# 1AC – Hegel

### 1AC: Framework

#### First, prefer a meta-ethic of constitutivism – a) Motivation – only a theory describing what is constitutive of the agent can guide action insofar as one cannot opt-out of what makes them an agent, b) Solves internalism-externalism paradox – avoids subjectivity of agent’s internal emotive desire without the necessity of deniable external impositions.

#### Second, human beings are rational animals – that is, both reason and sensibility, or affect, are constitutive to the subject –

#### 1] Reason is inherent – that is , we are capable of justifying our judgements. Reason is an unlimited facet of subjectivity that is constrained by anything but itself – absent reason, judgements are limited by laws of difference which inhibits the ability to justify what is.

#### 2] Affect is inherent – the subject is not constitutively defined by reason alone. We are also sensible organisms; in that we are affected by the external world. A complete account of subjectivity entails both reason and sensibility – for example, if I touch a hot stove, first I affectively feel pain, then I rationally seek the cause, the stove. Thus, ethics requires the actualization of reason and sensibility to ground action.

#### Third, the tension between reason and sensibility creates the possibility for evil because our desires can affect the maxims we will as principle such that they become anti-rational. The solution is the ethical community, which critiques particularized evils. Practical reasoners in the ethical community mutually recognize other agents as self-legislators – our status as reasoning agents necessitates that we recognize other agents as such and respect their ability to act on their maxims.

Gobsch 3 [Wolfram Gobsch, "The Idea of an Ethical Community: Kant and Hegel on the Necessity of Human Evil and the Love to Overcome It," Philosophical Topics, Vol. 42, No. (2014), p. 177-200.  Gobsch is research assistant at the Chair for Practical Philosophy at Universität Leibzig, studied Philosophy and Logic & Philosophy of Science in Leipzig, St Andrews and Basel, ssistant and senior assistant at the Chair for Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Basel, research stay at the University of Chicago.] CHSTM

Because the highest good is the complete end of the activity of pure reason, the unconditioned, it is necessarily possible.20 The unity of the highest good is the unity thought in the concept of a human being. It is the unity of reason, as of itself practical, with sensibility. It is the unity of pure reason and free choice, of moral law and maxim, through pure reason alone, unconditioned by anything else. Therefore, the idea of this unity, the idea of the highest good, is none other than the idea of ethical life, the idea of a reality in which the internality that is thought in the idea of the moral law as the principle from consciousness of which alone human beings act, if all goes well, and the relationality that is thought in the idea of the power of free choice in its dependence on sensible matter coincide with necessity, and that is: through pure reason. The idea of the highest good is the idea of ethical life: it is the idea of the actuality of a community constituted by the practical law as not only the principle from consciousness of which alone its constituents act, if all goes well, but in and only in so acting from which alone they are related to one another as persons. To identify the idea of ethical life with the idea of the highest good is to conceive of pure reason as the sole ground of the satisfaction of all the conditions of its actuality, or as Hegel puts it, referring to freedom and self-consciousness, the hallmarks of rational activity: Ethical life is the concept of freedom which has become the existing world and the nature of self-consciousness.21 One of the conditions of the actuality of the idea of ethical life is the very multiplicity of the human beings who constitute an ethical community. Satisfaction of this condition, too, must eventually come to be conceived—not as a brute fact, but—as the work of nothing but pure reason. And this is to say, among other things, that the actuality of an ethical community cannot be explained within the scope of methodological individualism. Ethical life, that is, cannot be explained as the result of a contract, for example.22 This reflects back on the content of the idea of ethical life. To act from one’s consciousness of nothing but the moral law is to act autonomously, it is to give this law to oneself: it is to act in such a way as to therein also constitute and preserve oneself as a being who is acting from nothing but one’s consciousness of this law. So for me to be related to you as one person to another in my acting from such respect for the moral law is for me to give the law to both of us and to therein receive it from you who is equally giving it to both of us. So as members of our ethical community, each of us acts in such a way as to constitute and preserve herself and therein the other as a person who acts from nothing but her consciousness of the moral law. In this sense, an act from respect for the moral law, conceived as the principle of an ethical community, is a joint or general act of the will. So in ethical life, the willing itself is relational.23 In our ethical community, that is, my willing is our willing, only from my perspective, oriented toward you; and your willing is our willing, only from your perspective, oriented toward me.24 And because our willing is our acting from nothing but our consciousness of the moral law, I am, in my willing, conscious of myself as related to you in this manner, and you are, in your willing, conscious of yourself as related to me in this manner: we share the same—relational—self-consciousness. In ethical life, the willing itself is relational in its very internality, in its very character as self-consciousness.25 In ethical life, we are conscious of one another as one at heart: as one in the consciousness of the principle from which we act; we are practically conscious of one another’s hearts. Through this consciousness we constitute a sense of “we” in which “validity for every human being (universitas vel omnitudo distributiva), i.e. communality of insight” and “universal union (omnitudo collectiva)”26 coincide with necessity. This implies that for me to act merely in accordance with the moral law, conceived as the principle of our ethical community, but not from my consciousness of it alone, is to break this law and to therein wrong you. But if I do act from nothing but my consciousness of the moral law, thus conceived, I am moved by reason and, therein, by you. That is to say that ethical life is the activity of unconditionally approving of one another’s individuality in such a way as to therein constitute and preserve one another as engaged in this very activity, and that is: love. It is the rational love we know as אהב) ahābā), ἀγάπη, caritas, and solidarity.27

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with mutual recognition in the ethical community. Prefer additionally –

#### 1] Bindingness – my framework is the only non-arbitrary basis for ethics – making a normative claim requires others in the ethical community to recognize it as such, or else it is meaningless.

Brandom 99 [Robert E. Brandom, “Some Pragmatist Themes In Hegel's Idealism: Negotiation And Administration In Hegel's Account Of The Structure And Content Of Conceptual Norms,” European Journal Of Philosophy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1999), pp. 164–189. Brandom is professor of philosophy at University of Pittsburgh, Won 2003 Mellon Distinguished Achievement Award, B.A. from Yale University, Ph.D. from Princeton University, under Richard Rorty and David Kellogg Lewis.] recut CHSTM

 That is, to be a self – a locus of conceptual commitment and responsibility – is to be taken or treated as one by those one takes or treats as one: to be recognized by those one recognizes. Merely biological beings, subjects and objects of desires, become spiritual beings, undertakers (and attributors) of commitments, by being at once the subjects and the objects of recognitive attitudes. At the same time and by the same means that selves, in this normative sense, are synthesized, so are communities, as structured wholes of selves all of whom recognize and are recognized by each other.17 Both selves and communities are normative structures instituted by reciprocal recognition. This is a social theory of selves in the sense that selves and communities are products of the same process, aspects of the same structure. But it is a social theory in a stronger sense as well. For being a self in this sense is not something one can achieve all on one’s own. Only part of what is needed is within the power of the candidate self. It is up to the individual who to recognize. But it is not up to the individual whether those individuals then in turn recognize the original recognizer. Only when this ‘movement’ is completed is a self constituted. I think the structure is clearest when one considers specific recognition – that is, attribution of some specific normative status, not just treating someone as having some normative status or other (as the subject of some responsibilities, or entitlements, commitments, or authority, which is recognition in general). For instance, it is up to me whom I recognize as a good chess player. I can settle for recognizing any old woodpusher who can play a legal game, or I can set my standards so high that only Grand Masters qualify. But it is not then up to me (certainly not up to me in the same sense) whether those I recognize as good players recognize me as a good player. If I’ve set my sights low enough, it will be easy to qualify. But if my aspirations for the sort of self I want to be, and so to be recognized as, are higher, it will be correspondingly more difficult for me to earn the recognition of those I recognize. This account of what it is to be a good chess player, in the various senses that term can take – and more generally, what it is to have some specific normative status – gives the candidate a certain sort of authority: the authority to constitute a community by recognizing individuals as members of it. But doing that is also ceding another sort of authority to those one recognizes: the authority to determine whether or not the candidate qualifies as a member of the community so constituted by the standards to which I have subjected myself. Having a normative status in this sense is an essentially social achievement, in which both the individual self and the community must participate. And both the self and the community achieve their status as such only as the result of successful reciprocal recognition. So when we talk about the structure and unity of the ‘I’ or of self-conscious selves according to Hegel, we are talking about the structure and unity produced by this process of reciprocal recognition, by which normative communities and community members are simultaneously instituted. This is what the idealist thesis proposes to use as a model for understanding the structure and unity of concepts. Here is a hint, to be followed up below. In recognizing others, I in effect institute a community – a kind of universal common to those others, and if all goes well, to me too. If they re cognize me in turn, they constitute me as something more than just the particular I started out as – a kind of individual (self), which is that particular (organism) as a member of the community, as characterized by that universal. The (recognizing) particular accordingly exercises a certain sort of authority over the universal, and the universal then exercises a certain sort of authority over the individual. It is at something like this level of abstraction that we will find a common structure between the social institution of selves and communities by reciprocal recognition, and the relation between concepts, as universals, and the particulars that fall under them, yielding the characterized individuals (particulars as falling under universals) that are presented by judgements.

#### 2] Rule following paradox – a) we can infinitely question why to follow that rule, which will eventually terminate at some base assumption with no external justification, b) rules are arbitrary since the agent can form a unique interpretation understanding which makes it impossible to verify a violation. Only the ethical community solves since we realize what it means to follow rules is to participate in the common good because we look at community interpretation of the rule not something universal.

#### 3] Inescapability – discussing ethical claims requires a method to critique and validate said ethical claims which is the ethical community since it engages in a process of self-criticism to overcome and inhibit evils which explains any critical structure without question begging our authority to make such judgement – that means contesting the 1AC framework proves its thesis.

### 1AC: Contention

#### I defend the resolution as a general principle ethical statement. Grant me I-meets to T/theory not checked in CX because they have access to bidirectional interps and I’ll always violate something. Now affirm –

#### 1] Role of the state – the state is only justified as a mechanism to allow different agents to recognize each other—it cannot act for private purposes because the only justification for its existence is to protect the freedom of its own citizens. When citizens recognize state authority, they only do so to secure their own freedoms, and so the state does not have the authority to take other action.

#### 2] Illegitimate taxation – even if the state can act for private purposes, it does not have the authority to tax for private purposes, since that would subordinate the will of the citizens to that of the state. The citizens are what creates the state, so the state cannot impose obligations on the citizens for a purpose external to them. Nuclear weapons require taxation –

Archer et al. 16 [Colin Archer, Jean-Marie Collin, Nina Decoularé-Delafontaine, Rob van Riet, & Alyn Ware, “Move the nuclear weapons money,” International Peace Bureau, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, and the World Future Council (2016).] CHSTM

Despite the decline in the overall number of nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War, expenditure in this field continues to increase. The numbers are alarming. According to a Nuclear Weapons Cost Study released by Global Zero in June 2011, global annual expenditure on nuclear weapons amounts to 105 billion USD annually or 12 million USD an hour. At this rate, we can calculate that nuclear-armed states will spend at least 1 trillion USD over the next 10 years. The significance of these numbers becomes even clearer when put into context. The annual budget of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs is only 10 million dollars. And the target of the UN Green Climate Fund is to secure 100 billion USD a year – an equivalent amount to the global nuclear weapons budget. The figures released by Global Zero in 2011 are likely to be under-stated, and the actual expenses much higher. Since 2011, the US Congress has authorized additional nuclear modernization programs, the full costs of which are not included in the 2011 figures. In a period where federal funds are desperately needed in communities like Cambridge in order to build affordable housing, improve public transit, and develop sustainable energy sources, our tax dollars are being diverted to and wasted on nuclear weapons upgrades that would make us less safe; Investing in companies producing nuclear weapons implicitly supports this misdirection of our tax dollars.

#### 3] International misrecognition – the maintenance of nuclear weapons wills a misrecognition of sovereignty between states – they necessitate an international system based on coercion, not recognition.

Epstein 18 [Charlotte Epstein, "The productive force of the negative and the desire for recognition: Lessons from Hegel and Lacan,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5 (Dec. 2018). Epstein is Associate Professor in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney, Australia.] WWBW

What the series of objects a ultimately hide, however, is the intractable – because logical, structural – dependence that underwrites Westphalian sovereignty as a structure of mutual recognition.125 This dependence is not a material vulnerability. The difference is illustrated by an exemplary objet a of sovereignty, nuclear weapons. The most destructive weapon in the history of humanity is designed to mark the state that owns it (or the state that aspires to owning it, and for the same reasons) as possessing what we have called an absolute ‘sovereign agency’. 126 The weapon’s (negative indeed) power is perceived by nuclear-armed states as affording the foolproof guarantee that their sovereignty will be respected by other states.127 The weapon is desired because it is thought to compensate for all other vulnerabilities; including in cases of states whose material capabilities are less developed or their sovereignty is less assured, North Korea being a case in point.128 The dependence, then, is symbolic and constitutive; it harks to the intractably social structure of the Westphalian system. This guarantee is necessarily fanstamatic, in the simple sense that it is projected, by the actor, onto the future129 – another negative. But this guarantee also taps into the workings of fantasy in the more theorised sense of a compensatory structure that both designates what the actor wants, and compensates for it not actually being able to have it. A state armed with such agentic, destructive capability does not demand but rather commands the recognition from other states (rivals or not) that its sovereignty is incontestable.130 Only this ‘wrenching’ is also acknowledged, by policymakers themselves, to mark the failure of other forms of interaction equally founded on mutual recognition, in particular, of commerce (which rests upon the partners having recognised each other as legitimate partners and is precisely what is suspended by sanctions). This was the diagnosis underwriting the so-called 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which has sought to shift the basis of the interactions between Iran and the group of world powers to a commercial, and away from this security, logic. The latter, then, is a dynamic of misrecognition. Nuclear weapons are founded in a logic of misrecognition that then feeds upon itself.131 They presuppose, and then continue to uphold, the impossibility of being recognised in one’s sovereignty (since they constitute the ultimate weapon designed to guard against such prospect: other states will recognise me as a state whether they like it or not if I have a nuclear weapon). They turn a desire to be recognised into a demand, or even a command, for recognition. They are also, however, an implicit acknowledgement of the impossibility of this desire that nonetheless continues to power the costly quest for, or maintenance of, nuclear weapons.