#### Communicative spheres such as debate are governed through biopolitical technologies of fluency which smooth over and systematically excludes semiotic interruptions in search for stable and univocal operations. This bends bodies to align their speech patterns with compulsory able-bodiedness. Thus the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best resists the technologies of fluency.

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“Given that compulsory able-bodiedness emanates from everywhere and nowhere, it is perhaps more fruitful to parse this consensus through the mode by which **compulsory able-bodiedness circulates and is translated across different ideas, practices, and institutions** rather than isolating the specific sites where this consensus, this hegemony, is produced. For McRuer, **“the experience of the able-bodied need for an agreed-on common ground” is a common experience that “links all people with disabilities under a system of compulsory able-bodiedness”** (8), and I suggest that this “common ground” of disability oppression is a how as much as a where or a what. That is, a common ground is never just found, but must be cleared away and maintained with effort through time. **“Fluency” can accordingly be understood as a technology operating at the intersection of biopower and hegemony that smooths over and straightens discontinuous semiotics, temporalities, and materialities to eliminate frictions within productive, biopolitical systems and thus secure social order within the material realm. An attention to fluency moves beyond the orthodox focus on ideology as the essential vehicle of hegemony to locate**, alongside Jon Beasley-Murray’s notion of “posthegemony,” **the production of consensus and the security of social order not within the realm of representation but the governance of bodies and life itself. Fluency attempts to regulate and collapse not merely the time between encounters, but the embodied time of encounter and access and judgment.** Fluency attempts to cover over political spaces—to mitigate (when it cannot eliminate) interruption and disruption—**thus facilitating** in one move **the rationalization** and naturali- zation **of embodied difference** that seems to emanate from everywhere and nowhere, **as if everyone agrees.** But whatever else it may be, **fluency is first a process enacted and lived within the material and corporeal.** Here I start from the semiotic and expand outwards. **The vast array of rhythms, semiotic modes, tempos, dictions, and (racialized or disabled) accents that constitute practices of aural “communication” have become the objective domain of the biomedicalizing industry of Speech-Language Pathology.** Barry Guitar, in his well-used textbook on speech impediments, offers an exemplary definition of fluency: “simply as the effortless flow of speech” (13). Yet there is hardly anything simple about this definition, which is offered amid caveats and backtracking. Guitar readily admits (12) that **fluency is difficult to pin down and that researchers** within Speech-Language Pathology often **focus on what it is not—namely, dysfluency.** There are a few characteristics: **Fluent speech is marked by a lack of hesitation, and** Speech-Language Pathology is forced to make (dubious and highly arbitrary) distinctions between “normal” and “abnormal” hesitations (Goldman-Eisler) since breaks and hesitations crop up in all speech. Fluent speech is marked by rhythmical (read: thoroughly normalized) patterning. Fluent speech is similarly marked by **the lack of “extra sounds” interjected into culturally dominant phonetic patterns.** Fluency is defined by the overall rate of speech, which includes not just the rate of vocal flow but of information flow (Starkweather). And lastly, fluency is often defined by a lack of “effort” on the part of the speaker; **a conceit of mastery over language** that highlights the twinned meaning of “fluency.” Transposing this definition into a critical register, **the “effortless flow of speech” can be read as a coordinated—yet often strained—performance of bending the energies and capacities of bodies toward stable and univocal futures. Autistics are compelled to restrict stimming, to sit on their hands** (to have “quiet hands,” Bascom), **and thereby reroute bodily capacities to the smooth performance of so-called intelligible communication. Dyslexic bodies that process information piecemeal and slowly are forced out of social time** (Cosenza 7). As Zach Richter has argued, **the facial tics and erratic gestures of dysfluent speakers are likewise never communicative inflections, but are made abject and cast out of the communicative realm altogether by** what I am here calling **technologies of fluency. Tics** of loud cursing and grunting **from** a public speaker with Tourette’s are imagined as **an interruption to communication.** **Dysfluencies are erased from closed captions and courtroom transcripts. What is thus left is a univocal and fluid semiotic operation that instrumentalizes our relations with others.** Or more precisely, if fluency is a type of Foucauldian technology, then the function of this biopolitical strategy is to regulate and focus the communicative event toward specific, technical ends through the logic of optimization and closure.” (342-344)

#### Neoliberal biocapitalism forecloses futures by locking groups into existing insofar as they suffer and ignores the ways that other disabled groups suffer. What is needed is a move away from the politics of recognition that creates a division between the abled and disabled towards gradations of debility and capacity that focus on ecologies of sensation and bodily capacities.

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“Puar's intervention is uncomfortable for disability studies insofar as she challenges the ways in which the field reproduces disability as an oppressed identity and an aggrieved subject enacted through what Brown (1993) terms “wounded attachments.” According to Brown, **identity groups form wounded attachments when they define themselves through the suffering they experience within dominant society in such a way that their identity becomes the painful underside of normative culture.** While Brown does not argue that marginalized groups who are left to wither do not suffer, her concern is that such **wounded attachments foreclose the freedom of a group by identifying exclusively with its “historical and present pain rather than conjure an imagined future of power to make itself”** (1993, 400). **Instead of critically evaluating dominant culture and working to replace it with something else**, Brown argues that **wounded attachments lead groups to strive for the material, social, and political wellbeing enjoyed by the very social elites whose privilege produced their suffering and marginalization.** By enunciating and making claims for themselves through “entrenching, dramatizing, and inscribing [their] pain in politics” a suffering group hold “out no future – for [themselves] or others – that triumphs over this pain” (Brown 1993, 406). **Wounded attachments lead to an unproductive but self-sustaining loop: because one identifies through their own suffering, a future without suffering would cause them to cease to exist. As such, they continuously reiterate their suffering and, thus, demand that everyone put their intellectual and affective energies into the source of their suffering as opposed to alternative political relations that would produce a more just and less oppressed future.** Neither dismissing the suffering any group faces, nor abetting the social relations that are at the root of that suffering, Brown instead wants to foster ways in which a group can enunciate and perform its historical oppression so as to not entirely delimit themselves but open themselves up to modes of healing that produce new and more just social relations. And because the wound or suffering that defines a marginalized group works to detach their suffering – and, thus, their group identity – from the ways in which that group participates in dominant culture, those wounds can cause others to suffer as well. As such, Sara Ahmed (2004) argues that enunciating and performing historical and contemporary injustices must also open up any oppressed group to the suffering they cause others through the few privileges they enjoy. **By focusing on normal/abnormal, or abled/disabled, rather than on gradations of debility and capacity, disabled people hang onto an understanding of themselves as being excluded in a way that is not productive for fighting the neoliberal biocapitalist conditions in which disabled people are situated.** One such wounded attachment is expressed in the desire of disabled people to be included in the workforce, from which they are largely excluded, despite the ways in which such a goal can re-inscribe the competitive, individualized, entrepreneurial subject formation that is key to neoliberalism’s success. This wounded attachment pre-empts certain critiques of the violence of neoliberalism more generally; critiques that would orient disabled subjects towards a future that rejects inequitable labour practices and the desire to be good neoliberal subjects. **This wounded attachment and the desire to be included closes avenues of political discussion and action that recognize and work to counter the suffering such inclusion would perpetuate for others – including other disabled subjects.** Just as Brown wants to approach suffering from an obtuse angle and not negate it, Puar takes up **debility and capacity** not to “disavow the crucial political gains enabled by disability activists globally, but to **invite a deconstruction of what ability and capacity mean, affectively and otherwise, and to push for a broader politics of debility that destabilizes the seamless production of abled-bodies in relation to disability”** (2009, 166). In doing so, Puar asks: **“How would our political landscape transform if it actively decentered the sustained reproduction and proliferation of the grieving subject, opening instead toward an affective politics, attentive to ecologies of sensation and switchpoints of bodily capacities, to habituations and unhabituations, to tendencies, multiple temporalities, and becomings?”** (2011, 157). While Puar may be interested in decentering a liberal political subject, rather than rehabilitating a grieving subject through intersectional politics, **debility and capacity can be a means to open up the suffering of disabled people and their communities in multiple ways that could allow for a more just future for everyone.**” (116-119)

#### Gradations in suffering is how the 1ACs analysis operates. Semiocapitalism has shifted the terrain and now requires information to move quickly and effortlessly. The result is the capacitation of certain disabled bodies at the expense of debilitating dysfluent laborers.

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“Considered **in terms of optimization**, the function of **fluency** is quite familiar: **technologies** of normalizing embodied difference **rely upon manageable or “docile” communication channels and semiotic protocols** (Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 135). **Speech is now human capital** (a flattened capacity that produces future return) and it is hardly surprising that **technologies of fluency have come to play a central role in the productive machinery of semiocapitalism. This system requires not only vast quantities of information, but the ability to move it around quickly and effortlessly. Fluency is not a “repressive” but a productive force** (Foucault, Discipline and Punish), **one that impels modern subjects to** be loquacious, to **increase their information flow** (see, for example, Starkweather above), **and to maximize their communicative inputs and outputs. These transformations have created new forms of disability oppression. Many disabled people who could not work under industrialized capitalist conditions have benefitted from the fact that communication has become immanent to the production process** (see Mitchell and Snyder, “Disability as Multitude,” 189) **yet such changes, while empowering for some, shift the socioeconomic terrain in threatening ways for others.** **Call centers, for example, are a mainstay of immaterial labor yet effectively exclude people with communication disabilities from employment across the board. The ability to regulate informational and affective flow has become a baseline for postindustrial labor.** Clare Butler argues that **“Being a skilled verbal communicator is** [now] **treated as a justifiable requirement in the workplace” (720), such that the imperatives to “sound right” and possess “excellent communication skills” marginalize dysfluent laborers** in postindustrial economies.” (344)

#### Neoliberal biocapitalism operates through disabling certain bodies at the expense of enhancing others. Through the figure of the Child, biocapitalism sustains a reproductive order geared towards the future in the image of a better than able-bodied subject. In reality, this sacred Child is impossible to satisfy and requires the simultaneous death and enhancement of disability. This replicates a cruel optimism towards the promise of the future that only works to disable others.

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“Thus, while Edelman (2004) is correct in asserting that the contemporary political order favours heteronormativity in the ways in which it incites **the Child as the image of the future**, this image of the Child of the future also **continuously incites compulsory enhanced-bodiediness as the child of reproductive futurity is not only not to be disabled, but must be better than able-bodied.** McRuer, in the context of Edelman’s work comments: **“‘everybody,’** after all, or so the saying goes, **‘wants a healthy baby.’** At the same time, despite this commonplace desire, **the imagined future is actually** inescapably **inaccessible; no real, flesh-and-blood child can ever embody the innocence, health, and ability associated with the sacred Child”** (2008). I agree with Edelman’s sharp and scathing critique of reproductive futurity, and while I also agree with McRuer that Edelman’s Child is able- bodied, what neither Edelman or McRuer elucidate is how **reproductive futurity relies on *both* a capacitated and bodily enhanced Child that shapes the ways the political gets mobilized in the name of the future, *and* for some disabled children to grow up at the expense of others who are never intended to grow up.** Edelman is right, then, about the ways in which the figure of the Child re-inforces heteronormativity but he fails to take stock of the ways in which **the Child is** also **always, already able-bodied, or how the Child is capacitated and enhanced.** While McRuer is right to point out that **no child can fully embody the desirable able-bodied child, and, thus, sets up disability as the impediment to a desirable future**, I am interested in how **the better-than-able-bodied Child requires some disabled children to grow up at the expense of other disabled children in order to give the Child meaning. Thus, the disabled child is the figure of no future,** as will be **demonstrated in the case of** Emily Rapp (2013) **desiring to terminate pregnancy on the basis of disability, and in the case of infanticide and filicide on the basis of disability.** **However, the disabled child is also the figure of the future in that the suffering child creates particular neoliberal futures through the mobilization of biocapital, cure, and enhancement.** Therefore, as I will go on to show, **we are deeply invested in narratives of suffering children, but some of those children are always supposed to remain children, never growing up, while others are celebrated, enhanced, and capacitated precisely because they can be made to slide into the neoliberal promise of the future.** As I will argue, **it is precisely in sliding into neoliberalism’s forms of capacitation and enhancement that incapacitates and disables others.**” (145-146)

#### We enact dysfluency as an interruption to the semiotic flow of debate. Dysfluency is not a “communicative breakdown” but rather is a flight that escapes the totalizing demands of fluency. Our politics of the mouth trips over proper speech and resist the spell of the linguistic. We endorse a material resistance towards fluency through endorsing interruptions to the system of fluency.

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“In conclusion, we might consider that for McRuer, following Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, **“disability” can refer to “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of bodily, mental, or behavioral functioning aren’t made** (or can’t be made) **to signify monolithically”** (156–57). **An attention to dysfluent voices as material enunciations offers one specific way to think about this crip excess, particularly as resistance to hegemony. Fluent voices presume to signify monolithically and thus anticipate and linearly sustain the givenness of what is**—**fluency must be decomposed for a crip politic to flourish.** Yet **while fluency may have the first word** (my speech arrives always a hesitation), **it certainly never has the last—the impulse of fluency is totalizing but “something always escapes!”** (Beasley-Murray xxi). Chris Eagle has written that **an attention to dysfluency within disability studies would “understand mastery over language as always already tenuous, fragile, and partial”** (6) and **we might in this way begin to imagine dysfluency not as a communicative “breakdown” but as a type of escape or,** **in Deleuzio-Guattarian terms, flight.** In Lexicon of the Mouth: Poetics and Politics of the Voice and the Oral Imaginary, Brandon LaBelle suggests that **by “considering interrupted speech, we enter into a politics of the mouth. By tripping over the word, stuttering evidences the deep performative drive of the mouth under the spell of the linguistic.** It stumbles precisely over a syllable, a grammar, a phoneme; the mouth gasps along the fault lines of a given vocabulary, to lisp over words, and in doing so, raises the volume on the very question as to what constitutes ‘proper speech’” (139; emphasis added). I have always imagined LaBelle’s offhanded remark a playful engagement with the Germanic fable the “Pied Piper.” In many versions of this classic tale, the piper leads all but three of the entranced village children into the river to drown. These are three crips, in fact: the first, physically disabled who could not keep pace; the second, deaf, who like Odysseus who could not hear the piper’s song; and the third, blind. Only those transformed by disability could resist the irresistible, the linear pull into deep water. In a similar way, **the spell of fluency lures and strings words from our mouths in the lock-and-file order of “proper speech,” intelligibility, and surplus value.** To what world and what dangers does this straightening syntax lead? **The crip mouth, on the other hand, stumbles over and along the major grammar. It cannot follow and in this excess forms a collective site of material agency that stubbornly resists the spell of the linguistic. Against the liberal sirens (those masters of consensus) the agential capacity of dysfluency lies precisely in its flight from understanding and intelligibility.**” (353-354)

#### Voting affirmative engages in a heterotopic imagination of disability. This is a method of imagining disability differently outside of the current neoliberal conditions. The product is a figure of disability not as something to overcome but as a life worth living.

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“**Challenging the undesirability of disability is a shared responsibility and goes beyond the inclusion of disabled people within** the exploitative and individualized relations of **neoliberal capitalism.** That is, challenging the undesirability of disability requires more than individualized access to education, employment, or vibrant social lives. **Challenging the undesirability of disability requires that disability be imagined differently, that is,** imagined **in ways that ensure that disability can be collectively practiced and experienced differently.** In order to imagine disability differently, **it is imperative to understand how the neoliberal hegemonic social imagination** both **works to curtail who is considered desirable** and informs the production of a good, individualized neoliberal subject that limits disabled and able-bodied people alike. Neoliberal policies and practices individualize both able-bodied and disabled bodies **through forms of debility and capacity** (Puar 2011) and through the economization of social relations and life itself (Murphy 2013) such that **being critical of these forms of social, economic, and political relations is not enough to extricate ourselves from our role in maintaining and reproducing these relations. In order to desire disability differently, we must begin with marginal, heterotopic imaginations whereby disability is practiced as not something to overcome or merely tolerate, but rather as a part of a life worth living.** Building on Michel Foucault’s concept of **heterotopia** (1998), a concept that **marks “outside places” by their discontinuity and multiplicity**, and drawing on the work of Mel Chen (2012) and Rod Michalko (1999), I argue that the **heterotopic imagination reconfigures how disability emerges, with whom it emerges, and where. When disability is viewed through the lens of the heterotopic imagination, it becomes an intracorporeal, non-anthropocentric, multiplicity that exceeds the individualized human body inscribed by neoliberal biocapitalism.** To elaborate on disability as this emergent multiplicity, I read Chen’s and Michalko’s work alongside Thomas Lemke’s (2015) work on Foucault’s concepts of the milieu and government of things, as well as the agential realism of feminist materialist Karen Barad (2007; 2008). **Desiring disability differently does not merely allow the current formulation of disability to become desirable.** On the contrary, desiring disability differently through the **heterotopic imagination *radically alters* what disability is, how it is practiced, and what it can be.**” (174-175)

#### Our movement exposes and publicizes ableism through forcing fluency to publicly display itself

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However, since dysfluency springs from all sorts of bodies and encounters we might thus also imagine fluency to govern other forms of embodiment beyond the semiotic. For example, in Feminist, Queer, Crip, Alison Kafer reflects on Eliza Chandler’s experience of her spastic body tripping up and falling on the sidewalk. This “becomes a moment of falling into disability; it is the falling that identifies her to others as disabled, plunging her into categories and identifications that trip her up” (36). The failure is one of fluency as much as normalcy. Spastic bodies are the correlate of stuttering bodies: both fail to move within fluid and calculable temporalities and thus both resist clear/stable meanings. By falling, Chandler is plunged into distinctly fluent categories and identifications that, with a dark irony, “trip her up.” To put this otherwise, Chandler can only be understood to “fall into disability” when set against a hegemonic order-ing that seeks to erase her spasticity. This movement discloses the compulsory nature of able-bodiedness: even the dysfluent fall is immediately, though never completely(!), recouped by fluency. An encounter gapes open—“What happened?”—and is quickly closed—“Oh, I understand. She is disabled.”—flattened into and contained within a neat series of biopolitical categorizations—“Nothing to see here, move along.”—Or, to expand the scope of analysis once more, fluency might be read to stabilize the gender binary by collapsing ambiguous gender presentation: “Hey! What are you?” Gender (like all forms of subjection) must be a fluent, intelligible performance without interpretation or dispute. Fluency thus works to cover over and provide closure to the discontinuities that constitute our experience by assigning a proper place and meaning to everything. Its impulse is totalizing, even if it can only ever be mobilized in immanent and partial ways.