Neo-liberal ideology makes extinction inevitable. The unthinking drive for competitiveness sidelines concerns of ecological sustainability and leads to war.

**Bristow 10** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

In recent years, regional development strategies have been subjugated to the hegemonic discourse of competitiveness, such that the ultimate objective for all regional development policy-makers and practitioners has become the creation of economic advantage through superior productivity performance, or the attraction of new ﬁrms and labour (Bristow, 2005). A major consequence is the developing ‘ubiquitiﬁcation’ of regional development strategies (Bristow, 2005; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). This reﬂects the status of competitiveness as a key discursive construct (Jessop, 2008) that has acquired hugely signiﬁcant rhetorical power for certain interests intent on reinforcing capitalist relations (Bristow, 2005; Fougner, 2006). Indeed, **the competitiveness hegemony is such that many policies** previously **considered only indirectly relevant to unfettered economic growth tend to be hijacked in support of competitiveness agendas** (for example Raco, 2008; also Dannestam, 2008). This paper will argue, however, that a particularly narrow **discourse of ‘competitiveness’ has** been constructed that has **a number of negative connotations for the** ‘resilience’ of regions. Resilience is deﬁned as the region’s ability to experience **positive economic success that is socially inclusive, works within environmental limits and** which **can ride global economic punches** (Ashby et al., 2009). As such, resilience clearly resonates with literatures on sustainability, localisation and diversiﬁcation, and the developing understanding of regions as intrinsically diverse entities with evolutionary and context-speciﬁc development trajectories (Hayter, 2004). In contrast, the **dominant discourse of competitiveness is ‘placeless’ and increasingly associated with globalised, growth-ﬁrst and environmentally malign agendas** (Hudson, 2005). However, this paper will argue that the relationships between competitiveness and resilience are more complex than might at ﬁrst appear. Using insights from the Cultural Political Economy (CPE) approach, which focuses on understanding the construction, development and spread of hegemonic policy discourses, the paper will argue that the dominant discourse of competitiveness used in regional development policy is narrowly constructed and is thus insensitive to contingencies of place and the more nuanced role of competition within economies. This leads to problems of resilience that can be partly overcome with the development of a more contextualised approach to competitiveness. The paper is now structured as follows. It begins by examining the developing understanding of resilience in the theorising and policy discourse around regional development. It then describes the CPE approach and utilises its framework to explain both how a narrow conception of competitiveness has come to dominate regional development policy and how resilience inter-plays in subtle and complex ways with competitiveness and its emerging critique. The paper then proceeds to illustrate what resilience means for regional development ﬁrstly, with reference to the Transition Towns concept, and then by developing a typology of regional strategies to show the different characteristics of policy approaches based on competitiveness and resilience. Regional resilience Resilience is rapidly emerging as an idea whose time has come in policy discourses around localities and regions, where it is developing widespread appeal owing to the peculiarly powerful combination of transformative pressures from below, and various catalytic, crisis-induced imperatives for change from above. It features strongly in policy discourses around environmental management and sustainable development (see Hudson, 2008a), but has also more recently emerged in relation to emergency and disaster planning with, for example ‘Regional Resilience Teams’ established in the English regions to support and co-ordinate civil protection activities around various emergency situations such as the threat of a swine ﬂu pandemic. The discourse of resilience is also taking hold in discussions around desirable local and regional development activities and strategies. The recent global ‘credit crunch’ and the accompanying in-crease in livelihood insecurity has highlighted the advantages of those local and regional economies that have greater ‘resilience’ by virtue of being less dependent upon globally footloose activities, hav-ing greater economic diversity, and/or having a de-termination to prioritise and effect more signiﬁcant structural change (Ashby et al, 2009; Larkin and Cooper, 2009). Indeed, **resilience features particular strongly** in the ‘grey’ literature spawned by thinktanks, consul-tancies and environmental interest groups **around the consequences of the global recession, catastrophic climate change and the arrival of** the era of **peak oil** for localities and regions with all its implications for the longevity of carbon-fuelled economies, cheap, long-distance transport and global trade. **This popularly labelled ‘triple crunch’** (New Economics Foundation, 2008) **has powerfully illuminated the potentially disastrous material consequences of the** voracious **growth imperative at the heart of** neoliberalism and **competitiveness, both in the form of resource constraints (especially food security) and** in **the inability** of the current system **to manage global ﬁnancial and ecological sustainability.** In so doing, it appears to be galvinising previously disparate, fractured debates about the merits of the current system, and challenging public and political opinion to develop a new, global concern with frugality, egalitarianism and localism (see, for example Jackson, 2009; New Economics Foundation, 2008).

Resisting neoliberal logic on an individual level is an ethical imperative.

**Zizek and Daly 04**[[2]](#footnote-2)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that **our ethico-political responsibility is to confront** the constitutive violence of today’s global **capitalism and its obscene** naturalization / **anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it** throughout the world. […] [Full text available] In this way, **neo-liberal ideology** attempts to **naturalize[s] capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as** if they were simply **a matter of** chance and **sound judgment in a neutral market place.** Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, **the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless** (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation.

Resisting neoliberalism requires critically analyzing the way the government constructs individuals as economic actors. **Hamann 09** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

This ”critical attitude” that Foucault repeatedly refers to in all of his discussions of Kant from the 1970’s and 1980’s is inseparable from both his analysis of governmentality and his discussions of ethics and the history of the experience of the relation-ship between the subject and truth. What fascinated Foucault about the ”care of the self” he discovered in Greek and Roman ethics was the ”spiritual” relationship that existed between the subject and truth. In order to gain access to the truth, that is, in order to acquire the ”right” to the truth, individuals had to take care of themselves by engaging in certain self-transformative practices or ascetic exercises. Here we find critical and resistant forms of subjectivation where, rather than objectifying them-selves within a given discourse of power/knowledge, individuals engaged in prac-tices of freedom that allowed them to engage in ethical parrhesia or speak truth to power. In modernity, however, following what Foucault identified as ”the Cartesian moment” the principle ”take care of yourself” has been replaced by the imperative to “know yourself” [THS, 1 - 24]. In contemporary life that which gives an individual access to the truth is knowledge and knowledge alone, including knowledge of one’s self. In this context knowledge of the self is not something produced through the work individuals perform on themselves, rather it is something given through dis-iplines such as biology, medicine, and the social sciences. These modern forms of knowledge, of course, become crucial to the emerging biopolitical forms of govern-mentality. Whereas individuals were once urged to take care of themselves by using self-reflexive ethical techniques to give form to their freedom, modern **biopolitics ensures that individuals are** already **taken care of in terms of** biological and **economic forms of knowledge** and practices. As Edward F. McGushin puts it in his book Foucault’s Askesis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life, Power functions by investing, defining, and caring for the body understood as a bioeconomic entity. **The operation of biopower is to define** the freedom and truth of **the individual in economic** and biological **terms**. Reason is given the task of comprehending the body in these terms and setting the conditions within which it can be free. ...The formation of the disciplines marks the moment where askesis itself was absorbed within biopolitics. Foucault explicitly identified critique, not as a transcendental form of judgment that would subsume particulars under a general rule, but as a specifically modern ”attitude” that can be traced historically as the constant companion of pastoral power and governmentality. As Judith Butler points out in her article “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue”,39 **critique** is an attitude, distinct from judgment, precisely because it **expresses a skeptical** or questioning **approach to the** rules and **rationalities** that serve as the basis for judgment **within a** particular **form of governance**. From its earliest formations, Foucault tells us, the art of government has al-ways relied upon certain relations to truth: truth as dogma, truth as an individualizing knowledge of individuals, and truth as a reflective technique comprising general rules, particular knowledge, precepts, methods of examination, confessions, inter-views, etc. And while **critique** has at times played a role within the art of government itself, as we’ve seen in the case of both liberalism and neoliberalism, it **has** also **made possible** what Foucault calls “the art of not being governed, or better, the art of not being governed like that and at that cost” (WC, 45). Critique is neither a form of abstract theoretical judgment nor a matter of outright rejection or condemnation of specific forms of governance. Rather it is a practical and agonistic engagement, re-engagement, or disengagement with the rationalities and practices that have led one to become a certain kind of subject. In his essay “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault suggests that **this** modern attitude is a voluntary choice made by certain people, a **way of acting** and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and **presents itself as a** task.40 Its task amounts to a **“historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves** and to recognize ourselves **as subjects** of what we are doing, thinking, [and] saying” (WE, 125). But how can we distinguish the kinds of resistance Foucault was interested in from the endless calls to ”do your own thing” or ”be all you can be” that stream forth in every direction from political campaigns to commercial advertising? How is it, to return to the last of the three concerns raised above, that Foucault does not simply lend technical sup-port to neoliberal forms of subjectivation? On the one hand, we can distinguish criti-cal acts of resistance and ethical self-fashioning from what Foucault called ”the Cali-fornian cult of the self” (OGE, 245), that is, the fascination with techniques designed to assist in discovering one’s ”true” or ”authentic” self, or the merely ”cosmetic” forms of rebellion served up for daily consumption and enjoyment. On the other hand we might also be careful not to dismiss forms of self-fashioning as ”merely” aesthetic. As Timothy O’Leary points out in his book Foucault and the Art of Ethics, Foucault’s notion of an aesthetics of existence countered the modern conception of art as a singular realm that is necessarily autonomous from the social, political, and ethical realms, at least as it pertained to his question of why it is that a lamp or a house can be a work of art, but not a life. O’Leary writes: Foucault is less interested in the critical power of art, than in the ‘artistic’ or ‘plas-tic’ power of critique. For Foucault, not only do no special advantages accrue from the autonomy of the aesthetic, but this autonomy unnecessarily restricts our possibilities for self-constitution. Hence, not only is Foucault aware of the specific nature of aesthetics after Kant, he is obviously hostile to it.41 What O’Leary rightly identifies here is Foucault’s interest in an aesthetics of existence that specifically stands in a critical but immanent relation to the ways in which our individuality is given to us in advance through ordered practices and forms of knowledge that determine the truth about us. The issue is not a matter of how we might distinguish “authentic” forms of resistance (whatever that might mean) from “merely” aesthetic ones. Rather it is a matter of **investigating** whether or not **the practices we engage in** either reinforce or resist the manner in which our freedom—how we think, act, and speak—has been governed in ways that are limiting and intolerable. In short, critical resistance **offers possibilities for** an experience of **de-subjectification.** Specifically in relation **to neoliberal** forms of **governmentality, this would involve resisting,** avoiding, countering **or opposing not only the ways** in which **we’ve been encouraged to be** little more than **self-interested subjects** of rational choice (to the exclusion of other ways of being and often at the expense of those “irresponsible” others who have “chosen” not to amass adequate amounts of human capital), **but** also **the ways** in which our social environments, **institutions**, communities, work places, and forms of political engagement have been reshaped in order to **foster the production of Homo economicus**. Endless examples of this kind of work can be found in many locations, from the international anti-globalization movement to local community organizing.

Thus the Role of the Ballot

You are a specific intellectual, unearthing the assumptions on which government policy is predicated. This is a prerequisite to political action.

**Owen 94** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

The ‘universal’ intellectual, on Foucault’s account, is that figure who maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which the pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for generating norms) grounds politics in the ‘truth’ of our being (e.g.. our ‘real’ interests). The problematic forms of this type of intellectual practice is the central concern of Foucault’s critique of humanist politics in so far as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. If, however, this is the case, what alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can Foucault present to us? Foucault’s elaboration of the figure of **the ‘specific’ intellectual** provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the intellectual who **destroys** evidence and **generalities,** the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, **locates and marks the weak points,** the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, **doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow** for he is too attentive to the present. (PPC p. 124) **The historicity of thought**, the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside of time, **leads Foucault to locate intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to** the present in terms of **what is singular and arbitrary in what we take to be universal** and necessary. Following from this, **the intellectual does not seek to offer grand theories but specific analyses**, not global but local criticism. We should be clear on the latter point for it is necessary to acknowledge that Foucault’s position does entail the impossibility of ‘acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits’ and, consequently, ‘we are always in the position of beginning again’ (FR p. 47). The upshot of this recognition of the partial character of criticism is not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but, in so far as it involves a recognition that everything is dangerous, ‘a hyper-and pessimistic activism’ (FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very historicity and partiality of criticisms which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ‘ideal’ critique and ‘real’ transformation. Foucault suggests that the activity of **critique ‘is not** a matter of **saying that things are not right as they are’ but rather ‘of pointing out on what** kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, **uncontested modes of thought the practices we accept rest’** (PPC p. 154)This distinction is perhaps slightly disingenuous, yet Foucault’s points if intelligence if we recognize his concerns to disclose the epistemological grammar which informs our social practices as the starting point of critique. This emerges in his recognition that ‘**criticism** (and radical criticism) **is** absolutely **indispensable for any transformation’: A transformation that remains within the same mode of thought,** a transformation that **is** only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a **superficial** transformation. (PPC p. 155) The genealogical thrust of this activity is ‘to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident as one believed to see that what is accepted as self-evident is no longer accepted as such’ for ‘as soon as one can no longer think things formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible’ (PPC p. 155). The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in which it is embedded) as the form of our autonomy, although this urgency is given its specific character for modern culture by the recognition that the humanist grammar of this thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics. **The ‘specificity’ of intellectual practice** and this account of the activity of critique **come together in the refusal to legislate a universal determination of ‘what is right’ in favour of the perpetual problematisation of the present**. It is not a question, for Foucault, of invoking a determination of who we are as a basis for critique but of locating what we are now as the basis for reposting of the question ‘ who are we?’ The role of the intellectual is thus not to speak on the behalf of others (the dispossessed, the downtrodden) but to create the space within which their struggles become visible such that these others can speak for themselves. The question remains, however, as to the capacity of Foucault’s work to perform this critical activity through an entrenchment of the ethics of creativity as the structures of recognition through which we recognize our autonomy in the contestation of determinations of who we are.

Genealogy is uniquely important in the context of rehabilitation and retribution. **Foucault 76**[[5]](#footnote-5)

To put it another way: to the extent that these notions of "the bourgeoisie" and "the interests of the bourgeoisie" probably have no content, or at least not in terms of the problems we have just raised, what we have to realize is precisely that there was no such thing as a bourgeoisie that thought that madness should be excluded or that infantile sexuality had to be repressed; but there were **mechanisms** to exclude madness and techniques to keep infantile sexuality under **[of] surveillance**. At a given moment, and for reasons that have to be studied, they **generate**d a certain **economic profit,** a certain **political utility, and** they **were therefore** colonized and **supported by global mechanisms and**, finally, by **the** entire system of the **State. If we concentrate on** the **techniques of power** and show the economic profit or political utility that can be derived from them, in a certain context and for certain reasons, **then we can understand how these mechanisms** actually and eventually **became part of the whole.** In other words, the bourgeoisie doesn't give a damn about the mad, but from the nineteenth century onward and subject to certain transformations, the procedures used to exclude the mad produced or generated a political profit, or even a certain economic utility. They consolidated the system and helped it to function as a whole. The bourgeoisie is not interested in the mad, but it is interested in power over the mad; the bourgeoisie is not interested in the sexuality of children, but it is interested in the system of power that controls the sexuality of children. **The bourgeois**ie **does not give a damn about delinquents, or** about **how they are punished or rehabilitated**, as that is of no great economic interest. On the other hand, the set of **mechanisms whereby delinquents are controlled**, kept track of, **punished, and reformed does generate a bourgeois interest that functions within the economicopolitical system as a whole.** That is the fourth precaution, the fourth methodological line I wanted to follow.

Uncritical focus on political action creates serial policy failure; it only reproduces the dominant discourse. **Dillon and Reid 2k** write[[6]](#footnote-6)

As a precursor to global governance, **governmentality, according to Foucault**'s initial account, **poses the question of order** not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but **in terms** instead **of the management of population.** The management of population is further refined in terms of **specific problematics** to which population management may be reduced. These typically **include** but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: **economy**, health, welfare, **poverty,** security, sexuality, **demographics,** resources, **skills,** culture, **and so on.** Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[34] More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. **Policy domains** reify the problematization of life in certain ways by **turn**ing **these epistemically** and politically **contestable orderings** of life **into "problems" that require** the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of **policymakers. Policy "actors"** develop and **compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems** or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. **Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy**, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet **serial policy failure**--the fate and the fuel of all policy--**compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis** that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[35]

Thus the plan. Resolved: The USFG ought to repeal section 20411 of the VCCLEA. I affirm repealing the ban on Pell Grants for prisoners not as a political action but as a site to undertake a genealogy of the criminal justice system.

The plan should be the starting point, not the conclusion.

**Smith 97** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

In summary, I think that Wallace fundamentally misrepresents the relationship between theory and practice. His article works very effectively, but only because of its internal logical and political structure. By his setting up of two alternatives (cooption or scholasticism) the logical structure of the article performs a disciplining function by placing anyone outside of his logic of the policy–theory relationship in a predefined position of being self-righteous, self-indulgent, opposed to empirical work, too detached from the world of practice and too fond of theory. Note also the very revealing way in which those defined as having to ‘struggle with the dilemmas of power’ are policy-makers; there are massive normative and ethical assumptions at work here, ones that undermine his very notion of theory as explanatory and reveal his political project. The trouble is that Wallace’s logical structure is a textual construction and is therefore never subjected to any self-critical analysis in the article. My worry is that his prescriptions would make academic International Relations a servant of the state, responding to today’s headlines. Agreeing with Wallace means that **academics** will **run the risk of having to work within** the agenda of **the policy community,** of being **unable to stand back and examine the moral**, ethical **and political implications** of that choice. **Giving policy advice** is not the problem; the problem is if those who give it are unaware of the extent to which they are standing on the policy conveyor-belt of the state. It means problem-solving, it **means taking the ‘givens’ of policy-makers as** the **starting points of analysis.** It means walking the thin line between influence and fitting the values of policymakers. Clearly the discipline wants and needs to give advice on policy, but to whom? Is doing so for policy-makers a requirement for academics in discharging their responsibility to the state? My worry is that policy advice all too often means talking to governments; unfortunately, they may not be the right people to talk to if one’s concern is really with ‘those who have to struggle with the dilemmas of power’. And, crucially, are policy-makers listening to ideas or are they searching for an intellectual justification for their existing values? Ultimately, Wallace’s picture worries me because he has a very restricted view of politics and its relationship to academia. Politics for Wallace is a far more limited activity than I think it is, and that is why **I find no academic activity more** political or **ethical than showing** the **epistemological assumptions** of International Relations theory. For me it is not so much a question of speaking truth to power as of showing how various versions of the power/truth relationship operate between civil society and the state. In that relationship it may well be that those who espouse a restrictive view of theory are the ones who are hiding behind walls, preaching sermons of self-righteousness, and ultimately acting as the discipliners of the discipline. For all of us interested in international relations, Wallace has raised important questions concerning our responsibilities and our self-awareness. I hope that this reply has shown why the picture is not quite as simple as his beguiling argument suggests and why, ultimately, it may be impossible for ‘truth to speak to power’ in the liberal way that he suggests. After all, **if ‘truth’** itself **only gets meaning from the regimes** of truth within which it operates, **then how can it speak to power** when it is itself a construction of those same power relationships? How do we know that it is truth rather than power that we speak when we are speaking to policy-makers? Surely **the task of academics is to show how** these very **relationships between truth and power**, and between the empirical and the theoretical, **operate. That**, rather than the search for influence within the policy-making community, **is the ultimate ethical** and political **engagement** with the civil society in which we work and to which we are responsible.

The federal ban on Pell Grants for prisoners’ education was engrained in neoliberal logic of economic competitiveness that privileged vocational training over liberal arts education. **Yates 9** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

In 1971, Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger spoke at the first National Conference on Corrections, “We know that today the programs of (prisoner) education range from nonexistent to inadequate, with all too few exceptions. However we do it, the illiterate and the unskilled who are sentenced for substantial terms must be given the opportunity, the means, and the motivation to learn his way to freedom” (Burger, 1985 p. 193). Prison-based programs have dated back to the 1800s as reformers sought to extend basic and vocational education, as well as moral education to those who had been convicted of crimes (Welch, 1996). Gehring and Wright (2003) propose that many of these early reformers were not just interested in improving the virtues of the inmates, but also had a sophisticated understanding of the anti-democratic nature of penal systems. They had the progressive notion that prisoners were capable of being agents in their own reformation by taking responsibility for education. Gehring and Wright call the presence of these early radical prison educators, “the hidden heritage of correctional education” (p. 52 5). They suggest this thread of progressiveness extended up through World War II after which Cold War pragmatism resulted in a return to basic education (Gehring & Wright 2003). Much of the **programs of the** 19**60s and** 19**70s** followed a functionalist approach that **equated an inmate’s** future **success** as a law-abiding citizen **with** the knowledge required to obtain lawful employment and negotiate legal society. These skill sets focused primarily on obtaining **vocational skills** and basic literacy. Howard Davidson describes this theory: “it propounds that crime results from individuals making poor (i.e. criminal) decisions when faced with life‟s many problems. **Out of neoliberalism comes the market metaphor, in which individuals make rational decisions based on calculating benefits against costs**” (Davidson, 1995, p.4). How did the modern functionalist approach to prisoner education take root? Much of the impetus seems to have arisen from human capital theory. **One** of the **primary feature**s **of neoliberal thought** and practice **is the reliance upon** human capital theory to explain the purpose of education. Human capital theory has been described by Robert Hart and Thomas Moutos (1995) as an investment of **skills training in workers that seeks to balance the costs of training with the return on** the **investment.** Even the proponents of human capital theory describe it as reductionist, mechanical and based upon “homogenized factors.” During the reign of neoliberalism, human capital theory slithered from its manufacturing origins into the corridors of education. Perhaps the most succinct description of the human capital theory of education is provided (without apparent irony) by Joop Hartog and Hessel Oosterbeek (2007): “The basic human capital model of schooling envisages two options (1) go to school for s years and earn an income Ys every year after leaving school, or (2) go to work right away and earn 53 annual income Yo” (p. 7). This reductionist view of the role of schooling does not take into account exogenous factors that can affect income level such as discrimination and availability of jobs in the market (Livingstone, 1997). The role of human capital theory in education reached a high level of urgency among neoliberals as concern arose regarding the United States competiveness in global markets. Chief among the proponents were Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton through the Goals 2000 project which set the priority for education to create the workers who could increase the U.S. efficacy in international capitalism (Briscoe, 2000). A center-piece of the thrust toward implementation of human capital theory in education was the No Child Left Behind legislation which narrowed the focus of educational curricula toward those basic skills required for technical society such as math, reading and science at the expense of those for an active, well-rounded life such as social studies, art, music and physical education. According to Pauline Lipman (2007) No Child Left Behind is “explicitly designed to meet the needs and technical rationality of business… symbolically, as well as practically, national testing constitutes a system of quality control, verifying that those who survive the gauntlet of tests and graduate have the literacies and dispositions business requires” (Lipman, 2007, p. 46). Lipman sees the legislation as a disciplinary process with the end product being docile workers, the ultimate in human capital. Prisoner job training programs fulfilled this need. In the 1970s and 1980s, **in part due to** the availability of **the Pell Grant,** a **liberal arts** curriculum **became a major component of** many **prison education** programs in a way that it never had before**.** According to Mary Wright (2001) the correction education liberal arts programs remained in favor well into the 1990s even as it was de-emphasized in the 54 larger academic world. She gives several reasons, including the slow pace of change in prisons, the lack of flexibility and increased cost of obtaining equipment for technical job training programs. However, **in the** 19**90s, liberal arts** in a correctional setting **fell into disfavor, and** adult basic education and **vocational education programs reasserted their primacy** in the penal system (Wright, 2001). Vocational programs in prison included plumbing, carpentry, electrical wiring, painting, heating and air conditioning as well as computer literacy. In addition, the emphasis on job training spilled over into the **language arts and math** programs as they **were retooled to focus on technical** and applied **reading and writing** (Steuer, 2001). Between 1995 and 2000, **the percentage of state prisons offering college courses decreased** from 31% to 26% **while** those offering basic adult education increased from 76% to 80%. State prisons offering **vocational education increased** from 54% to 55% and in private prisons it increased from 25% to 44% in the same time period (Harlow, 2003). Several reasons are given for this change in addition to the dissolution of prisoner Pell Grants. One is the perceived threat liberal arts curricula pose to the penal institution. Wright (2001) states that “a **liberal arts** curriculum, **which** often **emphasizes critical thinking,** intellectual and **moral reasoning and development of an inmate’s sense of self may pose a challenge to the established order of a correctional facility**” (p. 13). In addition, **with Pell Grants gone, prison**er **education** programs **became** more **dependent** up**on outcome-based funding.** Performance-based management of these programs, like the parallel evolution in public schools, led to “school report cards” that evaluated the effectiveness of the programs in turning out their product (Linton, 2005). Curricula that can lend to empirical studies, such as testing in basic adult education, were given priority 55 over liberal arts, which seemingly has more nebulous outcomes. According to John Linton (2005) of the U.S. Department of Education‟s Correction Education division: “The current climate [requires] that expenditure of public funds be restricted to „scientifically proven‟ effective interventions” (p. 91). **Job training fits well to this regime because** the **results of the program could be measured empirically through** the **numbers** of the test group who are **able to obtain work.** In addition, recidivism rates could be obtained. Numerous studies have pointed to the inverse relationship between vocational technical programs and recidivism (Hall & Bannatyne, 2000; Mattuci & Johnson, 2003; Young & Mattuci, 2006, Gordon & Weldon, 2003). Empirical studies focusing strictly on recidivism as a measurement of achievement have not been without their faults. In his examination of the more recent works, Charles Ubah (2002) has found a tendency for the inmates to self-select into the programs. These participants were probably more motivated, as a whole, to succeed upon their release, than those who did not participate (Ubah, 2002). Ubah‟s findings bring up another important question: What about those who slip through the cracks in the empirical studies? An example may be found in Robert Mattuci‟s (2003) description of the vocational program that he set up in a New York state prison. It consisted of an eight session program to teach the students basic plumbing skills in order to increase their employment prospects upon release. Mattuci, who had a bachelor‟s degree in education and twenty years experience as a plumber, appeared to incorporate a well-thought out system of pedagogy. He relates that “many inmates have never known a positive schooling experience so they lack the needed confidence to succeed at learning something new. A key to the program is therefore validating their differences as 56 individuals and accommodating their multiple learning styles” (p. 16). Mattuci had them work in groups for all hands-on activities and encouraged group brainstorming and problem solving. Yet, despite the care in which the teacher took in order to facilitate a sense of community on the shop floor, there were a significant number of inmates who did not take to the class. “Especially for the younger inmates, gang activity is very evident. The dropout rate of the male youth in three of the groups was 90%. For those influenced by gangs, there is a total lack of respect for the process of setting goals and working toward them” (Mattuci & Johnson, 2003, p. 17). A conventional vocational program may not reach this group of inmates who, as dropouts of the program are more likely to return to prison. While recidivism is an important issue, it must be understood within context of the many variables that exist both within the inmates and, just as importantly, the conditions that exist once they are released. Barriers to post-release employment include lack of current job skills in a rapidly changing market, lack of available jobs in a tight market, the large hole in the employment history created by incarceration, and perhaps most significantly, the criminal record. With the rise of the information society, even jobs considered “menial,” require criminal background checks. The perceived and actual impediments to employment can decrease the seeker‟s motivation and self image (Pavis, 2002). Combined with conditions that facilitated a life of crime in the first place: poverty, discrimination, substance abuse, the deck is stacked against the average inmate. Conventional job training in itself is clearly not going to arm these people against the challenges of life on the outside. The attributes previously described that led some 57 prisons to reject liberal arts education; the “critical thinking, intellectual and moral reasoning” leading to a “sense of self,” must be cultivated (p. 1). **Friere** (2004), Giroux (2006) **and others have called for** a **pedagogy** that is **freed from** the bonds of **the “bottom-line**.**”** Mike Cole (2005) puts it succinctly, **calling for schools to become sites where “teachers,** other school workers **and** pupils/**students** not only **agitate for changes** within the classroom and within the institutional context of the school, but also support a transformation in the objective conditions in which students and their parents labor” (p. 16). In this vision, there is no room for docile workers. Schools would be transformed into emancipatory institutions where workers would not only be provided basic literacy, vocational skills and liberal arts, but would also learn to advocate for a better world. I explore this possibility further in Chapter 5.

Analysis of Congressional transcripts shows that in both houses of Congress the ban on Pell Grants was premised upon discursive framing of criminals as parasitic upon working-class Americans. **Yates 9** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

**In the** U.S. **House, the fight to deny Pell grants to prisoners was led by Bart Gordon** (D-TN). Gordon represents a district bordering Nashville that “embodies qualities of both the Old and New South” (Congressional Quarterly, 1993, p. 1424) with both rural and suburban areas. Gordon‟s voting record is moderately liberal with high ratings from the AFL-CIO‟s grading of votes on labor issues and low scores from the American Conservative Union. In the early 1990s, Gordon may have started feeling some of the pressure from the Republican electoral tide sweeping the South. In 1990 he easily won re-election with 67% of the vote compared with 29% for his Republican opponent. In 1992, the year before he pushed through legislation denying Pell grants for prisoners, Gordon won election by a considerably narrower margin of 57 to 41%, his lowest spread ever. That year Gordon sought publicity for his most precious cause: educational fraud. According to the Congressional Quarterly, removing access to Pell grants for “shoddy” trade schools became a mission for Gordon, one in which he gained a considerable amount of publicity. While in Congress, he personally went undercover as a prospective student in a sting operation involving vocational schools at part of an NBC News expose (Congressional Quarterly, 1993). Gordon‟s attempts to gain maximum exposure from his causes, combined with his increasingly precarious state as a Southern White Democrat, increase the possibility his embrace of anti-crime rhetoric was an attempt to re-position himself in the eyes of voters. Gordon tried several legislative tactics to deny prisoner Pell Grants, including attaching amendments to education bills (ultimately deleted). But it was in the 91 supercharged arena of the debate surrounding the Omnibus Crime Bill that Gordon met with success. Gordon spelled out his case for his legislation on the House floor: Let me remind Members that every time that a prisoner gets a Pell grant that means a traditional student does not get a Pell grant. Not only do they not get it, but since prisoners have no income, they are first in line. So nobody else gets a Pell grant until all of the prisoners, with no income, get what they want. (1992, p. H1893) Here the congressman attempts to push the inmate students to the margins of consideration for Pell grants by identifying inmate students solely within the term “prisoner,” not inmate student or men or women. Thus he de-personalizes those in prison as compared to “traditional students.” **Gordon** also **attempts to drive a wedge between Us and Them by suggesting that grants toward prisoner** **s**tudents somehow **result in denial of grants to those who are not inmates. Unlike some grants** and scholarships, **Pell Grants have never been competitive.** In addition, **Gordon** deftly **turns** the one aspect of prisoner existence that would seemingly draw a modicum of sympathy, **the prisoner’s poverty, into a drawback.** Their lack of income puts them “first in line.” The illocutionary effect of this rhetorical device would be to view incarcerated student’s lack of personal income as some kind of unfair advantage over free students. **In the world** being **constructed by Gordon, being sentenced to prison placed them in** a position of **privilege.** This position is enforced through another passage: Let me just relate to Members a true story that happened to me. It was about 4 or 5 weeks ago. A policeman in my hometown of Murfreesboro was talking to me about trying to help his son get some financial aid to go to school. We all know that policeman (sic) are not overly paid, but he made too much money to be able to get in any kind of a Pell grant program. Let me tell Members, that policeman's son could not get a Pell grant. But if he arrested someone for breaking into your house tonight and put them in jail, then they could get a Pell grant. That just does not seem to make much sense. (1992, p. H1893)92 The tale apparently involved a member of the police department who tells the congressman he needs financial help for his son to continue his education. There the “true story” ends. No elaboration. Did his son achieve the minimal grade requirements for entrance? What kind of school was he attempting to enter? Not all institutions offer Pell grants. Not all majors are Pell grant eligible, so what was his? Was it continuing education? Gordon admits the officer made too much money for his son to be eligible for Pell grants, although “we all know that policeman (sic) are not overly paid.” Compared to whom? This sets up a “common sense” understanding in which it is assumed that all officers are underpaid, no matter what their rank. In Gordon’s world, like everyone’s, the blank spaces are filled with implied understandings that are informed by shared values. However, unlike most people, he has an inordinate amount of influence in creating these values given his status. In Gordon’s world, prisoners, who are blessed with no possessions, are taking advantage of police officers. It is likely that street cops are underpaid, but the same may be said of most firemen, teachers and mechanics, all of whom the congressman may have spoken to and obtained “true stories.” Yet, Gordon for some reason chose this particular tale. It is possible he chose the narrative of the policeman to further re-enforce the binary between the Us and Them. What better way to further marginalize inmates than to set up a contrast with the upholder of societal virtue: the policeman. Further, by associating himself with the victims of the alleged scam perpetrated by the prisoners, **Gordon sets himself up as defending** the shared or **“common sense” values**; thus **establishing his** and his fellow elites‟ **hegemonic position as** the vox populi or 93 **spokesman for the people.** This would surely play well with the folks back home in Murfreesboro. Like a cascading of dominos, Gordon’s cohorts (from both political parties) appeared to key in to his strategy. When opponents to the Gordon amendment offered up substitute legislation to deny prisoner Pell grants only if and when research indicated they did not reduce recidivism, Jack Fields (R-TX), rose in unequivocal opposition: Mr. Chairman, today we have the opportunity, once and for all, to make incarcerated prisoners ineligible to receive Pell grants--the grant program designed to help low- and middle-income students meet the costs of attending college. We can do that by voting for the Gordon-Holden-Fields amendment to the crime bill. Today, incarcerated prisoners are applying for, and obtaining Pell grants. Every dollar in Pell grant funds obtained by prisoners means that fewer law-abiding students who need help in meeting their college costs are eligible for that assistance. It also means that lawabiding students who meet eligibility criteria receive smaller annual grants than they might otherwise obtain. Mr. Speaker, the Federal Government spends up to $100 million a year on education and training programs specifically targeted at prisoners--and that's more than enough, as far as I'm concerned. This amendment mandates that incarcerated prisoners be ineligible to receive Pell grants. Now. Period. No more studies, no more delays. It is a straightforward, simple amendment. If you oppose Pell grants for prisoners, you should vote for the Gordon-Holden-Fields amendment. We do not need any more studies. We need more higher education funds for our constituents' sons and daughters who are struggling to pay for their children's college expenses. Our constituents already pay to feed, house, clothe and rehabilitate prisoners. Their sons and daughters shouldn't have to do without so that incarcerated prisoners can use Pell grant funds to go to college. (1994, p. H2545) Using seemingly populist rhetoric, Fields attempts to set up a binary between the imprisoned and the free by implying prisoners are virtual freeloaders living off the largesse of the taxpayer. To emphasize their status, Fields states that they are not only prisoners, but “incarcerated prisoners,” [emphasis added] four times in his diatribe. Those who deserve Pell grants are “law-abiding,” “students” and “son and daughters,” although most prisoners who receive grants fall into [at least] two of those categories. 94 Fields, through his syntactic choices, drives a wedge between the students on the outside and those on the inside. **Chief sponsor** of prisoner Pell grants legislation **in the Senate was Kay** Bailey **Hutchison** (R-TX). At the time of the debates, she had just won a special election to replace Senator Lloyd Bentsen who had accepted a cabinet position in the Clinton Administration. In the special election she won against the Democratic candidate to the office by a decisive margin of 67% to 33%. Her support was widespread across Texas and included every region with the exception of the extremely low-income, largely Hispanic border counties. Hutchison is considered a “tried and true Texas conservative” who has “anti-regulatory and pro-entrepreneurial beliefs” (Congressional Quarterly, 1993, p. 1443). In her speech, she appears to take a cue from her Democratic counterpart in the House, Gordon, by hitting upon similar themes of pitting prisoner students against non-prisoner students: My amendment is aimed at stretching every possible dollar for those young people who stay out of trouble, study hard, and deserve a chance to further their education, fair to working Americans who pay their taxes and do without in order that their children will have advantages they never had: a better education, more opportunities, a better future. The American people are frustrated by a Federal Government and a Congress that cannot seem to get priorities straight. They are frustrated and angry by a Federal Government that sets rules that put convicts at the head of the line for college financial aid, crowding out law abiding citizens (1993, p. S15748). In this passage **she isolates inmate students to the margins of humanity by constructing a** counter punctual **lexicon between, on the one hand, “students,”** “people,” “children,” **“Americans” and “citizens” and on the other, “convicts.”** Most prisoners probably qualify to be considered people, children, and citizens, but the Senator chooses not to include them as such. Hutchison, like Gordon and Fields in the previous passages, 95 attempts to set herself up as a defender of the “working Americans’” interests by positioning herself as the spokesperson of that ubiquitous police officer whose child can‟t qualify for a Pell grant: “One police officer whose daughter couldn't quality for a Pell grant summed up his frustration when he said recently, `Maybe I should take my badge off and rob a store” (1993, p. S15748). In this telling of the “true story,” the child is a daughter, not a son. In addition, the father‟s frustration over not qualifying for the Pell grant has raised to the point that he is contemplating going over to the other side through a life of crime. The implication is that the unfairness of current prisoner Pell grant policy threatens the basic values of the nation, as epitomized by the police officer‟s moral quandary of whether he should turn to crime to finance his child‟s education. There is one point in the excerpt above where Hutchison attempts to bridge the space between the inmate students and the students on the outside, but the gap is crossed only at a point of conflict as the prisoners and non-prisoners metaphorically jockey for position to obtain financial aid. In her narrative she describes inmate students as “convicts” who go “to the head of the line for financial aid, crowding out law-abiding citizens.” This phrase “crowding out” conjures two images: one of a large mass of prisoners, in itself having the potential to raise anxiety in the listener. Crowding out is accomplished through physical touch. Hutchinson takes the scene further in another passage: “The Department of Education apparently is aware that as many as 100,000 youngsters are being elbowed aside by those behind bars” (1993, p. S15586). In this passage she clinches her argument with a rhetorical flourish as **she invokes the image of** “100,000 **youngsters**” who are **being “elbowed aside” by** the **undeserving convicts**, thus establishing the discursive link between education policy run amok and physical violence against its young victims. The similarities of **Gordon**‟s, Fields **and Hutchison’s rhetorical devices**, within their contributions to the debate over the legislation to limit Pell grants, **suggest** the possibility of **intentional use of** the same **rhetorical** devices and/or **myths.** The “true story” of the police officer who could not afford to send his child to college managed to spread from the Democratic to the Republican side of the aisle and even from the U.S. House building to the Senate building. All evoke images of hordes of convicts pushing helpless youngsters aside in their apparent bloodlust for a college education. The **repetitive use of these images**, both temporally and spatially, undoubtedly **had an effect on the undiscerning listener** and viewer through the establishment of a “common sense” worldview of Pell grant policy. In this view it is only fair that access be cut off because the effect would be to tip the scales of justice toward some semblance of balance, thus setting up a situation where everyone wins when Pell grants are cut off for prisoners. In the words of Senator Hutchison: “As I said at the outset, this is not fair. It is not fair to taxpayers. It is not fair to law-abiding citizens. It is not fair to the victims of crime. But we can set things right. We only need to make a choice. And for me, it is an easy choice” (1993, p. S15746). Hutchison presents a functionalist argument for cutting off prisoner Pell grants by framing it as a win-win situation. Fairness is the order of the day – for the law-abiding taxpayer and the crime victim by making the rational decision, the common sense “easy choice” to deny prisoners the Pell Grant.

The Pell Grants ban was not neutral but premised upon underlying political motives. Democrats needed to win more votes, so they jumped on the Republican “tough on crime” bandwagon. **Yates 9** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

**In the early** 19**90s,** media stories of an “epidemic” of violence greatly increased (Chiricos, Eschholz & Gertz, 2006). In the same period of time, there was a presidential election in which the **Democratic candidate**, **Bill Clinton**, **sought to seize the mantle of crime crusader away from his Republican opponent.** By advocating tough-on-crime measures in order to reposition the New Democrats in the eyes of voters, Clinton managed to keep the issue on the campaign agenda (Hohenburg, 1997). **Public concern over violence reached a fever**ish **pitch, fueled** in part **by the media**, including those widely considered “liberal.” Around the time of the crime bill debate Walter Cronkite hosted a four hour documentary on crime, Victory Over Violence, which advocated, among other measures, “guaranteed incarceration of serious offenders” (Kondracke, 1994, p. 1). According to Gallup, **by** 19**94, the year the** Omnibus Crime **Bill passed, violent crime had become Americans’ most pressing concern** (Gallup, 1994). **In this climate the fate of Pell grants for prisoners had been sealed.** The congressional debates leading up to the passage of the 1994 Crime Bill should be understood within the context of the concurrent political situation. After serving two years in office, President Bill **Clinton’s Democratic majorities** in the House and the Senate **were facing midterm elections.** Traditionally, the party in power loses seats during midterm. Compounding this potential problem for the Democrats was President Clinton’s drop in popularity in the polls, apparently aggravated by his party’s inability to pass a promised healthcare reform bill (Hohenburg, 1997 p.15). **Nipping at Clinton’s heals was a newly energized Republican Party led by** an insurgent Newt **Gingrich**, pushing a platform of radical reform that would later be known as the Contract With America. The Republican manifesto included, among other provisions, a call for increases in military spending, deregulation, and welfare reform. In addition, the platform “embodies the Republican approach to fighting crime: making punishments severe enough to deter criminals from committing crimes” (p.38) by calling for mandatory sentences, reduction of habeas corpus appeals and increased prison construction (Gillespie, 1994). During the years leading to the midterm election the **Republicans were running hard on** their traditional platform strengths; chief among them was **the tough-on-crime issue.** Pushed by the Right, the Democratic Congress was acutely aware of the scrutiny they were under in their precarious position as the dominant party. The **pressure on** the 103rd **Congress was intensified by** the presence of **C-SPAN** cameras in the congressional chambers. The Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network (C87 SPAN) began broadcasting Congressional debates in 1979, but it was several years before cable became de jour in American homes. **By the** 19**90s,** the decade of the debates over the Omnibus Crime Bill, **most Americans had** a window into the lives of their elected officials to Congress. Over 70 million households had **C-SPAN access.** Politicians were acutely aware of this new medium and its potential as a gateway to hegemony. A young Newt Gingrich, whose eventual rise to the position of House Speaker has been attributed to his masterful use of chambers cameras, told a reporter: “Conflict equals exposure equals power” (Congressional Quarterly, 2008, p. 6). It is important to understand that the representatives were talking to more than just each other when they debated. In the course of the 1994 Crime Bill‟s intense debates some congressmen noted the gaze of the cameras; including one who acknowledged “the 1.5 million folks watching” the proceedings (Dornan, 1994, p.H2628). Independent observers suggest **the presence of the media had an effect on the politician’s behavior**. Columnist George Will (1994), in an editorial for the Washington Post suggested that, in addition to concerns over the economic costs, “In withdrawing Pell grants from prisoners the Senate may have been grandstanding and chest-thumping” (p. S1276).

The original focus of Pell Grants for prisoners was to equalize the playing field for marginalized populations. Claiborne Pell’s testimony proves. **Yates 9** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

Opponents of inmates receiving Pell Grants for college courses had tried for several years before 1994 to delete authorization. They were, as illustrated above, an ideologically disparate group. Prisoner Pell Grant supporters appeared to have more ideological cohesion while representing two factions within the Democratic Party: The Congressional Black Caucus and the White, Northeastern liberals, such as Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI). As previously related, the **opposition to prisoner Pell Grants relied** primarily **on** a tactic of negative-other presentation with **an attempt to marginalize prisoners outside of “normal” Americans.** There were a few attempts by Pell Grant supporters to counter this narrative through a similar construct. Claiborne Pell (D-RI), in Senate debate, cited an editorial from the Washington Post that was in support of Pell Grants for prisoners. In the course of the article was the following passage: America's wardens and parole officers know what few in the Senate and House are willing to acknowledge in the crime bill debate: The more education inmates receive while in prison, the less likely it is they will commit crimes on release. Recidivism rates, which range between 60 and 70 percent in most states, are cut by as much as 80 percent among men and women who completed high school or college courses while in prison. Education equals prevention. Diplomas are crime stoppers. As Congress finishes work on what is expected to be a $22 billion crime bill, no increased funding for education programs is in the legislation. It's the other way. **The Senate backed an amendment--sponsored by Kay** Bailey **Hutchison** (R-Texas), **who is currently under felony indictment** for political abuses--**to deny prisoners** college courses under **Pell grants.** (1994, p. S1275) The felony indictment mentioned in this passage was apparently a reference to allegations made against Hutchison for breaking election law during her recent election in which she allegedly tampered with state records regarding her use of state resources for 98 campaign purposes (Congressional Quarterly, 1993). **By mentioning these charges** against Hutchison, **Senator Pell may have been attempting to de-center her categorization of lawbreakers as outside society.** Senator Pell, by blurring the space between Hutchinson and prisoners problematizes her argument. Dislocations such as this, which lay manifest within the “real” world of the courtroom, may have been helpful in countering Hutchison’s attempts to construct a marginalized group in the eyes and ears of both the fellow Senators and the gaze of C-SPAN’s audience. However, other than the mention of Hutchinson‟s legal difficulties through the voice of the Post editorial, neither Senator Pell nor any other of the prisoner grant-supporting Senators mention the indictment in their own voices. There are a couple of possible reasons for Senator Pell’s circumreferential manner of introducing Hutchison‟s legal status. One may lie within the lived culture of the United States Senate, the other within the life of Senator Claiborne Pell. I will examine both. The social language of the Senate tends to be less partisan and more deliberative than in the House Chamber. In their study of congressional debate over welfare reform of the same time period as the Omnibus Crime Bill legislation, Mucciaroni and Quirk (2006) found that the Senators speak for much longer periods of time than in the House, and they appeared to display more “historical knowledge.” The “Senate debate was also less partisan and ideological in tone, with virtually none of the mutual disparagement and distrust of the other side that was frequent in the House” (p. 91). This study indicates why there tends to be fewer of the rhetorical “bomb throwers” in the Senate than in the House. A Newt Gingrich would be less likely to advance in the “gentleman’s chamber” of the Senate due to his violation of the existent social language. Mucciaroni and Quirk suggest there are several structural reasons why the differences in rhetorical style exist. One is the size of the bodies with 100 Senators and 435 House members. This has an effect on debate style. Senators have more time to make their case, allowing for reasoned, thought-out argument without having to resort to clipped sound bites. In addition, Senators are up for re-election every six years instead of two. As a result, their speech is colored less by appeals to constituents for re-election than the House. Senate members also represent, for the most part, larger populations, which tend to display greater ideological diversity. I would add to the researchers‟ conclusions by suggesting that the relative size of the Senate, as well as the increased term lengths, probably breed greater interaction on both spatial and temporal planes, as the legislators spend more time together in a smaller social body. This is likely to potentiate collegial relationships, even across boundaries of party and ideology. Finally, the presence of the filibuster, a mechanism not found in House rules, reduces partisanship because legislation that is utterly abhorrent to the other side can be waylaid. This increases the likelihood Senators will reach out to members of the opposing party to co-sponsor legislation. For these reasons, **personal attacks tend to be rare in Senate debate. So why did Senator Pell**, a Senator described as “unfailingly gracious,” break the chamber’s social rules by **draw**ing **attention to Hutchinson’s felony indictment? Reasons may be found in the passion** Senator **Pell felt toward** maintaining the Pell grant’s founding mission: To help **society’s most marginalized** members gain access to college education. This was a mission that he played a key role in originating. Senator Claiborne Pell came from a long line of wealthy power brokers, whose father was a member of Congress. The Princeton-educated Pell took an early interest in helping 100 the oppressed. In 1940, at the age of 22, **he was one of the few U.S. non-Jews** at the time **who tried to help Jews in German-occupied Europe. He was twice arrested by the Nazis while trying to free concentration camp inmates.** Pell was first elected to the U.S. Senate in 1960. By 1993 he was one of the most senior members, having been re-elected six times. Highly popular in his home state, he rarely received less than 60 % of the vote in an election. Having received a score averaging in the 90s by the AFL-CIO rating system and in the 20s from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, his popularity in his New England home state may have been buttressed by Senator Pell’s liberal voting record. His stature in the Senate was elevated by his position as chair of the Foreign Relations Committee where he was a staunch opponent of Ronald Reagan’s intervention in Central America (Congressional Quarterly, 1993). He also took the lead role in drafting legislation to create the National Endowment for the Arts and the Amtrak railway system. However, it was his efforts in the area of equal access to college education that the Senator gained his lasting claim to fame. In his first few years in office, **Senator Pell quickly became one of the primary advocates for equal** opportunity in higher **education** by initiating a comprehensive study on the issue. In part due to the findings, legislation was passed establishing the Basic Educational Opportunity Grant (BEOG), the means-based program for providing financial aid for low-income college students. In the years since, Senator Pell was a tireless opponent of efforts to water down the program. Tens of millions of students have received support from BEOG. In the 1980s, **in recognition of his efforts, the Senate redesignated the program as the Pell Grant.** The Senator was later asked how exactly the 101 name change came about and the always jovial legislator replied that it was “because there was no Senator Beog!” (Honan, January 2, 2009). It was possible that **Senator Pell took the socially risky step of calling Hutchison out** in denying Pell Grants to felons, saying she was under felony indictment **because he saw funding denial as an**other **assault on a program he had carefully nurtured for over 30 years.** Attempts were made to whittle down funding by narrowing income requirements for all students. In the couple of years before this debate, felons who had served time were restricted from Pell Grant access. The year before, in a compromise with prisoner Pell Grant opponents, inmate students who were either on death row or serving life sentences were denied access. Senator Pell, perhaps sensing that his program was suffering a “death by a thousand cuts,” took the uncharacteristic step of challenging Hutchison on a personal level.

## Theory Frontlines

## Omitted.

## Deontology Link

Omitted.

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2. Slavoj Zizek and Glyn Daly, Conversations with Zizek, 2004 page 14-16 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Trent H. Hamann is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at St. John's University. “Neoliberalism, governmentality, and ethics,” Foucault Studies, No 6, 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
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