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#### Modi’s popularity is at an all time high – elections boosted his mandate

Safi 19 [(Michael Safi, International Affairs Correspondent ) “India election results 2019: Modi claims landslide victory,” Guardian, 5-23-2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/23/india-election-results-narendra-modi-bjp-victory], (vikram)]

India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, has claimed a landslide victory in national elections that cements the Hindu nationalist leader as the country’s most formidable politician in decades. Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata party (BJP) had been expected to easily form a governing coalition with smaller allies, but official results showed the party ahead in at least 300 seats, comfortably beyond the 272 seats required for a majority in the lower house of parliament. Its main national opponent, Congress, was leading in just 50 constituencies and its party president, Rahul Gandhi, was turfed out of his family’s bastion seat of Amethi in Uttar Pradesh state. “Together we grow,” Modi said on Twitter as the results came in. “Together we prosper. Together we will build a strong and inclusive India. India wins yet again!” In a later televised address, he was critical of those who had doubted the BJP could increase its majority. “The political pundits of India have to leave behind their ideas of the past,” he said. This year’s polls, held over seven phases starting on 11 April, have been described as a contest for the soul of India. They pitted Modi’s Hindu nationalist government against a disparate group of opposition parties including Congress, whose secular vision has defined the country for most of the past 72 years. Votes from 542 lower-house constituencies – one fewer than usual after authorities discovered £1.3m in unaccounted cash in a south Indian party leader’s home and cancelled the poll there – started being counted at 8am local time (3.30am GMT), and results were released progressively throughout the day. BJP supporters in Bangalore on Thursday. FacebookTwitterPinterest BJP supporters in Bangalore on Thursday. Photograph: Jagadeesh Nv/EPA By early Thursday evening the BJP had won in close to 20 constituencies in the crucial state of West Bengal – up from just two seats in 2014 – while holding off a co-ordinated challenge from opposition parties in the Hindi heartland states of north India, where its support had been expected to fall from the high watermark of five years ago. Now it appears 2014 was no aberration, and that Indian politics has likely entered a new era of Hindu nationalist hegemony fuelled by Modi’s extraordinary popularity. “We are in an era where you have, once more, a central gravitational force around which Indian politics revolves,” said Milan Vaishnav, the director of the south Asia programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “I think 2019 will confirm that the BJP has replaced the Congress as that.” Nationalist agenda The emphatic victory will be greeted with dismay among some members of religious minority groups, who have voiced fears that a returned BJP government would be further emboldened to prosecute its Hindu nationalist agenda, including controversial citizenship-status checks to root out unauthorised migrants in border states. The BJP’s president, Amit Shah, described illegal migrants in the country’s north-east as “termites” in one speech that was widely condemned by opponents. Among the BJP candidates who won on Thursday was Pragya Singh Thakur, a Hindu nun and terrorism accused who is still facing trial for involvement in a 2008 bombing plot that killed six Muslims and injured scores of others. Beware of the lions: a comedian's guide to the Indian election Read more Alongside nationalism and Modi’s personal magnetism, the BJP’s victory was also fuelled by a relentless, data-driven and highly disciplined style of campaigning. The party sent up to 20 campaigners to manage the area around each polling booth, ensuring they knew their possible voters and what messages would resonate with them, an evolution from the older style of courting or inducing local chieftains to bring out their villages to vote. “We had organisations sitting in every booth and that’s unprecedented,” said Rajat Sethi, a BJP strategist. Modi the master The decisions of voters in the vast country of 1.3 billion people have been driven by innumerable local concerns, caste and religion, or rumours and opinions traded over WhatsApp or cups of chai at a tea stand. But the figure of Modi has towered over the contest like no prime minister since Indira Gandhi in the 1970s. “There is no match for Modi among the opposition parties,” said Rahul Verma, a fellow at the Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research. “He’s running at nearly an all-time high popularity. He’s charismatic, and people still repose faith in him despite not being very happy with the economic side of the government’s performance.” A survey released this week by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies found that nearly one-third of people who voted for the BJP did so in support of Modi, rather than the party or their local candidate. Modi’s popularity had actually grown compared with 2014, when he led his party to the first majority victory in 30 years, the researchers said. The months leading to the election were bumpy for the BJP. A government survey revealed unemployment to be the highest in 45 years. Data showing that farming incomes had plummeted to their lowest point in 18 years confirmed the distress of agricultural workers, some of who had marched on Delhi carrying skulls that they said belonged to farmers who had committed suicide due to drought and mounting debt. Modi’s promise on the 2014 campaign trail that “good days are coming” threatened to turn into a millstone around his neck. Is India the frontline in big tech’s assault on democracy? John Harris John Harris Read more Then a bombing in the disputed territory of Kashmir on 14 February helped to transform the contest. Rather than dent Modi’s strongman image, the killing of 40 Indian paramilitaries by a Pakistan-based militant group became the stage for his response, an airstrike deeper in neighbouring territory than Indian jets had ever struck. “It really put a premium on leadership,” said Vaishnav. “It spoke to the attributes that Modi often touts about himself: decisiveness, muscularity, nationalism and to a certain extent people started to see the vote not about a choice between political alternatives but a vote for the nation.” Modi styled himself as “chowkidar” – Hindi for watchman – and made national security the dominant message of the early part of his campaign.

#### Disarmament when India currently has a superior arsenal looks like weakness– Modi’s bases leaves him

Irfan Husain 19 [(Irfan Husain, ) “Wag the dog,” DAWN, 3-2-2019, https://www.dawn.com/news/1467116?fbclid=IwAR1mPiQpUBG3hYhKsmL2kNF-Qg8StAeHLUsDT7Lg\_vj4Alrmx23D7n\_LZnU], (vikram)]

IN the 1997 movie Wag the Dog, a US president’s re-election prospects look dim as a sex scandal threatens to dominate media coverage of the campaign. Enter Conrad Brean (played by Robert De Niro), a spin doctor who commissions film producer Stanley Motss (Dustin Hoffman) to fabricate a war with Albania to divert public attention from the scandal. News clips of ‘Albanian brutalities’ shot in a Hollywood studio are fed into the mainstream media, and soon, a shrill jingoism dominates the public discourse. Of course there’s no fighting, but such is the power of fake news that people soon believe America to be locked in a life or death struggle against tiny Albania. Read: When truth is the first casualty Does any of this sound familiar? While the scenario could apply to Donald Trump, it is currently more relevant to Narendra Modi’s India where the incumbent faces a tough re-election battle in a few months. In an increasingly jingoistic country, a ‘pre-emptive attack’ plays well with the electorate. Never mind that Indian bombs managed to blow up a few trees, damage a small wheat field and slightly hurt an elderly resident near Balakot. Take a look: Experts question India’s claim of destroying militant camp near LoC For a day, Indian euphoria was something to behold. Following events on Twitter, I was taken aback by the amount of hatred and bile, combined with a hysterical triumphalism, that Indians were posting. Pakistani Twitterati were more restrained, apart from some gung-ho keyboard warriors. On NDTV, the Indian news channel, a veritable parade of retired generals, air marshals and diplomats vented their fury, and repeatedly demanded that ‘Pakistan be taught a lesson’. Any moderate voices were immediately drowned out by anchors baying for blood. It is doubtful if the PM’s offer for talks will be accepted by India. But this chest-thumping has been scaled back following the downing of an Indian jet and the capture of its pilot over Azad Kashmir. For the time being, Indian triumphalism has been deflated, particularly after the truth about the Balakot raid has emerged. So what now? I don’t often agree with Prime Minister Imran Khan, but I thought his recent speech to the joint session of parliament struck the right note of gravitas. His decision to return the captured Indian pilot was entirely appropriate, and has given Pakistan the high moral ground. But I doubt if his invitation for talks will be accepted by India: with Modi in full election mode, any steps towards peace might lose him votes among Hindu nationalists who form the bulk of his supporters. And in a tight contest against a resurgent Congress, the Indian prime minister is unlikely to show any flexibility. The best outcome would be for both sides to declare victory and de-escalate. The risk of cross-border incursions spiralling out of control is too awful to contemplate. Already, the cost to Pakistan in terms of cancelled flights due to the closure of our airspace has been very high. Tens of thousands of passengers have been stranded, and the mobilisation of troops on the border is a very expensive business.

#### Modi cracks down and detains millions of Muslims to restore popularity, endorses mob violence, and refuses to protect Muslims and Dalits

Bruenig 19 [(Matt Bruenig, ) “Modi’s Mass Muslim Detention Scheme,” No Publication, 9-27-2019, https://jacobinmag.com/2019/09/india-narendra-modi-bjp-assam-bengali-muslims-displaced], (vikram)]

The instrument stripping 1.9 million people of rights is the National Register of Citizens (NRC), a now-arcane institution that was created in 1951 to identify who belonged to India at the time. It was reincarnated in 2014 and completed its work in Assam this year. 1.9 million people amounts to 6 percent of the total population of Assam and is two times the number of Rohingya refugees in neighboring Bangladesh. The current incarnation of the NRC’s purpose was to identify undocumented immigrants from neighboring, Muslim-majority Bangladesh. But its reach goes far beyond. The new NRC forced all of Assam’s residents to submit documentation like passports, land records, or birth certificates to show they had been in the country or were descended from people who were in the country on or before midnight of March 24, 1971, the day when Bangladesh went to war for independence from Pakistan, with India’s eventual armed support. Given the paucity of paper documentation in India and the cumbersome nature of its bureaucratic machinery, an unsurprisingly large number of people have been adversely affected. 1.9 million people, including those as old as sixty-five, are now legally forced to go to tribunals and the courts to prove that the only country they have ever lived in should not detain them. Nativist and Nationalist Roots The modern-day NRC’s roots lie in the two projects of Assamese nativism and Hindu nationalism in India. The small northeastern state of Assam has been a hotbed of opposition for more than forty years. The Assam movement from 1979 to 1985 began as an effort to exclude the non-Assamese from the state. In 1985, the Congress-led central government signed the Assam Accord with student groups and the state government committing to the expulsion of alleged foreigners. It is important to note that Assam’s student movement was not at first focused on undocumented migrants from Bangladesh but on those coming from other parts of India. However, the Hindu right paramilitary organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) that forms the social base for the BJP helped shift the focus of the student-led movement from the non-Assamese in general to specifically Bangladeshi undocumented migrants. As a result, a movement that began as an effort to preserve the northeastern state’s cultural identity from outsiders — whatever one might think of such an enterprise — morphed into something far more noxious under the auspices of the RSS: a project to define Bengali Muslims as “infiltrators,” a fifth column of Muslims who were attempting to undermine the Hindu right’s conception of India. The Hindu right’s project in Assam is part of a broader effort typified by the desire to cast doubt on the loyalties of Indian Muslims (they also target their animosity toward Christians) and their place in the country. The BJP, RSS, and their associated Hindu right organizations — known collectively as the Sangh Parivar — are seeking to restrict their rights as far as possible and transform India into a Herrenvolk democracy. As the rabidly xenophobic Shah put it recently, the alleged Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh are “termites” to them. “Every infiltrator,” he said, “will be expelled.” The true measure of the NRC’s impact has not yet been felt. The BJP intends to expand the NRC to a nationwide initiative. Forebodingly, the rollout of the program in Assam was accompanied by instructions from the central government to states to start building detention centers as part of a nationwide campaign to uproot undocumented immigrants from the country. At least two are known to be in the works in addition to nearly a dozen in Assam, including a megacomplex, and many more are likely to be built. Political Context With a second consecutive electoral victory, Hindu nationalists in India are emboldened. They sense an opening for the establishment of some of their most cherished nightmares. Not only are Muslim residents of Assam being uprooted, but India is stripping Muslim-majority Kashmir of statehood and its special autonomous status, leaving it fully occupied, with an unsurprising escalation in reports of human rights violations by the Indian Army. In schools, the BJP is engaged in the time-honored Indian political tradition of rewriting textbooks, this time with the noxious agenda of Hindutva at its heart. This has now extended to dictating the syllabus in universities. The attack on universities as spaces for open debate has also escalated with the Sangh’s recent election victory. The student wing of the Hindu right, the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), is slowly but surely gaining control of student unions. At the grassroots level, mobs are assaulting with impunity Muslims and Dalits, the lowest on the caste hierarchy. In some cases, the victims are being forced to recite Hindutva slogans or are being lynched, and in most cases the perpetrators are not charged. In one particularly heinous case, they were feted by a government minister. Given the relatively deep roots the secular tradition has among sections of the population, one might expect the equivalent of “the Resistance,” if not an effective, organized political force, to fight the dominance of Hindutva. But if you can imagine Trump instituting his agenda without the organizing work of groups like the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) to combat it, or the presence of a strong social-democratic left to oppose it, that’s what India looks like today. The opposition Congress party, long a dynastic relic that has no real center to its politics, shows little inclination to stand up to Hindutva’s agenda. While it opposed the NRC in Assam, it has supported it in the central state of Haryana. Congress official and the former chief minister of the state B. S. Hooda said that “Foreigners have to leave, it is the responsibility of the government to identify them.” The mainstream left in India, meanwhile, headed by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), is thoroughly disorganized, having lost one of its major bases of power, in West Bengal, in the last election. In its stead rose the BJP in that eastern state for the first time in modern memory. What’s left are a handful of local figures like West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee, who admirably stood and won against the implementation of the NRC in the state (for now), but who is widely seen as an opportunist. Those in India who oppose the right-wing agenda are appalled at what is happening to their country. But with rarely seen organized opposition on a national scale, it may be too late by the time a resistance gets mobilized to stop Modi and his henchmen. In the absence of a repatriation treaty with Bangladesh, it is unclear what will eventually happen to those who are held in detention for ostensibly being undocumented migrants from Bangladesh; there is currently no legal avenue for deportation. Concurrently, the government has ordered states to build detention centers across the country in places as far flung as Assam in the northeast, Karnataka in the south, and Maharashtra in the west (all states that have BJP majority governments, incidentally). It has indicated that its inclination is to round up Bangladeshi undocumented migrants across the country. A Wrench in the Machinery Because this Kafkaesque effort was overseen by the Supreme Court, the project has retained a level of statistical integrity, actually identifying more Hindus than Muslims to be stripped of their rights. By September 9, it had become clear that the vast majority of those left out of the NRC were Bengali Hindus who form the traditional voter base for the BJP in Assam and part of its vision for a Hindu nation. Home minister Amit Shah then announced that the government would be reintroducing the Citizenship Amendment Bill, which would allow for asylum-seeker status for only the non-Muslims excluded from the NRC. Thus, the BJP’s true agenda behind the project was again revealed; this was never about identifying undocumented people at all for the Hindu right. The targets are the 200 million Muslims living in India.

#### Crackdown radicalizes and creates new terrorists.

Farad Shah 10/18 **– December 18, 2019**, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/18/jailed-stone-throwing-join-terrorist-militant-group-kashmir-radicalization//argo>

Just a few months later, on Aug. 5, the BJP delivered on another of its campaign talking points: repealing a constitutional clause that had granted some autonomies to Kashmir and introducing a bill to divide the area into two federal territories under direct control of the federal government. The move came alongside a harsh crackdown on 7 million Kashmiris—including a months long communication ban and the arrests of [some 13,000 people](https://thewire.in/rights/kashmir-fact-finding)—setting the basis for even greater armed militancy, including among young people such as Hajam.

Hajam was one of 11 [young men who went missing](https://thejournalpress.net/2019/04/23/alarm-11-youth-reported-missing-across-south-kashmir-during-april/) in southern Kashmir in April. Soon after he left, his family went out looking for him. A few days after they started their search, a photo of him posing with a gun appeared on social media, said Javid Ahmad Hajam, his older brother. “He had told us that he will be back in a few days and stay well. Until his photo was posted on social media we had no knowledge of him.”

Even as Modi claimed that his administration is in control of militancy, in other words, another young person had joined a militant group—in this case, Lashkar-e-Taiba. Hajam’s story is not unusual. “In 2018, he was arrested, accused of being an OGW, and spent seven months in jail,” his brother recalled, using an abbreviation for “overground worker,” or helper of the militants. Following his jail term, he quit school. After that, his brother said, “he was at home and well, taking part in household work. We don’t know what was going on in his mind, he was very young.”

Many young people such as Hajam who have joined armed groups have also spent time in jail, typically booked under the draconian Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, which allows the government to jail people for up to two years without any trial. In fact, Indian jails are full of people who have not been tried or convicted of any crimes. [According to data from the National Crime Records Bureau](https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/undertrial-prisoners-indian-jails-ncrb-report-prison-statistics-supreme-court-1618588-2019-11-15), 68 percent of prisoners across the country have not been convicted.

In Kashmir, spending time in jail can strengthen a young person’s resolve to get revenge. Many of the jailed, who were never part of any protest, decide to join them when they are released. Others who are taken in for small crimes, such as throwing stones, become radicalized in jail. An [internal analysis on militancy](https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/front-page-2/83-youth-who-joined-militancy-in-last-18-months-were-stone-pelters-goc-dhilon/) from the Indian Army found that 83 percent of local youth who had joined a militant organization had a “record of stone-pelting.”

Since Aug. 5, the government has used the Public Safety Act to lock away scores of people. And [a fact-finding team](https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/grim-report-from-kashmir/cid/1715947) of several human-rights lawyers that recently returned from Kashmir has reported that, between Aug. 5 and Sept. 30, more than 330 habeas corpus petitions had been filed in cases where a complainant or representatives believes he or she has been detained illegally.

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#### Interpretation – the aff must fiat that all states eliminate their nuclear arsenals – it’s a generic bare plural

Nebel 14 (Jake, BPhil from Oxford and an AB from Princeton current PhD candidate in Philosophy @ NYU) “Jake Nebel on Specifying ‘Just Governments’,” Vbriefly, 12/19/2014 //KohlW

I believe that debaters shouldn’t specify a government on the living wage topic. The standard argument for this is simple: “just governments” is a plural noun phrase, so it refers to more than one just government. Most debaters will stop there. But there is much more to say. (Some seem not to care about the plural construction. I plan to address this view in a later article about the parametric conception of topicality.) Some noun phrases include articles like “the,” demonstratives like “these,” possessives like “my,” or quantifiers like “some” or “all.” These words are called determiners. Bare plurals, including “just governments,” lack determiners. There’s no article, demonstrative, possessive, or quantifier in front of the noun to tell you how many or which governments are being discussed. We use bare plurals for two main purposes. Consider some examples: Debaters are here. Debaters are smart. In (1), “debaters” seems equivalent to “some debaters.” It is true just in case there is more than one debater around. If I enter a restaurant and utter (1), I speak truly if there are a couple of debaters at a table. This is an existential use of the bare plural, because it just says that there exist things of the relevant class (debaters) that meet the relevant description (being here). In (2), though, “debaters” seems to refer to debaters in general. This use of the bare plural is generic. Some say that generics refer to kinds of things, rather than particular members of their kinds, or that they refer to typical cases. There is a large literature on understanding generics. Here my aim is not to figure out the truth conditions for the generic reading of the resolution; I shall simply work with our pre-theoretical grip on the contrast between sentences like (1) and (2). This distinction bears importantly on the resolution. If “just governments” is a generic bare plural, then the debate is about whether just governments in general ought to require that employers pay a living wage. If it is an existential bare plural, then the debate is about whether some just governments—i.e., more than one—ought to require that employers pay a living wage. Only the second interpretation allows one to affirm by specifying a few governments.

#### Violation – they spec India and Pakistan

#### Vote neg – limits–their interp makes it so that it’s impossible to have specific answers to every single aff and core neg generics no longer apply – functional limits don’t check – affs that are a combination of countries get out of DAs and there are a ton of questionably T affs like Israel and NATO – that prevents neg research and clash which is key to fairness and education

#### D rule for deterrence, competing interps to avoid judge intervention, no RVIs they discourage spending too much time on T

### 1nc – cp

#### India and Pakistan ought to establish a compromise that:

#### Increases security measures of their nuclear arsenals and obtain permissive action link (PAL) systems

#### Follow the prescribed “US model” to remove nukes from “prompt-launch” postures

#### Establish and better Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs)

#### Establish and maintain a nuclear NFU doctrine for Pakistan

#### Allow India to maintain public ambiguity around use of nuclear weapons.

#### Publicize measures taken

#### That solves- it creates a strong front against rising Pakistani and Chinese forces. Pakistan has no such constrictions by NFU and can wage war at any time.

Anil 9 [(Colonel Anil, Colonel Anil A Athale (retired) is the Chhattrapati Shivaji Fellow at the United Services Institution and coordinator of the Pune-based think-tank Inpad.) “Why India needs nuclear weapons,” Rediff, 9-25-2009]DC

The current Indian nuclear posture vis-a-vis Pakistan is 'passive, rigid and all or nothing' strategy. To wean away Pakistan from playing the cat's paw to outside powers, India has to create a force that would threaten total assured destruction of the Pakistani heartland.∂ Once it sinks into the Pakistani heads the cost of that playing the game of others is its own survival, we may see a change in their mindset.∂ Indian strategic thinking has been reduced to chanting of the mantra of 'no first use' and second strike capability. But we have an enemy that has not given a 'no first use' pledge and relies on calculated irrationality (the mad mullah image) as a strategy. We have to factor in these asymmetries in our approach to nuclear strategy.∂ It ought to be made clear to Pakistan that India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but also not be second!∂ Let me explain. Let us imagine a scenario of a repeat of 26/11 like attack. Our satellites detect Pakistan moving its F-16s to forward bases and begin arming of its missiles! Are we then to wait for the first nuclear bomb to fall on Delhi before we retaliate?∂ This strike in response to Pakistani provocations should be based on Force A -- Prithvi missiles and Bofors 155 mm guns. These should have tactical nuclear weapons or ERWs (Enhanced Radiation Weapons or so-called Neutron Bombs).∂ Force B -- The air force component and Agni/Brahmos missiles should target the likely locations of the Pakistani nuclear forces. These could have boosted fission devices in the range of 40 kilotons or more.∂ The primary target for Force A would be the 150 km narrow strip along our border that is the Pakistani heartland in terms of population. Force B should target distant cities, airfields and missile sites as well as nuclear establishments.∂ To sum up, India should shift to a 'flexible response' from the current no first use and minimum deterrence posture. Against China it would be a strategy of dissuasion based on a survivable second strike force that could threaten Chinese high value targets.∂ In the case of Pakistan, the flexible response strategy would be based on ambiguous no first or second use and a 1,000 point targeting with the aim of annihilation of that entity.∂ It is obvious that in the case of Pakistan at least we have to have a nuclear war fighting and winning capability -- it may sound bizarre and completely heartless to think of it for we must expect that a few Pakistani nuclear weapons will survive and reach our cities.∂ But given the state of that country and its self image as well as our own folly of passivity, reality is far worse and being unprepared is a sin that future generations will not forgive us.

#### CSBMs solve- diffuse tension and prevent miscalc.

Hilali 5 [(A. Z. Hilali, Hilali is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Peshawar, Pakistan) “Confidence- And Security-Building Measures For India And Pakistan,” Sage Publications, Inc., 6-1-2005]DC

In the 1980s, India and Pakistan enacted a series of additional measures to enhance the spirit of CSBMs. The two countries established a hotline link in 1986-1987 during the Brasstacks crisis30 and sought to move toward concrete conciliation. The absence of communication had become a cause for suspicion, and this was an important step in avoiding misunderstandings and misinformation. The hotlines were used in 1992-1993 to defuse the tension generated by political groups in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) when they attempted illegally to cross the LoC and enter Jammu and Kashmir to protest. In 1993, communication links were further extended to include sector commanders along the LoC in the Muree-Baramula and PoonchRajauri sectors. The main objective has been to exchange information on military exercises, maneuvers, and airspace violations, to defuse tensions and resolve disputes along the border. Moreover, after conducting nuclear tests in May 1998, both countries established a communication network to prevent accidental triggering of nuclear weapons. Both agreed that New Delhi and Islamabad would notify each other immediately in case of any accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a nuclear war. Both countries also agreed to establish regular communications linkages between the two directors-general of military operations.

#### PALs solve- increase security and prevents accidents.

Clary 13 [(Christopher Clary, Clary is a Ph.D candidate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a Stanton Nuclear Security Pre-doctoral Fellow at RAND Corporation.) “Lift the lid off nuclear secrecy,” The Hindu Business Line, 7-15-2013]DC

Does India have permissive action links? We do not know. If India has them, are they robust and tamper-resistant?∂ Apart from a cryptic reference in a 1998 press release to “safety interlocks,” there is no public information. Vice-Admiral Verghese Koithara, in his 2012 study of India’s nuclear arsenal, concluded the National Command Authority had a “lack of confidence” in its ability to exercise control over nuclear weapons through electronic means, suggesting that permissive action links are absent or rudimentary.∂ A decade ago, if you had asked scholars studying India’s nuclear programme, they would have told you permissive action links were important, but not necessary in the Indian case.∂ India was believed to store its nuclear weapons in a partially-disassembled, de-mated state that made the weapons immune to unauthorised launch during peacetime. However, without any public justification, this appears to have changed.∂ Bharat Karnad reported in his 2008 study of the programme that part of the arsenal was kept mated in peacetime.∂ DRDO head Avinash Chander said something consistent with Karnad’s claim when he stated, “In the second strike capability, the most important thing is how fast we can react. We are working on cannisterised systems that can launch from anywhere at anytime…. We are making missiles so response can be within minutes.”∂ Cannisterised systems, where the missile is stored in a sealed tube, seem to imply warhead mating and assembly is done long before launch.∂ If India has decided to keep missiles mated in peacetime, the presence of tamper-proof permissive action links is essential to avoid unauthorized launches.

#### Removing nukes from “prompt-launch” postures solves- delays launches, reduces “hairline-trigger” responses, and reduces miscalc.

Wright, MacDonald, and Gronlund 16 [(David Wright, Eryn MacDonald, and Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright is a co-director of the UCS Global Security Program. Eryn MacDonald is an analyst for the program. Lisbeth Gronlund is a co-director of the program.) “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War,” UCSUSA, 02-03-2016]DC

Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia continue to keep many hundreds of nuclear weapons on high alert, ready to be launched in minutes. This alert status—frequently called “hair-trigger alert,” “launch on warning” status, or other synonyms1 —allows both countries to launch missiles quickly in response to warning of an incoming nuclear attack, before the attacking missiles hit their targets. This Cold War–era policy is dangerous because it increases the chance of an accidental, unauthorized, or mistaken launch of nuclear weapons, as historical examples of false warning and other mistakes demonstrate. Growing tensions between the United States and Russia make it even more important to ensure that should a crisis develop—increasing the time pressure on decision makers and opportunities for misunderstandings—high alert status does not lead to a mistake that sparks an unintended nuclear exchange. In addition, the Chinese military has recently begun to argue that China should put its nuclear weapons on alert for the first time and build an early warning system to detect an incoming attack. These steps would also increase the risk of mistaken launches, especially since history shows that false alarms are more common early in the operation of a new warning system. U.S. nuclear policy is the largest external influence on Chinese nuclear policy. As a result, a U.S. decision to eliminate prompt-launch options from its nuclear war plans and take its missiles off high alert could affect the internal Chinese debate and help influence China to refrain from taking these dangerous steps (Kulacki 2015a). For these reasons, the United States should remove options from its nuclear plans for launching missiles on warning of an attack, and take its silo-based missiles off alert. These fixed land-based missiles are vulnerable to attack and therefore U.S. decision makers would be under the most pressure to launch them on warning. The United States also keeps submarine-based missiles at sea on high alert, but these are not vulnerable to attack so there would not be such pressure to launch them on warning. It is important that the United States remove rapid launch options from its nuclear plans. This change would mean that it would not return its missiles to high alert status in a time of crisis.

#### Pakistan NFU solves- maintains deterrence and ensures no first use.

Rajagopalan 19 [(Rajesh Rajagopalan, Dr. Rajesh Rajagopalan is Professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.) “The strategic logic of the No First Use nuclear doctrine,” ORF, 8-30-2019]DC

The central reason behind India’s NFU was the recognition that nuclear weapons served only a very limited purpose, that of ensuring national survival. The only real threat to such survival was a nuclear attack. Nuclear weapons are unique because unlike any other weapon, they could wreak so much destruction in such a short time that they could potentially end an entire society in an afternoon. The only way to prevent such destruction is to threaten similar destruction on any potential adversary, thus deterring them from pursuing such a course of action. Threatening retaliation is the only solution because there is no defense against these weapons. Though there were attempts by deterrence theorists in other parts of the world to consider the use of nuclear weapons for more limited tactical purposes than national survival, most Indian nuclear strategists were rightly skeptical of such possibilities. This drove some of the strongest proponents of India’s nuclear weapon programme to be also deeply critical of the kind of elaborate nuclear doctrines and arsenals being developed by other countries, especially the two Cold War superpowers. It was not a logic that they wanted India to follow because it made little sense for anyone, and definitely not for India. NFU was the outcome of this strategic logic. (The other corollary was a limited nuclear arsenal). If the primary purpose — indeed, the only purpose — of nuclear weapons was deterrence of other nuclear weapons, then threatening retaliation was the only manner in which these weapons could be used. The threat of retaliation is of course the essence of deterrence: preventing someone from taking an action by threatening to punish them if they did. Retaliation, by definition, could only be for an action that was already taken, in this case, a nuclear attack that has already happened. Deterrence and retaliation automatically meant that there was no logic to using nuclear weapons first: hence, no first use. Additional benefits also accrue from NFU: tighter political command over nuclear weapons, a much more relaxed command and control regime and a much safer nuclear arsenal.

### 1nc – case – framing

#### Absurd, low probability scenarios prevent effective decision-making – we can’t differentiate between different risks

Kessler 8. Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” Alternatives 33 (2008), 211-232

The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to  "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. If the risk of terrorism is defined in traditional terms by probability and potential loss, then the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of probabilities. The reason is that even the highest degree of improb- ability becomes irrelevant as the measure of loss goes to infinity.^o The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then there is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and risk manage- ment as a rational endeavor breaks down. Under the historical con- dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely absent. The second form of security policy that emerges when the deter- rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty. Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; uncer- tainty is a crucial precondition for catastrophies. In particular, cata- strophes happen at once, without a warning, but with major impli- cations for the world polity. In this category, we find the impact of meteorites. Mars attacks, the tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11. To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap- pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "ratio- nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre- empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro- phe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was responsible and whether it could have been prevented. This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur- ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex- ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur- rency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties. Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main prob- lem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that "most striking is the fact that we do not even know who or what will constitute the most serious future threat, "^i In order to cope with this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote, to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards" and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability- based defense planning strategy.53 The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that even the most absurd scenarios can gain plausibility. By construct- ing a chain of potentialities, improbable events are linked and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable. "Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step, the residual impression is one of plausibility. "54 This so-called Oth- ello effect has been effective in the dawn of the recent war in Iraq. The connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda that the US government tried to prove was disputed from the very begin- ning. False evidence was again and again presented and refuted, but this did not prevent the administration from presenting as the main rationale for war the improbable yet possible connection between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald Rumsfeld famously said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncer- tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.

### 1nc – case – escalation

#### No nuke escalation

David Brewster 2/27. PhD; National Security College at the Australian National University; Distinguished Research Fellow with the Australia India Institute. “India-Pakistan: Shadow Dancing in the Himalayas.” Lowy Institute. 2/27/2019. https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2019/02/27/india-pakistan\_shadow\_dancing\_in\_the\_himalayas\_112976.html

Nuclear war theorists tell us that competing nuclear-armed states inhabit what is called a “stability/instability paradox”. The fear of mutually assured destruction can create a form of stability at a strategic level (as we saw during the Cold War). But nuclear weapons can simultaneously create instability by making lower levels of violence relatively safe, because escalation up the nuclear ladder is perceived as too dangerous. In other words, by creating a nuclear ceiling that both sides do not wish to breach, there is also space for conflict underneath that ceiling. How large that space is will depend on the players involved. The India-Pakistan relationship is a great example of this. Pakistan has been a master in pursuing asymmetric strategies against India underneath the nuclear ceiling. This has included adopting a first-use doctrine and the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in an effort to blur nuclear red lines (creating space underneath the ceiling). It has supported major terrorist attacks inside India, including the 2001 attacks on the Indian Parliament and the 2008 attacks in Mumbai. It has of course long supported terrorist attacks in Kashmir. In past years, the nuclear threat from Pakistan has prevented New Delhi from responding forcefully to these actions – India’s failure to undertake a military response to the 2008 Mumbai attacks being one example. India is essentially a status quo power, whose first objective is often just to maintain the status quo. But as Pakistan is learning, the stability/instability paradox works in both directions. In 2016, after Pakistan-supported terrorists attacked an Indian Army base at Uri, Modi ordered a raid by Indian special forces against an insurgent’s camp in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. The so-called “surgical strike” was heralded as a major victory against terrorism. But while whole books have even been written about it – and even a movie – the details remain somewhat hazy. For its part, Islamabad claimed that the so-called “surgical strikes” never happened, and later invited foreigners to tour the area to “prove” that nothing happened. Each side, wanting to believe its own version, went away with honour served. We are seeing a similar dance now. These latest strikes allow the Modi government to trumpet a major victory against Pakistan, apparently “pre-empting” further imminent attacks against India. This time Delhi turned up the heat a little, striking near Balakot in (undisputed) Pakistan territory rather than in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. And, perhaps incidentally, Balakot is only around 60km from the city of Abbottabad, Osama bin Laden’s old hangout. For its part, Pakistan has again claimed that the strikes never happened and that the Indian planes were in fact forced by the Pakistan Air Force to jettison their bombs in uninhabited mountains and flee. Again, Pakistan has offered to show foreigners around a place somewhere near Balakot to show that nothing happened there. Nevertheless, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan met with Pakistan’s National Security Committee (which controls Pakistan’s nuclear weapons) and then announced that Pakistan would respond to the (non) attack “at the time and place of its choosing”. Whether Delhi and/or Islamabad feel the need to take further public action remains to be seen. But both will seek to manage events. The stability/instability paradox tells us that there may be room to move underneath the nuclear ceiling – sometimes considerable room – but also that the nuclear ceiling is still definitely there.

#### Zero risk of indopak war

Kumar, 13 (Sanjay – correspondent for The Diplomat, “Pakistan’s Elections: A Harbinger of Peace on the Subcontinent?”, The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/the-pulse/2013/05/16/pakistans-elections-a-harbinger-of-peace-on-the-subcontinent/>)

Now that we know Nawaz Sharif will succeed Raja Pervez Ashraf as the next prime minster of Pakistan, it’s worth noting that Pakistan has never seen a democratic transition as smooth as the one set to take place between the outgoing Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the newly elected Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, or PML(N).

In its 66-year history as an independent nation, Pakistan has witnessed three military coups and extended rule by army generals. Even today, the nation is plagued by political turmoil. But this year seems to be a new chapter in its turbulent history.

The verdict from the 2013 elections gives the PML(N) 123 seats out of 254 declared results as of Tuesday evening, giving Sharif’s party an unassailable lead over its main rivals, PPP and Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, which had secured 31 and 26 seats, respectively. The electoral results for the final 18 of Pakistan’s 272 National Assembly seats remain unannounced.

The voter turnout this year was impressive, with 60 percent of all registered voters turning up to the polls, up from a 45 percent turnout in the last national elections in 2008. This impressive turnout came despite the threat of violence. More than 150 people lost their lives and scores were injured in attacks by insurgents across the country during the election campaigning period and on election day. This brave statement by the people of Pakistan sends a new message to the outside world and gives hope for peace on the Subcontinent.

In particular, India has a stake in the democratic success of its neighbor, with whom relations have been turbulent. There is widespread hope in India that Sharif, who formed a new Indo-Pakistani relationship in the 1990s, will revive the peace process and improve Islamabad’s ties with New Delhi.

Indian Prime minister Manmohan Singh was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Sharif after his emphatic victory. In a letter, Singh talked about charting a new course for the relationship between the two countries and invited his Pakistan counterpart to visit India.

Sharif reciprocated and emphasized the need for improved relations with India. He further stressed the importance of resolving issues, including Kashmir, through peaceful means. He even informally invited the Indian premier to his inauguration ceremony in Islamabad.

According to veteran Pakistani author and political analyst Ahmed Rashid, circumstances may be more favorable this time for Sharif to improve ties with New Delhi. He writes, “During his two premierships in the 1990s, Sharif made genuine efforts at peace with India but was thwarted by an aggressive and uncompromising army.” But, he continues, “The army—faced with a severe weakening of the state—now seems more amenable to improving relations with New Delhi.”

The Hindu opines that where Sharif “gives most hope is in his strong and unambiguous articulation of better India-Pakistan relations, though this will depend on his stated determination to correct the civil-military imbalance, and reclaim the national agenda from the security establishment. Whether he can succeed is another question, but India will be hoping he will.”

As Pakistan passes through a rough economic patch, deeper engagement with its immediate neighbor will not only give the volatile country increased political stability but will also boost growth. India can play a major role in reviving Pakistan's bankrupt economy as a potential investor.

According to an article published by the New Delhi-based think tank Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), trade between the two South Asian countries could receive renewed impetus under the new regime, barring complications from opposition by the religious right. However, the IDSA article also notes that “one should not expect a lot of change in policies related to terrorism targeted at India or its aversion to India’s presence in Afghanistan.”

Despite skepticism, there is a general mood of optimism in India about the regime change in Pakistan. Just a couple of weeks ago Indian media was full of anti-Pakistan stories in the wake of the attack on Indian prisoner Sarabjit Singh in a Pakistani jail. While most Indian reports were full of jingoism in their coverage of the death of Singh, the election has changed the tone of the discourse.

The optimism stems from Sharif’s earlier initiatives in the 1990s to deepen ties with India. In 1999, he started a bus service that runs between Lahore and New Delhi. Then Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Pakistan in the inaugural bus ride. This bonhomie, however, was short-lived. Later that year hostilities erupted between the two nations at the Kargil sector, when the Pakistani army crossed the Line of Control under the leadership of former military ruler Pervez Musharraf.

The new leadership in Pakistan has a very tough job at hand: alleviate the deep-seated historical fear and mistrust between the two countries.

Likewise, India will have to show maturity in understanding the changing mood and aspirations of the people of Pakistan.

New Delhi needs to recognize that never before has there been such an overwhelming consensus for Pakistan to normalize relations with India. If the leaderships of both countries work hard to tap this desire, they may be able to usher in a new era of peace and progress on the Subcontinent.

#### No escalation – india won’t escalate

Adnan R Khan 12-4-2014; Adnan R. Khan has been on the ground for Maclean's in some of the world's most unfriendly places, from Pakistan to Iraq, writing about conflict, politics, society, and the occasional vacationing tips in Afghanistan. “The new nuclear threat” <http://www.macleans.ca/news/world/the-new-nuclear-threat/>

For the time being, the potential for that scenario to play out remains low, says retired colonel Baseer Malik, a military analyst in Islamabad. “India knows it outmatches Pakistan in conventional terms,” he says. “But, in terms of nuclear, it is a different story. India would not be so short-sighted as to provoke Pakistan in this way. They know how quickly things could escalate.” The threat of escalation now has as much to do with advances in conventional weapons as it does with nuclear imbalances. “Strategic stability is no longer just a product of the interaction between comparable nuclear forces,” the Council on Foreign Relations report says, “but, increasingly, between nuclear forces and non-nuclear technologies, such as missile defences, anti-satellite weapons, conventional precision-strike weapons, and cyberweapons.” Thankfully, the worst-case scenario for India and Pakistan is not likely to play out any time soon. India’s modernization of its conventional arsenal is still in its infancy, says Ladwig. But as long as it aggressively pursues advanced weaponry, Pakistan will feel threatened and respond with the expansion of its nuclear option. With no end in sight to the animosity between the two countries, the end result can only be bad.

### 1nc – case – bioweapons

#### The aff causes a shift to bioweapons use

Zilinskas 2K

Former Clinical Microbiologist. Dir. – Chem/Bio Weapons Nonproliferation Program – Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Raymond, Biological warfare: modern offense and defense, 1-2

It is an odd characteristic of biological weapons that military generals tend to view them with distaste, but civilian bioscientists often have lobbied for their development and deployment. There are, of course, understandable reasons for this oddity; generals find that these weapons do not fit neatly into tactical or strategic military doctrines of attack or defense, whereas researchers have observed that transforming microbes into weapons presents interesting scientific challenges whose solution governments have been willing to pay well for. Another oddity is that whenever biological weapons have been employed in battle, they have proven militarily ineffectual, yet bellicose national leaders persevere in seeking to acquire them. There is also a facile explanation for this anomaly, namely, that although pathogens are all too willing to invade prospective hosts, human ingenuity so far has failed to devise reliable methods for effectively conveying a large number of pathogens to the population targeted for annihilation by disease. This repeated failure has not deterred leaders; again and again they become allured by the potential destructive power of biological weapons. Perhaps trusting science too much, they direct government scientists to develop them, believing that this time a usable weapon of mass destruction will be achieved. Their belief so far has been thwarted, but is it possible that within the foreseeable future the potential of **b**iological **w**eapons will be realized and that the effect of a biological bomb, missile, or aerosolized cloud can be as readily predetermined as that of a bomb or missile carrying a conventional or nuclear warhead? There are many who believe that today's bioscientists and chemical engineers working in unison and wielding the techniques of molecule biology developed since the early 1970s could, if so commanded, develop militarily effective biological weapons within a fairly short time. If this supposition is correct, our **perception of biological weapons as being undependable, uncontrollable, and unreliable must change.** The reason is simple: if these weapons are demonstrated to possess properties that make it possible for commanders to effect controlled, confined mass destruction on command, all governments would be forced to construct defenses against them and some undoubtedly would be tempted to arm their military with these weapons that would be both powerful and relatively inexpensive to acquire. Ironically, as tougher international controls are put into place to deter nations from seeking to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons, **leaders may be even more drawn to biological arms** as the most accessible form of **w**eapon of **m**ass **d**estruction.

#### That’s worse than the aff

Singer 1

(Clifford E., professor of nuclear engineering and director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana – Champaign, “Will mankind survive the millennium?” Bulletin of the program in Arms Control Disarmament, and International Security, 13:1, Swords and Ploughshares, http://acdis.illinois.edu/assets/docs/312/WillMankindSurvivetheMillennium.pdf)

In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man would survive into the future for substantially less than a millennium was about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However fear of annihilation of the human species through nuclear warfare was confused with the admittedly terrifying, but much different matter of destruction of a dominant civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the globe’s population through the disruption from the direct consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still is, what is now known to be a rather small chance that dust raised by an all-out nuclear war would cause a so called nuclear winter, substantially reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As noted above [hu]mankind as a whole has weathered a number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fifty thousand years even if older cultures or civilizations have sometimes eventually given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publicized by widely seen works such as “On the Beach,” was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than reality. The epidemiological lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are barely statistically detectable except in immediate fallout plumes. The increase in radiation exposure far from the combatants in even a full scale nuclear exchange at the height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the variations in natural background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a number of human populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global warming or other insults to our physical environment resulting from currently used technologies will challenge the survival of mankind as a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the past fifty thousand years. There are, however, two technologies currently under development that may pose **a more serious threat to human survival**. The first and most immediate **is biological warfare** combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the power of this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is achieved.

#### Pakistan has bioweapons

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\*BW = Bioweapons

Collectively, taking into account the above-mentioned observations, there is apparently a sound rationale which led Pakistan to pursue BW and establish a strategic concept in accordance. The various considerations and postulations underlying a presumed Pakistani seeking for BW, as described herein, are regarded to be plausible. It can be concluded that an active BW programme, in all likelihood, commenced in Pakistan in the 1980s. It possibly yielded a first-generation BW arsenal by 1994. Otherwise, a first-generation BW arsenal probably came into being during the second half of the 1990s or the first half of the 2000s.

#### India has the means to create bioweapons – nukes means there’s no motive

NTI 15 – Nuclear Threat Initiative, “India: Biological” https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/india/biological/ //KohlW

New Delhi possesses the scientific capability and infrastructure to launch an offensive BW program, but does not appear to have chosen to do so. In terms of delivery, India also possesses the capability to produce aerosols and has numerous potential delivery systems ranging from crop dusters to sophisticated ballistic missiles. However, no information exists in the public domain suggesting interest by the Indian government in delivery of biological agents by these or any other means.

### 1nc – case – bioterror

#### War solves Pakistan’s terrorist support and does not escalate

Karnad 9 [(Bharat, Research Professor in National Security Studies at the Center for Policy Research) “Little room for manoeuvre,” Livemint, Jan 21]

It is easy to infer from New Delhi’s tip-toeing around the military option that it fears the situation spiralling out of control and into a nuclear exchange, whence Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s categorical assertion that there would be no war. This reading of the situation that Islamabad encourages ignores the cost of nuclear war for Pakistan. Should nuclear weapons use ever be initiated, the one certainty is that Pakistan cannot survive repeated Indian nuclear strikes. In the event, Islamabad has every incentive to avoid hostilities. It confers an advantage India has been loath to capitalize on. Islamabad has cannily used the overblown threat of nuclear conflagration, which is pumped up by the Western propaganda about “nuclear flashpoint”, to keep New Delhi in the throes of indecision and on the defensive. Most political leaders and their advisers in the highest reaches of the government having bought into such alarmist nonsense have urged caution, leading the 1999 Kargil conflict onwards to India’s passivity and inaction in the face of even extreme provocation. What has been swallowed whole is US thesis that because India and Pakistan are both nuclear-armed states, Pakistan can safely fuel the insurgency in Kashmir and facilitate terrorism in India because its nuclear arsenal will deter India from retaliating with its superior conventional military forces. But this argument holds only if India does not respond in kind. Terrorism cannot any longer be permitted to remain a cost-free option for Islamabad. Paying the Pakistani army and its creature, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), back in their own coin is the answer. This will require targeted intelligence operations to destabilize the brittle Pakistani polity. Support for sub-nationalist movements in Baluchistan, Baltistan and Sindh, stoking the anti-Punjab sentiment, and exacerbating the Sunni-Shia rift and, in parallel, for Indian special forces and the military to render live the Line of Control and the international border. In a short time, fissiparous forces will begin to tear that country apart and the sustained low-key military tension with India will sap the energy of the army and convince it that terrorism against India is not worth the consequences to Pakistan.

#### Pakistani biotech could fall into the hands of terrorists

NTI 15 – Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Pakistan: Biological” <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/pakistan/biological/> //KohlW

Pakistan's biotechnology sector has continued to expand in recent years, with dozens of institutions dealing with biotechnology and genetic engineering. Of greater proliferation concern than a dedicated BW program is the possibility that dangerous dual-use biological materials from these facilities could be inadvertently exported or fall into the hands of state or non-state actors as a result of possible weaknesses in Pakistan's export control and biological security systems. Since the mid-2000s, Pakistan has increased its regulation of the biological industry, issuing a set of biosafety rules in 2005 which established a National Biosafety Committee to create guidelines, issue export licenses, and inspect facilities dealing with "living modified organism[s] or genetically modified organisms." [8] Islamabad has also taken measures to improve its WMD-relevant export controls. In 2004, the government released the Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment Related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created the Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) to regulate exports of biological, nuclear, and missile-related products. [9] An updated control list, released in 2011, brought Pakistan's biological export controls in line with those of the Australia Group (AG), although Pakistan remains outside the Group. [10]

#### Extinction

Myhrvold 13 [Nathan, PhD in Theoretical and Mathematical Physics from Princeton, and founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as Chief Strategist and Chief Technology Officer of Microsoft Corporation, July, "Stratgic Terrorism: A Call to Action," http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf]

A virus genetically engineered to infect its host quickly, to generate symptoms slowly—say, only after weeks or months—and to spread easily through the air or by casual contact would be vastly more devastating than HIV. It could silently penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly. This type of epidemic would be almost impossible to combat because most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a virus and kill a large part of humanity with it. Indeed, terrorists may not have to develop it themselves: some scientist may do so first and publish the details. Given the rate at which biologists are making discoveries about viruses and the immune system, at some point in the near future, someone may create artificial pathogens that could drive the human race to extinction. Indeed, a detailed species-elimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal. The ostensible purpose of that particular research was to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria mosquito, but similar techniques could be directed toward humans.16 When I’ve talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with biotech remedies. If you challenge them to come up with improvements to the suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty of ideas. Modern biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not already, of bringing about the demise of the human race— or at least of killing a sufficient number of people to end high-tech civilization and set humanity back 1,000 years or more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in mind that it takes only a handful of individuals to accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically than nuclear proliferation, modern biological science has frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing mechanism throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agents—lethal enough to exterminate Homo sapiens—will be available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included. The 9/11 attacks involved at least four pilots, each of whom had sufficient education to enroll in flight schools and complete several years of training. Bin laden had a degree in civil engineering. Mohammed Atta attended a German university, where he earned a master’s degree in urban planning—not a field he likely chose for its relevance to terrorism. A future set of terrorists could just as easily be students of molecular biology who enter their studies innocently enough but later put their skills to homicidal use. Hundreds of universities in Europe and Asia have curricula sufficient to train people in the skills necessary to make a sophisticated biological weapon, and hundreds more in the United States accept students from all over the world. Thus it seems likely that sometime in the near future a small band of terrorists, or even a single misanthropic individual, will overcome our best defenses and do something truly terrible, such as fashion a bioweapon that could kill millions or even billions of people. Indeed, the creation of such weapons within the next 20 years seems to be a virtual certainty. The repercussions of their use are hard to estimate. One approach is to look at how the scale of destruction they may cause compares with that of other calamities that the human race has faced.