## Advantage

#### The nuclear deterrence ideology justifies the worst form of nuclear insecurity. The last warrant in this card is solvency.

Halaseh 14 – Economics at the University of Manchester (Feisal, “Is “Securitisation” an accurate description of what happens?,” [https://www.academia.edu/28600572/Nuclear\_Securitization)[KDandu](https://www.academia.edu/28600572/Nuclear_Securitization%29%5BKDandu) + CW]

Standing on these presumptions whilst keeping in thought the de-securitisation and securitisation course suggested from the Copenhagen School of thought, conforming to which whether the object in reference is a threat to global/national security or not, hence the need to undergo unprecedented measures (Buzan & Wæver 1998), nuclear risk is contemplated as the referent object in this essay, but de-securitising it would be almost impossible. Hence, this essay shall outline the adverse effects of nuclear deterrence and review what the academics have formerly analysed. Moreover, it will primarily contest that deterrence is not an optimal strategy, since it lies inside a troublesome and complicated groundwork, from the means of securitisation (Waltz 1981; McDonald 2008**).** As a deteriorated act of securitisation does not provide security and balance, it does not appear to be probable that nuclear deterrence is headed towards a different path. Accordingly, while analysing certain readings, it shall be debated that the exclusive material that nuclear deterrence actually gives, is a more intense form of re-securitisation of nuclear insecurity, which can be portrayed as a catastrophic result for the foundation of what Henry Kissinger had made known, a stable world, or in his own words “a global equilibrium” (Donaldson 1985). Debating that security concerns should be known “as an existential threat to a referent object” (Buzan & Wæver 1998), academics of the Copenhagen school of thought, advocate five layouts of the groundworks of security: political, societal, environmental, military and economic security. Each layout is carried out by the securitising agents, such as governments and leaders in politics and through referent objects, such as intellectual values, individuals, or the sovereignty of the state and nuclear risks. Even with their classical and academic stance on security, they attempt to widen the interpretation of security beyond the scope of military problems (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 80). The key academic format of the Copenhagen School of thought, urges the de-securitisation/securitisation method, in consequence, a matter could be heightened from being non-political to a political one which would then become securitised, and vice versa for de-securitisation. Hence, a move of securitisation points to the established classification of precise and no other phenomena, individuals or bodies as contemporary risks that would need extraordinary measures (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 79). Undoubtedly, some aspects of security, such as environmental/economic and nuclear risks, which are beyond the scope of the military, require fitting measures. Fundamental to the move of securitisation, in respect of the Copenhagen School, is its deviating arrangement, speech act theory, whilst the non-deviating portrayal appertains to implementations of policies. Conforming to the Copenhagen School of thought, securitisation is an action that is guided by unspoken rules, the achievement of which doesn’t rely on the presence of an actual risk, but on the competence to provide an improvement with a certain disposition. The thing that impacts the prosperous result of securitisation, is the prospect of acknowledgement from about the query of securitisation. Buzan argued that a prosperous act of discussion contains a mixture of culture and language, together peculiar aspects of discussion and the crowd that authorises and perceive that discussion (Buzan & Wæver 1998: 33). Whilst recognising the groundworks of security, Copenhagen School further considers the act of securitisation equivalent to the philosophy of war, in the unlikely situation of disagreement with the opponent; we attempt to eradicate them. This self-established abuse of order is the move of securitisation, and alarm that the opponent will eliminate us, is the primary impulse for a move like this (Buzan & Wæver 1998: 25). The issue of the philosophy behind the development of risk and the obligation of having to undergo extensive measures is linked to nuclear groundworks, can be simply resolved by observing the previous Soviet Union and USA relationship, particularly on the distribution of nuclear arms. The severely argumentative relation between the Soviet Union and United States, which was invoked by accusations and threats from both sides. With regards to the various range of affairs from the FYROM until this very day, the Russian government has been more attentive in observing the USA, than the USA observing them, so the USA’s strategist must not make any assumptions that a Russian-USA clash would commence with the pair in a fog (Oliker & Quinlivan 2011). In spite of Russia having been a powerful rival to the United States, it is not perceived as being the only enemy in the eyes of strategic administrators from the Western bloc. China used to pose as a nuclear risk, amply competent to ensue and launch, a major nuclear offensive. Those strategies are considerably threatening, due to declining foreign relationships between the countries and the nuclear proliferation that was strongly implemented. Instead of taking a stance on the argument of the efficiency of nuclear proliferation, as being the framework of deterrence beliefs, Kraig opted to defy the main ideology of the usefulness of nuclear arms, by wanting to know if they are truly the key to securitisation, then why do Nuclear Weapon States oppose the transmission of these arms to threatened states? (Kraig 1999: 142). Even with this question, it is straightforward that the full concept of nuclear proliferation should be effective as a referent object for securitisation and the essential component that provides an equilibrium amongst states. Academics who argue in favour of nuclear proliferation claim that nuclear distribution and an IT system available to both powers would efficiently form the use of conventional warfare and bring bilateral nuclear deterrence (Kraig 1999: 145). On the other hand, the academic who oppose nuclear proliferation, strongly identify the serious consequence of an unintended catastrophe and the inadequacy of intelligence which might upset nuclear stability, and declare the fact that nuclear bodies do not belong in the list of ‘agents of equalization’ (Kraig 1999: 143). Despite the complicated and problematic constitution of nuclear bodies and nuclear proliferation, it is agreeable that nuclear arms arrived to fill the void of parity and hope in a universal system filled with questionable priorities and uncertainty. The use of nuclear bodies has been opportunely adopted as the reasoning to oppose WMD also. Hence, whilst keeping the theory of securitisation in mind, the risk of a biochemical offensive by any guerrilla is rigorously securitised and is regarded as a threat to national security, consequently an unprecedented measure may have to be adopted taken. Thus, the use of nuclear bodies concluded to certain strategic dogmas, for the sake of authorities to be capable of regulating nuclear power and reshape its usefulness in opposition to probable threats. The premier appearance of deterrence as a securitisation strategy, was a few years from the Second World War and was the result of suspicion and threat of catastrophes of conflict between the general masses.Rephrased, a presence of worrisome was felt throughout the Western bloc (mainly the United States), it was the risk of being unable to keep any individual fatalities under control, so they had to take up other strategies in order to be able to oppose these risks (Mohan 1986: 4). Eventually, the ideology of deterrence had become the primary focus to the political and military realm of the United States, it was opted as the main strategy, a ‘Catholic doctrine’ as one might say (Mohan 1986: 3). Deterrence, like Game Theory, points to the observable and psychological impact of the rival concerning the avoidance of an attack by influencing the foe that an irrational step of warfare causes an unfavourable outcome for both sides (Morgan & Quester 2010: 6). As Dr Lawler mentioned in his lecture on radioactive security: “The losses outweigh the gains”. An example of nuclear deterrence - which had been the pillar of the United States’ defence policy - was the stringent warning informed to the Soviet by the United States, it pointed out to the termination of any want to strike the United States or its allies in the Western bloc, by pressuring a ‘nuclear retaliation’ (Mohan 1986: 8; Quinlivan & Oliker 2011: 73). It is crucial to keep in mind that if we welcome nuclear deterrence as the result of the threatening and suspicious setting of the 1960’s, when all the nuclear deterrence groundwork was advanced, was the shaky rivalry amidst the political and subjective doctrines of the Soviet Union and the United States, which were the communist and neo-liberal regimes respectively. Hence, amongst all this intellectual conflict, nuclear deterrence can itself, be characterised as an ideological belief. While the frameworks of this intellectualism have been crucial, the rivalry among both powers during the times before and after the Cold War, became a nuclear and military arms race, competently sufficient to risk global stability and security. Therefore nuclear deterrence, arrived to compensate for this void in security and for individuals, to assure safeness, equilibrium and welfare. Nuclear deterrence is an accommodating phrase for a complicated, a detailed collection of information, beliefs, assertions, ideologies and goals constructed amidst the main core values of the nation’s security or the welfare of the community. Thus, keeping those in is of high importance for the next part, as this essay wishes to assess and provide the arguable groundwork of nuclear deterrence, through readings of many academics, who have different stances on nuclear security. The dogma of deterrence was engaged and backed like any other strategic dogmas throughout the field of security studies. It is a very disputable dogma, which has led to many academics being for or against this dilemma, this makes the groundworks of deterrence quite problematic to deal with. Many academics established their cases for the significance of deterrence about the case of the help that has been contributed to countries to control and oversee any potential nuclear risks. Though, while some academics blame nuclear deterrence for the rise of insecurity and of a probable enormous number of mishaps through human errors, simultaneously they claim that mutual deterrence could give rise to worldwide security administration and to an interrelationship amongst the involved countries (Morgan & Quester 2010: 22). Moreover, while some consider the deterrence doctrine is fully behind the rise of weapons usage, the latter argue that deterrence is a method of weapons control. On the other hand, for those academics who argue in favour of the advantage that deterrence provides, other academics claim that it is not possible for a Nuclear Weapon State to broaden its deterrence to its alliances, due to the threat of destroying itself. Within the frameworks of technology, the idea that nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons rules out any threat from weapons of mass destruction, is still existent (Allison 2005: 719). Yet a great supply of nuclear substances still remain unchecked and loose in black markets, and could be sold to the foes of the Western bloc (Allison 2005: 715). Regardless of all the disputes, this essay debates that the full groundworks of deterrence interpret the necessity of creating policies by the aristocrats and has been used as an interventional motive through military and political influence to the different nuclear and political regimes. While recognising nuclear deterrence as a main actor behind the USA’s policies, it is feasible to consider that nuclear deterrence doctrine purposely affects the core values of those countries that are in favour of securing the Western bloc’s norms and values and the global equilibrium. The negative groundworks of securitisation inhibit the managing process and causes troublesome results (Aradu, 2004). Disputes about the decision-making process have mainly focused on the appropriate flow of democracy, ‘panic politics’ of securitisation disturbs, and if not ruins fully, the context of the legislative part in liberal democracies (Roe 2012: 251). Ordinary politics may be thought of as the normal conduct in liberal democracies, hence, any unusual policy could drastically harm the democratic procedure. In this manner, securitisation can be simply used as a method of breaching the sovereignty of nations and the democratic equilibrium. A fitting portrayal of this dispute can be the case of the unfortunate event of 9/11, when aristocrats used securitisation, through the medium of an existential risk, they implicated the army service in politics, in addition to instituting a martial law. Similarly, in the speech of Prime Minister Brown, major and recent threats advocate changes to the United Kingdom’s constitution. From time to time**, politicians use the securitisation of nuclear threats, as an instrument**, in contemplation of securing their re-election strengthening their political capacity. To rephrase, securitising agents use the speech of securitisation in manners that they create political hogwash in such breadth, which makes it very hard for individuals to reject or analyse the dismay as a result What causes the securitisation move to be prosperous, is the acceptance and acknowledgment of the discussion by individuals. Furthermore, by demonstrating a thing as an imminent threat, is hardly a move of securitisation, for it to be prosperous, it has to be accepted by the people (Buzan & Wæver 1998: 26). Taking these debates into account, one may be presented with another issue: to what breadth is it probable for the doctrine of deterrence to benefit the de-securitisation of threats from a nuclear catastrophe? In other words, in today’s times and with regards to certain occasions, what has the doctrine of nuclear deterrence presented about the probabilities of de-securitising the states that pose as a nuclear threat? The subsequent section will address these questions. To assess nuclear deterrence with regards to its obscure democratising and de-securitising capabilities, we should assess the extensive de-securitisation groundworks where deterrence happens. Hence, although, the securitisation action mentions the inclusion of problems into the agenda of security**, the process of de-securitisation is described as the reverse process of eliminating a problem of the agenda of security to an, ordinary democratic and politicised ‘sphere’** (Wæver 1995: 253; Buzan & Wæver 1998: 203-10). **A** fitting **example of the de-securitisation of a nuclear threat, was the USA’s reaction to Iran’s and India’s** **nuclear enrichment processes**. In such cases, one can observe an intriguing detail of classification. In spite of the fact that the two countries having advanced their nuclear programs, Iran’s nuclear program posed as a threat to the USA. The way that the USA treats the nuclear programs of Iran and India are quite different, India is viewed as a democracy, whilst Iran as a non-democratic regime, this helps one understand the USA’s policy (Hayes 2009: 986). The Bush administration had perceived that the Indian democratic character was a crucial representative for clarifying their collaboration with them, the implied message is the USA has confidence in India (Hayes 2009: 988). On the other hand, with regards to the matter of Iran, the USA responded in an alternative method. President Bush had used a farther characteristic remark, to show the ideology that was intensely enforced into the USA’s policies with regards to Iran. Following the Islamic revolution in Iran back, it became under the control of the ayatollahs, whom have oppressed and isolated the people of Iran. Prior to the nuclear deal that the West struck with Iran, they were challenging the world with their nuclear aspirations, even with almost every state in the world opposing their nuclear program. The USA kept on rallying the states of the world, to defy these nuclear threats (Hayes 2009: 991).

#### Securitization corrupts policy-making, placing the world in what Agamben states as a constant state of exception.

Szeluki 20 - , "Securitization and state encroachment on the energy sector: Politics of exception in Poland's energy governance," No Publication, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421519306536> Political scientist and sociologist, working on various aspects of trans- and international as well as comparative domestic politics (incl. contentious), policies (incl. energy, environment and climate) and governance. University of oslo.[KDandu]

Both cases are examples of securitization attempts – as we have seen, relatively rare in energy governance. Both contain **speech acts, which call up security, with the state** as the main referent object, and on the surface either directly point or at least **allude to an external threat**. Most importantly, they contain proposals from the **securitizing actors**, which **go beyond usual practices**, and **can be classified as exceptional measures “in the name of security”**. **In the case of the nuclear** project, the extraordinary measures are varied**. Security was used** by PM Tusk **to justify the blurring of legislative, regulatory, and executive roles** in the energy sector resulting from the political appointment of his colleague as utility CEO. More radical measures, **resembling Schmitt's state of exception**, were visible in the communication campaign strategy prepared by the government. **The idea of labelling political opponents** as “enemies” **and the de-humanizing language used**, with open suggestions for taming public debate**, should be alarming**. But arguably, they opened up the horizon of possibility for the third set of exceptional measures: the increased role of secret service agents and the ambiguous new competences of the head of the Internal Energy Agency, giving it surveillance tools , and potentially disarming societal dissent. Although that last move raised some questions among opposition parliamentarians and a handful of journalists, there was no de-securitization attempt within the Sejm. the lower house of the Polish parliament, and the measures were introduced, unchallenged. In the second case, state **security is used as a reason and justification for centralizing power and expanding the executive's competences** in the energy sector. Changes in companies' statutes are introduced to allow direct political steering of utilities – which can be used for different purposes. However, the change itself is legally debatable, and the governmental steering constitutes a direct challenge to the usual practices of companies on a liberal market. That incompatibility was cited as a reason for rejecting the government's proposal in one case where the State Treasury was not able to introduce changes single-handedly (as a majority shareholder), indicating the lack of broader audience acceptance. There are, however, important differences between the way securitizing moves are constructed in those two cases – elements which can account for their ultimate acceptance. While similar on the surface, as viewed on the level of official political rhetoric, both making references to “national energy security”, with the nation-state as the referent object, the direct referent objects are different. The exceptional measures in the nuclear energy sector are introduced to protect the nuclear program itself. With the shifting referent object so shifts the actual threat indicated or implied. While still possibly external (terrorists, spies), the main focus is on domestic “enemies”: “extreme fanatics for whom dissent is the reason for being”.[7](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421519306536#fn7) **Securitization in the nuclear sector aims at strengthening the state administration in its struggle with civil society organizations, much more than external threats**. The ultimate referent object, on which the nuclear project is built, is a particular vision of technocratic modernization and a socio-technical imaginary ([Jasanoff and Kim, 2013](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421519306536#bib30)) of Poland's energy future: centralized, with close state-utility bonds.

#### That legitimates all forms of violence against the perceived threat of the Other and guarantees global warfare– policy solutions are impossible without first addressing our underlying securitized epistemologies

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While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

#### Thus role of the judge is to act as a critical educator and the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that challenges the state of exception in our society. Our role as intellectuals is not to provide prophetic solutions, but to offer analyses that reveal the problems within hegemonic institutions.

Foucault 80 (Michel, “Questions of Method,” in “The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality,” (1991), by Michel Foucault, Graham Burchell, and Colin Gordon, p. 82-85) CW

It's in so far as there's been an awakening to a whole series of problems that the difficulty of doing anything comes to be felt. Not that this effect is an end in itself. But it seems to me that 'what is to be done' ought not to be determined from above by reformers, be they prophetic or legislative, but by a long work of comings and goings, of exchanges, reflections, trials, different analyses. If the social workers you are talking about don't know which way to turn, this just goes to show that they're looking, and hence are not anaesthetized or sterilized at all- on the contrary. And it's because of the need not to tie them down or immobilize them that there can be no question for me of trying to tell 'what is to be done'. If the questions posed by the social workers you spoke of are going to assume their full amplitude, the most important thing is not to bury them under the weight of prescriptive, prophetic discourse. The necessity of reform mustn't be allowed to become a form of blackmail serving to limit, reduce or halt the exercise of criticism. Under no circumstances should one pay attention to those who tell one: 'Don't criticize, since you're not capable of carrying out a reform.' That's ministerial cabinet talk. Critique doesn't have to be the premise of a deduction which concludes: this then is what needs to be done. It should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse what is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn't have to lay down the law for the law. It isn't a stage in a programming. It is a challenge directed to what is. The problem, you see, is one for the subject who acts - the subject of action through which the real is transformed. If prisons and punitive mechanisms are transformed, it won't be because a plan of reform has found its way into the heads of the social workers; it will be when those who have to do with that penal reality, all those people, have come into collision with each other and with themselves, run into dead-ends, problems and impossibilities, been through conflicts and confrontations; when critique has been played out in the real, not when reformers have realized their ideas.

## Advocacy

#### **I advocate that all nuclear states eliminate their nuclear arsenals**

#### T and theory interps must be checked in cross or I get an auto I meet.

#### Prohibitions on nukes ends deterrence. Deterrence is the source of security discourse that the 1ac critics.

Edward **lfft** , 3-15-2017, "A Challenge to Nuclear Deterrence," No Publication, [https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-03/features/challenge-nuclear-deterrence[KDandu](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-03/features/challenge-nuclear-deterrence%5BKDandu) + CW]

This will be the result of a nuclear weapons ban treaty, which is due to be negotiated beginning this month as authorized by the UN General Assembly on December 23, 2016, by a vote of 113-35, with 13 abstaining. Negotiating sessions in 2017 are scheduled for March 27-31 and from June 15 to July 7. The purpose of this treaty will be to prohibit but not eliminate nuclear weapons. In doing so, the intent will be to delegitimize nuclear deterrence, a concept that has been used to justify the possession of nuclear weapons among the five nuclear-weapon states, as well as the rationale for others inclined to seek their own nuclear arsenals. This will be an attempt to overturn what has been a central tenet of every U.S. administration since that of President Harry Truman, that nuclear deterrence is fundamental to international peace and security, at least until a safe, effective, and verifiable way to eliminate these weapons can be found. The United States and other countries with nuclear weapons regard nuclear deterrence as a key factor in the prevention of major warfare among the leading powers. Yet, this is not the only view. **Nuclear deterrence has been under attack for some time on pragmatic and moral grounds**. One view is that although nuclear deterrence has been effective in the past, **it has become** dangerous and **unnecessary now** and must be carefully replaced in a step-by-step process. Others maintain that the nuclear “balance of terror”—a phrase heard during the Cold War—has never been effective or morally acceptable and must be eliminated immediately. Understanding these radically different views of the world and their implications for world peace, even survival, should be a high priority.

#### Disarmament is the best possible form of banning since it is the fastest way to delegitimize nuclear deterrence.

#### Weigh interrogating this discourse first before post-fiat impacts and theory otherwise the round is irresolvable because without rejecting security discourse prima facie we can’t definitively be sure that our actions are ethically sound due to the creation of a state of exception.

## Underview

#### 1 don’t treat discourse from conventional war or cbws the same as nuclear discourse. Halaseh proves the difference.

#### Bioweapons don’t deter and they are unreliable, since they don’t create deterrence discourse it wouldn’t cause the k.

[Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley](https://thebulletin.org/biography/sonia-ben-ouagrham-gormley/) 2015 eSonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is an associate professor in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University. She is the author of Barriers to Bioweapons: The Challenges of Expertise and Organization for Weapons Development (Cornell University Press, 2014). Currently, Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is working on a book that provides testimonies of former US and Soviet bioweapons scientists, technicians, and administrative personnel, collected under a four-year oral history project funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The book will be accompanied by a documentary on bioweapons and bioethics, featuring former bioweapons scientists. A website under construction will also contain transcripts of interviews conducted under the oral history project and serve as an online bilingual forum to educate US and international scientists, engineers, and publics about the complicated ethical dilemmas underpinning scientific work. <https://thebulletin.org/roundtable_entry/bioweapons-not-an-alternative-to-nuclear-weapons/> [Lynbrook YM]

Further, **biological weapons are poor deterrents.** In addition to the fact that states can protect their populations beforehand, and in some cases even after an attack, depending on the agent used and the length of the incubation period, **biological weapons do not guarantee a certain level of predictable destruction as nuclear weapons do. They are sensitive to light and weather conditions**, making their use less effective during the day, when ultraviolet light can destroy the agents, or in windy conditions, when agents can inadvertently disseminate over unintended populations. Changes in air currents within cities and over variable terrain make it difficult to achieve accurate targeting. Their effects can also be mitigated by individual immune responses. Because of their sensitivity to environmental conditions, **biological weapons are also difficult to deploy, making their use for a second strike problematic.** Historically, **because of their unpredictability and the uncertainty of their outcomes, biological weapons were never fully integrated in US military** doctrine. In the Soviet Union, the military also viewed bioweapons as unreliable, due to the difficulty of controlling their dispersion and the possible risks of infecting Soviet troops. Attempts by Soviet scientists to develop new biological agents, unknown in nature, which the enemy could not protect against, lasted about 20 years and did not go beyond the exploratory and research and development phases. Furthermore, both the United States and Soviet Union struggled to design effective missile systems for the delivery of these weapons. The US program did not produce a dedicated bioweapons cruise missile, and the Soviets could not solve technical difficulties associated with the development of a ballistic missile warhead that could effectively protect fragile bioagents against the stress of re-entry.

#### On CV if the war happens no deterrence then none of the speech.

#### 2 nfu policies still bite, it creates security discourse about nuclear arsenals and the usage.

#### 3 Asteroids da doesn’t work, they have the burden to prove that only way to solve for asteroids is by the usage of nukes, that there is a high probability of the problem and that launching nukes into our atmosphere and allowing the by product of it to stay there is any better than asteroids.

## SPIKES

#### 1. Interp: The neg may only read counterplans that don’t have to do with nuclear power, since the aff critics the discourse that exists due to nuclear arsenals. Strat skew, I have to redo the 1ac in the 1ar this moots all aff offenses and makes the existing advantage of going neg even greater. Kills fairness – fairness is a voter since debate is about wins and losses. Kills education no clash if I can’t debate the substance of the 1ac.

#### 2. Prefer epistemic confidence – modesty destroys the value of framework, if any impact can be weighed regardless of framework then there would be no point to even reading it. Kills phil education.

#### 3. Pedagogical freedom – debate should be an open forum for students to defend their own approaches. You should have a very high threshold for disregarding the debated validity of my framework by just assuming their impact filter matters more. Debate is debate – role of the ballot arguments appeal to debate’s telos. In a util debate you wouldn’t say “prefer my analytics over their empirics because that’s most educational” – this is the same.

#### 4. T and theory interps must be disclosed before the round

#### 5. Even if philosophy is tainted, that requires that we learn and untangle it rather than abandoning it. Stevedarcy[[1]](#footnote-1) 4

But what conclusion should we draw about people like Hume, Heidegger, Frege, Kant, and JS Mill? **Should we regard [philosophers’**] their intellectual output **as** thoroughly **tainted, or** even (more strongly) as completely **discredited,** by the entwinement or interweaving of their philosophical conceptions with racist (and/or colonialist and/or sexist, etc.) ideas and assumptions? Should we, indeed, stop reading these people and studying them or trying to learn from an engagement with their ideas? No doubt, this is a tempting posture, for some. But it seems not to be plausible, on reflection. To see why, notice that the activity of **disentangling** defensible from indefensible thoughts and ideas, which are at first apparently integral and interconnected, is not a special undertaking on which we might propose to embark in the special case of racist (etc.) philosophers. No, it **is fundamental to our** very **understanding of** rational inquiry and **intellectual life**. To think is to perform precisely this operation of disentangling. “I agree with you on this point, and this other one, but not on this third point; there I insist you have gone astray, and I can tell you why….” Isn’t the compulsion to repeat this performance, to cycle through this disentangling action again and again, the ultimate source of philosophy’s drama and its enduring appeal? Isn’t it, too, an inescapable obligation that everyone is saddled with, unavoidably and perhaps involuntarily, as soon as one takes up the task of thinking? Yes. Of course. **To** dislodge and **debunk** the tangle of **error** and confusion that weaves itself **through** even our best **intellectual achievements is** exactly what we mean by **thinking**. And so, why not respond to the interweaving of Locke’s “right of revolution” with his “defence of slavery” in the old-fashioned way: by thinking it through? No other response seems authentically available, in fact, since to respond by **sweeping** him **under the** rug **only invites** his **spectral persistence**, as a haunting presence that we quietly agree not to mention, much less to grapple with and to confront.

#### 6 Conditionality is a voting issue. Kills 1AR strat since they'll always go for the one I undercover, means I'm always behind -- that's exacerbated by time skew of the short 1AR, and kills clash since we debate the advocacy with the least developed arguments for it.

#### 7 The aff gets first choice when it comes to framing. Affirming is harder since we have less time to respond. They have 13 minutes I have 7 minutes to respond. Neg is also responsive and with disclosure and being the second speaker, it is far easier to negate. If neg wants framing choice they must do two things

 [1] Provide another way to gain an advantage for the aff

 [2] Respond to all of framing

#### 8 All spikes are drop the debater

####  A] Neg is responsive they go second and have the ability to respond before biting a spike

####  B] the 7-4-time skew makes affirming much harder

####  C] aff is open sourced beforehand they have ample time to win on substance

# 1AR

### Extensions

For this aff I had done it card by card then just memorized a bunch about what the specific cards said so I could talk about it for like 10 minutes

### Extra Cards

Ahmed 12. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed [Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development;, the UK Defence Academy, etc. “The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society,” Global Change, Peace & Security: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change, Volume 23(3), 1/5/2012.[Recut Lynbrook KD]

By the same token, the incapacity to recogni\e and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges' such as 'low-intensity' intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular w/////ill in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations - rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such as 'political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens'. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a 'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this 'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of 'resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies', particularly due to a projected 'youth bulge' in the South, which 'will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy'. This will prompt a 'return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets'. Finally, climate change will 'compound' these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conflict are ominous.’97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.’98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’99 Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how secur-itisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarization against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous 'outsiders\*. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new "outsider\* identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of 'Otherisation'. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying 'discursive complex", where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on 'the construction of stark boundaries\* that 'operate to exclude and include\*. Yet these exclusionary discourses are 'intimately bound up with political and economic processes', such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of 'maintaining American hegemony\* by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests — exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of 'othering\* in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously 'included\* groups become 'ideologically recast' and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines — eventually legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and 'Otherised' in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of 'inclusion\*, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.1 3 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project - or colonial project — designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable. Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new 'outsider' group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105 This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed 'outsider' group vindicating various forms of violence.

#### The role of scholars should not be to model how to use the law or even how to fix it, but to liberate ourselves from it – reformism only assists sovereign power because it puts faith in the system.

Kotsko 13

Adam Kotsko “How To Read Agamben” LA Review of Books June 4th, 2013

Now may be the time to return to that Kafka story about Alexander the Great’s horse Bucephalus, entitled “The New Attorney.” (The text is available here. I recommend you take a moment to read it — it’s very short, and quite interesting.) In this brief fragment, we learn that Bucephalus has changed careers: he is no longer a warhorse, but a lawyer. What strikes Agamben about this story is that the steed of the greatest sovereign conqueror in the ancient world has taken up the study of the law. For Agamben, this provides an image of what it might look like not to go back to a previous, less destructive form of law, but to get free of law altogether: One day humanity will play with law just as children play with disused objects, not in order to restore them to their canonical use but to free them from it for good…. This liberation is the task of study, or of play. And this studious play is the passage that allows us to arrive at that justice that one of Benjamin’s posthumous fragments defines as a state of the world in which the world appears as a good that absolutely cannot be appropriated or made juridical. The law will not be simply done away with, but it is used in a fundamentally different way. In place of enforcement, we have study, and in place of solemn reverence, play. Agamben believes that the new attorney is going the state of emergency one better: his activity not only suspends the letter of the law, but, more importantly, suspends its force, its dominating power. Agamben’s critical work always aims toward these kinds of strange, evocative recommendations. Again and again, we find that the goal of tracking down the paradoxes and contradictions in the law is not to “fix” it or provide cautionary tales of what to avoid, but to push the paradox even further. Agamben often uses the theological term “messianic” to describe his argumentative strategy, because messianic movements throughout history — and here Agamben would include certain forms of Christianity — have often had an antagonistic relationship to the law (primarily, but not solely, the Jewish law, or Torah). Accordingly, he frequently draws on messianic texts from the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions for inspiration in his attempt to find a way out of the destructive paradoxes of Western legal thought.

#### The rotj is to vote for the side that critically analyzes security discourse.

Masco 2014 (Joseph, is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago; “The Theater of Operations”; Duke University Press; 193-200)**(SCROLL DOWN MOST OF CUT IS LOWER)(Lynbrook KD)**

Because the terrorist threat continues, the national emergency declared on September 14, 2001, and the powers and authorities adopted to deal with that emergency must continue in effect beyond September 14, 2011. Therefore, I am continuing in effect for an additional year the national emergency. **—PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, “NOTICE FROM THE PRESIDENT REGARDING THE CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TERRORIST ATTACKS”** The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attack that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. **—U.S. CONGRESS, “AUTHO- RIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE,” SEPTEMBER 12, 2001** In the first decade of its twenty-first-century emergency, the U.S. security state did nothing less than reinvent itself, imagining and pursuing a new planetary concept of American power or- ganized around the anticipation and pursuit of terror. The end- less futurity of terror (existing, imagined, emergent) transforms defense into a war that is boundless in both time and space and that is constantly evolving. The now annual presidential notice to Congress that the emergency provoked by the attacks on Sep- tember 11, 2001, continues, endows the country’s chief executive with wartime powers, creating a global theater of operations for the ever emerging U.S. counterterror state apparatus.1 It is also a means of suspending democratic institutions to enable radical forms of state agency in the hope of eliminating terrors, both real and imagined. What began as an international response to the suicide-hijacker attacks on New York and Washington organized by a small group identified as Al Qaeda has evolved into an American vision of planetary engagement that is aston- ishingly productive and wide-ranging—constituting simultaneously a new geopolitics and a new domestic social contract. In the name of existential defense, security experts across a vast range of fields and agencies spend each day trying to anticipate and preempt dangers from the future—hoping to eliminate surprise and thereby engineer a world without events. Multi- disciplinary, creative, hyperactive, gloomy—this counterterror state appa- ratus imagines a world without borders but filled with proliferating forms of terror (present, contingent, projected, imagined). It engages the future as a space of endless logistical need, where the spectrum of possible dan- gers requires ever new and expanding analytics, institutions, technologies, and forms of mobility. In this way, the counterterror state is not fighting a specific war that could be won or lost. Instead, it seeks to install technical capacities into the future to deal with terroristic threats both known and unknown, those expected and those not yet visible. As part of this expand- ing economy of counterterror, security experts are increasingly endowed with the power to imagine—and create—new forms of danger to engineer countermeasures to combat them. Thus, counterterror becomes terror becomes counterterror in a recursive system of anticipatory preemption, which focuses experts on engaging potential existential dangers—the what ifs—rather than on simply rebuilding and expanding nonmilitary Ameri- can, and international, infrastructures. In the proliferation of dangers and expert calls to build new capacities to meet them, it is easy to miss the fact that counterterror is naturalized as a permanent war (based on merging real, contingent, and imaginative practices). Indeed, war has become so deeply installed in everyday Amer- ican life in the first decade of counterterror that it is no longer actually “war”: the ongoing U.S. military actions (from troops, to special forces, to drone strikes) in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Iraq at the start of the second decade of counterterror are officially referred to as “overseas con- tingency operations.”2 By reframing the longest-running military actions in U.S. history as simply “overseas contingencies,” the violence once known as war is remade as part of a larger species of planetary governance (merging military, humanitarian, drug enforcement, and disaster relief activities), becoming radically open-ended, multifronted, and politically diffuse. This reframing naturalizes U.S. military engagements across scales and types as simply another mode of international relations and announces that—since contingencies are, after all, contingent (articulating radically different pos- sibilities of what might or might not happen)—the security state claims both near-term and deep future horizons for counterterror. For when can the contingent ever be truly defeated? How can one ever be fully prepared for the radically emergent? How does one dispel forever what *might* happen— let alone permanently and knowingly eliminate the worst-case scenarios of mushroom clouds, biological attacks, and terrorists armed with wmds? Counterterror is, in a key cultural sense, one logical multigenerational outcome of the contradictions installed in American society by the atomic bomb, a technology that remade the United States as a global superpower but did so only through the systematic application of nuclear terror—directly in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, geopolitically via the Cold War nuclear arms race, and affectively in the domestic form of U.S. civil defense. The national security state was empowered, organized, and psychosocially infused with nuclear terror from day one. Officials have relied on the existential threat of nuclear war for a wide range of projects since the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Indeed, the national security state was formally established in 1947 to prevent a nuclear Pearl Harbor, and to advance the interna- tional power of the United States as a nuclear superpower. This new kind of security state used nuclear fear writ large to transform domestic U.S. security into a global project with far-reaching economic, military, and political consequences. As a mode of global governance, however, the re- sulting Cold War balance of terror was always unstable in one key domain, as it required two superpower states locked in perpetual competition and equally committed to avoiding nuclear war from one minute to the next via nuclear deterrence. The War on Terror solves the structural problem of an unstable bipolarity (and specifically the potential loss of a stabilizing enemy other) by bypassing contemporary politics altogether (i.e., reliance on a specific named other to combat in perpetuity) and claiming the future itself as the domain it needs to secure. The counterterror state draws its power from identifying a proliferating field of potential dangers on a plan- etary scale and then attempting to build a security state capable of respond- ing to each contingency. Just note the proliferation of new securities in the past decade—homeland security, biosecurity, and cybersecurity—each of which is composed of a new universe of experts and objects that require a complex, global vision of American power combined with innovative modes of threat assessment and response. Each of these fields also enables new degrees and forms of militarism, merging new offensive and defensive capabilities through threat designation and affective governance. A con- cern about securing the U.S. homeland, for example, accompanies an ex- panding U.S. campaign of drone bombing in the homelands of Pakistanis, Yemenis, and Somalians (in countries with which the United States is not formally “at war”). The biosecurity apparatus, as I have argued, is not just preparing for infectious disease outbreaks within the United States but is researching future bioweapons and using disease eradication campaigns as a cover for covert operations on a global scale. The new official concern about domestic cybersecurity is tied directly to U.S. cyberwar campaigns (most publicly against Iranian nuclear facilities) as well as unprecedented forms of digital surveillance (as the National Security Agency now captures the bulk of all global digital communications in the name of counterter- rorism, but also spies on government officials and conducts corporate es- pionage around the world). Importantly, the counterterror state pursues technical capacities for the sake of new forms of future agency and is, thus, itself radically emergent. This commitment to constant revolutionary change across experts, technologies, and administrative abilities is perhaps the chief accomplishment of the counterterror state and why it will likely have such a deep hold on the twenty-first century. Moreover, counterterror is not only a highly flexible mode of security, based on an ever-expanding concept of terror and a highly elastic set of core concerns in the figuration of the wmd. It also addresses an unwinna- ble problem, for when can one say that terror—a basic emotional state—has been finally purged from American experience? Counterterror colonizes the American future by identifying an ever-shifting series of peoples, ob- jects, technologies, hypotheticals, and contingencies to secure in the name of planetary defense. The fact that very few of these potentials (people, tech- nologies, finances, microbes) can be perfectly secured on a global basis in practice is part of the recursive structure of counterterror, as both failure and surprise drive increasing calls for new capacities, increasing securi- tization, and more aggressive militarization. Counterterror, thus, thrives on a proliferating insecurity, using vulnerability (past, present, future) and imaginative creativity (scenarios, fears, nightmares) as its raison d’être. In this regard, counterterror is the perfect conceptual vehicle for a permanent mobilization of the security state. Infused with proliferating images of exis- tential danger to be fought in perpetuity, counterterror is highly flexible in its core goals, objects, techniques, and future ambitions. The transformations in American society during the first decade of ter- ror politics could not be more profound: counterterror has produced a new social contract not through open political deliberation (there has been almost no formal debate about alternative notions of security and costs) but through the constant amplification of threats. Indeed, the War on Ter- ror has fundamentally shifted American values, with the well-publicized illegal practices of the Bush administration (rendition, indefinite deten- tion, torture, and domestic surveillance) enhanced by the Obama admin- istration’s imperial commitment to cyberwar, digital surveillance, and a global “targeted killing” (that is, assassination) program using both Spe- cial Forces and drones (see also Constitution Project 2013; Open Society Foundation 2013; Becker and Shane 2012; Sanger 2012). Counterterror has trumped human rights and law at every turn in the first decade of the War on Terror, raising very basic questions about U.S. support for international law, the rights of U.S. citizens, and the limits of war in the twenty-first century. The coherence of these policies across the Bush and Obama administrations and the absence of any substantial effort by Con- gress or the Department of Justice to adjudicate practices such as water boarding, indefinite detention, warrantless surveillance, and the killing of U.S. citizens and others with drone attacks are powerful indications of the new counterterror consensus in Washington.3 As I have argued in this book, the United States has historically expanded its security apparatus not through careful deliberation but rather in times of national panic. The War on Terror, however, is unique, in that it is a conflict that cannot be bounded spatially or temporally, or won. For example, even if Al Qaeda were eliminated from the planet, that would not be the end of U.S. coun- terterror because the global future is now seen as the ultimate domain to secure. This notion of planetary security, as I have argued, is highly nation- alist in orientation and thus remains at odds with collective emergencies like climate change that cannot be easily militarized for national advan- tage. Thus, counterterror, despite its proliferating objects of concern and expansive imaginative practices of threat designation, does not recognize all terrors, or even all of the most immediate and challenging ones. Antici- patory preemption works to relocate the domain of security from the ma- terial world of everyday precarity into the collective imaginary, as experts conjure up images of perfected terrors that overwhelm all lesser but lived experiences of insecurity, displacing governance from existing forms of violence, suffering, and crisis in favor of combating nightmarish, if largely speculative, *what ifs*. As a result, counterterror has dominated the United States politically, socially, and financially in the early twenty-first century, a period of multi- plying crises across capital, environment, and public institutions. Though the country is not confronted by a high-tech, nuclear-armed, global ad- versary like the Soviet Union, the Pentagon’s current annual budget is over 50 percent higher than its average budget during the Cold War (Harrison 2011). The military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq are the longest wars in U.S. history and have so far cost at least $1.3 trillion; only World War II was a more expensive conflict (Belasco 2011; Daggett 2010, 2). By 2012 those who orchestrated the 2001 attacks (including Osama bin Laden and his chief lieutenants in Al Qaeda) were dead or in prison, but yearly U.S. national security expenditures remain at an all-time high (Hellman 2011), with no change in sight. The cost of the first decade of the War on Terror certainly exceeds $7.6 trillion (National Priorities Project 2011). This expen- diture comes in the midst of recurring global economic crises (including a 2008 recession second in severity only to the Great Depression of the 1930s) that wiped out twenty years of accumulated wealth for the median U.S. household (Appelbaum 2012). Despite these startling economic facts, the national security system is not subject to calls for substantial economic re- form and remains virtually immune to political criticism or review from elected officials of both major parties. Indeed, counterterror has been the primary growth industry in the United States in the early twenty-first century. New national infrastruc- tures of homeland security, biosecurity, and cybersecurity sit on top of the national security institutions built during the Cold War, already the larg- est national security apparatus in the world. The emerging counterterror infrastructure is staffed with experts and administrators leading lives that are classified secrets: in 2011, over 4.8 million Americans possessed a secu- rity clearance (U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2012, 3). The cost of maintaining government secrets is correspondingly at an all- time high, increasing 12 percent in 2011 alone, to reach a total of $11.3 billion (U.S. Information Security Oversight Office 2012, 3). The American commitment to militarization takes many forms, including maintaining a global system of over a thousand foreign military bases (Vine 2009, 42; see also Lutz 2009) and monopolizing two-thirds of the global arms trade (Shanker 2009). Increasingly, U.S. police departments have also been pulled into the national counterterror apparatus, participating in the yearly simu- lations of terrorist attacks while expanding capabilities via access to federal counterterror funds. Since 2001 rural as well as urban police departments have armed themselves with everything from military-grade weapons and bomb-detecting robots to drones in anticipation of wmd attacks but di- rected increasingly against everyday forms of crime and social protest. To this spectrum of official counterterror agents, we could add the host of new experts in counterterrorism, wmd emergency response, homeland security, and biosecurity that are being produced in universities and col- leges, with at least 350 new degree-granting programs in the United States alone.4 These academic programs join the twelve “centers of excellence” funded by the 2002 Homeland Security Act, which link hundreds of edu- cational institutions via counterterror, training new experts in terrorist risk assessment, microbial hazards, zoonotic disease defense, food safety, cata- strophic event response, explosives, immigration, coastal security, trans- portation, and security visualization sciences.5 These public counterterror training programs, of course, supplement the vast classified efforts in the Department of Defense and across the U.S. intelligence agencies—creating a new and highly redundant world of public, corporate, military, and clas- sified counterterror expertise.6 *Expertise*, as we have seen, is a crucial aspect of the *critical infrastructure* concept. Counterterror has produced a new competitive terrain across corporate, academic, military, intelligence, and scientific institutions for threat identification, anticipation, and response. Indeed, few contemporary social institutions or national infrastructures are not in some direct way now embedded within the larger U.S. counterterror state apparatus.7 In one sense this is a very American mode of security, a broad mobiliza- tion of social institutions to engage an emerging national danger as first happened during the Cold War. What is new is the radical open-endedness of the concept of terror, its claim on a deep future, and—precisely because anticipatory preemption is an imaginative enterprise—its self-colonizing nature. During the Cold War, one could debate what was the right balance of technological systems (missiles, warheads, bombers, submarines) to en- sure global nuclear deterrence. In a counterterror state, there can never be enough security, as threat is a potentiality without limit, capable of producing endless new experiences of anticipated menace and danger. Counterter- ror, therefore, involves linking infrastructures of militarism, technoscience, surveillance, and affect in a constantly emerging fusion of imagination, an- ticipation, preemption, and violence. It constantly enfolds new domains— policing, border patrols, public health, transportation, computing, and finance—and reorients them toward specific feared outcomes by constitut- ing a field of terror that is ever expanding and affectively overpowering. In this way, counterterror has quickly become the organizing principle for the U.S. security state, a vast set of institutions and experts who seek to address the problem of future violence by trying to engineer the global present

#### History proves– rhetoric with an overeager focus on national identity and suppression of otherness to further political goals paired with emphasis on security causes violent movements.

Burke ‘06 (Anthony; Professor in Humanities and Social Sciences at UNSW Canberra; “Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War Against the Other”; Routledge; pgs. 107-110)[recut lynbrook kd]

The 1999 crisis between Australia and Indonesia had its roots in a pattern of engagement and thinking developed during the Cold War, whose basis 1011 was a **rigid and violent deployment of identity.** When Suharto came to prominence after the so-called ‘coup attempt’ of October 1965, a powerful image of Australian identity combined an intense anti-communism with 3111 the fear and suspicion of Asia, present throughout Australia’s colonial history. While identity was still premised on a hostility towards cultural, political and strategic images of the Other, this previously monolithic image was fractured by strategic imperatives: Asian trading partners and military allies were subsumed into an economic and geopolitical image of the Same, which was nonetheless destabilised by continuing anxieties about cultural difference. These ‘friendly’ forms of otherness, it was hoped, could be slowly modified to allow for economic integration and the culti- vation of bourgeois forms of life and desire; the more threatening otherness represented by left-wing and nationalist movements was simply to be **elim- inated, however violently**.17 By the early 1960s the high hopes aroused by Australia’s support for Indonesia’s independence had given way to a situation in which Australia and other Western governments were increasing ly hostile to the regime of Indonesia’s President Sukarno because of his closeness to the Indonesian \ Communist Party (PKI) and the threat this posed to their strategic and economic interests in Southeast Asia. Thus the Menzies and Holt govern- 30111 ments responded to the Indonesian army’s takeover in 1965–6, during which as many as a million people were slaughtered, with enormous relief and admiration. Australia would play a crucial role both in protecting the 3 New Order’s position in Indonesia, and in securing the broader regional 4 order it had sanctioned. It was in this context, and the uncertainty created 5 by Nixon’s 1969 announcement that American ground forces would never 6 again be deployed to Southeast Asia, that the rhetoric of ‘strange neigh- 7 bours’ made an early appearance. An American strategic analyst, Kathryn 8 Young, wrote in 1970 that if a co-operative relationship between Australia 9 and the New Order did not develop in the wake of American failure in Vietnam, ‘the **prospects for stability** in the wider Southeast Asian area 1 **would become quite bleak’**.18 2 In this scenario serious conflicts of interest (and emotional attachment) 3 would develop for Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia – who had deep 4 cultural, language and religious ties with Indonesia but military, trade and political ties to Australia – along with possible great power involvement 111as tensions escalated. Whatever the growing warmth in relations between 2 Australia and the Suharto regime, Young wrote, sensitivities over the 3 Papua New Guinea border and differences in ‘modes of thinking, value 4 systems, economies and forms of political organisation’ left the relation- 5 ship vulnerable to upheaval and misunderstanding: 7 the usual factors making for a sense of community, or even sympa- 8 thetic mutual relations, between two nations are objectively absent in 9 this case. . . . Yet in spite of this objective dissimilarity a recognised 1011 and increasingly understood relationship has begun to develop.19 1 2 Thus the trope of strangeness became integral to a potent blackmail 1 that portrayed the relationship as a stabilising factor of ‘global’ signifi- 4 cance, in a newly ambiguous and uncertain world. A drive for sameness 5 coexisted with continuing anxieties about differences, which Australian 6 policy in particular now sought to reduce and manage. 7 Although a latent possibility, such differences had not yet emerged 8 as a problem. The vast slaughter that had accompanied the destruction of 9 the PKI’s social and political infrastructure, and the hundreds of thou- sands still held without charge or trial, were more cause for relief than 1 concern; the regime had written a generous new foreign investment law, 2 was receiving millions of dollars from the new international aid consor- 3 tium, IGGI (Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia), and had engineered 4 a dramatic pro-Western reversal in foreign policy. Notwithstanding the 5 war in Vietnam, Suharto’s regime seemed to have singlehandedly trans- 6 formed Southeast Asia into a bulwark of anti-communism and security. 7 Thus at this time strangeness displayed its Janus-face: growing mutual 8 assumptions of sameness and homogenisation. Assuming the theoretical 9 oneness of Western elites and their publics, the New Order regime took for granted a broad Western acceptance of authoritarianism; for their part 1 Western elites assumed a long-term convergence of values to match 2 Indonesia’s integration with the international strategic and capitalist order. 3 Gough Whitlam was moved to say that the region was witnessing the 4 creation of ‘a just and prosperous Indonesia . . . an example to our neigh- 5 bourhood of progress and social transformation’.20 6 This shockingly benign image of the New Order was also being **incorp- 7 orated** into a new Australian **politics of nation-building and identity**. 8 Whitlam assumed that the New Order regime was **essential to** Australia’s 9 **national security**, and that acceptance by the New Order was crucial to the cultivation of profitable and co-operative relations with a region that 1 retained recent memories of the White Australia policy and a neo-colonial 2 war in Vietnam. Indeed in 1973 he told an audience that ‘our **destiny is 3 inseparable** from Indonesia’. This cleaved, however strangely, with Labor’s 4 claims for a new national mission and identity: an Australia, as Whitlam told Suharto, committed to ‘social justice, human rights and peaceful regional co-operation’, ‘not open to suggestions of racism’, and which 2 could now take ‘her rightful, proud, secure and independent place in the 3 future of our region’.21 4 At the same time the New Order was playing out a more **repressive 5 politics of sameness**. In 1949, with the aim of welding thousands of islands 6 and numerous religions, languages and cultures into a single nation, the 7 nationalists had declared the national motto ‘Unity In Diversity’. After 8 1966 the New Order seized on this, and the five principles of the *Pancasila,* 9 in an effort to subsume political and cultural differences beneath a unifying model of identity that they could go on to re-interpret and control.22 1 However ‘**unity in diversity’** was bought at a **frightening cost**: before 1970 2 the army fought uprisings and rebellions in Central and West Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, the Moluccas, and faced strong resistance from the West 4 Papuans. Likewise the fear engendered by the PKI’s destruction remained 5 a powerful (if rarely stated) factor in the tranquillisation of political life. 6 Only 18 months before Suharto’s fall the slogan ‘Satu Nusa, Satu Bangsa, 7 Satu Bahasa, Indonesia’ (**One Land, One People, One Language, Indonesia)** 8 still hung triumphantly over Jakarta roadways as a testament to the New 9 Order’s **power over** national myths and **institutions**. These two drives for sameness converged when Portugal announced its 4 intention to decolonise East Timor in 1974. At the same time the politics 5 of their suppression of difference became more risky, and the contra- 6 dictions contained by the idea of ‘strange neighbours’ more likely to erupt. 7 The Indonesian army’s paranoia about national unity and stability, and 8 its intense hostility to the Left, ensured it would feel threatened by 9 the emergence of Fretilin; likewise Cold War geopolitics saw the West turn a blind eye to Indonesia’s brutal December 1975 invasion. Having 1 argued that Australia’s very destiny lay with the New Order, Whitlam had 2 made an ‘Australian’ politics of identity hostage to the generals’ whims. 3 In September 1974 he told Suharto of his preference for an Indonesian 4 rather than an independent East Timor. While he asserted this should occur 5 peacefully, by the outbreak of civil war in August 1975 he had abandoned 6 this opposition to the Indonesian use of force.23 In the **most destructive** 7 way possible, East Timor had now been incorporated into a **repressive** 8 Indonesian politics of **sameness**, which the West **encouraged** in the cause 9 of its own geopolitical drive for stability and identity. Australia’s national security was now wagered on the indivisible control 1 of the New Order regime throughout the archipelago, **whatever its violence 2 and cost;** likewise the pursuit of Australia’s ‘national interests’ and the 3 ontological realisation of its larger project – a renewed and modernised 4 identity – hinged on the preservation of its relationship with the New Order. The contradictions this would generate were quickly visible, as the 1111 Fraser government – pushed by outraged public opinion – **publicly 2 condemned** Indonesia’s full-scale invasion in December while **privately 3 showing understanding.** After a meeting with Indonesian foreign minister 4 Adam Malik six weeks after the invasion, Australian foreign minister 5 Andrew Peacock said that ‘differences of attitude . . . should be seen in 6 the context of the long-term importance to both countries and the region 7 as a whole of close and co-operative relations’.24

#### The constant military discourse allows the state to bypass and law and gives them the means necessary to justify anything in the name of security of the state. Letting­ the populace defer the law in a perceived state of emergency only further justifies its role as a flexible tool for sovereign control to control life and engage in endless violence. They feel like they’re doing some justice but only prop up the system – this kills social change.

**Humphreys 06:**

Stephen Humphreys (Associate Progessor of International Law @ London School of Economics, Former Research Director at the International Council on Human Rights Policy in Geneva) “*Legalizing Lawlessness:* *On Giorgio Agamben’s* State of Exception” The European Journal of International Law Vol. 17 no. 3. 2006.

**Agamben rejects Schmitt’s position** and moves to displace any theory that ‘seeks to annex the state of exception immediately to the law’ or to ‘inscribe [it] indirectly in a juridical context’ and to salvage it instead as law’s ‘other’: **‘the state of exception is not a “state of law” but a space without law’**, a ‘zone of anomie’. It is not equivalent to a dictatorship, where laws continue to be made and applied (albeit non-democratically), but **one in which law is rather entirely emptied of content.** In Agamben’s analysis, Schmitt’s ‘paradoxical’ formulation – which **attempts to reinsert a legal vacuum into the legal order – is** rather **designed to privilege sovereign violence** at all costs. Agamben challenges Schmitt’s paradigm through the voice of Walter Benjamin, whose 1921 ‘Critique of Violence’ speaks of a ‘pure’ or ‘divine’ violence that is neither subject to nor preserving of law, that may appear as a flash of revolutionary transcendence and that Agamben reads as a ‘cipher for human activity’. Schmitt’s state of exception, on this reading, is a legal edifice constructed to domesticate the very possibility of non-state (or pure) violence. In sum, Benjamin and Schmitt agree on the existence of anomic violence – but they treat it differently, either as the divine violence that ‘neither makes nor preserves law, but deposes it’ or as the last frontier to be annexed by the sovereign by means of the state of exception. The legal category of the emergency, then, extends or completes law’s empire. Agamben concludes that the state of exception is therefore ‘a fictio iuris par excellence which claims to maintain the law in its very suspension’, but produces instead a violence that has ‘shed every relation to law’. While this assertion remains unsupported by empirical reference or example – indeed, this is a general problem in Agamben’s writing – it nevertheless corresponds obliquely to the emergent phenomena referred to variously as global law, the transnational rule of law, and the fragmentation of international law. Agamben extends this argument along two countervailing paths – backwards to establish parallels with Roman imperialism, and forwards towards a theory of the relation between law and anomie. The first path locates a parallel (or, possibly, origin) of the contemporary state of exception in the Roman notion of iustitium. This was the suspension of the application of law in the Roman republic, following a declaration of a state of emergency (tumultus) by the Senate, to the actions of magistrates and even citizens; the word alters its meaning with the onset of the Roman Empire, ultimately referring to a period of institutionalized chaos following the death of the emperor, pending the inauguration of a successor. The later Roman iustitium, a declaration of anomie, explicitly signals the hiatus between one sovereign legal order and the next. Indeed, the iustitium becomes an effective instrument of the emperor, to be turned on or off at will. It is in his discussion of iustitium, a state in which certain laws simply do not apply, that Agamben reclaims the state of exception as a zone not of law but of anomie, not amenable to capture by law.

#### The existence of nuclear weapons leads to the necessity of security and militaristic discourse. Discourse on a state level about nuclear weapons are nearly don’t say “nearly,” just claim “always” always unproductive and a discussion about militaristic motives and security problems. Incomplete sentence

**Borrie**, J., & Caughley, T. (20**13**). Looking at Nuclear Weapons Through a Humanitarian Lens. *Viewing Nuclear Weapons through a Humanitarian Lens*, 11–12. doi: 10.18356/8e5de7a4-en[Lynbrook KD]

**My recut/highlight. Also I literally cannot find the text of this card anywhere online where did you cut it from. Also I think this and the next card are unnecessary given my recut of Halaseh**

What does it mean **to view nuclear** weapons through a humanitarian lens? Broadly speaking, it **means looking at the use of these weapons from the point of view of human impact.** It is guided by notions of protecting civilians from particular and persistent harm, or combatants from superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering due to such weapons’ characteristics. The association here with both disarmament and international humanitarian law (IHL) is clear—although a humanitarian lens extends beyond the legal to encompass moral and political imperatives as well. It entails an emphasis on actual consequences and not only on the effect intended or claimed by users of the weapon. Thus, evidence and critical investigation are important elements of any humanitarian lens.58 As noted in the first paper in this UNIDIR series (see chapter 1), considering individuals and their communities as reference points for security contrasts with orthodox security discourse and statecraft.59 But it has much to offer in altering the circular, and often **unproductive, exclusively state-centric discourse on curbing the risks of use of these weapons.** As Knopf (2002) notes, while most public discourse **assumes the** further **spread** of nuclear weapons **to be undesirable and destabilising, the field of security studies has always** been much more ambivalent. Waltz (1981) provides the classic exposition of **“proliferation optimism”,** and is **the starting point for any substantive critique of the threat that nuclear weapons may pose to international** security. This argument essentially rests on the proposition that since through their sheer destructive power nuclear weapons are qualitatively different from conventional weapons, they ‘purify’ deterrent strategies and produce a system-pacifying effect – or ‘nuclear peace’ – that actually promotes interstate stability. Upturning Clausewitzian dictums and replacing a probability of victory or survivable defeat with one of potential (mutual) annihilation, the costs of conflict are such that state leaders will be deterred from engaging in war, both nuclear and conventional, against nuclear armed states (this includes allies sheltering under the nuclear umbrella of other states). Based in large part on the so-called ‘long peace’ between the two Cold War superpowers, Waltz (1990: 74) went so far as to declare that “the probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero”. There are, however, numerous problems with this line of argument, not the least of which from a CSS perspective is the privileging of the Cold War as a time of bipolar stability given the rampant insecurity generated between and within states by superpower interventionism throughout the Third World during this period (Westad, 2007). This is of course entirely representative of the traditionalist view that equates international security with interstate – particularly Great Power – order and the absence of high-cost military conflict above all else. However, not only does Waltz believe that a ‘nuclear peace’ held during the Cold War, but that as the same logic remains it will continue to do so now in a more diffuse international order. A distinctly laissez-faire approach to further horizontal proliferation should therefore be welcomed[[4]](https://www.e-ir.info/2013/12/02/nuclear-proliferation-through-critical-security-studies/#_edn4). Writing, for example, of the current Iranian nuclear programme and likely international responses, Waltz boldly states that “a nuclear-armed Iran […] would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to restore stability to the Middle East”

#### Each state protects their nuclear arsenals and find it integral to their identity in terms of security

Biswas, **Shampa**. *Nuclear Desire: Power and the Postcolonial Nuclear Order*. University of Minnesota Press, 20**14**. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctt9qh3p6.[Lynbrook](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctt9qh3p6.%5BLynbrook) KD]

**As I’ve stated many times before, this card has no substance, warrant, or function**

We are reminded time and again by reasonable, thoughtful, concerned interlocuters that “we are all safer in a world with a denuclearized Iran.” But who is this “we”—this mythical international community that speaks of peace and well-being for all made possible by reigning in this nuclear upstart? What kinds of questions about nuclear order and disorder are precluded when we invoke this “we”? Iran’s current ability to produce even a single missile-deliverable nuclear weapon is fairly limited. Every single member of the P-5 (and Israel) has a sizeable nuclear weapons stockpile and considerable ability to deliver weapons**. Each considers nuclear weapons as essential to its security, and none has ever engaged in any serious negotiations to eliminate its own nuclear ambitions**. Nobody may be better off with Iranian nuclear weapons, but from what kinds of questions about the global nuclear order does this exaggerated attention to the disorderly conduct of Iran deflect attention?

#### Securitization always leads to violence. Mamon 12

(The Campaign against Criminalising Communities (CAMPACC) in association with the Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers, European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and World Human Rights (EDLH), the Newham Monitoring Project (NMP), the Network for Police Monitoring (Netpol), G4S Campaign and CagePrisoners); “Securitisation as a Political Strategy: Creating Insecurity, suppressing Dissent” Backdoor Broadcasting, 11 July 2012

‘Security Measures’ are becoming all-pervasive, supposedly to protect us from severe threats. In practice, such measures turn us into suspects – subjected to preventative measures such as state surveillance, restrictions on movement, extra-judicial powers, secret evidence and even punishment without trial. ‘Terrorism’ , ‘extremism’ and ‘ suspicious behavior’ are defined so broadly and vaguely as to entrap potentially anyone. Some measures target specific groups; for example, anti-terror powers target migrant diaspora and Muslim communities, as well as (increasingly) political activists. Organised as mass-media spectacles, anti-terror raids label individuals and entire groups as terror suspects. For the past decade, secret evidence has been systematically used to label and detain foreigners as ‘terror suspects’; more recently, secret evidence has been extended to other procedures, likewise in the name of national security. Curfews and dispersal orders target youth, labeling normal social activities as dangerous. Israel’s occupation of Palestine has served as a laboratory for many surveillance and control techniques designed for global export. These are being adapted for ‘security measures’ at airports and mega-events such as the Olympics. In the run-up to the London Olympics, military equipment is being deployed to build public fear, justifying a quasi-military occupation on behalf of multinational companies. Israeli checkpoints have been spreading: when Palestinian activists planned protests against Israel’s Habima Treatre performance in London in May, the Shakespeare Globe Theatre installed airport-style detectors to screen all ticket holders, as well as employing private ‘security guards’. The British-Danish company G4S has been quickly growing and gaining state-like powers in this country. It has been long involved in the Israeli occupation, e.g. by supplying equipment to Israeli prisons and ‘security services’ to businesses in illegal Israeli settlement. G4S has been designated as the ‘official provider of security and cash services for the Olympics’. In all these ways, securitisation is a political strategy for spreading fear and insecurity, while also suppressing dissent against neoliberal policies and war. It attempts to discipline us all through fear that our behavior will be treated as ‘extreme’ or ‘suspicious’. Societal conflicts are increasingly defined as ‘security problems’ warranting special measures – which thereby become normal. All these measures encourage suspicion towards each other, discouraging solidarity. We will ask the following questions: How is insecurity being defined and even created by the state? Who threatens whose security? What has been driving securitisation? How can this be undermined through solidarity among the groups being targeted?

#### Moral and political

The answers to these questions are morally complicated. It must first be recalled that the securitization of nuclear weapons is undertaken in the context of their prior deployment by the NWS for war fighting, deterrence, or compellence purposes. These **deployments were emergency security measures** undertaken **after the** various NWS **governments had effectively securitized their enemies** to their respective citizenries. Recall that the United States securitized the Soviets as godless communists bent on expansion; the Soviets securitized the United States as ravenous capitalist expansionists.48 For many Americans and Europeans, the fear of nuclear war in the aftermath of deterrence failure was palpable, and some observers made the argument that the experience of this fear counted as a significant moral harm.49 For his part, Steven Lee argued that the immorality of nuclear deterrence is principally found in the practice of nuclear hostage holding, where innocent civilians are put at risk of nuclear war without their consent. For Lee, this meant nuclear deterrence is immoral even if the hostages are unaware of their condition and accordingly do not suffer a collective psychological trauma. Nonetheless, he claimed that causing such psychological trauma provides another reason for reproaching hostage holding.50 Given this context, how should our considered moral judgments regard the seeming necessity of the countersecuritization of nuclear weapons by the antinuclear movement’s leaders and the corresponding production of a concrete and profound fear of nuclear holocaust among movement members—and later among citizens of the NWS? Moral consequentialism might

#### Security discourse

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#### Book chp 5

Biswas, **Shampa**. *Nuclear Desire: Power and the Postcolonial Nuclear Order*. University of Minnesota Press, 20**14**. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctt9qh3p6.

We are reminded time and again by reasonable, thoughtful, concerned interlocuters that “we are all safer in a world with a denuclearized Iran.” But who is this “we”—this mythical international community that speaks of peace and well-being for all made possible by reigning in this nuclear upstart? What kinds of questions about nuclear order and disorder are precluded when we invoke this “we”? Iran’s current ability to produce even a single missile-deliverable nuclear weapon is fairly limited. Every single member of the P-5 (and Israel) has a sizeable nuclear weapons stockpile and considerable ability to deliver weapons**. Each considers nuclear weapons as essential to its security, and none has ever engaged in any serious negotiations to eliminate its own nuclear ambitions**. Nobody may be better off with Iranian nuclear weapons, but from what kinds of questions about the global nuclear order does this exaggerated attention to the disorderly conduct of Iran deflect attention?

#### Prefer rejecting structural violence

#### It’s a pressing moral question.

Deborah Winter and Dana Leighton 1999 Southern Arkansas University <http://sites.saumag.edu/danaleighton/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2015/09/SVintro-2.pdf> [Lynbrook YM]

Finally, to recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and why we tolerate it, questions which often have painful answers for the privileged elite who unconsciously support it. A final question of this section is how and why we allow ourselves to be so oblivious to structural violence. Susan Opotow offers an intriguing set of answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that our normal perceptual/cognitive processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between those who are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and become either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it is an outcome of everyday social cognition. To reduce its nefarious efWInter & Leighton Structural Violence Page 4 facts, we must be vigilant in noticing and listening to oppressed, invisible, outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity.

#### 2 Moral Certainty. The most ethical thing to do is to improve the status quo’s world for the guarantee that what we do actually has a positive impact. Future consequences are irrelevant.

Holden Karnofsky 2014 Open Philanthropy Project <https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/moral-value-far-future>

We are often asked about our views on these topics, and this post attempts to lay them out. There is not complete internal consensus on these matters, so I speak for myself, though most staff members would accept most of what I write here. In brief: I broadly accept the idea that the bulk of our impact may come from effects on future generations, and this view causes me to be more interested in [scientific research funding](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/scientific-research-funding), [global catastrophic risk mitigation](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/potential-global-catastrophic-risk-focus-areas), and other causes outside of aid to the developing-world poor. (If not for this view, I would likely favor the latter and would likely be far more interested in [animal welfare](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/research/cause-reports/policy/treatment-animals-industrial-agriculture) as well.) How **assive as to clearly (in a probabilistic framework) dwarf all present-day considerations.** [More](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/moral-value-far-future#Sec1) **I reject the idea that placing high value on the far future - no** ever, **I place only limited weight on the specific argument given by Nick Bostrom in** [Astronomical Waste](http://www.nickbostrom.com/astronomical/waste.html) **- that the potential future population is so m matter how high the value - makes it clear that one should focus on reducing the risks of catastrophes** such as extreme climate change, pandemics, misuse of advanced artificial intelligence, etc. **Even one who fully accepts the conclusions of “Astronomical Waste” has good reason to consider focusing on shorter-term, more tangible, higher-certainty opportunities to do good - including donating** to GiveWell’s current [top charities](http://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities) **and reaping the associated** [flow-through effects](http://blog.givewell.org/2013/05/15/flow-through-effects/). [More](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/moral-value-far-future#Sec2) I consider “global catastrophic risk reduction” to be a promising area for a philanthropist. As [discussed previously](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/potential-global-catastrophic-risk-focus-areas), we are investigating this area actively. [More](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/moral-value-far-future#Sec3) Those interested in related materials may wish to look at two transcripts of recorded conversations I had on these topics: [a conversation on flow-through effects with Carl Shulman, Robert Wiblin, Paul Christiano, and Nick Beckstead](http://www.jefftk.com/p/flow-through-effects-conversation)and [a conversation on existential risk with Eliezer Yudkowsky and Luke Muehlhauser](http://intelligence.org/2014/01/27/existential-risk-strategy-conversation-with-holden-karnofsky/). The importance of the far future As discussed [previously,](http://blog.givewell.org/2013/05/15/flow-through-effects/) I believe that **the general state of the world has improved** dramatically over the past several hundred years. It seems reasonable to state that the people who made contributions (large or small) to this improvement have made a major difference to the lives of people living today, and that when all future generations are taken into account, their impact on generations following them could easily dwarf their impact in their own time. I believe **it is reasonable to expect this basic dynamic to continue**, and I believe that there remains huge room for further improvement (possibly dwarfing the improvements we’ve seen to date). I place some probability on [global upside possibilities](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/possible-global-catastrophic-risks) including breakthrough technology, space colonization, and widespread improvements in interconnectedness, empathy and altruism. Even if these don’t pan out, there remains a great deal of room for further reduction in poverty and in other causes of suffering. In [Astronomical Waste](http://www.nickbostrom.com/astronomical/waste.html), Nick Bostrom makes a more extreme and more specific claim: that the number of human lives possible under space colonization is so great that the mere possibility of a hugely populated future, when considered in an “expected value” framework, dwarfs all other moral considerations. I see no obvious analytical flaw in this claim, and give it some weight. However, because the argument relies heavily on specific predictions about a distant future, seemingly (as far as I can tell) backed by little other than speculation, I do not consider it “robust,” and so I do not consider it rational to let it play an overwhelming role in my belief system and actions. (More on my epistemology and method for handling non-robust arguments containing massive quantities [here](http://blog.givewell.org/2014/06/10/sequence-thinking-vs-cluster-thinking/).) In addition, if I did fully accept the reasoning of “Astronomical Waste” and evaluate all actions by their far future consequences, it isn’t clear what implications this would have. As discussed below, given our uncertainty about the specifics of the far future and our reasons to believe that doing good in the present day can have substantial impacts on the future as well, it seems possible that “seeing a large amount of value in future generations” and “seeing an overwhelming amount of value in future generations” lead to similar consequences for our actions. Catastrophic risk reduction vs. doing tangible good Many people have cited “Astronomical Waste” to me as evidence that the greatest opportunities for doing good are in the form of reducing the risks of catastrophes such as extreme climate change, pandemics, problematic developments related to artificial intelligence, etc. Indeed, “Astronomical Waste” seems to argue something like this: For standard utilitarians, priority number one, two, three and four should consequently be to reduce existential risk. The utilitarian imperative “Maximize expected aggregate utility!” can be simplified to the maxim “Minimize existential risk!”. I have always found this inference flawed, and in my [recent discussion with Eliezer Yudkowsky and Luke Muehlhauser](http://intelligence.org/2014/01/27/existential-risk-strategy-conversation-with-holden-karnofsky/), it was argued to me that the “Astronomical Waste” essay never meant to make this inference in the first place. The author’s [definition of existential risk](http://www.jetpress.org/volume9/risks.html) includes anything that stops humanity far short of realizing its full potential - including, presumably, stagnation in economic and technological progress leading to a long-lived but limited civilization. Under that definition, “Minimize existential risk!” would seem to potentially include any contribution to general human empowerment. I have often been challenged to explain how one could possibly reconcile (a) caring a great deal about the far future with (b) donating to one of [GiveWell’s top charities](http://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities). My general response is that in the face of sufficient [uncertainty](http://blog.givewell.org/2014/06/10/sequence-thinking-vs-cluster-thinking/) about one’s options, and lack of conviction that there are good (in the sense of high expected value) opportunities to make an enormous difference, it is rational to try to make a smaller but [robustly positive](http://blog.givewell.org/2014/06/10/sequence-thinking-vs-cluster-thinking/) difference, whether or not one can trace a specific causal pathway from doing this small amount of good to making a large impact on the far future. A few brief arguments in support of this position: I believe that the track record of “taking robustly strong opportunities to do ‘something good’ ” is far better than the track record of “taking actions whose value is contingent on high-uncertainty arguments about where the highest utility lies, and/or arguments about what is likely to happen in the far future.” This is true even when one evaluates track record only in terms of seeming impact on the far future. The developments that seem most positive in retrospect - from large ones like the development of the steam engine to small ones like the many economic contributions that facilitated strong overall growth - seem to have been driven by the former approach, and I’m not aware of many examples in which the latter approach has yielded great benefits. I see some sense in which the world’s overall civilizational ecosystem seems to have done a better job optimizing for the far future than any of the world’s individual minds. It’s often the case that people acting on relatively short-term, tangible considerations (especially when they did so with creativity, integrity, transparency, consensuality, and pursuit of gain via value creation rather than value transfer) have done good in ways they themselves wouldn’t have been able to foresee. If this is correct, it seems to imply that one should be focused on “playing one’s role as well as possible” - on finding opportunities to [“beat the broad market”](http://blog.givewell.org/2013/05/02/broad-market-efficiency/) (to do more good than people with similar goals would be able to) rather than pouring one’s resources into the areas that non-robust estimates have indicated as most important to the far future. The process of trying to accomplish tangible good can lead to a great deal of learning and unexpected positive developments, more so (in my view) than the process of putting resources into a low-feedback endeavor based on one’s current best-guess theory. In my [conversation with Luke and Eliezer](http://intelligence.org/2014/01/27/existential-risk-strategy-conversation-with-holden-karnofsky/), the two of them hypothesized that the greatest positive benefit of supporting GiveWell’s top charities may have been to raise the profile, influence, and learning abilities of GiveWell. If this were true, I don’t believe it would be an inexplicable stroke of luck for donors to top charities; rather, it would be the sort of development (facilitating feedback loops that lead to learning, organizational development, growing influence, etc.) that is often associated with “doing something well” as opposed to “doing the most worthwhile thing poorly.” I see multiple reasons to believe that contributing to general human empowerment mitigates global catastrophic risks. I laid some of these out in a [blog post](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/empowerment-and-catastrophic-risk) and discussed them further in my [conversation with Luke and Eliezer](http://intelligence.org/2014/01/27/existential-risk-strategy-conversation-with-holden-karnofsky/). For one who accepts these considerations, it seems to me that: It is not clear whether placing enormous value on the far future ought to change one’s actions from what they would be if one simply placed large value on the far future. In both cases, attempts to reduce global catastrophic risks and otherwise plan for far-off events must be weighed against attempts to do tangible good, and the question of which has more potential to shape the far future will often be a difficult one to answer. If one sees few robustly good opportunities to “make a huge difference to the far future,” the best approach to making a positive far-future difference may be “make a small but robustly positive difference to the present.” **One ought to be interested in** “unusual, outstanding **opportunities to do good**” **even if they don’t have a clear connection to improving the far future.**

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The puzzle that begins chapter 1 is centered on security. **Security is the primary problematic** for realist IR theorists and **states** the primary agents for delivering it. **In the** self-help **anarchy that describes international relations** for realists, creating cooperative institutions that might restrain state action is generally challenging. **In the area of security**, where state interests are most effectively individuated, **that challenge is considerably magnified**. Yet there is in place a truly enormous regime of interstate treaties and organizations, international nongovernmental agencies, think tanks, watchdog groups, and transnational activists that have made it their business to track, monitor, regulate, and effectively constrain **state actions with respect to the pursuit and possession of nuclear weapons**. The NPT is one, albeit absolutely critical and perhaps even central, node of this massive regime. Chapter 1 describes this NNP regime in detail, showing the various linkages, cross-cutting ties, and quite different specific aims of different elements of this regime. What unifies these different aims— sometimes complementary, sometimes contradictory—is that they all recognize the “problem” that nuclear weapons pose and attempt to solve it. They do so largely by focusing on the state—urging it, placing demands on it, cracking its secrecy, tracking it, monitoring it, and regulating it— and they all are engaged in the very well-intentioned task of constraining state actions toward the end of nuclear peace. Good intentions are fragile in the Hobbesian anarchy of realists, and so it is liberal IR theorists to whom I turn to see how well they explain the evolution of these mutually enabling identities and interests working toward a common end. The debate between realists and liberals over the emergence of cooperation under anarchy is interesting to an extent, I suggest, but doesn’t really get us too far in understanding how effective this kind of cooperation is, when it does actually emerge, as it has with the problem of nuclear weapons. It is this question of effectiveness that is the actual puzzle of chapter 1 and one that I suggest neither realists nor liberals are particularly good at theorizing. I suggest that there is a very important sense in which gauging the effectiveness of the vast, sprawling, complex, multi-billion-dollar regime in terms of the overall goal of creating nuclear peace reveals failure. I am compelled by the arguments made by Mueller, Ward, and others on the military uselessness of nuclear weapons. But the case for nuclear abolition has been well made, many times over, long before Mueller’s book. That case is now also being made by highly placed conservative policy leaders in heavily armed nuclear states that were previously committed adherents of deterrence. Numerous proposals and blueprints outline the steps to a nuclear-free world. But nuclear abolition has always been a receding goal, relegated to the future when all the other problems of nuclear weapons— especially proliferation—have been solved. The **number of nuclear warheads that exist in the world**, and the power to deliver them across great distances in relatively short time, **remains unacceptably high**, even **in the eyes of many experts who find nuclear weapons useful for security**. It is not the well-meaning intentions driving the regime that I question, nor even the specific successes in restraining the superpower arms race or preventing the spread of weapons material or technology, but the “liberal progress” this massive constellation of efforts should portend. **Whatever progress we make** via this or that treaty or organization, **we are not**, in my view**, progressing toward a nuclear-free world**; if anything, **anxieties about nuclear attacks have only increased recently**. Here I am on ground similar to Mueller’s in questioning the usefulness of this multi-billion-dollar enterprise in ensuring nuclear peace. But my interest is in querying this so-called failure further, asking if this failure itself can teach us something about the way the world works.

What, then, is the current global order as it pertains to nuclear proliferation? The intersubjective construction of contemporary threats by various actors concerns both ‘vertical’ proliferation – the maintenance and expansion of nuclear arsenals by the original five NPT states (N-5) – and, more frequently, that of ‘horizontal’ proliferation – the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the N-5 to various states and non-state actors (ICNND, 2009: 11-47). While estimates vary on overall stockpiles due to lack of transparency, eight states were widely acknowledged to possess operational nuclear weapons as of January 2012, with uncertainty remaining over the status of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities (SIPRI, 2012: 14-15)[[2]](https://www.e-ir.info/2013/12/02/nuclear-proliferation-through-critical-security-studies/#_edn2). Horizontal proliferation concerns incorporate so-called ‘first tier’ and ‘second tier’ proliferation: referring respectively to the sale or theft of necessary technologies and expertise from NWSs – or entities within them – to their non-nuclear equivalents, and to relevant trade between developing world states to bolster each other’s weapons capabilities (Braun & Chyba, 2004). More than thirty ‘latent’ states with indigenous civilian nuclear programmes also currently exist, many being able to cross the proliferation threshold in relatively short order (Montgomery and Sagan, 2009). Despite occasional active pursuit in recent years, primarily by al-Qa’eda and Aum Shinrikyo, and **with much** popular **discourse surrounding the potential threat**, non-state **actors have yet to** come close to **acquiring any form of nuclear weapons** – nor, according to Mueller (2009), is this realistically conceivable given the variety of substantial practical and organizational difficulties that are faced.

#### This investment in securitization sustains an affective economy of perpetual preemptive warfare

Massumi ‘14 (Brian Massumi, professor in the Communication Department of the University of Montreal, 2013-2014, “The Remains of the Day,” *On Violence* Volume 1, modified)

To help answer our questions, preemption can't be thought of as simply a doctrine. Doctrines change as political actors and institutions turn over. Preemption was a doctrine – in the aftermath of 9-11, it became the stated war doctrine of the George W Bush administration. But as a formative historical force with a power to regather itself and follow its own momentum, it overflowed the Bush administration and flowed into the Obama administration, and will likely flow beyond it. In addition, it can be argued that it overflowed the borders of the United States, going global.

Preemption in this sense is a tendency that cannot be reduced to a time- and place-specific doctrine. Tendencies are self-propagating. They have a power to repeat their operations in different times and places. Doctrines must be applied. Tendencies are self-applying. They are self-driving. This makes them a force to be contended within their own right

The question, then, is how preemption constitutes a self-driving tendency that has to be construed as a force of history passing through shifts in doctrine and changes in casts of characters.

We'll start from the way preemption was formulated as a doctrine by George W Bush in response to the 9-11 attacks -- and then consider how what was encapsulated in that doctrine took on a momentum of its own.

This is the doctrine, Bush's own words: "If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path to action."

Now some might actually see this as an example of "the more things change, the more they stay the same," because the right to preemptive attack has been a part of the practice of war for as long as there have been wars, and is a part of classical war theory and the law of war. However,in the past, preemptive attack was considered justified in response to "a clear and present danger**.**" the Bush doctrine changed danger to threat.

The first thing this does is shift the emphasis to the affective register. A clear and present danger is observable and in principle objectively verifiable, whereas a threat only has to be felt to be. It has a visceral reality that is self-confirming. If you feel threatened, you are – end of story. On 9-11 we felt it.

Although formalized as a State doctrine, preemption establishes a direct relation to life at its most visceral level. In other words, to affect – to what hits us in the gut so immediately that all we can do is reel, not yet reflect, not yet knowing how to act in response. Affect at this level of the visceral hit that suspends considered reflection and momentarily ~~paralyzes~~ [stifles] action isn't what we normally think about as emotion. Through a triggering event like 9-11, it hits collectively, directly riveting a whole population to a situation it is not yet capable of categorizing. It braces us together in uncertainty, in the terror of not yet being able to answer the question, "what just happened?" Unlike an emotion, affect at this level it is less something we each have personally, than it is something that has us collectively. We are taken up together in the terror. We are vaulted into it together. We are agape, in suspense together. We are all in it together, in the disorientation of terror. We are swept up by it. We are moved by it

Preemption establishes a direct link between the institutional level of policy – the formal level of collective organization -- and the informal affective level of sweeping collective disorientation and agitated ~~paralysis~~ [inaction]. With preemption, this political link to the level of affective immediacy becomes a motor of what happens. It goes off and running.It sets in motion an historical tendency that is difficult to put the brakes on once it starts. That tendency has a certain logic of its own.

I'm not saying that the connection of politics to a visceral level where reflection is momentarily suspended makes politics simply irrational. I'm saying that it gives preemption a logic of its own, and that to understand what changed on 9-11, and how it stays the same the more it changes, we have to understand that logic, and what's different about it.

There is something else that happens with preemption. There is another significant shift, this one concerning time. Classically, a preemptive attack is justified when there is "a clear and present danger." But threat inhabits the future. Threats don't clearly present themselves. They vaguely loom, and their looming casts a shadow on the present. A threat is how an uncertain future makes-itself-felt in the present. This has immediate consequences on the plane of action. Even in ~~paralysis~~ [inaction], it can change how we will be disposed to act. This viscerally felt, affective presence of an uncertain future has consequences for the future. In a weird way, threat is a way in which the future affects itself.

What I've just described is like a time-loop. The future comes back to the present to trigger a reaction that jolts the present back to the future, along a different path of action than would have eventuated otherwise. Threat is a strange animal: a future cause. It comes from the future, to act on the futurity from which it came. In a sense, threat makes future self-causing. There is a kind of short-circuit in time. A future cause (the looming of the threat) loops through affect in a way that effectively changes what goes down. Threat loops through affect to effect, never surrendering the future tense.

By contrast, the classical doctrine of preemption as it was understand pre-9-11 specifically referred to danger, not threat, as already mentioned. Danger involves the linear relationship between cause and effect that we are used to dealing with in our common-sense everyday lives. A situation clearly presents itself; its objective characteristics are analyzed; the analysis suggests reasonable paths of action; a direction is chosen, and the present marches the straight and narrow path to the future, as dictated by the decision. The effects of the decision flow logically, step-bystep from it. Of course all kinds of accidents can happen. The path can be miscalculated. The deliberations can be flawed, the implementation flubbed**.** But the point remains that there is an assumption that decisions affecting the future can be based on objectively verifiable, empirically present conditions, and that political response begins with deliberation and is guided by it. Here, the causes of things precede them in time. Their effects feed forward from the empirical past, through the observable present, and if all goes well, into a better future. It's all nicely ordered, comfortably linear.

All of this gets seriously twisted by threat. Because, once again, it's enough for a threat to be felt to make it real**.** It needs no objective validation to have an effect as a future cause. It doesn't operate in the realm of the objective. The future is precisely what is not yet objectively present. It's not empirically observable. Preemption operates in the realm of affect. Its concern is threat. If it is enough for threat to be felt for it to be real and effective, then it's logical that the actions that effectively flow from the feeling of threat are going to be justified affectively as well. With preemption, the justification for actions, the legitimation of political decision, tends to become fundamentally affective. It is reasonable to say that a shift of this magnitude marks a threshold where "everything changes." It's the death knell of centuries of politics that were supposed to be guided by the "reason of State."

To get a sense of how this works, consider Bush's well-known rationales for invading Iraq: 1) Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction; 2) Iraq was a haven for Al-Qaeda and would be used as a launching pad for further attacks.

The first rationale was vigorously discounted at the time by people objectively a position to know, such as UN weapons inspector Hans Blix. It was subsequently found to be entirely lacking any factual foundation. What was Bush's response when he had to face up to the fact that he had embarked on a costly war on objectively false premises? Did he apologize for the thousands of allied lives lost? For the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives lost? Did he admit having made a mistake? No, he reaffirmed that his decision to invade had been right in spite of having no factual basis. Because, he said, we can be certain that if Hussein had had weapons of mass destruction, he would have used them. In a word, if he could have, he would have. Maybe it's true he couldn't have then. But had the US not invaded, he might have could-have later on.

What threat does is shift the mode of political decision from the objective to the conditional – the "could have / would have" – and treat the conditional as a certainty. And it is a certainty – affectively speaking. Bush certainly felt that Hussein would have if he could have. This certainty is not an informed judgment about a set of objective conditions. It's a gut feeling that there is a potential for something to happen. The thing is, it is impossible to disprove a potential. Even if nothing has happened years later, nothing is disproven, because it might still happen years after that. There's nothing to say that it couldn't. No one can know. The only certainty is that you have to act now to do everything possible to preempt the potential. In the vocabulary of Bush's Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, the only thing certain is that you have to "go kinetic," even though you don't really know and can't know and know you don't know. There are known knowns, Rumsfeld famously said and there are known unknowns. But in the post 9-11 era of threat and terror, what we're dealing with and have to act on are the "unknown unknowns." As Bush put it in the quote cited earlier, "the only path to safety is the path to action" – against threats have not yet emerged. What has not yet emerged can be nothing other than an unknown unknown.

The best way to act when faced with the unknown unknown of a felt threat vaguely looming is … quickly. Otherwise you may have acted too late."We will have waited too long," Bush warned. The only way to act quickly on an unknown unknown is to act intuitively, using the same "gut feeling" you used to feel-thethreat-into-reality. Bush, it is well known, prided himself on deciding with his guts. He once actually said he used his advisors primarily as "mood rings."

So not only does preemption locate our actions in a realm of affect; not only does it politically legitimate actions affectively; it makes affect what makes them. All of this short-circuits objective assessment or evidence-based reasoning. Hair-trigger action replaces deliberation. Rapid-response tactical capabilities replace considered strategy. Remember the outrage when members of Bush's inner circle were quoted by investigative journalist Ron Suskind ridiculing what they called the "reality-based" community. While you're off deliberating all nice and civil about what's really real, they said, we're busy making reality, in our gutsy, preemptive way. The phrase "reality-based" was sarcastic. It's the height of illusion, they were saying, to treat a looming threat as if it were a clear and present danger that can be responded to in the old-fashioned way, as if the world were still orderly and linear. No, what's realistic is go kinetic with utmost urgency. And when you do that, you're not sitting back reflecting on the reality, you're making it, you're producing it.

How can an approach to decision-making based on vaguely looming futurities that have not yet emerged, that are still in potential, that as-yet exist only in the conditional, as would-haves and could-haves, in a way that short-circuits the present of considered reflection into a future time-loop – how can that actually produce the real? How can action legitimately bootstrap itself into reality, from a grounding in affect and potential?

The answer is obvious if you think about the second rationale Bush gave for going into Iraq. Iraq, he said, was a staging ground for Al Qaeda. Yes, the cynic might say. Iraq was a staging ground for Al Qaeda and Al-Qaeda-like terrorist groupings – but only after the invasion, and as a direct result of that preemptive action. It was the US invasion that created the conditions for AlQaeda to move in and capitalize on the chaos and resentment the invasion unleashed. The retort to that, following the logic of preemption, is simple. It happened. That's the reality. Iraq did become a staging ground for terrorrism – which only goes to show that the potential was there after all.

#### The role of the judge is to reject examples of security constructivist discourse this recreates security scenarios that state violence manifests itself in – vote aff to reject this constructivist rhetoric

Bourbeau 6 (Philippe Bourbeau, Ph.D., CCHS Fellow Department of Political Science University of British Columbia, 2006, “Migration and Security: Securitization theory and its refinement” pg 9-22)

Undoubtedly, securitization theory has become the benchmark of the securitization process in security studies today. Indeed, securitization theory provides at first sight a creative theoretical foundation for understanding the linkage between security and migration by acknowledging the subjective dimension of a securitized migration. Dealing effectively with the notion that migrants are an artefact produced by territorial boundaries (Faist, 2000), the theory postulates the social construction of threats and referent objects. Doubtful of an enterprise of looking for real threats—objective ones—securitization theory is said to be “radically constructivist regarding security, which ultimately is a specific form of social praxis” (Buzan et al., 1998:204). The theory also highlights the importance of discourse in the processes leading to a securitized migration. Indeed, as one of securitization theory’s friendly critics observes, one of securitization theory’s greatest strengths is that it underscores the importance of labelization as a form of symbolic power in security studies (Bigo, 1998); thus, shifting the focus of analysis away from merely material factors to include social-cultural ones as well. Despite its noteworthy insights, securitization theory is not without considerable weaknesses and limits. The theory displays a sense of incompleteness. Elsewhere, I have shown that securitization theory has three important weaknesses: a limiting analytical framework, a flawed view of agency, and an inadequate conceptualization of structures.4 In this paper, I will focus on the third. One of securitization theory’s weaknesses is that the conditions it identifies as enabling the process of securitization are ill defined and lack internal consistency. Indeed, securitization theory sends confused messages regarding the conditions making a securitization possible. Securitization theory asserts that “A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization—this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such [...] Successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech-act” (Buzan et al., 1998:25-31, emphasis added). This formulation immediately raises some concerns. Obviously, the first one is its ethno-centrism. The audience in a liberal democracy has probably something to say in regards to national security, but what exactly is the role of the audience in a dictatorship and in a repressive regime? Does talking in terms of acceptance, which ultimately means making a choice, make sense in a North Korean or a Zimbabwean context? Moreover, one could ask who precisely comprises the audience. Securitization theory’s response, which is to add an adjective here and there to the word audience, succeeds merely in confusing things. For instance, in Buzan et al. (1998), they refer to the “significant” audience (p.27) and to the “sufficient” audience (p.204), whereas in another contribution, Waever (2000:251) talks about the “relevant” audience.5 In turn, this list of adjectives leads to important and interrelated questions: what is a “sufficient” audience? How do we measure a “significant” audience? What is the “relevant” audience in the case of, for example, environmental security: the audience of a specific country or of the entire planet? Who decides which one it is? If it is the population of the whole world, where exactly can the audience voice their choice? Furthermore, Buzan et al.’s framework is inconclusive when looking at the question of ‘facilitating conditions’—that is, conditions making a successful securitization more likely. The theory postulates that “conditions for a successful speech act [are]: (1) the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security; (2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor—that is, the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt; and (3) features of the alleged threats” (Buzan et al., 1998:32-33). I share Buzan and Wæver’s reserves that these conditions should not be held as causal in a traditional sense. I am not calling for a systematic and fixed list of conditions under which a speech act works; thus, I agree with securitization theory that one should keep the field of conditions open. Rather the argument is that the categorization proposed in the theoretical statement cannot encompass, at best awkwardly, what the empirical research has found to be valuable. This is a conclusion that Buzan and Wæver themselves seem to arrive at in their latest contribution. They argue, for example, that length and ferocity of historical enmity, vulnerability of the referent objects, and geography are facilitating conditions (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). Trying to fit all these new conditions into the three categories listed earlier is a daunting challenge. For instance, ‘vulnerability of the referent objects’ enters neither the internal nor the social capital of the securitizing actor categories. It perhaps enters in the ‘features of the threat’ category but only by considerably distorting the initial definition of that category. To be sure, these conditions are not by themselves problematic; rather, the point is that a disconnection between theoretical components and empirical results is present. It is to the empirical research that I now turn Migration and security in Canada Firstly, let me set a number of bases for the purpose of the paper. What exactly do I mean by securitized migration? In order to restrict to the maximum the continuum of what is a security issue and to restrict the fish net of the study, I deliberately use a narrow definition of security to measure if migration has been securitized or not. Instead of opting for a rather subjective understanding of the link between migration and security, this study posits that at this point indicators should be based on objective measures as much as possible. In brief (and I cannot, given space limitation, develop further on this point in this paper), I rely on two indicators. The first indicator is whether immigration/migration is listed as a security concern in the mandates, objectives, and priorities of security related departments. Does, for example, the Canadian White Paper on Defense of 1994 talks about migration in security terms? Or, does the key 1995’s foreign policy document Bourbeau—ISA San Diego; Not for circulation or citation without permission of the author 12 “Canada in the World” list migration as a national security issue for Canada? The second indicator is the existence of a particular department or a bi/multilateral agreement in charge of border control and national security in which immigration is seen as a key element. To illustrate, in December 2003, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) was created. Building its mandate from the Canada-United States Smart Border Declaration (signed in December 2001), the CBSA is said to be an “integral component in enhancing Canada’s national security”. Accordingly, the CBSA wants to “identify security threats before they arrive in North America through collaborative approaches to reviewing crew and passenger manifests, managing refugees, and visa policy coordination”. With these tools, it is possible to track down temporally the phenomenon of securitized migration in Canada. The important date in the case of Canada is 1991. Whereas the previous official document, “Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada’s International Relations” published in 1985, was silent on the issue of migration, migration was said to be a security concern for Canada for the first time in the official document “Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities” published in 1991. Documents and statements that came after 1991, such as the White Paper on Defense (1994), Canada in the World (1995), and Canada International Policy Statement (2005), have all reiterated, in a form or another, that migration or some aspect of migration is a question of national security for Canada. The next step in our research is to identify securitizing actors. Two potential candidates have been studied: the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. My preliminary analyses yield some valuable, unexpected findings. One finding is that, in the 13 case of Canada, the Prime Minister has not been the central actor in the process of securitizing migration. A detailed examination of Canada’s PM speeches (527 speeches) is in fact quite revealing, as Figure 1 illustrates. Kim Campbell made the very first speech-act securitizing migration in her swearing- in speech of June 1993. The speech she gave is noteworthy because it was the first time a Prime Minister officially linked migration and security. Prime Minister Campbell told her audience that the newly Public Security portfolio was consolidating the responsibilities for policing, border protection, and the processing of immigrants’ applications in order to ensure that Canadian society was not at risk. However, the speech came nearly two years after the publication of the official Canadian document securitizing migration. Thus, a significant time gap exists between the outcome of a securitized migration and the first speech-act made by the PM. Furthermore, Kim Campbell was the Prime Minister of Canada for a very short period of time (from June 13, 1993 to October 25, 1993). Replacing Brian Mulroney as the leader of the Progressive Conservative Party, who left after two mandates in power, Campbell was in fact an interim Prime Minister. The Progressive Conservative Party suffered their biggest defeat in history in the 1993 federal election, going from a majority government (169 seats) to losing their status of recognized political party by Elections Canada (only two seats). This cast some doubt, as we shall see later, on the fundamental condition for a successful securitization identified by Securitization theory, i.e. that a successful securitization is decided by the audience and not by securitizing actors. Between 1989 and the terrorist attacks in New York in September 2001, Campbell’s speech is the only one that has openly securitized migration. It is not, however, as though Bourbeau—ISA San Diego; Not for circulation or citation without permission of the author 14 the opportunity did not exist. The arrival of 599 would-be Chinese immigrants near Vancouver during the summer of 1999, for example, has resulted in a groundswell of emotion across Canada, and could have easily justified a bold statement to the effect that the movement of people was disturbing Canada’s security. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister made no declaration to that effect. Figure 1. Prime Ministers’ Speeches, Canada, 1989-2005 Obviously, the attacks of 9/11 had a huge impact on the linkage between migration and security. Indeed, in his address during a Special House of Commons Debate in response to the terrorist attacks in the United States, Prime Minister Chrétien did not hesitate to establish the linkage. However, and perhaps in indication of the long-term Canadian position, Chrétien also noted that Canada would not give in to the temptation of creating a security curtain, and declared that his government would not be “stampeded in the hope—vain and ultimately self-defeating—that we can make Canada a fortress against Occurence the world.”6 Furthermore, one should also notice the sharp decrease as early as in 2002 in the linkage between migration and security in the Prime Minister’s speeches (Paul Martin included). Overall, one finding stands out clearly from the analysis of Prime Ministers’ speeches from 1989 to 2005 in the particular context of this study: the Prime Minister of Canada has not been the key securitizing actor in the process of securitizing migration. This conclusion, established through discourse analysis, is also corroborated by semi-structured interviews conducted in the fall of 2005. Every senior analysts/bureaucrats interviewed (from four departments: Prime Minister Office, Foreign Affairs, Citizenship and Immigration, and Transport) have indicated that the Prime Minister has not been a key player in the process of securitizing migration. Another finding of my study is that the Minister of Foreign Affairs appears to have been the key player in the process. A thorough examination of Canada’s Foreign Affairs Ministers speeches (384 speeches) is quite enlightening, as Figure 2 shows. Indeed, a temporal connection between a speech-act and the phenomenon of securitized migration is present. Barbara McDougall, in the second Progressive-Conservative majority government, was the first Foreign Affairs minister7 to declare that migration was a national security concern for Canada. In a speech she gave on December 10, 1991 to the conference commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Statute of Westminster, she declared that “in adopting [a] wider concept of security, Canada will be more aggressive and active in tackling transnational threats to security such as weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, terrorism, and irregular migration. These threats need to be managed to avoid the dangers of escalation to military action.”8 At the official opening of the Canadian Foreign Service Institute in Ottawa (1992), the minister told the audience “the challenges of our foreign services are increasingly complex and diverse. Mass movements of populations [...] have changed forever the way our immigration officers works. The work they do is crucial to the well-being and long-term security of all Canadians.”9 Figure 2. Ministers of Foreign Affairs’ Speeches, Canada, 1989-2005 Securitized Migration While one can observe a relative continuity in the way migration is seen in the first years of the Liberal government, a clear rupture is observed with the arrival of Lloyd Axworthy in the Lester B. Pearson building. Axworthy rarely speaks of the movement of people in terms of security issue for Canada and a sharp decrease in the securitization of migration is noticed. In fact, the angle of analysis preferred by Axworthy was brought onto the scene in the Occurence summer of 1999 with the arrival of four boats of Chinese would be-immigrants to British Columbia’s shores. Instead of mounting a charge to the effect that immigration was bringing all sorts of security problems to Canada, Axworthy cast the whole incident under the human security agenda. That is, the arrival of the boats “brought home to Canadians the ugly reality of another human security threat of global proportions—the smuggling and trafficking in human beings.”10 Or, as this passage illustrates nicely: “millions of vulnerable people have been forced from their homes; been driven to borders which are open one minute and closed the next; forced into hiding; separated from their families; made to act as human shields; stripped of their identities; sexually abused; and callously killed. The need to combat these threats has become the basis of the Canadian approach to foreign policy.”11 Undoubtedly, the linkage between migration and security is established under Axworthy; however, the link is constructed with a rather different angle then the one previously made. Securitized migration in this context is about the security of the migrants; migration is not conceived as a ‘threat’ to Canada. Rather, the linkage is made in terms of security for the migrants; an unsurprising finding given Axworthy’s track record as one of the most well-known public figures to have put human security in the international arena. Axworthy’s successor, John Manley, had a different understanding of how the movement of people should be interpreted. In his very first speech as Minister of Foreign Affairs and in front of a Canadian audience, Manley made it clear that under his leadership the department would see migration as a salient security issue. “We are facing new and complex security threats: including illegal migration, crime, terrorism, disease, 18 illegal drug trafficking, and computer-based crime”12 he argued at a forum on Canada’s foreign policy agenda and priorities in October 2000. As expected, the linkage between migration and security became especially acute after 9/11. Immigration, security, terrorism, border controls, and security screening are fused into the same conceptual category both in domestic speeches, such as the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and in international speeches, such as at the 56th Session of the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, the idea of the Smart Border Declaration, a key document signed by the US and Canada in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, is built around securitized migration. The first pillar of the Declaration’s action plan, entitled “The secure flow of people”, undoubtedly links migration and security in a formal and perhaps enduring way: “We will implement systems to collaborate in identifying security risks while expediting the flow of low risk travelers; We will identify security threats before they arrive in North America through collaborative approaches to reviewing crew and passenger manifests, managing refugees, and visa policy coordination.” A major change is brought, albeit with subtlety, to the general way the movement across borders is perceived. Indeed, the spectrum of security has significantly shrunk: either someone is a security ‘risk’ or a ‘low risk’ migrant. Tellingly, the category ‘not a risk’ is totally absent from the document—as is any conceptualization of the movement of people that is not from a ‘risk’ or a ‘threat’ perspective. From the very beginning, the migrant (and even the frequent traveler) is a security concern. In addition, it is important here to point out that since its signature in 2001, all Foreign Affairs’ Ministers have praised the success, the coherence, and the structure of the Smart Border Declaration. Actors and audience’s relationship in Canada One should bear in mind at this point that what we have witnessed so far according to securitization theory is only a securitizing move. The audience, not securitizing actors, is the decisive player for securitization theory. Indeed, according to the theory, “a discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization—this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such [...] Successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech-act” (Buzan et al., 1998:25-31, emphasis added). As previously mentioned, it is unclear what securitization theory means when they use ‘audience’. It is even more difficult to measure it. Given that no national referendum has been hold on the issue and that security as well as migration issues have not hold a prominent place in almost all federal elections in the last thirty years, one of the last resort to measure what the audience ‘think’ of a particular issue is to examine public opinion and national polls/surveys. Sadly, no poll has been conducted in Canada precisely on the question of the process of securitizing migration. The closest we can get is a Gallup poll that has been asking the following question to Canadians since 1975: “If it were your job to plan an immigration policy for Canada at this time, would you be inclined to increase immigration, decrease immigration, or keep the number of immigrants at about the current level?” I assume that if you think migration is a security problem, you will want to decrease it. However, as the Figure 3 shows, nothing indicates that the Canadian audience did accept the so-called securitizing move. The only time that those who answered ‘decrease of immigration’ pass the threshold of 50% is in 1982—indicating that the key concern was more about the economy and the job market than about national security. Furthermore, since 1991 there are less and less Canadians who opt for a decrease in the level of immigration. The lowest point in the last 30 years is in 2005 with 27%, i.e. after the terrorists’ attacks of 9/11. This robust evidence (as the poll has been conducted since 1975) not only permits to control for the effect of idiosyncratic events on public opinion, such as the arrival of refugee boats in 1999 or the terrorists’ attacks of 9/11, but it also gives a clear indication of the evolution of Canadians’ opinions on the issue. Figure 3. Gallup Poll Results: “Decrease of immigration”, Canada, 1975-2005 My analysis of the relationship between actors and audience in the particular context of the process of securitizing migration in Canada has serious consequences for Bourbeau—ISA San Diego; Not for circulation or citation without permission of the author 21Percentage securitization theory. Indeed, a central component of securitization theory (i.e. that an issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such) is problematic. On one hand, the previous discussion has shown that securitization theory’s usage of audience is ill-defined and inconclusive. On the other hand, I have found a disconnection, especially on the question of ‘when’ the audience has supposedly accepted the securitizing move, between empirical results and this central premise of securitization theory. Hence, securitization theory has to be refined. My concluding remarks will briefly initiate some reflections—as this is not the purpose of this paper—on the correctives offered to securitization theory in order to consolidate its theoretical framework and to better integrate its theoretical premises with empirical results.

#### Nuclear weapons have been labeled an existential threat, eliminating arsenals would remove a source of security rhetoric. The UN 2014

UN , 8-8-2014, "Nuclear Weapons Not Used Since 1945, But World 'Cannot Rely on Luck Indefinitely', First Committee Hears, as Speakers Grapple with Profound Implications," No Publication, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gadis3498.doc.htm>

Despite progress in some fields, he said, highlighting the Arms Trade Treaty, **the use of nuclear rhetoric amid global tension** and the inclusion of nuclear capabilities as part of military exercises were “worrying” developments. More than four decades since the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), non-nuclear-weapon States had a right to ask “if not now, when?”, said New Zealand’s representative. Echoing sentiments expressed by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, she said that despite all that was wrong in the world — armed conflicts, arms races, and the orgy of military spending — disarmament did have a future and would survive for two reasons: it worked, and it was the right thing to do. Disarmament did not happen in a vacuum, the representative of the Russian Federation said, adding that the future of that process depended to a great extent on the general security environment.  **Without the elimination of negative factors, the hopes for advancement towards “nuclear zero” would remain wishful thinking.** That representative also expressed concern about the concept of “prompt global strike”, which was getting closer to the practical implementation phase.  The goal was to immediately neutralize the defence capabilities of any “out-of-favour” country, leaving it without any time or opportunity for an armed response. France’s representative said that nuclear proliferation was a profound concern, and the European continent, which was thought to be permanently at peace, was once again prey to tensions.  The Ukrainian crisis and the violation of the 1994 Budapest memorandum, adopted in the framework of Ukraine’s accession to the NPT, had a “very negative effect” on international security, he said. There was a sequence for multilateral action, with the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the launch of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, he said, adding that to make progress, it was essential to better understand each State’s position, minimize divergences and identify possible avenues for compromise. Sharing the worry of several delegations in the room, the representative of the Republic of Korea pointed out that, despite recent efforts, **the possibility of nuclear terrorism remained a grave threat to international peace and security**. Brunei Darussalam’s delegate added that the advancement of other weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological, were readily available in many countries and were now possible alternatives for terrorists.  It was imperative, therefore, for the international community to ensure that counter-measures kept pace with the increasingly sophisticated methods for procuring such weapons. Also speaking were the representatives of Belarus, Cuba, Israel, Mongolia, Malaysia, Algeria, Libya, Australia, Spain, Denmark and Senegal. Exercising their right of reply were the representatives of Syria and Israel. The First Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. tomorrow, 9 October, to continue its general debate. Background The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to continue its general debate on all related agenda items before it.  For background, see Press Release [GA/DIS/3497](https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gadis3497.doc.htm).

#### Deterrence does not solve the problem of securitization, it actually makes it worse. We must end deterrence.

Halaseh 14 – Economics at the University of Manchester (Feisal, “Is “Securitisation” an accurate description of what happens?,” [https://www.academia.edu/28600572/Nuclear\_Securitization)[Lynbrook](https://www.academia.edu/28600572/Nuclear_Securitization%29%5BLynbrook) KD]

Standing on these presumptions whilst keeping in thought the de-securitisation and securitisation course suggested from the Copenhagen School of thought, conforming to which whether the object in reference is a threat to global/national security or not, hence the need to undergo unprecedented measures (Buzan & Wæver 1998), nuclear risk is contemplated as the referent object in this essay, but de-securitising it would be almost impossible. Hence, this essay shall outline the adverse effects of nuclear deterrence and review what the academics have formerly analysed. Moreover, it will primarily contest that deterrence is not an optimal strategy, since it lies inside a troublesome and complicated groundwork, from the means of securitisation (Waltz 1981; McDonald 2008**).** As a deteriorated act of securitisation does not provide security and balance, it does not appear to be probable that nuclear deterrence is headed towards a different path. Accordingly, while analysing certain readings, it shall be debated that the exclusive material that nuclear deterrence actually gives, is a more intense form of re-securitisation of nuclear insecurity, which can be portrayed as a catastrophic result for the foundation of what Henry Kissinger had made known, a stable world, or in his own words “a global equilibrium” (Donaldson 1985). Debating that security concerns should be known “as an existential threat to a referent object” (Buzan & Wæver 1998), academics of the Copenhagen school of thought, advocate five layouts of the groundworks of security: political, societal, environmental, military and economic security. Each layout is carried out by the securitising agents, such as governments and leaders in politics and through referent objects, such as intellectual values, individuals, or the sovereignty of the state and nuclear risks. Even with their classical and academic stance on security, they attempt to widen the interpretation of security beyond the scope of military problems (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 80). The key academic format of the Copenhagen School of thought, urges the de-securitisation/securitisation method, in consequence, a matter could be heightened from being non-political to a political one which would then become securitised, and vice versa for de-securitisation. Hence, a move of securitisation points to the established classification of precise and no other phenomena, individuals or bodies as contemporary risks that would need extraordinary measures (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 79). Undoubtedly, some aspects of security, such as environmental/economic and nuclear risks, which are beyond the scope of the military, require fitting measures. Fundamental to the move of securitisation, in respect of the Copenhagen School, is its deviating arrangement, speech act theory, whilst the non-deviating portrayal appertains to implementations of policies. Conforming to the Copenhagen School of thought, securitisation is an action that is guided by unspoken rules, the achievement of which doesn’t rely on the presence of an actual risk, but on the competence to provide an improvement with a certain disposition. The thing that impacts the prosperous result of securitisation, is the prospect of acknowledgement from about the query of securitisation. Buzan argued that a prosperous act of discussion contains a mixture of culture and language, together peculiar aspects of discussion and the crowd that authorises and perceive that discussion (Buzan & Wæver 1998: 33). Whilst recognising the groundworks of security, Copenhagen School further considers the act of securitisation equivalent to the philosophy of war, in the unlikely situation of disagreement with the opponent; we attempt to eradicate them. This self-established abuse of order is the move of securitisation, and alarm that the opponent will eliminate us, is the primary impulse for a move like this (Buzan & Wæver 1998: 25). The issue of the philosophy behind the development of risk and the obligation of having to undergo extensive measures is linked to nuclear groundworks, can be simply resolved by observing the previous Soviet Union and USA relationship, particularly on the distribution of nuclear arms. The severely argumentative relation between the Soviet Union and United States, which was invoked by accusations and threats from both sides. With regards to the various range of affairs from the FYROM until this very day, the Russian government has been more attentive in observing the USA, than the USA observing them, so the USA’s strategist must not make any assumptions that a Russian-USA clash would commence with the pair in a fog (Oliker & Quinlivan 2011). In spite of Russia having been a powerful rival to the United States, it is not perceived as being the only enemy in the eyes of strategic administrators from the Western bloc. China used to pose as a nuclear risk, amply competent to ensue and launch, a major nuclear offensive. Those strategies are considerably threatening, due to declining foreign relationships between the countries and the nuclear proliferation that was strongly implemented. Instead of taking a stance on the argument of the efficiency of nuclear proliferation, as being the framework of deterrence beliefs, Kraig opted to defy the main ideology of the usefulness of nuclear arms, by wanting to know if they are truly the key to securitisation, then why do Nuclear Weapon States oppose the transmission of these arms to threatened states? (Kraig 1999: 142). Even with this question, it is straightforward that the full concept of nuclear proliferation should be effective as a referent object for securitisation and the essential component that provides an equilibrium amongst states. Academics who argue in favour of nuclear proliferation claim that nuclear distribution and an IT system available to both powers would efficiently form the use of conventional warfare and bring bilateral nuclear deterrence (Kraig 1999: 145). On the other hand, the academic who oppose nuclear proliferation, strongly identify the serious consequence of an unintended catastrophe and the inadequacy of intelligence which might upset nuclear stability, and declare the fact that nuclear bodies do not belong in the list of ‘agents of equalization’ (Kraig 1999: 143). Despite the complicated and problematic constitution of nuclear bodies and nuclear proliferation, it is agreeable that nuclear arms arrived to fill the void of parity and hope in a universal system filled with questionable priorities and uncertainty. The use of nuclear bodies has been opportunely adopted as the reasoning to oppose WMD also. Hence, whilst keeping the theory of securitisation in mind, the risk of a biochemical offensive by any guerrilla is rigorously securitised and is regarded as a threat to national security, consequently an unprecedented measure may have to be adopted taken. Thus, the use of nuclear bodies concluded to certain strategic dogmas, for the sake of authorities to be capable of regulating nuclear power and reshape its usefulness in opposition to probable threats**.** The premier appearance of deterrence as a securitisation strategy, was a few years from the Second World War and was the result of suspicion and threat of catastrophes of conflict between the general masses.Rephrased, a presence of worrisome was felt throughout the Western bloc (mainly the United States), it was the risk of being unable to keep any individual fatalities under control, so they had to take up other strategies in order to be able to oppose these risks (Mohan 1986: 4). Eventually, the ideology of deterrence had become the primary focus to the political and military realm of the United States, it was opted as the main strategy, a ‘Catholic doctrine’ as one might say (Mohan 1986: 3). Deterrence, like Game Theory, points to the observable and psychological impact of the rival concerning the avoidance of an attack by influencing the foe that an irrational step of warfare causes an unfavourable outcome for both sides (Morgan & Quester 2010: 6). As Dr Lawler mentioned in his lecture on radioactive security: “The losses outweigh the gains”. An example of nuclear deterrence - which had been the pillar of the United States’ defence policy - was the stringent warning informed to the Soviet by the United States, it pointed out to the termination of any want to strike the United States or its allies in the Western bloc, by pressuring a ‘nuclear retaliation’ (Mohan 1986: 8; Quinlivan & Oliker 2011: 73). It is crucial to keep in mind that if we welcome nuclear deterrence as the result of the threatening and suspicious setting of the 1960’s, when all the nuclear deterrence groundwork was advanced, was the shaky rivalry amidst the political and subjective doctrines of the Soviet Union and the United States, which were the communist and neo-liberal regimes respectively. Hence, amongst all this intellectual conflict, nuclear deterrence can itself, be characterised as an ideological belief. While the frameworks of this intellectualism have been crucial, the rivalry among both powers during the times before and after the Cold War, became a nuclear and military arms race, competently sufficient to risk global stability and security. Therefore nuclear deterrence, arrived to compensate for this void in security and for individuals, to assure safeness, equilibrium and welfare. Nuclear deterrence is an accommodating phrase for a complicated, a detailed collection of information, beliefs, assertions, ideologies and goals constructed amidst the main core values of the nation’s security or the welfare of the community. Thus, keeping those in is of high importance for the next part, as this essay wishes to assess and provide the arguable groundwork of nuclear deterrence, through readings of many academics, who have different stances on nuclear security. The dogma of deterrence was engaged and backed like any other strategic dogmas throughout the field of security studies. It is a very disputable dogma, which has led to many academics being for or against this dilemma, this makes the groundworks of deterrence quite problematic to deal with. Many academics established their cases for the significance of deterrence about the case of the help that has been contributed to countries to control and oversee any potential nuclear risks. Though, while some academics blame nuclear deterrence for the rise of insecurity and of a probable enormous number of mishaps through human errors, simultaneously they claim that mutual deterrence could give rise to worldwide security administration and to an interrelationship amongst the involved countries (Morgan & Quester 2010: 22). Moreover, while some consider the deterrence doctrine is fully behind the rise of weapons usage, the latter argue that deterrence is a method of weapons control. On the other hand, for those academics who argue in favour of the advantage that deterrence provides, other academics claim that it is not possible for a Nuclear Weapon State to broaden its deterrence to its alliances, due to the threat of destroying itself. Within the frameworks of technology, the idea that nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons rules out any threat from weapons of mass destruction, is still existent (Allison 2005: 719). Yet a great supply of nuclear substances still remain unchecked and loose in black markets, and could be sold to the foes of the Western bloc (Allison 2005: 715). Regardless of all the disputes, this essay debates that the full groundworks of deterrence interpret the necessity of creating policies by the aristocrats and has been used as an interventional motive through military and political influence to the different nuclear and political regimes. While recognising nuclear deterrence as a main actor behind the USA’s policies, it is feasible to consider that nuclear deterrence doctrine purposely affects the core values of those countries that are in favour of securing the Western bloc’s norms and values and the global equilibrium. The negative groundworks of securitisation inhibit the managing process and causes troublesome results (Aradu, 2004). Disputes about the decision-making process have mainly focused on the appropriate flow of democracy, ‘panic politics’ of securitisation disturbs, and if not ruins fully, the context of the legislative part in liberal democracies (Roe 2012: 251). Ordinary politics may be thought of as the normal conduct in liberal democracies, hence, any unusual policy could drastically harm the democratic procedure. In this manner, securitisation can be simply used as a method of breaching the sovereignty of nations and the democratic equilibrium. A fitting portrayal of this dispute can be the case of the unfortunate event of 9/11, when aristocrats used securitisation, through the medium of an existential risk, they implicated the army service in politics, in addition to instituting a martial law. Similarly, in the speech of Prime Minister Brown, major and recent threats advocate changes to the United Kingdom’s constitution. From time to time**, politicians use the securitisation of nuclear threats, as an instrument**, in contemplation of securing their re-election strengthening their political capacity. To rephrase, securitising agents use the speech of securitisation in manners that they create political hogwash in such breadth, which makes it very hard for individuals to reject or analyse the dismay as a result. What causes the securitisation move to be prosperous, is the acceptance and acknowledgment of the discussion by individuals. Furthermore, by demonstrating a thing as an imminent threat, is hardly a move of securitisation, for it to be prosperous, it has to be accepted by the people (Buzan & Wæver 1998: 26). Taking these debates into account, one may be presented with another issue: to what breadth is it probable for the doctrine of deterrence to benefit the de-securitisation of threats from a nuclear catastrophe? In other words, in today’s times and with regards to certain occasions, what has the doctrine of nuclear deterrence presented about the probabilities of de-securitising the states that pose as a nuclear threat? The subsequent section will address these questions. To assess nuclear deterrence with regards to its obscure democratising and de-securitising capabilities, we should assess the extensive de-securitisation groundworks where deterrence happens. Hence, although, the securitisation action mentions the inclusion of problems into the agenda of security**, the process of de-securitisation is described as the reverse process of eliminating a problem of the agenda of security to an, ordinary democratic and politicised ‘sphere’** (Wæver 1995: 253; Buzan & Wæver 1998: 203-10). A fitting example of the de-securitisation of a nuclear threat, was the USA’s reaction to Iran’s and India’s nuclear enrichment processes. In such cases, one can observe an intriguing detail of classification. In spite of the fact that the two countries having advanced their nuclear programs, Iran’s nuclear program posed as a threat to the USA. The way that the USA treats the nuclear programs of Iran and India are quite different, India is viewed as a democracy, whilst Iran as a non-democratic regime, this helps one understand the USA’s policy (Hayes 2009: 986). The Bush administration had perceived that the Indian democratic character was a crucial representative for clarifying their collaboration with them, the implied message is the USA has confidence in India (Hayes 2009: 988). On the other hand, with regards to the matter of Iran, the USA responded in an alternative method. President Bush had used a farther characteristic remark, to show the ideology that was intensely enforced into the USA’s policies with regards to Iran. Following the Islamic revolution in Iran back, it became under the control of the ayatollahs, whom have oppressed and isolated the people of Iran. Prior to the nuclear deal that the West struck with Iran, they were challenging the world with their nuclear aspirations, even with almost every state in the world opposing their nuclear program. The USA kept on rallying the states of the world, to defy these nuclear threats (Hayes 2009: 991).

#### Deterrence has constantly stopped disarmament.

Camilleri 17 – Dr. of Philosophy from London University (Joseph, “Insecurity and Governance in an Age of Transition”, Global Insecurity, ISBN 978-1-349-95145-1) // SJ[Recut lynbrook KD]

Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War nuclear weapon states have made little progress towards nuclear disarmament. The world's combined stockpile presently consists of 15,700 nuclear warheads, of which 4,100 are thought to be operational, while some 1,800 US and Russian warheads are on high alert. More importantly, nuclear weapon states continue to modernise their nuclear arsenals and appear disinclined to engage in meaningful negotiations. The UN Security Council, not with- standing the well intentioned declarations of the 2009 summit-level meeting chaired by the United States, has remained inactive on the issue. The UN General Assembly First Committee has been largely stale-mated, while the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs has been entirely peripheral. For its part, the 65-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) has not negotiated a single disarmament agreement since the completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, and has not even managed to agree on the adoption of a programme of work. An informal working group has been no more successful in finding a consensus on any of the CD's four core issues: nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and negative security assurances. The five-yearly NPT Review Conferences have fared little better (Johnson 2010). After prolonged and at times acrimonious consultations, the 2015 Conference could not resolve differences over the pace and modalities of nuclear disarmament or on the process for convening a conference to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East (Meier 2015). Clearly, there is no dearth of multilateral avenues through which disarmament negotiations can be pursued. What is lacking is the capacity of key players (states) to make effective use of the existing multilateral framework. Yet, multilateralism does sometimes work. A promising recent initiative has been the 'humanitarian pledge' which emerged at the December 2014 Conference held in Vienna following two previous conferences held in Norway (2013) and Mexico (2014). In October 2016, the First committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a landmark resolution to negotiate a "legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination". The resolution was supported by 123 states with 38 states against (including all five major nuclear-weapon states and Israel) and 16 abstaining. The initiative is indicative of the potential of multistakeholder approaches but also of the bottlenecks which often mar multilateral initiatives.

#### The infinite securitization of finite things causes endless war and extinction – vote affirmative to refract security politics from its baroque display.

Dillon, 15 – [Michael, Emeritus Professor of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, UK. “Biopolitics of Security: A Political Analytic of Finitude”, pg. 210-213]//MM[recut Lynbrook kd]

The societies of the North Atlantic basin have never been so secure. That security is a function of such a wide variety of security institutions and practices it seems pointless to name them, for they penetrate into the very weft and warp of everyday life. Pointless to name them, but not pointless to re-describe them by giving them a different name. They are in every respect baroque. Ordinarily addressed as a period and or a style of art, an aesthetic, the baroque names, instead, a space of problematisation, and a mode of operationalisation. If factical finitude is the condition of possibility for the baroque, as well as for modern politics, the baroque names factical finitude's condition of operability. No more so, in fact, than in respect of die conditions of operability of modern politics of security. What is being secured is the securing of Life whose very vital signs are now construed as generically dangerous to itself, or of the sovereign that is fated to fail the standards the sovereign being, is the continuous suspension of any other expression of politics. It is a suppression that works through substitution, the substitution of repeated clichés, marvels and spectacles concerning the 'now', the 'future', 'potency', 'radical contingency' and survivability in a world whose very security apparatuses have turned politically motivated killing into an industrial and commercial processes integral to our civilization but capable also of threatening the survivability of planetary life. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, these now seek their expression in tropes that intensify security's baroque fixation with morbidity, mortality and modernity: complex adaptation and change, competitiveness, emergence, catastrophic emergency, the event that saves, the event that threatens, and, above all, resilience - the capacity to endure by becoming something else. To survive is to submit, through holocaust or social therapy, to self-annihilation as governmental necessity. We might therefore envisage the baroque character of our politics of security as the attempt to unify these themes within synthetic narratives of competitiveness, identity, the enemy, or simply terror. The past of security and war is forgotten by continuous repetition in spectacle, simulation and practice. These are now organised through scopic regime; employing different orders of signification and representation as well as novel technologies. To give our contemporary politics of security another name is, therefore, a deliberate device. It gives them another face. In rhetoric this maneuver is called prosopopoeia. Strictly speaking, prosopopoeia gives a face to that which does not have a face**.** Our security politics are preoccupied, however, with presenting a face that will move the world, a face for the world to accept at face value. Having a face is, therefore, not the issue here. The issue is what face. I have attempted to give our politics of security another face, one capable of refracting its face of baroque display. Prosopopoeia is a difficult art. It does not seek to achieve closure or finality as some forms of narrative, history and positivity do. It does not labour under the rule of verisimilar adequacy, and it does not suborn itself to policy or governmental relevance. It seeks to represent not that which is absent, 'but that whose presence is so intense that we can only feel it and… see it from a safe distance' (Godzich and Spadaccini, in Maravall 1986: xiii-xiv). Initially, the political programme of the baroque was the formal answer of the monarchical-seigniorial segments of sixteenth-century Spanish society, to the assaults launched against the traditional statist structure taking shape in early modern Spain (Godzich and Spadaccini, in Maravall 1986: xvii). One of its most distinguished historians, José Antonio Maravall, defines the baroque, 'as a culture provoked by a cultural crisis of major proportions, one that was felt in all of Europe, and perhaps most intensely in Spain, during the greater part of the seventeenth century' (Godzich and Spadaccini, in Maravall 1986: xviii). Where, once, baroque politics included defence of the monarchy, the safeguard of honour as the raison d’état of individual and social life, and the constant reaffirmation of love as a universal justification (Godzich and Spadaccini, in Maravall 1986: xix), our baroque politics of security is a vast palimpsest of rules of truth and truths of rule, constantly reaffirming peace, rights and justice as universal justifications for security and war. The baroque names its mode of operativity, rather than a period. I have extended this description of it to the generic crisis induced by factical finitude and the changing baroque politics of security that helps distinguish the states and societies of the North Atlantic basin at the beginning of the twenty-first century. As with the early baroque, so also with the twenty-first century we are confronted with a political culture directed towards the multitude of anonymous and, therefore, potentially disruptive individuals - homegrown 'terrorists', for example - no longer simply concentrated in the cities, but capable of circulating globally. Its mode of operativity is distinguished by the effort that is spent on casting the political subject as political spectator, whose voluntary servitude to indefinite governance is secured through the spectacles of security, catastrophic emergency and war, as much as through their everyday governmentalisation. Deleuze noted, acutely, that, '[t]he essence of the baroque entails neither falling into nor emerging from illusion but rather realizing something in illusion itself' (Deleuze 1992: 124). A fuller depiction of the neo-baroque character of contemporary security politics, therefore, requires further studies. Among other things, these would have to revisit the problematization not only of spectacle and the virtual, but all modes of making manifest politically and governmentally in which these are intimately involved as a matter of priority. But this has to wait, and for the moment I can only add a coda to the present book, by gesturing towards how politics of security in the twenty-first century are distinguished by the ways in which they exceed the katechontic security politics of the baroque sovereign that I introduced, through Reinhart Koselleck and Carl Schmitt, in the first chapter of the book. Politics of security remain katechontic, fated to pursue the infinite deferral of the very finitude of which they are comprised, and from which they also take their warrant to conduct the infinite securitisation of finite things and processes of becoming finite. But this katechontic enterprise changes its character as we not only move from addressing modern sovereign geopolitics to biopolitics, but also as we move from the baroque traits of the early modern era to those of the neo-baroque of our own times. What is additionally interesting is that, as the modern geopolitics of the West has become a largely biopolitical enterprise, so also has the katechontic task of restraint become acceleration of the very forces that the katechon was once said to restrain - chaos, lawlessness and anarchy, since order now is commonly said to arise from chaos. Katechontic politics of security at the beginning of the twenty-first century thus aim to become the very anomic chaos originally stigmatized in the anarchy problematic of classical international relations theory, which so extolled the necessity of the sovereign state, and of statecraft, simultaneously also fostering the belief that there was no stagecraft to statecraft, in explicitly katechontic terms. No longer simply committed to restraining the coming of the end, the katechontic enterprise of the biopolitics of security of the twenty-first century is now much less committed to restraint than to acceleration, acceleration of the vital forces of being-in-formation and becoming-dangerous that exceed finitude, thereby offering the prospect of securely commanding it. This, then, is less a matter of resisting the end, than cultivating the vitality whose power is not presence, but the power to make present. Contra Schmitt, this is a less a matter of the trompe l'oeil of ‘the miracle', a baroque trope if ever there was one, than of the novel powers of artifice and illusion realised through digital powers of the sign. As Deleuze observed, it is, of course, not the illusion that counts but what is realised through illusion. As one, now infamous, aide to George W Bush blankly put it. 'We are an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality - judiciously, if you will - we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors ... and you, all of you will be left to study what we do' (quoted in Egginton 2010: 1). Except, of course, as Benedetto Croce Ion~ ago observed, in the epigraph that heads this book, they do not, in fact, know what they do. It is not as if this were not, however, an all too familiar world -a madness that occurs in the full light of day.

#### Opening space for epistemological reflection is a prerequisite to successful policies.

Cheeseman & Bruce 96 (Graeme Cheeseman [Senior Lecturer at the University of New South Wales] Robert Bruce [Associate Professor in social sciences at Curtin University] “Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers,” pp. 5-8, 1996.)[Recut Lynbrook KD]

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the kenclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

# A2

### A2 CBW DA

Omitted

### A2 Conventional Weapons DA

Omitted

### A2 Tfwk

A2 tva

A2 Must be a policy definition cards

A2 Deliberation

A2 Clash

A2 Policy Pedagogy

A2 Switch side

A2 Critical Potential

A2 Fairness voter

A2 Education voter

Ahmed impact turn

Foucault impact turn

### Freaky shells I got ready

Spec t/k

Multiple shells bad

CI to rob spec

### A2 Security k turns

### A2 protests fail

### A2 no war

### A2 trump is whack

### A2 retrenchment unfeasible – McDonough

### A2 Rollback – Calleo

### A2 Heg Inev – Economics

### A2 Heg Inev – Multipol

### A2 Heg Inev – Dolla decline

### A2 Barillias

### A2 Barnett

### A2 BiW

### A2 Brzenzinski

### A2 Agamben whack

### A2 Chatterjee and Maira

### A2 Ferguson

### A2 Goldstein

### A2 Gray

### A2 Transition War – Herd

### A2 Heritage Foundation

### A2 Joffe

### A2 Kagan

### A2 Khalilzad

### A2 McC

### A2 Naim

### A2 Ravenal

### A2 Thayer

### A2 Wohlforth

### A2 Zhang and Shi

1. Stevedarcy, “On Heidegger in Particular, and Racist Philosophers in General,” http://publicautonomy.org/2015/01/22/heidegger/?utm\_content=buffer440dc&utm\_medium=social&utm\_source=facebook.com&utm\_campaign=buffer, Jan 22, 2015//FT [↑](#footnote-ref-1)