# AC

## Kant AC v Newark AK

### Advocacy

#### I defend the resolution as a general principle.

### C1

#### Contention 1 is Equal Freedom

**Living wage reduces poverty. Recent studies and economist consensus goes aff**

**Konczal 14**

Mike Konczal (fellow at the Roosevelt Institute. His work has appeared in The Nation, Slate, and The American Prospect). “7 Bipartisan Reasons to Raise the Minimum Wage.” Boston Review. March 3, 2014.

Some minimum wage advocates don’t care much about income inequality per se. Instead, they are focused on alleviating poverty. Poverty has significant consequences for human flourishing, with especially pronounced effects on children. A major mistake of the War on Poverty was its assumption that the economy would be capable of employing all people at generous wages as long as they had the right skills and as long as discriminatory obstacles were surmounted. Thus job training was a priority. However, during the ’70s, ’80s, and 2000s, wages at the bottom part of the income distribution fell, especially for men, even as the low-wage workforce became more educated. Education and technological advances alone could not solve poverty. **Recent research strongly indicates that raising the minimum wage reduces poverty.** Dube finds that a 10 percent hike in the minimum wage would reduce the number of people living in poverty by a modest but significant 2.4 percent. It also shrinks the poverty gap—how far people are below the poverty line—by 3.2 percent. And it reduces the poverty-squared gap, a measure of extreme poverty, by 9.6 percent. So it provides meaningful benefits for the poorest individuals. **Larger increases would offer even more impressive gains**. Raising the minimum wage to $10.10 would lift 4.6 million people out of poverty. It would also boost the incomes of those at the 10th percentile of the income distribution by $1,700 annually. That is a significant benefit for workers who have seen declining wages during the past forty years. In a review of the literature since the 1990s, Dube finds fifty-four estimates of the relationship between poverty and the minimum wage. Forty-eight of them show that a minimum wage reduces poverty. This reflects a **remarkable consensus** among economists. The effect of an increased minimum wage on poverty is real, and it would be positive.

#### The state must address poverty to ensure a system of equal freedom

**Allais 12**

Lucy Allais. “Kant on Giving to Beggars.” 2012.

Kant thinks that for a state to be legitimate, its monopoly on the means of coercion must be reconciled with each subjects’ right to freedom (Varden 2008). The idea is that no one’s freedom must be subjected to the choices of others, but only to universal law, which means that the state must ensure “that the total system of laws provides conditions under which any private person’s freedom is subject to universal law and not to another private person’s arbitrary choices” (Varden 2008). What is relevant to our question here is that **without** absolute **poverty relief, poor people’s freedom is subject to** the **arbitrary choices of those who have means**. This means that the state is not guaranteeing and enabling their freedom. As Ripstein explains, for Kant, “the problem of poverty is that “the poor are completely subject to the choices of those in more fortunate circumstances” (Ripstein 2009:274). The poor person’s purposiveness depends on the grace of others, like a slave or a serf, two of the most archetypally unfree conditions (Ripstein 2009:281). Obviously there will be questions about what constitutes absolute poverty, and how much relief is required. My concern here is not with resolving these complications, but simply with the idea that exercising basic human agency requires means: one cannot have and pursue purposes without any means. On Kant’s view, a person’s innate freedom is undermined if the basic conditions of their agency depend on another person’s arbitrary choiceanother person’s choosing to give or not to give. The justification of the legitimacy of the state depends on the state reconciling its monopoly on the means of coercion with each individual’s innate right to freedom. Avoidable absolute poverty is not compatible with individual’s innate right to freedom. So in a legitimate state, public structures must ensure that there is unconditional poverty relief. Further, it is significant that, on Kant’s view, a legitimate state is required for there to be rightful ownership of property. There is no conclusive ownership of property in a state of nature: you have control of what you can grab and what you can defend, which generates a presumptive right, but it doesn’t follow that you have anything with respect to which the state is obliged to defend your ownership. To have the full-fledged institution of property, it needs to be the case that the state has an obligation to defend your holdings. Rightful ownership of property requires a state with a monopoly on coercion (so that possession of property can be defended), and it requires that the defense of property can be reconciled with everyone’s freedom. Otherwise the state is simply an organisation of powerful groups defending their interests, as opposed to a legitimate state, which enables and defends everyone’s freedom. Making property rights enforceable is one of the functions of the state, and it 5 is important to enabling all of our freedom. But making property rights enforceable makes it the case that those in absolute poverty, where there are no jobs, have no ways of meeting their needs. This is a consequence of the defence of property: in a state of nature they could try to take what they need, but a state which defends property forbids them from doing this. Thus, creating property rights in a way which is compatible with everyone’s freedom **requires public provision against absolute poverty**. As Ripstein says, “the only way that property rights can be made enforceable is if the system that makes them so contains a provision for protecting against private dependence” (Ripstein 2009:228). Thus, ensuring absolute poverty relief is a requirement of anyone rightfully owning property. For Kant, it is crucial that absolute poverty relief is provided by public means: For reasons of state the government is therefore authorised to constrain the wealthy to provide the means of systenance to those who are unable to provide for even their most necessary natural needs. It will do this by way of coercion…by public taxation, not merely by voluntary contributions (3:326).

### C2

#### Contention 2 is Power Imbalance

#### Power imbalance in employment relationships treats workers as mere means

**Bowie 5**

Norman E. Bowie "Chapter 3--Kantian Ethical Thought." The Ethics of Human Resources and Industrial Relations. Ed. John W. Budd and James G. Scoville. Champaign: LERA, 2005. 61-88. Print. Labor and Employment Relations Association Ser. Pg. 82

The overwhelming number of people need to work to survive, at least for a large portion of their live. There is a sense in which **people are forced to work**. When an assailant says, “Your wallet or your life,” you technically have a choice. However, for many this situation is the paradigm of coercion. How close is the analogy between the assailant and the requirements of the employer? Admittedly, in good times the balance of power shifts somewhat, but in hard times the balance of power is with the employer. Most people have to take the terms of employment as they get them (Manning 2003). Someone wanting employment does not negotiate about whether or not to be tested for drugs, for example. If drug testing is the company policy, you either submit to the test or forfeit the job. If you want a job, you agree to employment at will and to layoffs if management believes that they are necessary. Survival for yourself and any dependents requires it. As with the assailant, you technically have a choice, but most employees argue they have little choice about multiple important terms of employment. **A Kantian**, in common with the pluralist school of industrial relations, **maintains that the imbalance between employer and employee ought to be addressed**. Otherwise, industrial relations rests on an unethical foundation.

**Living wage solves bargaining power which challenges the imbalance**

**Konczal 14**

Mike Konczal (fellow at the Roosevelt Institute). “7 Bipartisan Reasons to Raise the Minimum Wage.” Boston Review. March 3rd, 2014. http://www.bostonreview.net/us/mike-konczal-seven-reasons-raise-minimum-wage

When low-wage workers protest at fast food restaurants, low wages are not necessarily their sole concern. The working conditions may be equally important. Between a lack of sick days, random shift scheduling, and working without pay, there is a host of problems and humiliations from which workers seek redress. Civic republicanism presses against these practices. Philip Pettit, the philosopher most associated with this strain of thinking, defines its goal in terms of “freedom as non-domination,” freedom “as a condition under which a person is more or less immune to interference on an arbitrary basis.” In what sense can people be considered free if their means of survival places them at the mercy of an erratic schedule, thereby preventing the formation of civic and communal ties? Surveys of New York City’s low-wage workers find that 84 percent of them are not paid for their entire workday. When bosses can flout labor contracts and arbitrarily impose working conditions in this way, workers lack the kind of freedom that civic republicans celebrate. **By making the labor market tighter through lower turnover and vacancies,** a higher minimum wage creates bargaining power for workers and will help to eliminate these kinds of domination.

**Bargaining power is key to check back corporate exploitation**

**Gupta 15**

Sarita Gupta (executive director of Jobs with Justice). “Protect and Expand Workers’ Ability to Bargain.” Moyers and Company. January 20th, 2015. http://billmoyers.com/2015/01/20/protect-expand-workers-ability-bargain/

Greedy corporations have been on a decades-long bender to take advantage of working people — depressing wages, benefits and job standards, which has led to **record inequality** and poverty. At Jobs With Justice, we believe that fighting poverty requires expanding and protecting the ability of workers to bargain with their employers to demand higher wages, better working conditions and better living standards. As the nature of work changes, we look at collective bargaining through the union workplace campaign lens, but also through nontraditional forms, including legislative, policy, rulemaking and industry-wide interventions that put more money in workers’ pockets and improve standards and conditions for workers. Only through bargaining do workers have the power to directly confront the corporate actors behind poverty and inequality. Video From Jobs With Justice San Francisco: Fight for $15 and Just Hours Protest One example of this effort is our Retail Workers Bill of Rights campaign – led by Jobs With Justice San Francisco. Retail jobs are well understood to be some of the fastest growing and most poorly paid jobs in our economy, and an increasing number of people employed in this industry aren’t able to get the hours they need to earn enough to support their families. Working with the city’s Board of Supervisors, we pushed legislation to offer workers access to fairer, more predictable schedules. And in response to growing outrage over the turbulence families are experiencing due to a rise in inflexible and erratic schedules, community and labor advocates in a half dozen cities are planning to move similar reforms in 2015. Beyond winning better scheduling practices from employers, these campaigns – and others like them – have the potential to set workers up for more transformational fights, making bolder demands that increase onramps to collective bargaining and ultimately confront corporate power and fight poverty and inequality. Sign up now to join the fight for fair schedules and expanded bargaining for workers.

#### Independently, living wage is key to the imperfect duty of beneficence.

**Bowie 5**

Norman E. Bowie "Chapter 3--Kantian Ethical Thought." The Ethics of Human Resources and Industrial Relations. Ed. John W. Budd and James G. Scoville. Champaign: LERA, 2005. 61-88. Print. Labor and Employment Relations Association Ser. Pg. 82

Condition 3 speaks to the issue of a minimum or living wage. In both of his major ethical works, Foundations of the Metaphysics of morals and the second part of Metaphysics of Morals, popularly called Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, Kant argues that we have **an obligation of beneficence**, or a duty to aid others. This duty is an imperfect one in the sense that one does not have to help everyone all the time. That of course would be too demanding. But the obligation to help others must be taken seriously. When taken to the business context, **the most obviously way to be beneficent is to pay a living wage.** In line with Kant’s commitment to autonomy, a living wage is defined by its ability to allow a person to live independently. One cannot live independently if basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, and health care are not met. In addition to sufficient pay to cover these needs, there should be a bit left over for discretionary items. A wage that provides for basic needs plus a bit of discretionary income could be classified as minimally adequate.

### C3

#### Contention 3 is Racism

**Living wage reduces the wage gap among races; studies prove**

**Reich et al 14**

Michael Reich, (UC Berkeley Professor of Economics and Director, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, UC Berkeley), Ken Jacobs (UC Berkeley, Chair, Center for Labor Research and Education, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment), Annette Bernhardt (UC Berkeley Visiting Professor of Sociology and Visiting Researcher, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment). “Local Minimum Wage Laws: Impacts on Workers, Families and Businesses.” Report prepared for the Seattle Income Inequality Advisory Committee. March 2014. http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/104-14.pdf

For example, drawing on results in Reich and Laitinen (2003), Lantsberg (2003) conducted a prospective study of San Francisco’s first minimum wage increase in 2004 (from $6.75 to $8.50). He estimated that about 55,700 workers (14 percent of private sector workers) would benefit from the law, with 70 percent age 26 or older. Lantsberg also found differences by race and ethnicity. He estimated that while 9 percent of white workers would be affected, the corresponding figures were 18 percent of African American workers, 21 percent of Asian workers, and 22 percent of Hispanic workers. In his prospective study of Santa Fe’s 2004 minimum wage law, Pollin (2004) similarly found that the increase would benefit mainly adult workers (many of them primary bread-winners) and especially workers of color.

**Economic consensus goes aff**

**Reich et al 14**

Michael Reich, (UC Berkeley Professor of Economics and Director, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, UC Berkeley), Ken Jacobs (UC Berkeley, Chair, Center for Labor Research and Education, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment), Annette Bernhardt (UC Berkeley Visiting Professor of Sociology and Visiting Researcher, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment). “Local Minimum Wage Laws: Impacts on Workers, Families and Businesses.” Report prepared for the Seattle Income Inequality Advisory Committee. March 2014. http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/104-14.pdf

**Economists agree** that minimum wage laws have large positive effects on workers’ pay and their families’ living standards. Raising the minimum wage increases earnings for workers at the low end of the labor market, the majority of whom are adults. **Women and workers of color benefit disproportionately.** In addition, new research on the effect of minimum wage increases documents important reductions in family poverty rates. Moreover, low-wage workers and their families are often forced to rely on public assistance programs; new research on food stamps finds that raising the minimum wage reduces their reliance on this program.

### Framework

#### Morality requires respect for self-ownership

**Quinn 89**

Quinn, Warren S. “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.” *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 98, No. 3, (Jul., 1989), pp. 287-312. JSTOR

Whether we are speaking of ownership or more fundamental forms of possession, something is, morally speaking, his only if his say over what may be done to it (and thereby to him) can override the greater needs of others. A person is constituted by his body and mind. They are parts or aspects of him. For that very reason, it is fitting that he have primary say over what may be done to them-not because such an arrangement best promotes overall human welfare, but because any arrangement that denied him that say would be a grave indignity. In giving him this authority, morality recognizes his existence as an individual with ends of his own—an independent being. Since that is what he is, he deserves this recognition. Were morality to withhold it, were it to allow us to kill or injure him whenever that would be collectively best, **it would picture him not as a being in his own right but** as **a cell in the collective whole.** This last point can be illustrated not by thinking of bodies or minds but of lives. The moral sense in which your mind or body is yours seems to be the same as that in which your life is yours. And if your life is yours then there must be decisions concerning it that are yours to make-decisions protected by negative rights. One such matter is the choice of work or vocation. We think there is something morally amiss when people are forced to be farmers or flute players just because the balance of social needs tips in that direction. Barring great emergencies, we think people's lives must be theirs to lead. Not because that makes things go best in some independent sense but because the alternative seems to obliterate them as individuals. This obliteration, and not social inefficiency, is one of the things that strikes us as appalling in **totalitarian social projects** for example, in the Great Cultural Revolution. None of this, of course, denies the legitimate force of positive rights. They too are essential to the status we want as persons who matter, and they must be satisfied when it is morally possible to do so. But negative rights, for the reasons I have been giving, define the terms of moral possibility. Their precedence is essential to the moral fact of our lives, minds, and bodies really being ours.

#### Thus the standard is creating a system of equal freedom.

#### There are 2 additional warrants.

#### 1. Kant isn’t pure abstraction; the categorical imperative is the best middle ground which is key to mutual recognition between people

**Farr 2**

Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

One of the most popular criticisms of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is a valid distinction, the unity of the two is required for an understanding of human agency. The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. **Nothing could be further from the truth**. The Kantian subject is an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. The very fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness or wrongness of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check by my intelligible character, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that we formulate principles that keep our empirical impulses in check. The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others as rational moral agents who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. Hence, the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents.

#### The categorical imperative’s emphasis on treating people as ends is key to challenge racism

 **Farr 2**

Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed ﬁrst. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. The Kantian conception of rational beings requires such an abstraction. Some feminists and philosophers of race have found this abstract notion of rational beings problematic because they take it to mean that rationality is necessarily white, male, and European.33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. I ﬁnd this interpretation of Kant’s moral theory quite puzzling. Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. First, the abstraction requirement may be best understood as a demand for intersubjectivity or recognition. Second, it may be understood as an attempt to avoid ethical egoism in determining maxims for our actions. It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. The abstraction requirement simply demands that **in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves**. That is, we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common. Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for selfdetermination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. To avoid ethical egoism one must abstract from (think beyond) one’s own personal interest and subjective maxims. That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings. Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings. Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. **The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is that it contravenes racist ideology** to the extent that racist ideology is based on the use of persons of a different race **as a means to an end** rather than as ends in themselves. Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 Although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy. A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text. Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very signiﬁcant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. What deconstruction will reveal is not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather, it will disclose the disunity between Kant’s theory and his own feelings about blacks and women. Although the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, Kant the man has his own personal and moral problems. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, **it would be equally deplorable to reject the categorical imperative without ﬁrst exploring its emancipatory potential.**

**Liberalism does not exclude black radicalism. Kantianism is key.**

**Mills 15**

Charles Mills (the John Evans Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy at Northwestern University). “Black Radical Liberalism (by Charles Mills).” PEA Soup, philosophy blog run by professors David Sobel and David Shoemaker. 23 February 2015. http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2015/02/black-radical-liberalism-and-why-it-isnt-an-oxymoron.html

“Black radical liberalism” is my attempt to reconstruct from different and usually counterposed bodies of political thought what I see as **the most promising candidate** for an emancipatory African American political theory. So I am less concerned with the question of whether any African American political theorists actually self-consciously identified what they were doing under this designation than with the question of whether it stands up to criticism as a plausible way forward. In taxonomies of African American/black political thought, the standard contrast would be: [Neat visual diagram by Charles Mills removed for card formatting purposes.] I am arguing for a synthesizing, reconstructed black liberalism which draws upon the most valuable insights of the black nationalist and black Marxist traditions, and incorporates them into a dramatically transformed liberalism. So the taxonomies would now be drawn differently: [Neat visual diagram by Charles Mills removed for card formatting purposes.] How does black radical liberalism differ from black mainstream liberalism? By definition they are both “liberal” in endorsing liberalism as a political philosophy, but black radical liberalism **seeks to transform liberalism to make it responsive to the alternative realities of the black diasporic experience in modernity**, and the correspondingly necessary reordering of liberal normative priorities. Black radical liberalism both (i) recognizes white supremacy as central to the making of the United States and (more sweepingly) the modern world, and (ii) seeks the rethinking of the categories, crucial assumptions, and descriptive and **normative frameworks** of liberalism in the light of that recognition. Black mainstream liberalism either (i) refuses to recognize white supremacy (for example, by endorsing the “anomaly” view of U.S. racism [see Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in US History]) or, (ii) even if it does give lip service to its reality, assumes nonetheless that the categories, crucial assumptions, and descriptive and normative frameworks of liberalism can be adopted with little change to the task of getting rid of it. OBJECTIONS: (1) But how can Marxist and liberal insights be reconciled? Aren’t they necessarily opposed? Liberalism comes in different varieties, and black radical liberalism would obviously be a left-wing variety. Liberalism is opposed to state-commandist socialism, but state-commandist socialism has proved itself to be a historical failure, both economically and morally. Liberalism is not in principle opposed to social democracy or market socialism. (2) But how can black nationalist insights be reconciled either with Marxism or liberalism? Black nationalism likewise comes in different varieties. The key insight of the tradition, in my opinion, is the recognition of the reality and centrality of an ontology of race, and how it shapes people and their psychology, which can be accommodated in a modified Marxism and liberalism. (Obviously this means rejecting essentialist versions of black nationalism, whether onto-theological or culturalist. A “black Marxist”/”left nationalist” tradition has long existed that addresses these issues: see, e.g., Lucius Outlaw, Critical Social Theory in the Interests of Black Folks.) (3) But how can even a “black radical liberalism” (assuming it doesn’t fly apart from centrifugal forces) deal with the problems identified by Derrick Bell‘s “racial realism,” or more recent “Afro-pessimism”? There are no guarantees, but then no other competing ideology can offer them either. Insofar as black radical liberalism is attentive to trends within capitalism (e.g., the forthcoming consolidation and exacerbation of plutocracy in the Western world predicted by Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century), it would hope that an increasing number of the white poor/white working class may begin to wake up to the reality that the prospects for their children and grandchildren under plutocratic capitalism—albeit white-supremacist plutocratic capitalism—are not that great either. As a materialist political philosophy, black radical liberalism **does not rest its hopes for social transformation on moral suasion alone, but on the mobilization of group interests.** The strategy would be to combine the racial justice political project with a larger social justice political project, highlighting the startling fact that the U.S. has the most unequal distribution of income and wealth of all the Western democracies. So that (very sketchily) would be the real-world agenda. Let us now look at the (academic world) implications for Rawlsian liberalism. CHALLENGING MAINSTREAM WHITE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY [Neat visual diagram by Charles Mills removed for card formatting purposes.] IDEAL vs. NON-IDEAL THEORY In A Theory of Justice Rawls famously focuses on “ideal theory,” the normative theory of a perfectly just society, one of “strict compliance” with its principles of justice. Ideal theory, however, was supposed to be the necessary preliminary to properly doing non-ideal theory, including “compensatory justice.” But 40+ years later, the transition to theorizing “compensatory justice” has still not been made, and contemporary Rawlsian discussions of non-ideal theory are dealing with other senses of the term. Obviously, for a population historically subordinated in modernity through slavery, colonialism, and Jim Crow, non-ideal theory is the imperative. Afro-modern (as it is now called) political philosophy is centrally shaped by the experience of oppression, domination, exploitation, etc. So black radical liberalism is going to be a variety of non-ideal-theory liberalism, liberalism dealing with the overcoming of social oppression in a nominally liberal society. WELL-ORDERED vs. ILL-ORDERED SOCIETIES A related distinction is the difference between well-ordered (perfectly just) and (what I am going to call) ill-ordered societies. Rawls suggests we think of societies as “cooperative ventures for mutual advantage.” But a white supremacist state is not a cooperative venture for mutual advantage. To assume the cooperative-venture characterization would be to rule racist societies out of normative consideration from the start. So black radical liberalism rejects such a stipulation. Instead, it works with a conception of society broad enough to include ill-ordered societies. Ill-ordered societies are coercive rather than cooperative ventures, characterized by exploitation and asymmetries of respect rather than mutual advantage and reciprocal respect. Ill-ordered societies are, in other words, the world. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE In his A Short History of Distributive Justice, Samuel Fleischacker points out that universal distributive justice as a norm in the Western tradition is only slightly more than 200 years old (and of course initially really just extends over the “universe” of white males). At first, not even white women are included (Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract), and certainly not people of color in Western societies (Mills, The Racial Contract). “Corrective justice” as a concept is even more undeveloped and untheorized, especially where groups are concerned. Basic implication: Western normative theory in general historically for most of 2500 years, and liberalism for most of modernity, has been complicit with rather than condemnatory of, group subordination. The under-theorization in the tradition of corrective justice for subordinated groups, despite the subordination of most of the population nominally in the theory’s ambit, is itself a manifestation of this complicity. Black radical liberalism reverses these normative priorities, and makes corrective justice its central concern. ADAPTING RAWLS FOR CORRECTIVE JUSTICE Here’s a simple way of formulating Rawls’s two principles of justice (the arrows indicate lexical ordering): [Neat visual diagram by Charles Mills removed for card formatting purposes.] The hegemonic focus on these principles in the world of Anglo-American ideal-theory political philosophy makes it easy to forget how very limited (by Rawls’s own acknowledgment) their scope is. As a graphic representation and reminder of their severely restricted zone of application, let us put them inside identifying and constraining brackets: [Neat visual diagram by Charles Mills removed for card formatting purposes.] That is, these are principles of distributive justice for an ideal (I) well-ordered society, that being a society which is (i) a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, in which (ii) the rules are designed for reciprocal benefit, and (iii) people generally follow the rules. However, we are not, of course, in such a society. We are in a non-ideal (~I) ill-ordered society, which was historically established as (i) a coercive and exploitative venture for differential white advantage, and in which (ii) the rules are generally designed for white benefit. So how could PDJI be the appropriate principles of justice for such a society? Obviously, they cannot. What we want are principles of corrective justice that will eliminate illicit white advantage. How should this be conceptualized? In A Theory of Justice, in the attempt to establish the continuity of his approach with the classical, here Aristotelian, tradition, Rawls refers to pleonexia, “gaining some [illicit] advantage for oneself.” I suggest we think of illicit white advantage/white privilege as a form of racial pleonexia, historic and current, which needs to be corrected for. Let us call it ∆, the illicit white differential. So what we are seeking are: [Neat visual diagram by Charles Mills removed for card formatting purposes.] Translated into prose: these would be principles of corrective justice, P1, P2, P3, for eliminating illicit white advantage/white privilege/racial pleonexia in whites’ basic liberties, opportunities, and social respect, in a non-ideal, ill-ordered, white supremacist society. Clarificatory points: (i) respect is included as a basic social good in keeping with both Kantian and Rawlsian norms, and the need for correcting the founding of the polity on the systematic disrespect, dissin’, of people of color (ii) the asterisks indicate uncertainty about the principles’ ordering; from what Rawls says, P1 -> P2, but where would P3 fit? (iii) EO is listed rather than FEO, and the DP is not mentioned, because even for whites neither FEO nor the DP were ever institutionalized, and the principles here are for correcting actual white racial advantage. Does this settle the matter? Obviously not—it’s only a beginning. But what I at least wanted to establish by putting these two formulas side by side is the crucial conceptual and normative difference between the two projects and the fundamental mistakenness (in my opinion) of trying to derive racial justice from principles designed with a completely different end in mind. Rawls says himself in numerous locations that he is talking about principles of justice for the very limited case of a well-ordered society. He is not talking about racist societies such as our own. What are called for in the case of these societies are principles of transitional justice: [Neat visual diagram by Charles Mills removed for card formatting purposes.] So PCJ would be principles of corrective justice for remedying past injustices, and guiding the transition to a more just society. The concerns motivating a black radical liberalism would be addressed rather than evaded.

#### 2. Human Worth.

#### It follows from practical reason that rational beings have inherent value.

**Korsgaard 96**

Korsgaard, Christine (Prof of Phil @ Harvard). “The Sources of Normativity.” 1996.

This is just a fancy new model of an argument that first appeared in a much simpler form, Kant’s argument for his Formula of Humanity. The form of relativism with which Kant began was the most elementary one we encounter - the relativity of value to human desires and interests. He started from the fact that when we make a choice we must regard its object as good. His point is the one I have been making - that being human we must endorse our impulses before we can act on them. Kant asked what it is that makes these objects good, and, rejecting one form of realism, he decided that the goodness wa[i]s not in the objects themselves. Were it not for our desires and inclinations, we would not find their objects good. Kant saw that we take things to be important because they are important to us - and he concluded that we must therefore take ourselves to be important. In this way, the value of humanity itself is implicit in every human choice. If normative skepticism is to be avoided - if there is any such thing as a reason for action - then humanity as the source of all reasons and values must be valued for its own sake.

#### Reason must be embraced as the starting point.

**Hill and Boxill 1**

Thomas E. Hill (Professor of philosophy at Chapel Hill) and Bernard Boxill (Professor of African American philosophy at Chapel Hill). Kant and Race. In Race and Racism. March 2001. http://www.faculty.umb.edu/lawrence\_blum/courses/465\_11/readings/Race\_and\_Racism.pdf

It may seem that this is mistaken, because there are cases where knowing what is in conformity with duty requires more sophisticated intellectual argumentation than is available to ‘common human reason’. This may or may not be true. In any case, the objection now under consideration maintains that Kant’s remark is mistaken for a different and perhaps more fundamental reason. It can allow that, suitably qualiﬁed, Kant’s remark is right that ‘common human reason’ can always know what is in conformity with duty. The qualiﬁcation is that to be able to know what is in conformity with duty common human reason must always have the morally relevant facts vividly before it. But, so the objection goes, emotions, passions, and attitudes often make it extremely difﬁcult if not impossible for common human rea-son to have the morally relevant facts vividly before it. As Aristotle reminds us, the emotions, passions, and attitudes focus our attention on certain facts and distract our attention from other facts. The conﬁdent person tends to overlook facts that a fearful person notices; and an angry person tends to overlook facts that a happy person notices. In other words, emotions, passions, and attitudes tend to make certain facts vivid, and to make others obscure. Indeed they often make morally irrelevant facts vivid, and morally relevant facts obscure. But if common human reason must have the morally relevant facts vividly before it to know what is in conformity with duty, the emotions, passions, and attitudes can make it very difﬁcult for common human reason to know what is in conformity with duty. We can see this in a case that Kant himself constructs: according to him, a person cannot will that his maxim not to assist others in need be made a law of nature because many cases could occur in which he would need the assistance of others. But this argument depends on the possibility of such cases being sufficiently vivid to the person in question, and we know that they will not be if he is very proud and self-confident. Generally, if the maxims we can will to be universal laws depend on the factual beliefs we have vividly before us, and the maxims we can will to be universal laws determine what we think is right, our emotions, passions, and attitudes can determine what we think is right. The problem is that if our emotions and passions can make morally irrelevant facts vivid, and morally relevant facts obscure, they can mislead us into thinking that what is right is wrong, and that what is wrong is right. If this is correct, conﬁdent, complacent, well-positioned white people will not only ﬁnd it difficult to do what they know to be right; they will ﬁnd it still more difﬁcult to know what is right, even when they sincerely claim that they are trying to do so. Indeed, such sincere people are likely to be particularly dangerous for, feeling their own sincerity, they will be unlikely to believe that they can be mistaken. We do not think that Kant was altogether unaware of this problem, for he frequently warned of the dangers of self-deception. His mistake seems to have been to suppose we can always overcome our self-deceptions, and bring the morally relevant facts vividly before us, by a sufficiently strenuous rational self-examination. Still, the solution to this difficulty is not to abandon reliance on reason. On the contrary, we can only solve this difficulty **if we rely even more on reason.** It was reason that led us to appreciate that the emotions, passions, and attitudes can distort the results of reason’s efforts to determine what is right; and it was reason that led us to see that rational self-examination alone may not always enable us to bring all the morally relevant facts vividly before us. Finally, it is reason that will enable us to solve the problem, which in general is to ﬁnd some way to bring the morally relevant facts before common human reason. The ﬁrst step, of course, is to listen to what others are saying. Reason will only lead us to the truth if we listen to what others are saying. But we are not repeating this fact made familiar by every defender of freedom of expression. Listening to others with different viewpoints, different emotions and attitudes, and consequently different blind spots is a beginning, but it is not enough. The conﬁdent and complacent do not listen sympathetically to those they feel to be their inferiors, even when they invite these inferiors to speak. Somehow we must design institutions that will help us to listen to others sympathetically. Morally relevant facts that are obscure to us may be vivid to others, and if we listen to them sympathetically these facts may become vivid to us too. Rousseau believed that institutions that reduced inequalities and dependencies would help us to listen to others sympathetically. We believe he was right, but that is not the point we want to press now. Our point is that only by rational reﬂection together with adequate understanding of the social and psychological roots of racism can we design the institutions that will help us to listen to others sympathetically and consequently to know what is in conformity with duty.

#### Only a system of equal freedom respects the right of human beings to set their own purposes.

**Ripstein 9**

Arthur Ripstein (University of Toronto). “Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy.” 2009.

The same right to be your own master within a system of equal freedom also generates what Kant calls an “internal duty” of rightful honor, which “consists in asserting one’s worth as a human being in relation to others, a duty expressed by the saying do not make yourself into a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them.”14 Kant says that this duty can be “explained. as obligation from the right of humanity in our own person.” Kant’s characterization of this as an “internal duty” may seem out of place, given his earlier characterization of the Universal Principle of Right in terms of restrictions on each person’s conduct in light of the freedom of others. But the duty of rightful honor is also relational: it is a duty because it is a limit on the exercise of a person’s freedom that is imposed by the Universal Principle of Right. Just as the rights of others restrict your freedom, so that you cannot acquire a right to anything by acting in ways inconsistent with the innate right of another person, so, too, **the humanity in your own person restricts the ways in which you can exercise your freedom** by entering into arrangements with others. Your innate right prevents you from being bound by others more than you can in turn bind them; your duty of rightful honor prevents you from making yourself bound by others in those ways. Rightful honor does not warn you away from some juridical possibility that would somehow be demeaning or unworthy. You do not wrong yourself if you enter into a binding arrangement inconsistent with the humanity in your own person. Instead, your duty of rightful honor says that no such arrangement can be binding, so no other person could be entitled to enforce a claim of right against you that presupposes that you have acted contrary to rightful honor. Rightful honor does not demand that you behave selfishly, or refrain from helping another person with some particular project, or make another person’s ends your own. To do any of these things is just to adopt some particular purpose, and so is an exercise of your freedom. In later chapters, we will see that **rightful honor prevents you from giving up your capacity to set your own purposes**, and so prevents others from asserting claims of right that assume that you did. In private right your rightful honor prevents you from entering into an enforceable contract of slavery, even if you were to believe the arrangement to be to your advantage. In public right, it prevents officials from making arrangements on your behalf that are inconsistent with your innate right. Rightful honor also provides the link from private right to public right by imposing a duty on each to leave the state of nature, which Kant characterizes as a condition in which everyone is subject to the choice of others.

### Policy Good

**Racial progress has occurred though legal change --- pessimism ignores specific reforms that achieved lasting reductions in racial inequality**

-- desegregation of the armed forces, the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act, repeal of anti-miscegenation laws

-- spills over to legal access for feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements

-- antiblackness is political, not ontological; incarceration is used as a tool to suppress voting rights, women of color are policed via reproductive rights laws

**Omi and Winant 13**

Michael Omi (Sociologist at UC Berkeley, focusing on antiracism scholarship and Asian American studies) and Howard Winant (Professor of Sociology affiliated with the Black Studies and Chicana/o Studies departments of UC Santa Barbara), Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 36, Issue 6, p. 961-973, Special Issue: Symposium - Rethinking Racial Formation Theory. 2013.

In Feagin and Elias's account, white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent. There is little sense that the ‘white racial frame’ evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time. They dismiss important rearrangements and reforms as merely ‘a distraction from more ingrained structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities that continue to define US society’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call ‘surface flexibility’ to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase ‘racial democracy’ is an oxymoron – a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or political power in the USA, we disagree. The USA is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it is also in many respects a racial democracy, capable of being influenced towards more or less inclusive and redistributive economic policies, social policies, or for that matter, imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism? Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different institutional sites – employment, health, education – persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened tremendously. It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been continuous and unchanging throughout US history. But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights era. Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement, and that we ‘overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial inequalities’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we wrote about ‘racial reaction’ in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with us. While we argue that the right wing was able to ‘rearticulate’ race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil rights political landscape. So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion. These racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his ‘interest convergence hypothesis’ effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnson's famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 – ‘We have lost the South for a generation’ – count as ‘convergence’? The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime – under movement pressure – was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms – which he calls ‘passive revolutions’ – cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule. So yes, we think there were important if partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And yes, we think that further victories can take place both on the broad terrain of the state and on the more immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and across civil society. Indeed we have argued that in many ways **the most important accomplishment** of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined ‘others’ and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and **validation by both the state and civil society** of racially-defined experience and identity. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other ‘new social movements’: second-wave **feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements** among others. By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was an unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same ‘rearticulation’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of ‘colourblindness’ and its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even their incorporation and containment, even their confrontations with the various ‘backlash’ phenomena of the past few decades, even the need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of ‘colourblindness’, reveal the transformative character of the ‘politicization of the social’. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that are evident in US politics today. What are the political implications of contemporary racial trends? Feagin and Elias's use of racial categories can be imprecise. This is not their problem alone; anyone writing about race and racism needs to frame terms with care and precision, and we undoubtedly get fuzzy too from time to time. The absence of a careful approach leads to ‘racial lumping’ and essentialisms of various kinds. This imprecision is heightened in polemic. In the Feagin and Elias essay the term ‘whites’ at times refers to all whites, white elites, ‘dominant white actors’ and very exceptionally, anti-racist whites, a category in which we presume they would place themselves. Although the terms ‘black’, ‘African American’ and ‘Latino’ appear, the term ‘people of colour’ is emphasized, often in direct substitution for black reference points. In the USA today it is important not to frame race in a bipolar manner. The black/white paradigm made more sense in the past than it does in the twenty-first century. The racial make-up of the nation has now changed dramatically. Since the passage of the Immigration Reform Act of 1965, the USA has become more ‘coloured’. A ‘majority–minority’ national demographic shift is well underway. Predicted to arrive by the mid-twenty-first century, the numerical eclipse of the white population is already in evidence locally and regionally. In California, for example, non-Hispanic whites constitute only 39.7 per cent of the state's population. While the decline in the white population cannot be correlated with any decline of white racial dominance, the dawning and deepening of racial multipolarity calls into question a sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit black/white racial framework that is evident in Feagin and Elias's essay. Shifting racial demographics and identities also raise general questions of race and racism in new ways that the ‘systemic racism’ approach is not prepared to explain.3 Class questions and issues of panethnicizing trends, for example, call into question what we mean by race, racial identity and race consciousness. No racially defined group is even remotely uniform; groups that we so glibly refer to as Asian American or Latino are particularly heterogeneous. Some have achieved or exceeded socio-economic parity with whites, while others are subject to what we might call ‘engineered poverty’ in sweatshops, dirty and dangerous labour settings, or prisons. Tensions within panethnicized racial groups are notably present, and conflicts between racially defined groups (‘black/brown’ conflict, for example) are evident in both urban and rural settings. A substantial current of social scientific analysis now argues that Asians and Latinos are the ‘new white ethnics’, able to ‘work toward whiteness’4 at least in part, and that the black/white bipolarity retains its distinct and foundational qualities as the mainstay of US racism (Alba and Nee 2005; Perlmann 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Waters, Ueda and Marrow 2007). We question that argument in light of the massive demographic shifts taking place in the USA. Globalization, climate change and above all neoliberalism on a global scale, all drive migration. The country's economic capacity to absorb enormous numbers of immigrants, low-wage workers and their families (including a new, globally based and very female, servant class) without generating the sort of established subaltern groups we associate with the terms race and racism, may be more limited than it was when the ‘whitening’ of Europeans took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In other words this argument's key precedent, the absorption of white immigrants ‘of a different color’ (Jacobson 1998), may no longer apply. Indeed, we might think of the assimilationist model itself as a general theory of immigrant incorporation that was based on a historically specific case study – one that might not hold for, or be replicated by, subsequent big waves of immigration. Feagin and Elias's systemic racism model, while offering numerous important insights, does not inform concrete analysis of these issues. It is important going forward to understand how groups are differentially racialized and relatively positioned in the US racial hierarchy: once again racism must be seen as a shifting racial project. This has important consequences, not only with respect to emerging patterns of inequality, but also in regard to the degree of power available to different racial actors to define, shape or contest the existing racial landscape. Attention to such matters is largely absent in Feagin and Elias's account. In their view racially identified groups are located in strict reference to the dominant ‘white racial frame’, hammered into place, so to speak. As a consequence, they fail to examine how racially subordinate groups interact and influence each others’ boundaries, conditions and practices. Because they offer so little specific analysis of Asian American, Latino or Native American racial issues, the reader finds her/himself once again in the land (real or imaginary, depending on your racial politics) of bipolar US racial dynamics, in which whites and blacks play the leading roles, and other racially identified groups – as well as those ambiguously identified, such as Middle Eastern and South Asian Americans (MEASA) – play at best supporting roles, and are sometimes cast as extras or left out of the picture entirely. We still want to acknowledge that blacks have been catching hell and have borne the brunt of the racist reaction of the past several decades. For example, we agree with Feagin and Elias's critique of the reactionary politics of incarceration in the USA. The ‘new Jim Crow’ (Alexander 2012) or even the ‘new slavery’ that the present system practises is something that was just in its beginning stages when we were writing Racial Formation. It is now recognized as a national and indeed global scandal. How is it to be understood? Of course there are substantial debates on this topic, notably about the nature of the ‘prison-industrial complex’ (Davis 2003, p. 3) and the social and cultural effects of mass incarceration along racial lines. But beyond Feagin and Elias's denunciation of the ferocious white racism that is operating here, deeper political implications are worth considering. As Alexander (2012), Mauer (2006), Manza and Uggen (2008) and movement groups like Critical Resistance and the Ella Baker Center argue, the upsurge over recent decades in incarceration rates for black (and brown) men expresses the fear-based, law-and-order appeals that have shaped US racial politics since the rise of Nixonland (Perlstein 2008) and the ‘Southern strategy’. Perhaps even more central, racial repression aims at restricting the increasing impact of voters of colour in a demographically shifting electorate. There is a lot more to say about this, but for the present two key points stand out: first, it is not an area where Feagin and Elias and we have any sharp disagreement, and second, for all the horrors and injustices that the ‘new Jim Crow’ represents, incarceration, profiling and similar practices remain political issues. These practices and policies are not ineluctable and unalterable dimensions of the US racial regime. There have been previous waves of reform in these areas. They can be transformed again by mass mobilization, electoral shifts and so on. In other words, resistance is not futile. Speaking of electoral shifts and the formal political arena, how should President Barack Obama be politically situated in this discussion? How do Feagin and Elias explain Obama? Quite amazingly, his name does not appear in their essay. Is he a mere token, an ‘oreo’, a shill for Wall Street? Or does Obama represent a new development in US politics, a black leader of a mass, multiracial party that for sheer demographic reasons alone might eventually triumph over the white people's party, the Republicans? If the President is neither the white man's token nor Neo, the One,5 then once again we are in the world of politics: neither the near-total white despotism depicted by Feagin and Elias, nor a racially inclusive democracy. President Obama continues to enjoy widespread black support, although it is clear that he has not protected blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in history. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers’ rights – particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of colour are concentrated. He has not intervened to halt or slow foreclosures, except in ways that were largely symbolic. Workers and lower-middle-class people were the hardest hit by the great recession and the subprime home mortgage crisis, with black families faring worst, and Latinos close behind (Rugh and Massey 2010); Obama has not defended them. Many writers have explained Obama's centrism and unwillingness to raise the issue of race as functions of white racism (Sugrue 2010). The black community – and other communities of colour as well – remains politically divided. While black folk have taken the hardest blows from the reactionary and racist regime that has mostly dominated US politics since Reagan (if not since Nixon), no united black movement has succeeded the deaths of Malcolm and Martin. Although there is always important political activity underway, a relatively large and fairly conservative black middle class, a ‘black bourgeoisie’ in Frazier's (1957) terms, has generally maintained its position since the end of the civil rights era. Largely based in the public sector, and including a generally centrist business class as well, this stratum has continued to play the role that Frazier – and before him, Charles S. Johnson. William Lloyd Warner, Alison Davis and other scholars – identified: vacillation between the white elite and the black masses. Roughly similar patterns operate in Latino communities as well, where the ‘working towards whiteness’ framework coexists with a substantial amount of exclusion and super-exploitation. Alongside class issues in communities of colour, there are significant gender issues. The disappearance of blue-collar work, combined with the assault by the criminal justice system – chiefly profiling by the police (‘stop and frisk’) and imprisonment, have both unduly targeted and victimized black and brown men, especially youth. Women of colour are also targeted, especially by violence, discrimination and assaults on their reproductive rights (Harris-Perry 2011); profiling is everywhere (Glover 2009). Here again we are in the realm of racial politics. Debate proceeds in the black community on Obama's credibilty, with Cornel West and Tavis Smiley leading the critics. But it seems safe to say that in North Philly, Inglewood or Atlanta's Lakewood section, the president remains highly popular. Latino support for Obama remains high as well. Feagin and Elias need to clarify their views on black and brown political judgement. Is it attuned to political realities or has it been captured by the white racial frame? Is Obama's election of no importance? \*\*\* In conclusion, do Feagin and Elias really believe that white power is so complete, so extensive, so ‘sutured’ (as Laclau and Mouffe might say) as they suggest here? Do they mean to suggest, in Borg-fashion, that ‘resistance is futile?’ This seems to be the underlying political logic of the ‘systemic racism’ approach, perhaps unintentionally so. Is white racism so ubiquitous that no meaningful political challenge can be mounted against it? Are black and brown folk (yellow and red people, and also others unclassifiable under the always- absurd colour categories) utterly supine, duped, abject, unable to exert any political pressure? Is such a view of race and racism even recognizable in the USA of 2012? And is that a responsible political position to be advocating? Is this what we want to teach our students of colour? Or our white students for that matter? We suspect that if pressed, Feagin and Elias would concur with our judgement that racial conflict, both within (and against) the state and in everyday life, is a fundamentally political process. We think that they would also accept our claim that the ongoing political realities of race provide extensive evidence that people of colour in the USA are not so powerless, and that whites are not so omnipotent, as Feagin and Elias's analysis suggests them to be. Racial formation theory allows us to see that there are contradictions in racial oppression. The racial formation approach reveals that white racism is unstable and constantly challenged, from the national and indeed global level down to the personal and intra-psychic conflicts that we all experience, no matter what our racial identity might be. While racism – largely white – continues to flourish, it is not monolithic. Yes, there have been enormous increases in racial inequality in recent years. But movement-based anti-racist opposition continues, and sometimes scores victories. Challenges to white racism continue both within the state and in civil society. Although largely and properly led by people of colour, anti-racist movements also incorporate whites such as Feagin and Elias themselves. Movements may experience setbacks, the reforms for which they fought may be revealed as inadequate, and indeed their leaders may be co-opted or even eliminated, but racial subjectivity and self-awareness, unresolved and conflictual both within the individual psyche and the body politic, abides. Resistance is not futile.

**Anti-blackness isn’t ontological – policy’s the best venue to combat it**

**Bouie 13**, staff writer at The American Prospect, Making and Dismantling Racism, http://prospect.org/article/making-and-dismantling-racism

Over at The Atlantic, Ta-Nehisi Coates has been exploring the intersection of race and public policy, with a focus on white supremacy as a driving force in political decisions at all levels of government. This has led him to two conclusions: First, that anti-black racism as we understand it is a creation of explicit policy choices—the decision to exclude, marginalize, and stigmatize Africans and their descendants has as much to do with racial prejudice as does any intrinsic tribalism. And second, that it's possible to dismantle this prejudice using public policy. Here is Coates in his own words: Last night I had the luxury of sitting and talking with the brilliant historian Barbara Fields. One point she makes that very few Americans understand is that racism is a creation. You read Edmund Morgan’s work and actually see racism being inscribed in the law and the country changing as a result. If we accept that racism is a creation, then we must then accept that it can be destroyed. And if we accept that it can be destroyed, we must then accept that it can be destroyed by us and that it likely must be destroyed by methods kin to creation. **Racism was created by policy. It will** likely **only be** ultimately **destroyed by policy.** Over at his blog, Andrew Sullivan offers a reply: I don’t believe the law created racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred. It can encourage or mitigate these profound aspects of human psychology – it can create racist structures as in the Jim Crow South or Greater Israel. But it can no more end these things that it can create them. A complementary strategy is finding ways for the targets of such hatred to become inured to them, to let the slurs sting less until they sting not at all. Not easy. But a more manageable goal than TNC’s utopianism. I can appreciate the point Sullivan is making, but I'm not sure it's relevant to Coates' argument. It is absolutely true that "Group loyalty is deep in our DNA," as Sullivan writes. And if you define racism as an overly aggressive form of group loyalty—basically just prejudice—then Sullivan is right to throw water on the idea that the law can "create racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred." But Coates is making a more precise claim: That **there's nothing natural about the black/white divide** that has defined American history. White Europeans had contact with black Africans well before the trans-Atlantic slave trade **without** the emergence of an **anti-black racism**. It took **particular choices** made by particular people—in this case, plantation owners in colonial Virginia—to make black skin a stigma, to make the "one drop rule" a defining feature of American life for more than a hundred years. By enslaving African indentured servants and allowing their white counterparts a chance for upward mobility, colonial landowners began the process that would make white supremacy the ideology of America. The position of slavery generated a stigma that then justified continued enslavement—blacks are lowly, therefore we must keep them as slaves. Slavery (and later, Jim Crow) wasn't built to reflect racism as much as it was built in tandem with it. And later policy, in the late 19th and 20th centuries, further entrenched white supremacist attitudes. Block black people from owning homes, and they're forced to reside in crowded slums. Onlookers then use the reality of slums to deny homeownership to blacks, under the view that they're unfit for suburbs. In other words, create a prohibition preventing a marginalized group from engaging in socially sanctioned behavior—owning a home, getting married—and then blame them for the adverse consequences. Indeed, in arguing for gay marriage and responding to conservative critics, Sullivan has taken note of this exact dynamic. Here he is twelve years ago, in a column for The New Republic that builds on earlier ideas: Gay men--not because they're gay but because they are men in an all-male subculture--are almost certainly more sexually active with more partners than most straight men. (Straight men would be far more promiscuous, I think, if they could get away with it the way gay guys can.) Many gay men value this sexual freedom more than the stresses and strains of monogamous marriage (and I don't blame them). But this is not true of all gay men. Many actually yearn for social stability, for anchors for their relationships, for the family support and financial security that come with marriage. To deny this is surely to engage in the "soft bigotry of low expectations." They may be a minority at the moment. But with legal marriage, their numbers would surely grow. And they would function as emblems in gay culture of a sexual life linked to stability and love. [Emphasis added] What else is this but a variation on Coates' core argument, that society can create stigmas by using law to force particular kinds of behavior? Insofar as gay men were viewed as unusually promiscuous, it almost certainly had something to do with the fact that society refused to recognize their humanity and sanction their relationships. The absence of any institution to mediate love and desire encouraged behavior that led this same culture to say "these people are too degenerate to participate in this institution." If the prohibition against gay marriage helped create an anti-gay stigma, then lifting it—as we've seen over the last decade—has helped destroy it. There's no reason racism can't work the same way.

**Empirics prove engaging the state is the most productive mode of activism—this is specific to living wage**

**Themba-Nixon 2K**

Makani Themba-Nixon, 7-31-2000, Executive Director of The Praxis Project, a nonprofit organization helping communities use media and policy advocacy, Colorlines, Changing the Rules: What Public Policy Means for Organizing, Vol 3.2

“This is all about policy," a woman complained to me in a recent conversation. "I'm an organizer." The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, **if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies?** Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - **Over 600 local policies have been passed** to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to uneven enforcement and even discriminatory implementation of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our box.

**Demands on the state do not mean affirming the state, particularly for living wage**

Saul **Newman 10**, Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths, U of London, Theory & Event Volume 13, Issue 2

There are two aspects that I would like to address here. Firstly, the notion of demand: making certain demands on the state – say for **higher wages**, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war, or an end to draconian policing – is one of the basic strategies of social movements and radical groups. Making such demands **does not** necessarily **mean working within the state** or reaffirming its legitimacy. On the contrary, demands are made from a position outside the political order, and they often exceed the question of the implementation of this or that specific measure. They implicitly call into question the legitimacy and even the sovereignty of the state by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between, for instance, a formal constitutional order which guarantees certain rights and equalities, and state practices which in reality violate and deny them.

# 1AR

## Case

### AT Kant’s Racist

**TURN – Kant is an example of why ethics solves racism. He completely changed his racist beliefs as a result of his philosophy, which for a white dude in 18th century Europe is actually pretty damn progressive.**

**Kleingeld 7**

Pauline Kleingeld (Professor at the University of Groningen). “KANT’S SECOND THOUGHTS ON RACE.” Philosophical Quarterly. 2007. <http://www.rug.nl/staff/pauline.kleingeld/kleingeld-kant-on-race-pq.pdf>

**Kant radically revised his views on race during the 1790s.** He gives no indication of when or why he changed his views. **He makes no mention of a racial hierarchy anywhere in his published writings of the 1790s**, however, **and** what he does say about related issues **contradicts his earlier views on a racial hierarchy** and a plan of Nature designed to restrict human migration (after their initial dispersal across the globe). I ﬁrst discuss evidence for the thesis that Kant dropped his hierarchical view of the races, and then turn to the status of the concept of race as such in his later work. **In Toward Perpetual Peace and the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant clearly departs from his earlier position in a number of ways. First of all, he becomes more egalitarian with regard to race.**28 **He now grants a full juridical status to non-whites, a status irreconcilable with his earlier defence of slavery. For example, his concept of cosmopolitan right**, as introduced in Toward Perpetual Peace (: ), **explicitly prohibits the colonial conquest of foreign lands:** If one compares with this [viz the idea of cosmopolitan right] the inhospitable behaviour of the civilized states in our part of the world, especially the commercial ones, the injustice that the latter show when visiting foreign lands and peoples (which to them is one and the same as conquering those lands and peoples) takes on terrifying propor- tions. America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, etc., were at the time of their discovery lands that they regarded as belonging to no one, for the native inhabitants counted as nothing to them. **Any European settlement requires contractual agreement with the existing population**, says Kant, unless the settlement takes place so far from other people that there is no encroachment on anyone’s use of land. In the section on cosmopolitan right in the Metaphysics of Morals, **Kant speciﬁcally stipulates that such a contract should not take advantage of the ignorance of the in- habitants with regard to the terms of the contract** (MM : ), a stipulation which presupposes a concern not found in the 1780s texts. The very fact that Kant regards Native Americans, Africans and Asians as (equally) capable of signing contracts, and as persons whose interests and claims present a normative constraint on the behaviour of European powers, indicates a shift in perspective. After all, as long as Kant regarded slavery as appropriate for Native Americans and Africans, he did not con- sider their consent to be important at all. **The same can be said about the fact that he now defends hunting** and shepherding **peoples against en- croachment by Europeans, instead of highlighting their failure to develop agriculture** as he did earlier. **In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant rejects con- sequentialist justiﬁcations for colonialism (the alleged ‘civilizing’ eﬀects on the ‘savages’)** (MM : ). He also rejects the argument that the European colonists are justiﬁed in claiming ownership over foreign lands and their inhabitants by the fact they ‘establish a new civil union with them and bring these human beings (savages) into a rightful condition’. Instead, Kant main- tains that the latter have the right of ﬁrst possession, and that this right is violated by the European ownership claims (MM : ). Importantly, **Kant has now become unambiguously opposed to chattel slavery.** Robert Bernasconi has claimed that Kant was ‘silent on the slave trade in Africans’ and ‘failed to speak out against chattel slavery’, and that he is ‘aware of no direct statement by Kant calling for the abolition of either African slavery or the slave trade, even if only in principle’.29 Such state- ments do exist, however. In his notes for Toward Perpetual Peace (–), **Kant repeatedly and explicitly criticizes slavery of non-Europeans in the strongest terms, as a grave violation of cosmopolitan right** (: –). **He formulates a scathing critique of the conduct of European powers elsewhere in the world. He sharply criticizes ‘the civilized countries bordering the seas’, whom he accuses of recognizing no normative constraints in their behaviour towards people on other continents** and of regarding the ‘possess- ions and even the person of the stranger as a loot given to them by Nature’. **Kant censures the slave trade** (‘trade in Negroes’), not as an excessive form of an otherwise acceptable institution, but **as in itself a ‘violation’ of the cosmopolitan right of blacks** (: ). Similarly, he criticizes the fact that the inhabitants of America were treated as objects belonging to no one, and ‘were displaced or enslaved’ soon after Europeans reached the continent (: –). After having discussed European behaviour in Africa, America and Asia, he concludes (: ):

The principles underlying the supposed lawfulness of appropriating newly discovered and purportedly barbaric or irreligious lands, as goods belonging to no one, without the consent of the inhabitants and even subjugating them as well, are absolutely contrary to cosmopolitan right. In the published version of Toward Perpetual Peace, Kant repeats this judge- ment. He criticizes the ‘very most gruesome and most calculated slavery’30 on the Sugar Islands (PP : ). In the Metaphysics of Morals too (MM : , , ), he categorically and repeatedly condemns chattel slavery.31 **These passages show that Kant changed his earlier views on the status of non-whites. The oft-defended thesis that Kant’s racism remained constant thus needs correction, and one should not use evidence from the 1780s in support of claims about his views in the 1790s.** For example, his statements from the mid-1790s contradict the view that the role of the ‘idle races’ in Kant’s cosmopolitan theory was merely that of a contrast against which Europeans could measure their own progress,32 as well as the view that for Kant, the non-white races counted as a ‘waste’ of nature.33 These inter- pretations are based on Kant’s earlier texts, and therefore they are at most defensible as interpretations of his earlier views, not of his later views on the races. **Kant not only became more egalitarian with regard to race, he also revised his view of the role of race in connection with intercontinental migration.** In some of his earlier writings he called racial diﬀerentiation ‘necessary’ for the preservation of the species during its initial dispersal across the globe (DCHR : ), and claimed that Nature discouraged sub- sequent migrations. As Mark Larrimore has shown, however, these claims were in tension with Kant’s repeated declarations, often in the same writings, that whites are able to live anywhere on earth,34 for they imply that racial diﬀerentiation (or, more precisely, the development of non-whites) is not really necessary for the preservation of the species after all. Kant’s later position simply does not attribute any special role to racial diﬀerentiation (let alone racial hierarchy) for the purpose of global migration. In his 1795 description of what Nature has done to enable humans to live everywhere on earth, Kant omits any mention of predispositions for diﬀer- ent races (PP : –). He now claims that Nature has organized the earth in such a way that humans can and will live everywhere, and that they will eventually use the surface of the earth for interacting peacefully (PP : ). The new category of cosmopolitan right, introduced in Toward Perpetual Peace, is premised on increasing and continuing movement and interaction across borders. He concludes his exposition of cosmopolitan right (which includes his critique of colonialism and slavery) with the hope that In this way, remote parts of the world can establish relations peacefully with one another, relations which ultimately become regulated by public laws and can thus ﬁnally bring the human species ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution (PP : ). Instead of his earlier claim that blacks and Native Americans cannot govern themselves (: ) and that Europe ‘will probably eventually legislate for all other continents’ (IUH : ), Kant now envisages a world in which people of diﬀerent colours and on diﬀerent continents establish peaceful relations with each other that honour the normative principles laid down in his exposition of cosmopolitan right. **Finally, Kant’s ascription of mental characteristics to the diﬀerent races has changed. For example, he ascribes the ideal of military courage equally to Native Americans and mediaeval European knights** (PP : ). **This stands in marked contrast with his earlier insistence on the weakness and inertia of Native Americans.**

**Don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. The most productive strategy is revising Kant to account for race, like the 1AC does**

**Korsgaard 2**

Christine M. Korsgaard (Professor of Philosophy at Harvard). Internalism and the Sources of Normativity. Constructions of Practical Reason: Interviews on Moral and Political Philosophy, edited by Herlinde Pauer-Studer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002) <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CPR.CMK.Interview.pdf>

First of all, a lot of Rawls’s inﬂuence on me and on most of his students has been methodological. What I would like to say is, to put it a little bluntly, that he taught us how to read a book. Most of Rawls’s students were deeply impressed with the approach that he took to the classics of philosophy, which was to insist that we read them not to criticize them, but to learn from them. He urged us to interpret them generously and to make them say something as reasonable and interesting as possible. I feel very strongly that he taught us how to learn from the history of philosophy, and that he put me and many other people on the path of learning from the history of philosophy. He did that with respect to Kant, of course, but he taught us how to learn from other philosophers as well. Of course, another influence is that he helped to create my great respect for Kant. In particular, I have been influenced by the broadly Kantian account of how people should relate to one another which characterizes Rawls’s political philosophy as well as Kant’s moral philosophy.

**AT Anti-Ethics K**

**Perm**

**Perm do both; Kantianism is key to black radicalism. That’s Charles Mills in 15. It’s key to build coalitions among oppressed groups by recognizing the underlying universal ideal of equality that unites material differences.**

**General**

**There is no link to the performance of the aff. All of my contentions account for the material conditions of extreme poverty, exploitation of workers, and institutional discrimination.**

**TURN – the aff is a pre-requisite to embodied focus. The alternative is egoism in which nobody considers the embodied realities of others.**

**Phil Key**

**Ethical debates are a pre-req to social change.**

**Goldstein 14**

Rebecca Newberger Goldstein (Former professor of Philosophy at Rutgers and Columbia, PhD from Princeton). “Why Study Philosophy? 'To Challenge Your Own Point of View'.” 27 February 2014.

http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/02/why-study-philosophy-to-challenge-your-own-point-of-view/283954/t

It’s amazing how long it takes us, but we do make progress. And it’s usually philosophical arguments that first introduce the very outlandish idea that we need to extend rights. And it takes more, it takes a movement, and activism, and emotions, to affect real social change. It starts with an argument, but then it becomes obvious. The tracks of philosophy’s work are erased because it becomes intuitively obvious. The arguments against slavery, against cruel and unusual punishment, against unjust wars, against treating children cruelly—these all took arguments. Which philosophical arguments have you seen shifting our national conversation, changing what we once thought was obvious? About 30 years ago, the philosopher Peter Singer started to argue about the way animals are treated in our factory farms. Everybody thought he was nuts. But I’ve watched this movement grow; I’ve watched it become emotional. It has to become emotional. You have to draw empathy into it. But here it is, right in our time—a philosopher making the argument, everyone dismissing it, but then people start discussing it. Even criticizing it, or saying it’s not valid, is taking it seriously. This is what we have to teach our children. Even things that go against their intuition they need to take seriously. What was intuition two generations ago is no longer an intuition; and it’s arguments that change it. We are very inertial creatures. We do not like to change our thinking, especially if it’s inconvenient for us. And certainly the people in power never want to wonder whether they should hold power. So it really takes hard, hard work to overcome that.

## AT Counterplan

### General Answers

1. No solvency. There are a million other rallying points like prisons, police violence, the drug war and wealth gaps that people could rally around. If Ferguson didn’t cause it, the plan won’t.

2. TURN—The counterplan encourages the black blame that Price-2 says is bad. Affirmative action debates prove that leads black people to blame other black people, and Obama would get the blame.

3. They’ve massively overstated their evidence; Nationalism isn’t key.

**Tseghay 9**

Daniel Tseghay (writer from Vancouver who has written for the Toronto Star, The Georgia Straight, and THIS Magazine). “Book Review: Melanye T. Price’s Dreaming Blackness.” THIS Magazine. November 6th, 2009. http://this.org/blog/2009/11/06/melanye-price-dreaming-blackness/

**Price’s book does not read as a polemic** making the case **for Black Nationalism. She does not argue that it is the only way African Americans can shake the spectre of domination** they’ll continue to endure unless they create for themselves their own forms of organization. She does not make the argument that it would be a good for the soul and the psyche of the African American community or that Black Nationalism, paradoxically, is the best means towards achieving genuine integration and racial harmony (since real equality must always rest on the foundation of mutual respect for each other’s self-created achievement). **Price, instead, tracks the level at which the African American community** — broadly speaking — **supports Black Nationalist principles**. It appears a sizable number do. Perhaps the American public as a whole would do well to finally recognize this serious strand of African American thought.

4. Perm do the counterplan; it’s not competitive. The counterplan affirms living wage on balance; that’s the aff. They just clarify what exceptions exist to the general principle.

5. If I win the truth of deontology, there is no way he can go for this. Voting neg means endorsing overt systemic racism as a means for the greater good of reducing future racism.

6. Doesn’t solve any of the case. Black people are the ones who need wages the most, and he excludes them.

**Anti-Semitism DA**

Black Nationalism empowers anti-Semitism

**Fischel 95**

Jack Fischel. ‘The New Anti-Semitic Axis:Holocaust Denial, Black Nationalism, and the Crisis on Our College Campuse.” VQR. Spring 1995. http://www.vqronline.org/essay/new-anti-semitic-axisholocaust-denial-black-nationalism-and-crisis-our-college-campuse

Hitler has remained a hero among anti-Semites. For example in the Holocaust-denying Christian Identity Movement, with a “church” membership of more than 60,000, Hitler is viewed as a prophet sent to combat the Jews who are believed to be the offspring of the union between Eve and Satan that produced Cain. In the Christian Identity Church and its allied hate groups, such as the White Aryan Resistance, the negative religious stereotype is merged with Nazi social doctrine to produce images of Jews as the head of the conspiracy to weaken White Aryan America through the process of supporting integration, gay rights, the Women’s Movement, and other objectives on the liberal agenda. Hitler, in these circles, is viewed as a great leader who sacrificed his life to defend the purity of the Aryan race. They see the Holocaust as the barrier that prevents Hitler’s rehabilitation, a necessary step if Americans are ever to realize that race-mixing is the greatest threat to America’s survival. This is the theme of the Turner Diaries, the “Bible” of the neo-Nazi movement which refers to the United States government as ZOG or the Zionist Occupation Government. Similarly, by creating doubt about the Holocaust, in hopes of undermining the moral standing of Israel in the world community, the deniers have inadvertently received support from an unexpected source, the Nation of Islam and other black nationalist groups. **Black nationalist groups in** their **attempts to separate American blacks from** their traditional **allies in the white community have**, in particular, **focused on black-Jewish relations**. For example, **the Nation of Islam does not deny** the facts of **the Holocaust but does diminish its significance when it compares it to the “African Holocaust” of the Atlantic Slave Trade. The intent is to diminish the argument that Jews and blacks have a** common bond because of a **shared history of suffering**. Rather, **the rhetoric of black nationalism, like** its **white anti-Semitic counterparts, emphasizes the image of the Jew as a victimizer of blacks.** Deborah Lipstadt, in her book, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory, points out, The central assertion for the deniers is that Jews are not victims but victimizers. They “stole” billions in reparations, destroyed Germany’s good name by spreading the “myth” of the Holocaust and want international sympathy because of what they claimed had been done to them . . . they used the world’s sympathy to “displace” another people so that the state of Israel could be established. If Professor Lipstadt were to change a few words and instead substituted the lies spread about Jewish involvement in the slave trade, there would be little difference between the remarks of Khalil Muhammed, Louis Farrakhan, and the Holocaust deniers. It is also true, that black nationalists such as Farakhan, would share with Holocaust deniers the view that sympathy for the victims of the Holocaust led to the support of the creation of the State of Israel. It is no coincidence that the Nation of Islam continues to distribute the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Black nationalists, similar to Holocaust deniers, have a strong animus toward the Jewish state. In this context, Holocaust denial strategy focuses on college campuses where it hopes to find an audience receptive to its message. Its promoters count on reaching future generations of college students whose knowledge of the Holocaust is distant insofar as they have any direct contact with Holocaust survivors or even an interest in the subject. Further-more, Holocaust deniers believe that time is on their side. As witnesses to the Holocaust pass on and the memory of the Shook recedes in memory, the deniers count on presenting their case as simply another point of view, one well within the scholarly tradition of historical revisionism. In their efforts at gaining respectability, Holocaust deniers have not only hidden their agenda but veiled their associations. Holocaust denial, as a serious enterprise, was founded by Willis Carto, founder of the anti-Semitic Liberty Lobby and the Institute for Historical Review, which publishes the Journal of Historical Review. The publication presents itself as a scholarly journal and frequently publishes articles unrelated to the Holocaust. Historians, such as David Irving and, on occasion, John Toland, have lent their names to the periodical although most reputable historians have distanced themselves from the publication. Carto, as Irving, has links to many neo-Nazi movements in this country and abroad. Under Carto, the institute has become a clearing-house for Holocaust denying material for the use of anti-Semitic organizations and groups which share the objective of spreading doubt concerning the facts of the Holocaust.