# Butler Neg

## \*\*\*1NC\*\*\*

#### I value morality.

#### Ethics arise from the interaction between the self and an ethical community. Identity functions as fluid because it is constantly in relation to something else.

White (Stephen K [James Hart Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia] “As the World Turns: Ontology and Politics in Judith Butler” Polity, 1999)

Weak ontologies emerge from the conjunction of two insights: acceptance of the idea that a ll fundamental conceptualizations of self, other and world are contestable, and awareness that such conceptualizations are nevertheless unavoidable for any sort of reflective ethical and political life. The latter insight demands from us the affirmative activity of constructing foundations, the former prevents us from carrying out this task in a traditional fashion. One of the hallmarks of weak ontology is resistance to portraits of human being and world that assume a "disengaged self."4 Weak ontologies articulate a "stickier" conception of subjectivity. What exactly this amounts to varies among weak ontologists, but they all share certain distinctive common qualities. Weak ontologies do not proceed by categorical positings of, say, human nature or telos, accompanied by a crystalline conviction of the truth of that positing. Rather, they offer figurations of human being in terms of certain existential realities, most notably language, mortality or finitude, natality and the articulation of "sources of the self."5 These figurations are accounts of what it is to be a certain sort of creature: one entangled with language; conscious that it will die; possessing, despite its entanglement and limitedness, the capacity for radical novelty; and, finally, giving definition to itself against some ultimate background or "source" that evokes awe, wonder, or reverence. This sense of an unavoidable background is misconstrued when grasped either as something with a truth that reveals itself to us in an unmediated way or as something that is simply a matter of radical choice.

#### This has two implications:

#### 1. Ethical theories must account for this conception of human identity.

#### 2. It takes out the AC framework because they assume we have a static moral agent but our ethical theories have to change based on the culture and social background they exist in.

#### So, the standard is giving account of oneself which means promoting the conditions that force the expression of identity against this social background.

#### This is the only standard that accounts for the source of ethical questions.

Butler 1 (Judith [Maxine Elliot Prof of Rhetoric at Berkley] “Giving and Account of Oneself” University Press, 2005)

The ‘‘I’’ does not stand apart from the prevailing matrix of ethical norms and conflicting moral frameworks. In an important sense, this matrix is also the condition for the emergence of the ‘‘I,’’ even though the ‘‘I’’ is not causally induced by those norms. We cannot conclude that the ‘‘I’’ is simply the effect or the instrument of some prior ethos or some field of conflicting or discontinuous norms. When the ‘‘I’’ seeks to give an account of itself, it can start with itself, but it will find that this self is already implicated in a social temporality that exceeds its own capacities for narration; indeed, when the ‘‘I’’ seeks to give an account of itself, an account that must include the conditions of its own emergence, it must, as a matter of necessity, become a social theorist. The reason for this is that the ‘‘I’’ has no story of its own that is not also the story of a relation—or set of relations—to a set of norms. Although many contemporary critics worry that this means there is no concept of the subject that can serve as the ground for moral agency and moral accountability, that conclusion does not follow. The ‘‘I’’ is always to some extent dispossessed by the social conditions of its emergence.3 This dispossession does not mean that we have lost the subjective ground for ethics. On the contrary, it may well be the condition for moral inquiry, the condition under which morality itself emerges. If the ‘‘I’’ is not at one with moral norms, this means only that the subject must deliberate upon these norms, and that part of deliberation will entail a critical understanding of their social genesis and meaning. In this sense, ethical deliberation is bound up with the operation of critique. And critique finds that it cannot go forward without a consideration of how the deliberating subject comes into being and how a deliberating subject might actually live or appropriate a set of norms. Not only does ethics find itself embroiled in the task of social theory, but social theory, if it is to yield nonviolent results, must find a living place for this ‘‘I.’’

#### And, I preclude the AC because even if their ethical theory is true, it is only relevant to the social context that establishes moral agency. So the ability to express moral agency is a prior concern to their ethic.

#### I contend retribution better gives account of oneself than rehabilitation.

#### Punishment forces us to question our causal agency within society. We aren’t just passive actors – when we cause suffering or crime, punishment makes us be accountable for that. This forces criminals to give an account of themselves.

Butler 2 explains Nietzsche’s argument (Judith [Maxine Elliot Prof of Rhetoric at Berkley] “Giving and Account of Oneself” University Press, 2005)

In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche offers a controversial account of how we become reflective at all about our actions and how we become positioned to give an account of what we have done. He remarks that we become conscious of ourselves only after certain injuries have been inflicted. Someone suffers as a consequence, and the suffering person or, rather, someone acting as his or her advocate in a system of justice seeks to find the cause of that suffering and asks us whether we might be that cause. It is in the interest of meting out a just punishment to the one responsible for an injurious action that the question is posed and that the subject in question comes to question him or herself. ‘‘Punishment,’’ Nietzsche tells us, is ‘‘the making of a memory.’’4 The question posits the self as a causative force, and it also models a specific mode of responsibility. In asking whether we caused such suffering, we are being asked by an established authority not only to avow a causal link between our own actions and the suffering that follows but also to take responsibility for these actions and their effects. In this context, we find ourselves in the position of having to give an account of ourselves. We start to give an account only because we are interpellated as beings who are rendered accountable by a system of justice and punishment. This system is not there from the start, but becomes instituted over time and at great cost to the human instincts. Nietz-sche writes that, under these conditions, people ‘‘felt unable to cope with the simplest undertakings; in this new world they no longer possessed their former guides, their regulating, unconscious, and infallible drives: they were reduced to thinking, inferring, reckoning, co-ordinating cause and effect, these unfortunate creatures; they were reduced to their ‘consciousness,’ their weakest and most fallible organ!’’ (GM, 84). So I start to give an account, if Nietzsche is right, because someone has asked me to, and that someone has power delegated from an established system of justice. I have been addressed, even perhaps had an act attributed to me, and a certain threat of punishment backs up this interrogation. And so, in fearful response, I offer myself as an ‘‘I’’ and try to reconstruct my deeds, showing that the deed attributed to me was or was not, in fact, among them. I am either owning up to myself as the cause of such an action, qualifying my causative contribution, or defending myself against the attribution, perhaps locating the cause elsewhere. These are the parameters within which my account of myself takes place. For Nietzsche, accountability follows only upon an accusation or, minimally, an allegation, one made by someone in a position to deal out punishment if causality can be established. And we become reflective upon ourselves, accordingly, through fear and terror. Indeed, we become morally accountable as a consequence of fear and terror.

#### All the framework says is that when I make claims about moral agency, that agency doesn’t exist outside of relations to other people. These relations, though, come into conflict, for example, obama and Boehner would probably have different ideas of what to do with rehab and retribution, which means we ought to reflect on that role in social relations i.e give an account of ourselves.

## \*\*\*Frontlines\*\*\*

#### A2 Rehab makes us accountable:

1. Not true – rehab is a cop out. Instead of being forced to suffer because of our actions criminals get to take classes and treated as sick. This means they aren’t treated as casual actors, which Butler says, is uniquely key.

2. That’s not comparative - even if there is some self-reflection the fact that there is no punishment means the fear and terror my evidence talks about is eliminated. Fear is necessary because it is the only way to back up the interrogation present to the criminal so I outweigh.

3. They are missing the point. It’s not just about being accountable. Retribution has a unique ability to make the criminals take on an active identity – they have to admit they committed the crime not that they are sick or something else, otherwise it’s not a legitimate account of themselves.

#### A2 Collapses to util:

1. Not true – my evidence is really specfic to the narrative levels of existence – each individual has a different story and identity so aggregation doesn’t make sense.

2. Util prioritizes things like happiness and maximizing some good – my argument isn’t that we maximize giving account of one, only that the conditions are in place to do so.

3. Even if they’re right the NC contextualizes what the good we want to maximize is. This means if it’s ends based it still doesn’t devolve into net benefits but rather prioritizes giving account of oneself as the impact.

#### A2 Kantian contention (Add on)

And this straight turns the AC because the only way we treat people as an end is if we allow them to establish that identity in the first place. This means I control the internal link to the framework and through retribution solidify the person as something important in and of itself.