Raz[[1]](#footnote-1) defines moral permissibility as “**not the case that [one] ought to refrain from it.”**

Thus moral permissibility denotes a state of affairs that isn’t prohibited, and the absence of a normative prohibition generates the conditions of moral permissibility. Thus, the sufficient aff burden is to prove that a deadly response is not prohibited.

Prefer my interp:

A) Due to the law of the excluded middle, either moral permissibility or impermissibility is true. Things can either be A or not A. Thus, disproving a prohibition on the resolutional action proves that the resolution is morally permissible, and, neg ground is to prove a prohibition.

B) Proving there is no moral prohibition is impossible since negative existentials can’t be proven true. It is unreasonable to force the aff to prove that there are no ethical theories that prohibit action because that requires the impossible burden of answering every possible ethical theory. Rather, the burden of proof is set on the claim-maker.

C) Morally permissible is the converse of the word “impermissible,” which is synonymous with prohibited, so my interp is most linguistically accurate.

D) Even if a system of morals is necessary to call something morally permissible, that view forces the resolution into the conditional: ‘If a moral system exists, then a deadly response is morally permissible.’ Skep denies the antecedent and according to conditional logic if a statement has a false antecedent then the consequent resolution is true.

E) If moral systems don’t assign a moral status to some actions they are an incomplete guide to action. Understanding permissibility and prohibition such that all actions are either permissible or prohibited evades this problem.

F) Raz is the most predictable definition on the topic since people ran it at camp, on the targeted killing topic, and on this one. There is *no* theoretical excuse for not granting the aff this interp since the neg should have predicted it and come up with a responsive strat.

G) Raz is a summary article of conceptions of permissibility; it doesn’t advance a particular theory, and is thus the most universalizable definition of permissibility we can use. Raz doesn’t have a stake in the game, so my interp is the most impartial and reasonably considered.

And, if my interp is logically sound don’t evaluate T: A) if fairness precedes logic then we could just flip a coin to choose interps. B) Debate is an educational activity and must be unconditionally constrained by the principle that debaters should learn and experiment intellectually with different arguments. If their theory silences arguments that they have functionally conceded to be valid and true, then accepting their interp sets the precedent that uncovering truth is unimportant. As an educator it is your role to reject such argumentation.

I contend that moral prohibitions can’t exist.

A) It’s impossible for a moral subject to reason to universal conclusions about other human beings because that would require them to reason from the perspective of humanity as a whole which is impossible because it demands that we think from an unthinkable gods-eye perspective. Thus, universal rules about action are senseless.

B) Language can’t grasp prohibitory judgments since it equivocates the general term morally prohibited with the specific situational reasons why particular cases are morally prohibited. Since the general term equates different situations, it is fallacious.

C) Even if objective norms exist, it is ultimately up to the ethical subject to determine whether to act on them. Only a subjective “I” can make a judgment about good or bad, so it is impossible to say an action is prohibited. A person can always change their mind.

D) Our experience of another person, no matter how well we know them, can’t be so complete as to have a logical right to a total evaluation of them, because we cannot *know* from their perspective, and thus cannot with complete certainty predict how they will evaluate a moral dilemma. Also, we can’t physically check with each of the seven billion people to see if they concur with the prohibition. Thus, intersubjective prohibitions are impossible.

E) If morality can be fulfilled by following rules like prohibitions, then humanity is an incidental and unnecessary component of the ethical calculus, making morality self-defeating as it doesn’t respect man’s role as the source and subject of ethics.

F) If the good consists in the coincidence of the will with the moral law, the perfect subject would be an angel who is completely aligned with the law. To conform with the law the subject must alienate her will from itself; instead of the subject being the ‘hero’ of her act in realizing her will, the subject must act to realize the law. This suppresses the free will and unique evaluative drive that make them ethical subjects in the first place, making prohibitions unethical.

G) Any account of morality that asserts that things are objectively valuable independent of subjective determinations is regressive since it predicates one universal rule on the existence of another moral rule. Since every human chain of reasoning must be finite according to our finite nature, such a reasoning process must terminate in a rule for which no reason can be given. Thus, universal prohibitions are groundless.

H) Moral drives can be explained via evolution since human beings evolved to be altruistic since cooperation led to the benefit of the community. However as per Occam’s razor, this means that the simplest possible explanation of morality doesn’t involve external moral truths at all, and prohibitions, while they may be beneficial, aren’t *true.* Second, moral prohibitions aren’t logically sound since they commit the naturalistic fallacy and equivocate what *is*, namely our natural activities, with what ought to be.

Next is underviews:

**First,** put your discourse arguments away:

One, if the AC is really ethically disgusting, then they should have no problems beating the framework. Force them to engage with the AC.

Two, while the AC does endorse its construction of values, my advocacy does not “act the action” of the resolution: nobody in the room is killing a domestic abuser. The AC is just a bit of sophistry.

Three, using the suffering of others to directly access the ballot trivializes their suffering. If they actually care about other people’s misery they should concede the round and have an open discussion about it. If they don’t they’re just confirming that winning the game is the most important thing.

Four, an adversarial debate round is the wrong forum for micropolitical discussion, because if they go for micropol they will alienate one of the three people directly involved in the discussion, namely me.

Five, per my AC so called bad actions would not be labeled moral, morality would just not take a stance on the value of those issues.

**Second,** to beat the aff the neg must answer the specific warrants for the standard and contention since the section tags are just linguistic placeholders for their warrants. Moreover, general, nonresponsive dumps on the AC are horrible for clash since they don’t engage my specific arguments.

**Third,** the neg has turn ground on either part of the AC syllogism as well as discursive turn ground, so the AC isn’t unfair in terms of ground division. Also, I have to win framework and offense to win, so there is no 2-1 skew.

**Fourth,** the aff arguments function as defense to possible neg offense; like any string of defensive responses, if they drop a logical take out to their argument they lose that argument. The burden to answer the AC’s arguments isn’t structurally necessary but insufficient to win their NC any more than any pre-emptive argument is.

**Fifth,** presume aff: A) affirming is harder because of the time-skewed AR, so if there is no offense and the round is in equilibrium the aff has compensated for disadvantages and done the better debating. B) Presuming impermissibility paralyzes action because agents would have to reflect on the moral qualities of the most trivial of actions. The only operable system of morality must hold that all actions are morally permissible until prohibited, and you presume aff.

**Sixth,** the aff is sufficient since all arguments link to the necessary and sufficient standards of permissibility, the text of the resolution, and the concept of truth.

**Seventh,** skep is key framework ground since it both directly answers the resolutional question and is an enormous part of philosophical literature. Framework ground is key to education because philosophy is a type of knowledge unique to debate, and fairness is only instrumental to education since A) If we had a fair game but no education happened, then there would be no reason for it to exist. B) Fairness functions to provide a competitive incentive to learn more, which allows you to perform better in debate, and C) People create rules for debate to make the game more accessible for new debaters so they can get an educational benefit from the activity, but if I’m being educational the benefit is irrelevant.

**Eighth**, if the aff is abusive, the neg can run an equally abusive case, which compensates for reciprocity 100%, and forces more thoughtful framework clash making this interp educational as well. And, I’ll let the neg do whatever they want, abuse-wise, so don’t complain.

**Ninth**, skepticism takes out theory because a) my arguments prove fairness is an empty concept and therefore can’t ground our acceptance or rejection of practices and b) skepticism appeals to truth, and truth is a constraint on all arguments including theory. Moreover, it would be intellectually disingenuous for you as an educator to exclude arguments you view as true.

**Tenth,** fairness is not a voter:

1) Theory is more unfair than my abuse because to debate theory you have to pay thousands of dollars to go to camp and learn about these arguments. This makes debate more exclusionary because it builds a structural disadvantage into the activity, which will always outweigh the specific and singular abuse story articulate in their shell.

2) Theory is problematic from a resolvability standpoint. Given that theory can be initiated in the 1AR, it necessarily involves intervention if the neg decides to go for an RVI in the 2NR since the neg cannot possibly preempt every argument the 2AR could bring up. Thus, linear evaluation of theory debates is impossible.

3) It’s impossible to objectively determine which practices are unfair. The level of disagreement regarding appropriate practices in debate invites judge intervention, which means you should prefer objective means of making a decision like the case debate.

5) The text of the resolution, rather than a division of ground, is the most predictable. The resolution is the only mutual basis for preparation. Disregard all theory because theory is premised on the notion that the debate can address issues of ground rather than the text.

6) Reject theory because they always have an incentive to claim that they are being abused insofar as judges will vote for it, so you can never delineate real abuse from crying wolf. The impact is that you don’t know if the theory shell is genuine.

And if morality exists affirm since everyone thinks domestic violence is bad.

7) Theory is terrible for debate because there are a limited set of conceivable standards for fairness and education, and since becoming proficient at weighing all of them makes it *much* easier to win rounds, theory proactively justifies constraining debaters’ intellectual horizons.

1. Joseph Raz. Permissions and Supererogation. American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Apr., 1975) pp. 161-168 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)