### Framework

#### Practical reflection is an inescapable aspect of agency.

Ferrero Luca Ferrero (University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee) “Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV January 12th 2009 pp. 6-8 JW

3.2 Agency is special under two respects. First, agency is the enterprise with the largest jurisdiction.12 All ordinary enterprises fall under it. To engage in any ordinary enterprise is ipso facto to engage in the enterprise of agency. In addition, there are instances of behavior that fall under no other enterprise but agency. First, intentional transitions in and out of particular enterprises might not count as moves within those enterprises, but they are still instances of intentional agency, of bare intentional agency, so to say. Second, agency is the locus where we adjudicate the merits and demerits of participating in any ordinary enterprise. Reasoning whether to participate in a particular enterprise is often conducted outside of that enterprise, even while one is otherwise engaged in it. Practical reflection is a manifestation of full-fledged intentional agency but it does not necessary belong to any other specific enterprise. Once again, it might be an instance of bare intentional agency. In the limiting case, agency is the only enterprise that would still keep a subject busy if she were to attempt a ʻradical re-evaluationʼ of all of her engagements and at least temporarily suspend her participation in all ordinary enterprises.13 3.3 The second feature that makes agency stand apart from ordinary enterprises is agencyʼs closure. Agency is closed under the operation of reflective rational assessment. As the case of radical re-evaluations shows, ordinary enterprises are never fully closed under reflection. There is always the possibility of reflecting on [ordinary enterprises] their justification while standing outside of them. Not so for rational agency. The constitutive features of agency (no matter whether they are conceived as aims, motives, capacities, commitments, etc.) continue to operate even when the agent is assessing whether she is justified in her engagement in agency. One cannot put agency on hold while trying to determine whether agency is justified because this kind of practical reasoning is the exclusive job of intentional agency. This does not mean that agency falls outside of the reach of reflection. But even reflection about agency is a manifestation of agency.14 Agency is not necessarily self-reflective but all instances of reflective assessment, including those directed at agency itself, fall under its jurisdiction; they are conducted in deference to the constitutive standards of agency. This kind of closure is unique to agency. What is at work in reflection is the distinctive operation of intentional agency in its discursive mode. What is at work is not simply the subjectʼs capacity to shape her conduct in response to reasons for action but also her capacity both to ask for these reasons and to give them. Hence, agencyʼs closure under reflective rational assessment is closure under agencyʼs own distinctive operation: Agency is closed under itself.15

#### Impacts:

#### A) other frameworks devolve to the aff—to even reflect about the legitimacy of your standard concedes the authority of agency.

#### B) Justifying a normative claim requires adherence to the norm of the constitutive rules of the activity. Answering the question of why an agent ought to take an action is impossible without practice rules since each link can be independently questioned-proving the other frameworks collapses to infinite regress. Constitutivism solves because the answer to the question can just refer to the aim of the activity.

#### C) Ought claims must be constructivist-an ethical theory can’t tell us to apply knowledge of the good because that assumes we can act in the first place. The nature of identity is the source of moral conflicts. Skep doesn’t answer the aff since conflicts can only be resolved by competing reasons-this comes first, it’s a question of how we evaluate ethical claims in the first place.

#### Next, rational reflection requires that the maxims we act upon be universalizable.

Velleman David (Professor of Philosophy at New York University) “Self To Self” Cambridge University Press. 2006. Pg 18-19

Rational creatures have access to a shared perspective, from which they not only see the same things but can also see the visibility of those things to all rational creatures. Consider, for example, our capacity for arithmetic reasoning. **Anyone who adds 2 and 2 sees, not just that the sum is 4**, **but also that anyone who added 2 and 2 would see that it’s 4**, and that such a person would see this, too, and so on. **The facts of** elementary **arithmetic are thus common knowledge among all possible reasoners**, in the sense that every reasoner knows them, and knows that every reasoner knows them, and [so on] knows that every reasoner knows that every reasoner knows them. **As** arithmetic **reasoners**, then, **we have access to a perspective that is constant not only across time but also between persons**. We can compute the sum of 2 and 2 once and for all, in the sense that we would only get the same answer on any other occasion; and **each of us can compute the sum of 2 and 2 *once and for all***, in the sense that the others would only get the same answer. What’s more, the universality of our perspective on the sum of 2 and 2, we are aware of computing it for all, from a perspective that’s shared by all arithmetic reasoners. **In this sense, our judgment** of the sum **is authoritative, because it speaks for the judgment of all.**

#### Willing coercion as a universal law is contradictory.

Engstrom Stephen (Professor of Ethics at UPitt). “Universal Legislation As the Form of Practical Knowledge.”

Given the preceding considerations, it’s a straightforward matter to see how **a maxim** of action **that assaults** the **freedom** of others with a view **to further**ing one’s own **ends results in a contradiction** when we attempt to will it as a universal law in accordance with the foregoing account of the formula of universal law. Such a maxim would lie in a practical judgment that deems it good on the whole to act to limit others’ outer freedom, and hence their self-sufficiency, their capacity to realize their ends, where doing so augments, or extends, one’s own outer freedom and so also one’s own self-sufficiency. 19In this passage, Kant mentions assaults on property as well as on freedom. But since property is a specific, socially instituted form of freedom, I have omitted mention of it to focus on the primitive case. Now on the interpretation we’ve been entertaining, applying the formula of **universal law involves considering whether** it’s possible for **every person**—every subject capable of practical judgment—to **share[s] the** practical **judgment asserting the goodness of** every person’s acting according to **the maxim** in question. Thus in the present case the application of the formula involves considering whether it’s possible for every person to deem good every person’s acting to limit others’ freedom, where practicable, with a view to augmenting their own freedom. **Since** here **all persons** are on the one hand **deem**ing **good** both the **limitation of** others’ **freedom and** the **extension of their own** freedom, while on the other hand, insofar as they agree with the similar judgments of others, also deeming good the limitation of their own freedom and the extension of others’ freedom, **they** are all **deem**ing **good both the extension and the limitation of both their own and others’ freedom.**

#### The state of nature facilitates an infinite number of rights violations since disputes are settled by might, not right. To promote any system of moral obligations, we need an objective, impartial observer that represents both parties. This is the omnilateral will.

Kant: Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, trans. John Ladd. 1797. Indianapolis: Hackett Publsihing, 1999.

When I declare (by word or deed), “I will that an external thing shall be mine,” I thereby declare it obligatory for everyone else to refrain from the object of my will. This is an obligation that no one would have apart from this juridical act of mine. Included in this claim, however, is an acknowledgement of being reciprocally bound to everyone else to a similar and equal restraint with respect to what is theirs. The obligation involved here comes from a universal rule of the external juridical relationship. Consequently, I am not bound to leave what is another’s untouched if everyone else does not in turn guarantee to me with regard to what is mine that [t]he[y] will act in accordance with exactly the same principle. This guarantee does not require a special juridical act, but is already contained in the concept of being externally bound to a duty on account of the universality, and hence also the reciprocity, of an obligation coming from a universal rule. Now, with respect to an external and contingent possession, a unilateral Will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone, since that would be a violation of freedom in accordance with universal laws. Therefore, only a Will binding everyone else—that is, a collective, universal (common), and powerful Will—is the kind of Will that can provide the guarantee required. The condition of being subject to general external (that is, public) legislation that is backed by power is the civil society. Accordingly, a thing can be externally yours or mine only in a civil society.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the omnilateral will. Impact analysis: only benefits and harms intrinsic to the structure of an action are relevant.

#### A) freedom is a property of agency, not an additive consequence. Adding two circles together does not make anything more circular than what was before, just like two humans are not freer than one human.

#### B) we cannot be culpable for foreseen consequences—they are determined by external forces.

Hegel George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel The Philosophy of Right 1820

**The will has** before it **an outer reality**, upon which it operates. But to be able **to do this, it must have a representation of** this **reality**. True **responsibility** **is** **mine only** in **so far as the outer reality** **was within my consciousness**. The will, because this external matter is supplied to it, is finite; or rather because it is finite, the matter is supplied. When I think and will rationally, I am not at this standpoint of finitude, nor is the object I act upon something opposed to me. The finite always has limit and boundary. There stands opposed to me that which is other than I, something accidental and externally necessary; it may or may not fall into agreement with me. But I am only what relates to my freedom; and the act is the purport of my will only in so far as I am aware of it. Œdipus, who unwittingly slew his father, is not to be arraigned as a patricide. In the ancient laws, however, less value was attached to the subjective side of the act than is done to-day. Hence arose amongst the ancients asylums, where the fugitive from revenge might be received and protected. 118. **An act**, when it has become an external reality, and is connected with a varied outer necessity, has manifold consequences. These consequences, being the visible shape, whose soul is the end of action, belong to the act. But at the same time the inner act, **when realized** as an end **in the external world**, **is handed** over **to external forces, which attach** to it **something** quite **different from what it is in itself**, **and thus carry** it away into **strange** and **distant consequences. It is the right of the will to adopt only the first consequences, since they alone lie in the purpose.**

#### Prefer the standard:

#### 1. Only the omnilateral will can ensure temporal consistency of state authority.

Ripstein Arthur Ripstein, “Force and Freedom”. Harvard University Press, 2009

Kant argues that provision for the poor follows directly from the very idea of a united will. He remarks that the idea of a united lawgiving will requires that citizens regard the state as existing in perpetuity. By this he does not mean to impose an absurd requirement that people live forever,or even the weaker one that it must sustain an adequate population, or make sure that all of its members survive. The state does need to maintain its material preconditions, and as we saw in Chapter 7, this need generates its entitlement to “administer the state’s economy and finance. The state’s existence in perpetuity, however, is presented as a pure normative requirement, grounded in its ability to speak and act for everyone. That ability must be able to survive changes in the state’s membership. You are the same person you were a year ago because your normative principle of organization has stayed the same through changes in the matter making you up. As a being entitled to set and pursue your own purposes, you decide what your continuing body will do. That is why your deeds can be imputed to you even after every molecule in your body has changed, and even if you have forgotten what you did. The unity of your agency is created by the normative principle that makes your actions imputable to you. In the same way, the state must sustain its basic normative principle of organization through time, even as some members die or move away and new ones are born or move in. As we saw in Chapter 7, its [the state’s] unifying principle—“in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of the state”—is the idea of the original contract, through which people are bound by laws they have given themselves through public institutions. The state must have the structure that is required in order for everyone to be bound by it, so that it can legitimately claim to speak and act for all across time. The requirement of unity across time is clear in the cases of legislation by officials: if the official’s decision were only binding while a particular human being held office, a citizen would be entitled to regard laws as void once the official’s term ended. Because each person is master of him- or herself, one person is only bound by the authority of another through the idea of a united will. The idea of a united will presupposes some manner in which it exists through time. Past legislation, like past agreement, can only bind those who come after if the structure through which laws are made is one that can bind everyone it governs.

#### 2. Actor specificity. Societies are just collections of individuals that can act through reasoning.

Laurence Ben (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago) “An Anscombean Approach to Collective Action” in Ford and Hornsby, Eds. Essays on Anscombe's Intention (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) 293-294

It is enough that the same order displayed in collective action explanation can also be represented as a set of rational transitions justifying the actions undertaken by members of a group in light of a shared objective. In this way, whether or not there is strictly speaking a unitary knowing subject of the whole action, we can still see the actions in question as recommended by reasoning. This reasoning will not, of course, occur through the exercise of a separate practical reason possessed by the group, but rather through the reasoning of the individual members as the execute their shared objective. We might sum this up by saying that just as a collective agent can only act through the actions of its individual members, it can only know through their knowing, and reason through their reasoning.

#### Prefer this conception of government action: A. only my framework accounts for a *static* conception of government action since policymakers have a plurality of moral views-all they share is basic moral reason-absent a unified conception of action, decision making would collapse to moral chaos. B. this is inherent to the nature of any society which is by definition just a collection of individuals-any alternative government function is contingent on extrapolations of what a government ought to do. Actor specificity key to text—the res is a question of what happens in a government-text is the only way to have debate since the only thing we have in common before the round is the res.

### Contention

#### Private ownership of handguns should be banned:

#### 1. Gun ownership creates hierarchal relationships between individuals.

Debrabander Firmin Debrabander “The Freedom of an Armed Society” The New York Times December 16th 2012 <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/16/the-freedom-of-an-armed-society/> JW

As ever more people are armed in public, however — even brandishing weapons on the street — this is no longer recognizable as a civil society. Freedom is vanished at that point. And yet, gun rights advocates famously maintain that individual gun ownership, even of high caliber weapons, is the defining mark of our freedom as such, and the ultimate guarantee of our enduring liberty. Deeper reflection on their argument exposes basic fallacies. In her book “The Human Condition,” the philosopher Hannah Arendt states that “violence is mute.” According to Arendt, speech dominates and distinguishes the polis, the highest form of human association, which is devoted to the freedom and equality of its component members. Violence — and the threat of it — is a pre-political manner of communication and control, characteristic of undemocratic organizations and hierarchical relationships. For the ancient Athenians who practiced an incipient, albeit limited form of democracy (one that we surely aim to surpass), violence was characteristic of the master-slave relationship, not that of free citizens. Arendt offers two points that are salient to our thinking about guns: for one, they insert a hierarchy of some kind, but fundamental nonetheless, and thereby undermine equality. But furthermore, guns pose a monumental challenge to freedom, and particular, the liberty that is the hallmark of any democracy worthy of the name — that is, freedom of speech. Guns do communicate, after all, but in a way that is contrary to free speech aspirations: for, guns chasten speech. This becomes clear if only you pry a little more deeply into the N.R.A.’s logic behind an armed society. An armed society is polite, by their thinking, precisely because guns would compel everyone to tamp down eccentric behavior, and refrain from actions that might seem threatening. The suggestion is that guns liberally interspersed throughout society would cause us all to walk gingerly — not make any sudden, unexpected moves — and watch what we say, how we act, whom we might offend. As our Constitution provides, however, liberty entails precisely the freedom to be reckless, within limits, also the freedom to insult and offend as the case may be. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld our right to experiment in offensive language and ideas, and in some cases, offensive action and speech. Such experimentation is inherent to our freedom as such. But guns by their nature do not mix with this experiment — they don’t mix with taking offense. They are combustible ingredients in assembly and speech. I often think of the armed protestor who showed up to one of the famously raucous town hall hearings on Obamacare in the summer of 2009. The media was very worked up over this man, who bore a sign that invoked a famous quote of Thomas Jefferson, accusing the president of tyranny. But no one engaged him at the protest; no one dared approach him even, for discussion or debate — though this was a town hall meeting, intended for just such purposes. Such is the effect of guns on speech — and assembly. Like it or not, they transform the bearer, and end the conversation in some fundamental way. They announce that the conversation is not completely unbounded, unfettered and free; there is or can be a limit to negotiation and debate — definitively. The very power and possibility of free speech and assembly rests on their non-violence. The power of the Occupy Wall Street movement, as well as the Arab Spring protests, stemmed precisely from their non-violent nature. This power was made evident by the ferocity of government response to the Occupy movement. Occupy protestors across the country were increasingly confronted by police in military style garb and affect. Imagine what this would have looked like had the protestors been armed: in the face of the New York Police Department assault on Zuccotti Park, there might have been armed insurrection in the streets. The non-violent nature of protest in this country ensures that it can occur.

#### The laws must be changed to curtail actions that violate equal freedom. The powerful need to be regulated so they cannot rightfully abuse positions over those subject to them to maintain equal freedom.

Ripstein 2 Arthur Ripstein, “Force and Freedom”. Harvard University Press, 2009

Kant argues that provision for the poor follows directly from the very idea of a united will. He remarks that the idea of a united lawgiving will re- quires that citizens regard the state as existing in perpetuity.6 By this he does not mean to impose an absurd requirement that people live forever, or even the weaker one that it must sustain an adequate population, or make sure that all of its members survive.7 The state does need to main- tain its material preconditions, and as we saw in Chapter 7, this need gen- erates its entitlement to “administer the state’s economy and finance.”8 The state’s existence in perpetuity, however, is presented as a pure normative requirement, grounded in its ability to speak and act for everyone. That ability must be able to survive changes in the state’s membership. You are the same person you were a year ago because your normative principle of organization has stayed the same through changes in the mat- ter making you up. As a being entitled to set and pursue your own pur- poses, you decide what your continuing body will do. That is why your deeds can be imputed to you even after every molecule in your body has changed, and even if you have forgotten what you did. The unity of your agency is created by the normative principle that makes your actions im- putable to you.9 In the same way, the state must sustain its basic norma- tive principle of organization through time, even as some members die or move away and new ones are born or move in. As we saw in Chapter 7, its unifying principle—“in terms of which alone we can think of the legiti- macy of the state”—is the idea of the original contract, through which people are bound by laws they have given themselves through public in- stitutions.10 The state must have the structure that is required in order for everyone to be bound by it, so that it can legitimately claim to speak and act for all across time. The requirement of unity across time is clear in the cases of legislation by officials: if the official’s decision were only binding while a particular human being held office, a citizen would be entitled to regard laws as void once the official’s term ended. Because each person is master of him- or herself, one person is only bound by the authority of another through the idea of a united will. So the idea of a united will pre- supposes some manner in which it exists through time. Past legislation, like past agreement, can only bind those who come after if the structure through which laws are made is one that can bind everyone it governs.The solution to this family of problems is **a** self-sustaining **system** that **guarantees** **that all citizens** stand in the right relation to each other and, in particular, **do not stand in any relation inconsistent with their sharing a united will.** The most obvious way in which **people could** fail to share such a will is **through** relations of **private dependence** through which **one** person **is subject to the choice of another. A** serf or **slave does not share a united will with** his or her lord or **master**, so **these forms** of relationship **are in- consistent with a rightful condition**. Yet the same relation of dependence can arise through a series of rightful actions. **The problem** of poverty, on Kant’s analysis, **is** exactly that: the poor are completely **subject to the choice of those in more fortunate circumstances**. Although Kant argues that there is an ethical duty to give to charity,11 the crux of his argument is that dependence on private charity is incon- sistent with its benefactor and beneficiary sharing the united will that is required for them to live together in a rightful condition. The difficulty is that the poor person is subject to the choice of those who have more: **they are entitled to use their powers as they see fit, and so the decision** whether to give to those in need, or how much to give, or to which people, **is entirely discretionary**.12 So long as **there are** a variety of **unmet wants,** **private persons** are entitled to **determine which ones to attach priority to.**

#### 2. States have monopoly over force within their territory.

#### A) The view that someone can use force independently of the state’s yields a contradiction since they posit themselves to be the omnilateral will.

Ripstein 3 Arthur Ripstein, “Force and Freedom”. Harvard University Press, 2009

The first, “legalistic” argument turns on the claim that no one can sit in judgment of the sovereign, on the grounds that the person who could do so would be the sovereign**,** and so, either the real sovereign, or subject to having still others sit in judgment, generating either a regress or a contradiction**,** since under such an arrangement the supreme authority would both be and not be the supreme authority. Thus a constitution that reserves to the people a right of revolution necessarily contains a contradiction. This argument is often discussed independently of the other parts of Kant’s argument for the state, and unsurprisingly, it strikes many readers as too legalistic to be of much interest. However, Kant’s point in making it needs to be understood in the broader context of his argument for the state. As we saw in Chapter 6, that argument turns on the problem of unilateral choice, and the need for authoritative institutions to make choice omnilateral. In order for the power to resolve a dispute to be anything more than yet another unilateral use of force, the arbiter of the dispute must be able to make a decision on behalf of the parties to the dispute. In the case of a revolution, however, someone presents himself as outside the legal order, yet entitled to resolve a dispute in relation to it. In those terms, the revolutionary’s position is incoherent. From the claim that the revolutionary is not entitled to be judge in his own case, Kant draws the surprising conclusion that the sovereign is entitled to be judge in his own case.14

#### Individuals with guns are unaccountable agents with their own beliefs about how to act. Giving them force gives them a medium to use those beliefs to act inconsistently with the united will, thus they have no right to use the object in the first place and the government must ban it.

#### B) Individuals have the liberty to legitimately acquire certain objects, but the state must place restrictions on objects that inherently violate the ends of other agents to preserve a system of equal freedom. For example, I can own a twenty-four ounce soda because it is intended for use only on my own body, but not a nuclear weapon since they are built to prevent other individuals from setting ends by blowing them up. Even if I use a nuclear weapon to polish my shoes, its ownership is illegitimate since its function is coercive.

#### C) In order to leave the state of nature, individuals give up their power to use deadly force against others, since this would enable us to unilaterally determine the ends others set, since individuals could be coerced to cohere with our desires.

#### And, handguns are intrinsically objects used to exert force over another agent.

#### Merriam Webster defines a gun as “Gun” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gun JW

a weapon that shoots bullets or shells

#### And a weapon as “Weapon” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/weaponJW

something (as a club, knife, or gun) used to injure, defeat, or destroy

#### And, handguns are designed to kill people.

Honeywell 14 Ken (editor-in-chief of Punchnel’s) “What is the Purpose of a Gun?” <http://www.punchnels.com/2014/07/17/what-is-the-purpose-of-a-gun/> JW

What, after all, is the purpose of a gun? The purpose of a gun–if we’re being honest–is to kill something. It’s a tool that has enough power, when used properly (and very often improperly) to kill. Hunting rifles and shotguns are for killing animals. Handguns–if we’re being honest–are for killing people. That’s the purpose behind their design**–**they are portable, concealable, easy-to-use tools for killing a person. You may feel protected when you carry a gun, but guns are not for protection: They are for killing. Were I a paranoid person or on some sort of mystery-solving adventure, I might also feel safer if I carried my eight-inch chef’s knife that is for chopping vegetables. I might feel safer carrying a baseball bat or accompanied by a dog. (P.S.: The purpose of a dog is not to protect you. As far as I can tell, the purpose of a dog is to be a dog.) But guns are only for killing. So we have laws that make it easy for you and me and just about anybody to go to the gun store and buy a gun, and carry it damn near anywhere we please in Indiana, including our state parks. It only stands to reason that when lots of people are walking around the streets with tools that are made to kill people, people are going to die. I’m sure that if people were walking around with butcher knives, more people would get stuck. I’m also pretty sure that if more people were walking around with shovels, more people would get whacked in the melon with shovels. But I’ll bet more holes would get dug, too. And a gun is not for anything else. Except killing. Yes, target practice. But there’s a reason those targets are shaped like humans.

#### Impacts:

#### A) An object’s intrinsic function is inherent in its design -a bread knife becomes a machete once you lose the ridges made to go through bread crust. In the same way, a handgun turns into a hunk of metal once you lose the trigger and elements that make it shoot. Even if the hunk of metal is dangerous, it is no longer intrinsically an object of force.

#### B) Even if people use guns at shooting ranges or for collecting, that doesn’t change what is made for. Objects can have uses external to their intrinsic aims but the only government legislation that can be justified is based on inherent use. For example, I can use a baseball bat to beat someone up but its main use isn’t battery so the government can’t ban it.

#### C) Handguns are characterized and defined based on their usage – in the same way a lie becomes a misunderstanding when there is no intent to deceive, handguns cease to be handguns when they are not intended to dominate other individuals.

### Underview

#### 1. Only universal reason creates real world change-using intuitions is counter-productive.

Drescher 6 Gary L. Drescher (Visiting Fellow at the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, PhD in Computer Science from MIT). “Good and Real: Demystifying Paradoxes from Physics to Ethics.” Bradford Books. 5 May 2006.

Still, to the extent that evolution has rigged us with a disposition toward empathy and other cooperation-promoting emotions (as in Frank’s account), we might simply behave cooperatively without needing a rationale for doing so (just as you do not need a rationale to keep your heart beating—it’s simply built that way). But empathy is notoriously limited. We do not, for instance, grieve deeply each time we read of a stranger being murdered. And empirically, from the extent of violent, selfish, or predatory behavior in the world, we can see that whatever altruistic disposition our genes or upbringing may impose, it can in fact be overridden by other considerations, for better (violence used in self defense, perhaps, in small-scale or even large-scale conflicts) or for worse (harming people to rob them, or persecute them, or just for fun). Moreover, there are many inclinations that, even if they result from specific genetic predispositions, we want to override. For instance, suppose there is a genetic predisposition to alcoholism. If you learned that you had inherited the alcoholism genes, you would not necessarily resign yourself to becoming an addict, nor should you. A more sensible response would be to take special care to avoid the expression of that disposition. Or, a sense of empathy (whether hardwired or not) may disincline you to violate the bodily integrity of another. But if you are a surgeon, you must learn to suppress that aversion in order to make an incision through flesh. Dennett (1995), Gould (1981), and other critics of (some construals of) sociobiology point out that many putative genetically predisposed behavioral tendencies—for example, toward sexism or aggression in some situations— do not thereby constitute imperatives, either behavioral or ethical, even if the supposed genetic influences are real. But the same holds true for any genetic influences that tend to promote altruism or cooperation. The ethical imperative, if any, must still come from somewhere else. In short, whatever emotional impulse we may have toward altruism and empathy, and to whatever extent it may be genetically hardwired, it does not obviate the need for explicit judgments about right and wrong. If it did not seem correct to act with kindness and fairness, even at a net personal cost—if there were no sensible reason for so acting, beyond a raw impulse to do so—then we would have reason to regard the raw impulse as pointlessly self-destructive—like a disposition to alcoholism or a purely visceral (so to speak) aversion to surgery—and we would have reason to attempt to overcome it. And it is plausible that that attempt would have at least partial success, since empirically an impulse to altruism or empathy can be and often is overridden, for reasons good and bad. Thus, although a dog or cat is not in danger of having its friendly behavior diminished by a belief that the behavior lacks a rational foundation (because it presumably forms no opinion about rational foundations), humans may be subject to that risk. And conversely, a belief that our kindly inclinations are correct is likely to help cultivate and amplify those inclinations. An explicit **belief in the obligation to treat others fairly enables us to go beyond** what is compelled by **the limited emotional experience of caring.** Furthermore, we all experience temptations to do what is wrong if it profits us greatly. If there is an explicit belief that an obligation to be altruistic and principled is real, that it has a rational basis, then this belief presumably has some effect, at least in borderline cases. The belief is likely to push in one direction, whereas a belief that an altruistic inclination has no rational privilege over any other sort of inclination we might experience would likely push the other way. It is not surprising that our built-in inclinations do not suffice to explain ethics. The biological evolution of altruistic behavior, construed as a learning process, can be viewed as an early step in reasoning about ethics—a step taken by evolution itself, rather than by an individual intelligence. But as with other learning carried out by evolution, we may expect this early step to be rudimentary compared to what we can reason about explicitly. By analogy, evolution has also implicitly learned about some basic properties of physical objects; this knowledge is embodied in whatever hardwired competence we have for perceiving, manipulating, and navigating among the objects in our ordinary environments. But however helpful a point of departure this hardwired knowledge may be, it is naive by comparison with the knowledge developed by physicists. It would be a terrible mistake to settle for our crude, hardwired version of either physics or ethics. Similar considerations apply to socially inculcated tendencies toward cooperation. Many aspects of what we now recognize to be moral conduct began as revolutionary, unprecedented defiance of prevailing mores. For such progress to occur, social values themselves cannot be the ultimate origin of ethics. Consider the range of ethical beliefs and corresponding behaviors actually exhibited by large groups of people: from Nazism to humanism, from slavery and manifest destiny to freedom rides and Gandhian resistance. All these and more are demonstrably within the scope of human genetic, social, and psychological constraints. If a theory of ethics is to have finer resolution than this entire observed range, it must therefore appeal to more than social and biological constraints. It must invoke a sense of right and wrong that goes beyond a mere description of how our neural circuitry or social acclimation incline us to behave. And we often do feel that our actions are grounded in part in an appeal to an **abstract** knowledge of right and wrong. Although you may dislike violence, you may nonetheless support, say, law enforcement, or a war or a revolution, due to being convinced of the justness of the cause. Or you may refrain from doing something that would benefit you—lying or stealing, for example—because you consider it wrong. Even if sufficiently strong self-interest overrides moral qualms—you may feel, roughly, that you were unable to resist the temptation to do it anyway—the moral qualms may still be felt to exert an influence, albeit not a decisive one. Explicit **appeal to principle** is perhaps felt most strongly in the case of socially controversial matters—as democracy, slavery, executions, women’s suffrage, and gay rights have been at various times, for example—when we are called upon to choose and defend a position among conflicting popular alternatives. Of course, our introspection in such situations could be deceptive. It may be that our actions are caused by factors entirely other than beliefs about right and wrong, and that such beliefs merely occur to us as rationalizations of those actions. Quite plausibly this is often the case, just as more generally the reasons that we think are responsible for our doing or believing anything may just be retroactive rationalizations that substitute for the true cause. In many cases, though, when we see our beliefs or choices change under the weight of new evidence or arguments, we reasonably conclude that that evidence or argument likely caused the difference. Plausibly, then, explicit deliberations about right and wrong are at least sometimes influential in determining our actions. Thus, at a minimum, explicit beliefs about right and wrong may exert influence when the balance among other factors is roughly even, or when one must take sides in a social conflict. More importantly, though, even if explicit ethical theorizing does not proximally influence our actions much in routine situations, the other factors that do operate in such situations may themselves be shaped in the long run by explicit ethical reasoning (among other factors). This consideration applies especially to social influences, punishments and rewards, and feelings of pride or shame. Even when we conform to social pressures without knowing their origin, we are acting under the extended influence of whatever reasoning (and whatever other factors) helped sculpt those pressures over the years and millennia. By analogy, our biological form is determined by the accumulation of our ancestral mutations, even though mutation rarely affects an individual reproductive step. Similarly, the culturally cumulative effect of explicit reasoning about ethics quite possibly predominates over other factors, even if the immediate impact of explicit reasoning is negligible at almost every step. Attempts to logically derive ethical foundations without ethical presupposition should not be thought to suggest that such a derivation is necessary (or sufficient) to promote ethical conduct. Similarly, appeal to thought experiments involving agents with idealized rationality or idealized predictive powers does not suggest that people would need to have such powers in order to behave ethically. And of course, we would be foolish to pretend that we humans are ideally rational and hence able to behave ethically by sheer exercise of reason. Alas, we must not forgo the systematic incentives and sanctions that, in reality, we need in order to supplement the influence of our limited rationality. Still, I maintain it is both true and important that a sufficiently rational person would indeed have rational grounds, without prior ethical supposition, for benevolent and principled behavior, even if (unrealistically) all additional factors promoting such behavior were absent. It is important because if an arbitrarily rational person would find no reason for ethical behavior per se, that would be a reductio ad absurdum of the belief that one should behave ethically. Then, to the extent that we tried to base our actions on careful deliberation, we would be led away from ethical conduct, not toward it—benevolence and rationality would be adversarial rather than symbiotic. It may well be easier to motivate our ethical conduct by appealing to intuitions such as this is right, this is fair, and think about the other person’s feelings—rather than by the intellectual machismo of appealing only to abstract arguments about acausal means–end relations. Similarly, we would not need or want to try to motivate our every move on a bicycle by an analysis of Newtonian mechanics. Both in physics and in ethics, even if we accept the principles extracted from reasoning about idealized toy scenarios, the explicit application of those principles to everyday situations is often impractically complex. Anticlimactically, after all the analysis, we must revert to trusting our intuitions much of the time—intuitions that, I speculate, are implemented in part by means–end-recognizing machinery along the lines of what is sketched in chapter 5 above. (Dennett 1995 documents discussion of a similar point about intuition versus explicit reasoning at least as far back as the 1800s.) Nonetheless, by understanding how our intuitions could possibly be competent to know the truth about physical objects, or about ethics—by knowing that there are underlying mechanical principles whose ramifications our brains could be computing, even if the details of the computations are not introspectively accessible—and **by knowing the general form of those principles, we can** better **judge which** of our **intuitions to trust, and refine those intuitions.** Knowing physics may not help much in riding a bicycle, but it does help in designing a bicycle, not to mention a spaceship. And it helps us dismiss entire categories of spurious intuitions, such as those that pursue perpetual-motion machines or telekinesis. Knowing how our sense of balance works explains why we should trust it to stay upright while walking, but not while piloting an airplane inside clouds. Similarly, an account of ethical foundations can steer us away from grounding our choices in ancient mystical dictates, or in exclusive consideration of selfish causal consequences, while helping us understand why an intuitive balancing of categorical-imperative factors may be a more sound guide. In sum, ethical theory, explicit belief about right and wrong, is not omnipotent in determining our behavior, but it is influential. Good theories of ethics can encourage us to behave well; bad theories can promote correspondingly unethical behavior. Grounding ethics in reciprocal altruism unduly encourages selfishness; ultimate **reliance on social, legal, or religious tradition** or authority tends to **entrench the oppressive** or persecutorial **aspects of those institutions**; and perhaps most insidiously, denial that there is a rational foundation for ethics exerts influence toward ethical relativism, which tends to imply that any adopted ethical standard is as good as any other—and thence toward ethical nihilism, the doctrine that there is no real distinction between right and wrong.

#### 2. Truth testing kills reciprocity-comparing worlds solves.

Nelson Adam Nelson (Director of Lincoln-Douglas Debate at the Harker School) “Towards a Comprehensive Theory of LD” The Lincoln-Douglas Debate Theory Journal April 15th 2008 http://ldtheoryjournal.blogspot.com/2008/04/towards-comprehensive-theory-of-ld-adam.html JW

And the truth-statement model of the resolution imposes an absolute burden of proof on the affirmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the affirmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truth-claims until we are persuaded otherwise, the affirmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the affirmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufficient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges find ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution. If the negative need only prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to deny our ability to make truth-statements or to prove normative morality does not exist or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, such strategies seem fundamentally unfair, as they provide the negative with functionally infinite ground, as there are a nearly infinite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the affirmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole. Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of competing world-views rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the negative retains equal flexibility while being denie[s]d access to those skeptical arguments indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way.

#### Reciprocity is key to fairness since it ensures equal access to the ballot. And, err aff on framing issues-key to clash. It’s better to have a substantive debate under an imperfect paradigm than just have a debate about paradigms for the whole round.

#### 3. drop the arg on neg NIBs–ensures structural reciprocity by solving the 2-1 advantage, key to fairness because it ensures equal access to the ballot.

#### 4. neg abuse outweighs aff abuse. Neg is reactive and can always pick a strat to adapt to the aff and have a good shot at winning the round, 6 minute 2NR means you can answer the 1AR’s drops or coverage issues.

#### 5. aff gets 1AR theory and meta theory—deters neg from being infinitely abusive, otherwise they’ll always win. Meta theory ensures I can engage in theory and not lose on the highest layer.

#### 6. 1AR theory is drop the debater-the 1AR is too short to be able to rectify abuse and adequately cover substance-you should be punished.

# 2NR F/L

### A2 Objects don’t have intrinsic properties

1. definitions determine an objects intrinsic aim

2. intrinsic properties are inherent in design-bread knife becomes a machete when you lose the ridges that go through bread

3. they can also be defined based on usage

### A2 Gun Rights

#### There are property rights but those have limits-in the same way it’s illegitimate to own a nuclear weapon, gun ownership creates a coercive relationship between different agents that the government must rectify. Even if freedom is good in general-we need an overall system that protects it from other violations-that’s Kant-that means the aff contention comes first.

### Action Theory

#### Something qualifies as an action and not a mere event only if it is constituted by practical reasoning.

Rodl Sebastian. Self-Consciousness, Harvard University Press, 2000

**Calculation from desire does not yield a premise for instrumental reasoning because its conclusion represents a changeable state**, while an instrumental reasoning proceeds from a thought that represents something with the temporality of a movement. But the instrumental syllogism is a necessary form of practical reasoning, for practical reasoning arrives at a thought on which a movement may rest. And **if a movement rests on thought, then the unity of its phases**, which constitutes it as a movement, **must rest on thought.** So it does **if I reason [that]** from the same thought now, **“I want to do B. So let me do [X]”**, and then, “I want to do B. So let me do [Y]”, and so on. As “I want to do B” expresses the same thought all the while that I am doing B and until I have done it, **the unity of the phases of my doing B consists in the fact that they all hang on that thought. By contrast, if “I want to do B” represented a changeable state** I would not reason from the same thought, now to doing A1, and then to doing A2. In consequence, my doing A1 and my doing A2 would bear no unity. **These would not be phases of a movement, and I would not**, in doing A1 and A2, **be doing B.**

#### Outweighs the neg framework:

#### A) it’s a prerequisite-we can’t evaluate what a good action is if we don’t have a basic definition of what an action is.

#### B) denial of reason is impossible-we can always question why our desires matter, but asking whether we have a reason to act for reasons would be self-defeating because the question itself concedes the authority of reasons.

### Handgun=Gun

Merriam Webster “Handgun” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/handgun> JW

a small gun (such as a revolver or a pistol) designed to be held and shot with one hand

## Kant ROTB

### 2NR: Kant Oppression Method

Kantianism is the best method to reject oppression.

1. oppression is just coercion-your framework begs the question of what kind of coercion we reject. Only I’m contextualizing this with substantive justifications. This outweighs: A. strength of link-I solve for oppression and other bad things-oppression shouldn’t be the only focus of our evaluation of action-for example we should also say that killing someone is bad-even if that is not something related to oppression-I solve for everything bad so I outweigh. B. ethical debates are a prerequisite to social change-this means evaluate the framework debate by whose framework is capital T true.

Goldstein 14 Rebecca Newberger Goldstein (Former professor of Philosophy at Rutgers and Columbia, PhD from Princeton). “Why Study Philosophy? 'To Challenge Your Own Point of View'.” 27 February 2014. http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/02/why-study-philosophy-to-challenge-your-own-point-of-view/283954/t

It’s amazing how long it takes us, but we do make progress. And it’s usually philosophical arguments that first introduce the very outlandish idea that we need to extend rights. And it takes more, it takes a movement, and activism, and emotions, to affect real social change. It starts with an argument, but then it becomes obvious. The tracks of philosophy’s work are erased because it becomes intuitively obvious. The arguments against slavery, against cruel and unusual punishment, against unjust wars, against treating children cruelly—these all took arguments. Which philosophical arguments have you seen shifting our national conversation, changing what we once thought was obvious? About 30 years ago, the philosopher Peter Singer started to argue about the way animals are treated in our factory farms. Everybody thought he was nuts. But I’ve watched this movement grow; I’ve watched it become emotional. It has to become emotional. You have to draw empathy into it. But here it is, right in our time—a philosopher making the argument, everyone dismissing it, but then people start discussing it. Even criticizing it, or saying it’s not valid, is taking it seriously. This is what we have to teach our children. Even things that go against their intuition they need to take seriously. What was intuition two generations ago is no longer an intuition; and it’s arguments that change it. We are very inertial creatures. We do not like to change our thinking, especially if it’s inconvenient for us. And certainly the people in power never want to wonder whether they should hold power. So it really takes hard, hard work to overcome that.

2. Universalizability recognizes that we can’t ignore other people-this is essential to inclusion.

**Farr 02** Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others **as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

3. Using intuitions is insufficient and counter-productive. Only universal reason can create real world change.

Drescher 6 Gary L. Drescher (Visiting Fellow at the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, PhD in Computer Science from MIT). “Good and Real: Demystifying Paradoxes from Physics to Ethics.” Bradford Books. 5 May 2006.

Still, to the extent that evolution has rigged us with a disposition toward empathy and other cooperation-promoting emotions (as in Frank’s account), we might simply behave cooperatively without needing a rationale for doing so (just as you do not need a rationale to keep your heart beating—it’s simply built that way). But empathy is notoriously limited. We do not, for instance, grieve deeply each time we read of a stranger being murdered. And empirically, from the extent of violent, selfish, or predatory behavior in the world, we can see that whatever altruistic disposition our genes or upbringing may impose, it can in fact be overridden by other considerations, for better (violence used in self defense, perhaps, in small-scale or even large-scale conflicts) or for worse (harming people to rob them, or persecute them, or just for fun). Moreover, there are many inclinations that, even if they result from specific genetic predispositions, we want to override. For instance, suppose there is a genetic predisposition to alcoholism. If you learned that you had inherited the alcoholism genes, you would not necessarily resign yourself to becoming an addict, nor should you. A more sensible response would be to take special care to avoid the expression of that disposition. Or, a sense of empathy (whether hardwired or not) may disincline you to violate the bodily integrity of another. But if you are a surgeon, you must learn to suppress that aversion in order to make an incision through flesh. Dennett (1995), Gould (1981), and other critics of (some construals of) sociobiology point out that many putative genetically predisposed behavioral tendencies—for example, toward sexism or aggression in some situations— do not thereby constitute imperatives, either behavioral or ethical, even if the supposed genetic influences are real. But the same holds true for any genetic influences that tend to promote altruism or cooperation. The ethical imperative, if any, must still come from somewhere else. In short, whatever emotional impulse we may have toward altruism and empathy, and to whatever extent it may be genetically hardwired, it does not obviate the need for explicit judgments about right and wrong. If it did not seem correct to act with kindness and fairness, even at a net personal cost—if there were no sensible reason for so acting, beyond a raw impulse to do so—then we would have reason to regard the raw impulse as pointlessly self-destructive—like a disposition to alcoholism or a purely visceral (so to speak) aversion to surgery—and we would have reason to attempt to overcome it. And it is plausible that that attempt would have at least partial success, since empirically an impulse to altruism or empathy can be and often is overridden, for reasons good and bad. Thus, although a dog or cat is not in danger of having its friendly behavior diminished by a belief that the behavior lacks a rational foundation (because it presumably forms no opinion about rational foundations), humans may be subject to that risk. And conversely, a belief that our kindly inclinations are correct is likely to help cultivate and amplify those inclinations. An explicit **belief in the obligation to treat others fairly enables us to go beyond** what is compelled by **the limited emotional experience of caring.** Furthermore, we all experience temptations to do what is wrong if it profits us greatly. If there is an explicit belief that an obligation to be altruistic and principled is real, that it has a rational basis, then this belief presumably has some effect, at least in borderline cases. The belief is likely to push in one direction, whereas a belief that an altruistic inclination has no rational privilege over any other sort of inclination we might experience would likely push the other way. It is not surprising that our built-in inclinations do not suffice to explain ethics. The biological evolution of altruistic behavior, construed as a learning process, can be viewed as an early step in reasoning about ethics—a step taken by evolution itself, rather than by an individual intelligence. But as with other learning carried out by evolution, we may expect this early step to be rudimentary compared to what we can reason about explicitly. By analogy, evolution has also implicitly learned about some basic properties of physical objects; this knowledge is embodied in whatever hardwired competence we have for perceiving, manipulating, and navigating among the objects in our ordinary environments. But however helpful a point of departure this hardwired knowledge may be, it is naive by comparison with the knowledge developed by physicists. It would be a terrible mistake to settle for our crude, hardwired version of either physics or ethics. Similar considerations apply to socially inculcated tendencies toward cooperation. Many aspects of what we now recognize to be moral conduct began as revolutionary, unprecedented defiance of prevailing mores. For such progress to occur, social values themselves cannot be the ultimate origin of ethics. Consider the range of ethical beliefs and corresponding behaviors actually exhibited by large groups of people: from Nazism to humanism, from slavery and manifest destiny to freedom rides and Gandhian resistance. All these and more are demonstrably within the scope of human genetic, social, and psychological constraints. 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### Mutual Aid

An anarchist society is committed to mutual aid-people consent to organic reciprocal constraints-this is historically verified.

McKay Iain McKay (primary contributor and editor to “An Anarchist FAQ”) “Mutual Aid: An Introduction and Evaluation” pg. 35 <http://anarchism.pageabode.com/sites/anarchism.pageabode.com/files/MAintroduction.pdf> JW 2/6/15

Mutual Aid also provides substantial evidence to support the anarchist theory of social change. Anarchists argue that human societal evolution (including periods of swift evolution called revolution) was based on the conflict between what could be termed the “law of mutual struggle” and the “law of mutual aid.” The book provides empirical evidence that both historically and within current struggles, people have organised themselves to resist the institutions and negative results of mutual struggle (such as the oppression and exploitation resulting from private property, the state and other social hierarchies). These take many forms, including village folkmoots, neighbourhood forums, unions, strikes, guilds, co-operatives, and so on). Thus the mutual aid tendency “continued to live in the villages and among the poorer classes in the towns.” Indeed, “in so far as” new “economical and social institutions” were “a creation of the masses” they “have all originated from the same source” of mutual aid. By these means, the masses “maintained their own social organisation, which was based upon their own conceptions of equity, mutual aid, and mutual support . . . even when they were submitted to the most ferocious theocracy or autocracy.”162

### A2 Kant was Racist

1. T-Kant is an example of why ethics solves racism. He completely changed his racist beliefs as a result of his philosophy, which for a white dude in 18th century Europe is actually pretty damn progressive.

**Kleingeld 7** Pauline Kleingeld (Professor at the University of Groningen). “KANT’S SECOND THOUGHTS ON RACE.” Philosophical Quarterly. 2007. <http://www.rug.nl/staff/pauline.kleingeld/kleingeld-kant-on-race-pq.pdf>

**Kant radically revised his views on race during the 1790s.** He gives no indication of when or why he changed his views. **He makes no mention of a racial hierarchy anywhere in his published writings of the 1790s**, however, **and** what he does say about related issues **contradicts his earlier views on a racial hierarchy** and a plan of Nature designed to restrict human migration (after their initial dispersal across the globe). I ﬁrst discuss evidence for the thesis that Kant dropped his hierarchical view of the races, and then turn to the status of the concept of race as such in his later work. **In Toward Perpetual Peace and the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant clearly departs from his earlier position in a number of ways. First of all, he becomes more egalitarian with regard to race.**28 **He now grants a full juridical status to non-whites, a status irreconcilable with his earlier defence of slavery. For example, his concept of cosmopolitan right**, as introduced in Toward Perpetual Peace (: ), **explicitly prohibits the colonial conquest of foreign lands:** If one compares with this [viz the idea of cosmopolitan right] the inhospitable behaviour of the civilized states in our part of the world, especially the commercial ones, the injustice that the latter show when visiting foreign lands and peoples (which to them is one and the same as conquering those lands and peoples) takes on terrifying propor- tions. America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, etc., were at the time of their discovery lands that they regarded as belonging to no one, for the native inhabitants counted as nothing to them. **Any European settlement requires contractual agreement with the existing population**, says Kant, unless the settlement takes place so far from other people that there is no encroachment on anyone’s use of land. In the section on cosmopolitan right in the Metaphysics of Morals, **Kant speciﬁcally stipulates that such a contract should not take advantage of the ignorance of the in- habitants with regard to the terms of the contract** (MM : ), a stipulation which presupposes a concern not found in the 1780s texts. The very fact that Kant regards Native Americans, Africans and Asians as (equally) capable of signing contracts, and as persons whose interests and claims present a normative constraint on the behaviour of European powers, indicates a shift in perspective. After all, as long as Kant regarded slavery as appropriate for Native Americans and Africans, he did not con- sider their consent to be important at all. **The same can be said about the fact that he now defends hunting** and shepherding **peoples against en- croachment by Europeans, instead of highlighting their failure to develop agriculture** as he did earlier. **In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant rejects con- sequentialist justiﬁcations for colonialism (the alleged ‘civilizing’ eﬀects on the ‘savages’)** (MM : ). He also rejects the argument that the European colonists are justiﬁed in claiming ownership over foreign lands and their inhabitants by the fact they ‘establish a new civil union with them and bring these human beings (savages) into a rightful condition’. Instead, Kant main- tains that the latter have the right of ﬁrst possession, and that this right is violated by the European ownership claims (MM : ). Importantly, **Kant has now become unambiguously opposed to chattel slavery.** Robert Bernasconi has claimed that Kant was ‘silent on the slave trade in Africans’ and ‘failed to speak out against chattel slavery’, and that he is ‘aware of no direct statement by Kant calling for the abolition of either African slavery or the slave trade, even if only in principle’.29 Such state- ments do exist, however. In his notes for Toward Perpetual Peace (–), **Kant repeatedly and explicitly criticizes slavery of non-Europeans in the strongest terms, as a grave violation of cosmopolitan right** (: –). **He formulates a scathing critique of the conduct of European powers elsewhere in the world. He sharply criticizes ‘the civilized countries bordering the seas’, whom he accuses of recognizing no normative constraints in their behaviour towards people on other continents** and of regarding the ‘possess- ions and even the person of the stranger as a loot given to them by Nature’. **Kant censures the slave trade** (‘trade in Negroes’), not as an excessive form of an otherwise acceptable institution, but **as in itself a ‘violation’ of the cosmopolitan right of blacks** (: ). Similarly, he criticizes the fact that the inhabitants of America were treated as objects belonging to no one, and ‘were displaced or enslaved’ soon after Europeans reached the continent (: –). After having discussed European behaviour in Africa, America and Asia, he concludes (: ): The principles underlying the supposed lawfulness of appropriating newly discovered and purportedly barbaric or irreligious lands, as goods belonging to no one, without the consent of the inhabitants and even subjugating them as well, are absolutely contrary to cosmopolitan right. In the published version of Toward Perpetual Peace, Kant repeats this judge- ment. He criticizes the ‘very most gruesome and most calculated slavery’30 on the Sugar Islands (PP : ). In the Metaphysics of Morals too (MM : , , ), he categorically and repeatedly condemns chattel slavery.31 **These passages show that Kant changed his earlier views on the status of non-whites. The oft-defended thesis that Kant’s racism remained constant thus needs correction, and one should not use evidence from the 1780s in support of claims about his views in the 1790s.** For example, his statements from the mid-1790s contradict the view that the role of the ‘idle races’ in Kant’s cosmopolitan theory was merely that of a contrast against which Europeans could measure their own progress,32 as well as the view that for Kant, the non-white races counted as a ‘waste’ of nature.33 These inter- pretations are based on Kant’s earlier texts, and therefore they are at most defensible as interpretations of his earlier views, not of his later views on the races. **Kant not only became more egalitarian with regard to race, he also revised his view of the role of race in connection with intercontinental migration.** In some of his earlier writings he called racial diﬀerentiation ‘necessary’ for the preservation of the species during its initial dispersal across the globe (DCHR : ), and claimed that Nature discouraged sub- sequent migrations. As Mark Larrimore has shown, however, these claims were in tension with Kant’s repeated declarations, often in the same writings, that whites are able to live anywhere on earth,34 for they imply that racial diﬀerentiation (or, more precisely, the development of non-whites) is not really necessary for the preservation of the species after all. Kant’s later position simply does not attribute any special role to racial diﬀerentiation (let alone racial hierarchy) for the purpose of global migration. In his 1795 description of what Nature has done to enable humans to live everywhere on earth, Kant omits any mention of predispositions for diﬀer- ent races (PP : –). He now claims that Nature has organized the earth in such a way that humans can and will live everywhere, and that they will eventually use the surface of the earth for interacting peacefully (PP : ). The new category of cosmopolitan right, introduced in Toward Perpetual Peace, is premised on increasing and continuing movement and interaction across borders. He concludes his exposition of cosmopolitan right (which includes his critique of colonialism and slavery) with the hope that In this way, remote parts of the world can establish relations peacefully with one another, relations which ultimately become regulated by public laws and can thus ﬁnally bring the human species ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution (PP : ). Instead of his earlier claim that blacks and Native Americans cannot govern themselves (: ) and that Europe ‘will probably eventually legislate for all other continents’ (IUH : ), Kant now envisages a world in which people of diﬀerent colours and on diﬀerent continents establish peaceful relations with each other that honour the normative principles laid down in his exposition of cosmopolitan right. **Finally, Kant’s ascription of mental characteristics to the diﬀerent races has changed. For example, he ascribes the ideal of military courage equally to Native Americans and mediaeval European knights** (PP : ). **This stands in marked contrast with his earlier insistence on the weakness and inertia of Native Americans.**

2. Not a reason to reject the entire theory. Sometimes bad people make good things.

3. Kant’s theory is total separate from his beliefs. Universality is key to avoiding ethical egoism.

**Farr 2** Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed ﬁrst. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. **The Kantian conception of rational beings requires** such an **abstraction. Some** feminists and **philosophers of race** have **found** this **abstract** notion of **rational beings problematic because** they take it to mean that **rationality is** necessarily **white, male, and European.**33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. **I ﬁnd this interpretation** of Kant’s moral theory quite **puzzling.** Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. **First,** the **abstraction** requirement **may be best understood as a demand for intersubjectivity** or recognition. **Second, it may be understood as an attempt to** avoid **ethical** egoism in determining maxims for our actions. It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. The **abstraction** requirement simply **demands that in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves.** That is, we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common. Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for selfdetermination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. **To avoid** ethical **egoism one must abstract from** (think beyond) one’s own **personal interest** and subjective maxims. That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings. Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings. Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. **The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is that it contravenes racist ideology** to the extent **that** racist ideology **is based on the use of persons** of a different race **as a means to an end** rather than as ends in themselves. Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 Although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy. A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text. Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very signiﬁcant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. What **deconstruction will reveal** is not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather, it will disclose the **disunity between Kant’s theory and his own feelings** about blacks and women. **Although** the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, **Kant** the man **has his own** personal and moral **problems**. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, **it would be equally deplorable to reject the categorical imperative without ﬁrst exploring its** emancipatory potential**.**

### Ng

The constitutive nature of agency makes immanent critique impossible.

Ng Karen Ng (Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University) “From the Critique of Reason to the Critique of Ideology: On the Relation between Life and Consciousness from Hegel to Critical Theory” JW

In order to determine exactly how the relation between life and consciousness can be methodologically instructive for a critique of ideology, I want to begin by clarifying the paradox inherited from the critique of reason that is constitutive of the critique of ideology. In its most general statement, and following Raymond Geuss’ characterization, ideology critique is inherently reflexive or self-referential: a critique of a form of life as ideological necessarily belongs to the very “object-domain” that it both describes and criticizes.4 Just as the critique of reason operates within the bounds of reason, ideology critique belongs to and is conditioned by the very social formation that it seeks to understand, critique, and transform. This self-referentiality, necessitated by the project of self-critique, is perhaps the formal characteristic that distinguishes traditional from critical theories. In traditional theory, critique and the object of critique (or more broadly, subject and object) are kept strictly apart and express no necessary or internal relationship. (Horkheimer associates this with the Cartesian point of view, whose contemporary incarnates include scientism and/or positivism).5 Critical theories, however, find themselves on both sides of the subject/object divide, and must be able to account for themselves as parts of their objects of investigation. Initially, we might picture here a snake biting its own tail, insofar as the critique of ideology is an activity that arises out of the very form of life it criticizes. Far from a mere idiosyncrasy, the selfreferentiality of critique tracks two essential and essentially connected modern developments. The first is the modern conception of the self, most commonly conceived under the heading of “self-consciousness.” In its most minimal determination, selfconsciousness denotes a certain reflectiveness and self-awareness of one’s own constitutive conditions from within those conditions themselves.6 For Kant, this meant coming to an understanding of the transcendental conditions of possibility for knowledge within the limits of possible experience; for Hegel, it meant attempting to establish the totality of conditions necessary for spirit’s development and self-understanding, a totality that he called, “actuality” (Wirklichkeit);7 for Marx, it meant determining the conditions of the production of material life, a production that always takes place as a social and historical act.8 What we see in this progressive self-critical examination of one’s own conditions from Kant to Marx is not only increasing concreteness (from transcendental conditions of possibility to conditions of actuality to material (economic) conditions), but an increasing awareness of history and historical conditions as self-determined, and hence, as a potential site of freedom and transformation. Thus, the self-referentiality of critique, what Habermas called modernity’s consciousness of time,9 at the same time tracks a second modern injunction, namely, the normative demand to live a free life.10 In seeking to understand and criticize our own constitutive conditions, ideology critique exposes the ambivalence of those conditions from within, exemplifying a distinctively modern form of reflective, historical self-consciousness. Another common way of characterizing this reflexivity is to identify ideology critique as a mode of immanent critique.11 Very roughly defined, immanent critique is a form of self-critique that arises out of the contradictions, inconsistencies, paradoxes, inversions, crises, protests, failures, exclusions, and even tragedies of social formations. The locus classicus for the project of immanent critique is Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, where the formation and experience of modern self-conscious life is traced according to the failures of spirit to live up to its own self-given criteria for truth, goodness, and most importantly, freedom.12 More specifically, and in a way analogous to the distinguishing feature of critical theories, Hegel unfolds the experience, development, and transformation of consciousness by demonstrating the entwinement of subject and object at every stage. Critique is immanent not only because consciousness continually finds itself in its object (an object of thought, another person, social reality), but further, because the incongruencies and conflicts that arise immanently in the course of experience are transformative of both subject and object, producing new forms of consciousness, new norms, and new social realities.13 From this very general description of the reflexivity of ideology critique, we can immediately identify two well-known problems with this approach, problems that have led many theorists—both within and outside the confines of critical theory—to abandon the project of ideology critique altogether.14 The first can be called the problem of totalization: in being unable to step outside of a form of life in order to criticize it, in living in, by, and through the very conditions that one seeks to understand, critique appears to be so fully integrated into that which it criticizes that it becomes very difficult to distinguish between ideology and non-ideology.15 Thus, Adorno writes of the “complicity of cultural criticism with culture,”16 suggest[s]ing that practices of critique might come to merge so seamlessly with their object so as to render their critical edge entirely obsolete. It appears here that the closure of ideology is so complete, its reach so all-encompassing, that there is simply no place for the critic to stand.

But, attempts to transcend the human condition makes critique useless.

Ng 2 Karen Ng (Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University) “From the Critique of Reason to the Critique of Ideology: On the Relation between Life and Consciousness from Hegel to Critical Theory” JW

Now if one wants to reject this characterization, we are led into a second problem: to avoid the notion of a fully ideologically saturated form of life, the critic can assume a position that is outside of, or transcends, her object of critique. In transcending the object of critique, the critic can easily identify its object as ideological from a neutral standpoint outside the reach of ideology. Of course, this conception is equally fraught with problems. In assuming a position of transcendence, the critic finds herself open to a whole host of objections, including paternalism, arbitrariness, foundationalism, a naïve conception of the relation between reality and appearances, and a conception of truth that exists outside the bounds of the conditions of truth. Most importantly, by ejecting itself from its object of critique, the position of transcendence reverts back to the traditional theory that ideology critique was meant to overcome in the first place.17

Critique must navigate between the concrete and the abstract. Ideology and materiality influence each other.

Ng 3 Karen Ng (Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University) “From the Critique of Reason to the Critique of Ideology: On the Relation between Life and Consciousness from Hegel to Critical Theory” JW

It should almost go without saying that just as Hegel’s “Idea” is not something merely in the head, ideology, and especially its effects, are also not to be taken as mere ideas. In fact, the first instance of ideology (the “German” ideology of the young Hegelians) is the conviction that only changing our ideas will thereby suffice to change reality. Marx’s conception of ideology begins with a fairly straightforward presupposition, namely, “the existence of living human individuals [die Existenz lebendiger menschlicher Individuen]” and the material conditions of productive activity through which they reproduce their life.37 To distinguish human life from animal life, Marx again uses the logic of species-being, specifying that taking life activity as an object of volition and consciousness, is, minimally, to actively produce one’s means of subsistence. Recalling Adorno’s Hegelian assessment that to set a limit is also thereby to go beyond it, the material conditions of actual life are both found as given and already existing, and as something that is produced and reproduced by the activities of living human individuals. We can understand the emergence of ideology from these presuppositions in two stages. The first is a very general claim made by Marx that ideas, conceptions, and consciousness itself must be understood as the products or results of the activities of human beings. Far from being a reductionist claim, all Marx is suggesting here is the Hegelian thought that ideas are not in the head, that the ideas and conceptions of consciousness must have some necessary relation to the productive activities of real, living individuals. His simple and straightforward formula for this claim is that “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.”38 Just as Hegel objected to Kant’s purely transcendental critique of reason, Marx is suggesting that we cannot simply attack ideas we don’t like—patriarchy, individualism, private property—as if ideas were entirely self-sufficient, as if ideas could swing entirely free from the material conditions and practices from which they draw their life. More accurately, what constitutes ideology in the first instance is the belief that concepts autonomously control and determine material conditions and practices, rather than the other way around. This is a fairly common way of understanding ideology, and accounts for the use of term when we talk, for example, about political or religious ideologies (religion of course is always the first example of ideology for Marx). The self-sufficiency and transcendence of the products of consciousness also in part accounts for the purportedly eternal or “natural” character of ideologies (so sexist and racist ideas are true, in and of themselves, independent of material conditions, and we must use these ideas to determine and organize reality). However, the matter is little more complicated, for this inversion of the life/selfconsciousness relation in which consciousness and its products come to be falsely viewed as self-sufficient, is only half the story. To cite another famous passage from The German Ideology: If in all ideology human beings and their circumstances [Verhältnisse] appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.39 The other half of the story is this: the illusion that the ideas and conceptions of consciousness autonomously determine and control the material conditions of life, and the inversion of life and self-consciousness that this represents, is itself an idea that arises from a determinate configuration of the material conditions of production, of the practices and institutions that organize a society. That is, the very belief in the uncoupling of self-consciousness from life, the belief in an upside-down or inverted version of that relationship, the belief in the absolute transcendence of consciousness, is itself a product of the material circumstances and relations that obtain in a particular form of life. This is why it is not simply enough to attack ideas qua ideas, and why, instead, critique must navigate the dialectic of immanence and transcendence in which ideologies thrive. To turn to an example that in fact illuminates the entire problematic: when Marx and Adorno criticize idealism as a philosophy, the suggestion is not simply that idealism is a bad idea. Rather, it is no accident that idealism as a philosophy emerges with the development of the bourgeois class, and even while idealism asserts its autonomy from the conditions of life, it is nonetheless a philosophy that is decidedly, perhaps even necessarily, a product of the bourgeois form of life. Insofar as idealism in fact corresponds to the reality of bourgeois life, idealism as a philosophy is very much “true”—precisely because it corresponds with reality. What is wrong or false about idealism is not its status as a mere idea, but that it corresponds to a wrong or false reality, that it is an ideological reflex or echo of a wrong and false form of life.40 The critique of reason must become a critique of ideology, for to criticize ideas without criticizing the form of life that gave rise to them is to simultaneously attack a caput mortuum, and to resurrect that which is, in a sense, already dead. Philosophical critique becomes social critique, as soon as ideas become wedded to reality.

### Fem NB

Kantian studies are vital for gender equality.

Hay KANTIANISM, Liberalism; and Feminism Resisting Oppression Carol Hay University of Massachusetts Lowell, USA

**Kant's defense of the ultimate moral importance of our rational nature is something that feminists cannot afford to ignore**. This is because, as we will see in detail in Chapter 4, harms to one's rational nature are among the worst harms an oppressed person can face. **It is critically important for feminists to have something to say about why harms to women's rational capacities are seriously morally problematic because these harms are among the most egregious problems** that arise from women's oppression. [continues] Kantianism gives us a way to explain what is wrong with these harms. Despite what Kant himself might have thought, we know that women's rational capacities are no different from men's. Thus, we know that **women are just as deserving of respect as men**. And we know that **the respect that women are owed in virtue of their rational capacities is incompatible with the harms to women's rationality that can result from oppression**. **Feminists therefore have good reason to take Kant**ianism seriously **since Kant's work** on rationality **gives us the conceptual tools to make sense of what is wrong with** some of the worst harms of **sexist oppression.** But Kantianism is hardly the only moral framework that has the resources to explain what is wrong with harming women's rational capacities. What then, precisely, is the baby feminists risk throwing out with the Kantian bathwater?88 The baby, I hope it is clear by now, is the Kantian duty of self-respect. **Because Kant provides such a robust account of duties to the self, his account is unparalleled in its ability to fully explain the moral importance of self-respect. We will see next that his account is also unparalleled in its ability to condemn** certain **gendered norms of self-sacrifice.**

### Anthro NB

We must value animal nature in ourselves to think we have some final good, which would logically mean we must value animal nature in others.

Korsgaard The Origin of the Good and Our Animal Nature Christine M. Korsgaard Harvard University

Here’s what I mean: the distinctive form of life that characterizes an animal involves the maintenance of that very form of life by means of a relationship that obtains between the animal and her own functioning: the animal monitors her own functioning and has positive evaluative attitudes towards the things that promote her functioning and negative ones towards the things that will inhibit it. To put it more simply and intuitively, healthy, well- functioning animals like to eat when they are hungry, are eager to mate, fear their enemies, work assiduously to keep themselves clean and healthy, and so on. (Now don’t say “well, *of course* they do.” Allow yourself to be struck by the act that there are entities, *things*, that attend in this way to the goodness of their own condition.) What these phenomena show is that the function of an animal is to take care of itself – and nature made that possible by designing the animal *to care about itself* – by which I mean, to enjoy and suffer from its own extended- evaluative condition. On Aristotle’s conception, that’s not just a fact about animals – that’s what an animal essentially is, something that functions by caring about itself, and how it is doing. Animals have a final good because it is their nature to have evaluative attitudes about their own extended-evaluative condition. And that’s what a final good is: a final good is something that constitutes or contributes to the good condition of something that can experience its own condition as a good. That, I want to say, is the Aristotelian theory of the *nature* of the final good. To put it more carefully, Aristotle’s theory of the nature of the final good is that a final good is something that constitutes or contributes to the good condition of something that stands in an evaluative relationship to its own condition. Since an animal is essentially something that stands in an evaluative relationship to its own condition, to say that an animal has a final good is a kind of tautology. The two concepts – the concept of a being with a final good, and the concept of an animal – are pretty much co-extensive.