Module

#### PICs are a voting issue – 1] they moot the entire AC and force a 1ar restart creating a 13-7 time skew - kills reciprocity and fairness which is a voter since it’s constitutive of a competitive activity. 2] incentivizes debaters to find the most obscure and tiny parts of the lit that that are impossible for the aff to research and have little to no quality aff ground – also un-educational because it shifts the debate from the core of the topic to cheaty positions that avoid clash and engagement.

#### Vote for fairness and fairness outweighs education – it’s a gateway issue to clash, and only clash creates unique education in the debate space. Err aff on this substance – if we’re not winning the substance of this argument it’s because the position’s abusive

#### Drop the debater to deter them from further abuse and because the abuse has already happened – I had to spend a minute on this shell. Competing interps because they get more time and should have to defend their norm. No RVI’s – they can stick 6 min of answers to a short arg and win the debate.

### 1AR – Multiplank Module

#### Multi-plank fiat is a voter – 1] Predictability – multiplank fiat destroys predictability because it incentivizes debaters to read planks that can never be predicted. Predictability k2 fairness because it creates clash. 2] Time Skew – forces aff debaters to answer each plank independently in an already time-crunched 1AR. Destroys fairness through time skew – I don’t have enough time to answer each plank which means there’s no fair way to test the entire CP 3] Ground – explodes neg ground and aff prep burden. Reading multiple planks allows the neg to fit multiple DIFFERENT policy options under 1 argument, and explodes aff burden on already short 1AR. 4] Topic Ed – emphasizes breadth over depth and doesn’t allow for detailed discussion of policy options. Depth k2 education because then we would all be jack-of-all-trades and masters of none.

#### C/A voting issues and paradigm issues from PIC’s bad.

## 1AR – Disadvantages

### A2 DA – Israel Aggression

#### 1] The plan solves – Arab states lay down their CBW’s which is signal for peace in the region. Also no prolif – that’s Ingram.

#### 2] The disad assumes that strikes will continue post-plan – there’s no warrant for this analysis in the card. It’s literally about what would happen if Israel still had nukes. You should prefer our analysis over theirs because we take into account the plan.

#### 3] At best you get a conventional war – in this case we outweigh on magnitude.

#### 4] All of your discussion of Israel-Iran tensions are like pre 2015 – this is really bad recency and I’m def winning this uniqueness debate.

#### 5] The impact card and the link card don’t make sense together – this is not a coherent argument. The impact evidence doesn’t mention Israel in the impact scenario whatsoever. In addition, the impact scenario is Iran – Saudi war under the guise of a nuclear bomb held by Iran, which doesn’t happen post plan. In addition, nuclear conflict can’t happen bc post-plan creates a WMDFZ.

#### 6] Link turn – lack of elimination forces Iranian escalation and bomb threat. That’s 1AC Norman which is what triggers your disad.

### A2 DA – Israel Deterrence

#### 1] The aff solves the disad – Ingram states that Israeil nuclear disarm leads to the creation of a WMDFZ in the Middle East. Iran BACKS this.

#### 2] Disarm eliminates any necessity for Iran prolif in the region – eliminates the double standard regarding nuclear possession and clarifies the NPT stance on nuclear weapons.

#### 3] The disad assumes that strikes will continue post-plan – there’s no warrant for this analysis in the card. It’s literally about what would happen if Israel still had nukes. You should prefer our analysis over theirs because we take into account the plan.

#### 4] Link turn – lack of elimination forces Iranian escalation and bomb threat. That’s 1AC Norman.

#### 5] You should reject their westernized impact framing – 1NC Goldberg literally just claims that Iran is evil, which is entirely based on western epistemologies. Vote aff to reject their orientalist representations. Reps come first because they’re linked to your scholarship, which is an intrinsic part of the 1NC.

#### 6] Deterrence empirics flow aff

**Wilson 8** (Ward Hayes Wilson is a Senior Fellow and director of the Rethinking Nuclear Weapons project at the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), a think tank focusing on nuclear disarmament based in London and Washington, D.C. "The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence," Nonproliferation Review, Vol 15 No 3, November 2008. <https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/153_wilson.pdf>) *jsk*

The Uncertain Track Record of Nuclear Deterrence Some people try to make the case for nuclear deterrence not by explaining its theoretical basis but by simply pointing to its track record. They assert that nuclear deterrence prevented nuclear attacks for the thirty years from 1950 to 1980 and claim that that is proof enough of its efficacy. There are problems with this, however. In order to answer the question, ‘‘did deterrence work?’’ you must first be able to know whether your opponent had a fully formed intention to attack and then refrained from doing so because of your threat. Questions of intention, particularly the intention of world leaders\*who are typically reluctant to admit being thwarted in almost any circumstances\*are rarely documented, and when documentary evidence is present, difficult to judge. As George and Smoke note, ‘‘It is difficult . . . to identify cases of deterrence success reliably in the absence of better data on the policy calculations of potential initiators who were presumably deterred. Instances of apparently successful deterrence . . . may be spurious.’’39 There are also a number of other plausible explanations for the absence of war during this period. Most major wars are followed by periods, sometimes quite long 432 WARD WILSON periods, of relative peace. The hundred years following the Napoleonic wars were for the most part ones of peace in Europe. The period following the Thirty Years War also was strikingly pacific. Why does it make sense to attribute the peace following the Thirty Years War and the Napoleonic Wars to ‘‘war weariness,’’ ‘‘economic exhaustion,’’ or ‘‘domestic political distraction,’’ but the peace after World War II to nuclear deterrence? Consider, for example, the case of chemical weapons following World War I. The conditions necessary for deterrence with these weapons of mass destruction were present. In the early 1920s, Germany, England, France, Italy, Russia, the United States, and others possessed the means necessary (industrial capacity to mass produce the chemical agents, bombers with sufficient range and carrying capacity, naval ships capable of firing large shells over long ranges) to use chemical weapons against the densely populated coastal and interior urban centers of their enemies.40 Such attacks, properly planned and executed, could have killed hundreds of thousands. They would certainly have ranked on a par with the most deadly city attacks in World War II. Yet no standard histories of the post!World War I era ascribe the peace that was maintained during those years to a ‘‘delicate balance’’ of deadly weapons of mass destruction. We do not rush to give deterrence the credit for the peace of those years. If nuclear weapons are seen as preventing war from 1950 to 1980, why is it that chemical weapons are not seen as having prevented war for the seven years from 1918 to 1925?41 Locating the reason why an action or phenomenon did not occur, finding the cause of an absence, is always problematic. For example, I believe firmly that the garlic I wear around my neck has prevented vampire attacks. The proof, I say, is that no vampires have, as yet, attacked me. Yet objective observers might still be skeptical. The problem with the claim about deterrence is that although there were contingency plans on both sides, there is little evidence that either the United States or the Soviet Union was ever on the brink of launching an aggressive war against the other. There is certainly no evidence of such an action that was planned, agreed to, and then thwarted by the threat of nuclear counterattack.42 How is it possible to assert that deterrence prevented war without clear evidence that war was ever imminent? It might be argued that while there is no particular war that was abandoned because of deterrence, deterrence did engender a general mutual restraint both in normal diplomatic relations and during the numerous crises of the Cold War. It is true that the large nuclear arsenals in the United States and the Soviet Union induced caution during this period. Numerous memoirs of leaders on both sides attest to this fact. But this is not evidence that deterrence worked. The mutual caution of the Cold War is evidence that nuclear weapons are dangerous, not that they are effective weapons of war or useful for threatening. To understand this, imagine a counterfactual involving biological weapons. No one argues that biological weapons are ideal weapons. They are blunt instruments, clumsy and difficult to employ effectively. Targeting with precision is a particular problem, as the wind has an unfortunate tendency to blow in unexpected directions, and the biological agents can, under certain circumstances, blow back on your own troops or population. No one argues that biological weapons are decisive weapons of war, crucial for security. They argue instead that biological weapons are dangerous, clumsy weapons that are best banned. THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 433 Imagine, however, that following World War II the United States and Soviet Union had been armed with large arsenals of biological weapons mounted on missiles kept on hair-trigger alert. Is it difficult to believe that such arsenals would have induced caution on both sides? Yet we would not take this caution as proof that biological weapons were any less clumsy, difficult to aim, or difficult to control. We would not take this caution as proof that biological weapons are actually more militarily effective than we had previously thought. In the same way, nuclear weapons are dangerous (and induce caution) without being particularly effective. The caution on both sides during the Cold War is not proof of the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. Although the successes of nuclear deterrence over the thirty years from 1950 to 1980 are speculative, its failures are not. Despite expectations to the contrary, the U.S. nuclear monopoly in the four years after World War II did not yield significantly greater diplomatic influence.43 Far from being cowed, the Soviets were very tough in post-war negotiations, culminating in the 1948 showdown over access to Berlin. Nuclear weapons also failed to give their possessors a decisive military advantage in war. The United States was fought to a draw in Korea and subsequently lost a war fought in Vietnam, despite possessing the ‘‘ultimate weapon.’’ The Soviet Union found that its nuclear arsenal could not prevent failure in its own guerrilla war in Afghanistan. Since Vietnam, the United States has fought in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.44 In none of these wars were its opponents intimidated into surrendering, nor could a practical use for nuclear weapons be devised. Against these failures are often offered a range of explanations. The enemy had an ally who possessed nuclear weapons, the war was not sufficiently central to the interests of the nuclear power to justify using weapons of last resort, and so on. These explanations, however, cannot account for the striking failure of deterrence in both the Yom Kippur War and the Falkland Islands War. Twice, during the Cold War, countries that had nuclear weapons were attacked\*were made war on\*by nations that did not have nuclear weapons. In both cases the threat of a nuclear retaliation failed to deter. How can these failures be accounted for? One of the benefits of deterrence is that it is supposed to protect against conventional assault. Yet in both these cases nuclear weapons failed to provide this protection. The case of Israel is particularly striking. Given the deep animus between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt and Syria, on the other, the repeated statements by various Arab spokesmen that Israel had no right to exist, and the resulting probability that Israel would interpret any attack as a threat to its very existence, the danger of a nuclear attack by Israel would seem to be far greater than in any instance of Cold War confrontation. Yet nuclear weapons failed Israel. They did not deter. In fact, they failed twice: neither Anwar Sadat, the leader of Egypt, nor Hafez al-Assad, the leader of Syria, was deterred.45 There is positive evidence that nuclear threats do not prevent conventional attacks, even in circumstances where nuclear deterrence ought to work robustly (extermination a possibility, implacable foes). Similarly the evidence provides little support for the notion that nuclear weapons provide diplomatic leverage. The only use for nuclear deterrence with no clear-cut failures (thankfully) is the claim that nuclear deterrence wards off nuclear 434 WARD WILSON attacks. Although the practical record does not indict this form of deterrence, the general theoretical objections to it still apply.

### A2 DA – CBW

#### 1] Shift to CBW’s are inevitable but maintaining deterrence logic breaks down global cooperation needed to adapt to those threats.

George P. **Shultz et al 11** [60th Secretary of State, 62nd Secretary of the Treasury, PhD Industrial Economics], William J. Perry [19th Secretary of Defense, PhD Mathematics], Henry A. Kissinger [56th Secretary of State, former National Security Advisor, Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, PhD Political Science], and Sam Nunn [Former Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, LLB Emory], “Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation,” Wall Street Journal, 3-7-2011, <https://media.nti.org/pdfs/NSP_op-eds_final_.pdf>//GDS-VC

The first step is to recognize that there is a daunting new spectrum of global security threats. These threats include chemical, biological and radiological weapons, catastrophic terrorism and cyber warfare, as well as natural disasters resulting from climate change or other environmental problems, and health‐related crises. For the United States and many other nations, existential threats relating to the very survival of the state have diminished, largely because of the end of the Cold War and the increasing realization that our common interests greatly exceed our differences. However, an accident or mistake involving nuclear weapons, or nuclear terrorism fueled by the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear know‐how, is still a very real risk. An effective strategy to deal with these dangers must be developed. The second step is the realization that continued reliance on nuclear weapons as the principal element for deterrence is encouraging, or at least excusing, the spread of these weapons, and will inevitably erode the essential cooperation necessary to avoid proliferation, protect nuclear materials and deal effectively with new threats Third, the U.S. and Russia have no basis for maintaining a structure of deterrence involving nuclear weapons deployed in ways that increase the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon, or even a deliberate nuclear exchange based on a false warning. Reducing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles with verification to the levels set by the New Start Treaty is an important step in reducing nuclear risks. Deeper nuclear reductions and changes in nuclear force posture involving the two nations should remain a priority. Further steps must include short‐range tactical nuclear weapons.

#### 2] Bioweapons are better than nuclear weapons – less casualties, less efficient, and less reliable

**Horowitz and Narang 14**, “Poor Man's Atomic Bomb? Exploring the Relationship between "Weapons of Mass Destruction"” Author(s): Michael C. Horowitz ( Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, ) and Neil Narang ( 2 Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA 3 Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA) Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 58, No. 3, Special Issue: Nuclear Posture, Nonproliferation Policy, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (April 2014), pp. 509-535 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24545650> //GDS-MR

Additionally, most countries do not view CBWs as destructive enough to actually substitute for nuclear weapons. To this end, Zelicoff (2001) argues that the magnitude of destruction possible from chemical weapons means they are not WMDs 2 The historical record provides some support for this view. While the Germans achieved an important tactical breakthrough at the battle at Second Ypres in 1915, once both sides in World War I developed their own chemical arsenals and defenses, the weapons ceased to be decisive. Also, weather conditions such as sunlight and wind can heavily influence the relative effectiveness of chemical weapons (Hammond 1999,65). This makes them relatively unreliable in many cases. The difficulty of mating chemical weapons onto missiles also complicates perceptions of their relative effectiveness (Karp 1996). Even with the United States in World War I, when 26.8 percent of US casualties were due to chemical weapons, only 2 percent of those casualties died (Spiers 1994,4). Attempted uses of chemical weapons in the post-cold war era may also illustrate the difficulties involved in their delivery. When Aum Shinrikyo distributed sarin gas in the Japanese subway system in 1995, thousands were sent to the hospital but only twelve died (Tucker 2001). Similarly, biological weapons, while offering the possibility for massive destruction, also face a multiplicity of technical complications that potentially reduces their relative utility.3 First, biological agents are unlikely to survive for a long time in the open atmosphere, meaning they have to be delivered rapidly. Second, changing weather conditions could undermine the effectiveness of a BW attack (Panofsky 1998). Third, biological weapons would either have to be directly placed in a position to cause destruction, such as the poisoning of a water supply, or sprayed in the air above a city. This is harder to do than many realize and reduces the probability of a successful BW attack (Karp 1996). Finally, if proper warning and containment occur, passive defense measures can substantially cut into the impact of a BW attack (Office of Technology Assessment 1993,52). For these reasons, it is perhaps not surprising that the empirical record is mixed on the perceived effectiveness of biological weapons. For instance, the United States abandoned its offensive biological weapons program in the early 1970s, believing biological weapons did not provide a relative edge in combat. CBWs also have limited utility in counterforce usages against infrastructure and strategic targets. Since they are predominantly useful for generating casualties, they cannot substitute for the destructive counterforce power of nuclear weapons. Together, the substantial technical limitations of CBWs and the distinct patterns in their historical usage on the battlefield (smaller scale and often domestic threats) suggest that to some degree the three weapons may be treated as complements in Horowitz and Narang 515 states' overall weapons portfolio. If this supposition is accurate, the popular usage of the term WMD may obscure more than it clarifies, especially if it leads to a single WMD counterproliferation policy under the assumption that the demand for each type is driven by the same factors.

#### 3] Warrants in Narang are WRONG – 1] they don’t indicate that nations have an interest in shift it’s just an analysis of what the world would look like IF nations moved to the next WMD and 2] 1AC Brehm solves – disarm allows for global cooperation and peace and 3] We have a working treaty against the creation and use of bioweapons – no nation in their right mind is going to push for bioweapons.

### A2 DA – Nuclear Renaissance

#### 1] Nuclear will generate as much carbon dioxide as coal, nuclear industry underestimates

Sovacool 08 **[Dr.** Benjamin **Sovacool , July 15**, 2008, Jakarta Post, p. 6 (Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool is a Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and Globalization, part of the distinguished Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.]

Opponents of nuclear power have responded in kind. In their calculation, Australian researchers have estimated that wind turbines have one-third the carbon equivalent emissions of nuclear power over their lifecycle and hydroelectric one-fourth the equivalent emissions. **The Oxford Research Group projects that if percentage of world nuclear capacity remains what it is today, by 2050 nuclear power would generate as much carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour (kWh) as comparable gas-fired power stations. One new study published in the August 2008 issue of the peer-reviewed journal Energy Policy attempts to answer this question by screening 103 lifecycle studies of greenhouse gas equivalent emissions for nuclear power plants.** The study attempts to identify a subset of the most current, original, and methodologically rigorous studies. **Researchers calculated** that while the range of emissions for nuclear energy over the lifetime of a plant reported from qualified studies examined is significant, **the mean value is about 66 grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per kWh** (gCO2e/kWh). **The frontend component of the nuclear fuel cycle** (uranium mining, milling, and enrichment) **is responsible for 38 percent of equivalent emissions. Decommissioning and plant operation, including the use of fossil-fueled generators to backup nuclear plants when they offline for servicing, account for 35 percent. The backend of the fuel cycle, which includes storing spent fuel and fuel conditioning, account for 15 percent of the emissions, and plant construction is responsible for 12 percent**. **This average-66 grams of carbon dioxide for every kWh-is staggeringly high compared to what the nuclear industry has reported. It also shows, conclusively, that nuclear energy is in no way "carbon free" or "emissions free,"** and that nuclear power is worse than the equivalent carbon emissions over the lifecycle of renewable and small scale distributed generators. To provide just a rough estimate of how much equivalent carbon dioxide nuclear plants emit over the course of their lifecycle, a 1,000 MW reactor operating at a 90 percent capacity factor will emit the equivalent of 1,427 tons of carbon dioxide every day, or 522,323 metric tons of carbon dioxide every year.

#### 2] The warrants on Muralidharan are pitiful – 1] 1NC Goldstien indicates that government support is critical for nuclear resurgence – Muralidharan doesn’t have a single case that shows explicit government support for nuclear power. 2] Space travel warrants are so bad – there’s no empirics for probability and the ev is just theorization.

#### 3] Nuclear power hurts indigenous populations and waste creates increased chances for cancer

Adebagbo ‘18 Adebagbo, Oluwaseun, Education Program Assistant at Stanford University School of Medicine. “Environmental Injustice: Racism Behind Nuclear Energy.” Stanford University. March 26, 2018. <http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2018/ph241/adebagbo1/>

Nuclear power plant **(NPP**) reactors produce low-level ionizing radiation, high level nuclear waste, and are likely to lead to catastrophic contamination events. Power generated from NPPs produce nuclear waste that should kept away from humans for thousands of years. **[1]** The key concern **in NPP accidents** is when radioactive elements escape from the core into the environment. **[2] (See Fig. 1 for example of a power plant.)** Communities living near NPPs are alsoexposed to possible soil and water contamination. **[1]** Risks presented by NPP can have multigenerational effects on people and communities in close proximity to these power plants. **There are three key forms of environmental justice: distributive justice, procedural justice, and recognition justice.** According to Rawls theory of distributive justice, it is unjust for disadvantaged populations to bear further harms from the placement of nuclear power facilities un**less they derive special benefits**.Communities where **certain** disadvantaged populations (such as low income and minority groups) reside are where the U.S. stations waste facilities. **[3]** Environmental racism combines public policies and industry practices to provide benefits for whites while shifting the costs to people of color. **[4] Low-income and Minorities Disproportionately Impacted In a study done by Kynes,** there was a larger percentage of African Americans living within the 50 mile radius of NPPs, while there was a larger percentage of whites living outside the 50 mile radius. **[1] An example of this can be found from Warren County, the Savannah River nuclear facility. This facility which is a source of radioactive leaks, is located in a predominantly African American community in South Carolina. [3] Minorities communities are unequally more impacted by the NPP than white communities.** Minority and poverty-level communities often include higher percentages of women and children and both are more sensitive to ionizing radiation, yet most radiation standards are created to only protect adult males. **[5]** Despite the lack of consent from Indigenous peoples, NPP use their lands for uranium mining/processing. Indigenous people have been harmed by working in unregulated uranium mines or by exposure to uncontrolled uranium wastes on native lands. Uranium mining and milling on reservation lands in the Black Hills and Four Corners regions, are primary examples of nuclear colonism and racism. **[4]** In the U.S., Native-American uranium miners, face 14 times the normal lung-cancer risk

## **1AR – Kritiks**

### A2 K – Overview

#### [1] Lemme weigh the aff against the k – a] it moots 6 min of offense and forces me to restart in the 1AR with a 13-7 time skew AND time skew is the biggest link to fairness because you need time to make arguments. b] it’s not educational to exclude aff impacts because it denies education on material conditions of the world.

#### [2] Permutation: do the plan and the alternative--The permutation solves best: Methodological pluralism creates critical reflexivity and sustainable critique.

Bleiker 14 [Roland Bleiker 2014 (professor of international relations at the University of Queensland) INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique, 2014. Retrieved May 26, 2016 from EBSCOhost.] **Tfane23**

Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine’s sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101-102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructural deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine’s approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

#### [3] No root cause claims

**Thompson et al 13**

Jack S. Levy, Board of Governors' Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, and Affiliate at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and William R. Thompson is Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly, "The Decline of War? Multiple Trajectories and Diverging Trends", International Studies Review, 2013, accessed: 18 July 2019, 15, pp. 396-419, R.S.

If true, we would have a unified theory of violence. Pinker subsequently steps back from this expansive claim. He notes that some other forms of violence— including homicides, lynchings, domestic violence, and rapes—do not fit a power law model, suggesting that the mechanisms driving these practices differ from those driving international war. Still, there are others who have insisted on a unified theory of violence. Examples might include Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of aggressive instincts as a root cause of war (Einstein and Freud 1933), frustration-aggression theory (Durbin and Bowlby 1939), and contemporary rational choice theories. We are highly skeptical. We fear that any theory broad enough to explain violence at the levels of the individual, family, neighborhood, communal group, state, and international system would be too general and too indiscriminating to capture variations in violence within each level, which is a prerequisite for any satisfactory theoretical explanation. It is difficult to imagine an explanation for great power war, or interstate war more generally, that does not include system-level structures of power and wealth, dyadic-level rivalries, and domestic institutions and processes. All but the latter contribute little if anything to an explanation of homicides and domestic violence. It is not even clear whether different kinds of organized warfare—hegemonic wars, interstate wars, colonial wars, and civil wars—can be explained with a single theory. In fact, the theoretical literature on interstate war and civil war remains for the most part two distinct literatures, with little overlap in their respective analyses of the causes of war.9 Exceptions include the concept of the security dilemma (Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999) and the increasingly influential bargaining model of war (Fearon 1995), which cut across both literatures. International relations scholars are even divided on the question of whether different kinds of interstate wars can be subsumed under a single theory. A 1990 symposium addressed the questions of whether big wars and small wars had similar causes and whether a single theory could account for both.10 Whereas Bueno de Mesquita (1990) argued that an expected utility framework can explain all kinds of wars, Thompson (1990) argued that system-level structures of power and wealth differentiate big wars from small wars.11 The closely related question of whether the outbreak and spread (expansion) of war are driven by the same or different variables and processes was the subject of another recent symposium (Vasquez, Diehl, Flint, and Scheffran 2011). Our skepticism about the utility of a unified theory of violence or war is reinforced by the systematic and rigorous evidence Pinker provides about the trends in different forms of violence over time.

#### AND, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that proves a material obligation to affirm or negate

**Status quo debate shuts down conversations about everyday violence—only focus on material violence that creates spaces for finding solutions is productive and ethical.**

**Curry ’14**

Dr. Tommy J, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Affiliated Professor of Africana Studies, and a Ray A. Rothrock Fellow at Texas A&M University; first Black JV National Debate champion (for UMKC) and was half of the first all Black CEDA team to win the Pi Kappa Delta National Debate Tournament. “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century.” 2014. IB

Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics **when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other.** In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “**ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics)**; [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set] against factual/descriptive issues.” **At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively.** Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. **This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures** which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. **Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like.** At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics.’ How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

#### AND permutation double bind – either the alt is strong enough to solve any residual link or it can’t solve the aff so it can’t solve for everything.

### A2 K – Security

#### **1] Perm do both - Desecuritization can only begin with state engagement**

Kempa 10 [Associate Professor, Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa] Kempa, Michael “The Political Economy of Human Security: A Conceptual Approach to Policing Studies and Reform” University of Ottawa Press, Les Presses de l'Université d'Ottawa. (2010) [https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1ckpf38.8 //](https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1ckpf38.8%20//)

The scholar who has perhaps been most clearly recently identified with non-state engagement is Mark Neocleous, who uses a Foucauldian and partly Marxist approach to develop the argument that the very term “security” has been hijacked by the state/capital framework (see Neocleous 2008). This has happened, he argues, for both instrumental and conceptual reasons. On the one hand, powerful people promote a conception of security that corresponds with safety for private property because they profit from doing so. As part of this, powerful government actors have deliberately taken control over the security studies agenda throughout the Anglophone Western academy through controlling funding, and, where necessary, applying naked pressure upon academics to produce knowledge that is useful for the “police science” of security for private property and capital (Neocleous 2008, 160–86). On the other hand, and more subtly, the conceptual sanctity of private property and capital trumps, in the last instance, the rights of individuals and their practical well-being from the perspective of any liberal “security”. This is to say that any programme for liberal security begins with the belief that protecting private property and the infinite growth of capital is the accepted means through which to achieve human well-being. Thus, for Neocleous, to do any kind of project that seeks to engage state agencies to promote “human security” or even “critical security” tends to result in getting locked into the state/capital framework that, in his view, currently produces so many of the threats to human well-being and even species survival in the present. If for the moment we accept Neocleous’s view, it follows that there is nothing to preclude attempting to identify and support completely alternative dispute resolution and non-state local peace structures that reflect alternative political economies. A key example here, and the one I am most familiar with, is the work of Clifford Shearing on developing and rolling out the Zwelethemba dispute resolution and peace committee model, which promotes security in poor shantytowns in South Africa through training, hiring and paying members of the local community to resolve disputes and support safety within the limits of the Constitution. One of the things the Zwelethemba model is doing is working totally outside the established “security” paradigm, to speak in terms of organizing governance programmes that promote human well-being and safety, using a set of concepts that has no lineage connection to liberal-democratic security notions of enfolding and solidifying private peace to make safe spaces for capital growth (on this model, see Kempa and Shearing 2002). But what about working with the state? While I definitely share with Neocleous a healthy degree of scepticism about the ability or desire of state bureaucrats to think in alternative political-economic terms, I am not as pessimistic about engaging these actors as he is. In saying this, I am indicating an important point of connection with state optimists, notably Ian Loader and Neil Walker (2007), and Lucia Zedner (2006), for whom there is a default role for the state in leading its citizens in “civilized” debates about security in order to check the worst excesses of marketized security services that actively promote public fear and intolerance, on the basis that these negative emotions are a source of profit. These scholars thereby consider that efforts to “decapitalize” security must begin with the state. What can be said from my perspective is that the questions of whether or not, and whom, to engage towards institutionalizing programmes for human well-being and safety boils down to a pragmatic question of aligning available opportunities and personal strengths at any given moment. Is there any realistic opportunity for working beyond the known conceptual limits of capital and private property, through engaging a particular organization at a particular moment? What opportunities do we actually have? These themes form the basis of my developing collaboration with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to review evolutions in Canadian international policing assistance, with a view to illuminating the connection between the aims and understandings of the political economy underpinning these efforts. This will permit the International Branch of the RCMP to ask itself if it wishes to persist with its current course, ask how best to organize to pursue these or alternate aims as effectively as possible, and promote a level of self-awareness that will enable the RCMP to hear alternative proposals emanating from the international communities they work with, in the terms of the politicaleconomic aspirations they represent. A vital part of this enterprise is to develop the measurement tools required to evaluate the efficacy of their programmes in terms of the values they are explicitly and consciously seeking to promote. There is no use promoting interesting alternative aims if we cannot demonstrate the benefits of such programmes to governments in a language they can understand (see Kempa 2010).

#### 2] Emancipatory politics get coopted and fail without engagement in the ‘present order’

Burke, 07 – Anthony, Ph. D in International Relations and Political Science from the Australian National University, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales, Political theorist and IR scholar, “Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence”, pgs 19-21

At the same time the idea of emancipation is not without its problems, especially as it has been conceived in Welsh School thinking. First, as set out by Booth, human agency is a concern of individuals who are constrained and repressed by power, who if secured properly might exercise their agency freely and be ‘more fully human’.42 Notwithstanding his cosmopolitan ethic and the normative drive of his argument, there is little in such a formulation to prevent its co-option by the communitarian vision of the social contract idealists, from Hobbes to Rousseau and Hegel, for whom human existence is most realised in the body of the state, which is not an alien and repressive form but an extension of our own will. This is what it is, they argue, to be fully human. Likewise, Foucauldian understandings of power, discourse and freedom have made conceptions of human agency far more complex, and in the wake of his insights this book sets out to theorise security as a political technology that enables, produces and constrains individuals within larger systems of power and institutional action. The exercise of human agency is not precluded by this theory, but it is not entirely free, for important ethical and pragmatic reasons. Rather such agency struggles with its social definition and reproduction within systems of knowledge and power that continually work to define identity, frustrate autonomy and align individual interests with those of the state and capital. Nor, for important ethical reasons that I explore in the closing sections of Chapter 9, can emancipated individuals or communities be devoted to self-realisation or heedless freedom; they must consider their impact on the Other. The struggle is threefold: to identify available ways of being, to choose among them responsibly, and if they do not yet exist, to conceive and enable them. Second, with Chapters 8 and 9 as a background warning, an overly idealistic invocation of emancipation runs the danger of sliding into the concepts of positive liberty, instrumental reason and unlicensed freedom that I analyse there and that were of such concern to thinkers like Berlin. This is especially true when individual emancipation becomes the target of a systemic or strategic process like US foreign policy. (Neither Booth nor the rest of the CSS school are guilty of this, which I raise as a cautionary note. Indeed Wyn Jones suggests that we should understand emancipation as a ‘process’ rather than an ‘endpoint’.43) We must be careful to set out what we actually mean by emancipation, how it differs from ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ (and may be endangered by them), and why it may need to be limited in its exercise and conception.44 In the wake of the Enlightenment and the industrial revolution, when modern science and reason seized the powers of heaven for the aggrandisement of man, we have been confronted by a form of freedom that accepted no limits and authorised vast impersonal projects in which ‘the pattern matters more than the individual’ (as Berlin wrote of Hegel, charging him with an ‘historically fatal identification of liberty . . . with security’).45 The imperial idealism of the Bush administration is one example of such freedom, but it is fed by deeper roots in modern thought and especially in the social contract where, as Rousseau wrote, we truly give ourselves up to the pattern: ‘in giving myself to all, I give myself to none’.46 A further argument of the CSS thinkers, one that adds a sharply conservative note to their normative discourse, needs comment. This states that proposals for political transformation must be based on an identification of ‘immanent possibilities’ for change in the present order. Indeed, Richard Wyn Jones is quite militant about this: [D]escriptions of a more emancipated order must focus on realizable utopias . . . If [critical theorists] succumb to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for an emancipated order that is unrelated to the possibilities inherent in the present . . . [they] have no way of justifying their arguments epistemologically. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that a vision of an emancipated order that is not based on immanent potential will be politically efficacious.47

#### 3] The aff turns the kritik – the only way in which we desecuritize middle eastern politics is through Israeli disarmament. You should weigh one instance of security logic against an eternity of middle eastern securitization in the neg world.

#### 4] No serial policy failure – disarm breaks down theat perceptions which makes it the best way to desecuritize nuclear rhetoric.

Brehm, 18 -- Researcher with expertise in international humanitarian and human rights law, disarmament and weapons law; co-founder of ICAN Switzerland

[Maya, "Disarmament as a means to build peace," 6-19-18, www.article36.org/weapons/cluster-munitions/disarmament-peace-presentation/, accessed 12-13-19]

Contributing to peace through disarmament

This contribution of disarmament to the realization of ‘peace within and between societies, including equality and non-discrimination, justice and the rule of law and freedom from fear and want’ is not limited to, but is most obvious in relation to so-called ‘humanitarian disarmament’ – multilateral disarmament and weapons control measures grounded in humanitarian principles.

The focus of humanitarian disarmament is on mitigating the impacts of armed conflict, protecting civilians and upholding the principle of humanity. For example, the States parties to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) are expected to ‘codif[y] and progressive[ly] develop[…]the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict’. In accordance with this commitment, they have adopted restrictions and prohibitions on the use of incendiary weapons and on blinding laser weapons to alleviate the suffering of the victims of war. And over the last couple of years, they have held talks in response to concerns raised by increasing autonomy in weapons systems.

These talks have brought to the fore the role of disarmament in guarding against the erosion of longstanding legal principles for the protection of the human person. How new weapons and evolving practices of armed violence accord with existing norms and shape their future development are key questions in ongoing debates on science & technology and weaponization. Beyond the question of compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL), these debates have encouraged more profound reflection on States’ duty to safeguard human dignity, humanity and act in accordance with the public conscience.

Disarmament practice can also help support the international rule of law. This is perhaps most obvious where the rule of law is under most strain. In their reactions to the use of chemical weapons and recent threats to use nuclear weapons, many States emphatically reaffirmed their commitment to a rules-based international system.

Promoting the rule of law requires respect for human rights. Although IHL remains the dominant legal framework for ‘humanitarian disarmament’, some disarmament instruments explicitly recognize the human rights dimensions of weapons and armed violence. Notably, States increasingly accept a duty to respond to the needs and realize the rights of survivors of anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions, and the remnants of other explosive weapons. Both the Convention on Cluster Munitions adopted in 2008 and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons adopted last year contain provisions on ‘victim assistance’ under which States assume an obligation to provide to survivors and other affected persons ‘assistance, without discrimination, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion’ in accordance with human rights law. Another example is the Arms Trade Treaty, adopted in 2013, which, among other objectives, aims to prevent arms transfers that could be used to ‘commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human rights law’ (Art 7.1).

Over the past two decades, States have also assumed increasing responsibilities in relation to the after-math of weapons use. Clearance of contaminated land is a key duty assumed by States Parties to the 1997 Anti-personnel Landmine Convention, the 2003 CCW Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. According to the SG’s Disarmament Agenda, ‘Mine action has played a particularly important role in sustaining peace’. Under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons States also assume an obligation to take measures for the environmental remediation of contaminated areas. This is consistent with the treaty’s recognition of the ‘grave implications [of nuclear weapons] for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations’.

Beyond measures in relation to particular weapon types, recent humanitarian disarmament talks have also provided an opportunity to engage with more systemic issues that stand in the way of ‘peace within and between societies’. In particular, the gendered aspects of armed violence and the differential impacts of weapons have been problematized, for example, in relation to ‘signature’ drone strikes and other applications of algorithm-based targeting, as well as in relation to the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty accept a duty to ‘take into account the risk’ that an arms export facilitates ‘serious acts of gender-based violence’ (Art 7.4). Victim-assistance under the aforementioned instruments is to be ‘age- and gender-sensitive’. The preamble of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons acknowledges the disproportionate impact of ionizing radiation on women and girls. It also reflects recognition of the disproportionate impact of nuclear-weapon activities on indigenous peoples. Finally, urgent questions have been raised about the lack of inclusiveness and diversity in the forums that deliberate and make decision about disarmament policy.

Taken together, disarmament can contribute to building peace in two key respects:

Disarmament processes offer an important chance for transformation towards more peaceful and less violent ways of resolving conflicts. They do so by changing the perception of threats in the relations between actors and by building confidence. The transformative potential of disarmament will, ultimately, depend on its capacity to foster an understanding and a conviction that violence-free relations and peaceful conflict resolution are possible and sustainable.

Disarmament mechanisms contribute to the institutionalization of a cooperative security order – a system of collective security. Disarmament institutions can promote multilateralism, uphold the rule of law and develop and maintain norms for the common good. As is well known, however, the multilateral disarmament machinery suffers from critical shortcomings, including in terms of diversity.

Disarmament for peace or security?

Against the backdrop of increasing militarization, resurgent strategic tensions, and eroding respect for international norms and commitments that have motivated the UNSG to launch a new disarmament agenda, deeper reflection is needed about disarmament in relation to peace and security.

### A2 K – Set Col

#### 1] Perm do both — bottom-up indigenous movements and top-down leftists should form alliances which results in the eventual dismantling of colonialism.

**NoiseCat 16** Julian Brave NoiseCat is an enrolled member of the Canim Lake Band Tsq'escen in British Columbia and a graduate of Columbia University and the University of Oxford. “The Indigenous Revolution.” 11/24/2016. <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/11/standing-rock-dakota-access-pipeline-obama/> || OES-SW

Movements working to reshape infrastructure, environmental policy, financial systems, policing, and work will be of particular importance to indigenous people. Fossil fuel divestment and the “Keep It in the Ground” movement can weaken and even undermine companies seeking to exploit fossil fuels on indigenous lands. Regulations that dismantle financial instruments and policies that profit from natural resource speculation could divert and damage returns on capital flows. The abolition of mass incarceration would loosen the death grip of prisons and police on indigenous communities. Unions can turn individual workers into collective forces of resistance, helping drive up costs for developers and protect laborers from unsafe working conditions. Long-term efforts to reimagine work through full automation and a universal basic income could prevent laborers from having to seek such dangerous work in the first place. As Standing Rock has shown, indigenous nations that use their unique standing to advocate for viable alternatives to unjust systems will gain supporters. Our traditional territories encompass the rivers, mountains, and forests that capital exploits with abandon. Our resistance — to the pipelines, bulldozers, and mines that cut through our lands and communities — has greater potential than yet realized. Ours is a powerful voice envisioning a more harmonious and sustainable relationship with the natural world rooted in the resurgence of indigenous sovereignty. As long as indigenous people continue to make this argument, we are positioned to win policies, court decisions, and international agreements that protect and enlarge our sovereignty and jurisdiction. As our jurisdiction and sovereignty grow, we will have more power to stop, reroute, and transform carbon-based, capitalist, and colonial infrastructure. When the Justice Department halted construction of DAPL in October, they also said they would begin looking into Free Prior Informed Consent legislation. This is a minimal first step, and we must hold them to it. Longstanding alliances with progressive parties and politicians are key to our success. In the United States, Native people have worked with Democratic elected officials like Bernie Sanders and Raúl Grijalva to advance bills like the Save Oak Flat Act, which aimed to stop an international mining conglomerate from exploiting an Apache sacred site in Arizona. In Canada, First Nations have supported the New Democratic Party. In New Zealand, the Maori Rātana religious and political movement has an alliance with the Labour Party that stretches back to the 1930s. Some indigenous leaders, such as outspoken Aboriginal Australian leader Pat Dodson, a Labour senator for Western Australia, have won prominent positions in these parties. This does not mean, of course, that we should pay deference to elected officials. In 2014, Obama became one of the first sitting presidents to visit an Indian reservation when he travelled to Standing Rock. His visit was historically symbolic and emotionally important, but if Obama fails to stop DAPL, indigenous people should renounce him. Politicians are helpful when they change policies and outcomes. We cannot and should not settle for symbolic victories. If there is to be an enduring indigenous-left coalition, the Left must support indigenous demands for land, jurisdiction, and sovereignty. At their core, these demands undermine the imperial cut-and-paste model of the nation-state, stretching from Hobbes to the present, which insists that there is room for just one sovereign entity in the state apparatus. Thomas Piketty’s call for a global wealth tax implies an international governance structure to levy such a tax. He pushes us to think beyond the state. Similarly, indigenous demands for lands, jurisdiction, and sovereignty imply that we must think beneath it. As the Fourth World continues to push states to recognize our inherent, constitutional, and treaty rights as sovereign nations, the Left cannot remain neutral. To remain neutral is to perpetuate a long history of colonization. To remain neutral is to lose a valuable, organized, and powerful ally.

#### 2] Link turn – the presence of nuclear weapons magnifies colonial violence everyday as a symbol of the torture indigenous people went through to ensure their creation. Voting aff is representative as a rejection of native suffering.

#### 3] Link turn – Israel Nuclear Weapons are intrinsic to ensuring the continuation of militaristic settler colonialism in the Middle East

Dana, Tariq, and Ali Jarbawi. "A Century of Settler Colonialism in Palestine: Zionism's Entangled Project." Brown J. World Aff. 24 (2017): 197. (Director of the Center for Development Studies at Birzeit University)//Elmer

The Zionist terror campaigns **resulted in the widespread destruction of Palestinian society**. Over 750,000 Palestinians were expelled from their homeland and became refugees in surrounding countries and in the diaspora; hundreds of cities and villages were destroyed and depopulated; and a fifth of the 150,000 Palestinians remaining in Israel became internally displaced.25 When British forces departed from Palestine on 14 May 1948, five Arab armies joined the fight against the Zionist groups but were handily defeated. The 1948 defeat of the Palestinians and the Arab forces resulted in the occupation of 77 percent of mandatory Palestine.26 The birth of the State of Israel was declared. The year 1948 stands as a seminal one in the modern history of Palestine, as it precipitated two diametrically opposed realities and narratives: the Palestinian catastrophe (commemorated annually as Nakba day) and the establishment of the State of Israel (celebrated annually as the day of independence).27 With the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948, the ideological characteristics of Zionism became the foundational underpinning and the source of continuity of the Israeli nationhood. Most importantly, this Zionist worldview became the guiding principle **of the Israeli settler-colonial project**, which framed the state-society relations in a broad consensus around the nationalistic/messianic mission towards constructing a Jewish exclusivity. **Institutionalizing Settler-Colonialism** in the Israeli State The twenty-year period between the major Arab-Israeli wars (1948–1967) witnessed concentrated efforts to consolidate the nascent Israeli State. The settler-colonial paradigm became codified into the state’s legal and institutional structures and was translated into aggressive policies against the remaining Palestinian communities and surrounding countries. This resulted in a wide range of practices that primarily aimed at fostering the Jewish character of the state and **ensuring superiority and deterrent capability** at the regional level. First, in order to consolidate its grip on a wide swath of the land, the Israeli authorities embarked on the “legal dispossession” of Palestinians by creating a new land regime that primarily aimed “to seize, retain, expropriate, reallocate, and reclassify the Arab lands appropriated by the state.”28 Most importantly, with the passing of the “absentee property law” by the Knesset in 1950, the Israeli state captured 90 percent of the land. The absentee property law designated as “absentee” every Palestinian or resident of Palestine who had left his or her usual place of residence due to the partition brought about by the United Nations Palestine Resolution in 1947. Even people who remained within the eventual borders of the Israeli state and eventually became Israeli citizens were classified as “present absentees.”29 Second, while hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees who were expelled from their homeland were denied the right to return to their lands and properties, Jews worldwide were granted the right to live in Israel and acquire citizenship. The Law of Return of 1950 and the Citizenship Law of 1952 were designed to attract Jewish immigration without preconditions; being of Jewish decent was the principal requirement that could guarantee automatic citizenship. This set of laws constituted the cornerstone for consolidating the Jewish character of the state by maintaining a privileged Jewish majority. Third, Palestinian residents were subjected to institutional discrimination and exclusion. This was done through the legal military regime that governed areas inhabited by the Palestinians. Israel formed a military government (1948– 1966) to perform a variety of roles pertaining to monitoring, controlling, and constraining the Palestinian residents of Israel. They were effectively rendered second-class citizens of the state.30 Those areas were subjected to the Emergency Regulations inherited from the British mandate and included policies such as curfews, administrative detention, military trial, banning of political activity, and imposing of security closure on these areas. Moreover, the Interior Ministry appointed “minorities officers” to implement policies of segregation among Palestinian communities, turning them into separate security zones and effectively restricting social and commercial interactions between them.31 Fourth, the construction of a powerful military institution was another significant feature of the state, society, and culture. Zionist paramilitary groups that conducted the ethnic cleansing operations in 1948 were reorganized in a formal state army. Yet, the Israeli military is not solely an institution concerned with security, defense, and war. It was designed to play multiple social and economic functions and **promote the culture of militarism**. As a result, Israeli society is a militarized one, where citizens are actively involved in military activities, and the military is actively involved in non-military activities. For example, the Defense Service Law of 1948 obliges male Israeli citizens who turn 18 to serve in the army for 36 months, while women must serve for 24 months. This mandatory conscription is still ardently upheld today. Following the end of military service, Israelis remain in a reserve unit and spend one month in the army every year until the age of 40. Additionally, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Israeli state invested heavily in expanding the military workshops that existed before the foundation of the state, and they introduced new industries that not only served the military needs of the state, but also proved to be a lucrative exportoriented industry. While not acknowledged officially, Israel upgraded its status as a deterrent force by **developing a nuclear program** in the 1950s, through which it became **the only state possessing nuclear weapons in the Middle East**. By the 1960s, Israel completed the development stage of its first nuclear weapon, and on the eve of the 1967 war, it already had nuclear capability.32 Fifth, Israel sought to weaken and restrict the development of neighboring Arab countries while projecting itself as a regional power. In 1956, Israel triggered a conflict with Egypt, joined by an Anglo-French imperial coalition, culminating in a large-scale offensive war against Egypt in response to the nationalization of the Suez Canal. While the Suez Canal crisis did not pose a strategic threat to Israel, it was a “war of choice,” motivated by the desire to weaken Egypt militarily and overthrow the Egyptian President Jamal Abdul-Nasser; to consolidate its alliance with Western imperial powers; and to enforce a new MENA (Middle East and North Africa) regional order in which Israel was the superior power. 33 Entangled Colonization After consolidating the settler-colonial state, Israel embarked on a new colonial venture to expand its boundaries and achieve its dream of a “Greater Israel” of maximum land with minimum Arabs. For this purpose, Israel waged a lightning war against its Arab neighbors in 1967, resulting in a swift victory that inaugurated a new chapter in its settler-colonial expansionism. It extended its colonial order over the remaining parts of Palestine while occupying the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip was perceived as a fulfillment of the Zionist ambition of greater Israel over historic Palestine, without which “the Zionist dream would remain incomplete.”34 Nevertheless, it could hardly be argued that the Zionist dream was completed following the 1967 occupation. Unlike the demographic reality in the aftermath of the Nakba, which ensured Jewish predominance and facilitated the establishment of the Israeli state, only 350,000 people fled the territories occupied in 1967, leaving over 1.5 million Palestinians in a direct encounter with the Israeli occupation

#### 4] Their pedagogy of decolonization means they don’t solve

Tuck and Yang 12 (Eve, State University of New York at New Paltz, and K. Wayne, University of California, San Diego. “Decolonization is not a metaphor.” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education and Society.* Vol 1, No 1, 2012. pp. 7. –Veeder)

Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire - utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces. Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth). Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context - empire, settlement, and internal colony - make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires7. Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.

## 1AR – Theory

### A2 T – Nebel

#### 1] Counterinterp – Aff may spec a state.

#### A] Stable advocacy: Whole rez incentivizes aff shiftiness on neg links. Moving targets wreck fairness because they cause 2NR restart with 7-6 aff time skew. Turs fairness – we need time to make argument and only an equal time allocation solves.

#### B] Field context – no single nuclear disarm policy exists and most topic lit is centered around single scenarios – the neg’s norm doesn’t endorse an real-life educational model of this topic.

#### Pragmatics come first – 1] most people prep from the wiki as a stasis point, not the res 2] No point in doing something if semantics make it impossible to do. 3] Topic lit and disclosure solve.

#### Depth over breadth – the aff is good bc it forces us to delve completely into a specific topic. We get more nuanced education from this aff than whole rez which will be spread all over the place.

#### 2] We meet – the aff is a subset of the bare plural, which means we affirm a bare plural.

#### On their shell –

#### Err aff—they most likely misinterpreted bare plurals

Reiter and Frank ’10 (Nils Reiter and Anette Frank Department of Computational Linguistics Heidelberg University, Germany, July 2010. “Identifying Generic Noun Phrases” <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5078/2fb22573c8b612743aade2d3e0b241f8ae0f.pdf>)

The above classification of generic expressions is well established in traditional formal semantics (cf. Krifka et al. (1995))2. As we argue in this paper, these distinctions are relevant for semantic processing in computational linguistics, especially for information extraction and ontology learning and population tasks. With appropriate semantic analysis of generic statements, we can not only formally capture and exploit generic knowledge, but also distinguish between information pertaining to individuals vs. classes. We will argue that the automatic identification of generic expressions should be cast as a machine learning problem instead of a rule-based approach, as there is (i) no transparent marking of genericity in English (as in most other European languages) and (ii) the phenomenon is highly context dependent. In this paper, we build on insights from formal semantics to establish a corpus-based machine learning approach for the automatic classification of generic expressions. In principle our approach is applicable to the detection of both generic NPs and generic sentences, and in fact it would be highly desirable and possibly advantageous to cover both types of genericity simultaneously. Our current work is confined to generic NPs, as there are no corpora available at present that contain annotations for genericity at the sentence level. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces generic expressions and motivates their relevance for knowledge acquisition and semantic processing tasks in computational linguistics. Section 3 reviews prior and related work. In section 4 we motivate the choice of feature sets for the automatic identification of generic NPs in context. Sections 5 and 6 present our experiments and results obtained for this task on the ACE-2 data set. Section 7 concludes. 2 Generic Expressions & their Relevance for Computational Linguistics 2.1 Interpretation of generic expressions Generic NPs There are two contrasting views on how to formally interpret generic NPs. According to the first one, a generic NP involves a special form of quantification. Quine (1960), for example, proposes a universally quantified reading for generic NPs. This view is confronted with the most important problem of all quantificationbased approaches, namely that the exact determination of the quantifier restriction (QR) is highly dependent on the context, as illustrated in (3)3. (3) a. Lions are mammals. QR: all lions b. Mammals give birth to live young. QR: less than half of all mammals 3Some of these examples are taken from Carlson (1977). c. Rats are bothersome to people. QR: few rats4 In view of this difficulty, several approaches restrict the quantification to only “relevant” (Declerck, 1991) or “normal” (Dahl, 1975) individuals. According to the second view, generic noun phrases denote kinds. Following Carlson (1977), a kind can be considered as an individual that has properties on its own. On this view, the generic NP cannot be analysed as a quantifier over individuals pertaining to the kind. For some predicates, this is clearly marked. (1.a), for instance, attributes a property to the kind lion that cannot be attributed to individual lions. Generic sentences are usually analysed using a special dyadic operator, as first proposed by Heim (1982). The dyadic operator relates two semantic constituents, the restrictor and the matrix: Q[x1, ..., xi]([x1, ..., xi] | {z } Restrictor ; 9y1, ..., yi[x1, .., xi, y1, ..., yi] | {z } Matrix ) By choosing GEN as a generic dyadic operator, it is possible to represent the two readings (a) and (b) of the characterising sentence (4) by variation in the specification of restrictor and matrix (Krifka et al., 1995). (4) Typhoons arise in this part of the pacific. (a) Typhoons in general have a common origin in this part of the pacific. (b) There arise typhoons in this part of the pacific. (a’) GEN[x; y](Typhoon(x);this-part-of-thepacific( y)^arise-in(x, y)) (b’) GEN[x; y](this-part-of-thepacific( x);Typhoon(y)^arise-in(y, x)) In order to cope with characterising sentences as in (2.a), we must allow the generic operator to quantify over situations or events, in this case, “normal” situations which were such that Erd˝os took amphetamines. 2.2 Relevance for computational linguistics Knowledge acquisition The automatic acquisition of formal knowledge for computational applications is a major endeavour in current research 4Most rats are not even noticed by people. 41 and could lead to big improvements of semanticsbased processing. Bos (2009), e.g., describes systems using automated deduction for language understanding tasks using formal knowledge. There are manually built formal ontologies such as SUMO (Niles and Pease, 2001) or Cyc (Lenat, 1995) and linguistic ontologies like Word- Net (Fellbaum, 1998) that capture linguistic and world knowledge to a certain extent. However, these resources either lack coverage or depth. Automatically constructed ontologies or taxonomies, on the other hand, are still of poor quality (Cimiano, 2006; Ponzetto and Strube, 2007). Attempts to automatically induce knowledge bases from text or encyclopaedic sources are currently not concerned with the distinction between generic and non-generic expressions, concentrating mainly on factual knowledge. However, rulelike knowledge can be found in textual sources in the form of generic expressions5. In view of the properties of generic expressions discussed above, this lack of attention bears two types of risks. The first concerns the distinction between classes and instances, regarding the attribution of properties. The second concerns modelling exceptions in both representation and inferencing. The distinction between classes and instances is a serious challenge even for the simplest methods in automatic ontology construction, e.g., Hearst (1992) patterns. The so-called IS-A patterns do not only identify subclasses, but also instances. Shakespeare, e.g., would be recognised as a hyponym of author in the same way as temple is recognised as a hyponym of civic building. Such a missing distinction between classes and instances is problematic. First, there are predicates that can only attribute properties to a kind (1.a). Second, even for properties that in principle can be attributed to individuals of the class, this is highly dependent on the selection of the quantifier’s restriction in context (3). In both cases, it holds that properties attributed to a class are not necessarily 5In the field of cognitive science, research on the acquisition of generic knowledge in humans has shown that adult speakers tend to use generic expressions very often when talking to children (Pappas and Gelman, 1998). We are not aware of any detailed assessment of the proportion of generic noun phrases in educational text genres or encyclopaedic resources like Wikipedia. Concerning generic sentences, Mathew and Katz (2009) report that 19.9% of the sentences in their annotated portion of the Penn Treebank are habitual (generic) and 80.1% episodic (non-generic). inherited by any or all instances pertaining to the class. Zirn et al. (2008) are the first to present fully automatic, heuristic methods to distinguish between classes and instances in the Wikipedia taxonomy derived by Ponzetto and Strube (2007). They report an accuracy of 81.6% and 84.5% for different classification schemes. However, apart from a plural feature, all heuristics are tailored to specific properties of the Wikipedia resource. Modelling exceptions is a cumbersome but necessary problem to be handled in ontology building, be it manually or by automatic means, and whether or not the genericity of knowledge is formalised explicitly. In artificial intelligence research, this area has been tackled for many years. Default reasoning (Reiter, 1980) is confronted with severe efficiency problems and therefore has not extended beyond experimental systems. However, the emerging paradigm of Answer Set Programming (ASP, Lifschitz (2008)) seems to be able to model exceptions efficiently. In ASP a given problem is cast as a logic program, and an answer set solver calculates all possible answer sets, where an answer set corresponds to a solution of the problem. Efficient answer set solvers have been proposed (Gelfond, 2007). Although ASP may provide us with very efficient reasoning systems, it is still necessary to distinguish and mark default rules explicitly (Lifschitz, 2002). Hence, the recognition of generic expressions is an important precondition for the adequate representation and processing of generic knowledge. 3 Prior Work Suh (2006) applied a rule-based approach to automatically identify generic noun phrases. Suh used patterns based on part of speech tags that identify bare plural noun phrases, reporting a precision of 28.9% for generic entities, measured against an annotated corpus, the ACE 2005 (Ferro et al., 2005). Neither recall nor f-measure are reported. To our knowledge, this is the single prior work on the task of identifying generic NPs.

#### On Limits – 1] you still get access to disads like deterrence and CBW, which means you can engage. 2] Overlimiting bad – don’t force me to read 1 aff for the rest of my senior year. 3] Limits bad – there are 9 affs on the topic that’s not much at all. 4] TVA doesn’t solve – you can link out of the advocacy to avoid any advantage debate, which moots the 1AC.

### A2 T – Plural

#### C/I: Aff can spec a state

#### “States” is a bare plural that is meaningless absent quantification.

K=”State”

F=”… ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.”

Nguyen ’19 blue [Anthony Nguyen (PhD Student at USC Philosophy), 2019, “The Radical Account of Bare Plural Generics,” Academia *Philosophical Studies*] KD

1. Introduction I use ‘bare plural’ to refer to generic sentences of the form ‘Ks F’, where ‘F’ is a predicate and ‘K’—loosely speaking—is a kind term. 1,2 For example, ‘Ducks lay eggs’, ‘Cars have wheels’, and ‘Philosophers are crafty’ are all bare plurals. It is unclear how to provide a uniform semantics for bare plurals. There is no consensus on what semantics to assign bare plurals. 3 And yet, bare plurals pervade natural language. Bare plurals have even been put to substantial philosophical work.4 It would be philosophically fruitful, then, to understand how they work. Are bare plurals really all that puzzling? Many are initially attracted to a “simple” account of bare plurals, on which ‘Ks F’ is true iff, normally, all Ks F. After all, many bare plurals seem to express information about what is normal for a member of the kind in question. This simple account is, however, susceptible to various counterexamples. The bare plural ‘Ducks lay eggs’ seems true, but it is false that, normally, all ducks lay eggs. After all, there is nothing abnormal about a duck’s being male. But no male duck ever lays eggs. Moreover, the bare plural ‘Mosquitoes transmit malaria’ seems true and yet it is false that, normally, all mosquitoes transmit malaria. Less than 1% of mosquitoes have ever transmitted malaria. Only an abnormal mosquito transmits malaria. Therefore, the simple account is untenable (Leslie 2007, p. 380). Semantic theorizing about bare plurals is not easy. I proceed, in §2, by systematically observing the many ways in which we use bare plurals. This “messy” feature of bare plurals is, I think, the key to theorizing about them. In §3, I develop a novel account that promises a simple, uniform semantics for bare plurals. On this view, bare plurals fail to semantically ex press propositions. Nonetheless, speakers still utter them in order to make assertions. Finally, in §4, I reply to objections. 2. The Variety Data There is a wide range of non-figurative uses that bare plurals may be put to. This phenomenon, which I call ‘the variety data’, must be accommodated by any satisfactory account of bare plurals. I will present a novel and systematic taxonomy of this variety. There are four different classes falling under the variety data: homoplural statistical variety, heteroplural statistical variety, homoplural use variety, and heteroplural use variety. 2.1 Homoplural Statistical Variety Homoplural statistical variety is the phenomenon by which different tokens of the same bare plural type are used to assert different statistical generalizations. 5 For example, suppose that John desperately needs money by the end of the month and earnestly asks Sally if it is a good idea for him to buy lottery tickets. Sally replies by uttering ‘No, lottery tickets are losers’. It seems that by uttering ‘Lottery tickets are losers’, Sally asserts something true— that almost all lottery tickets are losers. Contrast this case with one in which Donald is a wealthy billionaire who, for some peculiar reason, believes that all lottery tickets are losers. Donald is so confident in this belief that he signed a legal contract stating that he is to give any future lottery winners a billion dollars. Donald’s close friend reprimands him for making this decision. In reply, Donald utters ‘Lottery tickets are losers’. By uttering this generic, it seems that Donald asserts, falsely, that all lottery tickets are losers. I have provided two cases in which ‘Lottery tickets are losers’ differ in truth-value. In one case, ‘Lottery tickets are losers’ is used to assert that almost all lottery tickets are losers.6 In another case, it is used to assert that all lottery tickets are losers. We have before us two tokens and two different statistical generalizations. Therefore, homoplural statistical variety exists. 2.2 Heteroplural Statistical Variety Heteroplural statistical variety is the phenomenon by which different tokens of different bare plurals are used to assert different statistical generalizations. Such variation is evident upon considering the three generics ‘Sharks kill bathers’, ‘Barns are red’, and ‘Prime numbers are odd’. A speaker easily asserts a truth by uttering ‘Sharks kill bathers’. Such speaker might assert, for instance, that a few sharks kill bathers. A speaker also easily asserts a truth by uttering ‘Barns are red’. Such a speaker might assert, for instance, that many barns are red.7 On the other hand, a speaker cannot easily assert a truth by uttering ‘Prime numbers are odd’. Such a speaker might assert the falsehood that all prime numbers are odd. (After all, 2 is an even prime.) I have provided different bare plurals that used to assert different statistical generalizations. Therefore, heteroplural statistical variety exists. 2.3 Homoplural Use Variety Homoplural statistical variety is the phenomenon by which different tokens of the same bare plural are used to assert different sorts of propositions altogether.8 Consider the bare plural ‘Ravens are black’. Suppose that all ravens have been painted white earlier today. Now consider the following two cases. First, Oliver is an ornithologist giving a lecture on the properties that ravens are, in general, biologically disposed to have. By uttering ‘Ravens are black’, he seems to assert something true. In this context, the bare plural is used to assert the true proposition that, under normal circumstances, almost all ravens are black. Second, Mary is playing a game in which she is to guess the color of a randomly chosen raven. She does not know that any ravens have been painted white. She, then, asserts something false by uttering ‘Ravens are black’. After all, Mary is only interested in the actual color of ravens. In this context, she asserts the false proposition that most ravens are black by uttering ‘Ravens are black’. I have provided two cases in which ‘Ravens are black’ is used to assert different sorts of propositions. In the former case, the speaker asserts a proposition about what is normal for ravens. In the latter case, the speaker asserts a statistical generalization over actual, presently existing ravens. Therefore, homoplural statistical variety exists.9 2.4 Heteroplural Use Variety Heteroplural use variety is the phenomenon by which speakers use different tokens of different bare plural types in order to assert different sorts of propositions. Some bare plurals, for example, are used to assert what it is to be a member of a kind. For example, ‘Round squares are round’ may be used to assert the proposition that, by definition, all round squares are round. Bare plurals are also sometimes used to assert propositions concerning what is normal. For example, ‘Ravens are black’, in certain contexts, is used to assert some proposition about what is normal for ravens. Additionally, bare plurals can be used to assert normative claims. For example, ‘Boys don’t cry’ is used, in some contexts, to assert some (false) proposition about what ought to be the case. Finally, bare plurals may be used to assert some proposition about the capacities of the members of a kind. For instance, it seems that an overprotective parent may utter ‘Tabletop corners hurt babies’ in order to assert that, in general, tabletop corners can hurt babies. 2.5 The Import of the Variety Data As the variety data indicates, bare plurals are non-figuratively used to assert a wide range of propositions. That is, speakers are able to—without speaking figuratively—use bare plurals to make a wide range of assertions. Any adequate account of bare plurals must provide some explanation of this variety data. But many influential accounts of bare plurals struggle to accommodate the variety data. I survey some such views below. Roughly, Ariel Cohen (1999, pp. 55–56) claims that any bare plural ‘Ks F’ is true just in case either (i) most Ks F or (ii) the probability that a randomly chosen K Fs is higher than the probability that a randomly chosen individual that has an alternative property to being a K itself Fs. 10 Cohen’s account then incorrectly predicts that ‘Prime numbers are odd’ is true. Not only are most prime numbers odd, the probability that a prime number is odd is much higher than the probability that a non-prime number is odd. So, the relevant instances of both (i) and (ii) are true. So, Cohen is committed to claiming that ‘Prime numbers are odd’ is true. But, intuitively, this bare plural can be straightforwardly used to assert, falsely, that all prime numbers are odd. Cohen’s account, then, fails to accommodate statistical variety. Roughly, Bernhard Nickel (2016, p. 64) claims that Ks F just in case there is a normal way of being a K such that all Ks that are normal in this way F. But then Nickel cannot accommodate homoplural or heteroplural use variety. Consider a case in which almost all ravens have been painted white and Alice, who is unaware of the painting, utters ‘Ravens are black’ in order to assert the (false) statistical generalization that almost all ravens are black.11 Nickel incorrectly predicts that ‘Ravens are black’ is true in that context, since being black is a normal way of being a raven such that all ra- vens that are normal in this way are black. Utterances of ‘Ks F’ are not always about what is normal for the Ks. David Liebesman (2011, p. 417) treats all bare plurals as direct-kind predications. That is, Ks F just in case the kind K itself Fs. For example, Liebesman would claim that ‘Tigers are striped’ is true just in case the tiger kind (Panthera tigris) is itself striped. This account, however, leaves heteroplural statistical variety completely unexplained. ‘Prime numbers are odd’ seems false even though almost all prime numbers are odd; on the other hand, ‘Mosquitoes transmit malaria’ seems true even though almost no mosquitoes transmit malaria. Liebesman (2011, 420) tells us that “[t]he relationship between kinds and their members is…unsystematic.” But this is utterly mysterious. It would be much more preferable to give a deeper explanation of why we have the intuitions we do about, for instance, ‘Prime numbers are odd’ and ‘Mosquitoes transmit malaria’. Sarah-Jane Leslie (2007, p. 382) claims that bare plurals express cognitively primitive generalizations. But what is crucial for our purposes is that she gives a purely disquotational semantics for Gen, a commonly posited binary operator that relates the restrictor and scope in a bare plural: Gen x [Restrictor(x) [Scope(x)] However, as Rachel Sterken (2015b, p. 2503) points out, a purely disquotational semantics of Gen does not predict context-sensitivity. All we are told is that ‘Ks F’ is true iff Gen x [K(x)][F(x)], but we are not told anything else about the semantics of Gen. But context-sensitivity appears to be precisely what homoplural statistical and use variety suggest exists. Therefore, the variety data is left unexplained on Leslie’s account. If we were to revise Leslie’s account to make it predict contextsensitivity, we would turn Gen into an indexical. After all, as Sterken (2015a) has argued, bare plurals are context-sensitive in a way that the corresponding sentences containing overt adverbs of quantification like ‘typically’ or ‘generally’ are not. But now we are considering Sterken’s (2015a) view, on which Gen is an indexical. This account can—at least in principle—readily accommodate the variety data, but, as we shall see in §3, I think the variety data can be explained without positing Gen. As I will elaborate on at the end of §3, doing without Gen is an advantage. On the radical account of bare plurals, all bare plurals are semantically incomplete. They only express propositional radicals. Speakers complete what is said in order to make assertions. The speaker’s communicative intentions determine what is added to what is said. Here is a case that provides some evidence that bare plurals are semantically incomplete. Suppose that it was recently discovered that there are things called ‘zorks’ and an activity called ‘flibbetting’. Supposing that any sentence may be used literally and that bare plurals express propositions, ‘Zorks flibbet’ should express a proposition. But it is unclear that it does. What does the world have to be like in order for this bare plural to be true? Do all zorks have to flibbet? Just some? Or, under normal circumstances, all zorks? Or something else? Especially in light of the variety data, I do not have any clear intuitions as to what the world would have to be like so that zorks flibbet simpliciter. 19 This is naturally explained if all bare plurals are semantically incomplete. Nothing evaluable for truth is expressed by any bare plural. It seems that what is missing in ‘Zorks flibbet’ is a quantifier expression. How many zorks is the speaker talking about? The speaker must contribute a quantifier if she is to make an assertion. She does so through completion. But sometimes, something else besides a quantifier is added by completion. This arises when the speaker is asserting something besides a pure statistical generalization. For example, the speaker may be asserting something about what is normal for the members of the kind being dis- cussed. In such cases, the content of a sentential operator or a modal verb— in addition to a quantifier—is added to what is said.20 Below are seven examples of possible completions:21 (1) [A few] mosquitoes transmit malaria. (2) [Many] barns are red. (3) [All] prime numbers are odd. (4) [Under normal circumstances, almost all] ravens are black. (5) [By definition, all] round squares are round. (6) [Ideally, all] boys don’t cry. (7) [All] orange crushers [can] crush oranges. A speaker may utter ‘Mosquitoes transmit malaria’ in order to assert that a few mosquitoes transmit malaria. Similarly, a speaker may utter ‘Barns are red’ in order to assert that many barns are red. Moreover, an imprudent mathematics student may utter ‘Prime numbers are odd’ in order to assert that all prime numbers are odd. These three bare plurals are used to convey mere statistical generalizations. When a speaker is concerned with the properties that ravens are intrinsically disposed to have as a result of their genetic endowment, she may utter ‘Ravens are black’ in order to assert that, under normal circumstances, almost all ravens are black. This bare plural is used to assert a proposition about what is normal for ravens. Furthermore, when a speaker is concerned with what it is to be a round square, she may utter ‘Round squares are round’ in order to assert that, by definition, all round squares are round. This bare plural is used to assert a proposition about what it is to be a round square. (This is especially plausible because it is impossible for anything to be a round square.) Moreover, when a speaker is concerned with what is ideal for boys, she may utter ‘Boys don’t cry’ in order to assert that, ideally, all boys don’t cry. This bare plural is used to assert a (false) proposition about what is ideal. Finally, even if no orange crushers have ever been used to crush oranges, a speaker may utter ‘Orange crushers crush oranges’ in order to assert that all orange crushers can crush oranges. This bare plural is used to assert a proposition about the capacities of orange crushers. The seven completions in (1)–(7) are not the only completions possible. Sufficiently vary conversational goals and the mutually held beliefs of the speaker and audience, and the completions will vary too. Allow me to outline the advantages of this account of bare plurals. It easily accommodates the feature of bare plurals in need of explanation—the variety data. The speaker’s communicative intentions determine which proposition is asserted, or communicated.22 Just as the speaker’s communicative intentions may differ wildly across different contexts, the proposition communicated by uttering a bare plural may differ wildly across different contexts. The radical account has a distinct methodological advantage over standard accounts of bare plurals. The radical account makes room for a simpler semantics.23 It does not posit covert syntactic structure that other accounts posit. 24 Standard accounts of bare plurals posit Gen, a supposedly covert quantifier, which is mysteriously never pronounced in any natural language (Leslie 2008, p. 4; Liebesman 2011, pp. 414–415). The semantics for Gen are also incredibly controversial. The radical account allows us to do away with this vexed will-o’-the-wisp altogether. I thus agree with Liebesman’s claim that “Gen has proven [semantically] intractable for a very simple reason: it doesn’t exist” (2011, p. 411). Instead of Gen, the radical account merely appeals to the contents of familiar quantifier expressions (e.g. ‘many’ and ‘all’), sentential operators (e.g. ‘under normal circumstances’, ‘by definition’, and ‘ideally’), and modal verbs (e.g. ‘can’) that commonly appear in natural language. We already had to develop a semantics for such expressions. The radical account is thus appealingly parsimonious. This is, by the way, the main advantage that the radical account has over Sterken’s (2015a). On her account, Gen is an indexical that is contextsensitive enough to accommodate the variety. However, it still posits Gen, which I find costly enough to warrant preferring the radical account. But, at the very least, the radical account should be taken as a serious contender in the debates over the semantics and pragmatics of bare plurals. proposition is asserted, or communicated.22 Just as the speaker’s communicative intentions may differ wildly across different contexts, the proposition communicated by uttering a bare plural may differ wildly across different contexts. The radical account has a distinct methodological advantage over standard accounts of bare plurals.

#### 2. Err aff—they most likely misinterpreted bare plurals

Reiter and Frank ’10 (Nils Reiter and Anette Frank Department of Computational Linguistics Heidelberg University, Germany, July 2010. “Identifying Generic Noun Phrases” <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5078/2fb22573c8b612743aade2d3e0b241f8ae0f.pdf>)

The above classification of generic expressions is well established in traditional formal semantics (cf. Krifka et al. (1995))2. As we argue in this paper, these distinctions are relevant for semantic processing in computational linguistics, especially for information extraction and ontology learning and population tasks. With appropriate semantic analysis of generic statements, we can not only formally capture and exploit generic knowledge, but also distinguish between information pertaining to individuals vs. classes. We will argue that the automatic identification of generic expressions should be cast as a machine learning problem instead of a rule-based approach, as there is (i) no transparent marking of genericity in English (as in most other European languages) and (ii) the phenomenon is highly context dependent. In this paper, we build on insights from formal semantics to establish a corpus-based machine learning approach for the automatic classification of generic expressions. In principle our approach is applicable to the detection of both generic NPs and generic sentences, and in fact it would be highly desirable and possibly advantageous to cover both types of genericity simultaneously. Our current work is confined to generic NPs, as there are no corpora available at present that contain annotations for genericity at the sentence level. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces generic expressions and motivates their relevance for knowledge acquisition and semantic processing tasks in computational linguistics. Section 3 reviews prior and related work. In section 4 we motivate the choice of feature sets for the automatic identification of generic NPs in context. Sections 5 and 6 present our experiments and results obtained for this task on the ACE-2 data set. Section 7 concludes. 2 Generic Expressions & their Relevance for Computational Linguistics 2.1 Interpretation of generic expressions Generic NPs There are two contrasting views on how to formally interpret generic NPs. According to the first one, a generic NP involves a special form of quantification. Quine (1960), for example, proposes a universally quantified reading for generic NPs. This view is confronted with the most important problem of all quantificationbased approaches, namely that the exact determination of the quantifier restriction (QR) is highly dependent on the context, as illustrated in (3)3. (3) a. Lions are mammals. QR: all lions b. Mammals give birth to live young. QR: less than half of all mammals 3Some of these examples are taken from Carlson (1977). c. Rats are bothersome to people. QR: few rats4 In view of this difficulty, several approaches restrict the quantification to only “relevant” (Declerck, 1991) or “normal” (Dahl, 1975) individuals. According to the second view, generic noun phrases denote kinds. Following Carlson (1977), a kind can be considered as an individual that has properties on its own. On this view, the generic NP cannot be analysed as a quantifier over individuals pertaining to the kind. For some predicates, this is clearly marked. (1.a), for instance, attributes a property to the kind lion that cannot be attributed to individual lions. Generic sentences are usually analysed using a special dyadic operator, as first proposed by Heim (1982). The dyadic operator relates two semantic constituents, the restrictor and the matrix: Q[x1, ..., xi]([x1, ..., xi] | {z } Restrictor ; 9y1, ..., yi[x1, .., xi, y1, ..., yi] | {z } Matrix ) By choosing GEN as a generic dyadic operator, it is possible to represent the two readings (a) and (b) of the characterising sentence (4) by variation in the specification of restrictor and matrix (Krifka et al., 1995). (4) Typhoons arise in this part of the pacific. (a) Typhoons in general have a common origin in this part of the pacific. (b) There arise typhoons in this part of the pacific. (a’) GEN[x; y](Typhoon(x);this-part-of-thepacific( y)^arise-in(x, y)) (b’) GEN[x; y](this-part-of-thepacific( x);Typhoon(y)^arise-in(y, x)) In order to cope with characterising sentences as in (2.a), we must allow the generic operator to quantify over situations or events, in this case, “normal” situations which were such that Erd˝os took amphetamines. 2.2 Relevance for computational linguistics Knowledge acquisition The automatic acquisition of formal knowledge for computational applications is a major endeavour in current research 4Most rats are not even noticed by people. 41 and could lead to big improvements of semanticsbased processing. Bos (2009), e.g., describes systems using automated deduction for language understanding tasks using formal knowledge. There are manually built formal ontologies such as SUMO (Niles and Pease, 2001) or Cyc (Lenat, 1995) and linguistic ontologies like Word- Net (Fellbaum, 1998) that capture linguistic and world knowledge to a certain extent. However, these resources either lack coverage or depth. Automatically constructed ontologies or taxonomies, on the other hand, are still of poor quality (Cimiano, 2006; Ponzetto and Strube, 2007). Attempts to automatically induce knowledge bases from text or encyclopaedic sources are currently not concerned with the distinction between generic and non-generic expressions, concentrating mainly on factual knowledge. However, rulelike knowledge can be found in textual sources in the form of generic expressions5. In view of the properties of generic expressions discussed above, this lack of attention bears two types of risks. The first concerns the distinction between classes and instances, regarding the attribution of properties. The second concerns modelling exceptions in both representation and inferencing. The distinction between classes and instances is a serious challenge even for the simplest methods in automatic ontology construction, e.g., Hearst (1992) patterns. The so-called IS-A patterns do not only identify subclasses, but also instances. Shakespeare, e.g., would be recognised as a hyponym of author in the same way as temple is recognised as a hyponym of civic building. Such a missing distinction between classes and instances is problematic. First, there are predicates that can only attribute properties to a kind (1.a). Second, even for properties that in principle can be attributed to individuals of the class, this is highly dependent on the selection of the quantifier’s restriction in context (3). In both cases, it holds that properties attributed to a class are not necessarily 5In the field of cognitive science, research on the acquisition of generic knowledge in humans has shown that adult speakers tend to use generic expressions very often when talking to children (Pappas and Gelman, 1998). We are not aware of any detailed assessment of the proportion of generic noun phrases in educational text genres or encyclopaedic resources like Wikipedia. Concerning generic sentences, Mathew and Katz (2009) report that 19.9% of the sentences in their annotated portion of the Penn Treebank are habitual (generic) and 80.1% episodic (non-generic). inherited by any or all instances pertaining to the class. Zirn et al. (2008) are the first to present fully automatic, heuristic methods to distinguish between classes and instances in the Wikipedia taxonomy derived by Ponzetto and Strube (2007). They report an accuracy of 81.6% and 84.5% for different classification schemes. However, apart from a plural feature, all heuristics are tailored to specific properties of the Wikipedia resource. Modelling exceptions is a cumbersome but necessary problem to be handled in ontology building, be it manually or by automatic means, and whether or not the genericity of knowledge is formalised explicitly. In artificial intelligence research, this area has been tackled for many years. Default reasoning (Reiter, 1980) is confronted with severe efficiency problems and therefore has not extended beyond experimental systems. However, the emerging paradigm of Answer Set Programming (ASP, Lifschitz (2008)) seems to be able to model exceptions efficiently. In ASP a given problem is cast as a logic program, and an answer set solver calculates all possible answer sets, where an answer set corresponds to a solution of the problem. Efficient answer set solvers have been proposed (Gelfond, 2007). Although ASP may provide us with very efficient reasoning systems, it is still necessary to distinguish and mark default rules explicitly (Lifschitz, 2002). Hence, the recognition of generic expressions is an important precondition for the adequate representation and processing of generic knowledge. 3 Prior Work Suh (2006) applied a rule-based approach to automatically identify generic noun phrases. Suh used patterns based on part of speech tags that identify bare plural noun phrases, reporting a precision of 28.9% for generic entities, measured against an annotated corpus, the ACE 2005 (Ferro et al., 2005). Neither recall nor f-measure are reported. To our knowledge, this is the single prior work on the task of identifying generic NPs.

#### 3. Overlimiting---there’s very little lit for multiple country Affs which means functionally they only allow for Indo-Pak and whole res, which means either the Aff frankensteins countries and loses to PICs because there’s no built in sol def or they only have two Affs on a 5 month topic which causes stale debates and Aff losses to hyperspecific negs

#### 4. No limits explosion – there’s 9 states with nuclear weapons – solvency advocates, disclosure, and generics check. No ground loss – preparing individuals applies to combinations, solves ground loss.

FAS 19. “Status of World Nuclear Forces.” Federation of American Scientists. 2019. <https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/> TG

A close up of a newspaper

Description automatically generated

#### 4. This just isn’t true---Israel deterrence DA, CBW Prolif DA, ME Instability DA, etc---link magnitude isn’t determined by number of countries and more in depth research solves finding good negative arguments---5 month topic

#### 5. Use reasonability—competing intepretations causes substance crowdout dooming topic ed which outweighs on magnitude even if fairness matters more in a vacuum

### A2 T – Extra

#### We meet – the fiat implementation of the resolution.

#### Counter Interp: The aff may specify a method of implementation, including the ratification of a treaty if they have a solvency advocate

#### Prefer for field context – there are infinite methods of implementation such as disarmament, detonation, etc. Aff specification means we can have an actual debate on actual methods of implementation and promotes education about the mechanisms of the topic.

#### Treaties count as implementation – they are a form of enforcement and constitute the majority of topic literature regarding denuclearization. Preventing affs from using treaties as means of implementation makes claims about disarmament arbitrary and holds no line regarding what disarmament means.

Prefer additionally for **Policymaking education– we learn about how enforcement of policies works in the real world. Vague affs get rolled back by implementers since they don’t know how to implement it AND states don’t follow.**

#### Perkovich and Acton 09 (George Perkovich and James M. Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons a debate”, Carnegie Endowment. 2009. <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf>. AH)

**Enforcement** Many contributors to this volume acknowledge the salience and difficulty of the enforcement challenges we raise in chapter 4. Some who criticize us for underemphasizing the benefits of abolition or focusing too much on obstacles do not actually address how these enforcement problems can be resolved. It seems inescapable that the potential to authorize use of force, and to muster effective instruments of coercion, would be necessary to secure a world without nuclear weapons. In this vein, Schell and Pan rightly criticize us for paying too little atten- tion to the problem of enforcing a nuclear weapon prohibition if one of the major military and economic powers, for example the United States or Russia, were found in noncompliance. We noted that smaller economic and military powers would feel inhibited from undertaking economic sanctions or military action against a great power, but the issue deserves greater consideration. States that now rely on their own nuclear deterrents or extended nuclear umbrellas against larger powers would need to be convinced that reliable means would exist to deter or defeat a larger adversary that breaks out from a nuclear weapon prohibition. 322 **| George Perkovich and James M. Acton** Some might argue that the major military powers would be the least likely to violate a nuclear weapon prohibition, because they would have adequate conventional military power to deter aggression against them- selves or those whose security they guarantee. Yet, if conventional military balances among the major powers—say, the United States, Russia, and China—were not managed to give each confidence in its sufficiency, one or more of these powers could be tempted under duress to take measures that could raise questions about compliance. Obviously this is a circular dynamic: The major powers would not agree to eliminate their nuclear arsenals if their relations and military balances were not stable. Still, in the near to medium terms, the history of moves to abrogate or violate arms control agreements, as occurred when the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and Russia was found not to have elimi- nated all its biological weapons as required under the Biological Weapons Convention, have to be overcome. Zedillo advances the enforcement discussion thoughtfully in his analy- sis of the impediments posed by the veto mechanism in today’s Security Council. He argues persuasively that “[t]here is no obvious reason why an enlarged Security Council would inherently be more functional than the present one.” Functionality—effectiveness—would be determined more by the rules of the council’s decision making. “[F]ailure to accomplish veto reform,” Zedillo writes, “would leave the abolition process in a dead end.” Raghavan makes an elliptical point that “India would be unlikely to find it in its interests to join ... a coalition of enforcers.” This deserves elabo- ration. It seems to reflect a belief that India’s attainment of a permanent seat on the Security Council would meet with objections that India would not want to exacerbate by having council membership related to disarma- ment enforcement. But if India were a permanent member, and the Security Council had a role in enforcing a prohibition on nuclear weapons, which seems inevitable, wouldn’t India have to participate? How else would the nuclear disarmament that India now advocates be enforced? Raghavan writes that “[t]he power to enforce would also need to be subordinated to the intent of all states represented in the United Nations.” But among other questions, this raises anew the problem of ensuring that enforcement would be reliable and timely. Similar questions of timeliness and efficacy would also seem to confound Mian’s interesting suggestion that “the International Court of Justice, rather than the Security Council, could serve as the body that adju- dicates disputes over compliance involving nonproliferation, arms control, and abolition agreements.”

#### Education is a voter – schools fund debate for its educational value and debate educates us in both he academic world and leaves us with portable skills. Outweighs fairness because we can take education out of the round with us, making it a lasting impact.

#### On their shell –

#### 1] They can still access core generics under our interp – things like Israel deterrence, first strike Iran CP, and ME instability link to the aff regardless of advocacy method.

#### 2] Reasonability good – if I’m topical and am still predominantly defending the resolution you shouldn’t vote neg. 1] Competing interps causes an RTTT and leads to decision paralysis. Brightline is link and impact turn ground.

#### 3] Theory is about in-round abuse – you shouldn’t punish me for something that they think can happen in another round. If my abuse is not big enough to irreparably skew the round, then I shouldn’t lose bc of it.

### A2 T – Nuclear States

#### We meet – the aff defends the elimination of nuclear arsenals from a state recognized as a nuclear power.

Davenport 19 [Kelsey Davenport, Arms Control Association, "Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance | Arms Control Association", July 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat] **IV**  
Nuclear-Weapon States: The nuclear-weapon states (NWS) are the five states—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States—officially recognized as possessing nuclear weapons by the NPT. The treaty legitimizes these states’ nuclear arsenals, but establishes they are not supposed to build and maintain such weapons in perpetuity. In 2000, the NWS committed themselves to an “unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” Because of the secretive nature with which most governments treat information about their nuclear arsenals, most of the figures below are best estimates of each nuclear-weapon state’s nuclear holdings, including both strategic warheads and lower-yield devices referred to as tactical weapons. China About 290 total warheads. France: About 300 total warheads. Russia: March 2019 New START declaration: 1,461 strategic warheads deployed on 524 intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) estimates approximately 4,490 stockpiled warheads and 2,000 retired warheads for a total of roughly 6,490 warheads, as of early 2019. United Kingdom: About 120 strategic warheads, of which no more than 40 are deployed at sea on a nuclear ballistic missile submarine at any given time. The United Kingdom possesses a total of four ballistic missile submarines. Total stockpile is estimated up to 200 warheads. United States: March 2019 New START declaration: 1,365 strategic nuclear warheads deployed on 656 intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers. FAS estimates approximately 3,800 stockpiled warheads and 2,385 retired warheads for a total of 6,185 warheads as of early 2019. Non-NPT Nuclear Weapons Possessors: India, Israel, and Pakistan never joined the NPT and are known to possess nuclear weapons. India first tested a nuclear explosive device in 1974. That test spurred Pakistan to ramp up work on its secret nuclear weapons program. India and Pakistan both publicly demonstrated their nuclear weapon capabilities with a round of tit-for-tat nuclear tests in May 1998. Israel has not publicly conducted a nuclear test, does not admit or deny having nuclear weapons, and states that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Israel is universally believed to possess nuclear arms, although it is unclear exactly how many. The following arsenal estimates are based on the amount of fissile material—highly enriched uranium and plutonium—that each of the states is estimated to have produced. Fissile material is the key element for making nuclear weapons. India and Israel are believed to use plutonium in their weapons, while Pakistan is thought to use highly enriched uranium. India: Between 130-140 nuclear warheads. Israel: An estimated 80-90 nuclear warheads, with fissile material for up to 200. Pakistan: Between 150-160 nuclear warheads. States of Immediate Proliferation Concern: Prior to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran pursued a uranium-enrichment program and other projects that provided it with the capability to produce bomb-grade fissile material and develop nuclear weapons, if it chose to do so. Iran’s uranium enrichment program continues, but it is restricted and monitored by the nuclear deal. North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and tested nuclear devices and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Uncertainty persists about how many nuclear devices North Korea has assembled. In 2007, Israel bombed a site in Syria that was widely assessed to be a nuclear reactor being constructed with North Korea's assistance. Syria has refused to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency's attempts to investigate. Iran: No known weapons or sufficient fissile material stockpiles to build weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the institution charged with verifying that states are not illicitly building nuclear weapons, concluded in 2003 that Iran had undertaken covert nuclear activities to establish the capacity to indigenously produce fissile material. July 2015: Iran and six world powers negotiated a long-term agreement to verify and significantly reduce Iran's capacity to produce material for nuclear weapons. As part of this agreement, the IAEA and Iran concluded an investigation into Iran’s past nuclear weapons-related activities. The agency concluded that Iran had an organized program to pursue nuclear weapons prior to 2003. Some of these activities continued through 2009, but there were no indications of weaponization activities taking place after that date. North Korea: Estimated as of June 2019 to have approximately 20-30 warheads and the fissile material for 30-60 nuclear weapons. While there is a high degree of uncertainty surrounding North Korea's fissile material stockpile and production, particularly on the uranium enrichment side, North Korea is estimated to have 20-40 kilograms of plutonium and 250-500 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. The estimated annual production of fissile material is enough for 6-7 weapons. North Korea operates its 5-megawatt heavy-water graphite-moderated reactor used to extract plutonium in the past for nuclear warheads on an intermittent basis since August 2013. There has also been intermittent activity at North Korea's reprocessing facility since 2016, indicating that Pyongyang has likely separated plutonium from the reactor's spent fuel. North Korea unveiled a centrifuge facility in 2010. It is likely that Pyongyang is using the facility to produce highly-enriched uranium for weapons. U.S. intelligence suggests that there are several additional centrifuge facilities in North Korea. By 2020, experts estimate that North Korea could have anywhere between 20-100 nuclear warheads based on the rate of its stockpile growth and technological improvements. Syria: September 2007: Israel conducted an airstrike on what U.S. officials alleged was the construction site of a nuclear research reactor similar to North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor. The extent of Syrian-North Korean nuclear cooperation is unclear, but is believed to have begun in 1997. Investigations into U.S. claims uncovered traces of undeclared man-made uranium particles at both the site of the destroyed facility and Syria’s declared research reactor. Syria has not adequately cooperated with the IAEA to clarify the nature of the destroyed facility and procurement efforts that could be related to a nuclear program.

#### Counterinterp: The aff may defend the elimination of a state with possession of nuclear weapons

#### We meet our interp – CA Davenport

#### Best definition – comes from NPT recognition and more recent.

#### 